Ward Churchill, Jim Vander Wall - The COINTELPRO Papers - Documents From The FBI's Secret Wars Against Domestic Dissent-South End Press (1990)

The COINTELPRO Papers
Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars

Against Domestic Dissent
by
Ward Churchill and
Jim Vander Wall
Foreword by John Trudell

Preface by Brian Glick
South End Press Boston, MA

Copyright 1990 © by Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall
Copyrights are required for book production in the United States. However,
in our case, it is a disliked necessity. Thus, any properly footnoted quotation of up
to 500 sequential words may be used without permission so long as the total number
of words quoted does not exceed 2,000. For longer quotations or for a greater number
of total words, authors should write to South End Press for permission.
Edited by the South End Press collective.

Design and layout by Saxifrage Publications Group.
Cover by Ty de Pass
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Churchill, Ward
The COINTELPRO Papers: documents from the FBI's secret wars against
domestic dissent / by Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall; foreword by John
Trudell; preface by Brian Glick.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-89608-360-8: $40.00 - ISBN 0-89608-359-4 (pbk.): $16.00
1. United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation - Archives. 2.Political
Crimes and offenses - United States - History - 20th century - Sources. 3. Political
persecution - United States - History - 20th century - Sources. 4. Criminal
investigation-United States - History - 20th century - Sources. I. Vander Wall, Jim.
II. Title.
HV8144.F43C48 1990 90-40185
363.2'32 - dc20 CIP
South End Press/ 116 Saint Botolph St./Boston, MA 02115

99 98 97 96 95 94 23456789
Table of Contents
Dedication vi
Acknowledgments vii
About the Authors viii
Foreword by John Trudell ix
Preface by Brian Glick x
Guide to the Documents by Chip Berlet and Brian Glick xvii
Introduction:
A Glimpse Into the Files of America's Secret Police 1
1. Understanding Deletions in FBI Documents 23
2. COINTELPRO - CP, USA 33
3. COINTELPRO - SWP 49
4. COINTELPRO - Puerto Rican Independence Movement 63
5. COINTELPRO - Black Liberation Movement 91
6. COINTELPRO - New Left 165
7. COINTELPRO - AIM 231
8. Conclusion: COINTELPRO Lives On 303
Organizational Contacts 328

Notes 331
Bibliography 420
Index 439
Dedication
For Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, two brothers who paid COINTELPRO's
ultimate penalty during the pre-dawn hours of December 4, 1969.
vi
Acknowldgements
We would like to thank the following individuals without whose various

contributions this book would not have been possible: Mike Albert, Maria del Pilar
Arguellas, Chip Berlet, Maria Theresa Blanco, Kathy Boudin, Cindy Bowden,
Paulette D'Auteuil-Robideau, Dan Debo, Vine Deloria, Jr., Bill Dunne, Bruce Ellison,
Roger Finzel, Carmen Gautier, Sue Gegner, Larry Giddings, Mery Glass, Jr., Brian
Glick, Lew Gurwitz, Jeff Haas, Candy Hamilton, Stuart Hanlon, Todd Jailer, M.
Annette Jaimes, Bill Kunstler, Winona LaDuke, Tim Lange, Ken Lawrence, Larry
Leaventhal, Jonathan Lubell, Peter Matthiessen, Russ Means, Nick Meinhart, Maria
Merrill Ramirez, Jim Messerschmidt, Glenn Morris, Ahmed Obafemi, Sheila
O'Donnell, Mary O'Melveny, Roz Payne, Geronimo Ji Jaga Pratt, Ellen Ray, Bob
Robideau, Ricardo Romero, Susan Rosenberg, Lydia Sargent, Bill Schaap, Paul
Scribner, Afeni Shakur, Standing Deer, Dan Stern, Jan Susler, Flint Taylor, John
Thorne, Jennie Vander Wall, Bill Vornberger and Louis Wolf.
Certain of the documents reproduced herein have previously appeared in
Harry Blackstock's COINTELPRO: The FBI's Secret War on Political Freedom (Path-
finder Press, 1987), Christy Macy's and Susan Kaplan's Documents (Penguin, 1980),
Edith Tiger's In Re Alger Hiss (Hill and Wang, 1979) and Flint Taylor's and Margaret
Vanhouten's Counterintelligence: A Documentary Look at America's Secret Police (Na-
tional Lawyers Guild Task Force on Counterintelligence and the Secret Police, 1978).
Portions of the material published herein have been published elsewhere by the
authors in other forms. We would therefore like to express our gratitude to
AkwesasneNotes , Covert Action Information Bulletin, The Other Side, Propaganda Review,
Rolling Stock and Zeta Magazine for their various assistance and permission to
reprint.
In terms of editing, technical assistance and general support we'd like to
thank the entire South End Press Collective - Cynthia Peters, Steve Chase and Greg
Bates in particular - as well as editor friends such as S.K. Levin and Bob Sipe. The
Center for Studies of Ethnicity and Race in America at the University of Colorado/
Boulder provided certain material assistance, as did the Educational Development
Program at the same institution, and the Fourth World Center for Study of Indige-
nous Law and Politics at the University of Colorado/Denver. Thanks is also due the
Saxifrage Publications Group (Boulder) for use of layout facilities. Finally, we would
like to express our gratitude to the National Lawyers Guild Anti-Repression Project
for its solidarity and financial support.
The book could never have been completed without the input and guidance
of all of the above. Errors, factual or interpretive, however, remain solely the respon-
sibility of the authors.
vii
About the Authors
Ward Churchill (Creek/Cherokee Metis) is co-director, with Glenn Morris,
of the Colorado Chapter of the American Indian Movement and coordinator of
American Indian Studies with the Center for Studies of Ethnicity and Race in
America at the University of Colorado/Boulder. He has served as a delegate of the
International Indian Treaty Council to the United Nations Working Group on
Indigenous Populations and the Inter-American Indian Congress, as well as to the
nations of Libya and Cuba. His previous books include Marxism and Native Ameri-
cans (1983), Culture versus Economism: Essays on Marxism in the Multicultural Arena
(1984), and Critical Issues in Native North America (1989). He is also a regular
columnist for Zeta Magazine and editor of New Studies on the Left.
Jim Vander Wall has been an active supporter of the struggles of Native
Peoples for sovereignty since 1974 and has written several articles on FBI counter-
intelligence operations. He is co-author, with Ward Churchill, of Agents of Repres-
sion: The FBI's Secret Wars on the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement
(1988) and an editor of New Studies on the Left.
Brian Glick is an activist/attorney who has long been involved in the

defense of those - notably Geronimo Ji Jaga Pratt - targeted for neutralization by
federal counterintelligence operations. He is coauthor of The Bust Book (1969) andThe
Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual (1984), and author of War at Home: Covert Action Against
U.S. Activists and What We Can Do About It (1989).
Chip Berlet is a long-time researcher on the workings of America's police
state. Editor of a periodical, The Public Eye, devoted to exposing secret police and
intelligence activities, he has also been a frequent contributor to journals like
Counterspy and Covert Action Information Bulletin. He is presently associated with the
National Lawyers Guild Anti-Repression Project.
John Trudell (Santee Dakota) was national chairman of the American

Indian Movement from 1974-79, when the position was dissolved. On February 12
of the latter year, his entire family - his wife Tina, children Ricarda Star (age five),
Sunshine Karma (age three) and Eli Changing Sun (age one), as well as his mother-
in-law, Leah Hicks Manning - were murdered on the Duck Valley Paiute Reserva-
tion in Utah as part of a government anti-AIM counterintelligence operation. An
accomplished poet, Trudell has authored a book of verse, Living in Reality (1982),
and has recorded several tapes of his poetry with musical accompaniment. These
include Tribal Voice (with Tribal Voice, 1983), 1.T.ILE.D. (with Kiowa guitarist Jesse
Edwin Davis, 1985), A.K.A. Graffitti Man (with the Graffitti Band, 1986), Heart Jump
Bouquet (with the Graffitti Band, 1987) and But This Isn't El Salvador (with the Grafitti
Band and Tribal Voice, 1987).
viii
Foreword
Living in Reality
...Living in Reality
we are targets
of your unwariness
With Warriors for targets
You Create
Your own destruction
This is how we
bring you down
target by target
You wound yourself
Using your greed
WE watch
Your spirit fade
Living in Reality
We can endure
Your cages
Your bullets
Your lies
Your confusion
We know
You have destroyed
Your Peace
Living in Reality
You only exist.
- John Trudell
(Poem Fragment)
ix
Intro duction
Gee, but I'd like to be a G-Man
And go Bang! Bang! Bang! Bang!
Just like Dick Tracy, what a "he-man"
And go Bang! Bang! Bang! Bang!
I'd do as I please, act high-handed and regal
'Cause when you're a G-Man there's nothing illegal.
- Harold Rome -
from "The G-Man Song"
1937
Preface
The Face of COINTELPRO

Regardless of the unattractiveness or noisy militancy of some private
citizens or organizations, the Constitution does not permit federal inter-
ference with their activities except through the criminal justice system,
armed with its ancient safeguards. There are no exceptions. No federal
agency, the CIA, the IRS, or the FBI, can be at the same time policeman,
prosecutor, judge and jury. That is what constitutionally guaranteed due
process is all about. It may sometimes be disorderly and unsatisfactory to
some, but it is the essence of freedom...I suggest that the philosophy
supporting COINTELPRO is the subversive notion that any public offi-
cial, the President or a policeman, possesses a kind of inherent power to set
aside the Constitution whenever he thinks the public interest, or "national
security" warrants it. That notion is postulate of tyranny.
— Congressman Don Edwards —
1975
The FBI documents collected in this book offer a unique window into the inner
workings of the U.S. political police. They expose the secret, systematic, and
sometimes savage use of force and fraud, by all levels of government, to sabotage
progressive political activity supposedly protected by the U.S. constitution. They
reveal ongoing, country-wide CIA-style covert action - infiltration, psychological
warfare, legal harassment, and violence - against a very broad range of domestic
dissidents. While prodding us to re-evaluate U.S. democracy and to rethink our
understanding of recent U.S. history, these documents can help us to protect our
movements from future government attack.
This is the final volume of what amounts to a South End Press trilogy on
domestic covert action. Ward Churchill's and Jim Vander Wall's Agents of Repres-
sion' details the FBI's secret war on the Black Panther Party and the American Indian
Movement. My War at Home 2shows that such covert operations have become a per-
manent feature of U.S. politics. It analyzes the specific methods used against
progressive activists and opens a discussion of how to respond.
Now Churchill and Vander Wall have reproduced many of the FBI files on
which our books are based. Some of these documents illustrate recent FBI cam-
paigns against the American Indian Movement (AIM) and the Committee in
Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). Others reveal early attacks on
Marcus Garvey (1920s) and Alger Hiss (1950s). The bulk are from the counterintel-
ligence programs (COINTELPROs) that the FBI mounted to "disrupt, misdirect,
discredit or otherwise neutralize" the civil rights, black liberation, Puerto Rican
independence, anti-war and student movements of the 1960s.
Preface
In this book, we see the actual directives that set in motion those infamous 1960s
programs. Here, too, are action proposals that FBI field offices submitted in response
to the COINTELPRO directives. FBI Headquarters teletypes back its approval or
modifications. Agents report specific operations in which they took part. Supervi-
sors summarize progress in neutralizing a particular target. Policy memoranda
adjust Bureau tactics in light of new dangers and opportunities. Most illuminating
are the book's facsimiles of some of the weapons the FBI actually deployed in its
hidden war at home. From the Bureau's arsenal of psychological warfare, Churchill
and Vander Wall show us:
• the letter the FBI secretly sent to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in December
1964, in an attempt to provoke his suicide;
• other forged letters to activists and their supporters, families, employers,
landlords, college administrators and church superiors;
• FBI-authored articles and editorials which "cooperative news media" ran as
their own;
• cartoon leaflets that the FBI published in the name of certain radical groups
in order to ridicule and antagonize others.
Although some of these documents have been published previously, the -7
collections are hard to find and many are out of print. The most thorough and useful
to date - the National Lawyers Guild's Counterintelligence: A Documentary Look at
America's Secret Police,' - has been incorporated into The COINTELPRO Papers. The
NLG Civil Liberties Committee generously donated its limited resources to subsi-
dize publication of this book (and War at Home) instead of reprinting its earlier
compilation.
The FBI documents reproduced here originated as confidential internal com-
munications. They were for Bureau eyes only. They remained secret until March
1971, when a "Citizen's Committee to Investigate the FBI" removed boxes of files
from an FBI resident agency office in Media, Pennsylvania, and released them to the
press. Gradually, more files were obtained through the federal Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA), which had been temporarily strengthened to help restore public
confidence in government in the wake of Watergate and the exposure of official lies
about the Vietnam War. A few agents and informers began to disaffect from the FBI
and publicly confess their misdeeds. New senate and house intelligence committees
held public hearings and published voluminous reports. These, in turn, enabled
activists to get more documents through FOIA requests and lawsuits. _J
The full story of COINTELPRO has not yet been told. The Bureau's files were
never seized by congress or the courts. Many have been destroyed. Others remain
hidden or were released with such heavy deletion that only "the," "and," "or" and
"but" remain (examples are reprinted in Chapter 1 of The COINTELPRO Papers, with
a critique of the process which generates such absurdities). The most heinous and
xi
THE COINTELPRO PAPERS
embarrassing counterintelligence actions were not committed to writing, and ex-

operatives are now legally prohibited from disclosing them.
Still, an unprecedented wealth of detailed information has been amassed. That
material is summarized in Agents of Repression, War at Home and elsewhere. What
sets The COINTELPRO Papers apart is the number and scope of the FBI documents
it reproduces. As the title indicates, these documents are drawn mainly from the
FBI's formal counterintelligence programs, in place from 1956-1971. This is not
because these were the FBI's only programs of domestic covert action. Rather, it is
because they were the only ones to have their records substantially revealed.
COINTELPRO involved a unique experiment. Though covert operations have
been employed throughout FBI history, the COINTELPROs were the first to be both
broadly targeted and centrally directed. FBI headquarters set policy, assessed
progress, charted new directions, demanded increased production, and carefully
monitored and controlled day-to-day operations. This arrangement required that
national COINTELPRO supervisors and local FBI field offices communicate back
and forth, at great length, concerning every operation. They did so quite freely, with
little fear of public exposure. This generated a prolific trail of bureaucratic paper.
The moment that paper trail began to surface, the FBI discontinued all of its formal
domestic counterintelligence programs. It did not, however, cease its covert political
activity against U.S. dissidents. The documents show that the Bureau evaluated the
COINTELPROs as "successful over the years." It disbanded them only "to afford ad-
ditional security to our sensitive techniques and operations." Continued reliance on
those same techniques and operations was officially authorized, only now on a case-
by-case basis, "with tight procedures to insure absolute security."
By discontinuing use of the term "COINTELPRO," the Bureau gave the appear-
ance of acceding to public and congressional pressure. In reality, it protected its
capacity to continue precisely the same activity under other names. Decentralization
of covert operations vastly reduced the volume of required reporting. It dispersed
the remaining documentation to individual case files in diverse field offices, and it
purged those files of any caption suggesting domestic covert action. The Bureau's
"sensitive techniques and operations" have since been further insulated from public
scrutiny. Scheduled congressional hearings into the Bureau's mid-1970s campaign
against AIM were squelched by means of what turns out to have been yet another
FBI covert operation. The FOIA has been drastically narrowed, with thousands of
files reclassified "top secret." The Intelligence Identities Protection Act now makes
it a federal crime to disclose" any information that identifies an individual as a covert
agent."
This careful concealment of post-COINTELPRO domestic counterintelligence
action is part of a broader effort to rehabilitate the U.S. political police. Central to that
effort has been a sophisticated campaign to refurbish the public image of the FBI. The
Bureau's egomaniacal, reactionary, crudely racist and sexist founder, J. Edgar
Hoover, died in 1972. After interim directors failed to restore the Bureau's prestige,
two federal judges, William Webster and William Sessions, were recruited to clean
xii
Preface
house and build a "new FBI." The new directors have cultivated a low-visibility
managerial style and discreetly avoided public attack on prominent liberals. Anti-
communism - the time-honored rationale for political police work - has been
augmented by "counter-terrorism" and "the war on drugs," pretexts that better
resonate with current popular fears. The old myth of the FBI as crime-busting 7
protector of democratic rights has been revived in modern garb by films like
Mississippi Burning and the television series, Mancuso FBI.
This repackaging seems to have sold the "new FBI" to some of the most
prominent critics of earlier COINTELPRO. University professors and congressional
committees that helped to expose the domestic covert action of the past now deny
its persistence in the present. Because of their credentials, these respectable "objec-
tive" sources do more damage than the FBI's blatant right-wing publicists. Left un-
contested, their sophistry could disarm a new generation of activists, leaving them
vulnerable to government subversion.
The introduction to The COINTELPRO Papers refutes one such academic expert,
Athan Theoharis, in his preposterous claim that the FBI's war on AIM during the
1970s was not a COINTELPRO-style "program of harassment." Equally treacherous
is The FBI and CISPES, a 1989 report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence."
This is nothing more than a whitewash of the Bureau's covert and extralegal effort
to wipe out domestic opposition to U.S. intervention in Central America.
That FBI campaign was first made public by a central participant, Frank Varelli.
The Bureau admits it paid Varelli from 1981 to 1984 to infiltrate CISPES. Varelli has
testified that the FBI's stated objective was to "break" CISPES. He recounts a modus
operandi straight out of the annals COINTELPRO - from break-ins, bogus publica-
tions and disruption of public events to planting guns on CISPES members and
seducing CISPES leaders in order to get blackmail photos for the FBI.'
Alerted by Varelli's disclosures, the Center for Constitutional Rights obtained
a small portion of the Bureau's CISPES files and released them to the press. The files
show the U.S. government targeting a very broad range of religious, labor and
community groups opposed to its Central America policies.They confirm that the
FBI's objective was to attack and "neutralize" these groups" Mainstream media
coverage of these revelations elicited a flurry of congressional investigations and
hearings. Publicly exposed, the FBI tried to scapegoat the whistle blower. Its in-
house investigation found Varelli "unreliable" and held his false reports of CISPES
terrorism responsible for the entire FBI operation. The Bureau denied any violation
of the constitutional rights of US. citizens or involvement in the hundreds of break-
ins reported by Central America activists. A grand total of six agents received
"formal censure" and three were suspended for 14 days. The FBI moved its CISPES
file to the national archives and Director Sessions declared the case dosed, a mere
"aberration" due to "failure in FBI management."'
The Bureau's slander of Varelli gave the congress an easy way out. The single
congressional report, The FBI and CISPES, endorses the FBI's entire account, without
any reservation or qualification. It legitimizes a cover-up of current covert opera-
tions by exploiting the past reputation of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
r- That committee-known initially as the "Church Committee," after its founding

chair, Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho) - gained respect in the mid-1970s through
detailed public documentation of FBI and CIA abuses. In truth, the committee never
did play quite the heroic role claimed for it by liberal historians. Compromised from
the outset, it allowed the agencies under investigation to turn over only sanitized
versions of selected files and then to edit and censor the committee's reports before
publication.' It colluded in the FBI's continuing concealment of a decade-long secret
war on the Puerto Rican independence movement.
Church and his successor as committee chair, Senator Birch Bayh (D., Indiana),
eventually were driven from office. They fell victim to the same combination of
right-wing disinformation and Democratic Party passivity that later set up House
Speaker Jim Wright' Divested of its liberal populist leadership, the intelligence
committee became - like so many other congressional and administrative bodies -
an instrument of the very agencies it purports to oversee. It was this latter-day
committee which ratified the FBI's coverup of its campaign against Central America
activists without hearing from a single critic or victim. Relying exclusively on FBI
and Justice Department testimony, the committee crudely reiterates the Bureau's
own self-serving findings, often verbatim. It writes off Frank Varelli with the
undocumented assertion that his "credibility...was called into doubt at a hearing
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.""
The committee also ignores testimony that the reports submitted in Varelli's
name, which provided the FBI's pretext for attacking CISPES, were actually dictated
by FBI higher-ups." It makes no reference to Varelli's repeated, detailed sworn
statements - corroborated by the Bureau's own files - that the FBI used COIN-
TELPRO methods against CISPES in order to achieve COINTELPRO ends. To
rationalize its dismissal of the campaign against CISPES as a mere "aberration" from
the FBI's "definite pattern of adherence to established safeguards for constitutional
rights,"" the committee carefully avoids any reference to the sordid history of
COINTELPRO. Neither the acronym nor the concept appear even once in its report.
Such a whitewash should not be allowed to obscure the reality of continuing
COINTELPRO-type attacks on progressive activists. Ongoing domestic covert ac-
tion is more than amply documented by The COINTELPRO Papers, Agents of
Repression and War at Home. The targets are not limited to the opponents of U.S.
intervention in Central America. They include virtually all who fight for peace and
social justice in the United States - from AIM, Puerto Rican independentistas and the
Coalition for a New South, to environmentalists, pacifists, trade unionists, homeless
and seniors, feminists, gay and lesbian activists, radical clergy and teachers, pub-
lishers of dissident literature, prison reformers, progressive attorneys, civil rights
and anti-poverty workers, and on and on. Consider the following examples drawn
from 1989 alone:
• national leaders of Earth First! imprisoned on the word of an FBI infiltrator,
Mike Tait"
xiv
Preface
• the coordinator of the National Lawyers Guild's anti-repression task force,

active in the defense of Puerto Rican independentistas, subpoenaed at the
FBI's instigation before a gratuitous, punitive grand jury and faced with jail
for refusing to testify against a former client"
• more than 200 African-American elected officials in Alabama, Georgia and
North Carolina victimized by FBI smear campaigns, false criminal charges
and elaborate "sting" operations."
These can be no more than the tip of the iceberg, given that the great bulk of
COINTELPRO-type operations remain secret until long after their damage has been
done. By all indications, domestic covert operations have become a permanent
feature of U.S. politics. The implications of this are truly alarming: in the name of
protecting our fundamental freedoms, the FBI and police systematically subvert
them. They routinely take the law into their own hands to punish dissident speech
and association without the least semblance of due process of law. Those who
manage to organize for social justice in the United States, despite the many obstacles
in their path, face country-wide covert campaigns to discredit and disrupt their con-
stitutionally protected political activity.
The documents reproduced in this book reveal a U.S. political reality which is
the antithesis of democracy. They also suggest an alternative reading of recent U.S.
history. Memoirs and commentaries on "The Sixties" have recently become quite
popular. COINTELPRO, however, receives little attention in these accounts. It is
rarely mentioned, and even then it seems somehow not to affect the rest of the story.
Otherwise responsible historians describe a systematic campaign to covertly dis-
credit progressive movements without so much as considering the possibility that
their own perceptions might be distorted as a result of that campaign.
Take, for instance, Todd Gitlin's often insightful and eloquent account of his
experience in the 1960s. A sophisticated participant-observer and early president of
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Gitlin is well aware of COINTELPRO. Yet,
at least one pivotal incident reported matter-of-factly in his book turns out to have
been an FBI covert operation. Recalling a 1969 telephone threat which helped split
the emerging women's movement from SDS, Gitlin repeats a widely accepted
account attributing the call to Cathy Wilkerson, a late-SDS and future Weather
Underground militant. Gitlin was shocked to learn, at an SDS reunion in 1988, that
neither Wilkerson nor any other SDS woman had made such a call. Who knows how
many other incidents represented as historical fact by Gitlin (let alone in the writings
of those lacking his integrity) are actually COINTELPRO fiction?"
COINTELPRO has been especially effective in distorting the public image of the
Black Panther Party (BPP). The BPP was the most prominent African-American po-
litical force in the U.S. during the late '60s, with chapters all across the country.
Working from a 10 point socialist program for black self-determination, it formed
(legal) armed street patrols to deter KKK and police brutality, gave out free food and
xv
health care, and fought against hard drugs. The BPP was instrumental in forging a
broad-based "rainbow coalition" against U.S. intervention abroad and for commu-
nity control of the police, schools and other key institutions at home. Its weekly
newspaper, The Black Panther, brought a radical anti-imperialist perspective on na-
tional and international developments to over 100,000 readers.
These achievements have by and large been ignored by white historians, who
present instead only the FBI's view of the BPP. Even books about COINTELPRO
tend to regurgitate as scholarship the very lies and racist caricatures which the
Bureau promoted through COINTELPRO. At best, such studies equate the
government's violence with the BPP's, overlooking the fact that the FBI and police
harassed, vandalized, beat, framed and murdered Panthers for years before finally
provoking the party's retaliation. A prime example is Kenneth O'Reilly's Racial
Matters: The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972. Here we find the BPP
identified as a gang of "preening ghetto generals spouting off-the-pig rhetoric and
sporting black leathers, Cuban shades, and unkempt Afros." They were "peripheral
characters...who never attained mass support." In a portrayal laced with the FBI's
racist epithets - "monsters," "cold-blooded killers," "nihilistic terror" - O'Reilly
argues that "the Black Panther Party invited the sort of FBI repression that typified
Lyndon Johnson's last two years in the White House and Richard Nixon's first four."
One such "invitation" consisted, we are told, of a "coloring book depicting Black
children challenging white law and order in the ghetto." Only the most careful
reader will discover, some 21 pages later, that this "outrageous Panther provoca-
tion" was actually a COINTELPRO forgery published by the FBI to discredit the
BPP."
Clearly, COINTELPRO and similar operations under other names work to
distort academic and popular perceptions of recent U.S. history. They violate our
basic democratic rights and undermine our ability to alter government policy and
structure. They have done enormous damage to the struggle for peace and social
justice. Though formidable and dangerous, such domestic covert action is not insur-
mountable. It can be overcome through a combination of militant public protest (as
in recent "FBI Off Campus" campaigns) and careful internal education and prepa-
ration within progressive movements. The greatest gift of The COINTELPRO Papers
is its potential for helping present and future activists grasp the methodology of this
form of repression in order to defeat it. Read these documents with that in mind, and
use them well!
Brian Glick
New Rochelle, New York
- March 1990 -
xvi
Guide to the Documents
by Chip Berlet and Brian Glick
Introduction
12 Memo: Hoover to Attorney General re: Marcus Garvey "prominent Negro agitator."
Neutralize his political work with fraud prosecution.
13 Report: From infiltrator who targeted Garvey.
14-5 Letter: Hiss defense investigator actually reported to FBI.
16 Memo: FBI knew Hiss prosecution claims regarding typewriter forgery were false.
17 Teletype: Agent to infiltrate Dallas CISPES.
18-9 Teletype: Attack CISPES for defying government policy.
Understanding Deletions in FBI Documents

24 Rosenberg memo-text entirely deleted.
25 Document: Systematic deletions from FBI documents follow pattern.
COINTELPRO — CP, USA

40 Memo: COINTELPRO initiated against CP, USA.
42 Memo: Cause organized crime to attack CP, USA.
43 FBI circulates bogus CP leaflet to provoke mafia.
44-6 FBI-authored anonymous letter incites Teamsters against CP; authority requested
for more.
47 Memo: Teamster business agent of "weak character" cultivated as informant.
COINTELPRO — SWP
51 Memo: Anonymous phone call to subvert NAACP support for Committee to Aid
Monroe Defendants.
52-3 Teletype: Authority sought for media smear of SWP organizers running for public
office.
54-5 Memo: Phoenix FBI requests authority for anonymous letter campaign to provoke
firing of SWP faculty member.
56-7 Memo/Cartoon: From campaign to disrupt anti-war movement and SWP.
COINTELPRO — Puerto Rican Independence Movement

68 Document: Launch program to disrupt Puerto Rican independence movement.
69 Memo: New York suggests "exploiting factionalism" in Puerto Rican independence
movement.
70 Document: Hoover suggests plan to promote hostility toward Puerto Rican inde-
pendence movement by planting articles in media.
71 Document: New York and San Juan discuss plans to disrupt Puerto Rican independ-
ence movement.
xvi i
73 Document: Split and disrupt group seeking Puerto Rican independence

75 FBI secretly authors daily newspaper editorial attacking Puerto Rican student
independentistas.
76 Document: Delve deeply into independentistas personal lives to "disrupt their
activities and compromise their effectiveness."
77 Anonymous leaflet circulated by FBI to discredit independentista leader Juan Mari
Bras.
78 Memo: FBI gloats over Mari Bras heart attack and claims its anonymous letter was
partial cause.
79 Memo: Anonymous leaflet mailed to 300 in effort to fuel factionalism among
independentistas.
80 Document: Anonymous mailing and other covert operations to crush "budding"
high school pro-independence movement.
81 Airtel: Anonymous letter approved to foment disputes within independentista
movement, as long as Bureau role remains hidden.
83 Memo: San Juan suggests anonymous letter on supposed sexual affair to discredit
Mari Bras and alienate other independence advocates.
85 Airtel: San Juan informs Hoover of campaign to subvert 1967 UN plebiscite on
Puerto Rican political status.
87 Bogus cartoon ridicules Mari Bras in name of other independentistas.
89 Bogus cartoon linking Puerto Rican independentistas with Fidel Castro, issued in
name of fictitious Puerto Rican group set up by FBI to subvert 1967 plebiscite.
COINTELPRO Black Liberation Movement

92-3 Document: Establish program to "disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neu-
tralize" black nationalist organizations and leaders.
98 Document: Remove Dr. Martin Luther King from leadership role in civil rights
movement.
99 Anonymous Letter: Urges King to commit suicide or face exposure of alleged
misdeeds.
100-1 Memo: Anonymous leaflet and article planted in news media to undermine Ameri-
can Friends Service Committee work in Poor People's Campaign.
102 Memo: Strategy discussion on disruption of Nation of Islam ("Black Muslims")
takes credit for factional dispute against Malcolm X.
104 Document: Proposal to provoke murder of Dick Gregory by organized crime.
107 Memo expands program to neutralize black movement.
108-11 Airtel: Anti-black program expanded; prevent coalitions, respectability, youth
militancy, "rise of a 'messiah'."
113-4 Memo: Disrupt marriage of St. Louis civil rights activist Reverend Charles Koen and
discredit him in black community through anonymous accusations of sexual infi-
delity.
115 Second FBI anonymous letter against Koen.
116 Document: St. Louis reports results of distribution of bogus underground newspa-
per designed to divide black activists.
118-9 Document: Director suggests all offices follow Miami example of providing deroga-
tory background information on COINTELPRO targets to cooperative media.
xviii
120 Memo: Anonymous letter to discredit Republic of New Afrika (RNA) leader.
121 Document: Director approves above letter.
122 Document: Discussion of campaign to discredit RNA and prevent land purchase in
Mississippi.
124-5 Memo: Tactics to "thwart and disrupt the Black Panther Party (BPP)."
127 Memo: Provide information to cooperative media to "foster split" between Black
Panther Party and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).
128 Document: Proposal to create false impression that Stokely Carmichael is a CIA
informant.
130 Memo: Plan to provoke violence between Black Panther Party and another black
organization (US).
131 Bogus Cartoons: Used in Black Panther Party/US campaign to provoke violence.
132 Memo: Discussion of continuing plan to provoke violence between Black Panther
Party and US.
133 Document: Summary of 'Tangible Results" and "accomplishments" of Black Pan-
ther Party COINTELPRO, e.g., "Shootings,beating and a high degree of unrest" and
collapse of BPP program providing free breakfast for ghetto youth.
134 Documents. Anonymous mailing of derogatory cartoon targeting Newark Black
Panther Party.
136-7 Memo: Proposal to provoke Jewish Defense League violence against BPP.
138 Document: Anonymous letter to Chicago gang leader Jeff Fort provoking violence
against BPP.
139 Document/ sketch. FBI informant's drawing of floorplan showing where BPP leader
Fred Hampton slept. Used by police to murder Hampton and Mark Clark.
141 Airtel: Cash bonus requested for FBI informant who targeted Hampton for deadly
raid.
144-5 Airtel: Hoover reprimands San Francisco FBI for criticizing plan to discredit and
destroy BPP.
148 Memo: Summary of anti-black COINTELPRO; friction created among BPP leaders.
150 Airtel: Hoover informs agents that when targeting BPP, purpose is disruption, and
"it is immaterial whether facts exist to substantiate the charge."
151-2 Teletype: Propose forged letter to divide BPP and isolate Geronimo Pratt.
154-5 Memo: Bogus underground newspaper proposed to discredit Geronimo Pratt,
ridicule BPP and "foment mistrust and suspicion" among its members.
156 Teletype: Continue targeting Pratt.
158 Memo: FBI and prosecutor collude to keep evidence from judge and defense
attorneys in trial of three former Panthers ("the New York 3").
160-1 Airtel: Director summarizes success in shattering BPP and driving BPP leader Huey
Newton crazy.
162-3 Memo: "Thwart BPP newspaper; FBI anonymous letters charge BPP anti-semitism
to disaffect donors solicited by conductor Leonard Bernstein; further disinforma-
tion and Jewish Defense League provocation.
COINTELPRO New Left
177-8 Memo: Disruption of new left formalized as new program.
xix
180 Target anti-war leaders Dellinger and Hayden.

181-2 Newark proposes new left be "destroyed or neutralized from the inside," Hayden
labelled as informer.
183 12 point master plan for COINTELPRO against new left.
185-6 Memo: Cartoons, pamphlets and anonymous letters used to disrupt SDS at Temple
University.
187 Cartoon. Used to discredit SDS at Temple University.
192-3 Memo: Block emergence of Detroit area anti-war coalition; bogus letter in name of
Black United Front demanding $25,000 from "white liberals."
194-6 Disrupt Liberation News Service through divisive anonymous letter.
197 Memo: Milwaukee proposes plan to discredit alternative newspaper in Madison,
Wisconsin.
199 Airtel: Newark proposes plan to disrupt Princeton SDS through conservative
campus group.
200 Airtel: Director approves plan to disrupt Princeton SDS.
201 Cartoon from campaign to disrupt Princeton SDS
202 Director urges plan to "drive a wedge between the new left and the black student
power advocates" at New York University.
203 FBI-authored racist letter from anonymous "SDS member" used in COINTELPRO
operation at NYU.
204 Letter: Approval of NYU COINTELPRO.
205-7 Memo: Plan to use "anonymous messages" with "a mystical connotation" to harass
Temple University new left activists.
209 Director urges anonymous communications "to cause confusion in the organizing
for [Los Angeles anti-war] demonstration by causing dissent amongst its sponsors."
210 Memo: COINTELPRO operation proposed to inhibit "the embryonic alliance"
between SDS and BPP.
211 Letter: Authority granted for above operation by using informants to create rift.
212 Memo: Detroit requests device to squirt "foul smelling feces" on publications
distributed by Radical Education Project.
213 Airtel: Divide SDS and BPP through bogus racist, sexist, homophobic attack in name
of "Newark SDS."
214-5 Airtel: Plant newspaper article decrying Jane Fonda's fundraising for BPP.
216-7 Airtel: FBI-authored letter to newspaper columnist from fictitious person smearing
BPP-supporting actress Jean Seberg as pregnant from Black Panther rather than
white husband.
218 Director approves action vs. Seberg, with adjustments to protect FBI cover.
219 Document/Los Angeles Times clipping: Claim Seberg COINTELPRO successful.
227 Document/Postcard: FBI sends "Minutemen" death-threat post card to intimidate
author Churchill.
COINTELPRO - AIM
242 Report: Source describes Denver AIM organizational structure.
243 Teletype: Report on AIM sent to legal attache in Ottawa, Canada.
245-6 Teletype: Police brutality against AIM activist Russell Means.
)0C
307-9 Document: Summary of justification for and tactics used in AIM investigation,
stresses fostering of paranoia.
Conclusion
312 Chart: Admitted FBI illegal acts committed during COINTELPRO era.
313 Teletype: Director calls for compilation of reports of FBI warrantless electronic
surveillance in domestic security investigations.
315 Airtel: Wide range of political "extremists" labelled "terrorists."
331 Chart of penal coercion techniques and functions.
247-8 Teletype: Circulation of false claim that AIM was obtaining illegal automatic
weapons; FBI and local law enforcement coordinate operations against AIM.
252 Document: Establishing predication for criminal investigation of AIM.
253 Teletype: Use of reporter at Wounded Knee as unwitting informant for FBI through
covert cooperation of management.
256-60 Memo: Position paper on role of FBI in case of "a major confrontation in Indian
country," based on analysis of Wounded Knee operations.
263-5 Teletype: Unsubstantiated rumor of AIM arms purchases; proposal to use that
rumor to block funding of AIM by Sammy Davis, Jr.
266-7 Document: Initiate "forceful and penetrative interview program" against AIM
activists.
271 Memo: Characterization of AIM as violent and destructive "insurgents."
274 Memo: COINTELPRO veteran agent Richard G. Held assigned to direct investiga-
tion into death of two agents in 'Peltier" Pine Ridge killings case.
275 Memo: Involvement of agent Richard W. Held, son of Richard G., in Pine Ridge case.
276 Memo: Glowing evaluation of performance of Richard W. Held on Pine Ridge
during period of intense repressive abuses against AIM supporters.
277 Memo: Director desires prompt resolution of any "inconsistencies" in stories
relating to Pine Ridge killings.
279 Tactical summary shows use of grand jury to coerce reluctant witnesses to implicate
Peltier and others in Pine Ridge killings.
280 Teletype: Richard G. Held returns from Rapid City to duties as SAC Chicago.
281 Memo: Richard G. Held continues involvement in Pine Ridge case, plans to meet
with judge.
282-3 FBI Terrorist Digest: AIM included in summary of possible terrorist attacks on 1976
Bicentennial celebrations.
284-7 Teletype: Lengthy report from single unverified source alleges non-existent AIM
"Dog Soldiers" plan massive campaign of murder and terrorism.
288-9 Memo: Media leak that FBI shared information on Native American protests with
CIA.
290-3 FBI analyzes acquittal in first Pine Ridge killings trial in order to be sure to convict
Peltier in second trial.
294 Memo: Co-defendant dismissed so "full prosecutive weight of the Federal Govern-
ment could be directed against Leonard Peltier."
296 Affidavit: Myrtle Poor Bear alleges she heard Peltier plan to ambush FBI agents at
Pine Ridge, and that later he confessed.
297 Affidavit: Myrtle Poor Bear alleges she saw Peltier actually shoot FBI agents.
298-9 Affidavit: Myrtle Poor Bear abandons claim Peltier planned and confessed killings;
adds substantial detail to her "eyewitness" account.
300 Airtel: "Enclosed herewith one pair of hands" taken from as yet unidentified Anna
Mae Aquash. Initial autopsy inconclusive despite bullet lodged in skull.
301 Identification Report: Fingerprints reveal identity of Anna Mae Aquash.
302 Teletype: Ballistics test showed rifle claimed as Pine Ridge killings weapon could
not have fired the cartridge casing recovered from trunk of car.
303 Lab Notes: Firing pin test showing lack of match—described as "inconclusive" at
trial.
xxi
Introduction
A Glimpse Into the Files of America's

Political Police
The inescapable message of much of the material we have covered is that
the FBI jeopardizes the whole system of freedom of expression which is the
cornerstone of an open society...At worst it raises the specter of a police
state...in essence the FBI conceives of itself as an instrument to prevent
radical social change in America...the Bureau's view of its function leads it
beyond data collection and into political warfare.
— Thomas I. Emerson —
Yale Law Professor
1971
A picture, as they say, is worth a thousand words. Actually seeing the visual
representation of that which others describe, and from which they draw conclu-
sions, can serve for many people as a sort of ultimate proof of the propositions at
issue. The truth of this old adage seems quite pronounced in this instance, which
leads us to reproduce secret FBI documents to allow the Bureau to document its own
lawlessness.
In Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against the Black Panther Party and
the American Indian Movement (South End Press, 1988), we endeavored to prove
among other things that the Bureau has since its inception acted not as the country's
foremost crime-fighting agency — an image it has always actively promoted in col-
laboration with a vast array of "friendly' media representatives and "scholars" —but
as America's political police engaged in all manner of extralegality and illegality as
expedients to containing and controlling political diversity within the United States.
In essence, we argued that the FBI's raison d'être is and always has been the
implementation of what the Bureau formally designated from the mid-1950s
through the early '70s as "COINTELPROs" (COunterINTELligence PR Ograms)
designed to "disrupt and destabilize," "cripple," "destroy" or otherwise "neutral-
ize" dissident individuals and political groupings in the United States, a process de-
nounced by congressional investigators as being "a sophisticated vigilante opera-
tion."' Our case, it seemed to us, was rather plainly made.
Such clarity is, predictably enough, anathema to the Bureau and the more
conscious apologists it has cultivated, both of whom wish to deny the realities we
have sought to expose. For the FBI, as well as the broader politico-legalistic structure
of which it is an integral part, there are matters of policy and outright criminal
culpability to be covered up through systematic denial of truth and the extension of
1
2 THE COINTELPRO PAPERS
certain countervailing mythologies. Many apologists have based their careers and
professional reputations on shielding the Bureau from exposure while assisting in
the perfection and perpetuation of its preferred myths.
On this score, a review of Agents of Repression written for the Washington Post by
Athan Theoharis, a professor at Marquette University, serves as an instructive
example.2The techniques employed in this attempt to discredit our theses afford
virtual textbook instruction in how the facts of the Bureau's activities and agenda are
obscured from the public by properly-anointed "experts" while the officially-
approved image of the Bureau is reinforced, or at least maintained, through the
mainstream media.3Consequently, the Post review bears detailed scrutiny.
Of Myths and Documentation
After accurately summarizing the main thrust of our conclusions regarding the
nature, scope and duration of the FBI's domestic counterintelligence operations,
Theoharis tries to bring about their dismissal out-of-hand. "Do the authors doc-
ument these alarming charges?" he asks. 'The answer is quite simply: They do not."
Observe that he does not attempt to challenge the appropriateness of the documen-
tation we offer, arguing that it is insufficient to our purposes or that we have
somehow misinterpreted it. Instead, he asserts that we use no documentation at all,
a claim intended to lead his readers to the false impression that Agents consists of
nothing more than a lengthy stream of heavy-handed and unsupported accusations
against the FBI.
In order to accomplish this gross distortion, he simply remains silent about the
fact that we accompanied our 388 pages of text with 79 pages of notes (all in fine
print), some 1,513 entries in all, hundreds of them citing more than a single source,
and fully a third referring to specific FBI and/or other government documents.
Having ignored the evidentiary record upon which we base our work, he contrives
to extend a countering, essentially fictitious "record" of his own. Focusing on our
main thesis, that rather than being suspended in anything other than name in 1971
(when the FBI says it was), COINTELPRO was actually continued and even
escalated against the American Indian Movement over the next several years, the
reviewer sets his stage! The most serious problem with Agents, he says, is that "the
authors seem indifferent to the uniqueness, and thus significance, of the FBI's
COINTELPRO operations. They were unique because Bureau officials launched
formal, action-oriented programs whose main purpose was not to collect evidence
for prosecution, and in the process created a rather comprehensive written record
of their actions."3He goes on to claim that:
In contrast to its activities against the Black Panthers [before 1971], activities
authorized and monitored exclusively by the Bureau, the FBI's activities involving
AIM were designed to result in judicial prosecution [and] were subject to review by
Introduction 3
justice Department officials...The FBI files released on AIM do not document a

program of harassment.
In this passage, Theoharis has carefully implanted another pair of serious pieces
of disinformation in his supposedly factual rebuttal. One concerns the extent to
which the Bureau has made available documents concerning its anti-AIM cam-
paign, while the other centers upon what is allegedly revealed within this documen-
tation. Both of these contribute directly to furtherance of the myth by which the FBI
wishes to be publicly understood. Each element will be considered in turn, because
both reveal much about the methods and functions of academic apologists in service
to the Bureau propaganda system.
"The AIM Files"

After mentioning "the FBI files released on AIM," Theoharis sums up his point
with a snide query: "Can we then read between the lines and conclude that by the
1970s FBI actions were not recorded in writing?" Leaving aside the possibility that
by this point in its history agents might well have learned not to record certain things
in written form, it is abundantly clear to anyone familiar with the material to which
the reviewer refers that neither we nor he has had the opportunity to assess what the
FBI did or did not commit to paper with regard to its actions against AIM. Still less
have we been forced to "read between the lines" of available documents in order to
arrive at conclusions contradicted by such evidence. Contrary to Theoharis' smug
remark about what his own perusal of these files shows, the fact of the matter is that
the vast bulk of them have never been released.
Although the Bureau acknowledges having compiled hundreds of thousands of
"investigative" documents during the course of its major anti-AIM activities, only
17,000-odd pages of this material have been declassified and made available to re-
searchers at the "reading room" facility in FBI headquarters, and most of these show
extensive deletions. The reviewer is being deliberately misleading when he casually
juxtaposes the veritable mountains of paper available through the FBI on its Black
Panther COINTELPRO with the paucity of documents made available on AIM -
pretending these are equivalent data-bases - and then suggests he had predicated
his conclusions upon a comparison of the two sets of files. Nor is he more forthcom-
ing about why such a disparity in the availability of these records exists.
In essence, the FBI was quite literally forced to divulge most of its Panther files
by the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations during hearings
held in 1974 and 1975. Conversely, the Bureau was able to avoid being compelled to
do this with regard to its anti-AIM operations, under circumstances which bear
recounting.' Concerning the Panther documents, the Senate committee itself found
its hand forced by a seemingly endless series of revelations about governmental
transgressions during the early '70s. There was a "credibility gap" engendered by
the federal executive branch having been caught lying too many times, too red-
handedly and over too many years in its efforts to dupe the public into supporting
the U.S. war in Southeast Asia. This had reached epic proportions when Daniel
Ellsberg leaked the "Pentagon Papers," a highly secret government documentary
history of official duplicity by which America had become embroiled in Indochina,
and caused particularly sensitive excerpts to be published in the New York Times.'
The situation was greatly exacerbated by the so-called Watergate Scandal, which
followed immediately, in which it was publicly revealed that virtually the entire
Nixon administration had been, as a matter of course, engaging in exactly the same
sort of behavior on many other fronts, both at home and abroad. To compound the
crisis even further, a citizen's action group raided the FBI's Media, Pennsylvania
resident agency, appropriated its files, and exposed the long-secret existence of
COINTELPRO in the Washington Post° As a result of all of these factors, public
confidence in government was at an all-time low, and showed signs of unraveling
even further.
In this peculiar and potentially volatile set of circumstances, a government-
wide effort was undertaken to convince the citizenry that its institutions were
fundamentally sound, albeit in need of "fine-tuning" and a bit of "housecleaning."
It was immediately announced that U.S. ground forces would be withdrawn from
Vietnam as rapidly as possible. Televised congressional hearings were staged to
"get to the bottom of Watergate," a spectacle which soon led to the resignations of
a number of Nixon officials, the brief imprisonment of a few of them, and the
eventual resignation of the president himself. Another form assumed by this high-
level exercise in (re)establishing a national consensus favoring faith-in-government
was the conducting of a series of well-publicized and tightly-scripted show-trial-
type hearings with regard to the various police and intelligence agencies which had
been exposed as complicit in the Vietnam and Watergate "messes."
For its part, the FBI was cast as an agency which had "in the past" (no matter how
recent) and "temporarily" (no matter how long the duration) "gotten out of control,"
thus "aberrantly" but busily trampling upon citizens' civil and constitutional rights
in the name of social and political orthodoxy. To add just the right touch of
melodrama to the whole affair, the Bureau was made to "confess" to a certain range
of its already completed COINTELPRO operations - such as the not-directly-lethal
dimensions of its anti-Panther activities - and to provide extensive portions of its
internal documentation of these misdeeds. As a finale, Bureau officials were made
to appear properly contrite while promising never to engage in such naughty things
again. The FBI's quid pro quo for cooperating in this charade seems to have been that
none of its agents would actually see the inside of a prison as a result of the
"excesses" thereby revealed'
The object of all this illusory congressional muscle-flexing was, of course, to
instill in the public a perception that congress had finally gotten tough, placing itself
in a position to administer "appropriate oversight" of the FBI. It followed that
citizens had no further reason to worry over what the Bureau was doing at that very
moment, or what it might do in the future. This, in turn, would allow the status quo
Introduction 5
sufficient breathing room to pass laws and executive orders gradually converting
the FBI's COINTELPRO-style illegalities into legal, or at least protected, spheres of
endeavor.1° The selling of this bill of goods was apparently deemed so important that
congress was willing go to to extreme lengths in achieving success.
Hence, in 1975 the Senate Select Committee concluded that in order to complete
its (re)building of the required public impression, it might be necessary to risk going
beyond exploration of the Bureau's past counterintelligence practices and explore
ongoing (i.e.: ostensibly post-COINTELPRO) FBI conduct visa vis political activists.
Specifically at issue in this connection was what was even then being done to AIM,
and hearings were scheduled to begin in July. But this is where the Bureau, which
had been reluctantly going along up to that point, drew the line. The hearings never
happened. Instead, they were "indefinitely postponed" in late June of 1975, at the
direct request of the FBI , and on the basis of what by the Bureau's own admission
turned out to have been a major disinformation ploy designed to win it widespread
public support."
The FBI's AIM files have thus ended up, not in the public domain as Theoharis
would have his readers believe, but amongst the Bureau's most secret archives.
While it is true, as the reviewer states, that the relatively few AIM files the FBI has
chosen to release "do not document a program of harassment," what he intention-
ally leaves unstated is even more true: the released files in themselves provide a
vastly insufficient evidentiary base from which Theoharis or anyone else might
conclusively determine whether a de facto COINTELPRO was conducted against
AIM. And sheer common sense will warn that the Bureau has not so fiercely resisted
producing its records in this matter because their content is neutral or serves to
absolve it of wrongdoing.12
"Judicial Prosecution"
The obvious question at this point is whether the FBI's success in blocking access
to AIM files makes it impossible to arrive at any legitimate conclusion concerning
what the Bureau did to that organization. Are we guilty, as Theoharis claims, of mere
reliance upon "guilt by association - i.e., that because the FBI launched a formal
program to harass the Black Panthers, it adopted the same practices against AIM"?
Hardly. Even disregarding such unofficial sources as eyewitness and victim ac-
counts of various episodes of the Bureau's anti-AIM campaign - many of which we
will always insist hold at /east as much validity and integrity as any FBI teletype, field
report or memorandum - there are still a great number of official sources which we
could and did use to support the conclusions we reached in Agents. -1
These include several reports of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, a pair of
reports of the Justice Department's Task Force on Indian Matters, a report of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Subcommittee on Internal Security), the find-
ings of the federally-sponsored Minnesota Citizens' Commission to Review the FBI,
a report from the General Accounting Office, transcripts of the 97th Congress' first
session on FBI authorizations, several legal depositions, Bureau of Prison records,

grand jury summaries, voluminous trial transcripts, an array of legal briefs and
hearing transcripts, transcriptions of oral arguments on appeal and a number of
judicial opinions. These sources, adding up to tens of thousands of pages of
documentation, were all cited repeatedly, and most of them quoted, in Agents.
Theoharis avoids mentioning this extensive documentary base - consisting of
the same sort of material he himself has drawn upon quite heavily in his own books
on the FBI - while summarily dismissing our effort as "undocumented." And well
he might. The conclusions reached in virtually every item of the real record
correspond quite neatly with one or more of those drawn in Agents. This is to say that
the tangible, officially available record of the FBI's anti-AIM campaign leads directly
away from the sort of absolution of the Bureau Theoharis seeks to foist on his
readers. It was, after all, the Civil Rights Commission - not Churchill and Vander
Wall - which determined after extensive on-site investigation that the FBI had been
complicit in rigging the 1974 Pine Ridge tribal election against AIM candidates.13
And it was this same federal agency which officially reported that the Bureau was
involved in perpetrating "a reign of terror" against AIM members and supporters
on the same reservation, during the same period."
Similarly, it was not the "tendentious" authors of Agents, but federal district
judge Fred Nichol who noted that he was dismissing charges against AIM defen-
dants because of the methods employed by the FBI and federal prosecutors. "The
waters of justice have been polluted," said the judge, by the Bureau he had "revered
so long," but which had "stooped so low" in its vendetta against AIM." And again,
it was not us but the foreman of a federal jury who, when acquitting other AIM
defendants of murder charges the FBI had lodged against them, observed that
aspects of the case assembled by the Bureau had been so obviously fabricated that
not a member of the jury believed them." We could, as we did in Agents, go on in this
vein for hundreds of pages. But that book has already been written.
The last two examples are especially important, however, since they disprove
Theoharis' argument that, "in contrast to its activities against the Black Pan-
thers...the FBI's activities involving AIM were designed to result in judicial prosecu-
tion." The first untruth embedded in this proposition is that the COINTELPRO
directed against the Panthers did not use false prosecution as a tactic." The reality
is, as is borne out in a Bureau document quoted verbatim in Agents, "key black
activists" were repeatedly arrested "on any excuse" until "they could no longer
make bail." As an illustration of how this worked, we examined in some detail the
case of former Panther leader Geronimo Pratt, imprisoned in San Quentin for the
past 18 years as a result of FBI actions causing him to be repeatedly prosecuted on
bogus charges until he was finally convicted of a murder the Bureau had knew he
never committed."
As concerns AIM, the facts - which Theoharis opts to ignore - fit precisely the
same pattern. After the 1973 siege of Wounded Knee, for instance, the FBI caused 542
separate charges to be filed against those it identified as "key AIM leaders." Russell
Introduction 7
Means alone was faced with 37 felony and three misdemeanor charges. Organiza-
tion members often languished in jail for months as the cumulative bail required to
free them outstripped resource capabilities of AIM and supporting groups. Yet,
when it came time for the trials, the transparency of the Bureau's evidence was such
that hundreds of charges were simply dropped while the remaining defendants
were acquitted in droves. The net result of this FBI "prosecution" effort was an
absurdly low 15 convictions, all on such petty or contrived "offenses" as "interfering
with a federal officer in the performance of his duty." None of the 40 charges leveled
at Means held up in court.19But, while the juridical nature of what the Bureau was
doing may be seen as ludicrous at best, this "prosecutorial" element of the anti-AIM
campaign self-evidently served to "disrupt," "destabilize" and even "cripple" its
target.
At another level, one might reasonably ask what sort of bona fide "investigation
to facilitate prosecution" is involved in FBI agents bribing an individual, as they did
with Louis Moves Camp, to testify as an "eyewitness" to the participation of others
in felonious acts allegedly committed at a time when the witness was a thousand
miles from the scene?" This is just one of the "Bureau activities involving AIM"
which came out during the 1974 trial of Russell Means and Dennis Banks, the sort
of activity which caused Judge Nichol to dismiss charges and write the opinion
quoted earlier. The same query might be entered with regard to other of the FBI's
efforts to secure conviction of AIM members. For example, what sort of legitimacy
is it that attaches itself to the arrangement in which charges were dropped against
Marvin Redshirt, confessed murderer of Los Angeles cab driver George Aird, in
exchange for his admittedly perjured testimony against AIM members Paul
"Skyhorse" Durant and Richard "Mohawk" Billings, men who were subsequently
exonerated from having any part in the crime?"
We can easily go on framing such questions: What, exactly, is the difference
between the way the FBI subverted the judicial system to "get results" during its
COINTELPROs against "black extremists," and its well-documented kidnapping
and raw coercion of a mentally unbalanced Indian woman, Myrtle Poor Bear, in
order to force her to sign three mutually contradictory-and utterly false- affidavits;
the Bureau's choice of the affidavits was, to be sure, duly submitted in court as an
expedient to obtaining AIM member Leonard Peltier's extradition from Canada."
For that matter, what is the precise distinction between the COINTELPRO usage of
phony witnesses such as Julio Butler in order to obtain the murder conviction of
Geronimo Pratt on the one hand, and the FBI's later use of Poor Bear in the same
capacity to secure a murder conviction against AIM member Richard Marshall on
the other?" And again, what are we to make of FBI agents who went on the stand
and testified to one thing in the murder trial of AIM members Dino Butler and Bob
Robideau, only to reverse completely their testimony on the same events during the
subsequent trial of Leonard Peltier on the same charge?
Obviously, the documented nature of the FBI's activities "designed to result in
judicial prosecution" of AIM members was identical to those it employed under the
rubric of COINTELPRO against the Black Panther Party and other black liberation
organizations. For Theoharis to argue that the Bureau's "prosecutorial" tactics
against AIM are normal FBI procedure not only tends to dissolve the very distinction
between the COINTELPRO and "post-COINTELPRO" eras he seeks to establish, it
bespeaks a very interesting view on his part of how the judicial process should be
used.
Theoharis does make an important and serious point when he observes that the
Panther COINTELPRO was "action-oriented" in ways which went beyond any
conceivable definition of the judicial arena. We agree. So much so that, in Agents, we
broke the tactical methodologies of COINTELPRO out into 10 separate categories,
only one of which concerned manipulation of the judicial system, and demonstrated
by example how each had been applied to the Panthers and other black liberation
groups. This, however, hardly serves to validate either his assertion of a "contrast"
between what was done to the Panthers and AIM, or his contention that the latter
was not subjected to a comparable "program of harassment." To the contrary, we
also demonstrated, on the basis of available documentation, that each of the remain-
ing nine non-judicial COINTELPRO methods was utilized during the repression of
AIM.
Take, for example, the category of "black propaganda." In the book, we quote
verbatim one of the FBI's "Dog Soldier Teletypes," deliberately released to the press
in 1976 under the guise of alerting the public to the "fact" that some "2,000 AIM
warriors" were on the verge of launching an outlandish wave of terrorism through-
out South Dakota. We cite a number of articles in major newspapers across the
country in which this disinformation immediately and prominently appeared, as
well as statements by local police authorities responding to the "menace." And we
quote then-director of the FBI Clarence Kelley, on the witness stand shortly there-
after, admitting that he knew of no factual basis whatsoever to support these wild
public allegations on the part of his typically close-mouthed Bureau. Several other
instances of FBI activity visa vis AIM in the propaganda area are also chronicled and
substantiated with comparable documentation in Agents."
Or, take the matter of the COINTELPRO tactic of infiltrating agents provocateurs
into target organizations (provocateurs, as opposed to mere informants, are used to
actively and illegally disrupt, entrap and otherwise neutralize their quarry). In
Agents, we present an undeniable case that this was done to AIM in exactly the same
fashion as it was done to the Panthers. The matter concerns the activities of one
Douglass Durham, and is abundantly documented through such sources as the
earlier-mentioned Skyhorse/Mohawk case (during which FBI undercover em-
ployee Durham went on the stand impersonating an "Iowa psychologist" in order
to cause bail to be denied the defendants), the provocateur's own admission of what
he'd done after he was unmasked as an infiltrator in 1975, and his subsequent
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. And so it goes, point
by point, down the entire list of elements comprising the Bureau's COINTELPRO
repertoire.
Introduction 9
All of this disproves Theoharis' assertion that, when it came to AIM, the FBI's
methods "were designed [only] to result in [legitimate] judicial prosecution." It also
contradicts his accusation that, in conduding otherwise, we were forced to rely upon
sheer "guilt by association." And, by rights, it should expose for what it really is the
reviewer's allegation that "at no time do [we] substantiate [our] conjecture that an
FBI-orchestrated conspiracy to harass AIM." Contrary to the fabricated version of
reality presented in the Post review, it has been solidly demonstrated that the
American Indian Movement was very much the victim of a de facto COINTELPRO
operation.
Mythology
Merely being on the receiving end of a disingenuous review, while never

pleasant, hardly warrants the assembly of an in-depth counter-critique such as we
have provided here. At issue here, however, is not just the fact that Theoharis used
his mainstream media forum as a vehicle with which to prevent accurate informa-
tion from reaching the public, but the kinds of inaccuracies he seeks to promulgate
as a replacement. It is not so much that he denies the validity of the way in which we
used our documentation in Agents, for example, as that he denies such documenta-
tion exists. The upshot here is that he deliberately portrays the FBI - which in
actuality went to extraordinary lengths to block disclosure of its AIM files in the
1970s, and which has clamped the tightest mantle of secrecy around them ever since
- as a model of propriety, thoroughly forthcoming and above-board in the handling
of these records, with nothing hidden about its anti-AIM campaign. The image
projected by Theoharis' reference to a fictional "release" of AIM files is that the
Bureau - which in reality has once again taken to treating the Freedom of Informa-
tion and Privacy Acts as so much toilet paper, generally refusing to release any new
document unless expressly required to do so by court order - is that of an "open"
agency which typically makes its records available to researchers and the public at
large. The resultant mis-impression is a building block in the reviewer's reasonably
subtle construction of the real "contrast" he wishes to impart concerning what was
done to the Black Panther Party and what was done to AIM. The locus of the false
distinction Theoharis is after lies not so much within the experiences of the two
groups as within the FBI itself.
In "the bad old days" of COINTELPRO, the story goes, the Bureau was proven
to have committed criminal acts and used official secrecy to conceal them, but those
days ended forever in the wake of the Church Committee investigations. When an
FBI agent like Richard W. Held orchestrated a program in 1971 to disrupt and
destroy the Los Angeles Black Panther Party, Theoharis agrees that this was a
political counterintelligence program because FBI documents released to the Church
Committee concerning these activities bore the caption "COINTELPRO." However,
when the same agent was involved in the same type of program using exactly the
same techniques against AIM on the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1975 or the Puerto
Rican independence movement in San Juan in 1985, Theoharis would have us

believe this could not have been a COINTELPRO because the FBI has not released
related documents bearing said caption. And, according to him, for us to assert
otherwise is by definition simply "guilt by association."" The pacifying effect upon
readers intended by the spooning up of this stale pabulum is unmistakable. And for
the relative few who might remain skeptical in the face of this sort of reassurance,
the reviewer offers a slightly different tranquilizer. They are calmly handed the
option of sharing "the authors' outrage over some of the Bureau's [post-
COINTELPRO] investigative methods and the fairness of the American legal system
[emphasis added]," as if in the end we had somehow all agreed that it is only
investigative rather than counterintelligence techniques which are at issue, and that
the actions of the FBI in this quarter conform to some recognizable system of legality.
The invitation extended to skeptics is thus no more than a final touch to the review's
main purpose, a ruse designed not only to divert the last measure of attention away
from what is contained in Agents, but to posit in its stead an impression of the
reviewer's preferred version of reality.
We have arrived at the core of the myth, perpetuation of which constitutes the
real purpose of reviews such as Theoharis'. This is, and has always been, the central
myth of the FBI. Regardless of the variations and complexities of the lesser mytholo-
gies required to support it at a given moment or given context, it has remained
r
remarkably consistent and ultimately reducible to the simplest terms: "Don't worry,
everythingisOKnow." No matter when or in what circumstances the Bureau has been
called to account, its official spokespeople and unofficial apologists can be counted
upon to queue up and say whatever is necessary to pass along the idea that, while
there may have been "problems" or "errors" in the past, these have been corrected.
There has never been, in such recountings, any current reason for worry or concern.
All has already been set right.
This theme prevailed in the 1920s, in the wake of the Palmer Raids. It was main-
tained in the '30s, after the worst of the Bureau's union busting had been completed.
It continued in the '40s, when the true extent of the FBI's surveillance of the citizenry
began to be apparent. During the '50s, it held up even as the Bureau's linkages to Mc-
Carthyism were exposed. In the '60s, those who would pose uncomfortable ques-
tions concerning FBI activities were, like Martin Luther King, dismissed as liars and
"paranoids." Even during the 1970s, as the COINTELPRO revelations were ushered
forth, the myth was used as the Bureau's major defense. And in the end, as always,
it held sway. Meanwhile, through it all, the apparatus of political repression which
the myth was created to shield continued, essentially unhindered by real public
scrutiny of any sort, to be evolved, perfected and applied.
As we enter the '90s, the FBI's slaughter of "AIM militants" has long since been
completed and hidden from view. CISPES (Committee in Solidarity with the People
of El Salvador) and some 200 other domestic dissident groups have more recently
found themselves monitored, disrupted and occasionally destabilized by Bureau
operatives using many of the same COINTELPRO tactics employed against "New
Introduction 11
Left" organizations two decades ago." And still Professor Theoharis would have us
believe the FBI no longer engages in political counterintelligence programs and
when evidence emerges to the contrary, the Bureau (not the victims) should be given
every benefit of the doubt.
We readily concur with his assessment that these are "important questions of
decided contemporary relevance." Unlike him, however, we will continue to
conclude that their importance lies in the fact that, concerning the form and function
of the FBI, things have never been "OK." Further, we will continue to assert that
things will never be OK in this regard until the realities both he and the Bureau seek
so desperately to hide are brought fully into the open, until the whole pattern of FBI
performance has at last been pieced completely together, called by its right name
and placed before the public. Then, perhaps, real corrective action can occur.
Unquestionably, the start of any such positive process must rest in destroying the
myth Theoharis so clearly presents.
Citation of materials not readily accessible to the general public is not in itself
sufficient to decide such issues, and this takes us right back to the proposition that
a picture is worth a thousand words. Therefore, in this follow-up volume to Agents
we will photographically reproduce a substantial selection of the FBI documents
which led us to the conclusions expressed in Agents. Hence, when we say, for
example, that the Bureau was engaged from its earliest moments in precisely the
same tactics of political repression which later marked the COINTELPRO era per se,
we do not intend to leave the matter open to debate or charges of "conjecture."
Instead, we will provide the exact facsimile of a document - such as the accompa-
nying 1919 letter written by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover proposing a strategy which
was ultimately used to neutralize black nationalist leader Marcus Garvey- allowing
the Bureau itself to create a "word picture" concretizing our case for us.
As concerns the Garvey letter, readers should take careful note of the fact, clearly
drawn by Hoover, that it is not written about an individual who is believed to have
violated (or is planning to violate) any particular law. To the contrary, the FBI
director is recommending - to the very sort of Justice Department officials whose
"review" Theoharis would have us believe now safeguards us against such FBI
activities - that the federal government devote its vast legal resources to contriving
a case, any case, against Garvey, to make him appear guilty of a crime. In this way,
the black dissident's eventual imprisonment could be made to seem a simple
"criminal matter" rather than the act of political repression it actually was. The key
to understanding what really happened in the Garvey case lies squarely in appre-
ciation of the fact that the decision to bring about his elimination had been made at
the highest level of the Bureau long before any hint of criminal conduct could be
attached to him.
In the same vein, when we contend that upon approval of Hoover's plan the FBI
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
WACNIN5TON,D.C .
October 11, 1919.
111M0:1.11DUM ?OR
I am transmitting herewith a communication which 1,18 come

to my attention from the Panama Cara, Washington offioe, rela-
tive to the activities of MARCUS G.ARV3Y. Garvey is a West-
Indian negro and in addition to his activities in endeavoring
to establish the Black Star Line Steamahip Corporation he has
also been particularly active among the radical elements in
New York City in agitating the negro movement. Unfortunately,
however, he has not as yet violated any federal law whereby
he could be proceeded against on the grounds of being an un-
desirable alien, from the point of view of deportation. It
ocours to me, however, from the attached olipring that there
might be some proceeding against him for fraud in connection
with his Black Star Line propaganda and for this reason I em
transmitting the oommunication to you for your appropriate
attention.
The following is a brief statement of Marcus Garvey and

his activities;
Subject a native of the West Indies and one of the most
prominent negro agitators in New York;
He is a founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Asso-
ciation and African Communities League;
He is the promulgator of the Black Star Line and is the
managing editor of the Negro World;
He is an exoeptiona1,4 fine orator, creating much excitement
among the negroes through his steamship proposition;
In his paper the "Negro ?forld" the Soviet Russian Rule is
upheld and there is open advooation of Bolshevism.
Respectfully,
.Na
1919 letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, proposing

to frame Marcus Garvey as a means of "neutralizing" the black
nationalist leader's political effectiveness.
used infiltrators against Garvey's non-criminal,United Negro Improvement Asso-

ciation (UNIA) in order to cast about for some kind of "evidence" through which a
plausible case against its leader could be developed, we are prepared to back it up.
For instance, we can reproduce the 1921 report to the Bureau from James Wormley
Jones, code-named "Confidential Agent 800," a black man paid by the Bureau to
work his way into a position of trust within UNIA. It should be noted that even with
this highly-placed source of inside information, the FBI was unable to assemble any
sort of case against Garvey in its first two attempts, both of which had to be
abandoned for lack of even the appearance of substance. In the end, having charged
him with everything from income tax evasion to conspiracy, the Bureau managed
Introduction 13
A report from James Wormley

Jones, the "confidential agent
800" who infiltrated UNIA and
helped finger Marcus Garvey
for the FBI.
r. I OTANI
f L-
11111,10 N ISVLITYNIONI
OiC43., hot 21214101

*II.IrMfI waves
411,
"'"'
to obtain a conviction on only a single, relatively minor, count of mail fraud. This was
enough, however, to take the black leader out of the political arena and into Atlanta
federal prison, from whence he could be deported as an "undesirable alien" in
1927.27
Or, if we wish to leap three decades ahead and assert that comparable methods
were utilized by the Bureau vis a vis "liberal" government officials such as Alger Hiss
- an expedient in promoting McCarthyism and the Red Scare of the late 1940s and
early '50s - we can produce documents to this effect. For example, consider the
accompanying letter from Horace Schmahl to FBI agent Thomas Spencer. Schmahl,
it should be noted, was an ostensible private investigator retained by Hiss defense
attorneys to ferret out evidence which would exonerate their client from charges
he'd used a position in the State Department to spy for the Soviet Union. In actuality,
Schmahl was reporting directly to the Bureau on every nuance of the defense
strategy, a matter which undoubtedly proved a great boon in the government's
securing of a conviction.
The particular missive from Schmahl we reproduce is especially interesting
because it shows him alerting the FBI to Hiss' attorneys' plans to argue on appeal
that the key piece of evidence introduced by the government at the trial - a
HORACE SCHMAHL
TRIAL PREPARATION
TEL. DI4-1795 62 William Street
•New York, New York
Robert S. Gilson,Jr.
Edward F. Camber
Associates
22 November 1950
Mr. Thomas Spencer, Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Court House
Foley Square
New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Spencers
Today I had a visit from Mr. J. Howard Haring, the hand-
writing expert who had been retained upon your suggestion by Mr.
McLean in the origional Hiss investigation. I had an occasion to
use Mr. Haring on some other matter, and he told me that Mr. Lock-
wood had recently called on him, accompanied by an attorney named
Lane. Mr. Haring told me that Messers. Lockwood and Lane had with
them a typewriter expert named Tytel. According to Mr. Haring,
Lockwood and Lane proposed to retain Mr. Haring to assist Mr. Tytel
in some task which he had undertaken upon the request of Messrs.
Lockwood and Lane in anticipation of a new trial in the Hiss case.
It appears that Tytel had been retained by Mr. Hiss'
attorneys to reconstruct a Woodstock typewriter which would have
the identical type characteristics as the machine on which the
Whittaker Chambers papers had been typed. It seems furthermore
that Tytel is doing this work with the aid of typed records only.
He claims that he has not seen or had any physical contact with
the Woodstock typewriter which figured in the original trial.
Tytel told Mr. Haring that he expected to testify in this anticipated
new trial that he had been able to reproduce a machine having the
same type characteristics as the machine introduced in the course
of the oriainal trial without ever having seen the machine. This
would appear to indicate that Hiss' new counsel might try to argue
that the Whittaker Chambers papers, on the basis of which Hiss was
convicted, were forgeries produced on a machine other than the
Fansler Woodstock typewriter which had been doctored up to match
the type of that machine. Mr. Tytel furthermore told Mr. Haring
that in the course of his efforts to produce a Woodstock typewriter
which would match the type characteristics of the original machine,
he went "form blind". Mr. Haring tells me that "form blindness"
is an occupational ailment that sometimes befalls handwriting or
typewriting experts when they concentrate strenuously on certain
types of print or writing over a period of time. Tyel wanted to
Letter demonstrating that the private investigator supposedly working on Alger Hiss'
defense effort was actually reporting to the FBI.
Woodstock typewriter once owned by Hiss, the type irregularities of which suppos-
edly matched those appearing in alleged espionage correspondence - could have
been altered to produce the desired result. Schmahl's warning allowed the Bureau
Introduction 15
Page 2 - Mr. Thomas Spencer

retain Hering to complete his work. Haring, who is a good patriotic
American, said that he would have none of it and suggested that
Messrs. Lockwood, Lane and Tytel leave his office.
Mr. Kenneth Simon left with my secretary an affidavit
obviously prepared by Mr. Rosenwald, which he wanted me to sign.
I refused to sign this affidavit. However, I am sending you here-
with enclosed a copy of it for your files.
I expect to be pretty well tied up for the remainder of
this week and therefore, find it difficult to drop-up and see you
personally.
I would prefer that you destroy this letter after it has
served your purpose. I remain, with my very best personal regards
to yourself and Mr. McAndrews.
Faithfully yours,
Horace Schmahl
P.S. Needless to say that any other information that will come into
my hands will be promptly submitted to you.
sufficient time to assemble a countering argument that no such modifications to a

typewriter were possible. When we say the FBI was aware that its counter-argument
- which served to keep the government's "proof of espionage" propaganda cam-
paign alive (and Hiss in prison) was categorically untrue, we can make our case by
reproducing the accompanying January 1951 memo from A.H. Belmont to D.M.
Ladd in which the author admits the "FBI Laboratory advised that it would be
possible for a person who is well versed in typewriter defects and similarities in type
design to construct a typewriter so that it would make these defective characteristics
appear on paper when the machine was used." Instructively, both documents were
among the many thousands of pages in its Hiss files the Bureau kept secret for nearly
three decades after the case was closed."
Both of the examples used thus far have seemed to demonstrate that the reality
of COINTELPRO greatly predates the formal adoption of the acronym during the
mid-1950s. If, on the other hand, we wish to demonstrate that this reality has
continued to exist after the FBI so pointedly abandoned the term in 1971, we can
readily illustrate our point. We can, for example, simply reproduce the accompany-
ing September 1983 teletype concerning the infiltration of an agent with "extensive
UC [undercover] experience" into the Dallas chapter of CISPES. And lest the reader
be persuaded the Bureau was doing this because it genuinely believed the organi-
zation was engaged (or planning to engage) in bona fide criminal activities -
"terrorism," according to current FBI director William Sessions - attention should
- Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES

•
TO i lfr. D. 11. Ladd DATE: January .:32, 19,57
/ :r,
PROM : A. h. Belmont '
SUBJECT: JAY LAUD c
-•
1-V.WJlh.r
ESPI,3PA,7E — R
?flit 49:;i7
14tk
.cre.4
To oev:se that the Piss attorneys havoattempted
to construct a :.,'oodstocktypeWi;iter which will have the
same t:jinn cTwrocteristics as the typing on the Chambers
documents used an evidence in this case; that by. pure conjecture
they apparently intend to show that (Members had"conotructed
a nodstocFr typewriter on which Chanbers typed these documents,
and that they, too, can construct a similar typewriter ,from
the typing characteristias on the Chamhars documents; that they
are also eneelvoring to prove that the film an which the "punJi7in
papers" vere,photoraphed was not manufactured in 1935, but
was manufactured at a later date. The F;II_Laborotory advised
.1"thnt it mould he pose:ble far c persnr. who is i:;e11 veras(: in
.ypewriterdt:;ects and similcriti,..8 of type design to construct
la Aypowritcr so that it would make these deiective characteristics
Ilapacar on wiperper wben the machine was used; that if the .Fiss •
atAorneys pi subseuently had a machine "doctored" to produce
the defects appearing in the 64 Chambers documents used by
DT?e Laboratory technician in his testimony in court, .and
,those only, then they could easily have made a ernve error,
inasmuch. as every d(fIcrent character that mokl: its appe7ranCe
id, the 54 dOcument• would h'-ue to to studied oc..e."ully and the
tape faces '!fixed" :n he typewriter; that .not .:nly would the
• defects discovered the Laboratory have to be identical, • .
but the reconstructed typewriter would have to aye all of
•. its own characteristic letter defects eliminated and all of •
the characteristics adpearing on the 54 documents. SAC
• Donegan and USA. .3(wpol hove been fully advised of defense
tactics and they contemplate no action until such tine as the
P 4efense files a motion for a new trill based on newly—discoyered
evidence.
PAÎMROUNP EX - 75 --ED k- —41W%
You will recall that Alger Rise...Way fliOvh.a:mainlY

FErfr.
00
on the Oovernment!s presentation in evidence"oj . 64.typewritten
.documents
..._.. produced by Whittakr Chambers, mhich.he claimed were
FLJ:eas;(njf) 1 665A
.•. ,
!=. vI.r, 4-
ta , r
. :,
Although federal prosecutors in the case of Alger Hiss contended that it would be
impossible to alter Hiss' typewriter to match incriminating documents, here we find the
FBI acknowledging the reverse was true. Upon advice of the Bureau, the government con-
tinued to deny the possibility of alteration during Hiss' appeal.
b RELLivEL,
jELETrpr 1.4 7
NO0 .7.D4 314 ISIZZ
C..„RN^ Di_
pc pa] (4„,..)
FA {0 Nli':5 3g,,
OF „,,,,:ionfrOiA
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FM Fri ORLEANS] (199C - 5 (P)
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DALLAS (1990-795) R TIRE
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Teletype proposing actions against CISPES because of its "defiance," 1983.
politically objectionable to the Bureau — no more, or less — and was therefore

deliberately targeted for repression. COINTELPRO by any other name is still
COINTELPRO.29
The collection of FBI self-portraits contained herein is far from exhaustive. There
are several reasons for this, beginning, of course, with the fact that so many of the
Bureau's documents remain secret. Conversely, the material which has been re-
leased runs into hundreds of thousands of pages, most portions of which are
Introduction 19
v.
GC: hSC -3 33 erre.F724
. . DENA:" Y DISPLAY THEIR b hp

OD ■
,TS rET FOR THE U.S. GOVERREFT EY MAKING SPEECHES An P:OPAGA -
IZ THEIR CAUSE WHILE ASKING FOR POLITICAL tsyLur.Alitj

71 07LEA KS IS - OF THE orirIor THAT DEPAPTME !ITS CF JUSTICE
A'^ STATE SHOULD ES CO”SULTED TO EXPLORE THE POSS.'S IL ITT OF
rrP011'IvG THESE I'D IVIDUALS OR AT BEST DEFYING THEIR PE -ENTRY
VCS THEY LEAVE. gaj
1 .11".. - 11600111.
gr"=B-r-"r7?m"
=22 - i %11)
1;gmliz2f
TTJ (1
redundant, a seemingly endless repetition of the same theme. Many thousands of

the documents released over the years were provided in such poor quality that they
are simply impossible to reproduce with enough clarity to render them legible in
book format. Still others were released in such deleted form as to be useless in any
way at all (examples of this are provided in Chapter 1). A final problem presents it-
self in that the Bureau has run so many of these sorts of counterintelligence
operations, and over such an extended period, that any attempt to offer a compre-
hensive, start-to-finish exposition would inevitably prove too bulky for a single
volume, or even a dozen volumes.
Some means of not only organizing, but limiting the material we wish to present
has therefore been necessary. The method we have employed has been to focus our
attention on several of the entities the FBI itself has targeted for its fiercest attacks:
the Puertorriquefto independence movement, the black liberation movement (par-
ticularly the Black Panther Party), and the American Indian Movement. Addition-
ally, we will provide sections illustrating the tactics employed against a new left
organization, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and two of the old left, the
Communist Party, USA (CP,USA) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).3° In each
case, given constraints of available space, we will provide background narrative to
"ground" our study, to provide readers with insights into the specific historical and
topical contexts from which the COINTELPROs emerged and functioned, both
socially and politically. In each instance, we also provide an overview of FBI
counterintelligence operations visa vis the Bureau's COINTELPRO targets since
such things were supposedly stopped in 1971.
Most of the documentary material, with the exception of that concerning AIM,
is drawn directly from the period when COINTELPRO reigned in its own name.
This is partly because the documents are virtually crystalline in their representation
of what the FBI's domestic counterintelligence operations are all about. It is also
because, like the official non-Bureau sources we utilized in Agents, they provide so
obvious a basis from which to understand the meaning underlying the FBI's AIM
documents. The lines of continuity between the "pre-COINTELPRO," COIN-
TELPRO and "post-COINTELPRO" eras are thereby dramatically underscored,
and perhaps as a result an increasing number of activists can learn to recognize them
from their own recent experiences. If so, this volume will have amply served its
purpose, for in such recognition may be forged the means by which we may
surmount the process of official political repression which has served for so long to
abort the potential for positive social change in the United States. In our view,
participation in the fostering of such change is the sole defensible motivation for
anyone to engage in the acts of writing or publishing at the present time.
Clearly, there were many reasons for our doing this book, but it was the outlook
expressed immediately above which ultimately proved decisive. In the end, we have
assembled The COINTELPRO Papers, not simply to vindicate Agents of Repression, or
to have another bibliographical entry in the curriculum vita, but to amplify the con-
clusions we reached in that volume. Simultaneously, we have sought to create a
readily accessible mini-archive which will ultimately say more than we ever could.
We have felt a responsibility to do this because the sad fact is that COINTELPRO
lives. We must all learn its face. Only in unmasking it can we ever hope to destroy
it and move forward to our more constructive goals and objectives.
Ward Churchill & Jim Vander Wall
Boulder, Colorado
- May 1990 -
The FBI, by infiltrating and spying on selected groups in American society, arro-
gated to itself the role of a thought police. It decided which groups were legitimate,
and which were a danger — by FBI standards — to the Republic. It took sides in social
and political conflicts...deciding, for example, that those who opposed the war in
Vietnam, or whose skin was black, should be targets for FBI attention. Since the FBI
acted secretly, it distorted the political process by covertly acting against certain
groups and individuals. In short, the FBI filled the classic role of a secret political
police.
— David Wise —
The American Police State
Chapter 1
Understanding Deletions in
FBI Documents
We must be prepared to surrender a small measure of our liberties in order
to preserve the great bulk of them.
- Clarence M. Kelley -
FBI Director
1975
Anyone having opportunity to review documents released by the FBI immedi-

ately encounters the fact that in most cases portions of the original document have
been deleted. In some instances, this may consist of only a name or a few words;
elsewhere, the entire text of documents has been obliterated (see accompanying
examples) prior to their having been "made available" to the public. In such cases,
Bureau censors will almost always scribble a code or series of codes - (b)(1)(b), for
example - in the margins of each page, explaining the statutory basis upon which
they decided to withhold particular bits of information. In order to understand not
only the codes, but their underlying basis, it is necessary to review the evolution of
such "exemptions."
"National Security"
The origins of the FBI's ability to declare its documents (or portions thereof)
secret by reason that their release might "compromise the security of the United
States" lie in two executive orders handed down during the early 1950s. The first was
Harry Truman's EO-10290 (16 FR 9795, Sept. 25,1951) which extended the military
system of national security classification over certain nominally civilian police and
intelligence agencies engaged in counter-espionage and counterintelligence opera-
tions directed at "agents of foreign powers hostile to the United States." The Truman
order provided that the Bureau might withhold, even from courts of law, documents
deriving from such pursuits under four classifications: "Security Information - Top
Secret," "Security Information - Secret," "Security Information- Confidential," and
"Security Information - Restricted."
Two years later, President Dwight D. Eisenhower effected EO-10501 (18 FR
7050, Nov. 10, 1953) which revised the classification system to include only three
23
rerawq 3aw1910
CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED EC /;-6,
F.EASCH FC;R EXTENSION jf$SONAL
FCIM, II, 1-2.4 2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION J •
The people's right to know. Information "released" by the FBI on the

Rosenberg espionage case more than 30 years after the fact. Such exten-
sive deletion in Bureau investigative documents is not at all uncommon.
To the contrary, it has become normative under Ronald Reagan's E.O.
12356 if, indeed, documents are released at all.
Understanding Deletions in FBI Documents 25
categories: "Top Secret," "Secret," and "Confidential." The Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (68 Stat. 921) then added a fourth classification designated as "Restricted Data."
Operating behind the shield of this series of headings, the Bureau also developed a
sequence of internal classifications of its own: "Strictly Confidential," "Sensitive,"
"JUNE," and even "Do Not File." Taken together, this complex of security classifi-
cations was sufficient to hide virtually the entirety of the FBI's proliferating political
action files for a full decade.
In 1964, congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 80 Stat. 250),
designed and intended to provide citizen access to government files. However, in
passing the act, congress failed to challenge the prerogative of the federal executive
to simply declare whole bodies of information secret for reasons of national security.
Instead, the act allowed agencies such as the FBI to exempt material they felt was:
(A) Specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be
kept secret in the interest of national security and (B) are in fact properly classified
pursuant to such executive order.
This loophole allowed the Bureau to continue hiding its political files for another
decade. With the COINTELPRO revelations of the early '70s demonstrating just
what kind of documents the FBI was withholding, however, congress amended the
FOIA in 1974 (P.L. 93-502) to provide that Bureau claims to national security
exemption would be subject to in camera review by federal district courts to
determine whether the classification assigned file materials in given cases was
actually appropriate. This procedure may seem at first glance to represent a solution
to the problem. But, as has been noted elsewhere:
The courts have shown reluctance to exercise their new power. Too often, despite
notorious abuses by many agencies of the power to classify documents, courts have
accepted at face value an agency's allegation that information has been properly
classified, and have refused to examine the documents for themselves.1
Part of the problem may have been initially that as of the date the amended FOIA
took effect (February 1975), even the lowest ("confidential") national security
classification was still defined quite subjectively under Richard M. Nixon's E0-
11652 (37 FR 5209, March 8, 1972) as material of which "unauthorized disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security."2In 1978,
President Jimmy Carter signed EO-12065 (43 FR 28950, July 3, 1978), defining the
classification somewhat more stringently: "'Confidential' shall be applied to infor-
mation, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause
identifiable damage to the national security [emphasis added]." Section 1-101 of this
order also stipulated that, "if there is a reasonable doubt which classification ['Top
Secret,"Secret,' or 'Confidential'] is appropriate, or whether the information should
be classified at all, the less restrictive designation should be used, or the information
should not be classified." Both points were reiterated in a separate directive to the
recently-formed Interagency Classification Review Committee (43 FR 46280, Oct. 2,
1978).
In its amended form, the FOIA makes no allowance at all for restricting informa-
tion on the basis of "national security," providing instead that classification must
pertain to matters genuinely affecting "national defense" and "foreign policy."
Carter's executive order and corresponding ICRC directive follow suit, at least to the
extent that they define valid national security concerns as being only those matters
clearly bearing on "the national defense and foreign policy of the United States."
Section 1-601 of the order also specifies that "classification may not be used to
conceal violations of the law, inefficiency, an administrative error, to prevent
embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency, or to restrict competition."
As a domestic police agency, the FBI has—by definition— relatively little real role
to play in either national defense or foreign policy. This is all the more true when the
targets of the Bureau's attentions are U.S. citizens rather than "aliens" or "agents of
foreign powers" supposedly operating within the country. Yet, anyone examining
those documents the Bureau has "released" for public scrutiny will discover myr-
iad instances in which text has been blacked out, with an accompanying "(b)(1)"
notation indicating this was done for reasons of national security. The text of entire
documents is often deleted on this basis, as was the case with some 95,000 pages
pertaining to the Rosenberg case alone. Further, as Ann Mari Buitrago and Leon
Andrew Imrnennan have pointed out:
The FBI has also been known to "white" out classification markings entirely, so that
the reader cannot tell whether the markings had ever been made. This is an
unjustifiable practice unless — as is quite unlikely — the markings themselves are
exempt under the FOIA.3
These deletion practices have been patently illegal sin 1975 when the amended
FOIA took effect and were even more so in light of President Carter's instructions
in 1978. Hence, although no FBI employees were ever penalized for their blatantly
consistent violation of the law in this regard, occasional court victories forced se-
lected batches of documents into the open. In April 1983, however, Ronald Reagan
signed E0-12356 (48 FR 6304, April 9,1983), effectively authorizing the Bureau and
other U.S. intelligence agencies to withhold documents as they saw fit' While this
does not in itself legalize the FBI's documentary misconduct, it greatly confuses the
issue, making it as difficult to force the Bureau to reveal its files as it was in the late
1960s.
Police Records
The FOIA offers another set of loopholes, collectively know as the "(b)(7)
exemptions," through which the FBI has routinely passed en route to deleting
information. The statutory language at issue allows the Bureau to withhold:
...investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with law enforcement
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication,
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a
confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by any agency
conducting a lawful national security investigation, confidential information fur-
nished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
Taken together, these provide an umbrella under which the Bureau can hide
(and has hidden) many things. A particularly striking example concerns the use of
the (b) (7) (a) category: the FBI has consistently sought to employ it, but has argued
that FOIA applicants should not even be informed that it was being employed
insofar as such notification might alert the subjects of investigations that there was
(or had been) an investigation of them, and that the investigation was (or had been)
in regard to suspected criminal activities. By the same token, says the Bureau,
notifying applicants officially that there was no investigation of their activities
might serve to allow them to continue criminal conduct "secure in the knowledge
that the FBI is not yet on their trail." Thus, in simplest terms, the Bureau holds that
it should be able to use the (b)(7)(a) exemption whenever it wants, but the exemption
itself should be considered exempt within the "spirit" of the FOIA. As is usually the
case, the FBI has simply proceeded to put its novel interpretation of the law into
practice from time to time; hence, one finds occasional passages blacked out by
Bureau censors without provision of accompanying code notations in the margins.
While struggling to prevent its reliance upon (b)(7)(a) from becoming a part of
the record, the Bureau has, on the other hand, indulged itself spectacularly in the use
of (b)(7)(c), ostensibly to "protect the privacy" of third parties mentioned in docu-
ments, but who were not themselves subject to the investigation in question. This
tends to possess a certain appropriate sense until we note that the censors have often
left many, even all, genuine third party names undeleted in the documents released
while simultaneously blacking out the names of agents and FBI officials (including,
in one document we have on file, the name of director J. Edgar Hoover himself). The
latter, of course, are public officials rather than bona fide "third parties," and have
never been legally entitled to "privacy" while in performance of their public duties.
The Bureau's attempt to "reconcile" the situation has led censors to apply the
(b)(7)(c) exemption to all names of third parties and FBI personnel alike in many
documents. Bureau abuse of this exemption category was so flagrant that, in a memo
dated May 25, 1977, the Justice Department set forth guidelines intended to curtail
at least the worst manipulations:
...if the FBI has a file on John Doe —our requestor — and information has been deliber-
ately placed in that file which pertains to Richard Roe, that Roe information is
presumptively information about Doe as well and should not ordinarily be withheld
from him on 7(c) grounds. If it does not pertain to Doe, one may well ask, why is it
in the Doe file at all?...the routine excising/denial of all "third-party information"
is to cease.
The Bureau didn't comply, of course, any more than it has ever conformed to the
legal requirements that it restrict its (b)(7)(d) deletions with regard to "informer
confidentiality" to appropriate instances. Despite a June 2,1977 Justice Department
memorandum emphasizing that the FOIA explicitly prohibited such exemptions to

conceal unlawful activities on the part of the Bureau, the FBI has continued to
conceal the fruits of its "black bag jobs" (burglaries) behind wording indicating they
derive from "anonymous sources" and deleting material as if these sources were
actually human beings. Similarly, the product of ELSURS (Electronic Surveillance)
is typically referred to as coming from "confidential sources," with information
carefully deleted in such a way as to make it appear that censors are protecting live
informers.
One key to determining the type of activity at issue lies in the use of FBI internal
informant identity codes left intact in the documents:
Permanent numbers are assigned to "sensitive" sources of information — for ex-
ample "CSNY 1020-S' ("a confidential source, New York") or "CNDI5" ("a
confidential National Defense Informant"). Source numbers followed by "S" are
"security" sources; by a "C," "criminal;' by an "R," "racial." Asterisked sources are
unavailable to testify and are likely to be illegal investigative techniques...Electronic
Surveillances and burglaries are often given "S*" numbers.. .5
The FBI has also contended that it is entitled to utilize the (b)(7)(d) exemption
with regard to the identity of virtually any informant insofar as individuals
performing such a "service" have done so only on the basis of a promise of
confidentiality, either expressed or implied. For the most part, this is a categorically
false contention. Former FBI agents have pointed out that standard Bureau proce-
dure has always been to instruct informants from the outset that the FBI itself
retained the option of calling upon them to testify in open court, an understanding
by which promises of anonymity are effectively precluded.' The Bureau's conven-
ient "interpretation" of the FOIA in this connection serves to retain its power in de-
termining what (if any) information concerning informers will be released, and
facilitates its hiding of illegal intelligence-gathering techniques within the frame-
work of exemptions.
Another dubious use to which the Bureau has put the (b)(7)(d) clause has been
to consistently delete the identities of government employees and agencies which
have provided information during investigations. This is not only contrary to the
intent of the FOIA, but in direct contravention of the guidelines laid down in the
FBI's own manual, which states clearly that federal employees cannot be considered
confidential sources. Bureau censors also habitually extend this lid of secrecy to
cover the identities of state and local agencies and personnel, such as police
departments, although they have absolutely no legal authorization to do so.
Finally, as with (b)(1) exemptions, there have always been serious questions
about how the Bureau utilizes (b)(7)(d) to withhold information for reasons of
"national security." Many of the FBI's more outrageous activities have been "reclas-
sified" under national security headings in order to hide them. Although the (b)(7)
cluster of exemptions is legally bound to the 1974 FOIA Amendments Congression-
al Conference Committee definition that national security considerations exist
solely in "military security, national defense or foreign policy," as pertains to (b)(1),

...most "national security" investigations [have] had no connection to any national
security interest. Investigations other than "criminal" or "applicant" were most
often called "subversive," not "national security" cases. Such cases were conducted
under headings such as "domestic intelligence'," "internal security," "subversive
matters," "racial intelligence," or "extremist." Such cases involved domestic dis-
senters almost exclusively, with no connecting strand to national defense or foreign
relations. Yet these investigations are now, for concealment under FOIA exemp-
tions, being justified in the name of "national security." The very term "investiga-
tion" is an euphemism when, as is often the case, it denotes a program to suppress
lawful political action and speech!
As with the primary (b)(1), "national security" escape mechanism, much of this
transparently illegal Bureau manipulation of the classification system was shielded
by Ronald Reagan EO-12356 in 1983.
Other Loopholes
One might think the preceding provided more than ample latitude for the
Bureau to hide most anything it desired. Not in the view of the FBI. For instance,
deletions have often been made on the alleged basis that they are authorized through
the FOIA (b)(2) provision that reporting agencies might exempt information per-
taining exclusively to "internal administrative procedures" such as "personnel's
use of parking facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick
leave and the like."8A 1976 Supreme Court ruling added that the "general thrust of
the exemption is simply to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and
maintaining for public inspection matters in which the public could not reasonably
be expected to have an interest."
Notwithstanding these firm instructions, the Bureau has consistently "con-
strued" (b)(2) to mean that it is free to excise such things as markings referring to file
numbers, markings referring to type of investigation, records of document dissemi-
nation, case leads, agents' initials and notes synopsizing the contents of given
documents. Self-evidently, all of this might well be of legitimate interest to the
public. A May 25, 1977 Justice Department memo ostensibly ended the routine
deletion of such material, yet the FBI has persisted in blacking out whatever in the
sphere it considers "sensitive."1e An indication of what is meant by this may be
readily discerned in the fact that just one of the markings, "JUNE," refers exclusively
to unwarranted electronic surveillance and surreptitious entries. Its very appear-
ance would therefore provide prima fade evidence of illegal Bureau activity.
The notation (b)(3) seldom appears with reference to FBI deletions; when it does,
it usually refers to information associated with secret grand jury proceedings.
Although the secrecy surrounding such proceedings is objectionable in a number of
ways, it is legally valid for the Bureau to withhold such material. Similarly, the (b)(5)
exemption, allowing the withholding of documents originating in other govern-

ment agencies (such as the military, CIA, or local police departments) is seldom used
by FBI censors, although it does appear from time to time. Another occasionally used
exemption notation, "(k)(5)," derives not from the FOIA but from the Privacy Act of
1974 (88 Stat. 1896). This allows withholding of:
...investigative material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability,

eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Fed-
eral contracts, or access to classified information, but only to the extent that the
disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source who furnished
information to the Government under an express premise that the identity would be
held in confidence, or, prior to the effective date of this section [Sept. 27,1975] under
an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence.
Finally, as Buitrago and Irnmerman note, "One more 'exemption' must be

considered: one which, though not mentioned by the FOIA or PA, enables the FBI
to keep significant information from requesters. The FBI normally refuses to
provide, or inform the requester of, information unilaterally determined to be
'outside the scope of or 'not pertinent to' a request. Unfortunately, for the requester,
information kept back as 'outside the scope' maybe highly pertinent to a request. Yet
this information will not be released and its existence will be difficult to discover."11
Conclusion
Despite the considerable range of means, both legal and illegal, available to the
FBI to keep its documents (or portions of documents) secret, far more of this informa-
tion has become public than the Bureau wanted. This is due only in part to such
congressional actions as compelling disclosure of many of the Panther COIN-
TELPRO files, processes which almost automatically propel the documents thus
released into the FBI reading room. Large quantities of documents have also been
released as the result of privately generated law suits - more than 100,000 pages in
the Geronimo Pratt case alone,12another 100,000 as a result of litigation concerning
the 1969 Hampton-Clark assassinations in Chicago" - and individual FOIA re-
quests. Although each page of this material has been technically "declassified" and
introduced into the public domain, the Bureau is not required to make any special
public notice of the fact, or to make the items accessible through its reading room.
To the contrary, many such documents, once "released," are denied to a different re-
quester.
Many thousands of pages of material therefore remain isolated in the hands of
individual recipients and - for FBI purposes - almost as secret as when lodged in
Bureau archives. While much of this material is redundant, it still bears a certain
research utility since FBI censors have proven amazingly erratic in what they delete.
Material blacked out when a document is released pursuant to a given FOIA request
or court order may well appear (although other information is usually censored)
when the same document is provided with regard to a different request or order. In
the same fashion, whole documents which are withheld in a given release often
appear in the next. Comparison of multiple releases of the same document allow the
assembly of a complete, or nearly complete, version. By using this comparison
technique whole files can be assembled.
The task confronting those who wish to see as complete as possible a documen-
tary record (and research base) on FBI activities is thus not simply to try to compel
the Bureau to reveal more of its documents, although this is plainly an important and
necessary enterprise. It is also to assemble as broad as possible a selection of those
FBI materials which have already escaped from Bureau control in one place, where
they may be properly catalogued, indexed, compared and rendered generally ac-
cessible to the public. Indeed, a need has long been recognized, and on at least one
occasion seriously attempted, by progressives. The expense and sheer scale of such
effort, however, greatly outstrips the resources and capabilities of even the most
ambitious individuals and private political or legal organizations.
Still, the need is there. And it stands as mute testimony to the shallowness of
established rhetoric on "scholarship," "openness," and "the public's right to know"
that no element of government, or any major library or university, has ever
undertaken to approach the task in anything resembling a systematic and compre-
hensive way. Until someone does, it is left to each of us to gather what we can, and
to learn whatever is possible from what we gather.
Ch apter 2
COINTELPRO CP, USA

During the ten years that I was on the U.S. Intelligence Board...never once
did I hear anybody, including myself, raise the questions: "Is this course of
action which we have agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it moral and
ethical?" We never gave any thought to this realm of reasoning, because we
were just naturally pragmatists. The one thing we were concerned with
was this: will this course of action work, will it get us what we want, will
it reach the objective we desire to reach? J
— William C. Sullivan —
Former FBI Assistant Director
1975
The FBI's first formally designated COINTELPRO was directed against the
Communist Party, USA (CP or CP,USA).2It was initiated by a closely guarded
memorandum written by Director J. Edgar Hoover to a select group of officials
within the Bureau's counterintelligence and internal security wings on August 28,
1956, bidding them to create extralegal "action programs" aimed at negating the
CP's "influence over the masses, ability to create controversy leading to confusion
and disunity, penetration of specific channels in American life where public opinion
is molded, and espionage and sabotage potential."2With the exception of the last
two areas mentioned, both of which seem to have been added on an almost pro forma
basis, the stated objectives of COINTELPRO-CP,USA were all entirely legal modes
of activity. The objective was thus plainly to "cripple or destroy" the CP as a political
rather than "criminal" entity.
The immediate response to Hoover's concealed directive was a second secret
memo, this one from Alan Belmont, head of the FBI's Internal Security Section, to L.
V. Boardman of the Counterintelligence Division, recommending that these two
legally separate units quietly collaborate to "foster factionalism" within the party
and "initiate on a broader scale than heretofore attempted, a counterintelligence
program against the CP." Belmont concluded that "[Ole Internal Security Section is
giving this matter continuous thought and we are remaining alert for situations
which could afford additional opportunities for further disruption of the CP, USA."'
FBI counterintelligence operations against the CP predate these memos. The
party had been targeted for "special attention" from the moment it emerged under
the leadership of Louis Fraina and Charles E. Ruthenburg as a left-wing splinter of
the Socialist Party of America (SPA) during September 1919' This was a period in
33
American history when ideologies for positive social change had made tremendous
inroads into the country's popular consciousness.
Talk of a major 'reconstruction' of American society was commonplace, and support
for major and fundamental reforms was widespread...In a number of American
cities, such as Butte [Montana], Portland [Oregon], Seattle, Toledo and Denver,
Soldiers, Sailors and Workers' Councils were formed in conscious imitation of the
Russian soviets, while thousands attended meetings in cities such as Denver, San
Francisco, Seattle and Washington, D.C. to demand recognition of Bolshevik Russia,
the freeing of political prisoners, and withdrawal of American troops from
Russia...Even more ominous in the eyes of conservatives was the clearly increasing
strength of radicalism within the labor movement.5
In response to this massive upsurge of public sentiment to alter the U.S. socio-
economic and political status quo, on June 12, 1919 Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer requested that congress appropriate $500,000 to "fight radicali sm."6On July
19:
Congress appropriated special funds for the Justice Department for prosecuting
radicals, and on August 1 Palmer announced creation of the General Intelligence
Division (GID), which had the sole function of collecting information on radical
activities. Under the leadership of a twenty-four-year-old graduate of Georgetown
University Law School named J. Edgar Hoover, the GID began a program of
collecting information on radicals from private, local, state and military authorities,
set up index files on hundreds of thousands of alleged radicals, began to heavily
infiltrate radical organizations, and became a major agent fostering [a] red scare
through its practice of sending out sensationalized charges against radicals to major
organs of the media, including charges that strikes and race riots had connections to
communist activity. The GID's program of general surveillance of radical activity
was entirely without Congressional authorization, since money appropriated could
only be used for "detection and prosecution of crimes," but the Justice Department
got around this by authorizing the GID to secure evidence which might be of use
under legislation "which may hereafter be enacted"...There is some evidence that
Hoover...deliberately exploited the radical issue to enhance the power and prestige
of the...GID, a tactic [he] would frequently use throughout his career?
Actually, Hoover's prototype of the FBI did far more than "surveille" domestic
dissidents. Indeed, it took a lead role in carrying out the so-called Palmer Raids, a
draconian sweep of the nation designed to crush all manner of progressive expres-
sion in the U.S., from anarchism and radical unionism to socialism and communism.
The first of these occurred on November 7,1919, with GID agents raiding the offices
of the Union of Russian Workers (URW) in twelve cities across the country.
Although no evidence of criminal activity was ever linked to the URW, more than
650 warrantless arrests were effected; 250 more occurred in Detroit alone on
November 8.8By December 21, 242 alleged "radical aliens," who had received no
token of due process in the matter, were packed aboard the steamship Buford and
arbitrarily deported to the USSR, As concerns the CP:
COINTELPRO - CP, USA 35
The climactic event of the red scare occurred on January 2,1920, when federal agents
under the direction of Hoover and Palmer swooped down on radical hangouts in
over thirty cities across the country and arrested somewhere between five and ten
thousand persons believed to be alien members of the CP and the [closely related
Communist Labor Party] CLP. Those arrested included virtually every local or
national leader of the parties, and the raids disrupted the activities of practically
every local communist organization in the country...The majority of arrests and
break-ins were made without either search or arrest warrants.1°
In New Jersey, "several 'bombs' were seized which turned out to be iron
bowling balls. Throughout the country, only three pistols were seized in raids on
what was [claimed] to be dangerous radicals actively plotting a revolution."11
Nonetheless, the January 2 raids were followed up with "minor sweeping opera-
tions in various parts of the country during the next six weeks, with the last major
raid in Seattle on January 20."12
The massive arrests completely overwhelmed detention facilities in many areas. In
Detroit, eight hundred persons were detained for up to six days in a dark, win-
dowless, narrow corridor in the city's federal building; they had access to one toilet
and were denied food for twenty-four hours...Many of those arrested were beaten
or threatened while in detention; in some cases persons coming to visit or bail out
those arrested were themselves arrested on suspicion of being communists. Palmer
explained such persons were "practically the same as a person found in an active
meeting of the [CP] organization."13
Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, meanwhile, announced on January 19 that
mere membership in the CP would be considered sufficient grounds to warrant
deportation of alien residents of the U.S., or bring about the denaturalization of those
who had become citizens." An unknown number of party members were shipped
abroad before U.S. District Judge George Anderson finally put a stop to the practice
in June of 1920, sharply rebuking Palmer and Hoover as having fomented virtual
mob rule from the right: "A mob is a mob whether made up of government officials
acting under instructions from the Department of Justice or of criminals, loafers and
the vicious classes.""
Although the judge's ruling effectively ended the federal onslaught against
progressive organizations, "by the mid-twenties, most liberals and social reformers
had been thoroughly intimidated. But the more lasting significance of the red
scare...was its devastation of all the organizations that had been built up so
laboriously for twenty years which were capable of providing leadership for any
sort of radical political or labor movement - the SPA, the IWW [Industrial Workers
of the World, an anarcho-syndicalist union], the NPL [Non-Partisan League], the CP
and the CLP...[And the] general climate of repression that prevailed throughout the
twenties made it extremely difficult for rebuilding to occur."16With regard to the CP
in particular, both party and FBI sources concur that this meant a drastic decline in
membership over a span of barely more than six months; in October 1919, the CP
ranks totaled 27,341, while by April of 1920 they had shrunk to 8,223.17
Hence, when Hoover was able to recast the GID as the FBI in 1924, he was very
much in a position to sanctimoniously disavow any further "political activities" on
the part of his Bureau, not because of any legal or moral considerations, but because
he could feel he'd already destroyed radicalism as a viable force in American society.
Throughout the 1920s and most of the '30s, the director was true to his word, at least
insofar as placing a counterintelligence focus upon the CP per se was concerned.
Rather, the application of such methods became situational, designed to "keep a lid
on" party growth by destroying particular projects through which the CP hoped to
bolster its shattered credibility. Examples of this include FBI collaboration in the
brutal suppression of the party-backed textile workers' strikes in Passaic, New
Jersey (1926); New Bedford, Massachusetts (1927); and Gastonia, North Carolina
(1928)." Similar handling was accorded CP initiatives to support the Unemployed
Movement and Bonus Army during the early '30s," while pressure was maintained
upon those - such as Eugene Dennis, Jack Barton, Sam Darcy, and Harry Bridges -
identified as key party leaders?°CP forays into union activities in the '30s were also
repressed quite harshly, and with Bureau complicity, as in the Imperial Valley,
California agricultural workers' strike (1930) and the Harlan County, Kentucky coal
miners' strike (1931-32).21
Still, the decade of the Great Depression provided rather fertile ground for CP
recruitment, and by the late 1930s party membership was estimated to be as high as
40,000.' Hoover therefore appears to have determined that a resumption of counter-
intelligence measures against the party would be in order. In this desire, he was
aided to some extent by the formation of Representative Martin Dies' House Un-
American Activities Committee in May 1938 and, briefly, by a wave of anti-CP
sentiment following the signing of the nazi-Soviet "Mutual Non-Aggression Pact"
in August of 1939.23Beginning at least as early as September 6, 1939, Hoover utilized
a directive from President Franklin D. Roosevelt as the "authorizing basis" for illegal
action against the party. The relevant portion of Roosevelt's instruction reads as
follows:
The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau of the
Department of Justice to take charge of the investigative work in matters relating to
espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations...This task must be
conducted in a comprehensive and effective manner on a national basis...To this
end, I request all police officers, sheriffs, and other law enforcement officers in the
United States promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the [FBI] any
information obtained by them relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities,
and violations of the neutrality laws [emphasis added]."
Using the term "subversive activities" as a virtual synonym for the holding of
any left-leaning ideological outlook, arch-reactionary Hoover began to devote an in-
creasing proportion of the Bureau's energy and resources to "consideration" of
organizations such as the CP and Socialist Workers Party (SWP; see next chapter).
He encountered no resistance from the Roosevelt administration in such activities,
and, as COINTELPRO architect William C. Sullivan would later recall, the methods
COINTELPRO — CP, USA 37
of "investigation" included such anti-CP counterintelligence measures as "sending

out anonymous letters and phone calls...in 1941 Sullivan also recounted how one
."25
of his first assignments as an agent, in December 1941, was to bug and monitor party
meetings in Milwaukee?' But, by late 1942, the situation had changed appreciably.
With the U.S. engaged in World War II, and the Soviet Union a crucial ally in the
campaign against nazi Germany, Roosevelt sought to "clarify" his earlier position.
On January 3, 1943 he issued another statement:
On September 6, 1939, I issued a directive providing that the [FBI]...should take
charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and viola-
tions of the neutrality regulations, pointing out that the investigations must be
carried out in a comprehensive manner, on a national basis and all information sifted
and correlated in order to avoid confusion and irresponsibility...I am again calling
the attention of all law enforcement officers to the request that they report all such
information promptly to the nearest field representative of the [FBI]."
Despite the president's careful avoidance of using the words "subversive

activities," a matter which can be construed as removing whatever authorization
Hoover might previously have enjoyed in terms of placing a Bureau emphasis upon
operations targeting "communists and communist sympathizers," the director
consistently cited this 1943 directive as "further authorization" for his "war on
Bolshevism." The FBI's anti-communist activities were thus continued without
disruption. For instance, on February 27,1946, Intelligence Division head D.M. Ladd
suggested in a memo to Hoover that the Bureau undertake a campaign to influence
public opinion by leaking "educational material" about the CP through "available
channels." The purpose of this, according to Ladd, was hardly investigative or
designed to stop criminal activity, either real or perceived. Rather, it was expressly
to cause the political undermining of party support accruing from such "liberal
elements" as churches and labor unions, and to "demonstrate the basically Russian
nature of the Communist Party in this country:in Hoover approved, and Ladd
turned to conservative columnists such as Walter Winchell as well as outright fascist
sympathizers like Father John Cronin to carry the word?'
Finally, in 1948, the Bureau's role as a bastion of anti-communism, and as the pri-
mary vehicle for covert action against the CP, was concretized and to some extent
legitimated. Attorney General Tom Clark formulated a Justice Department policy
position, shortly after released as a public statement by President Harry Truman,
which relied almost entirely upon J. Edgar Hoover's "interpretation" of Roosevelt's
earlier posture:
On September 6, 1939, and again on January 8, 1943, a Presidential directive was
issued providing that the (FBI] should take charge of investigative work relating to
espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and in related matters....The [FBI] has fully
carried out its responsibilities with respect to the internal security of the United
States under these directives...I wish to emphasize at this time that these directives
continue in full force and effect...Investigations in matters relating to the internal
security of the United States must be conducted in a comprehensive manner, on a

national basis, and by a single central agency. The [FBI] is the agency designated for
this purpose. At this time again, I request that all information concerning activities
within the United States, its territories or possessions, believed to be subversive in
nature, be reported promptly to the nearest field representative of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation [emphases added]."
After a lengthy review and consultation with his National Security Council,
Truman issued a revised version of this statement, broadening his authorization of
Bureau action against "subversives, and in related matters," on July 24, 1950.32
Meanwhile, "During HUAC hearings in 1949-50, the FBI resumed its open collabo-
ration with the now-Democratically-controlled committee. In fact, the major pur-
pose of HUAC hearings during these years seemed to be that of 'publicizing
information in FBI files.'"32As the matter has been put elsewhere:
[The FBI's] efforts to contain radicalism by [such techniques as] leaking derogatory
information about prominent radicals and organizations did not constitute the sole
political activities of FBI officials. They also sought to reduce the ability of radical
organizations to function effectively or recruit new members. For a time, with the
intensification of Cold War fears and the rise of McCarthyite politics, these informal
efforts bore fruit. In 1948, for example, twelve Communist party leaders were
indicted under the Smith Act of 1940 [18 U.S.C.A. § 2385]. Then, under provisions
of the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 [66 Stat. 163] and the Communist
Control Act of 1954 [68 Stat.1146], Communist, Communist-front, and Communist-
action organizations were required to register as foreign agents with the Subversive
Activities Control Board and to label their publications as Communist propaganda.
Beginning in 1947 and extending throughout the 1950s, moreover, through highly
publicized hearings congressional committees (notably the House Committee on
Un-American Activities and the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security) relied
directly or indirectly on FBI investigative reports to expose Communist influence
in the federal government, in the entertainment industry, in labor unions, and in
public schools and universities. Last, FBI investigative reports were employed
during the conduct of federal loyalty/security programs to raise doubts about the
loyalty of, and deny employment to certain ["subversive"] individuals."33
As a result of such harassment, J. Edgar Hoover was able to announce that the
anti-communist crusade in which his Bureau was playing such a leading role had
been able to bring about a reduction in overall CP membership to approximately
12,00034Apparently realizing that his boast might be construed as an admission that
there was "no longer a need" for the Bureau's services in "combatting subversion,"
he quickly offered a warning that although the number of party members might no
longer be large, the public should not allow the information to be used "by the
ignorant and apologists and appeasers of communism in our country as minimizing
the danger of these subversives in our midst.""
The 1953 change from Truman's liberal" Democratic administration to that of
conservative Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower entailed no discernable alteration
in the government's view of the FBI's self-defined mission of "fighting commu-

nism." To the contrary, on December 15,1953, Eisenhower issued a statement in this
regard which amounted to little more than a paraphrase of that offered by Truman
in 1950." Under Eisenhower, the bulk of FBI anti-CP activity was carried out under
the heading COMINFIL (for Communist Infiltration). Within this program, the
Bureau supposedly investigated party attempts to "influence" blacks, young people,
women, veterans, religion, education, industry and other targets. But, as the Senate
Intelligence Committee reported in 1976, although the COMINFIL investigations
were supposed to focus only on the CP [in its alleged role as an "agency of a foreign
power"] attempts to infiltrate various groups, "in practice the target often became
the domestic groups themselves" and the COMINFIL investigations "reached into
domestic groups in virtually every area of American political life."" There is no
evidence that anyone in the Eisenhower administration ever expressed concern over
the situation.
Cumulatively, all of these things laid a reasonably solid post hoc policy foun-
dation under the Bureau's anti-CP counterintelligence "efforts [which dated from]
the early 1940s,,"7° a flow of activity which congealed into COINTELPRO-CP,USA
by the mid-'50s. That the new program was devoted entirely to extralegal (or clearly
illegal) rather than prosecutorial initiatives was both because what the FBI had
typically found objectionable about the Party was its politics rather than any defined
(or definable) criminal behavior," and even when this was not the case:
High-level FBI officials had always been deeply concerned about prosecuting
activities. These concerns increased after 1947 as FBI officials became troubled by the
effect of prosecution on the FBI's intelligence-gathering capabilities. For example,
over one hundred FBI informants had had to be exposed during the various Smith
Act trials and Subversive Activities Control Board proceedings. Then, in a series of
important rulings in 1956 and 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court imposed major
restrictions on uses of FBI reports, challenged the premise that individual liberties
must be sacrificed to safeguard the national security, and thereby threatened to close
what for the FBI had been an effective means of propagandizing anti-radical fears."
In any event, Hoover provided a briefing report on the progress of COIN-

TELPRO-CP,USA on May 8, 1958. Although much has subsequently been made of
the notion that the Bureau's COINTELPROs were conducted on an entirely autono-
mous basis, and without the knowledge of higher-ups, Hoover's missive to Attor-
ney General William Rogers and Special Assistant to the President Robert Cutler
spelled out quite plainly that for nearly two years the FBI had been engaged in an
extensive program "designed to promote disruption within the ranks of the Com-
munist Party." Specifically mentioned were tactics of using infiltrators to spark
"acrimonious debates" and "increase factionalism" within the CP, and a campaign
of anonymous mailings to generate "disillusionment [with] and defection" from the
party.41 This was followed, six months later, on November 8, by Hoover's provision
of a personal briefing to Eisenhower's full cabinet concerning his anti-CP opera-
() fit;ii17% iiidiG;3 • UNITED STATES GOVIAINMENT

DAM August 28 19;6
TO - L. V. Boardman
riom Mr. A. H. Belmont
SUDJICT: CP, U3.1 -

Bra-ANAL SI.ZURITY - C
During its im. estigation of the Ccrn:unist Party,
USA, the 5c eau has soui:nt tc capitalize on incidents
involving tne Tazty leaders In order to icscer
factienalisz, tilt! Cemmunis; ?art; (C?) and its leaders
into cilsrepute Lefore tne .__:icon puslic and cause con•%inicr.
and dissatisfaction ,,nong ran.e-and-file mesn:ers of the CP.
Generally, the above acticn has constitnted
harrassacnt rather tnin disruption, since, fcr the cost
the Bureau i:as set ap particular incidents. zr.ci the attic:: i1.53
been from tine cutsice. tne present: *.i.2e, u-ra is
:existing within tno C? a situation slid:, from the dev:lop-
ments al. the f...;an i.:en:rass 7..ne C:' tne Soviet j-..nci
thre...1;:3
.prosecutions anher tr.e 194i) are the 1.nterr-al
Security Act af 1950 %A:len is wade to order for an all-cot.
disruptive 47.1',..1,24 a7ainst ti._ LP frcj withi_n. it;i:e•r cones,
the ,Borcati. Is in d position to initLetc, 0:1 broarier scale
than hartorcre attempted, a cour.terintelli;ance arc-read against
the CP, not by ha:rasa:en; the uutaid-i,Laq.n; -_y
serve to Prinz znt various factions tog.etner , out by ,feecinz
and fostering from within the internal filot currently razing.
We havo been censidering pessible courses to 1.=plement
-.such a aro,ran ;nd, at the provint time, is are actively working
• on the folic...1:1J feez:•
1) The Socialist '..'or!‘.ers ?arty (E..7) is ::;d:i/IZ •:•.:1 all-
out effort to -.In over cP ne.;:.crs •..no nave c•cere
with CLJL.nizt =eztcr: are niztriouzin6
of "The p.Joli,;icn) C?
and arc cont....cting ;e.;;Lers in en attamP; to SCil
Kickoff: The document which initiated COINTELPRO — CP, USA..
tions. Although the director's exposition could hardly be described as exhaustive,

he utilized a classified ("Top Secret") 36-page booklet which described COIN-
TELPRO-CP,USA as follows:
To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence in the United States, we

have a...program designed to intensify confusion and dissatisfaction among its
members. During the past few years, the program has been most effective. Selective
informants were briefed and trained to raise controversial issues within the Party.
In the process, they may be able to advance themselves to high positions. The
Internal Revenue Service was furnished the names and addresses of Party
functionaries...Based on this information, investigations have been instituted in 262
possible income tax evasion cases. Anticommunist literature and simulated Party
documents were mailed anonymously to carefully chosen members.12
As Robert Justin Goldstein has observed, "Although the precise results of FBI
efforts cannot be determined, between 1957 and 1959, what was left of the CP was
virtually destroyed by factional infighting. Even as the CP collapsed into a tiny sect
of a few thousand members, FBI COINTELPRO activities increased and expanded."*'
When the political winds blew liberal Democrats back into the executive, replacing
Eisenhower's Republicans in 1961, the COINTELPRO status quo was maintained.
On January 10, 1961 Hoover apprized the incoming Kennedy administration of the
anti-CP COINTELPRO by sending identical letters to Secretary of State (designate)
Dean Rusk and Attorney General (designate) Robert Kennedy. These read in part
that some of the Bureau's "more effective" anti-communist counterintelligence op-
erations included:
...penetration of the Party at all levels with security informants; use of various
techniques to keep the Party off-balance and disillusion individual communists
concerning communist ideology; investigation of every known member of the
CPUSA in order to determine whether he should be detained in the event of a
national emergency...As an adjunct to our regular investigative operations, we carry
on a carefully planned program of counterattack against the CPUSA...In certain
instances, we have been successful in preventing communists from seizing control
of legitimate organizations and have discredited others."
Neither Rusk nor Robert Kennedy - nor John F. Kennedy, for that matter -
appear to have asked any questions on this matter, or suggested that perhaps the
Bureau was exceeding its investigative mandate in launching intentionally disrup-
tive direct action operations against a domestic political formation. The same may
be said for President Lyndon B. Johnson. Under his administration, subsequently
admitted COINTELPRO operations numbered 230 in 1964, 220 in 1965, 240 in 1966,
180 in 1967, and 123 in 1968." As concerns the CP:
COINTELPRO activities against the CP continued, with such tactics as informing
the news media that the son of a CP couple had been arrested for drugs and that the
wife of a CP leader had purchased a new car as an example of the "prosperity" of
the CP leadership. In 1964, the FBI planted a document in the car of a leading New
York CP official that made him appear an informer; subsequently the official (who
had been convicted under the Smith Act and ordered to register as a communist by
the [Subversive Activities Control Board]) was expelled from the party. A 1965 FBI
memo reporting the expulsion stated that the affair "crippled the activities of the
New York State communist organization and the turmoil within the party contin-
UNITED S. /NIA:Li
1 - Mr. DeLoach
Memorandu z 1 - Mr. W.C.( ,llivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
M.
rot Mr. Sulliv DATC: October 4, 1964

T m.
1 Ulu. Nor -
FROM F. . Baumgardner Gee*
- - ! y/'
)
stmliwr,11 DWINi2) II..
-----(INTERNAL SECURITY) I r
PURPOSE: bAtz.
. ._
The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend a
i long-:range.counterintelligence program designed to provoke a

dispute between the Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostr
under the code name of Hoodwink. . ....
OBJECTIVES: •
A dispute between the Communist Party, USA, and
La Cosa Nostra would cause disruption of both groups by
having each expend their energies, time, and money attacking
the other. This would help neutralize the activities of both
groups which are detrimental to this country.
BACKGROUND:
La Cosa Nostra has no sympathy for the communists.
The Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostra come in contact
Owith each other in the labor field where hoodlums operate
businesses under "sweatshop" conditions. By making it appear
that the Party is attacking hoodlum labor practices, over a
period of time we could provoke a bitter dispute between the
two organizations.
)
The New York Office has recommended • specific

technique to initiate this program. This technique consists
of anonymously forwarding one leaflet to a local La Cosa Nostra
leader attacking the labor practices of one of his enterprises.
The leaflet would ostensibly be published by a local Party
unit. A note with the leaflet would give the impression that
it has received wide cirWation
RC 10
14 ) I
ialitt. /00 -- '1 41::"""
ERZ losure■SP470 4.- Ofl -
1 - Special Investigative (Route through for rezisyL. ... -
TJD:jes ;., 4Lir I a le OCT 19 1911

Ior arm / 1- t)--i
LIETEP COPY SENT rW",..JZONTI
Memorandum initiating Operation Hoodwink.
ues to this date." The FBI created a fictional organization in 1965 entitled the
Committee for Expansion of Socialist Thought in America, which purported to
attack the CP from the "Marxist right." As a result of other COINTELPRO activity,
an FBI internal memo stated in 1965, "many meeting places formerly used on a
regular basis by the Communists have been barred from their use"...Frequently
actions which came under the CP COINTELPRO label were directed at non-CP
groups and individuals. Thus, the FBI targeted the entire Unitarian Society of
Cleveland in 1964 because the minister and some members circulated a petition
1 - DsLoach
1 - tat. •.C. Sullivan
SAC, Neviork . 10/5/66
111k4,.
, L Sir: Bausgardner-
Diretos, ,ft.x,
•
hC
fiocatin • ,
--•=int•rzalut. IBCURITY)
13 .
Refflet captioned "Communist Party, USA; Counter..
intelligence Program; IS - C; (La Cosa Nostra)," dated
1,„ 1-, 9/22f56. Ito&dwink is the co47.eoril,esignated for this
program. ..
•
,
111.
.
t New York is authorized to mail the anonymous letterxtr
and leaflet set out in relet an the beginning of a long-range 2
program to cause a dispute between La Coss Nostra (LCN) and '-'"
the Communist Party. USA (CPUSA). To strengthen this alleged s
attack, add a last sentence to the leaflet: "Let's show 4
the hoodlums and the bosses that the workers are united •
against sweatshops.*
Take the usual precautions to insure this mailing
cannot be associated with the Bureau and advise of tangible
results. New York should also submit /allow-up recommendations
to continue this program.
-
The Party has been the subject of recent boabings,
a typical hoodlum technique. Consider a spurious Party
ktatement blaming the LCN for the bombings because of
ctlyarty efforts on behalf of the workers." This statemenps
qpuldbe aimed at specific =members if appropriate.
1
In developing this program, thought should also • 1
- 4-,- gigs to initiating spurious LCN attacks oa the CPUSA, so !bat
'i- w mounting arcampaigl
-:.sact",:group would think the other w
0 tgaisdt it. . ,. :.
4 1-41
5.• •
d s
The Bureau very much appreciates New York's careful
analysis of this program and the initial "low-key" technique
suggested.
1. --Special Investigative (Route ough for review) "1- "---4-J-1
TJD:jetm40q. i OCi Il
iliNtik ,flr
; See memorandum Baum to Mr. Sullivan, 10
Toned above, prepatIA•byt.
- 4
•
nun". um' C;1-
Memorandum authorizing Operation Hoodwink. Senior FBI officials could not

have helped but be aware that the proposed plan could easily result in the murder
of CP leaders and organizers. This became a standard COINTELPRO tactic.
calling for the abolition of HUAC and because the church gave office space to a
group the FBI did not like. In 1965, the FBI tried to block a City Council campaign
of a lawyer who had defended Smith Act defendants. In 1966, the FBI tried to get the
Texas State Alcohol Beverage Control Commission to raid a Democratic Party
fundraising affair because two Democratic candidates who would be present had
participated in anti-war and anti-HUAC activities."
Memorandum
TO : DIRECTOR, PSI (100-446533) a 4 DATE: 3/22/68
m :I RAC, NEW YORK (100.459407) (P) , A/4

,(1
U 14 -HOODWIRE
-
12 1/ 7"
- -
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
Re New York letters to Bureau, dated 1/30/68 and
2/27/68, and philadelphia airtels to Bureau, dated 2/14/68
and 3/4/68.
In oonnection with the anonymous letter sent to Teams.
ter Union locals in the philadelphia, Pennsylvanis area, as
referred to in above-referenced communications, the results of
this mailing can be summarized as followsg
4 Jt, • This
etts n sing sent toTeamster Union
€ 44 in philadelphia, was also sent to Teamster Union
(1). Bureau (RM) EX-110 REF71.
Philadelphia (100•49252) (RN)
2 • New York (41)
JJEID
(6) tP
Operation Hoodwink continues. As can be seen in this document the FBI was not
content with attempting to use only "La Cosa Nostra" to do its dirty work against
the CP. From the Bureau perspective, reactionary unions would do just as well.
(Memo continues on pages 45 and 46.)
Hence, having received what amounted to concurrence from at least four suc-
cessive presidents that illegal operations against the CP were "justified," and would
therefore be condoned and hushed up, Hoover escalated the level of tactics em-
ployed within COINTELPRO-CP,USA to include attempts to orchestrate the assas-
NY 100.159407
111111111.1.1.111111.1dadin iladelphis.)
Tnasisuch as
The NYC requests Bureau permission to orepare the

following anonymous letter. Xerox copies of which would be
mailed to the same Teamster Union locals in the philedelphia.
Pennsylvania area which were sent the first anonymous letter:
"March 22. 1968 •
'Dear union Boss:

"I'm the loyal union man who wrote you around the
sod of January and rye get more news for you.
'You'll remember that / told you then that I beard
from my Commie brother-in...law that the leaders of his party
had been in Moscow and among the instructions they came back
with was to try to get rid of the hoodlums in truck and dock
unions in this country.
!Well. I was talking with my brother-in-law a few
nights ago and he asked me how things were going in my Teamster
local and I said c.X. He told me he knew that there were a
lot of gangsters in my union but he said things would be chang-
ing for the best shortly. He told me that in February some of
the leaders of his party were in Hungary meeting party people
from other countries and it came up again about how his party
is going to clean up the gangster controlled unions in the
United States. I told him he was all wet but I didn't use those
words.
"Pm afraid these Commie. mean basins's so watch out.
'Thanks to the free use of a copy machine I can get
the ward around about this.
• 2a
MOM
sination of "key communist leaders." By 1964, this took the form, as is revealed by
the accompanying October 4,1966 memo from counterintelligence specialist Fred J.
Baumgardner to Bureau Assistant Director William C. Sullivan, of "Operation
Hoodwink." The plan was to provoke a "dispute" between organized crime and the
CP and, as the means by which "La Cosa Nostra" tended to resolve conflicts was
rather well known (even to FBI officials), the desired outcome of the scheme is not
mysterious. As is readily apparent in the following memo, from Hoover and dated
October 10,1966 the concept was quickly approved and implemented. Finally, as is
demonstrated by the third document in this series, from the SAC New York to
IT 100.459407
*Don't let th.qamplim over••
.
A patriotic American and Union Man.
With respect to the above letter, it is a fact that
three leaders of the communist Pat'', USA (CP,USA) were in Buda-
pest, Hungary in February and March, 1968 to attend an Inter.
national Consultative Meeting of Communist and workers Parties,
end accounts of their scheduled attendance appeared in news.
natter articles. Two of these three leaders have since returned
to the United States. However, the information in the letter
that in Hungary it came up again about how his party is going
to clean up the gangster controlled unions in the United States'
has no basis in feet. A few typing errors would also be inserted
into this letter.
Should the Bureau approve of this letter for anonymous
mailing, it will be typed on commercial stationery, updated, and
Xerox copies of this letter would be made on oommercial stationery,
and it will be mailed from New York City to the same Teamster
Union looals in Philadelphia to whioh the first anonymous letter
was sent. The original of this letter would not be sent and it
would be retained in instant file.
The NY0 is again hopeful that the above letter, though
it contains some information without basis in fact, will reach
criminal elements in the Teamsters Union and it might serve to
to between the•riminal elements and the CP USA
Hoover, dated January 22, 1968, Operation Hoodwink was not only continued over
a sustained period, but broadened to include a range of entities outside organized
crime as well. Although, unlike COINTELPROs directed against other organiza-
tions (see Chapters 4, 5 and 7), there is no evidence that any CP member was actually
killed as a result of Operation Hoodwink, this is obviously not for lack of the FBI's
having tried to make things turn out otherwise.
Perhaps ironically, it was Hoover's personal obsession with the CP - undoubt-
edly developed over more than four decades of trying unsuccessfully to destroy it
while constructing his personal anti-communist empire - which led him to insist on
advised at a Negro B
had been.fairly close
was iladelphia and'affiliated wit
iiiiers unteered to make this Business Agent (no tied
by name) available for interview.' He described this indi-
vidual as a "weak character" and said he thought "this guy
will cop out and maybe even work for you." . .
•
Philadelphia will explore the possibilities of
'interviewing above-described Business Agent and will.make.,
- appropriate recommend the Bureau.' It is noted;'
'A.,. howe
!'.f.::••-.
eing urn to the Bureau an
New York under the Counterintelligence Program caption.
. . .
' New York is re ted to review the results of
this contact with as set out under instant caption
and under the Co in elligence Program caption, and to
. . make additional.suggestions or recommend appropriate.follow-
up.action.,'. : . . .
, ..., .•.:..... • • .--
R. .
The cultivation of informers, usually of "weak character," was a staple of COIN-

TELPRO — CP,USA and similar FBI undertakings.
going ahead with repression of CP,USA even after it had accomplished its objec-
tives, and to thereby foster a bitter factionalism not only within the target organiza-
tion, but within the FBI itself. By the second half of the 1960s, the CP had become so
debilitated by the combination of unremitting counterintelligence operations aimed
at it (in 1975, the Justice Department admitted the FBI had engaged in 1,388 separate
COINTELPRO actions against the CP between 1956 and 1971) and its own ideologi-
cal contradictions that its membership had shrunk from more than 80,000 in 1946 to
less than 2,800. Of these, fully half were categorized as "inactive," while the
remainder averaged 49 years of age and were considered "totally ineffectual" by the
Bureau's own investigators" William C. Sullivan, under whose immediate author-
ity the COINTELPROs fell, therefore sought to reallocate his resources to focus
upon "the mainstream of revolutionary action" in the U.S., a trend he associated
(correctly enough) with the Black and Puertorriqueflo liberation movements and the
new left." Hoover adamantly refused, and so, as Sullivan recounts:
Even though the CPUSA was finished we kept after them. Early in 1969 we learned
that the Soviet Union planned on sending [CP head Gus] Hall a gift of some
expensive stallions and mares which Hall planned to ship to his brother's farm in
Minnesota. They expected to breed thoroughbreds and sell the colts to help fill the
coffers of the party. On learning about the impending gift to Hall, one of the
imaginative men in my division came up with an idea [which Hoover quickly
approved]. He contacted a veterinarian, and without telling him what it was about,
got the doctor to agree to inject the horses with a substance that would sterilize them
before they were taken off the ship in New York."
It was not a disagreement over whether endeavors such as COINTELPRO were

warranted or should be pursued, but against whom and by what prioritization.
Sullivan had come to view such anti-CP activities as "the horse caper" as being
largely childish, nonsensical or misdirected, eventually informing Hoover that, "if
there is no longer a Communist problem we should not spend money on it. In fact,
I have for some years been taking men off Communist work in the field and here at
Headquarters and putting them on some important work."5° Meanwhile, he had
become actively involved in a Nixon administration planning group headed by Tom
Huston and intended to bring about greater coordination among U.S. intelligence
agencies, "upgrade the effectiveness" of domestic counterintelligence activities, and
ultimately to depose "dinosaurs" such as Hoover (this is taken up in more detail in
Chapter 6). The director sensed what was going on. Hence, when Sullivan finally
went public on October 12, 1970 with his contention that the CP posed "no
significant threat to national security,"51Hoover used this "insubordination" to
force the younger man into retirements= A significant portion of the Bureau sup-
ported Sullivan, and there is evidence that only Hoover's timely death on May 2,
1972 ended a process which was rapidly eroding the carefully crafted FBI cohesion
the director had built up over the preceding half-century.
Chapter 3
COINTELPRO SWP
As long as [anti-communism] remains national policy, an...important
requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramili-
tary organization more effective, more unique, and if necessary, more
ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to
stand in the way of the prompt, efficient, and secure establishment of this
mission.
—The Doolittle Committee Report —

1954
As with the CP, "modern" FBI counterintelligence against the Socialist Workers
Party (SWP, founded in 1938), began at least as early as the beginning of the 1940s.
A result was that one of the two Smith Act prosecutions brought by the government
on the basis of Bureau-assembled evidence during World War II was against this
party.1As Howard Zinn frames the matter, "Only one organized socialist group
opposed the war unequivocally. This was the Socialist Workers Party. The Espio-
nage Act of 1917 [C 30 Title 1, 40 Stat. 217, et seq.], still on the books, applied to
wartime statements. But, in 1940, with the United States not yet at war, Congress
passed the Smith Act. This took Espionage Act prohibitions against talk or writing
that would lead to refusal of duty in the armed forces and applied them to peacetime.
The Smith Act also made it a crime to advocate the overthrow of the government by
force or violence, or join any group that advocated this, or publish anything with
such ideas. In Minneapolis in 1943, eighteen members of the [SAW] were convicted
of belonging to a party whose ideas, expressed in its Declaration of Principles, and
in the Communist Manifesto, were said to violate the Smith Act. They were sentenced
to prison terms, and the Supreme Court refused to review their case."'
When the high court finally did get around to considering the Smith Act in 1950,
it was in order to allow Justice Robert H. Jackson — fresh from a stint in Nuremberg
prosecuting nazis for, among other things, their legalistic persecution of leftists
during the 1930s — to articulate America's "liberal" philosophical alternative in
handling "subversives." Utterly ignoring the act's proscriptions on anti-draft agita-
tion, Jackson held that "it was no violation of free speech to convict Communists for
conspiring to teach or advocate the forcible overthrow of the government, even if no
dear and apparent danger [of such overthrow] could be proved. To await the danger
becoming apparent, he argued, would mean that "Communist plotting is protected
during the period of incubation; its preliminary stages of organization and prepa-
ration are immune from the law; the government can move only after imminent
action is manifest, when it would, of course, be too late." Thus, for the supreme court,
49
"some legal formula that will secure Ethel existing order against radicalism" was
called for'
The formula Justice Jackson sought was already at hand. In 1948, Republican
congressmen Karl Mundt of South Dakota and Richard M. Nixon of California
reported a draft bill out of Nixon's House Un-American Activities Committee,
calling for the registration of all CP members as well as other radicals. Liberal
Democrats in the Senate objected vociferously, and President Truman ultimately
vetoed the legislation. As it turned out, the Democrats' problem was not with its
clear totalitarian implications, but that it hadn't been heavy-handed enough in its
original form. Among themselves, senate liberals such as Estes Kefauver and Hubert
Humphrey supported an alternate version proposed by Nevada's reactionary Pat
McCarran which included provisions for "the ultimate weapon of repression:
concentration camps to intern potential troublemakers on the occasion of some
loosely-defined future 'Internal Security Emergency.'" As what became the Inter-
nal Security Act of 1950 (also known as the McCarran Act, after its sponsor) went
through committee, Humphrey became obsessed that it might be "overly diluted,"
grousing openly that those herded into the planned camps might retain even the
most elementary rights such as that of habeas corpus. Allowing the politically
objectionable to retain any rights, he felt, would make for a "weaker bill, not a bill to
strike stronger blows at the Communist menace, but weaker blows."5He needn't
have worried; the act passed relatively intact, and was sustained over Truman's
veto.'
In such a climate, the FBI was able to continue its ad hoc counterintelligence
operations against the SWP throughout the 1950s.7Unlike the situation with the CP,
however, these were never consolidated into a formal COINTELPRO during that
decade, a situation which seems largely due to J. Edgar Hoover's personal assess-
ment that the term "socialist" was somewhat less extreme (and therefore less of a
priority) than the word "communist." Nonetheless, by 1961- with a tacit green light
from the newly-installed Kennedy administration on his anti-CP COINTELPRO
already in hand - the director determined it would be both timely and appropriate
to proceed in the same fashion against the SWP. Hence, on October 12 of that year
he dispatched a memorandum to several field offices instructing them to begin the
new "disruption program." The rationale for this, according to Hoover, was that the
SWP:
...has, over the past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and
national basis through the running of candidates for public office and strongly
directing and/or supporting such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems
arising in the South. The SWP has been in frequent contact with international
Trotskyite groups stopping short of open and direct contact with these groups...It is
felt that a disruption program along similar lines [to COINTELPRO-CP,USA] could
be initiated against the SWP on a very selective basis. One of the purposes of this
program would be to alert the public to the fact that the SWP is not just another
socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin and Engels
COINTELPRO - SWP 51
as interpreted by Leon Trotsky...It may be desirable to expand the program after the
effects have been evaluated!
One of the first "tasks" undertaken through COINTELPRO-SWP was to attempt

to abort the judicial process in the case of the so-called Monroe defendants, a group
of blacks and a white supporter who had followed the leadership of Monroe, North
Carolina NAACP leader Robert Williams in adopting a posture of armed self-
defense against ku klux klan terror in 1961' The SWP extended its cooperation to the
NAACP in establishing a multi-racial "Committee to Aid the Monroe Defendants"
(CAMD) to put together a legal effort through which to obtain acquittals on the
serious charges resultantly leveled against the accused. The initial expressed
purpose of CAMD was "to fight the anticipated extradition order for [Williams'
assistant Mae] Mallory, who was in Ohio, and Williams, whose whereabouts were
unknown, and to raise bail money for the three defendants in Monroe."1° As can be
readily seen in the accompanying document, dated June 14,1962, the Bureau imme-
diately set out to break up this emerging support network, and thereby sought to
destroy or at least seriously impair the defendants' right to mount an effective legal
defense. This aspect of COINTELPRO-SWP was continued in full force after Mallory
was extradited and the group went to trial facing capital charges in 1964. Under the
circumstances, they were convicted, although this was later overturned on appeal 11
On other fronts, "The Bureau would investigate on the slightest pretext. When
Lori Paton, a high school student in New Jersey, wrote to the Young Socialist
Alliance (the youth branch of the Socialist Workers Party) for information as part of
a project for her social studies class, agents visited the high school to ask about her."12
Some of the COINTELPRO activities against the SWP — revealed in Bureau docu-
ments that were released in 1975 in connection with a lawsuit filed by the Political
Rights Defense Fund — were very inventive indeed. In one instance, the Bureau
learned that Walter Elliott, scoutmaster of a Boy Scout troop in East Orange, New
Jersey, whose wife was a member of the party, had said he considered the Scouts a
better way of influencing young minds than joining the SWP. The Newark Field
Office, although its files contained "no public source information of a subversive
nature concerning Elliott," reacted by persuading the Boy Scouts not to renew his
troop's charter!'
Overall, COINTELPRO-SWP seems to have focused itself in the educational
and electoral arenas. For instance, as is reflected in the accompanying memo from
the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Denver to the Director, FBI, dated May 5,1965,
the Bureau produced and sent a phony letter ostensibly signed by "A Concerned
Mother" as part of a disinformation campaign designed to ruin the candidacies of
SWP members Barbara Taplin and Howard Wallace for the Denver School Board.
Again, as is shown in the accompanying October 1, 1968 memo from the Phoenix
SAC to the FBI director, the Bureau utilized similar disinformational techniques - in
an effort the SAC confused with simultaneous operations being conducted under
the rubric of COINTELPRO-New Left- to bring about the dismissal of Arizona State
0
LI) STATES CO
ci r•- ---, •
Memoranduir----- ./
,. ---•
,---- . !
.-
1
TO Mr.t;.'.===..
,..%1 DATC 54442
L.
,,,..
FROM : MiOC:::===0( I i A,..
'./
SUBJECT: .°SOCIALIST NOR= PARTY -1........m..... i ‘.' '.''' ' )
i 'INTERNAL SECURITY - SWP - i V

1 DISRUPTION PRUGRAM 1,..., id...----4A
1 New York by airtel dated 5-10-62 recommended that an
anonymous telephone call be made to an official of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) which
has recently endorsed the Committee to Aid the Monroe Defendants
(CAMD) to advise this official that the CAN) is run on a day-to-
day basis by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), which has been designated
pursuant to Executive order l0450. and thereby cause considerable
disruption of the U.nD's activities. If the NAACP became aware of
I
1the control of the CAA) by the Si?, any financial help and other
support would be withdrawn by the NAACP.
i
P ' ''''''Z.,......=
Ie' rlft the CAM) recently received
, endorsement and financial support from the NAACP. (..::...--- ":1F
......ASOMi The SWP now feels that the c.3.•a) has
-WW:c2:asis=isteateami-
„r become a "legitimate" organization through support of the NAACP.

. • ,
The leadership of the NAACP is undoubtedly unaware of the
ifact that the SNP created and directs the C.irD. The SNP is attempting
to raise money as soon as possible to organize a move of headquarters
of the CAV.D from the SNP building, 116 Univetsity Place, New York City.7-
to separate quarters to avoid CA:.:Dts connection with the SNP becoming
• known. It is felt that if the NAACP were aware of this connection
support would be withdrawn.
' New York mronoses to niace an anonymous telephone call to
..., ............................1
--
f ? the NAACI-
;1 `-ws.e•.e.r,a)-"oc ,
t', u.. . ..;',IP
J."..C.S.V,I.,..",a. : ,ki ".,., .."....4.1,
a ......-.......4......a;114-..t. :a-
v. hew York purposes Placing this call .i .
-.... .v.--Y'w•,.7toe. ei.'•*rwas ..iewti mg.'•: ezely
aPk :, .
.- ST-' t Eons
L., Z. • ii:Aw,,,,......,.,..........0,..L.,:,: :-0ne..‘...k1. :1.._..— • i
adVised that tne CA:a: was being operated from Si . ? headquarters and
directed on a day- to - day basis by Berta Green, SiiP member, and CAM N
secretary. 4%-- 'P''lt"ft:--7
''-.=SBS=k4-.- ■ r.ITSITCV' ..' nass this
information on to appropriate i,:acers or tne MALI' in view of tne
NAACP's stir:port recently extended to the CAXD. w:.......—..:- .-.
--!7-...-.2:..::::;.—.....::
--1.......__-.....-..‘.w,-..- ) t
4. a. ! 1 ''? 1
Memo initiating CAMD COINTELPRO.
University professor Morris Starsky (a matter which was not consummated until
1970)." On other fronts, as Noam Chomsky has pointed out:
Beginning in the late fall of 1971, some curious events took place in Detroit,
Michigan. In late October, lists of supporters, contributors, and subscribers to the
COINTELPRO — SWP 53
r ni
Datr, 6 /4 ./ c 5
'
_ A TIT.J4
TO: DIRECTOR, FDIC,-
nlen:
(SOCiAL.C.:T FA:.TY)
Re Denver letter 4/20/GS and Bureau letter 4/23/C7,

captioned shove.
Bnr-lcf;ed for the Durenu is one copy each of •

articles a:-(arin: in tha -!/?:•,C5 issue of the "Dchver fost-
and 5j4/F L c-f the - Rochy :bouhtain Set; s" conceini
D.- u-.•cr school hoard election.
Referenced Denver letter contained infcrmation that

AL= Itranch Cr;:a::ter of the Dcnver hranch. jWD,
was runnisr., for the Denver School hoard, which election is
beir;7 hell Yli/G5. However, L,-TiAlL1 TAi,h1N and EGAD
WALL,.C.%, Beth 7:embers of the.?ienver Branch, S;.-D, have filed
their cand.cy for election to the school hoard instceu of
ALL7:N as previously reported.
Bureau authority is requested prior to 5/11/C:,_-

for Denver to send the revised sr- ;:e:,ted letter and
enclosed net :.parer clippin:.,n to thc Prc:;icient of the Denver
School Board in an effort to prevent these people iron
elected.
Y
•The su--,emted le't'' is as fol/ows:
kz•
-1
...t
±
-.7 -
,,Af
....„:
....!:. • ',
. f
COINTELPRO against the SWP in Denver.
party newspaper were stolen from the headquarters of the Michigan [SWP]. A few
months later, the home of an [SWP] organizer was robbed. Valuables were ignored,
but membership lists and internal party bulletins were stolen. The burglaries
remain unsolved...If we ask who might be interested in obtaining the stolen
material, a plausible hypothesis suggests itself. The natural hypothesis gains
"Dear Sir:
"Recently while (Ilcw-:;in! - with a friend

:,
the candi dates for 1-!le upr.or!in'_:, Denver
School roard Election, I obcrvcd th,,,names of
Mrs. Barbara Taplin, 1631 Pearl Street, and
Howard Wollac.-;, 1S60 lace Street, Denver, Colo-
rado as candidates.for the D::.nver School Board
with their political parties listed as SWP.
•
"I vividly recall that Mr. Allen Taplin
who is li.ted in the 'Post' article dated
`4/25/05 as the husband of :.!rs. Barbara 'tap] in,
as the unsuccessful Sotial7:nt Worhcrs Party
candidate for the United SLaL,2s Bouse of
)1cpresentatives in 196,1. In an article of
- the 'Denver Post' v:hich I a:1 enclosing for your
iniornation, this or .-.nizatun is listed as
both su:Jversive and a: the Attorney General's
hist cf sutycrsire ,,i7ations. Inc article
also hints that Mr. in is a communjst.
"Being a consci• Yous voter and mother of

_school age children, feel that someol:e should
do something to prevent persons of this sort
from being elected to the school board.
"Although I am much in favor of publicly
-
opposing these people, I feel it best for my

family's sake that I withhold my name and leave
this situation in your capable hands.
"A Concerned Mother"
. .- If authority is granted to mail this letter,
instructions concerning previous approved letter will be
"followed. .. .
. . . _. .
••-•-----“"4"e""'""`""1,*%1-.4?.) 7". "sh v -ft ?Ps-F.(4...4,w a ...4.,- -...,,, ...",'".,,,,,,- •►4 .4.4,
••■
Text of bogus letter targeting Taplin and Wallace (above). Memo initiating action
against SWP member Morris Starsky which cost him his faculty position at
Arizona State University (facing page).
support from the fact that persons whose names appear on the stolen lists were then
contacted and harassed by FBI agents, and a personal letter of resignation from the
party, apparently stolen from the headquarters, was transmitted by the FBI to the
COINTELPRO - SWP 55
LY,TED
- Ideinoranditm
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (b) (7) DATE: 10/1/63
FROM SAC, PHOENIX (b) (7)
- nilITECr; COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM'

INTERNAL SZOURITY
DISRUPTION 0? THE NEW LEFT
Remylet, 7/1/68.
1. Potential Counterintelligence Action

MORRIS J. STARSEY, by his actions, has continued
to spotlight himself as a target for counterintelligence
notion. He and his wife were both oared as presidential
electors by and for the Socialist Workers Party he the
S?P in August, 19,5S, gained a place on the ballot in Ari-
. zoos. In addition they have signed thel-.' 5 as treasarcr
and secretary respectively of the Arizona o.P. Professor
STAREKY's status at Arizona State University may be affected
-by the outcome of his pending trial on charges of disturb-
. ing the peace. He is alleged to have used violent, abusive
and obscene lan4uage against the Assistant Maua;ing Director
Of Garmlage Auditorium at ASU during renc..ial services for
MARTIN LUTHER KING last April. Trial is now scheduled for
.10/8/68 in Justice Court, Tempe, Arizona.
A recommendation for counr.,2riutelliqence'aiin

to STARSKY will be submitted by sepavatf,
(b) ( 7 )
Bureau approval is requested to mail4a copy of the

enclosed anonymous letter to each menher of the faculty
committee which is hearing the charges against STARSKY. This
committee is sitting in the Law School on the ASU campus and
is composed of the following faculty members:
1. Dr. ROSS R. RICE, Chairman.
2. JOHN A, COC1E-..1N
. 3. RICEARD S EFFLAND
4. JOHN P. DECKER
S. WALLACE ADAMS, Chairman of the Faculty Assembly.

ANONYMOUS LT•TTFR TO MFMMURS

ur in, EALULLA
ACADrMIC FP -7Djl AND TYNURT!
ARIZONA STAT:: UNIVISITY
Dear Sir:
It seems appropriate that you should he informed

of one of the most recent activities of Morris J. Starsky.
Starsky learned of a suicide atte:npt by one of his close campus
co-workers, David Murphy. Feeling that Murphy could no lonzar
be trusted as a memoer of thy campus sucialit group, Starsky
demanded that :,:urpUy retain alt literature and othYr materials
beldngina to tne socialOtt ;airahy refused to give Starshv
a quantity of literature in his posaussion until Stars..;
would pay him a sum slinhtly in excess of $10 which '::as oaed for
telephone calls charged by Starshy to Murphy's telephone. Morris
Starsky was intitt:nant at ::unphy's independent attitude and at
2:00 A. M. on April 5, P.2,70 he, necol'.pallied hy his vile Panala
and two yomo: male associate.;, jlivndnd :U:rphy',t apantmort and
under threat demanded re to UZI tto aciIlIst literature. ;:iirt.t
Murphy refused unless Starsky paid the phone bill, Starsky told
him that his two associates would hear him mannrcitully. Murphy, -
conaalescing . from a Lecent h.b..tal slay, watt under great fear
of bodily harm or death and surrendered the literature.
I find this eptsmfp iaterystin 7. iihare td Stars;

learn of the cflentivenesf of zu:,..uLn; into peraaa 0 hoe-, at
2:00 A. N.? Also, of 1 ,-•r,otf:, to theeaten
health or lifY of soocono? Is Hite; c:111p1.• c
socialism? Should the ALif; ,1 I (glyoy the yu DI
such an instructor? It seeJ.., to oe thia thts •yai. of act:yitt..-
is something that or t cout , an at
Starsky did not enjoy tire' ;t15, nod oa!, ctuu•y of his position
he would ha properly punished for totalitarian vent , .ne.
!_taforarmfyiy • yairphy is It t.eTnif , yd to testily ayainat Sta...%y
AV A coocraed albanu3
Text of one of the bogus letters by which Starsky's dismissal was accomplished.
Civil Service Commission. Information that has since been obtained about FBI
activities, including burglaries over many years, lends further substantiation to the
conclusion that the FBI was engaged in one of its multifarious endeavors to
undermine and disrupt activities that fall beyond the narrow bounds of the
established political consensus...The Detroit events recall another incident which,
with its aftermath, became the major news story of 1974. But it would be misleading
to compare the Detroit burglaries to the Watergate caper...[T]he Detroit burglaries
are a far more serious matter...Mn Detroit it was the political police of the national
government which, in their official function, were engaged in disrupting the
"sanctity of the democratic process," not merely a gang of bunglers working
"outside the system."15
COINTELPRO - SWP 57
The FBI's subversion of the electoral process through COINTELPRO-SWP has

had a number of effects which go far beyond the question of who was allowed to win
in a given race. A classic example concerns the 1966 candidacy of SWP member Judy
White for governor of the state of New York. In a memo dated October 24, 1966, the
SAC, New York informed Hoover that the New York field office had been successful
in undertaking a disinformation campaign which resulted in the state legislature's
changing of the New York election laws to preclude anyone under 30 years of age
(which White was at the time) not only from being seated as governor, but from
campaigning for the governorship as well. The intent of this, from the FBI point of
view, was to block the SWP from having a forum." The law, as altered by the Bureau,
remains in effect a quarter-century later.
While COINTELPRO-SWP appears never to have entailed anything approach-
ing the level of hoped for violence evident in COINTELPRO-CP,USA's Operation
Hoodwink, or the concretely lethal dimension of several other COINTELPROs,
there is at least one instance in which the FBI attempted to set an SWP candidate up
to suffer physical harm. This concerns the Party's 1968 presidential candidate, Fred
Halstead, who incorporated a trip to visit U.S. forces in Vietnam into his campaign.
In a memo dated July 23,1968, the SAC, New York proposed to the FBI director that
the Bureau plant inflammatory information in the military press with the idea that
this might cause G.I.s to physically attack Halstead upon his arrival." Although the
idea was approved on July 25, there is no indication service personnel responded in
the desired manner. According to Halstead, he was instead "received in a friendly
and courteous way. Never in a hostile way.""
Other anti-SWP efforts followed the pattern, established in the CAMD case, of
attempting to foil alliances, real or potential, between the Party and other organiza-
tions. Notably, this included the spiking of a tentative association between the SWP
in New York and the then-emergent Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU)
headed by Malcolm X in 1965. In a memo dated June 15, 1965, the SAC, New York
informed director Hoover that, "SW? influence on the followers of Malcolm X [can]
be disrupted by emphasizing the atheism of the SWP as opposed to the basic
religious orientation of the [OAAU]." Hoover quickly approved, and by August the
New York SAC was reporting that, "It is believed probable that the disintegrating
relations between the SWP and [the OAAU] can be attributed to the disruptive tactic
authorized...and will result in a continued loss of influence by the SWP among this
group of Negroes."19
As is evident from the accompanying memo from the SAC, New York to
Hoover, dated February 13, 1970, the Bureau also went to considerable lengths -
including the pornographic - in using disinformation to undermine coalitions
between the SWP and new left anti-war organizations such as the New Mobilization
to End the War in Vietnam ("Mobe" or "New Mobe") during the late 1960s and early
'70s. As examples of the kind of activity involved:
In August 1968 the New York FBI office sent [an] anonymous letter to 68 "new left
(2)
UNI'l CU SY 11
Alemorandwn
DIRECTOR, FBI (:=7.7" DATE: 2/13/70
:7..10
SAC, NEW YORE P."27:77.M
S OCIAL-1ST '..:03::ERS PARTY -

--6"DISTWJETIC:1 PROGRAil
ReNYlet, 12/30/69.
AP
Enclose,,,aor the Bureau is a copy of an unsigned
oeleaflet entitleFly Unitcd?", mailed this past woe): to some
230 selected individuals and oraanizations in Left.eid
related groups under the COINTELPRO at New York with prior e
Bureau authority.
,r—<1
The leaflet is designed to cause din:action in the
peace movement, prim:,rily in the New 1.1obilization Cz;..;ittec
to End the War in Vietnam, and to minimize the groi..ihr influ-'
ence of the SWP in the movement. It is also designed to cause
consternation and confusion in the SUP itself.
)
The enclosed has been marked "Obscene" because of
its contents. The copy program on the leaflet has been writ%;an-'
in the jargon of the New Left, necessitating the use of a
certain amount of profanity.
Conies of the leaflet have been mailed to members el.
the SWP, its youth group the Young Socialist Alliance, the
Student Mobilization Committee, CP USA, DCA and other groups.
No tangible results have been detected at this
early date, although one source, 17.7.-- has attributed
the leaflet to dissident elements the New Mobilization
Committee.
The Bureau will be kept advised of retorted results.
1194,101CV"aalito4<
• c, 4r- 7:wan . ,t7T
Memorandum proposing action to drive a wedge between the SWP and "New Mobe,"
one of the New Left's array of anti-war organizations.
groups" and "peace groups." The purpose of the FBI letter was to "widen the split"
between the YSA and a prominent anti-war group called the Student Mobilization
Committee to End the War in Vietnam ("SMC"). The letter accused the YSA of
disrupting the SMC and of opposing the only really effective elements within the
SMC. There is testimony to the effect that the letter caused great trouble within the
YSA. The trouble related to the suspicion and worry as to who would write such a
Jur warm?
Par-6
BALLS!
71=.: it. It'o time to pull the c6ain, brothers -nd sinters. If
u,:anv ec•cleent in A:rike in tu survive, the crap influence
of the Soni',1int Work ?arty and itn bLnrnrd youth .roue
- Vcrong - ilunt be flunnd from New Mobe
uw:e end for :.11. St-, nAnt rvron like Freddie Nalstend and
R1.-;, 70th n= ere of the S.:1' Nat'l 0c=itteo, must
,:upped. r.ct rid cf the Carol Lip nns, Gun
e;:d ?he Jonnn Wnn1)- r
.t. 7, :;
,lth other
le,
Suite 900, 10:'9 Vermont Loft., N.W., Wanhinc,ton, D.C.
at
shit!
WZ+6 416
Pornographic cartoon mailed to selected Mobe organizers in order to exacerbate

tensions between them and the SWP.
letter and what its effects would be. In September 1%8, to further embarrass the SWP
and the YSA, the FBI sent a follow-up anonymous letter. This letter ridiculed these
organizations for cowardice in the demonstration at the 1968 Democratic Party
convention in Chicago. The letter implored the SWP and YSA to "stay home" on
future occasions of this kind...The SWP and YSA participated in an anti-war group
called the National Mobilization Committee ("MOBE"). In February 1969 the FBI's
New York office sent out an anonymous letter ridiculing MOBE's activities at the so-
called "counter-inaugural" that took place in Washington, D.C. at the same time as
President Nixon's inauguration in January 1969. The letter was sent to members of
various anti-war groups, including the SWP and YSA. There is testimony that this
letter aggravated certain problems within MOBE. MOBE ceased operation in
February 1969...The next FBI effort involved an anti-war parade in New York City
that took place on April 5, 1969. This parade was jointly sponsored by the SWP, YSA
and SMC. Since it was to involve both civilians and military personnel, the sponsors
of the parade considered it particularly important to keep the parade peaceful, so as
not to draw the military personnel into trouble with the law. Just before the parade,
the FBI's New York office distributed an anonymous leaflet entitled "Notes from the
Sand Castle" (the latter term being slang for Columbia University), accusing the
"SWP-YSA-SMC coalition" of cowardice in not being willing to fight the "pigs"
(police) and to accumulate "battle wounds." The FBI's expressed purpose in
creating the leaflet was to "disrupt plans for the demonstration and create ill-will
between the SWP-YSA and other participating non-Trotskyist groups and individu-
als." The evidence shows that this communication created difficulties in managing
the march...In December 1969 the New York FBI office sent an anonymous obscene
leaflet to 230 individuals and organizations urging them to "flush" the SWP and
YSA from the successor to MOBE, called New MOBE. From the scope and nature of
the operation, the court concludes that it had a disruptive effect of the kind intended
by the FBI...In February 1970 the New York FBI office sent a memorandum to various
anti-war activists purporting to be written by a member of New MOBE. The FBI's
purpose was to "create splits" between the SWP participants and other groups in the
New MOBE coalition. The memorandum attacked "the Trotskyites" for taking
control of the New MOBE and for resisting the recruitment of blacks. The FBI was
aware, through its informant system, of criticism of the SWP about racial imbalance
disfavoring blacks. The court concludes that this operation had a disruptive effect
of the kind intended by the FBI...The SMC planned a conference at Catholic
University, Washington, D.C. in February 1971. An internal FBI memorandum
recommended efforts to bring the university's attention to the SWP/YSA's alleged
domination of the SMC, and to disrupt the conference. The FBI distributed an
anonymous leaflet in advance of the conference date, entitled "Trotskyists Wel-
comed at Catholic University!" The leaflet questioned whether the Catholic Church
had been "duped again," in allowing its facilities to be used by the SMC...This
operation was carried out under the COINTELPRO-New Left program. The evi-
dence shows other instances of FBI operations designed to disrupt the SWP [in this
regard] 20
Although COINTELPRO-SWP had been officially terminated by the time its ex-
istence was revealed through a court-ordered release of documents to NBC reporter
Carl Stern on March 7, 1974,21the New York Times reported two years later (five years
after the "termination") that FBI infiltration and disruption of the Party was
continuing unabated." For instance:
An FBI report dated June 20, 1973 [i.e.: after COINTELPRO-SWP supposedly
ended], refers to the FBI having obtained "items stolen from the YSA local office."
The reference is to certain file cards removed by [Timothy] Redfearn from a private
file box. Redfearn regularly obtained confidential documents from the YSA, so that
the FBI could copy them. Redfearn would then return the documents to their
original location. In a report dated January 22, 1974, the FBI rated Redfearn as
"excellent." On February 3,1975, Redfearn was arrested by the Denver police for
burglaries unrelated to his informant activities. Redfearn requested FBI assistance,
but the FBI declined to help him [or so it says]. Redfearn then cooperated with local
police and gave them information regarding other persons who were burglars or
fences. Redfearn was [allegedly] discontinued as an FBI informant on April 17,1975.
Shortly thereafter he was [unaccountably] given a deferred prosecution [rather than
a suspended sentence, or some such, which would be much more usual in the case
of a snitch] on the local burglary charges...Redfearn then called the FBI, which
reinstated him as an informant on May 28, 1975. Beginning in June 1976 Redfearn
started to work at a book store in Denver that was operated by The Militant. Redfearn
told the FBI that this would give him access to records of both the SWP and the YSA.
On July 2, 1976, the SWP headquarters in Denver, located in the book store, was
burglarized. A padlock on the door to the book store had been cut, and the contents
of a file cabinet and a small box of petty cash were taken. On July 7 Redfearn called
his FBI contact agent and showed him a group of SWP files [taken from the
cabinet].-After the SWP burglary was reported in the local news media, the FBI
claimed no knowledge of the matter. A local FBI agent was called before a grand jury
in Denver and denied knowing how Redfearn had obtained the files?'
Given this, there is no particular reason to assume such anti-SWP activities on

the part of the Bureau have ever really ended. Be this as it may:
[Between 1960 and 1971] the FBI approved and implemented forty-six disruptive
COINTELPRO operations against the SWP; in addition, from 1960 to 1966, the FBI
conducted over ninety burglaries of SWP offices, and photographed over eight
thousand pages of SWP files, including financial records and personal letters?*
All of this undoubtedly was intended to quash:

...the threat of intellectual independence and uncontrolled political and social or-
ganization [which] has been well contained...Alone among the parliamentary de-
mocracies, the United States has had no mass-based socialist party, however mild
and reformist [since 1920], no socialist voice in the media, and virtually no
departure from centrist ideology within the schools and universities, at least until
the pressure from student activism impelled a slight departure from orthodoxy
[during the 1960s]. All this is testimony to the effectiveness of the system of controls
that has been in force for many years, the activities of the FBI being only the
spearhead for far more extensive, substantial, and effective — if more low-keyed —
measures enforced throughout American society?'
Interestingly, as with its simultaneous operations against the CP, the FBI's
COINTELPRO-SWP was probably self-defeating on its own terms. By the 1960s,
both the CP and the SWP were, like most old left organizations, moribund. Left to
themselves, they would undoubtedly have simply passed into a well deserved
oblivion. Ultimately, "the only thing that seemed to keep organizations like the SWP
going was the attention and concern of the FBI; just as their appeal would fade, the
Bureau would issue a new warning about how dangerous they were and new
recruits would flock to the cause."2'The situation is made even more interesting by
the fact that this largely useless (in its own terms) COINTELPRO ultimately resulted
in the Bureau's losing a suit filed against it by the Political Rights Defense Fund on
behalf of the SWP on July 18,1973, under provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act
(28 U.S.C. § 2401 [b]).27After years of preliminary maneuvering, during which the
government resisted plaintiff discovery motions and repeatedly moved for dis-
missal, the case came to trial in New York on April 2, 1981.2°Five years after the trial,
on August 25,1986, U.S. District Judge Thomas P. Greisa ruled that the Bureau had
indeed violated the basic rights of the plaintiff's over an extended period, through
"the FBI's disruption activities, surreptitious entries and use of informants," he
awarded the SWP a total of $246,000 in damages as a result?' This was followed, on
August 17, 1987, by Judge Greisa's issuance of an unprecedented injunction against
the FBI's use of the estimated 1,000,000 pages of investigative documents it had
compiled on the SWP and its members since 1940 for any reason whatsoever,
without the judge's personal consent, due to the illegal activity which had attended
the gathering of the material; the injunction applies to all police and intelligence
agencies - federal and local - within the U.S.'°
Hence, even many of the "intelligence gathering" (as opposed to counterintel-
ligence) activities which are associated with COINTELPRO - the use of infiltrators
and informers against political targets, to take a notable example - have at last been
declared unconstitutional in a court of law. As the celebrated constitutional attorney
Leonard Boudin, who handled the case, has put it, "This lawsuit represented the first
wholesale attack upon the entire hierarchy of so-called intelligence agencies that
[have] attempted to infiltrate and destroy...lawful political part[ies]...The SWP and
the Political Rights Defense Fund have carried to a successful conclusion a case
whose victory materially advances the First Amendment rights of speech and
association, and the Fourth Amendment Rights against invasion of privacy.""
Chapter 4
COINTELPRO - Puerto Rican

Independence Movement
[Agents of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division] should bear in mind
that the attitudes expressed by the President, the Director, and many
legislators in Congress, have been to curtail the militant actions...on the
part of a significant group of...people in the United States today. The
thinking of the Supreme Court of the United States has been along the lines
of suppressing the activities of those who openly advocate the overthrow
of democratic authority in the United States. In addition the Internal
Security Division of the Department of Justice has been specifically en-
larged and strengthened to deal with these matters.
— J. Edgar Hoover —
1970
On February 27, 1946, D. Milton Ladd, head of the FBI's Intelligence Division,
wrote a memorandum to J. Edgar Hoover recommending the Bureau cut back its
operations in Puerto Rico, "specifically excepting" counterintelligence measures
aimed at "communists and members of the Nationalist Party" on the island.1The
memo emerged from the context of relations developed by the U.S. with its small
Caribbean neighbor during the period since the former assumed direct "ownership"
of the latter in 1899, after the Spanish-American War:
The United States had to make the Spanish feel their loss from the war. Because Spain
had no cash left, as [U.S. plenipotentiary] Whitelaw Reid put it, "No indemnity was
possible, save in territory." We thought of taking Cuba, but "desolated by twelve
years of [its own anti-colonialist] war," the country wasn't worth much. That left
Puerto Rico...2
Having acquired the island through conquest, the federal government set out to
determine how the new possession should be managed:
The result of [more than a year of] congressional debate was the Foraker Act of 1900
[31 Stat. 77, named after Senator Thomas B. Foraker, its sponsor], which was
Congress's first essay in crafting the so-called Organic Acts that were to govern
Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico became a new constitutional animal, an "unincorporated
territory" subject to the absolute will of Congress, a colonial status that was
63
recognized by the Insular Cases by the Supreme Court...Representative [James D.]

Richardson's observations on Hawaii were quoted in the debate on the Foraker Act:
"Nations have always acted and should govern themselves at all times upon
principles which are entirely different from those which activate individuals...In
looking at the question of any foreign territory the only question that should enter
into consideration by us is one question: Is it best for the United States? The weal or
woe, the misery or happiness, the poverty or prosperity of the foreigner or those to
be annexed is not involved.'
With this self-enabling legislation in hand, the U.S. next installed a puppet gov-
ernment to administer its new colony. This consisted of "a governor and an
Executive Council appointed by the president of the United States, who also
appointed all the justices of the Supreme Court."' With a government under its total
control in place, "the customs duty on Puerto Rican goods was removed [by
congress]; dependent for export of its products, free of duty, to the mainland, the
island became a regional economy of the United States. Thus, by 1901, the Foraker
Act had set the essential framework of the U.S. connection. The political framework
might be enlarged in the direction of home rule in an endeavor to remove the stigma
of colonialism; the economic bond would work against any final severance of
permanent political union with the metropolitan power."'
At first, the island response was to follow U.S.-stipulated procedural forms in
attempting to alter the politico-economic equation. By 1916, however, Puertorriquefio
sentiment against the nature of federal rule had risen to a point which caused
Washington to reveal just how meaningless its "due process" really was. Concerned
that a scheduled "referendum on the imposition of U.S. citizenship and the military
draft" might result instead in an overwhelming vote for complete independence,
President Woodrow Wilson arbitrarily suspended balloting until July 1917, after
passage of the Jones Act (39 Stat. 951) unilaterally conferred citizenship and its at-
tendant obligations upon the island populace, regardless of Puertorriquefio desires.'
As to any prospect of eventual independence, the House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs proclaimed that "Our people have already decided Porto Rico [sic] is
forever to remain part of the United States [emphasis added]."'
Under such conditions, an increasing number of Puertorriqueflos turned to non-
electoral means of changing their circumstances. Following in the tradition of
Ramon Emeterio Betances, one of the few island leaders who openly advocated
complete separation from Spain prior to 1898, the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party
(NPPR) was founded in 1922; Pedro Albizu Campos became its president in 1930,
"injecting it with his radical nationalism."' Rejecting elections as "a periodic farce to
keep the Puerto Rican family divided," Albizu called for a strategy of direct action
to achieve full national sovereignty.' The federal response was to launch a campaign
of repression against the independentistas, a matter for which the government was
equipped with an on-site military (primarily naval) presence, the island's national
guard, and the local colonial police apparatus working in direct liaison with the FBI
(which maintained a field office in San Juan, as well as resident agencies in Ponce,
COINTELPRO - Puerto Rican Independence Movement 65
Aguadilla and Fajardo)." Although the Bureau's counterintelligence role in the

events occurring in Puerto Rico during the '30s is sketchy at best, Ladd's memo
provides firm indication that it was an active one, and that Albizu's followers were
a particular target. The island's police commander, Colonel Frank Riggs announced
that his men were in a state of "war to the death with all Puerto Ricans.""
In the face of this, Albizu proclaimed a quid pro quo of sorts: "for every
Nationalist killed, a continental American would die."12Hence, when the police
fired into a crowd of student demonstrators (killing five) from the University of
Puerto Rico at Rio Piedras on October 24, 1935, the NPPR replied by assassinating
Riggs himself."
Albizu wanted revolution, but the United States tried to prevent one by holding the
next face-off, not in the streets but in the courts. On March 7,1936, federal authorities
[read: the FBI] raided nationalist headquarters, collected "compromising evidence,"
and collected Albizu Campos and seven of his closest colleagues as well. The charge
was sedition; the penalty, if convicted, was a long stretch in a mainland — never
Puerto Rican — prison."
As Ronald Fernandez has observed, "since eight Americans and four Puerto
Ricans failed to reach a consensus, the first trial ended in a hung jury...[so] in the
second trial, federal officials took no chances. They stacked the jury with twelve safe
people. Ten were Americans, two were Puerto Ricans, and together they produced
a verdict which federal prosecutors found 'satisfactory.'"" Official opinion held
that the two-to-ten year sentences meted out to Albizu and most of the other NPPR
leadership "ought to go far to restore order and tranquility on the island.." This
assessment undoubtedly seemed all the more solid to the government insofar as the
prosecution's "need to gather evidence" for the sedition trial had been used as the
basis from which to undertake "the first use of Grand Jury proceedings to harass,
intimidate, and cripple an organized national liberation movement."17Specifically
at issue in this regard was the sentencing, on April 2,1936, "to a year in federal prison
of the then Secretary General of the Nationalist Party, Puerto Rican poet Juan
Antonio Corretjer, for contempt...in refusing to surrender to [the grand jury] the
minutes and list of members of the party."" However:
Exactly the opposite occurred. Indeed, after the Federal Court of Appeals upheld
Albizu's conviction in February 1937, Puerto Rico witnessed what is quite accurately
referred to as a massacre of nationalist supporters. To show solidarity with Albizu,
his followers planned a parade in Ponce...[H]eavily armed police blocked off every
street in the vicinity...a shot rang out. Within minutes, twenty civilians, some just
bystanders, had been killed and more than 150 wounded .19
Despite government contentions that the NPPR itself was responsible for the
bloodbath, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), after an exhaustive in-
vestigation, concluded "[t]he facts show that the affair of March 21, 1937, in Ponce
was a massacre...due to the denial by police of the civil rights of citizens to parade
and assemble. This denial was ordered by the [U.S. appointed] Governor of Puerto
Rico."2° Badly battered, the independentistas responded with a rapid series of repri-
sals before withdrawing into an extended period of regroupment:
In June 1937, two nationalists tried to kill the federal judge who presided at Albizu's
trial; during a rally at which Puerto Rico's resident commissioner defended the use
of the American flag, two nationalists tried to kill him. And, on July 25, 1938, at a
parade celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the American takeover, Albizu's
followers tried to assassinate Governor Blanton Winship by firing more than eighty
shots at the reviewing stand. Somehow Winship escaped injury, but his bodyguard
was wounded and a colonel in the National Guard was killed by a stray bullet?1
With Albizu in prison - he ultimately served more than 18 years behind federal
bars before dying of radiation-induced cancer in 196522 - the NPPR underwent a
period of intense internal turmoil. The extent to which FBI infiltration facilitated its
resultant fragmentation is unclear but, again, Ladd's memo suggests some such in-
volvement. In any event, effectively leaderless and undoubtedly tired of incessant
discord and infighting, a significant portion of the membership had, by 1945, drifted
toward the softer and "more realistic" position of advocating commonwealth status
rather than full independence for Puerto Rico, a posture advanced by the liberal Luis
Munoz Marin and his Partido Popular Democratic° (PPD), founded in 193823This ero-
sion was offset to some extent by the formation of a caucus calling itself the Congresso
pro Independentista (CPI) which, by 1946, had largely merged with Concepcion de
Garcia's Partido Independentista Puertorriqueno (PIP). The general flow away from the
NPPR appears to have been what the federal government had in mind at a
counterintelligence level, and Ladd's memo suggesting that pressure might be
removed from all those other than active communists and/or nationalists should be
viewed as a way of "encouraging defection."
By 1948, Mufkoz Marin, posing himself as an "alternative to the violence of the
independentistas," was able to win Puerto Rico's first elected governorship on the
basis of a promise that he could negotiate a favorable resolution to the island's
political status question with federal policy-makers." "But Congress had absolutely
no intention of letting Puerto Rico go. That the United States wanted to retain its
colony was made clear to Mufloz on his frequent trips to Washington, and in the end
he settled for what Congress was willing to give. Testifying before the House in
March 1950, Mulioz [was reduced to] repeatedly telling congressmen what they
wanted to hear," that he and the PPD would willingly bow to the authority of their
colonizers in exchange for approval of a "constitution" which was itself utterly sub-
ordinate to the will of the U.S." By this point, even the mainstream Puerto Rican
press was attacking Mufioz as a sell-out.26
It was into this scene of perceived betrayal on the part of many Puertorriquenos
that Pedro Albizu Campos returned after a full decade of incarceration. Immedi-
ately, he informed the independentistas that, "the Nationalist Party [which he sought
to revitalize] is going to dynamite America and expel the Yankees from Puerto
Rico...The day always comes when justice arms the weak and puts the giants to
flight. Then another Te Deum shall be sung...but it will be preceded by armed

struggle."29
On October 30, 1950, a group of approximately two thousand nationalists orches-
trated uprisings throughout the island...in the mountains, the nationalists not only
took over the town of Jayuya, they used it as a temporary capital for the sovereign
republic of Puerto Rico...in San Juan, Muftoz was lucky to be alive. Armed with
machine guns and Molotov cocktails, five nationalists had entered La Fortaleza, the
governor's residence, intent upon killing him and blowing up the structure that had
always been a potent symbol of colonialism.28
Mufloz Marin's would-be executioners were killed and the revolt put down
(with considerable direct U.S. military involvement), but, "two days after the attack
on La Fortaleza, two New York nationalists - Oscar Collazo and Grisilio Torresola
- took a train to Washington. They meant to kill President Truman, but when they
spotted guards at the entrance to Blair House (Truman's temporary residence),
Collazo opened fire, and within seconds Terresola and a police officer were dead.
Examining Terresola's body, police found letters from Albizu Campos. Although
they said nothing explicit about an assassination...they led to Albizu's arrest and im-
prisonment."29This was followed, on March 4, 1954, by four independentistas
managing to smuggle a gun into the House of Representatives, where they were able
to wound five congressmen before running out of ammunition.3°
As in the late 1930s, the momentum achieved by the NPPR could not be sus-
tained. Exhaustion and factionalism once again took their toll during the late '50s,
as the independentistas splintered into such smaller student organizations as the Fed-
eracion de Universdrios Pro Independencia (FUPI) and Federacion Estudiantil pro In-
dependencia (FEPI, a high school level group), as well as a proliferating number of sec-
tarian "grouplets" like the Accion Patriatica Revolucionaria (APR) and Movimiento 27
de Marzo, each committed to continuing the armed struggle on its own terms. As is
the case with the 1940s, the precise role of FBI infiltration, disinformation, and so
forth in helping this disintegration process along is murky, but subsequent Bureau
memoranda allude to the fact that active counterintelligence operations were oc-
curring at some level. Meanwhile, the PIP's increasingly legalistic strategy of
"fighting the regime from within the regime," promulgated by party founder
Gilberto Conception de Garcia had come to seem largely irrelevant to a growing
number of activists. The slack in radical party politics was taken up, to a certain
extent at least, by recruitment of former NPPR members into the Movimiento por
Independencia Puertorriquerio (MPIPR), headed by the avowed marxist-leninist, Juan
Mari Bras, and the emergence of the Partido Socialista Puertorriqueno (PSP).31
It was at this juncture that the FBI implemented a formal COINTELPRO with the
expressed intent of bolstering the U.S. colonial grip on Puerto Rico through the
expedient of destroying virtually the entire spectrum of left opposition on the island.
In a memorandum to the SAC, San Juan (accompanying text), on August 5,1960, FBI
director J. Edgar Hoover announced that the Bureau was "considering" the new
-
-
SAC, San Juan (105-3353) August 4,

r.
Direct-r, FBI (105-66754) PrIZSOP;AL
A" 4,01
TVR 111FZIU_ILICS
- /7-
(sUBVNSIVE.
• The Burenu is considering the fer-sibility•-•-.
of instituting a progrna of disruption to be directed -
Egninst organizations vlich seek independence for
Puerto Rico through other than ltrrful„ peaceful mauls.
Because of the increasing boldness apparent
in the activities of such organizations, their utte:-.
disregard of the will of the aejority, the inevitable
.ccrimunist and/or So'f le t. effort to czbarress the -
/United States, and the courage given to their cause
/ by Castro's Cuba, ne mist make a more positive effort, -
not only to curtail, but to disrupt their activities:,
_.
San Juan and hew York should give this Latter
stu.lied consideration and thereafter furnish the V:u-ertu
obszrvations, suggestions and rec.-emendations relative
to tire institution of such u progrzia to reach the
Bureau no later than 3-25-60..
In considering this matter. vpu shoy14 f.`ftl" -
in rand the Bureau desires to disrupt the activities
pQ p these organizations and is not interested in nee.:
harasmer.t. Ao action should be taRei in tills pro,r,rmu • 0
O 1. Avithoet Bureau authority, at arC,' time.
O
- A copy of this camunication is designatel
0 - for the Chicago Office and a copy for the hashington
Office for information.
r.T.• 'York (105-Z2872k
li ■
• r
- Chicago (105-5531)"'
...ashington Field
-
1 62-7721 (NPPR)
• - .
TC/b371,;'.te ' ' '
r
- (9)
- (1
.
13 AuQji019,by
:
_ NAL Ii W CD TELETYPE UNIT P
Memo initiating
initiating COINTELPRO - Puerto Rican Independence Movement.
COINTELPRO, and stipulated he was no longer interested in operations which

involved "mere harassment." San Juan complied, at least on the level of planting
disinformation in the island press, as is indicated in the accompanying letter from
Hoover to the SAC, dated November 14 (but referring to a October 26,1960 commu-
nication from San Juan), in which the director critiques a fabricated news story. In
the same missive, Hoover recommends gearing up the COINTELPRO, using already
existing infiltrators within "groups seeking independence for Puerto Rico" in the
COINTELPRO — Puerto Rican Independence Movement 69
UNITED STATES CO ././.:ENT
Memorandum
T0 , DIRECTOR, FBI (105-66754) DATE4 11/15/60
SAC, NEW YORK (105-32872)

sROUPS. SEEKING _INDEPENDENCE
SUBJECT: FOR PUERTO RICO (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)
SUBVERSIVE CONTROL.5c27/
TOO: SanJuan).—
Re Bureau letter dated 9/13/60. .

• A review of the files of the NYC has been
made concerning the activities of Puerto Rican pro-indepen-
dence groups which seek independence by other than peaceful
means, as well as the files on the counterintelligence
program as it relates to the Communist Party. It is believed
that upon instituting a counterintelligence program in this
field, efforts should be directed with the following aims in (3,
mind:
I. Disruption and discord. . •
II. Creating doubts as to the wisdom of re-

maining in the independence movement.
11.
III. Causing defections from the indpendence ,q
movement. e0
LI:.
The suggested means of obtaining these desired Ik .s
ends are as follows:
2) Exploiting factionalism within an o...
organization.-
Factionalism is a common fault within pro-
independence groups and it is believed that this existing
element can be developed, enlarged and exploited. As an
example, after the demise of the Accion Patriotica
- P -
'2' -,Bureau-(105 -66754) (RM)
2/ San Juan (105-3353) (RM)
1//06-:
I.:.New York (105-32872) (#413) fa NOV Ilissa
(5)
New York field office response to COINTELPRO startup.
role of provocateurs. The director felt that "carefully selected informants" might be
able to raise "controversial issues" within independentista formations such as the
MPIPR, as they were even then doing within the CP,USA and preparing to do within
the SWP. Further, he pointed out that such individuals might be utilized effectively
to create situations in which "nationalist elements could be pitted against the
communist elements to disrupt some of the organizations, particularly the MPIPR
and...FUPI." He also instructed that "the San Juan Office should be constantly alert
SAC, San Juan (105.3353) . November 14, 1900

AM= J/4.41 ^ t‘ "7:1;- : •
Di rectortj cFBI
th• X4 itre "
GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE
FOR PUERTO RICO
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)
A
Reurep 10-26-60.
After careful review of the proposed article, it is
believed that it would not achieve the results desired; namely,
to cause animosity between Juan Mari Bras and Juan Antonio
Corretjer, nor would it convey to the readers of the article
the dangerousness of the Puerto Rican independence groups.
The question of voting or not voting in the general elections
in Puerto Rico is not now the type of issue which is sufficiently
divisive to accomplish the purpose of this program.
As an alternative, it is suggested San Juan prepare
a brief article which would be in the nature of alerting
Puerto Ricans to the dangerousness of the various segments of
the independence movement in Puerto Rico. Such en article
would, of course, have to be interesting enough to interest a
newspaper contact to utilize the some and sufficiently informa-
tive to develop hostility in the minds of readers towards the
elements-engaged in the independence movement. The article
should be self-sustaining in interest and informative without
using confidential information received from our sources, and
it should mot embarraesthe Bureau.
With regard to your request for information relating
to counterintelligence tactics and techniques employed against
the Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA) for possible use against
the Puerto Rican independence groups, it appears that the exact
same tactics would not be applicable.
Some varied forms of the same tactics may undoubtedly
be applied; for example;
1 - New York PALED SI
mew
NOV 14 194o le Te ite
11.1m. C•MM411
COW.
OwLora
MM.
lmm
Ro
Wime TC:djw
)
AleY3 1960-
‘111
The Bureau's first plan of attack against the independentistas
for articles extolling the virtues of Puerto Rico's relationship to the United States as
opposed to complete separation from the United States, for use in anonymous mail-
ings to selected subjects in the independence movement who may be psychologi-
cally affected by such information."
As can be seen in the next document, the New York field office (in cooperation
with San Juan) had responded with a concrete "action proposal" within 48 hours.
Within months, San Juan was reporting back regularly on the relative success of its
various counterintelligence operations (such as in the accompanying November
(1) Security informants operating inside tie groups 1

could, lmder certain circumstances, raise controversial issues
at meetings, raise justifiable criticisms against leaders and
take other steps which would weaken the organization. In the
proposed article youfurnisned, the question of voting or
abstainin;:from voting, as it was related by t.;:o of the top
leaders of the Mavimiento Pro Independencia de Puerto Rico
(MPIPR), appears to be an issue which would be controversial
within the M?I?R.
In connection with cur counterintelligence program,

any informant operatino. thereunder must be first approved by
the Bureau for such operation and then carefully briefed by
the k,rert handling him before he engages in controiersial
discussions or criticisms inside the particular group. If you
desire to initiate this type of action through selected inforc:an'at
you should furnish the identities of informants selected, basis
for selection and the proposed mannezyou plan to use them-
Our informants operating in thejCPUSA_ have caused dis.-)tion
1:47itTlcut jeopardizin: their informant status and, in fact, son_
have advanced inside the Party primarily because of their forceful
acts in criticizing poor leaders and other weaknesses in the
Party organization.
(2) The San Juan Office should be constantly alert- .

for articles extolling the virtues of Puerto Rico's relationship'
with the United States as opposed to complete separation from
the United States, for use in anonymous mailings to selected .
subjects in the independence movement who may be psycholosically
affected by such information.
(3) It appears the nationalist elements could be

pitted a,..ainst the cemmunist elements to effectively disrupt
some of the orz371izatfons, particularly the rPIFR and tne
Federacion de Un!_vcrsitsric5 Pro injependencia (FUF.1), ;:h2;2
We have determined there is corlsunist influence. Ti._ nationslist
elements in Puerto Pica prior to the time Castro obtained power
in Cuba have indicated they sere anticaamunist. The CP in
Puerto Rlco has never teen strong, and today it appears that
the influence of international communism has a greater influence
on the radical elements within Puerto Rico. in re:arc to the
XPIPR and FUPI, it is noted that these to orzahisatione
apparently have the largest membership of any of the indepen-
dence groups in Puerto Rico.
In the future, San Juan and New York should furnish

the identity of the newspaper contact to whom you desire to
furnish such the t:L'r,e- or the submission of the
articles to the Bureau.
Because of the large number of Puerto Ricans

residing in New Yor, and the fact thata number of Puerto Rican
independence ornizt!.ons arc active in New York, New for ',: and
San Juan should exchange ideas relative to tactics and techniques
which may be effective in your divisions.
The nationalists in Puerto Rico within themselves

are a threat to the internal security of the United States,
and nationalists influenced by international comunism can be
an even greater threat. The Bureau believes this pro:ram can
be effective, and continuous attention must be given to it.
1960 memo describing the planting of an editorial in the San Juan daily, El Mundo
and other actions), and receiving a steady flow of suggestions from Hoover as to
how to improve the COINTELPRO's effectiveness (see accompanying document,
dated November 21, 1962). By late 1967, the director was positively jubilant in his
assessment to the San Juan SAC of the "benefits" accruing from such tactics:
[The COINTELPRO has served to] confuse the independentist leaders, exploit
group rivalries and jealousies, inflame personality conflicts, emasculate the...strength
of these organizations, and thwart any possibility of pro independence unity [emphasis
added] 32
In achieving the results which so delighted the director, the San Juan SAC had
first and foremost taken a tip from Hoover that, "the PSI [Public Security Index] is
interested in publishing anticommunist articles, particularly those which could
expose pro-Cuban and communist influence in the various national independence
organizations in Puerto Pico...The purposes of this program are to disrupt the
activities and lessen the influence of nationalists and communists who seek to
separate Puerto Rico from the United States."' The COINTELPRO thus included a
full-scale disinformation component by which agents systematically planted ar-
ticles and editorials (often containing malicious gossip concerning independentista
leaders' alleged sexual or financial affairs) in "friendly" newspapers, and dispensed
"private" warnings to the owners of island radio stations that their FCC licenses
might be revoked if pro-independence material were aired.
The articles and editorials...were placed mainly in El Mundo, a Spanish language
daily dating back to the early part of this century, and owned since the 1960s by
Northamerican Mrs. Argentina Hills, the 1977-78 president of the Interamerican
Press Association (a U.S. fomented association of newspaper owners in this
hemisphere). E/Muntio is also one of the Knight (U.S.) chain of newspapers...The San
Juan Star, a Scripps-Howard (U.S.) chain newspaper, and El Imparcial in its latter
days, after the death of its pm-independence owner, Sr. Ayuso, were also used to
plant articles and editorials...Other less prominent newspapers like El Vigra, the
University of Puerto Rico's Catholic Youth organ, and the so-called Bohemia Libre
Puertorriquen — well described by the Bureau as an "anticommunist and anti-Cuban
publication" — were also used to disseminate the accusation that FUPI was commu-
nist and thus "scare other University students away from joining it."34
Concerning radio programming, there is clear evidence that agents "talked to"
the owners of radio stations WLEO in Ponce, WKFE in Yauco and WJRS in San
German about their licensing as early as 1963.3' One result was cancellation of the
one hour daily time-block allotted to "Radio Bandera," a program produced by the
APU.36Such tactics to deny a media voice to independentistas accord well with other,
more directly physical methods employed during the 1970s, after COINTELPRO
supposedly ended:
[There was] the bombing of Claridad [daily paper first of the MPIPR and then the
SA.0 Juan (105-3333) November 21, 1962

I
Director, 1111 (105-93124)
SEEK1NG IDE
NPI:2;DENCE
FOE PUER1- u RICO
(COUYILRINTELLNECE P2OCRAM)
SUBVERSIVE CoN1RuL SECTION
It has been noted at the Bureau that

Accion Patriotica Unitaria (APU) has increased in
membership and activity in recent months,largely
through the aggre -. ..5ive leadership of (Tc- •• 3
I t is desired that ways ana -r..CaltS . Z..2 —

\:::pilli'eil -at this time in an effort to curtail and
disrupt the activities of APU both in New York and
San Juan, Some of the items which might be used are:
(l ..."
leanings efi)._._ Lz jL3 Marxist background and
Show,,th-P
(2) Expose V.. desire to

puSh the older more constiveelement out of
API) in favor of younger men who may be more easily
influenced by Marxism and who might be more
susceptible to committing acts of violence.
(3) Exnloi t the_ohyripusili:ssensi on

existing in the APU over insistence
in supporting the_Cuban revolution,
(4) The split in the Bares Board between

APU and the more conservative independence groups
might be used.
mi
„ idea the rift be tweea n
co..!...f9.1 San Juan and New York should give full
consideration to counterintelligence measures against I
-,....______. APU and submit recommendations to the Bureau as to /..1 ..•
methods which might s..b 'successfully employed in that i ii
connection. .. , .„1 P,K-'31" . '..:. -., 17W ---' VI1
. -•' ft r, /,, ,
A ., - e.-,..1 / i / 66
" ----I 2 - New York (105-32E72) P....1_:....-
it ,Pi r,f/ . 7?Yr- •
*'''' • -- - •;r1I1GLP:cad •' 1 9Roy 2G 1962 iik.

`c• prv( 6 )• (1--190A ()e l/
..,... L., /
.---.________ V CL 1107,3_
7 Tru.liPr. UNIT 1=3 Pr
-
The FBI's plan of attack against the independentistas is refined and developed in this 1962
memo, written when the COINTELPRO was approximately two years old. The tactics
involved have continued to be perfected over the years, but show every indication of still
being used by the Bureau and other police agencies at the present time (albeit, often
without a formal counterintelligence label).
PSP] printing presses which has occurred at least five times in the present decade.
Although the MPI [now PSP] usually furnished the police with detailed information
as to the perpetrators of these acts, not even one trial has ever been held on this island
in connection with these bombings, nor even one arrest made. The same holds true
for a 1973 bombing of the National Committee of the [PIP]."
Operating in this sort of curtailment in exposure of valid independentista views,

the FBI was able to sow discord and factionalism within and between targeted
groups much more effectively, "beginning with FUPI and the [NPPR] in 1960,
through the [APU] in 1962 and 1963, [and later] Ligua Socialista Puertorriqueria, the
MPI[PR] and...the PIP."" In order to accomplish this, as the accompanying June 12,
1961 memo from the San Juan SAC to Hoover indicates, the Bureau engaged in
intensive investigation of independentista leaders both on the island and in New York
in order to ascertain their (real or arguable) "weaknesses" in terms of "morals,
criminal records, spouses, children, family life, educational qualifications and
personal activities other than independence activities." The findings, however
flimsy or contrived, were pumped into the media, disseminated as bogus cartoons
or "political broadsides," and/or surfaced within organizational contexts by provo-
cateurs, all with the express intent of setting the leaders one against the other and at
odds with their respective organizational memberships.
The Bureau assessed such undertakings as being quite successful, a matter
witnessed by the accompanying AIRTEL from Hoover to the SAC, San Juan, dated
March 9, 1962, in which distribution of a bogus leaflet accusing the FUPI leadership
of "secret links to communism" is discussed. When evidence to support such red-
baiting contentions could not be discovered, the FBI's COINTELPRO specialists
simply made it up:
MPIPR leaders, cognizant of the basic antipathy of Puerto Ricans, predominantly
Roman Catholic, to communism, have consistently avoided, at times through public
statements, any direct, overt linkage of the MPIPR to communism...The [San Juan
office] feels that the above situation can be exploited by means of a counterintelli-
gence letter, purportedly by an anonymous veteran MPIPR member. This letter
would alert MPIPR members to a probable Communist takeover of the organiza-
tion.39
Such methods were routinely employed against all independentista organiza-

tions, as is shown in the accompanying memo from the San Juan SAC to Hoover,
dated November 21, 1962 and targeting the APU. Things also assumed a highly
personal tone, as when in 1966 an unidentified agent dummied up a letter to MPIPR
head Juan Mari Bras "warning" him to "beware the ambitiousness" of a younger
colleague." By 1968, such tactics had evolved to the point that Mari Bras was being
accused in Bureau-fabricated leaflets and cartoons of "sending young men out to die
as members of the Comandos Armados de LiberaciOn [CAL, an armed formation whose
dedication was often misused by the FBI for such propaganda purposes] while he
TO :
- DIRECTOR, FET. (105-93124) DATE: t y3
r r A
k•UrLIA 1.!1 41,_
,,
FROM : Î
SAC, SAN JUAN (105-3353 Sub
i L 5
SUBJECT: FOR
()GROUPS S==KTNG INDEPENDE NCE
PUERTO 4IC0 (COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)
SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION
Re San Juan letter tc rureau 1/30/61 concerni^z
publisninz of editorial in "El Eundo.
_
Enclosed are two copies to Eureau and one to New York
f t-ansiation of an editorial which appeared in 'El 1:undo"
dated 27/61, actually published and released on afternoon
of 4/26/61. Translation was made by San Juan Office
Trans(,tort: -
It is noted this editorial is essentially the same as
.-"---'=, previously furnished to r::',
„„—....-- .:-`,::-..: -'T'':' ---
..-.L.1.LILilof "El Mundo", with appropriaTT—EriaTTEas 1,9ov2r cur:.: ,
deveirpments in the FUPI.
For the information of the Bureau and New York the
following series of events transpired just prior to the
publshinz of this editorial and are believed to have created
the proper atmosphere for whic _i.:1-' was waiting
prior to issuance of this editoz71-al: -- .
April 13, 1961: FUPI picketed the San Juan Office of the
FBI and alleged FBI "persecution of
independentist students"
April 19, 1961: FUPI conducted spontaneous "victory
demonstration" in streets of Rio Piedras
(section of Metropolitan San Juan) when
news received that FIDEL CASTRO had wiped
out invading forces. Demonstration ended in
'• violence as a result of clash when anti-CASTRO
/, students and 12 FUPI members were arrested.
. 4.:54:-)
I 2-Bureau (Eno ,,,,
-.2) (RM) ,-.. I
(1-N-=w York PS. 328(2)(Enc. 1)(RM) --,› •
1 1 sen JuanOc.30 '
-
, 4:\r5. -
::. :..: ;7
JCB:vv ., s2''' ,
c:-•‘." 1
N 1 '
'OH . 1: i i.14,t-,. 0
. )
,•
f 1.1
A l
' 3 7(5:
..
: .I,I ,-, , L.,,,
,I t I '; 'i ' fro
bu, of...4.4,1,
k 1• C 1 '..-....
—S -. -Car R<,
cati.mh o --.
Early COINTELPRO memo recapping disinformation tactics employed against

Federacion de llniversitarios pro Independencia (FUPI) and the results obtained
thereby. Such methods were used against independentistas throughout the dura-
tion of the COINTELPRO in Puerto Rico.
SAC, San Juan (1d5-3353 Sub_1)::y June l2, 1961

ts.0.1 ■
Director, FBI (105-93124) tetztt
. q..
GROUPS SEEKINf; INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO

(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRM) • -
SUBVEIZSIVE CONTROL SECTION -
•
In order to appraise the caliber of leadership
in the Puerto Rican independence movement, particularly
as it pertains to our efforts to disrupt their activities
and compromise their effectiveness, we should have an
intimate detailed knowledge of the more influential
leaders as individuals.
The names of each of the leaders listed below
are maintained in the Security Index.'
SAN JUAN' NEN YORK L•
it747.575T.T41 7,757Nr711.
1'4; 11.-i-..;,'•
'••
.
•
1- Your files will contain descriptive information

appropriate to our investigative reporting. he should,
however, for the purposes of this program, delve deeply
into that part of their lives which do not show on the
surface; for example.. we must determine their capabilities
of influencing others, capabilities of real leadership,
why the intense desire for Puerto Rico's independence,
what they eNpect to gain from independence, and the support
they have from other leaders and rank-and-file members.
he must have information concerning their weaknesses,
morals, criminal records, spouses, children family life,
educational qualifications and personal activitir other e+^
, than independence activities. 44/
'- I I: •
.-New York (L:5 323i;1. f -
M3 c):.). P1
•
r ,
,. •
•
,.
f;
• •
SEE NOTE ON YELLOW,-PAWA.

TC:djwtt— „
JUN 13 1551
' rt?
i;>.t7f tin T
Early document delineating plan to discredit selected independentista

leaders. Such tactics appear to still be in use today.
remain[edl protected by his foreign benefactor [supposedly Cuban premier Fidel

Castrol."41
These methods were used not only to divide Puertorriquerios among themselves,
but to forestall alliances between any of the various elements of the independentista
movement and progressive groups on the U.S. mainland. For instance, when the
i2==77727= supreme leader for many years

in the nationalist mocnent in Puerto Rico, often disavowed
comunist influences in the nationalist movement. Dnrn;._,__
the United States war against communism in Korea,F71•-
specifically stated that the Nationalist Party of'PU:i-to Rico
must avoid being considered in anrNay com=unistic in its vipws.
Whatever his relationship ay have been with communist

individuals and regardless of how wrong, or right he was,
17. against Soviet communist ideoloz.
suppose.---- could see his wifc,777" -- y--':-..
and so-callea
Fidel Castro's Soviet-ty clitn like leeches.
supposel7777Ahnew of the Federation of University
Students for I-HTEFTLcdce joining with international
communism, which t if we are indiifercnt, can eventually
destroy the Americas which 17777.777777iloves.
Snoose 7 7711earns that Juan rari CI-ZS iS

attem')ting to unite nationalists and communists under
the banner of the Novimicnto Pro-Indepcndencia. ..Jsays
opposite the nationalists desire a reiublic end the
communists a socialist state like Soviet Russia.
-7:1::new that the Accion Fatrictica
Suppose ',L..717777
Unitaria, contiiiTdescendant of his Nationalist
Party of Puerto Pico, is almost combletel• doriimmted,
and controlled by the co:mtunist
who directs but never leads. ------
...-.:777.is being betrayed, but nom important

g
is tlia - raCI--thLt Puerto Rico is bein
The destiny of Puerto P,ico'must not include sub-
serviei,ce to an atheistic ideology.
Puerto Rice, yes; communism, no!
Text of "anonymous leaflet" circulated in 1962 to discredit Juan Mari Bras.
black liberation journal Soulbook published an editorial entitled "The Puerto Rican
Revolution" in 1965, arguing that Puertorriquenos and mainland Afro-Americans
shared both a common heritage and a common oppressor,42COINTELPRO experts
in New York saw to it that anonymous and thoroughly racist "letters of objection"
were immediately dispatched to the MPIPR:
We resent the implication that (name deleted) black nationalist allies in the editor's
statement that our people are Negro as was our martyred leader Pedro Albizu
Campos. We are proud of our Spanish heritage and culture. Although Negroes are
welcome in our movement and may seek refuge in our nation, let it not be said that
the majority of [Puertorriquenos] are Negro."
On October 23, 1967, the New York SAC also came forth with a plan to
195-"5353
• • .
lZft727.17:7atated that MARI BRAS' heart attack on 7.

A ril 21, 1964, was obviously brought on by strain and on
work and opinioned that the anonymous letter certainly did
nothing to ease his tensions for he felt the effects of the
letter deeply. The source pointed out that with MARI BRAS'
illness and effects of the letter on the MPIPR leaders, that
the organization's activities had come to a nearhalt., .
- : •
ci,...-1L„:_,,,..„,„..::,.;,, ,o1-,::,:_,L_L•-.:,
:,.....,..,.......„
- -:.-'4'.7."•,$' .
It is clear from the abovehatv our anonymous letter '
has seriously 'disrupted the MPITR ranks and created a climate.
•of distrust and dissension from which it willl take them some,-,
time to recover. This particular technique has been out-
standingly successful and we shall be on the lookout to further
L exploit out achivements in this field. The Bureau will be
promptly advised of other positive results of this program :1.:.
that may come, to our attention.
Fragment of 1964 memo in which the FBI takes credit for the near-fatal heart
attack of Juan Mari Bras. Such claims were repeated during the mid-70s in the
wake of the assassination of the independentista leader's son.
disseminate a forged leaflet in the name of Juan Mari Bras and designed to
misrepresent the MPIPR in such a way as to alienate a number of stateside
organizations - Youth Against War and Fascism, the Progressive Labor Party, the
Socialist Workers Party, Movimiento por Independencia, Casa Puerto Rico, the Worker's
World Party and Young Socialist Alliance among them- with which Mari Bras had
been attempting to forge a united front." Similarly, the Bureau sought to thwart any
possibility of a constructive relationship between independentistas and socialist
countries or liberation movements located outside the U.S. By 1966, the FBI was
preoccupied with "statements made by Mari Bras covering efforts to gain independ-
ence for Puerto Rico through the United Nations, support of the Cuban government
and the South Viet Nam Liberation Front (Viet Cong)."45One response to this
"threat" was the preparation and distribution of a cartoon (see page 89) purporting
to show Mari Bras and other MPIPR leaders under the direct control of Castro."
Other efforts in this vein included a campaign of sexual slander targeting Dona
Laura Meneses, wife of Albizu Campos, and Juan Juarbe y Juarbe, NPPR Delegate
for External Affairs (both were living in Havana at the time) for purposes of
"ridiculing the Puerto Rican independence movement, and the government of Fidel
Castro."47By 1971, the Bureau was even undertaking COINTELPRO actions to
SlA 1 LS Cl) ;NNILNT
Alonor an du in
TO
DIRECTOR, FBI (105-93124) DATE: June 8, y64
FROM :
51.1191.0 T:
SAC, SAN JUAN (105-3353 sub 1) (p)
turs
0:FEKING 'MEM:PENCE FOR PUERTO RIA:
COUNTRRINTELLIG'ZNCE PROGRAM
sr.m."4:=
SECRET
A.??Ip:
f
RIAZEA"-'
:l :FIELD
(SULiVEMIVE CONT1-30L) -
SL IPS C it
ReSanJuanlet 3/11/64 and Bulet 3/23/64. -
The anonymous leaflet proposed in reSJlet and

authorizedly reiulet was mailed April 13, 1964. The leaflet,
printed on cheap stock and enclosed in inexpensive envelopes.,
was mailed to about 300 persons, most ef them taken from our
portion of the mPiril railing list, and to a few selected in-
dependentistas. Reaction to its distribution was immediate
and most gratifying.
Fragment of typical memo describing use of bogus leaflet to foster factionalism

within the independentista movement.
prevent a link-up between the essentially defunct CP,USA on the basis that CP
leader Gus Hall had traveled to Puerto Rico, "raised the priority of Puerto Rican
independence" for his party, and promised to champion the cause when he traveled
to "the USSR and other socialist countries.""
Predictably, the sorts of manipulations involved in the COINTELPRO against
the Puertorriquefio independence movement entailed more than the fostering of
confusion and infighting among independentistas and the public at large. There can
be no doubt that lethal outcomes were acceptable to, even desired by, the FBI. For
example, as the accompanying excerpt from a July 1964 memo from the San Juan
SAC to Hoover bears out, the Bureau considered Mari Bras' near-fatal heart attack
during April of that year to have been brought on, at least in part, by an anonymous
counterintelligence letter. Far from expressing regret, or concern that perhaps the
FBI was overstepping its intentions in light of these consequences, the SAC con-
cludes by promising to "be on the lookout to exploit [our] achievements in this field
[emphasis added]" in the future, and to "advise the Bureau of other positive results
[emphasis added]" of the COINTELPRO in Puerto Rico.The pattern remained
evident more than a decade later when, as Mari Bras subsequently testified before
the United Nations Commission on Decolonization (after reviewing portions of the
75 volumes of documents the FBI had compiled on him), the Bureau undertook
tactics apparently intended to cause him to suffer a second coronary:
[The documents] reflect the general activity of the FBI toward the movement. But
some of the memos are dated 1976 and 1977; long after COINTELPRO was [suppos-
8/25/64
SAC, San Juan (101-3353)
-102-
Director, FBI (105-93124)
•
CGROUPS SEEF,ING INDEPENDECE Pu-,:aTo RLCO
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(SUBVERSIVE CONTROL) --
Re!lu]et 8/5/64 which outlined a suggested

Counterintelligence rove against the Federation of
Fniversity Students for Independence (Furl).
Your report of F/7/64 concerning the

organization and activities of the Federation of Students
for Independence (FEPI) has been reviewed with interest.
It is believed that a counterintelligence program against
FEPI can be initiated along with the suggested activity
against FUPI. It is believed that copies of the flyer
which will be prepared showing FUPI's connection with
international communism can be effectively used along
with an attached flyer in the Spanish language si:owing
FUPI's connection with FEPI.
These documents could h‘c distributed .anonymously

to some of the school officials and parents and might tend,
to reduce the influence of this budding youth organizati
Carefully review this matter witb Agents of youir

office- handling investigations of FUPI and FEPI submitting
your recommendations to the Bureau regarding proposed
counterintelligence procedures.
NOTE:
FEPI is new independence organization presently
existing in eight high schools in Puerto Rico.- It is the
child of FUPI, college age independence group at the Universil
of Puerto Rico which has connected tics with international
co:mmunism as well as Puerto Rican independence groups..,z-
0) Y
I - 105-123330 (Fcpiy_C- 43 ,
BGLP:all (5) 10 AUG241954

/
EX-108
Counterintelligence from cradle to grave. Document announcing FBI plans to add the
high school organization Federacion Estudiantil pro Independencia (FEPI) to its list of
COINTELPRO targets in Puerto Rico. Indications are that the Bureau continued its op-
erations against Puertorriquetio juveniles until at least 1971 and in all probability
much longer, perhaps through the present moment.
5/11/57
SAC, San Juan (105-3333-Sub 1)

1:7-1C-
FiL (105-93124)
SEF.=0 INDa?E.:C=CE
:'dE.- TO RICO
C=ERINTELLIL:ESCE PF.007.AM
IS - F.RN
Reurairtel 5/S/67.
Authority E>ranted to prepare proposed letter in

Spanish lan&ansc and to mail it as set forth on page three
of reerenced eirtel.
?reparation and Tsailins should b2 handled under

t!.2 nest secure conditions to protect the Bureau as the
Ldvise the Bureau of any info.:m:rstion coning to
yc,ur attentio nre.garding the ceiling of this letter..
Fragment of typical Airtel authorizing the sending of an anonymous

letter to foment disputes within the independentista movement. Note
the concern expressed that it not be discovered the letter originated with
the FBI. Hundreds of such letters are known to have been sent.
edly] ended as an FBI activity...At one point, there is a detailed description of the
death of my son, in 1976, at the hands of a gun-toting assassin. The bottom of the
memo is fully deleted, leaving one to wonder who the assassin was. The main point,
however, is that the memo is almost joyful about the impact his death will have upon
me in my Gubernatorial campaign, as head of our party, in 1976."
After this impact expressed itself in the form of an attack of severe depression
the same year, the San Juan SAC noted in a memo to FBI headquarters that, "It would
hardly be idle boasting to say that some of the Bureau's activities have provoked the
situation of Mari Bras [emphasis added]."" Obviously, one possible interpretation of
this language is that the FBI had a hand in orchestrating the murder of the MPIPR
leader's son, or at least helped cover the trail of the assassin(s). Given the context
established by the Bureau's own statements vis a vis Mari Bras, it also seems quite
likely that one of the means by which the FBI continued to "exploit its achievements"
in "provoking the situation" of the independentista leader was to arrange for the
firebombing of his home in 1978,51in addition to maintaining such normal "inves-
tigative" harassment as obtaining copies of every single deposit slip and check
written on his personal account for more than 20 years."
Plainly, the lethal or near-lethal dimension of the Puerto Rico COINTELPRO ex-
panded dramatically during the 1970s, after such operations had been allegedly
terminated. As Alfredo Lopez recounted in 1988:
[(D]ver the past fiftean years, 170 attacks — beatings, shootings, and bombings of
independence organizations and activists — have been documented...there have
been countless attacks and beatings of people at rallies and pickets, to say nothing
of independentistas walking the streets. The 1975 bombing of a rally at Mayaguez that
killed two restaurant workers was more dramatic, but like the other 170 attacks
remains unsolved. Although many right-wing organizations claimed credit for
these attacks, not one person has been arrested or brought to tria1.53
This pattern of seeming ineffectuality on the part of the FBI and cooperating
local police agencies when it comes to solving violent crimes against groups or
individuals targeted by COINTELPRO is revealing in a way which will be explored
more thoroughly in our chapter on the Bureau's anti-AIM operations. Suffice to say
that there can be no question that "lack of manpower" accounts for such apparent
ineptitude. By the 1970s, the FBI's San Juan field office was rostered with four
squads (about 80 agents), with another squad posted to each of the three resident
agencies (an additional 60 agents, overall), exclusive of a steady flow of technicians
from the mainland brought in to perform one or another "special task," all inter-
locked tightly with the island's substantial local police force." Further, the Bureau
is known to have customarily shared information and coordinated activities on the
island with the CIA, Secret Service, Naval Intelligence Service, 771st Military
Intelligence Detachment, the State Department, and Office of Naval Intelligence, all
of which maintain facilities and appreciable numbers of personnel on site in Puerto
Rico." All of this adds up to an incredible saturation of agents on a small Caribbean
island with an aggregate population of only 3.5 million. And, while the Bureau can't
seem to muster the wherewithal to apprehend any of the perpetrators of the beatings
and bombings of independentistas, it has always had ample resources available to
engage in anti-independentista gossip and editorializing, keeping track of Mari Bras'
checkbook, and arresting numerous FUPI students engaged in distributing pro-in-
dependence literature on such weighty charges as "possessing marihuana ciga-
rettes.""
In those few instances when the FBI did actually become involved in the
investigation of the murders of independentistas during the '70s, the results have been
bizarre. For example, when Teamster activist Juan Caballero disappeared in 1977,
the Bureau atypically joined in the search for him. On October 25, a body was found
in the El Yunque rain forest, badly decomposed and trussed up in electrical wire.
This, the FBI announced, was Caballero, who had probably been killed by "associ-
ates" who suspected him of having been a "police informant." No such suspicion
had existed prior to the Bureau's announcing it. Then, mysteriously, it was discov-
ered that the dental structure of the corpse failed to match that of Caballero. Further
1 C M20 Ta0,1% ??7,

(105-312:1) D.\ a: 5/23,-59
T■
(1. / ' :nc, . (105-3353 sub (P)
l./``
T,ICO
Soarces of the San Juan Cffice ::ave for a period

of ti7e avised of rc7:atic interests e::Lstins between
S=:7, hea,: of 'ane 1.:ovi7iento Prc—In:;epaniencia
.Los (Puerto T,ic,:r o. t) ("f1.12-?,
• - aone ti:ne Fe6eracion
alFedertion a: University
Juts f. r __., a FUPI) 7, e:r.ber :',ne estransec2
I;; so of Cc,!: - ----77 ., a me!:ber o: the :n:?? recently
51. restet — ft , '-. in an atter:Dt to bo7:b a Te x aco CL1
faailty in Gaaynabo, 17.uarto Rtco.
..^n Juan. proposes that a letter, pre7.r,red in the

7'-4 ^ be sent to
L ,:r:tner and he--
!!issia-r. rointin7
an: inbicat'ns th:t :Itaa.tion should be
, ];ed '.-,afore the press is advised an -: .KnOWn
the 1:-.1FR, thrsa:h the actLon: of it: leader, rewar:-Is
faithful a.::vocators of inc:enen.dence. letter may be
worded as follows:
0.
I c;snti7-.ues to be seen wL:h; - if you
are too rA.:on of a fool to resent 'nein:: a I as a
frIsn:: will not allow Lt to ,so on If you will not stop
this I will e -,:pore this fat clown to all, inciuiinS our
Scionsr7.77- ; of the press."
• • reerrod to above is .
77 adaily San Juan Sp ne%;spap,2r

c.nc: a 1.7:%; of DEAS and the VHF R.
• •
2
/ -Pureau •
2-San :Han
/ •
GYC:cab `~4!o
COINTELPRO continues. Ongoing disinformation operation against Mari Bras and

the MPIPR in 1969. Note sexual innuendos.
tests revealed that the body lacked evidence of a bone fracture in the right hand the
ostensible victim was known to have suffered. The fingers of a hand were then
severed and shipped to the FBI crime lab in Washington, D.C., for fingerprint
identification. The lab promptly "lost" the fingers. The fate of Juan Caballero thus
remains unknown, as does the identity of the individual actually murdered in El
Yunque."
Equally novel have been the techniques by which the Bureau has amassed
"evidence" of alleged independentista violence. Take, for instance, the case of the
"hopping fingerprint" after the shooting of North American attorney Allen Randall
in September 1977." Shortly after the killing, a communique was supposedly
received from a "worker's commando," taking credit for the action and explaining
the rationale underlying it. A follow-up communique was said to have been
received within a matter of hours. Two days later, local police, acting on information
provided by the FBI, arrested island Teamster head Miguel Cabrera and several
other key union organizers. Cabrera's fingerprint, the Bureau said, had been found
on the first communique. At a pretrial hearing during January of 1978, however, the
prosecution produced Bureau-provided evidence that Cabrera's fingerprint was on
the second communique rather than the first, thus producing the joke among the
defendants that the print was busily hopping from document to document in the FBI
crime lab. During the trial in 1979, police records were subpoenaed by the defense
which showed that the Bureau had requested a set of Cabrera's prints prior to
receiving any evidence in the case, a matter which strongly suggested the crime lab's
conclusions had been predetermined. As a result, Cabrera and his colleagues were
acquitted."
A much clearer instance of direct FBI involvement in anti-independentista
violence is the "Cerro Maravilla Episode" of July 25, 1978. On that date, two young
activists, Arnaldo Dario Rosado and Carlos Soto Arrivi (son of the distinguished
Puertorriquao novelist, Pedro Juan Soto), accompanied a provocateur named Alejan-
dro Gonzalez Molave, were lured into a trap and shot to death by police near the
mountain village. Official reports claimed the pair had been on the way to blow up
a television tower near Cerro Maravilla, and had fired first when officers attempted
to arrest them. A taxi driver who was also on the scene, however, adamantly insisted
that this was untrue, that neither independentista had offered resistance when
captured, and that the police themselves had fired two volleys of shots in order to
make it sound from a distance as if they'd been fired upon. "It was a planned
murder," the witness said, "and it was carried out like that."" What had actually
happened became even more obvious when a police officer named Julio Cesar An-
drades came forward and asserted that the assassination had been planned "from
on high" and in collaboration with the Bureau." This led to confirmation of
Gonzalez Molave's role as an infiltrator reporting to both the local police and the FBI,
a situation which prompted him to admit "having planned and urged the bombing"
in order to set the two young victims up for execution." In the end, it was shown that:
Dario and Soto [had] surrendered. Police forced the men to their knees, handcuffed
their arms behind their backs, and as the two independentistas pleaded for justice, the
police tortured and murdered them."
None of the police and other officials involved were ever convicted of the
murders and crimes directly involved in this sordid affair. However, despite several
-. iD 7
..,,, i
TO
1D7:2.- R 31 (105-}
,,' '•:=--
:=: //s1:..c. S= JUA:: (:01-333)
-FOR Od -.
15--- F7:: /
/
The ..iienta Pro Tndependencls de Puerto Rico
(PL:erto can E-ro Tndepenlence :.se7.(,ant) (Y.PIBR)
(2-•:file 105-75715) prestHtly consists of two c; ours, the
.?I"?? an.d the :.?71=.R Youth, each cf which ;reintai::s their
cw ❑ slate of officers, a;lthouzh they share the sa-- rseetins
halls, p-,- tic, '";,- illes, etc.
,_______
Therta ve been rLc.:.nt indicat ioh s that(
•-•••• - - . . ..
r
Yout, as . 7 1,:r (.=
- IculZie,with
varioLs tor leale osishe !,- IPR, :-:o recei%c ouch - i12''
ill'
■ as arc availa'cle to MPTPR le,:Lters, while the 12IP0 Youth does

as
:':ost of the worl:.
li ,,
- •• • - -(ce- the ;".?.IRF, Youth,
-----.-s. -7,,l'f=s P y-T-
•%•.-,_..- .-'.•.,.:
,..::,---.__------z--1..,, ,-- -...• _c-. • Ju'n
-'1—'-'.-----',---2.--;-—s-', G. 0=rice
1- - f.e1
. - s taut
7. .‘. 1
D'1 -, if, . , :can ice split from the 3.'2IPR at this sime,
enora; - _-;:--11.:71FP, Youth memLers would be sufficiently
_onfused and disLrur,tled to effectively neutralize the hPIP
1 durinE.,- the critical /period just prior to the plebiscite
nchedulei for July 23, 1967. A
...I:)... /
....i
,;----
,
1 .3)- Bureau (R•)
ST-11n REC 467 "5,7 :. : 12. 1/
. (1 - =
.2__
,........
-;; - ?-'-2 -'.) (CO:iNTERF7TELLIG:CE R.R0277e,U__
r -c----._ _____________
2 - San Juan ___ _ _____.1
. 0.: .(1 -.. 105-3373'Sub. 1) (COWrERLN2:-.LLIC-ENCE PROGRAV.) \c i
r-J ../ly 7,:•47 i
01 -' (;:-3) : -V-
i ?.
4
•-, ..;'t.:1-•,' ..,,,
\ \ '. 1,_
•• :.,- 1
,
••
Sera 1'
Al -: • "
Per --4,,...___.— \—.. __:-
Sptci al Agen: an Cr.n:rJe
1967 Airtel from SAC, San Juan to J. Edgar Hoover describing a portion of the COIN-
TELPRO methods to be used in subverting the 1967 United Nations plebescite to de-
termine the political status of Puerto Rico.
years of systematic coverup by the FBI and U.S. Justice Department, working in
direct collaboration with the guilty cops, ten of the latter were finally convicted on
multiple counts of perjury and sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 30 years
apiece.'' Having evaded legal responsibility for his actions altogether, provocateur
Gonzalez Molave was shot to death in front of his home on April 29,1986, by "party
or parties unknown."" This was followed, on February 28,1987, by the government's
payment of $575,000 settlements to both victims' families, a total of $1,150,000 in
acknowledgment of the official misconduct attending their deaths and the subse-
quent investigation(s)."
At about the same time that Dario and Soto were summarily executed (August
28 - September 1, 1978), the FBI was hosting an international conference on
"counter-terrorism" in San Juan. Among the participants in this three-day event
were:
Anthony Quainton (then head of the State Department's Office on Combatting

Terrorism), British General Richard Clutterbuck (a specialist in counterinsurgency
theory and author of several books on the subject), Uruguayan General Manuelo
Querrolo (head of the 1960s campaign that destroyed the Tupamaros guerrillas),
Reinhard Rupprecht (a head of the West German Bundeskriminalamt and responsible
for pursuit of the Red Army Fraction [RAM Robin Borne (Canadian head of the
campaign to repress the Quebec Liberation Movement), Inspector Ronald McIntyre
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Canada's FBI), Jay Mallin (editor for
"Terrorism and Latin America" with Soldier of Fortune magazine), Dr. Aaron Katz (of
the Center for the Study of Human Behavior, a RAND-type think tank devoted to
counterinsurgency research), and Louis 0. Giuffrida (a "private sector" specialist
involved in delivering counter-terrorist, counterinsurgency and SWAT training to
law enforcement personnel). In addition, the meeting was attended by several high-
ranking FBI men, including COINTELPRO specialist Richard Wallace Held, then
Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Bureau's San Juan Field Office"'
One result of the conference seems to have been the designation of a mainland
formation of the independentista movement, theFuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional
(FALN), along with three other national liberation organizations (the Republic of
New Afrika (RNA], Movimiento de Liberation Nacional Mexico EMLNMJ, and the
American Indian Movement) as "the most significant current internal security
threats to the United States."" A more concrete outcome was a massive island-wide
raid conducted by more than 300 SWAT-equipped agents, beginning before dawn
on the morning of August 30, 1985. Operating out of the Roosevelt Roads Naval
Base, the raiders invaded scores of homes and offices, arresting nearly 50 independen-
tistas on "John Doe" warrants in which charges were not specified. Considerable
personal property was destroyed, impounded or "lost."" The raid was initially
"justified" by San Juan SAC Richard W. Held on the basis of "anti-terrorism"
evidenced in the arrest of 11 independentistas - including Filiberto Ojeda Rios, a
leader of Los Macheteros, a clandestine organization - said to have been involved in
COINTELPRO cartoon distributed to discredit MPIPR leader Juan Mari Bras (depicted at
left) just before the 1967 plebescite. The fraud was attributed to other independentistas.
the expropriation of $7.1 million from a Wells Fargo facility in West Hartford, Con-
necticut on September 12,1983.70
The cover story, which in any event failed to explain why 37 other independen-
tistas none of whom were accused of specific criminal acts - had been rounded up
-
in the raid, was quickly belied by the U.S. Attorney in Puerto Rico. "You have to
remember," he said at a press conference, "there were two simultaneous investiga-
tions going on. There was the West Hartford investigation and the one going on down
here [emphasis added]." His boss, U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese, was even
more straightforward: "We are sending a message to terrorists that their bloody acts
will not be tolerated."" Thus mere public advocacy of independence for Puerto Rico
was converted into "terrorism" and utilized as the basis for the continuation of CO-
INTELPRO under the rhetorical veneer of "counter-terrorist" operations. What had
happened was seen quite plainly on the island by nearly everyone, including
relatively establishment-oriented politicians. PIP leader Ruben Berrios Martinez,

for instance, termed the whole affair "a frontal attack on an entire movement and an
entire set of ideals. It is virtually an act of war upon our people's will, determination
and rights."" Even Governor Carlos Barcele Romero, no friend of the independentis-
tas, formally protested the trampling upon Puerto Rico's constitution inherent to the
Bureau's brand of counterintelligence activity."
The governor was saying more than he intended. Inevitably, the FBI's concerted
efforts to repress the independentista perspective in Puerto Rico's political life has
served to deform the Puertorriqueo political process as a whole. And, as was the case
with COINTELPRO-SWP, this appears to have been quite conscious and inten-
tional. But, in Puerto Rico, the implications extend rather further. Not only did the
Bureau's systematic denial of media access to, spreading of disinformation about,
and fostering of factionalism within the independentista movement have the effect of
negating much of the movement's electoral potential within the island arena itself,
such tactics also subverted other initiatives to resolve the issue of Puerto Rico's
colonial status in a peaceful fashion. This concerns in particular a plebescite called
for July 23, 1967. During the ten months prior to the scheduled referendum to
determine the desires of the Puertorriquerlo public with regard to the political status
of their island, the Bureau went far out of its way to spread confusion. The
COINTELPRO methods used included creation of two fictitious organizations -
Grupo pro-Ltso Voto del MPI (roughly, "Group within the MPIPR in Favor of Voting
to Achieve Independence") and the "Committee Against Foreign Domination of the
Fight for Independence" - as the medium through which to misrepresent indepen-
dentista positions "from the inside."" One outcome was that Puertorriquerio voters
increasingly shied away from the apparently jumbled and bewildering independen-
tista agenda and "accepted" continuation of a "commonwealth" status under U.S.
domination which satisfied virtually none of the populace.
With this accomplished, the Bureau set about seeing to it the independentistas re-
mained artificially discredited (and the overall Puertorriquefio option to mount a co-
herent effort to protest or reconvene the plebescite truncated) by shifting responsi-
bility for the disaster onto its foremost victims:
It might be desirable to blame the communist bloc and particularly Cuba for the
failure of the United Nations and to criticize Mari Bras and others for isolating the
Puerto Rican independence forces from the democratic countries."
Since 1967, although Mari Bras and other independentistas have made an annual
pilgrimage to the UN Committee on Decolonization, and in 1978 managed to
achieve formal international recognition that the island remains a colony despite
designation as a commonwealth," the U.S. has been able to shunt off the issue. U.S.
diplomats routinely argue that the 1967 referendum "permanently reaffirmed by
popular consent" the "domestic status" of Puerto Rico accepted by Munoz Mann in
1953. This, according to the diplomats, represents the "exercise of self-determina-
More Bureau art work. Cartoon purporting to show that Mari Bras (center) and other
MPIPR leaders were under the control of Cuban premier Fidel Castro in 1967. The
cartoon was distributed in the name of the Grupo pro-Uso Voto del MPI, a fictitious
independentista entity invented by the FBI for such purposes. The fabrication was
circulated immediately prior to the U.N. plebescite.
tion" by Puertorriquerios, and renders the island's affairs an "internal concern of the
United States" rather than a matter of international jurisdiction." And, just in case
the utterly contrived nature of the U.S. position failed to prove sufficiently convinc-
ing to Third World nations, "[U.S. United Nations] Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick
made it clear to nonaligned nations that...a vote against the United States would
carry penalties" when the independentistas finally managed to bring their questions
to the General Assembly in 1981.7a
With literally every avenue of "due and democratic process" sealed off by the
extralegal methods of their colonizers, the independentistas have been left with essen-
tially no recourse but armed struggle. Some realized this as early as the 1930s, others
much later. For its part, the FBI seems to have understood from the outset that this
would be the result of its mission in keeping Puerto Rico firmly within the U.S. orbit.
Hence, the Bureau's early undertaking of counterintelligence operations against the
NPPR and the evolution of these activities into the much more inclusive anti-inde-
pendentista COINTELPRO beginning in 1960. Such an assessment also accounts for
the apparent escalation of the sort of counterintelligence tactics used against the
independentistas after 1971, when COINTELPRO was supposedly a thing of the past.
As the events of 1985 abundantly demonstrate, in Puerto Rico the essentials of
COINTELPRO remain very much alive. And, under the conditions which now
prevail, its continuation promises to be more treacherous and violent than ever.
Chapter 5
COINTELPRO
Black Liberation Movement
Predictably, the most serious of the FBI's disruption programs [between
1956 and 19711 were those directed at "Black Nationalists." These
programs...initiated under liberal Democratic administrations, had as
their purpose "to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neu-
tralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and
groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and
supporters"...Agents were instructed to "inspire action in instances where
circumstances warrant." Specifically, they were to undertake actions to
discredit these groups both within the "responsible Negro community"
and to "Negro radicals," and also "to the white community, both the
responsible community and to 'liberals' who have vestiges of sympathy for
militant black nationalists..."
— Noam Chomsky —
COINTELPRO
Although the FBI's COINTELPRO against the black liberation movement was
not formally initiated until issuance of J. Edgar Hoover's August 25, 1967 memo
quoted above by Noam Chomsky (see accompanying document), the roots of the
Bureau's anti-black counterintelligence operations extend much deeper into U.S.
history. As was documented in the introduction to this volume, Hoover was
engaged at least as early as 1918 in plans to destroy black nationalist leader Marcus
Garvey under the guise of "criminal proceedings." This occurred in the context of
"the infamous race riot that first engulfed East St. Louis in July 1917, taking the lives
of thirty-nine blacks and nine whites and the explosion that occurred less than two
months later in Houston, Texas, in which two black soldiers and seventeen white
men lost their lives."1Such violence was part of the process by which the U.S.
national order, in which blacks as an overall population lived under near-total
political disenfranchisement, economic prostration, and super-exploitation of their
labor by the Euroamerican status quo, was intended to be preserved. In the aftermath
of World War I, blacks had begun to mount the first serious challenge to such
circumstances since the Reconstruction period immediately following the Civil
War; Hoover and his proto-FBI organization, in kind with white vigilante forma-
tions, seem to have seen one of their primary missions as keeping blacks "in their
place" by what ever repressive means were available?
91
SAC, Albany August 25,-1967
PERSONAL ATTENTION TO ALL 0 ICES

DirsT, FBI
1 - rennan
1 -
COMITTESINTELLIGENCR,U_OGRAM 1 ..;-
BLACg_NATIONALI2T - HA-E GROUPS 1 -
INTERNAL SECURITY 7 1 -
1 -
Offices receiving copies of th c e er are instructed
to immediately establish a control file, captioned as above, and
to assign responsibility for following and coordinating this new
counterintelligence program to an experienced and imaginative
Special Agent well versed in investigations relating to black
nationalist, hate-type organizations. The field office control
file used under this program may be maintained in a pending
inactive status until such time as • specific operation or
technique is placed under consideration for implementation.
N ' The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor

is to expobe, aisrupt, misoirect, i . 4
neutralize the activities OZ macs nationalist, mace-type
organizations andigroupings, their ieanersnip, spokesmen,
memnersnip, ana supporters, Ana to counter their propensity for
.0olence ana civil alsoraer. The activities or all such groups
or intelligence interest to this Bureau must be followed on a
continuous basis sow will bo in a position to promptly take
advantageiof all opportunitiesfor counterintelligence and to
inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant. The
pernicious background of such groups, their duplicity, and devious
,e. • maneuvers must be exposed to public ecru ny whore such Publicity 1
rir will have a neutralizing effect Ef r s,of the various groups -
2 - Atlanta
%!An /06- 448Q06 -.—.
2 - Philadelphia I -
2 - Baltimore C, $‘' 2 - Phoenix ....„1,...
...,.„, ...
kc., tir 2 - Boston 2 - Pittsburgh
2 .-
Buffalo 2 - Richmond 301LIG 291967.
2 - Charlotte 102 2 - St. Louis
X 2:Chicago 2 - Ban Francisco • °..r
2 Cincinnati it.Aqip.a c , 2 - Washington Field Office
2 CleVeland
......___k_.x
. 2 - Detroit r.i:',)1.:;.1967:' A''
"
ap
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.9 Jackson ii P-
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2.1._..7= 2 - New York SI, l'; / lE;gitiaCT:0591iFIED ,• 1:-,::)...;::
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.A.,..d.P TELCTTPCIMIT P oviasnsE.
A4/
Memo initiating COINTELPRO — Black Liberation Movement
It was into this disturbed atmosphere, further disturbed by the painful experiences
of black soldiers during the [World War I] mobilization, that a new generation of
radical black spokesmen, calling themselves "the New Negro" stepped...Buoyed by
a wide array of spirited newspapers and militant journals that helped shape the
black community's political consciousness, the New Negro radicals represented a
new and startling breed...tottering] radical, some might even say revolutionary,
prescriptions for overturning the status quo of white supremacy.'
COINTELPRO - Black Liberation Movement 93
Letter to EAC, Albany

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK RATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
r-,to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthfu e
adherents must be frustrated. Be opportunity should be este] \,
to exploit through counterintelligence techniques the
organizational and personal conflicts of the leaderships of the ,
groups And where possible an effort ohould be made to capitalize
upon existing conflicts between competing black nationalist
organizations. When an opportunity is apparent to disrupt or
neutralize black nationalist, hate-type organizations through the
cooperation of established local news media contacts or through
ouch contact with sources available to the Seat of Government,
in every instance careful attention must be given to the proposal
to insure the targeted group is disrupted, ridiculed, or
discredited through the publicity and not merely publiciied.
Consideration ohould be given to techniques to preclude violence-
prone or rabble-rouser leaders of hate groups from spreading their
L philoapphy publicly or through various mass communication media.
Many individuals currently active in black nationalist
organizations have backgrounds of immorality, subversive activity,
and criminal records. Through your investigation of key agitators,
you should endeavor to establish their unsavory backgrounds,
Be alert to determine evidence of misappropriation of funds or
other types of personal misconduct on the part of militant
nationalist leaders oo any practical or warranted counter-
intelligence nay be instituted.
Intensified attention under this program should be
afforded to the activities of such groups as the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, Revolutionary Action Movement, the
Deacons for Defense and Justice, Congrees of Racial Equality,
and the Nation of Islam. Particular emphasis should be given to
extremists who direct the activities and policies of
revolutionary or militant groups such as Stokely'Carmichael,
H. "Rap" Brown, Elijah Ibhammad, And Maxwell Stanford.
At this time the Bureau is netting up no requirement
for status letters to be periodically submitted under this
program. It will be incumbent upon you to insure the program
is being afforded necessary and continuing attention and that
no opportunities will be overlooked for counterintelligence
action.
I program should not be confused with the program
}entitled "Communist Party, USA,,Counterintelligence- Program,
!entitled
lInternal Security - C," (Bufile 100-3-104), which is directed
Development of this "new racial awareness on the part of blacks led to a sharp
increase in the number of lynchings after 1917 - seventy-six blacks were lynched in
1919 alone - and the simultaneous unprecedented wave of violent racial clashes,
culminating in the summer of 1919 (known as 'Red Summer'), that must be seen
largely as the attempt by whites to restore the racial status quo ante...In trying to
contain the movement, the U.S. government chose to respond by launching a
massive surveillance campaign to counter the influence of black leaders. Spear-
headed by the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation, forerunner of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence services tended to view the newly
awakened black militancy through the tinted prism of the Red Scare (i.e., as an off-
shoot of communist agitation), leading them to adopt against blacks many of the
same repressive measures employed against so-called subversives...What the offi-
cial evidence now discloses is the apprehension by authorities of a parallel 'Black
Scare.'"
In this regard, Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro Improvement Associa-
tion (UNIA) were a primary target. When the FBI was able, after five solid years of
intensive effort, to arrange for Garvey's indictment and subsequent conviction on
extremely dubious "fraud" charges, "he was jailed without even one day to arrange
for UNIA's future." Instead, he was surrounded by "heavily armed federal agents
who conducted him to the Tombs prison [in New York City], from which he was
taken [straight] to the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary in February 1925," as if he were
a public menace rather than - at worst - the perpetrator of an offense devoid of
physical violence .s As a result:
By the summer of 1926 [UNIA] was no longer a coordinated unit, even though it still
had hundreds of thousands of members, perhaps a million. The official Universal
Negro Improvement Association was still there, and there was one last gigantic
international convention in 1929, but the organization was no longer what it had
been before Garvey entered prison.'
Nor was Garvey alone in being accorded "special attention" by the Bureau. For
instance, during the massive railroad strikes in the 1920s, the FBI -as part of its much
broader anti-labor and anti-black endeavors - went out of its way to topple A. Philip
Randolph, black head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Union.' At about
the same time, Hoover's agents initiated a "close surveillance" (a term usually as-
sociated with infiltration) of W.E.B. DuBois' National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) in the name of knowing "what every radical
organization in the country was doing.. " The monitoring continued throughout the
1920s and '30s although it was not until 1940 that Hoover offered a definition of what
the FBI meant by the term "subversive activities" with which he "justified" such
activities. It included:
he holding of office in...Communist groups; the distribution of literature and pro-
paganda favorable to a foreign power and opposed to the American way of life;
agitators who are adherents of foreign ideologies who have for their purpose the
stirring of internal strike [ski, class hatreds and the development of activities which
in time of war would be a serious handicap in a program of internal security and
national defense.'
This bald assertion of the political interests of the status quo was utilized as the
rationale by which to step up investigation of possible CP "contamination and
manipulation of the NAACP," a process which was "continued for twenty-five
years despite FBI's failing to uncover any evidence of subversive domination of the
[black organization].""
The [escalated] FBI investigation of the NAACP, begun in 1941, continued until
1966. Although the FBI prepared massive reports on the NAACP, including infor-
mation on the group's political and legislative plans, the Bureau never uncovered
any evidence of subversive domination or sympathies. In 1957, the New York field
office of the FBI prepared a 137-page report on NAACP activities during the
previous year, based on information supplied by 151 informers or confidential
sources. From 1946 to 1960, the FBI used about three thousand wiretaps and over
eight hundred "bugs," and obtained membership and financial records of [such]
dissident groups."
Notwithstanding its tangible lack of success in linking the NAACP to the CP or

any other "foreign dominated" organization, the FBI lobbied to have it included
among the groups covered by the Communist Control Act of 1954, and a cluster of
corresponding state laws." Only a series of Supreme Court decisions prevented the
entire NAACP membership from being forced to register as "subversives," or going
to prison for refusing to do so." Meanwhile, the Bureau also began to focus its
attention upon the recently-formed Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC), an entirely reformist and philosophically nonviolent black civil rights
advocacy organization established in 1957 by the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., and "several dozen other southern black ministers."14
The FBI and Martin Luther King

The stated objective of the SCLC, and the nature of its practical activities, was
to organize for the securing of black voting rights across the rural South, with an eye
toward the ultimate dismantlement of at least the most blatant aspects of the
southern U.S. system of "segregation" (apartheid). Even this seemingly innocuous
agenda was, however, seen as a threat by the FBI. In mid-September of 1957, FBI
supervisor J.G. Kelly forwarded a newspaper clipping describing the formation of
the SCLC to the Bureau's Atlanta field office - that city being the location of SCLC
headquarters - informing local agents, for reasons which were never specified, the
civil rights group was "a likely target for communist infiltration," and that "in view
of the stated purpose of the organization you should remain alert for public source
information concerning it in connection with the racial situation.""
The Atlanta field office "looked into" the matter and ultimately opened a
COMINFIL investigation of the SCLC, apparently based on the fact that a single
SWP member, Lonnie Cross, had offered his services as a clerk in the organization's
main office." By the end of the first year of FBI scrutiny, in September of 1958, a
personal file had been opened on King himself, ostensibly because he had been
approached on the steps of a Harlem church in which he'd delivered a guest sermon
by black CP member Benjamin J. Davis." By October 1960, as the SCLC call for
desegregation and black voting rights in the south gained increasing attention and
support across the nation, the Bureau began actively infiltrating organizational
meetings and conferences." In less than a year, by July of 1961 FBI intelligence on the
group was detailed enough to recount that King had been affiliated with the
Progressive Party in 1948 (while an undergraduate at Atlanta's Morehouse College),
and that executive director Wyatt Tee Walker had once subscribed to a CP newspaper,
The Worker." Actual counterintelligence operations against King and the SCLC more
generally seem to have begun with a January 8,1962 letter from Hoover to Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy, contending that the civil rights leader enjoyed a "close
relationship" with Stanley D. Levison, "a member of the Communist Party, USA,"
and that Isadore Wofsy, "a high ranking communist leader," had written a speech
for King.2°
On the night of March 15-16,1962, FBI agents secretly broke into Levison's New
York office and planted a bug; a wiretap of his office phone followed on March 20.21
Among the other things picked up by this ELSURS surveillance was information
that Jack O'Dell, who also had an alleged "record of ties to the Communist party,"
had been recommended by both King and Levison to serve as an assistant to Wyatt
Tee Walker.22Although none of these supposed communist affiliations were ever
substantiated, it was on this basis that SCLC was targeted within the Bureau's
ongoing COINTELPRO-CP,USA, beginning with the planting of five disinforma-
tional "news stories" concerning the organization's "communist connections" on
October 24, 1962.23By this point, Martin Luther King's name had been placed in
Section A of the FBI Reserve Index, one step below those individuals registered in
the Security Index and scheduled to be rounded up and "preventively detained" in
concentration camps in the event of a declared national emergency ;24Attorney
General Kennedy had also authorized round-the-clock ELSURS surveillance of all
SCLC offices, as well as King's home." Hence, by November 8,1963, comprehensive
telephone taps had been installed at all organizational offices, and King's resi-
dence."
The reasons for this covert but steadily mounting attention to the Reverend Dr.
King were posited in an internal monograph on the subject prepared by FBI counter-
intelligence specialist Charles D. Brennan at the behest of COINTELPRO head
William C. Sullivan in September 1963. In this 11-page document, Brennan found
that, given the scope of support it had attracted over the preceding five years, civil
rights agitation represented a dear threat to "the established order" of the U.S., and
that "King is growing in stature daily as the leader among leaders of the Negro
movement...so goes Martin Luther King, and also so goes the Negro movement in
the United States."" This accorded well with Sullivan's own view, committed to
writing shortly after King's landmark "I Have a Dream" speech during the massive
civil rights demonstration in Washington, D.C., on August 28 of the same year:
We must mark [King] now, if we have not before, as the most dangerous Negro in
the future of this Nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro, and
COINTELPRO — Black Liberation Movement 97
national security...it maybe unrealistic to limit [our actions against King] to legalistic
proofs that would stand up in court or before Congressional Committees.?'
By 1964, King was not only firmly established as a preeminent civil rights leader,
but was beginning to show signs of pursuing a more fundamental structural agenda
of social change. Correspondingly, as the text of the accompanying memo from
Sullivan to Joseph A. Sizoo makes plain, the Bureau's intent had crystallized into an
unvarnished intervention into the domestic political process, with the goal of
bringing about King's replacement with someone "acceptable" to the FBI. The
means employed in the attempt to accomplish this centered in continued efforts to
discredit King, maintaining a drumbeat of mass media-distributed propaganda
concerning his supposed "communist influences" and sexual proclivities, as well as
the triggering of a spate of harassment by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)." When
this strategy failed to the extent that it was announced on October 14 of that year that
King would receive a Nobel Peace Prize as a reward for his work in behalf of the
rights of American blacks, the Bureau — exhibiting a certain sense of desperation by
this juncture — dramatically escalated its efforts to neutralize him.
Two days after announcement of the impending award, Sullivan caused a
composite audio tape to be produced, supposedly consisting of "highlights" taken
from the taps of King's phones and bugs placed in his various hotel rooms over the
preceding two years. The result, prepared by FBI audio technician John Matter,
purported to demonstrate the civil rights leader had engaged in a series of "orgias-
tic" trysts with prostitutes and, thus, "the depths of his sexual perversion and
depravity." The finished tape was packaged, along with the accompanying anony-
mous letter (prepared on unwatermarked paper by Bureau Internal Security Super-
visor Seymore F. Phillips on Sullivan's instruction), informing King that the audio
material would be released to the media unless he committed suicide prior to
bestowal of the Nobel Prize. Sullivan then instructed veteran COINTELPRO opera-
tive Lish Whitson to fly to Miami with the package; once there, Whitson was
instructed to address the parcel and mail it to the intended victim.3°
When King failed to comply with Sullivan's anonymous directive that he kill
himself, FBI Associate Director Cartha D. "Deke" DeLoach attempted to follow
through with the threat to make the contents of the doctored tape public:
The Bureau Crime Records Division, headed by DeLoach, initiated a major cam-
paign to let newsmen know just what the Bureau [claimed to have] on King.
DeLoach personally offered a copy of the King surveillance transcript to Newsweek
Washington bureau chief Benjamin Bradlee. Bradlee refused it, and mentioned the
approach to a Newsday colleague, Jay Iselin."
Bradlee's disclosure of what the FBI was up to served to curtail the effectiveness
of DeLoach's operation, and Bureau propagandists consequently found relatively
few takers on this particular "story." More, in the face of a planned investigation of
r • ----.
1:r.
r ,
n--.!--
Date: December 1, 1964
To: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

nr.
From: J. A. Sizo Ti" I
Subject: MARTIN LUTI R KING, JR,
Reference is made to the attached memorandum Deli=

t dated 11/27/64 concerning DeLoach's interview with
awd—to--ret+t'—tof-erma-1-4semo-,—al-so--at-tecbed.
V eninagstated to DeLoachtthat be was faced with the
difficult problem of taking steps to remove King from the national
picture. He indicates in his comments a lack of confidence that
be, alone, could be successful. It is, therefore, suggested that
consideration be given to the following course of action:
That DeLoach ' urther discussion with and

offer to bo helpful to in connection with the problem of
the removal of King from6#11
T c national scene;
That DeLoach suggest that night

night desire to
call a meeting of Negro leaders in t e country which might include,
for instance, 2 or 3 top leaders in the civil rights novenent such
as Janes Farmer and A. Philip Randolph; 2 or 3 top Negro judges
such as Judge Parsons and Judge Hasty; 2 or 3 top reputable
uinisters such as Robert Johnson, Uoderator of the Washington
City Presbytery; 2 or 3 other selected Negro officials from public
life such as the Negro Attorney General from one of the New England
states. These men could be called for the purpose of learning the
facts as to the Bureau's performance in the fulfillment of its
responsibilities under the Civil Rights statute, and this could
well be done at such a meeting. In addition, the Bureau, on a
highly •confidentia - such a Troup on the security
background of King 7---
- '''- '-'
*---''''''" --
such--as--Gonten-P-1-1:
ng.
The inclusion of U.S. Government officials, such as Carl

Roweh or Ralph Dunche, is not suggested as they might feel a duty
to advise the White House of such a contemplated meeting. It is
,'believed this would give us an opportunity to outline to a group of
ìnfluential Negro leaders what our record in the enforcenent of
G civia)ri3hts has been. It would also _give them, on a confidential _
basis, information concerning King which would convince th -, •
the danger of King to the over-all civil rights movement.
Is already well aware of this. This group should include ucn
leadership as would be capable of removing King from the scene
if they, of their own volition, decided this was the thing to do
'after such a briefing. The group should include strong enough nen
to control a man like James Farmer and make him see the light
day. his might have the effect of increasing the stature of
..-.. - who is a'capable person and is ambitious.
L There are refinements which, of course, could be added
to the above which is set forth in outline form for possible
consideration.
1714;,', look into 'your heart. 7ou %mow You are conoleta
fraud and a :treat liability to all of 713 W,groes. Whits
people in thin COL:M:7'7 hive anouEh fr•suda of their own bu,
am JUT, they don't 'have one at this time that is any vtare :_ear
our equal. You are no clargran and you 1.17W it. 2 rene.et
nr- a colossal f--u:! and ar vicio'as nt that
•
•• • • •
•
;Lin;, like 311 fraus you c.a.71!
•
. • -
you ore done. Your 'nonorary" ci,rees, your .NODdl

Prize (what s grin urea) and ocher awards trill not 3240 7011.
Yir.;, 7 reneet ,cu are Bone.
enrrv,r, 7:7
The American rublic, the church oreanizations that hove been

heloinz — Proltestant, Catholic and Jews will know you for what
you are — an evil, ebnormal beast. So will others who have backed
you. You are done.
iCinA, there is only one thin," left for you to do. Tou know
what it 13. You have lust 34 -days in which to do (this exact
number has been sclecLad for a sr<clfic reason, it hs definite" "
orncticol sirrdVicant. You are done. ?nem.. is but one way out for
'-ou. Vail better toka it before your filthyobnormal fraddsIont self
13 bared to the nation.
Memo (left) proposing the sending of an anonymous letter (above) to Martin

Luther King in an unsuccessful attempt to convince him to commit suicide.
electronic surveillance by government agencies announced by Democratic Missouri

Senator Edward V. Long, J. Edgar Hoover was forced to order the rapid dismantling
of the ELSURS coverage of both King and the SCLC, drying up much of the source
material upon which Sullivan and his COINTELPRO specialists depended for "au-
thenticity." Hoover's "weakness" on this matter appears to have infuriated Sulli-
',-
r,11 !I' .":"IN•a•
Noe rr
UNITED STATES GOVERN:eli':.■

:1):j 11' 3 Ill*.4'
"."1 !!*" -7`
!. '
Memorandum C4010 -
Creel
Co.
TO : Mr. N. C. Sullivan Ì 5 " DATE: May 2i., 1968
"."
'FROM Mr. G. C. Moor: /
MADJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

DLACE NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(POOR PEC4A.E'S CAMPAIGN)
This is to recommend an item regarding the

06-)
Poor People's Campaign be given a cooperative news media
source on a confidential basis by the Crime Records Division.
A source has advised that some leaders of the Poor People's
Campaign (PPC) feel that the American Friends Service
Committee (AFSC), a Quaker group, is trying to dominate the
PPC in Washington, D. C. The AFSC has assisted the Southern
Cnristian Leaaersnip 1..:onference in various muses n: tnis
campaign. This situation is so serious that Fred C. Bennett°,
in charge of security for the PPC, refuses to go to the
campaign office inWashington because of the presence of
AFSC representatives.
An item has been prepared, copy attached, to show
this jealousy on the part of PPC leaders. It is felt this
* should be given a cooperative news media source on a confidential
basis by the Crime Records Division.
ACTION:
That attached' item regarding the Poor People's
Campaign be furnished a cooperative news media source on a
i)/onfidential basis by Crime Records.
■
))
.4Wk , Af; 11-1r
(
' ! Enclosure .. •4 t11,1r
O' :: :.......■ .......
11> 1 - Mr.
(8) .
C. D.
qCC1
DeLoach
1i
„i
JUN 5 1968
},
AVAAZ
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr.
1
G. C.
,
Moore 1.q...
(Mass Media) l'• ' '
n ,,- --!,
r-
I ' ,(Mass Media) ;,:i. ✓
1 -- s i 1--'
/7 tr;I/ %—
J. -
van, who seems to have felt that congress should simply have been defied, setting
in place a permanent rift between the two senior FBI officials."
Still, the Bureau's counterintelligence operations against King continued apace,
right up to the moment of the target's death by sniper fire on a Memphis hotel
balcony on April 4, 1968. Indeed, as the accompanying memo from Sullivan to
George C. Moore (head of the Bureau's "racial intelligence" squad) on May 22 of the
REc- 24
"FR17=3" TOO MITI= Fon ;

LEADZIIS OF POS3 PEOPLE'S CAUPAIGN
**".".•'
Leaders of the "Poor People's Campaign' in

Washington, D. C., arc not exactly grateful for the assistance
of the Imerican Friends Service Committee on the campaign.
They feel)ghis help is a subtle effort to dominate the
campaign.
One campaign leader is co irritated with the
"Friends" that he refuses to go to the campaign office at
1401 U 3trect, U. W. , Washington, D. C., because of the
"Friends" there. lie claims tho representatives of tho
Aoerican Trio:Ids Service Committee that arc at the campaign
office are uncooperative.
I P. n.
Ur;
1- U. C. Lallivan
1 - sr. T. r. D!.r.thop
1 - Sr. G. C. ..acre
1 Wasp nodia)
1 - LW (Sacs Iledia)
1- -_
19i
-
NOTE:
See memo G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan captioned
as above, dated May 22, 19GS, prepared by .
4:\
r
ENCLOSURE vtr6P--7
Memo (left) proposing anonymous letter to disrupt the Poor People's Campaign.
Text of letter appears above.
same year amply demonstrates, certain of King's projects- such as the Poor People's
Campaign - remained the focus of active COINTELPRO endeavors even after their
leader's assassination. By 1969, as has been noted elsewhere, "[FBI] efforts to
"'expose' Martin Luther King, Jr., had not slackened even though King had been
dead for a year. [The Bureau] furnished ammunition to conservatives to attack
King's memory, and...tried to block efforts to honor the slain leader.""
UNITED STATE? OVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO --IffrECTOR, FBI• (100-448006) DATE: 1/22/69, -
PROM Q7 ICAGO (157-2209) (P)
suluEcr: C NTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

BLACK NATIONALIST - NATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(NATION OF ISLAM)
Reurlet, 1/7/69; Chicago letters 12/24/68 and

1/14/69.
ReBulet has been thoroughly studied and discussed

by the SAC, the Supervisor, and Agents familiar with facets
of the NOI which might indicate trends and possible future
direction of the organization. The Bureau'■ concern is most
understandable and suggestions appreciated.
r Over the years considerable thought has been given,

and action taken with Bureau approval, relating to methods
through which the NOI could be discredited in the eyes of
the general black populace or through which factionalism among
the leadership could be created. Serious consideration has
also been given towards developing ways and means of changing
NOI philosophy to one whereby the members could be developed
into useful citizens and the organization developed into one
emphasizing religion - the brotherhood of mankind - and
self improvement. Factional disputes have been developed
1)e
he ■
u• Prominent black
—
personttge nablic1T and —t-i --Wlpoken out against
naor
the group - U.S. District Court Judge JAMES BENTON PARSONS
being one example. The media of the press has played down
the NOI. This appears to be a most effective tool as
individuals such as NURAMIIAD assuredly seek? any and all
publicity be it good or bad; however, if the press is utilized
It would appear it should not concentrate on such aspects
as the alleged strength of the NOI, immoral activities of
the leadership, misuse of funds by these officials, etc.
It is the opinion of this office that such exposure is
ineffective, possibly creates interest and maybe ,envy
among the lesser educated black van causing them out of
curiosity to attend meetings and maybirjoin, and encourage
the opportunist to neck personal gain - physical or . I
monetary - through alignment with the group. At any ra
it is felt such publicity in the case of the 1401 is n9 t
I ef fective. , -- • e 76.
4 .,re
2:1 B46 (RH) ;•
P13-nChiP v 41r
44q:bab Bey U.S. Saving: Bend: Regularly en Mt Para,/ Savings.Ples
Memo taking credit for the assassination of Malcolm X, killed in an FBI-

provoked factional dispute on February 14,1965.
King and the SCLC were, of course, hardly the only objects of the Bureau's de
facto COINTELPRO against the emerging black liberation movement during this
period. As Manning Marable has pointed out, the FBI also went after the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), an affiliated but rather more radical

civil rights organization than the SCLC, very early on: "In late 1960, FBI agents began
to monitor SNCC meetings. [President Lyndon] Johnson's Attorney General, Nicho-
las Katzenbach, gave approval for the FBI to wiretap all SNCC leaders' phones in
1965...Hoover ordered the extensive infiltration and disruption of SNCC."" An-
other instance concerns the Nation of Islam (NoI) or "Black Muslim" movement
headed by Elijah Muhammad (s/ n: Elijah Poole):
The Bureau began wiretap surveillance of Elija Muhammed's [sic] Chicago resi-
dence in 1957...on the grounds that members of the NoI "disavow allegiance to the
United States" and "are taught not to obey the laws of the United States"...When Elija
Muhammed bought a winter home in Arizona in 1961, a wiretap and microphone
were installed there. Both forms of surveillance continued for years...[The FBI]
played assorted COINTEL tricks on the organization as early as the late 1950s"
As was documented in Chapter 3, when Malcolm X, one of Elijah Muhammad's

principle lieutenants, broke away from the NoI in March of 1964 to establish a
separate church, the Muslim Mosque, Inc., and a consciously political black organi-
zation, the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU), the Bureau undertook
concerted COINTELPRO actions to block the development of alliances between the
OAAU and white radical organizations such as the SWP. By the point of Malcolm's
assassination during a speech in Harlem on the night of February 14,1965, the FBI
had compiled at least 2,300 pages of material on the victim in just one of its files on
him, the NoI and the OAAU." Malcolm X was supposedly murdered by former
colleagues in the NoI as a result of the faction-fighting which had led to his splitting
away from that movement, and their "natural wrath" at his establishment of a
competing entity. However, as the accompanying January 22, 1969 memo from the
SAC, Chicago, to the Director makes clear, the NoI factionalism at issue didn't "just
happen." Rather, it had "been developed" by deliberate Bureau actions - through lod'
infiltration and the "sparking of acrimonious debates within the organization,"
rumor-mongering, and other tactics designed to foster internal disputes - which
were always the standard fare of COINTELPRO.3' The Chicago SAC, Marlin
Johnson, who would shortly oversee the assassinations of Illinois Black Panther
Party leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, makes it quite obvious that he views
the murder of Malcolm X as something of a model for "successful" counterintelli-
gence operations.
Nor was it necessary for black spokespersons to be heading or forming political
organizations in order to be targeted for elimination by the FBI's "informal"
counterintelligence methods. As the accompanying May 15, 1968 memo from
Director Hoover tothe Chicago SAC reveals, even independent activists such as the
writer/comedian Dick Gregory came in for potentially lethal treatment. In Gregory's
case, these assumed the form -a la COINTELPRO-CP,USA's Operation Hoodwink
(see Chapter 2) - of attempting to provoke "La Cosa Nostra" into dispensing with
him. A considerable body of circumstantial evidence suggests - although docu-
ROUTE IN ENVEL PE
BAC, Chicago
L ector, FBI (700-448006)
COURTRAI/IV:LUCY:NEE PROORAU
DUCE NATIONALIST nArs GROWS
RACIAL INTJILLIOLVCS
(RICIIARD CLANTON ouroonT)
RoMelet 4/23/8B.
r Chicago nirtel and LBO dated 5/2/68 and cePtiosed

"Richard Claxton Gregory" concern * speech by 6r.saa.kg on .
4/29/G8 shorn he noted that "Byndicate booi'e (are' living
all over. They are the Iilthleat snlkon that wrist on this
earth." Referenced Dulet instructed you to eerelop covntar-
intelligenle action concerning tillitant black nntionnitst
Dick Gregory.
Couttier the tune of this statement in devoimptng

e counterintelligence operation to alert to.Coswalhstrs (141)
L to Gregory's attack on MIL It Is mace thpt other speeches
by Gregory also contain attacks on the La. No counterintelligence
action should be taken without Durso% authority.
TJD:pagintrm
(5) -0
NOTE:
Teletype from New Orleans to Director, 7/80/88,
captioned "Richard Claxton Gregory" reported cpecch hy Gregory
referring to the Director and FBI Agents in derogstovy terms.
The Director noted, on the infornative-oote of trl -teletype
which said we would recommend counterintolliginee action
against Gregory when indicated, "Right."
Rte.? / tl
•••--
. ■■■ •
11 MAY 15 ViCn
AY 2.01, 11.I.ZTITC
Proposal to provoke the murder of comedian/activist Dick Gregory by "La Cosa

Nostra" A la COINTELPRO — CP,USA's Operation Hoodwink.
ments have yet to be released - that the Bureau undertook comparably Machiavel-
lian efforts to achieve the neutralization of a number of other black leaders during
the late 1960s and early 1970s. These ranged from the Reverend Ralph Abernathy
(King's replacement in SCLC) to Georgia Senator Julian Bond.
The War Against Black Liberation

As the 1960s unfolded, the true extent of official resistance to even the most
moderate improvements in the status of blacks - and concomitant alterations in the
balance of social, economic and political power in the U.S. - became increasingly
apparent. This recalcitrance on the part of the status quo was signified but hardly
encompassed by the repressive activities of the FBI vis a vis figures such as King. This
official posture gave rise to a spiral of frustration on the part of those whose
objectives had initially been merely the obtaining of such elemental rights as the
ballot, equal pay for equal work, use of public facilities and the like. In turn, this
frustration both led to broad acceptance of increasingly radical analyses of U.S.
society on the part of black activists and theorists. By the mid-60s, the primacy of
those such as King who had developed a mass following on the basis of appeals for
"equal rights" was being rapidly supplanted by that of younger leaders such as
SNCC's Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, who espoused a much more
militant vision of "black power.."4°
At the same time, not only conscious black power adherents, but the black
community as a whole, showed increasing signs of abandoning the posture of
"principled nonviolence" which had all along marked the SCLC performance. This
was manifested not only in Carmichael's and Brown's oversight of a change in
SNCC's name from Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee to Student National
Coordinating Committee, but much more concretely, "in the streets.."41This corre-
sponded with the rise of a generalized perception among blacks that, far from being
restricted to the former Confederate states of the "Old South," the problems they
confronted were fully national in scope:
Even before the assassination of Malcolm, many social critics sensed that non-
violent direct action, a tactic of protest used effectively in the South, would have little
appeal in the Northern ghetto. Far more likely were a series of urban social
upheavals which could not becontrolled or channeled by the civil rights leadership...In
the spring and summer months of 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968, massive black
rebellions swept across almost every major US city in the Northeast, Middle West
and California. In Watts and Compton, the black districts of Los Angeles, black men
and women took to the streets, attacking and burning white-owned property and
institutions. The [1965] Watts rebellion left $40 million in private property damage
and 34 persons killed. Federal authorities ordered 15,000 state police and National
Guardsmen into Detroit to quell that city's uprising of 1967. In Detroit 43 residents
were killed; almost 2,000 were injured; 2,700 white-owned businesses were broken
into, and 50 per cent of these were gutted by fire or completely destroyed; fourteen
square miles of Detroit's inner city were torched; 5,000 black persons were left
without homes. Combining the total weight of socio-economic destruction, the
ghetto rebellions from 1964 to 1972 led to 250 deaths, 10,000 serious injuries, and
60,000 arrests, at a cost of police, troops, and other coercive measures taken by the
state and losses to business in the billions of dollars.42
Given this, it is fair to say that, by 1967 at the latest, black Americans were in a
state of open insurgency against the Euroamerican society to whose interests they
had all along been subordinated. Established order in the U.S. was thereby con-
fronted with its most serious internal challenge since the period of the First World
War. The response of the status quo was essentially twofold. On the one hand, the
government moved to defuse the situation through a series of cooptive gestures
designed to make it appear that things were finally changing for the better. The
executive branch, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, declared "war on poverty"
and launched a series of tokenistic and soon to be forgotten programs such as
"Project Build."" Congress cooperated in this exercise in damage control by quickly
enacting bits of legislation like the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and revision of the Civil
Rights Act in 1968, structured in such a way as to convey a superficial impression of
"progress" to disgruntled blacks while leaving fundamental social relations very
much intact."
On the other hand, key government figures were astute enough to perceive that
the ghetto rebellions were largely spontaneous and uncoordinated outpourings of
black rage. Costly as the ghetto revolts were, real danger to the status quo would
come only when a black organizational leadership appeared with the capacity to
harness and direct the force of such anger. If this occurred, it was recognized, mere
gestures would be insufficient to contain black pressure for social justice. Already,
activist concepts and rhetoric had shifted from demands for black power within
American society to black liberation from U.S. "internal colonialism."45The task
thus presented in completing the federal counterinsurgency strategy was to destroy
such community-based black leadership before it had an opportunity to consolidate
itself and instill a vision of real freedom among the great mass of blacks. In this, of
course, the FBI assumed a central role. President Johnson publidy announced, in the
wake of the 1967 uprisings in Detroit and Newark, that he had issued "standing
instructions" that the Bureau should bring "the instigators" of such "riots" to heel,
by any means at its disposal," while his attorney general, Ramsey Clark, instructed
Hoover by memo to:
[U]se the [FBI's] maximum resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and
report all facts bearing upon the question as to whether there has been or is a scheme
or conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness or affiliation to plan,
promote or aggravate riot activity."
The attorney general's memo further suggested the FBI expand or establish
"sources or informants" within "black nationalist organizations" such as SNCC, the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and "other less publicized groups" in order to
"determine the size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other
groups, and also to determine the whereabouts of persons who might be involved"
in their activities." As was shown at the outset of this chapter, Hoover responded
by launching a formal anti-black liberation COINTELPRO in August 1967. By early
1968, as the accompanying Airtel from G.C. Moore to William C. Sullivan demon-
strates, the counterintelligence operation was not only in full swing across the
• ' • • •
Ob. GM I. OW If
MIMI) STATES 4 ERNmENT

'
Memoraridum
To . C. Sullivan uArL, FebruatyB, 1988
• 091
f ON.
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
. C. Moore %.11 \17
-
MOM 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan Imo
1 - Mr
1
"lel COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM 1 -
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
PURPOSE:
To expand the Counterintelligence Program designed
to neutralize militant black nationalist groups from 23 to
41 field divisions so as to cover the great majority of black
nationalist activity in this country.
BACKGROUND:
By letter dated August 25, 1967,23 field offices
were advised of • new Counterintelligence Program designed
to neutralize militant black nationalists and prevent violence
on their part. Goals of this program are to prevent the coalition
of militant black nationalist groups, prevent the rise of •
leader who might unify and electrify these violence-prone
elements, prevent these militants from gaining respectability
and prevent the growth of these groups among America's youth.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:
In view of the tremendous increase in black nationalist
activity, and the approach of summer, this program should be
expanded and these goals should be reiterated to the field.
Attached airtel also instructs the field to submit periodic
progress letters to stimulate thInking in this area.•
,;EC its . .1
Attached airtel also reminds/the field that counterintel-
1 ligence suggestions to expose these ■
them must be approved by the Bureau.
ilitanIsjm_ncgIrplize
ACTION:
6 VAR 11 EU)
That attached airtel expanding Salt program,. defining
goals and instructing periodic progress letters be' submitted
be sent Albany and the other listed field offices.
CiSclosure- 3 ‘A---61f
TJD:rmm (6)
k)1I qh.-
ALL DrYnr3IPTTAN INMIT4
.1 o smut rrr,c-s;r7 /0
Eta?? WHERE Slim - 5- TIP
-
OMERNISZ.
Memorandum expanding COINTELPRO — Black Liberation Movement to fully

National scope.
3/4/68
To: SAC, Albany

RECig
From: Director, FBI (100-44300G)
BLACK NATIONALIST-RATE GROUPS
RACIWINTELLIGENCE
LO
F1 Title is-changed to substitute Racial Intelligence
for Internal Security for Bureau routing purposes.
■-•
a
Cr. °
PERSONAL ATTENTION FOR ALL TEETOL/MING SACS
,•
2 -:'ltinnta 2- Minneapolis
2 - Baltimore 2- Mobile
2 - Birmingham 2- Newark
2 - Boston 2- Now Haven
2 - Buffalo 2- New Orleans
2 - Charlotte 2- New York
2 - Chicago 2- Omaha
2 - Cincinnati 2- Philadelphia
2 - Cleveland 2- Phoenix
2 - Denver 2- Pittsburgh
2
2
- Detroit
- Houston
2-
2-
Portland
Richmond V
2 - Indianapolis 2- Sacramento
2 - Jackson 2- San Diego .
2
2
- Jacksonville
- Kansas City
2-
2-
San Francisco
Seattle
11)
t
2 - Los Angeles 2- Springfield
2 - Memphis 2- St. Louis - 44,
2 - Miami 2- Tampa
2 - Milwaukee 2- WFO . ./
_
INTre:I■ yin entnroat
JD:rmm (88) IM.E4t •:■
, • ' , muffin It 11:SIV,
ivcr7r ryrrs. sHovni
•
'•
;• ' OTHERWISE.
-1111/ 1968;,
MAIL ROOLID TELETYPE AMID
Airtel itemizing expanded list of FBI field offices participating in COINTELPRO —

Black Liberation Movement. List of original participants and a description of this
COINTELPRO's goals and targets appear as memo continues on the following pages.
country, but was being expanded from 23 to 41 cities. Both the initial and expanded
lists of participating field offices are brought out in the accompanying March 4,1968
memo from Hoover to the SAC, Albany, in which he shifts COINTELPRO-Black
Liberation Movement from "Internal Security" to "Racial Intelligence" for purposes
of internal Bureau classification, and describes the overall goals of the effort.
Airtel to SAC, Albany

'CiCE NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
-
I
13ACKGROUND
uy letter dated 8/25/67 tho following officei
were advised of the beginning of a Counterintelligence
Program against militant Black Nationalist-Bate Groups:
Albany' MCmphis
Atlanta' Newark .
Baltimore _ New Orleans -
- Boston - :se's :ark r .
Buffalo Philadelphia
Charlotte . Phoenix .. •
Chicago Pittsburgh
,Cincinnati Richmond
Cleveland St. Louis
Detroit:' ' Ban Francisco
• Jacknon. WashIngcon Field
LAG Angeles
.., . - . .
- Each • of the above offices vas:: to.dosignate a •
Special Agent to coordinate this program. , Replies to thin
letter indicated an interest in"countorintelligonce against.
militant black nationalist groups' that foment violence and. -
several offices outlined procedutes.which bad been effective-
in the past.. For example, Washington Field Office had : '-
furnished information about a new Ration of Islam (NOI)'
grade school to appropriate authorities- JD the District
of Columbia who investigated to determine if the school
conformed to District'regulations•for private schools: In
the process WFO obtained background information on the parents
of each pupil.
. •
The Rovolutionary'ActionItivement (RAW),.a - pro-
Chinese communiet group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa.,
in the summer of 1907. The Philadelphia Office alerted -- •
local police; who then.put RAM leaders under:close scrutiny.
They were arrested on every possible charge until they could
. no longer make bail. As a result,'RAM loaders spemt.peostofthe
Simmer
--.....in fail and no violence traceable to rum took place.....:.
.
:-... ' The Counterintelligenco Program is now being
:Tended to include 41 offices. Each of the offices added
0 this program should designate"an.Agont familiar vithb1 c!:,
- 2 -
These last explicitly include the blocking of coalitions between radical black
political organizations, the targeting of key leaders such as "Martin Luther King,
Stokely Carmichael, and Elija Muhammed" for special attention by the Bureau, the
"neutralizing" - by unspecified means - of both organizations and selected leaders,
the undertaking of propaganda efforts to "discredit" targeted groups and individu-
als in order to deny them "respectability" within their own communities and, hence,
"prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, espe-
cially among youth." Elsewhere, Hoover called upon his operatives to intervene
directly in blocking free speech and access by black radicals to the media: "Consid-
Airtel toSAC, Albany '

'RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
GLACE NATIONALIST —RATE GROUPS
. :.
atronaliet activity, 'and interested in counterintelligen r
o coordinate this program.This
• Agent pill be responsib
or the periodic progress letters being requested, but each
., ,gent working this type of case should participate in the.."'--:
.
formulation of counterintelligence operations.
. .,.
.:.GOALS :- .- 4 ,
.. • -
e! ' For maximum effectiveness of the Counterintelligence
.program, and to prevent wasted effort, long—range goals are
being set.
Prevent the coalition of militant black
nationalist groups. 'In unity there is strength; a truism
that is no less valid for, all its triteness. An effective
coalition of black nationalist groups eight be the first -
;step toward a real "Man Mau" in America, the beginning of
'a true black revolution. •
2; Prevent the'rtoe'of a "messiah" who could

-.unify, and electrify,.the militant black nationalist- movement.
, Malcolm X might have been such a "messiah;" he is the martyr
of the movement today. Martin Luther Xing, Stokely Cermichael..,::
. and Elijah Muhammed all aspire to this position. Elijah
Muhammad is less of a throat because of his age. Xing could ' •
be a very real contender for this position should he abandon
his supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines"
(nonviolence) and embrace,black nationalism. Carmichael
bas the necessary charisma to be a real threat in this veg.:,
•
' • ' Prevent violence on the part of black ":"
3.
e• nationalist groups. This in of primary iMportance,-and is,
.of course, a goal of our investigative activity; it should
also be a goal of the Counterintelligence program. Through-
counterintelligence it should bespossible .to pinpoint.potential
troublemakers and neet•alime them before they exercise their
potential for violence.
r, 4. prevent militant black nationalist groups And
leaders from gaining respectability, by discrediting them
•to three separate QcgSOT-ifs of the ccamunity. Iho goal of
discrediting black notionalistemust be handled tactically
n throe ways. You must discredit these groups nod
adividuals to, first, the responsible Negro community.
ii econd,.they must be discredited to the white community,
,
eration should be given to preclude [black] rabble-rouser leaders of these hate

groups from spreading their philosophy publicly or through the communications
media."'"
Over the first year of its official anti-black COINTELPRO, the FBI developed a
network of some 4,000 members, assembled from what had previously been code-
named the TOPLEV ("Top Level" Black Community Leadership Program) BLACPRO
("Black Program") efforts as well as new recruits, called the "Ghetto Informant
Program.""It also used the information thus collected to go after the incipient black
liberation movement, hammer and tong:
COINTELPRO — Black Liberation Movement
Airtel to SAC, Albany

BLACK . NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
. both:the responsible community and to "liberals" who have

vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalist simpl
because they are Negroes. Third, these groups must be
iscredited in the oyes of Negro radicals, the followers
of the movement. This la4t area requires entirely different •
tactics from the first two. .Publiciti about violent tendencloe
!and radical statements merely enhance black nationalists :
the last group;. it adds "respectab lity" in .a different
• .
..,• ,
- -
5. A final goal should•be to prevent the long.- ' •

range growth of militant black nationalist organizations,
'especially among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these .
groups from converting young people must he developed. -
. .
Besides these five goale'counterintelligence is
'a valuable part of our regular investigative programas. it
often produces positive information. •
TARGETS •
,
- Primary targets of the Counterintelligence Program,
Blnck Nationalist-Nate Groupe, should be the most violent
and radical groups end their lenders.. To should emphasize
thoso leaders and organizetions that are nationwide in scope
and are most capable of disrupting this country. These;' .
targets should include the radical and violence-prone.- :"
leaders, members, and followers of the:
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),-.
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM),
Nation of Islam (NO/)
... .. , . . „. . - • .. .
n. . Offices handling these cases and those of Stokely'
Carmichael of SNCC, 11.. Eap Brown of MC,' Martin Luther King
of SCLC, Maxwell Stanford of RAM, and Elijah Muhammad of -
NO/, shouldbe alert for counterintelligence suggestions....
•
INSTRUCTIONS - - '
The effectiveness of counterintelligence depends :-

' = on -the quality and quantity of positive information
,available regarding the target• and on the.imagination and
,
;-initiative of Agents working the program. The response of
the field to the Counterintelligence: Program against the
'Communist Party, USA,'indicatesthat a superb job can be'
done by the field on counterintelligence. „: . •
'-' Counterintelligence operations •must be approved •"•„„
by the Bureau. Because of the nature of this program each I
operation must be designed to protect•the Bureau's interest
so that there is no possibility of embarrassment to the . 1 41 ."
Bureau. Beyond this the.Bureau will give every possible
J consideration to your proposals.•. •
•
NOTE: .
See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Captioned as above dated.2/1V68, prepared by TJD:rmm: ' _
-• •
63 4; 5
In August 1967, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover ordered the extensive infiltration and
disruption of SNCC, as well as other...formations, such as the militant Revolution-
ary Action Movement, the Deacons of Defense, and CORE...FBI agents were sent to
monitor [Stokely] Carmichael and [H. Rap] Brown wherever they went, seeking to
elicit evidence to imprison them. Brown was charged with inciting a race riot in
Maryland, and was eventually sentenced to five years in a federal penitentiary for
carrying a rifle across state lines while under criminal indictment. [SNCC leader
Ralph] Featherstone and...activist Che Payne were murdered o n 9 March 1970, when
a bomb exploded in their automobile in Bel Air, Maryland. [ SNCC leader Cleveland]
Sellers was indicted for organizing black students in South Carolina and for
[himselfl resisting the draft s1
As has been noted elsewhere, "the FBI had between 5,000 and 10,000 active cases
on matters of race at any given time nationwide. In 1967 some 1,246 FBI agents
received...racial intelligence assignments each month. By [1968] the number had
jumped to 1,678...Hoover [also ordered William Sullivan] to compile a more refined
listing of 'vociferous rabble rousers' than provided by the Security Index. [He]
hoped the first edition of the new Rabble Rouser Index of 'individuals who have
demonstrated a potential for fomenting racial discord' would facilitate target
selection for the new black nationalist counterintelligence program...Everything
was computerized."52
Although Hoover contended the Bureau's COINTELPRO tactics were necessi-
tated by the "violence" of its intended victims, his March 4 memo negates even this
flimsy rationalization by placing King's purely pacifistic SCLC among its primary
targets from the beginning, adding King himself in February 1968, shortly before the
civil rights leader's assassination." Similarly, he included SNCC, still calling it by
its long-standing descriptor as a nonviolent entity. Even in the case of Maxwell
Sanford's Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), which had never offered profes-
sions of pacifist intent, Hoover was forced to admit that his agents had turned up no
hard evidence of violence or other criminal activities. Rather, the director points
with pride to an anti-RAM COINTELPRO operation undertaken during the sum-
mer of 1967 in which RAM members were "arrested on every possible charge until
they could no longer make bail" and consequently "spent most of the summer in
jail," even though there had never been any intent to take them to trial on the variety
of contrived offenses with which they were charged." Hoover recommended this
campaign of deliberate false arrest as being the sort of "neutralizing" method he had
in mind for black activists, and then ordered each of the 41 field offices receiving his
memo to assign a full-time coordinator to such COINTELPRO activities within 30
days.
The nature of the actions triggered by Hoover's instructions varied considerably
from field office to field office. In St. Louis, for example, agents undertook a series
of anonymous letters - the first of which is proposed in the accompanying February
14, 1969 memo from the St. Louis SAC to the director, and approved in the
accompanying reply from Hoover on February 28 - to ensnare the Reverend Charles
....11.4,111■ 11MO
WOPME.01...
0. PIMP ie 11•0•040.11
UNITED STATES ANNIENT I

Memorandum
To . DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448 008) DAM: 2-14-89
SAC, ST, LOUIS (187-5818) P
susjtcr: - COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

L' eLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
:(SLAM LIBERATORS)
4
Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies and for Spring iel (
one copy of a letter to

The following counter-intelligence ac proposed
b the 8 Is
and
e act emp o a ienate.;
m roll his w e and cause suspicion among the BLACK LIBERATORS that
they have a dangerous troublemaker in their midst.
BACKGROUND:
am who
sends her s e apps a
He occasionally
u , 0 ng wife, who is
apparently convinced that her husband is performing a vital service to
the Black world therefore, ust endure this separation without
bothering him. is, to all 1 ications an intelligent, respectable
young mother,
Her husband, on the other hand, considers himself a "ROMEO"
and he frequently enjoyed the bed .'- -f"rtio ofvarious Sisters of
IBERATOB3, including
actually fee 0
conjec use, but TVis highly probable that he wants no problems at
'
home that would detract from his Black Nationalist Wor)c, or cast a
reflection upon him with the white ministers in the area who are
sympathic and previously helpful to him.
gdd)I . tO t, 9
Bureau (Encl. 2) RR
fv,) Imo. REc 44 :2-
- Springfield" (Encl. 1) RE 2-
1 - St. Louis
JAF:wma
(5) •- • . • ■-•Int; •
V...- , • -.
Be U.S. Saohy Bear Ripka" es the Payroll Savinv Pies
Memo proposing COINTELPRO against the Reverend Charles Koen in St. Louis
Koen, a long-time SNCC activist, in a web of sexual innuendo and/or outright

slander (much the same approach as had been used against King). Koen was
perceived by the Bureau, correctly enough, as the galvanizing figure in the then-
occurring transformation of the Black Liberators, a black street gang in the St. Louis/
SL: 157-5818
EXPLANATION OF LETTER:
The enclosed letter was prepared from a penmanship, spelling,
and vocabulary style to imitate that of the average Black Libera
r. It contains several accusations which should cause
great concern. The letter is to be mailed in a chew unmarke
nvelope with no return address and sent from St. Louis to
residence in Cairo. Since her letters tel usual y v a
the Black Liberator Headquarters, any me d have access to
getting her address from one of. her envelopes. This address is
available to the St. Louis Division.
Her response, upon receipt of this letter, is difficult to
predict and the counter-intelligence effect will be nullified f she
does not discuss it with him. Therefore, to insure that nd the
Black Liberators are made aware that the letter was sent, e below
follow-up action is necessary:
St. Louis will furnish Springfield with a machine copy of the
actual letter that is sent. Attached to this copy will be a neat
typed note saying:
1111111 utual friend made this available without

" 1knowledge. I understand she recently
recieve this letter from St. Louis. I suggest
you rookinto this matter.
God Bless You "
This note would give the impression that somehow one of
close friends, probabl a ter, obtained a copy of the
r and made it available t he above material is to be
mailed by the Springfield Division at Cairo, Ill., anonymously in a
suitable envelope with no return address to:
Althoughlilliris now living in E. St. Louis, Ill., he did

use the above addre when arrested in St. Louis in Jan., 1969, and
it was printed in local newspapers. Mail will reach him at the above
address since it is the residence of a close associate
of his.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS:
The following results are anticipated following the
execution of the above-counter-intelligence activity:
I. I11 feeling and pose! et will be
brought about betwee The concern
ovek 'what to do about ay e rac rom his time spent
in the plots and plans of thd SNCC. He may even decide
to spend more time with his wife and children and less
time in Black Nationalist activity.
2. The Black Liberators will waste a great deal of time
trying to discover the writer of the letter. It is
possible that their not-too subtle investigation
will lose present members and alienate potential ones.
3. Inasmuch as Black Liberator strel*h is ebbing at its
lowest level, this action may well be the "death-blow."
ROUTE L. _,.IVELOPE
SAC,-St. Louis (157-5212)
REC 44
Direeter, FBI (100-448006)—
7 1 - In=
1 -
1-
2/28/89
BLACK NATIONALIST RATE GROUPS
RACIAL IFIELLIGENCI
(BLACK LIBERATORS)
Reurlot 2/14/62.
St. Louls.le authorized to send anonymous letter
sot out in ralet and Springfield is authorized to send the
second anonymous letter proposed in relet. Use commercially
purchased stationery and take the other precautions sot out
to insure this cannot be traced to this Bureau.
The Bureau feels there should be an interval between
the two letters of at least ten days. St. Louis should advise
Springfield of date second letter should be mAiled.
St. Louis and Springfield should advice the Bureau
of any results.
2 .-•Springfield
TJD:ckl
(2)
11214
The Liborat u
Lout
of e Stu en onv o en oor na ing omm ee
) or the Midwest. BNCC is also a black extremist
St. Louis recommend anonymous letters be seam,
it 1 ctivities.
(:Pel'e
cause oen to spa m re of
.
r s time a home since ill know his wife is aware of
his activities. Since nd his wife are so the
4...• irA letters cannot hurt the w e lyt might dra back,to
- his wife.
St. Louis also feels that the Black Liberators

will try to discover the writer within the organization
which will help neutralize new and potential member..
Since the letters are to be sent anonymously, there is no
possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau. St. Louis has
prepared the first anonymous letter using the penmanship and
grammar of the typical member of the Black Liberators.
Based on dat furnished by St. Louis, it appears this
separation is due to organization work among black
extremists and not because of marital discord, however,
it is knownlillihaa had eat ital affairs.
The COINTELPRO against Koen continues (above) and, in a May 26,1969 memo
(excerpt right) it is expanded to include a bogus underground newspaper, The
Blackboard to spread disinformation within the St. Louis black community.
BLACKBOARD UNDERGROVND DESSPAPIR
Pursuant to Bureau authority received in letter

from the Bureau to Bt. Louis on 4/14/69, the St. Louis Div'.
slop prepared 200 copies of BLACKBOARD, an alleged underground
newspaper of the black studeiTiWriathern Illinois University
(SID) It was nailed anonymously by Special Ageots of the
St. Louts Division.st idamrdsville, Ill., and copies of it
were soot to virtually every black activist organization.
and Black Nationalist leader is the bi -state area. .
The following results were noted by the St. tools'

Division:
Page 10 of the 4/24/89 issued of the "St. Louis --

American", a weekly newspaper published in St. Louis, No.,
and oriented to the black community, contains a column by - -7-
FARM WILSON, a black columnist for that newspaper. hides,
through his column and recitation of various local events, -e..7
WILSON said, "Them is an absolutely scandalous •underground'
sheet floating around both sides of the river that devotos,i...,c
as entire section of its first page to some real dangerous
allegations about a few of our 'blacker' black brothers and -
Oster, and scale so-called rholl_pating' sure hope that whoever
is printing that jazz is prepared to back it up.°
prov
co sad
Louis and last
the "the word was out" that

woul•pun is •rticipation in . so
advised that was extremely angry a ut the
newspaper an ral pooplo that he was going
"to get' was so angry about it that
be attemp to got a oca egro radio station to sive him
radio time to answer the chargos in DLACKB0d81).
be 12 IS SOUTCOS 5 a •
to "get out of town" by several black • s as is result et -rr_
his tirades against the pmcncan0 newspaper and his outburst
at the ACTION meeting. •
pr u*
'vision tha any wit
for pub c ug n CKBOARD ,rovious -.
fans with the Zulu 1200, a black rmsnization;
, Louis, $o., which is now defunct. ted
till" in person about this recently, and a thous
attempted to de onnection iirACKBOA
did
. not believe
. denial:. in
had no i ormation_
as to any specific future action which black s is the
.t st '
The Bt. Louis Division feels, on the basis of the

above, that the publication of BLACKBOARD was a most successful
cou•telli•ence *tides • e that the effectiveness
of as been blunted, and it is
unl e y is to regain their former
stature. MVO probably also lost some
dogree of a tonne as of BLACLBOARD's publication.
East St. Louis area, into a politicized social action organization. He was also known
to be a key leader in black community attempts - through formation of a "United
Front" - to resist Ku Klux Klan terror in nearby Cairo, Illinois. It was foreseen that
his neutralization would lead to a virtual collapse of black political activity through-
out southern Missouri and Illinois. By May 26, 1969, as the accompanying memo
from the St. Louis SAC to Hoover shows, the letter campaign against Koen was not
only well developed, but disinformation activities had been broadened to include
production and distribution of The Blackboard, a bogus "underground" newspaper
aimed mainly at spreading allegations of sexual impropriety about a broadening
circle of black community leaders and activists. By 1970, the resulting interpersonal
jealousies and animosities had sown a discord sufficient to cause a general disinte-
gration of effectiveness within the black liberation movement in the target area.
Similarly, in New York, the Bureau "placed the fifteen or twenty members of
Charles 37X Kenyatta's Harlem Mau Mau on the COINTELPRO target list.""
Although the details of the operations directed against the group remain murky,
they may well have played into the April 1973 murder of Malcolm X's brother,
Hakim Jamal (s/n: Allen Donaldson), by a Roxbury, Massachusetts affiliate dubbed
"De Mau Mau."' In any event, the death of Jamal prompted the Boston FBI office
to file a request that headquarters "delete subject from the [Black] Extremist
Photograph Album," indicating that he too had been a high-priority COINTELPRO
target "
Meanwhile, in southern Florida, as the accompanying August 5, 1968 memo
from Hoover to the SAC, Albany, bears out, a more sophisticated propaganda effort
had been conducted. Working with obviously "friendly" media representatives,
local COINTELPRO specialists oversaw the finalization of a television "documen-
tary" on both the black liberation movement and the new left in the Miami area. The
program, which was viewed by a mass audience, was consciously edited to take the
statements of key activists out of context in such a way as to make them appear to
advocate gratuitous violence and seem "cowardly," and utilized camera angles
deliberately selected to make those interviewed come off like "rats trapped under
scientific observation." After detailing such intentionally gross distortion of reality
-passed off all the while as "news" and "objective journalism" -Hoover called upon
"[e]ach counterintelligence office [to] be alert to exploit this technique both for black
nationalists and New Left types." Overall, it appears that most field offices complied
with this instruction to the best of their respective abilities, a matter which perhaps
accounts for much of the negativity with which the black liberation movement came
to be publicly viewed by the end of the 1960s.
In Detroit, COINTELPRO operatives set out to destroy the recently-founded
Republic of New Afrika (RNA) by targeting its leader, Imari Abubakari Obadele (s/
n: Richard Henry). At first they used, as the accompanying memos dated Novem-
ber 22 and December 3,1968 reveal, a barrage of anonymous letters in much the same
fashion as those employed against Koen in St. Louis, albeit in this case they charged
financial rather than sexual impropriety. When this approach failed to achieve the
SAC, Albany
1
()
Director, FBI (100-448006)
BLACK NATIONALIST - BATE GROUPS
c,,,e RACIAL INTELLIGENCE • ?
The Bureau wants to bring a highly succbssful•••

counterintelligence operation to the attention of all
counterintelligence offices, so that n11 offices 7111
be aware of the type'of results that can be obtained
in this program. .
r. The Miami Division develtped a source at a
local television station and the source produced a
news special on black nationalists and on the.Nen Left.
Miami requested Bureau authority to furnish the sourca
background data of a public source nature when'ths
source indicated an interest in producing a shoT
exposing these groups.
(... - • Li
2 - Atlanta 2 - Minneapolis
2 - Baltimore 2 - Mobile = (.3 .
2 - Birmingham 2 - Newark ta%
OD
f2 - Boston 2 New Raven- EA-102
CO 2 - Buffalo 2 - New Orlean elA
.4 Fl 2 - Charlotte 2 - New York tra't
r 2 . R 2 Chicago 2 - Omaha
1 9 .
2 - Cincinnati
2 - Columbia
2 - Philadelphia /00'• (400 6.
2 - Phoenix 2:
Z1..- 2 - Cleveland 2 - Pittsburgh
2 - Denver 2 - Portland E3 AUG 141958
2 - Detroit 2 - Richmond •
2 - Houston 2 - Sacramento .
evsy 2 - Indianapolis.
2 - Jackson
N- 2 - Jacksonville
2 San Diego
2 - San Francisco
2 - Seattle
.1' 2 - Kansas City
- 2 - Springfidd
tole. 2 - Los Angeles 2 - St. Louis
Del...
14he
2 - Memphis ▪ Tampa
en." 2 - Miami - VFO
C... 2 Milwaukee
C.A.
;‘ ti
re.
C...
S.
Sor
(91) • S ,if.,SEE NO
TI
T4 •-• -C•IN
::::""r-2AUG i. q V, :
17c;
.7 Ovia
.s171:1111
For APPRMAL ,
-,,,...7,- TtLETTPC ornr CI
Shaping the news. Memo establishing model of COINTELPRO media techniques

utilized against the new left and black liberation movement.
desired result, the Bureau escalated, setting out to bring about their target's
imprisonment. In the view of involved agents, "If Obadele can be kept off the streets,
it may prevent further problems with the RNA inasmuch as he completely domi-
Letter to SAC, Albany

100-448006
Spew ArecorZED 7/7/4,
The Bureau authorized 1r4s.blasLthe souree data
n a confidential basis and the a
seat deal of research was done amilil;aargid it
resulted in an excellent program. The show, which ended
with quotes from the Director on the nature of the New .
Loft, was so well received that the television station
received requests for a film of the show by local civic
groups.
As you are aware publicity about New Left
and black nationalist groups, especially television
coverage, sometimes enhances the stature of these groups.
At the same time, Miami has demonstrated that a carefully
planned television show can be extremely effective in
showing these extremists for what they are: local New
Left and black nationalist leaders were interviewed on
the show and seemed to have been chosen for oither their
inability to articulate or their simpering and stupid
appearance.
Miami furnished a film of thiszhow for Bureau

review and it was apparent that the television source
used the very best judgment in editing comments by
these extremists. Re brought out that they were in
favor of violent revolution without their explaining
why. But he also brought out that they, personally,
would be afraid to lead a violent revolution, making
them appear to be cowards. The interview of black
nationalist leaders on the show bad the leaders seated,
ill at ease, in hard chairs. Full-length camera shots
showed each movement as they squirmed about in their
chairs, resembling rats trapped under scientific
observation.
Each counterintelligence office should be
alert to exploit this technique both for black nationalists
and New Left types. Miami learned from sources that those
who appeared on the show realized that it presented them
in a most unfavorable light. One oven complained to the
television station about it. This counterintelligence
operation will be of great value in the South Florida area
and the Bureau hopes these results can be duplicated is -
other offices. Success in this' case resulted from hard.
work and acumen on the part of the Agents who handled '
the matter. Especially important was the choice of
individuals interviewed as they did not have the ability
to stand up to a professional newsman. The fine job of
interviewing and editing done by the news people involved
was also most important.
•
Eadh office should be alert to the possibility
of using this technique'. No counterintelligence action
should be taken without Bureau authority.' For your
information operations of this type must be handled
through reliable, established sources and must be set
up so that the FBI is not revealed as the source. •
NOTE:
See memorandum G.C. Moore to Mr. W.C. Sullivan,
captioned as above, dated 8/1/63, prepared by
• 11/1einorandum
To DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006) DATE: 11/22/68
SAC, DETROIT (157-3214)
SgBJECT: CUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

BEXCitNATTO:TALIST - RATE_GROTTP8
RACIAL INIELLIGENCE
(REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA)
10/31/68. Re Bureau airtel to Detroit, dated
Per suggestion set forth in re Bureau

airtel, Detroit requests mailing letters prepared
on commercially purchased paper to various members
of the Republic of New Africa (RNA) with the
exception of RICHARD HENRY, signed by a concerned
RNA brother.
The letter will read as follows:
Dear Brother and Sister:

Ii
Lately I have been concerned N14*
about the lack of funds of the RNA.
I know that many brothers and sisters
have paid taxes and have donated on
various occasions to the Republic.
Where has the money gone, and why
haven't we purchased our land with
it?
I do not make any direct

accusation at any brother or Sister
but I would like to know how Brother
Imari owns a house, supports a family,
and travels all over the country when
he is net even working. I think we
all deserve an explanation of the use.
of the RNA money, and I think we are
foolish to donate and pay taxes to
support one man, when the Republic
is in such dire need of money. I
think this question should be raised
at the next Wednesday meeting. I'm
not signing my name because I do not
want to create a personal conflict
among us.
A Concerned Brother
This letter will be mailed to Detroit members
of the RNA only and if a favocable response is received,
a similar letter will be prepared for nationwide
RNA member circulation. .
Detroit requests Bureau approval.
Memo initiating COINTELPRO against the Republic of New Afrika by targeting

its leader, Imari Abubakari Obadele (s/n: Richard Henry), shortly after the organi-
zation's founding in 1968.
• 6.‘ EN--
Ts- 7NT1T:.IT •.•
RO UTE
SAC, Detroit (157-3214) December 3, 1967;
REG- 12G
Dircctiir, FBI (100-446006)
1 - Mr. Tunstall
• • 1 - Mr. Deakin
COTJI:TIZIINTIMLICZI:CE FROCILVI
NATIORZIST - NAM GROUPS
RACIAL IhTI:LLIGU:ZE
(REPUBLIC cr. FEW AFRICA)
Reurlet 11/22/60.
Detroit is authorized to send the anonymous letter

set out in relet to selected members of the Republic of
Mew Africa.(FN) using commercially purchased stationery. ..
Insure this mailing cannot be traced to the F,ureau

and advise of results. If results or favorable, calwlidsr
submitting a recciamendation for circulating this letter
to othez mc.-nteI's in other cities.
TJD:ekw
(5)
NOTE:
This anonymous letter criticizes Richard Henry

(brother Imari), an RFA officer who allegedly is using
RNA funds for personal expenses. This has been a matter
of discussion with enough members so as to protect cur
sources. Criticism of leaders of black nationnliSt eNtremist
groups, such as the RNA, for misusing funds, is an effective
method of neutralizing these leaders. Since this is an
anonymous letter, there is no possibility of embarrassment
to the clurcau.
c.J;.
41 ('
• •
1j)1/ (-/
rl Elvi, r
Memo authorizing COINTELPRO against Imari Obadele and the RNA.
nates the organization and all members follow his instructions."" Hence, when the
RNA leader moved south to consummate an organizational plan of establishing a
liberated zone" in the Mississippi River delta, near Jackson, Mississippi, the FBI
moved to provoke a confrontation which could then be used to obtain a conviction.
First, as is shown in the accompanying December 12, 1970 memo from the SAC,
:Anse March, 1968, the Republic of New Africa (RNA)

718 been attempting to start a separate black nation in five
southern states, starting with Mississippi. In this regard,
the RNA has been tying to buy and lease land in Missilaippi
in the Jacksdn Division on several past occasions. (Counter-
intelligence measures, has been able to abort all RNA efforts to
obtain lend in Mississippi.)
In late Joly, 1970, TtCIIARD hENRY, aka Brother Imari,
leader of the RNA, ea O5 to Jackson, Mississippi, accempenied
by many out-of-state :supporters Zs) hold a national RNA meeting
on the land of She nation in Mississippi". This conference was
disruptive and iaej:Tectile ,lue to .Jackson Diviaion,Bnreaus
approved counterintelligence measures.
In mid-September, 1970, Brother IMARI and a few close
associees of his came to look at land which was for sale in
aural Muds County, Mississippi, near Jackson; this land was
awned by a Negro male who was retiring and owned over 560 acres.
Jackaon Informants advised Bureau Agents of developments regarding
this land and the fact that the owner of the land,f7a......a-=-771,
N/M, had advised Brother LIAR' he will lease or sell him ten
to twenty acres. RNA leaders, including Brother IMARI, were
delighted over this land purchase or leasing prospect. Jackson
informants were directed by contacting Agents to approach c7:73
privately and indicate to him that his selling land to Brother
IMARIswould not be a wise endeavor. Additionally, on 10/9/70,
7.) was interviewed by Bureau Agents and advised of the true
. 1ture and violence potential of the RNA and its leaders. The
interview lasted 11/2 hours; following the interview, (7L -)

indicated he would reconsider whether he would sell or lease -
any land to the RNA; on 10/21/7r.; Bureau Agents' interviewed
Vii_
who was assisting the
BNA in their dealings : 7.S• ..:a.finiegarding the
land. The true nature and violence •notential of the RNA
and its leaders was explained to
As a result of the •bo•c ceantaaintelliaence
efforts, the land 1,hich the RNA had almost finalized plans
regarding purchasing or leasing in rural Binds County,
Miss., has not been sold, cscleaacd to then. Jackson has
maintained contact _ a) and he has advised he has
no plans to lease or sell any land to the RNA in the'Immodiate
future. There have been no recent visits by top officials
of the BNA to Mississippi regarding the land, it being noted
they made aevcrarvisits in September, 1970, when their
prospects for the land purchase or leasing was good.
As a aasult of the above, intensive efforts
of the RNA to obtain land in Missiasippi o•cr the asst
two and one•half .:era ara still aaitalty on:aceaa:fai.
Excerpt from a December 2,1970 report detailing the COINTELPRO opera-

tions in Mississippi which resulted in the case of the RNA 11.
Jackson (Elmer Linberg), to Hoover, agents intervened to block the perfectly legal
sale of a land parcel to Obadele. SA George Holder and his associates undertook by
word of mouth to foster a marked increase in anti-RNA sentiment in the Klan-ridden
Jackson area. Finally, they coordinated an early morning assault on RNA facilities
in the city involving some 36 heavily armed agents and local police headed by SAC
Linberg - as well as an armored car - on August 18, 1971.
In the resultant firelight, one police officer, William Skinner, was killed and an
agent, William Stringer, was wounded. Imari Obadele and 10 other RNA members
were arrested - thereby becoming the "RNA 11" - and charged with murder,
assault, sedition, conspiracy, possession of illegal weapons, and "treason against the
state of Mississippi."" Tellingly, the original charges, which had ostensibly pro-
vided a basis for the massive police raid, were never brought to court. In the end,
eight of the accused were convicted, but only of conspiracy to assault federal officers,
assault, illegal possession of a nonexistent automatic weapon, and having used
weapons in the commission of these other "felonies."60This is to say they were
imprisoned for having defended themselves from the armed attack of a large
number of FBI agents and police who could never show any particular reason for
having launched the assault in the first place. Obadele received a twelve year
sentence, served seven, and the entire operation undoubtedly entered the annals of
"successful" COINTELPROs.
COINTELPRO Against the Black Panther Party

By the fall of 1968, the FBI felt it had identified the organization most likely to
succeed as the catalyst of a united black liberation movement in the U.S. This was
the Black Panther Party (BPP), originally established as the Black Panther Party for
Self-Defense in the San Francisco Bay area city of Oakland by Merritt College
students Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale (a former RAM member) during October
of 1966. On September 8, 1968, J. Edgar Hoover let it be known in the pages of the
New York Times that he considered the Panthers "the greatest [single] threat to the
internal security of the country."61Shortly thereafter, William Sullivan sent the ac-
companying memo to George C. Moore, outlining a plan by which already-existing
COINTELPRO actions against the BPP might "be accelerated."
Although Sullivan utilized the habitual Bureau pretense that targets of such
attention were "violence-prone" and making "efforts to perpetrate violence in the
United States," the party's predication-as evidenced in its Ten-Point Program-was
in some ways rather moderate and, in any event, entirely legal 62Far from conduct-
ing "physical attacks on police," as Sullivan claimed, the Panthers were well-known
to have anchored themselves firmly in the constitutional right to bear arms and
effect citizen's arrests in order to curtail the high level of systematic (and generally
quite illegal) violence customarily visited upon black inner city residents by local
police." More to the point, but left unmentioned by the FBI assistant director, was
that the entire thrust of BPP organizing - reliance on the principle of armed self-
defense included - went to forging direct community political control over and
economic self-sufficiency within the black ghettos." As has been noted elsewhere,
"In late 1967, the Panthers initiated a free breakfast programme for black children,
and offered free health care to ghetto residents."" By the summer of 1968, these
undertakings had been augmented by a community education project and an anti-
heroin campaign. The party was offering a coherent strategy to improve the realities
•....... •...... (
UNITED STATES••ANMENT
Memora1um IlF
4
TO . H. C. Sullivan,V . 9/27/68-
•
(r. C. MooreY/ 0.••■
,„
FROM
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan -
SiBJECI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM • 1 - Hr
XACE -NATidatist HATE GROUPS 1 -
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE .- 1 -
(BLACKIANTHER PARTY) 1
PURPOSE:
To obtain authority for the attached letter to

those field divisions having Black Panther Party (BPP)
activity instructing that the counterintelligence program
against this organization btaseelersted and that each
office submit concrete suggestions as to future action
to be taken against the BPP.
• The extremist BPP of Oakland, California, is

rapidly expanding. It is the most violence-prone organization
of.all the extremist giaupg now operating in the United States.'
This group has a record of violence and connections with
foreign revolutionaries. It puts particular emphasis on not(_
only verbal attacks but also physical attacks on police.
. _ ...
OBSERVATIONS:
11Ec-14,,,.. _ 44yt.,,/ -.3.-..,:
The information we are recefVing from otr sources
concerning activites of the BPrycp,early indicates that : ---7:"-
more violence can be expected Y?ofti thir organization in the
immediate future. It therefdre, is essential that we not 1777.
only accelerate our investigations of this organizatqn, u ,
and increase our informants in the organization but that le .
take action under the counterintelligence prograurto-disrupt—,..
the group. Our counterintelligence program may bring about --.,
esults which could lead to prosecution of these violence-prone
eaders apd active members, thereby thwarting their efforts
ferpetrate vlolence,ipthe United States. -
..:P
Enclosure
100-448006
JGD:rmm (7)
Memo initiating COINTELPRO - BPP.
- both spiritual and material - of ghetto life. Consequently, black community

perceptions of the BPP were radically different from those entertained by the police
establishment (which the Panthers described as an "occupying army").
O
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE : -COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
ABLACK PANTHER PARTY)
(
SCOPE OF PROPOSED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM:
• As stated above, the attached letter will instruct ----

the field to submit positive suggestions as to actions to -
be taken to thwart and disrupt the BPP. Instructions are and -
will be reiterated that no action is to be taken without -
prior Bureau authority. ...•
These suggestions are to create factionalism between
not only the national leaders but also loCil leaders, steps
to neutralize all organizational efforts of the BPP as well
as create suspicion amongst the leaders as to each others
sources of finances, suspicion concerning their respective
spouses and suspicion as to who may be cooperating with -
law enforcement. In addition, suspicion should be developed --.
as to who may be attempting to gain control of the organization - -
for their own private betterment, as well as suggestions as
to the best method of exploiting the foreign visits made by
BPP members. We are also soliciting recommendations as to
the best method of creating opposition to the BPP on the
part of the majority of the residents of the ghetto areas. .
RECOMMENDATION:
That attached letter , in accordance with the above, --

be approved.
A significant measure of the Black Panthers' success was described in racist

terms by Sullivan who noted that membership was "multiplying rapidly." Begin-
ning with a core of five members in 1966, the BPP had grown to include as many as
5,000 members within two years, and had spread from its original Oakland base to
include chapters in more than a dozen cities."This seems due, not only to the appeal
inherent in the Panthers' combination of standing up for basic black rights in the face
of even the most visible expressions of state power with concrete programs to
upgrade inner city life, but to the party's unique inclusiveness. Although the
conditions for acceptance into the BPP were in some ways quite stringent, Newton
and Seale had from the outset focused their recruiting and organizing efforts on
what they termed "the lumpen" - a cast of street gangs, prostitutes, convicts and ex-
cons typically shunned by progressive movements - with an eye towards forming
a new political force based upon this "most oppressed and alienated sector of the
population" and activating its socially constructive energies."
Also of apparent concern to the Bureau was the Panthers' demonstrated ability
to link their new recruitment base to other important sectors of the U.S. opposition."
One of the party's first major achievements in this regard came when Chairman
Bobby Seale and Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver managed to engineer the
merger of SNCC with their organization, an event signified at a mass rally in
Oakland on February 17,1968 when Stokely Carmichael was designated as honor-
ary BPP Prime Minister, H. Rap Brown as Minister of Justice and James Forman as
Minister of Foreign Affairs." As is demonstrated in the accompanying October 10,
1968 memo from Moore to Sullivan, the FBI quickly initiated a COINTELPRO effort
to "foster a split between...the two most prominent black nationalist extremist
groups" through the media.
The SNCC leadership was also targeted more heavily than ever. H. Rap Brown
was shortly eliminated by being "charged with inciting a race riot in Maryland,"
allowed to make bail only under the constitutionally dubious proviso that he not
leave the Borough of Manhattan in New York, "and was eventually sentenced to five
years in a federal penitentiary [not on the original charge, but] for carrying a rifle
across state lines while under criminal indictment."7° Stokely Carmichael's neutrali-
zation took a rather different form. Utilizing the services of Peter Cardoza, an
infiltrator who had worked his way into a position as the SNCC leader's bodyguard,
the Bureau applied a "bad jacket," deliberately creating the false appearance that
Carmichael was himself an operative.71In a memo dated July 10,1968, the SAC, New
York, proposed to Hoover that:
...consideration be given to convey the impression that CARMICHAEL is a CIA
informer. One method of accomplishing [this] would be to have a carbon copy of an
informant report supposedly written by CARMICHAEL to the CIA carefully
deposited in the automobile of a close Black Nationalist friend...It is hoped that when
the informant report is read it will help promote distrust between CARMICHAEL
and the Black Community...It is also suggested that we inform a certain percentage
of reliable criminal and racial informants that "we have it from reliable sources that
CARMICHAEL is a CIA agent. It is hoped that the informants would spread the
rumor in various large Negro communities across the land."
Pursuant to a May 19, 1969 Airtel from the SAC, San Francisco, to Hoover, the
Bureau then proceeded to "assist" the BPP in "expelling" Carmichael through the
forgery of letters on party letterhead. The gambit worked, as is evidenced in the Sep-
tember 5, 1970 assertion by BPP head Huey P. Newton: "We...charge that Stokely
Carmichael is operating as an agent of the CIA."73
Meanwhile, according to the New York SAC, his COINTELPRO technicians had
followed up, using the target's mother as a prop in their scheme:
I.9■
W, "'"." "
. -
1.1.114 -
NO ON Oa mg VP
UNITED STATES 045RNMENT

Memorandum
F fr 1
ft.A4.. s ...CA.0.3.e.
.:
r717:1 r,.,.'
0 . •
''.:1
,,,
ID : r:. !r:- C. Sulliv 2 DAlI. October 10, 1988 - --

. . ..._ .. r',.,..
FROM r. G. C. Moor40.......--
Avoilla COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

' RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(BLACK PANTHER PARTY)
PURPOSE:
To recommend attached item be given news media
source on confidential basis as counterintelligence measure
to help neutralize extremist Black Panthers and foster split
between them and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC).
BACKGROUND:
There is a feud between the two most prominent
black nationalist extremist groups, The Black Panthers and
ONCC. Attached item notes that the feud is being continued
by SNCC circulating the statement that:
"According to zoologists,the main difference hefted]
a panther and other large cats is that the panther has the i
smallest head."
This is biologically true. Publicity to this effect ':-:
might help neutralize Black Panther recruiting extorts. .. y r
ACTION: i i i trthrih,
• (er That attached item, captioned "Panther Pinheads,"_
.,,,ljaaturnished • cooperative news media source by the Crime
p '''. Records Division on a confidential basis. We will be aler #
for other ways to exploit this item. - ,r
Enclosure h,./6( if
100-448008 •
-- Br. C.D. DeLoach /lift , ion
- Mr. •.C. Sullivan 1 • . "
- -
- Br: T.E. Bishop
GC e 4 4 ?, • . - --7/.. . it "!. :
,..01
' A1. —■
. t tik $' t-' !ILjr•-•-'
-
1
111-
1
On CI W -
Memo outlining tactic to split the BPP and SNCC.
On 9/4/68, a pretext phone call was placed to the residence of STOKELY

CARMICHAEL and in absence of CARMICHAEL his mother was told that a friend
was calling who was fearful of the future safety of her son. It was explained to Mrs.
CARMICHAEL the absolute necessity for CARMICHAEL to "hide out" inasmuch
r
It is suggested that consideration begiven

to convey the impression that CARMICHAEL is a CIA
informant.
One method of accomplishing the above ynuld
be to have a carbon copy of informant report reportedly
written by CARMICHAEL to the CIA carefully deposited in
the automobile of a close Black Nationalist friend.
The report should be so placed that it will be readily
seen.
It is hoped that when the informant report
is read it will help promote distrust between CARMICHAEL
and the Black Community. It is suggested that carbon
copy of report be used to indicate that CARMICIIAEL turned
original copy into CIA and kept carbon copy for himself.
It is also suggested that we inform a certain
percentage of reliable criminal and racial infefrents
that "re heard from reliable sources that CARMIqiAEL
is a CIA agent". It is hoped that these informants
would spread the rumor in various large Negras commun-
ities across the land.
Excerpt from July10,1968 memo proposing the bad-jacketing of

SNCC/BPP leader Stokely Carmichael.
as several BPP members were out to kill him. Mrs. CARMICHAEL appeared
shocked upon hearing the news and stated she would tell STOKELY when he came
home."
Although there is no evidence whatsoever that a Panther "hit team" had been
assembled to silence the accused informer, Carmichael left the U.S. for an extended
period in Africa the following day, and the SNCC/Panther coalition was effectively
destroyed.
As all this was going on, Cleaver was developing another highly visible alliance,
this one with "white mother country radicals," which he and Seale had initiated in
December 1967." This was with the so-called Peace and Freedom Party, which
planned to place Cleaver — not only in his capacity as a leading Panther, but as the
celebrated convict-author of Soul on Ice" and parolee editor of Ramparts magazine —
on the California ballot as a presidential candidate during the 1968 election; his vice
presidential candidate was slated to be SDS co-founder Tom Hayden, while Huey
P. Newton was offered as a congressional candidate from his prison cell." The
ensuing campaign resulted in a wave of positive exposure for the BPP which the
authorities were relatively powerless to counteract. Hence, Cleaver — the powerful
writer and speaker at the center of it all — was targeted for rapid elimination.
On April 6 (1968), two days after Martin Luther King was killed, Cleaver was in the
Ramparts office in the late afternoon, dictating his article, "Requiem for Nonvi-
olence." In a matter of hours he and other Panthers would be involved in a shoot-
out with the Oakland police. Seventeen-year-old Bobby Hutton died, shot in the
back moments after he and Eldridge, arms above their heads, stumbled out of the
building where they'd taken refuge. Cleaver, who was wounded in the leg, was
taken first to Oakland's Highland Hospital; then to the Alameda County Court-
house where police made him lie on the floor while he was being booked; and finally,
that same night, to San Quentin Hospital where a guard pushed him down a flight
of stairs. He was brought to the state medical facility at Vacaville and confined in the
"hole.""
Although Cleaver was never convicted of any charge stemming from the
firelight, and it soon became apparent that Ray Brown's Oakland Panther Squad had
deliberately provoked the incident, his "parole was quickly revoked, and for two
months he sat at Vacaville. The [California] Adult Authority had exercised its
authority to suspend or revoke parole without notice or hearing, basing its actions
solely on police reports. Three parole violations were listed: possession of firearms,
associating with individuals of bad reputation, and failing to cooperate with the
parole agent."" But, when Charles Garry, Cleaver's attorney, petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus, it was granted by state Superior Court Judge Raymond J. Sherwin,
in Solano County (where Vacaville is located).
Judge Sherwin almost immediately dismissed the claim that Cleaver had
associated with persons of "bad reputation," noting that the adult authority had
been unable to even list who was supposedly at issue. The noncooperation claim was
also scuttled when Garry introduced evidence that the parole officer in question had
consistently assessed Cleaver in written reports as "reliable" and "cooperative"
since his release from prison. The state's weapons possession claim also fell apart
when the judge found that, "Cleaver's only handling of a firearm [a rifle] was in
obedience to a police command. He did not handle a hand gun at all."" The judge
concluded that:
It has to be stressed that the uncontradicted evidence presented to this Court
indicated that the petitioner had been a model parolee. The peril to his parole status
stemmed from no failure of personal rehabilitation, but from his undue eloquence
in pursuing political goals, goals which were offensive to many of his contemporar-
ies. Not only was there absence of cause for the cancellation of his parole, it was the
product of a type of pressure unbecoming, to say the least, to the law enforcement
paraphernalia of the state."
With that, Judge Sherwin ordered Cleaver's release, a ruling which was imme-
diately appealed by the adult authority to the state appellate court. The higher court,
refusing to hear any evidence in the matter, simply affirmed "the arbitrary power of
the adult authority to revoke parole."52Consequently, despite having been shown
to have engaged in no criminal activity at all, Cleaver was ordered back to San
Quentin as of November 27,1968. Under such conditions, he opted instead to go into
exile, first in Cuba, then Algeria and, eventually, France." The immediacy of his
talents, energy and stature were thus lost to the BPP — along with the life of Bobby
Hutton, one of its earliest and most dedicated members — while the stage was set for
a future COINTELPRO operation.
0 A4!etito'candulit
•
lo = SAC, Baltimore
- BLACK NAT IONALIs

• RACIAL INTELLICaNtEf4ABLtCKi'A ■
-:11-F.CR PARTY)
For-'ne-infomaiiion of -recipient offices'a serion

:
struggle is taking place between the Black Panther Party (i:lT)...

and the US organizatiOn. The struggle hns reached_such
that. it is - taking on the aura of gang warfare with attondni:
-threatsof.murder and reprisals. .' - - -
In order to fully capitalize upon BPP and US
differences as well as to exploit all avenues of creating
further 'dissension in the.- ranlzs of the BPF, recipient OffiCCs.
are instructed to submit imaginative and hard-hitting
counterintelligence measures air:ad at crippling the BPP.
. - •-
Commencing December 2, 1958, and every two-week pnr•.o,i
thereafter, each office is instructed to submit a letter under
this caption containing counterintelligence measures aimed
against the BPP. The bi-weekly letter should also contain
accomplishments obtained during the previous two-week period m7.1,.a
captioned program.
- All counterintelligence actions must be approved
lat_the_kureau prior to taking steps to implement them.
Memo initiating the lethal COINTELPRO which pitted the US organization against
the BPP. Note the similarity in method to that of Operation Hoodwink.
Anti-Panther COINTELPRO activities were directed not only at blocking or
destroying the party's coalition-building. They were, as the accompanying Novem-
ber 25, 1968 memo from Hoover to the SAC, Baltimore, bears out, also devoted to
exacerbating tensions between the BPP and organizations with which it had strong
ideological differences. In the case of the so-called United Slaves (US), a black
cultural nationalist group based primarily in southern California, this was done
despite - or because of - "The struggle...taking on the aura of gang warfare with
attendant threats of murder and reprisal." What was meant by the Bureau "fully
capitalizing" on the situation is readily attested by the accompanying November 29
memo to Hoover from the SAC, Los Angeles, proposing the sending of an anony-
mous letter - attributed to the Panthers - "revealing" a fictional BPP plot to
assassinate US head Ron Karenga. The stated objective was to provoke "an US and
BPP vendetta." A number of defamatory cartoons - attributed to both US and the
-'
,(4.Z.14.Y., L •
VegAIShe CI
; .-
fr• Yefr.
13"Vgcqle
1/14WJ-Net. rm I
Samples of the sorts of cartoons produced and distributed by the FBI

in southern California to provoke violence between US and the BPP.
BPP, with each side appearing to viciously ridicule the other - were also produced
and distributed within local black communities by the Los Angeles and San Diego
FBI offices.
M.M.POMMWO
WAYNNWWW.V
UNITED STATES GO' ENT
Memorandum
: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006) DATE: 11/29/68
ROM :SAC! LOS ANGELES (157-1751) (11
upjEcr: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

RACIAL INTELLIGENCE /A`Pki.
Re Los Angeles lettorto Bureau dated 9/25/69.
I. OPERATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION
The Los Angeles Office is currently preparing en
anonymous letter for Bureau approval which will be sent to
the Los Angeles Black Panther Party (BPP) supposedly from
a member of the "US" organization in which it will be stated
that the youth group of the "US" organization is aware of the../
BPP "contract" to kill RON KARENGA, leader of "US", and they,
"US" members, in retaliation, have made plane to ambush
leaders of the BPP in Los Angeles.
It is honed this counterintelligence measure will
result in antS" and BPP vendetta.
Investigation has indicated that the Peace and
Freedom Party (PFP) hac been furnishing the BP? with
financial assistance. An anonymous letter is being prepared.
for Bureau approval to be sent to a leader of PFP in which
it is set forth that the BPP has made statements in closed •
meetings that when the armed rebellion comes the whites in
the PFP will be lined up against the wall with the rest of the
whites. •
It is felt that this type of a letter could cause
considerable disruption of the association between the BPP
and the PFP.
In order to cause disruption between the BPP of
Oakland, California, and the pp? of Los Angeles, an '
envelope is being prepared flr.Bureau approval which appears
ao
41
!
_, Bureau (RN)
- Los Angeles
LVIS/d11
(3j
1t' ‘,t)
Portion of memo highlighting continuing efforts to foster violence between US

and the BPP. Note simultaneous operations being conducted to split the BPP from
its support base in the Peace and Freedom Party as well as to foment discord
among the Panthers themselves.
RSSULTS
The DPP Drenbfast Pregram appears to be floundering

'in ban Diego chic to lack of public support and unfavorable
puhlicity ,,enaccrning it. It is noted that it has presently
been tcpbrarily suspended. Therefore, it fi , felt that:
placing the above mentioned anonymous call to theDishop AL_
this particular time mi!tht be a significant. fac.torTiW'•
precluding the resumption of thu program. The information
to the.Dishop aupeored to be favorably reepised and he seemed
to be quite concerned over the fact that cnc of his; Priests
was tieeply involved in utilization of churen facilities for
this purpose. ThiS matter, of cournb, will be closely
followed for further anticipated developments concerning the
Breakfast Program. -
Shootin s 1 11
continues to orevall in the -1spito nr.•:t of .:017111g 1 ni ,Tn
Althow:h no specific counterintellir.ence action can he
credited with contributing to this over-;111 situation, it
leit that a suOulantial amount of the thIrcst is directly
attributable to this program,
TM.
In view of the recent killing of BPP mgmbcr SYLVESTER
BELL a new cartoon is being considered in the hopes that
it—Wiil assist , in the continuance of the rift between BPP
and.U.S, This cartoon, or seri,2r. of cartoons, he similar
in raturc to those formerly apdroved by 'ti sac will
he for.,:arded to the But.cau for 'cvalua'cion approval
; immediately upon their completion.
Excerpt from an August 20,1969 report summarizing the "accomplishments"

and plans for the BPP/US COINTELPRO in San Diego.
On January 17, 1969, these tactics bore their malignant fruit when Los Angeles
BPP leaders AlprenticeBunchy" Carter and Jon Huggins were shot to death by US
members George and Joseph Stiner, and Claude Hubert, in a classroom at UCLA's
Campbell Hall. Apparently at the FBI's behest, the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) followed up by conducting a massive raid - 75 to 100 SWAT equipped police
participated - on the home of Jon Huggins' widow, Ericka, on the evening of his
death, an action guaranteed to drastically raise the level of rage and frustration felt
by the Panthers assembled there. The police contended that the rousting of Ericka
Huggins and other surviving LA-BPP leaders was intended to "avert further
violence," a rationale which hardly explains why during the raid a cop placed a
loaded gun to the head of the Huggins' six-month-old baby, Mai, laughed and said
"You're next."" In the aftermath, southern California COINTELPRO specialists
assigned themselves "a good measure of credit" for these "accomplishments," and
proposed distribution of a new series of cartoons - including the accompanying
examples -to "indicate to the BPP that the US organization feels they are ineffectual,
inadequate, and riddled with graft and corruption."g5
The idea was approved and, as is shown in the accompanying excerpts from an
August 20, 1969 report by the San Diego SAC to Hoover, obtained similar results.
ROUr111_13:1 ■ ' .ZridOPE
SAC, Newark (100-49654) 10/2/69

7 E-103
X
REciA1,!Director, FBI (100-448006) 412(r
I - 777 • - 77.1
-±":
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE CROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (NPP)
ReNKlet 9/18/69.
Authority is granted Newark to mail the cartoon
submitted in referenced letter. The cartoon, which was
drawn by the Newark Office, is satisfactory and needs no
duplication. In reproducing this cartoon, Newark'should
insure that the -paper and envelopes used do not contain
any traceable markings. When mailing this cartoon, care
should be taken so that the Bureau is not disclosed as the
source and strict security is maintained. Newark should
advise of any results received from this mailing.
The BPP/US COINTELPRO continued in the east.

Among the "tangible results" which the SAC found to be "directly attributable to
this program" were "shootings, beatings, and a high degree of unrest...in the ghetto
area." At another point, he noted that one of the shootings had resulted in the death
of Panther Sylvester Bell at the hands of US gunmen on August 14 (another San
Diego Panther, John Savage, had also been murdered by US on May 23), and
announced that, apparently on the basis of such a resounding success, "a new
cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will assist in the continuance of the
rift between the BPP and US."
The Newark field office also joined in the act, as is attested by the accompanying
October 2, 1%9 memo from the SAC in that city to Hoover, and the cartoon which
corresponds to it. Newark credited the COINTELPRO with three other Panther
murders as of September 30,1969, when it sent an anonymous letter to the local BPP
chapter warning them to "watch out: Karenga's coming," and listing a national "box
score" of "US - 6, Panthers - 0."" While this seems to have been the extent of the
fatalities induced through the COINTELPRO operation - a bodycount which in
itself would not have proven crippling to either side of the dispute - such FBI
activities did, as cultural nationalist leader Amiri Baraka (s/n: LeRoi Jones) has
pointed out, help solidify deep divisions within the radical black community as a
whole which took years to overcome, and which effectively precluded the possibil-
ity of unified political action within the black liberation movements'
As has been noted elsewhere, one "of the FBI's favorite tactics was to accuse the
Panthers and other black nationalists of anti-Semitism, a tactic designed to destroy
the movement's image 'among liberal and naive elements.' Bureau interest in anti-
Semitism grew during the summer of 1967 at the National Convention for a New
Politics, when SNCC's James Forman and Rap Brown led a floor fight for a
resolution condemning Zionist expansion. The convention's black caucus intro-
duced the resolution, and SNCC emerged as the first black group to take a public
stand against Israel in the Mid-East conflict."" In New York, as is revealed in the
accompanying September 10,1969 memo, this assumed the form of sending anony-
mous letters to Rabbi Meir Kahane of the neo-fascistic Jewish Defense League in
hopes that the "embellishment" of "factual information" within the missives might
provoke Kahane's thugs "to act" against the BPP.
Comparable methods were used in Chicago, where BPP leader Fred Hampton
was showing considerable promise in negotiating a working alliance with a huge
black street gang known as the Blackstone Rangers (or Black P. Stone Nation). As is
demonstrated in the accompanying January 30, 1969 letter from Hoover to Marlin
Johnson, the Chicago SAC (see page 138), this "threat" prompted the local COIN-
TELPRO section to propose-and Hoover to approve-the sending of an anonymous
letter to Ranger head Jeff Fort, falsely warning that Hampton had "a hit [murder
contract] out on" him as part of a Panther plot to take over his gang. What the Bureau
expected to result from the sending of this missive had already been outlined by
Johnson in a memo to Hoover on January 10:
It is believed that the [letter] may intensify the degree of animosity between the two
111140' .14 ONT011

A • . 7 worn. Nam) on.. •
UNITED STATES. ANMENT
Memorandum.
TO DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006) DAM: ' 9/10/69
SAC, NEW YORK (100-161140) (P)
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP)
Re NY report of , captioned
"JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE, RACIAL MATTERS , NY file 157-3463;
Bu letter to NY, 7/25/69.
Referenced report has been reviewed by the NYO
in an effort to target one individual within the Jewish
Defense League (JEDEL) who would be the suitable recipient
of information furnished on an anonymous basis that the
Bureau wishes to disseminate and/or use for future counter-
intelligence purposes.'
r,
... ' NY is of the opinion that the individual within

J•. JEDEL who would most suitably serve the above stated purpose
would be Rabbi MEIR KAHANE, a Director of JEDEL. It is
• , noted that Rabbi KAHANE's background as a writer for the
q) NY newspaper "Jewish Press" would enable him to give wide-
)
V, r ci spread coverage of anti-Semetic statements made by the BPP

, . - 0 and other Black Nationalist hate groups not only to members
');.. of JEDEL but to other individuals who would take cognizance
of such statements.
In order to prepare a suggested initial communi-
.3cation from the anonymous source to Rabbi KAHANE which would
'establish rapport between the two, it is felt that this contact
." should not be limited to the furnishing of factual information
of interest to the aims of JEDEL because the NYO does not
feel that JEDEL could be motivated to act as called for in
referenced Bureau letter if the information gathered by the
NYO concerning anti-semitism and other matters were furnished
to that organization without some embellishment.
Memo proposing anonymous letter to provoke conflict between the Jewish Defense
League and the BPP. Text of letter appears on the next page.
groups and occasion Forte [sic] to take retaliatory action which could disrupt the
BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership...Consideration has been given to a
similar letter to the BPP alleging a Ranger plot against the BPP leadership; however,
it is not felt that this would beproductive principallybecause the BPP...is not believed
to be as violence prone as the Rangers, to whom violent type activity — shooting and the
like — is second nature [emphasis added].
The FBI's concern in the matter was not, as Hoover makes abundantly clear in
his letter, that someone might be killed as a consequence of such "disruptive
For example it is felt that JEDEL is aware

of the majority of information concerning the factual
views of the BPP and other Black Nationalist groups through
public sources of information such as the BPP newspaper,
"The Black Panther", and to furnish such information from
an"anonymous source" would either be dismissed by JEDEL as
trivial or attributed to some other party who may have an
interest in causing JEDEL to act against such groups as
the BPP.
In view of the above comments the following is
submitted as the suggested communication to be used to
establish rapport between the anonymous source and the
selected individual associated with JEDEL:
"Dear Rabbi Kahape:
I am a Negro man who is 48 years old and served
his country in the U.S. Army in WW2 and worked as a truck
driver with "the famous red-ball express" in Gen. Eisenhour's
Army in France and Natzi Germany. One day I had a crash
with the truck I was driving, a 2i ton truck, and was injured
real bad. I was treated and helped by a Jewish Army Dr.
named "Rothstein" who helped me get better again.
Also I was encouraged to remain in high school
for two years by my favorite teacher, Mr. Katz. I•have
always thought Jewish people are good and they have helped
me all my life. That is why I become so upset about my
oldest son who is a Black Panther and very much against
Jewish people. My oldest son just returned from Algers in
Africa where he met a bunch of other Black Panthers from
all over the world. He said to me that they all agree that
the Jewish people are against all the colored people and
that the only friends the colored people have are the Arabs.
I told my child that the Jewish people are the
friends of the colored people but he calls me a Tom and
says never be anything better than a Jew boy's slave
Last night my boy had a meeting at my house
with six of his Black Panther friends. From the way
they talked it sounded like they had a plan to force
Jewish store owners to give them money or they would
drop a bomb on the Jewish store. Some of the money
they get will be sent to the Arabs in Africa.
They left books and pictures around with Arab
writing on them and pictures of Jewish soldiers killing
Arab babys. I think they are going to give these away
at Negro Christian Churchs.
I though you might be able to stop this. I
think I can get some of the pictures and books without
getting myself In trouble. I will send them to. you If
you are interested.
I would like not to use my real name at this
time.
A friend"
It is further suggested that a second communication
be sent to Rabbi KAHANE approximately one week after the
above described letter which will follow the same foremat,
but will contain as enclosures some BPP artifacts such as
pictures of BOBBY SEALE, ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, a copy of a BPP
'newspaper, etc. It is felt that a progression of letters
should then follow which would further establish rapport
with the JEDEL and eventually culminate in the anonymous
letter writer requesting some response from the JEDEL
recipient of these letters.
I SA C,. Chicago (157.2209)
Director, FBI (IAA-44E006) -) 77

ner I"
1/30/69
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE P ROCHA!
BLACK NATIONAL/ST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
BLACK PANTHER PANT
Reurlet 1/13/69.
Authority is granted to mail anonymous letter

to Jeff Fort, as suggested in relet, in care of the
First Presbyterian Church, 6401 South Kimbark, Chicago,
Illinois.
Utilize a commercially purchased envelope for

this letter and insure that the mailing is not traced
to the source.
Advise the Bureau of any results obtained by

the above mailing.
WDU:mms
NOTE:
Jeff Fort is the leader of the Blackstone

Rangers, a black extremist organization. Chicago
advises that so long as Fort continues as the leader
of the Rangers, .working arrangement between the BPP
and the Rangers may be effected on Ranger terms.
Chicago has iecommended the anonymous mailing of the
following letter;in anticipation that its receipt by'11
Fort will intensify the degree of animosity existing
etween these two black extremist organizations: ',
I'
)Brother Jeff: k vi.,,, .41.e 44,
- 1 ,1iv,11
. . .
"I've spent some time with some Panther friends

on the vest side lately and I know what's been going on.
The brothe sfthat run the Panthers blame you for blocking
their thing and there's supposed to be a hit out for--
you. I'm not a Panther, or a Ranger, just block. From
what I see these Panthers are out for themselves not
black people. I thin!: you ought to know what their up
to, I know whet I'd do if I was you. You might herr from
me again."
"A black brother you &Wit
Letter authorizing sending of bogus letter to Chicago gang leader Jeff Fort in
hopes that it will provoke violent retaliation against city BPP head Fred Hampton.
activities," but that a properly nondescript envelope be employed in the mailing of

the bogus letter in order that "any tangible results obtained" could not be "traced
back to" the Bureau." Similar tactics were employed to block or "destabilize"
Floor plan of Hampton's apartment provided by FBI infiltrator William O'Neal in

order to pinpoint targets during the Panther leader's assassination.
emerging alliances between the Chicago BPP and another black gang, the Mau Maus
(unrelated to Kenyatta's Harlem-based organization), as well as the already politicized
Puertorriqu di° Young Lords, a white street gang called the Young Patriots, and even
SDS, the white radical organization." The letter-writing COINTELPRO had a sig-
nificant impact in preventing Hampton from consolidating the city-wide "Rainbow
Coalition" he was attempting to establish at the time, but it failed to bring about his
physical liquidation.
Hence, in mid-November 1969, COINTELPRO specialist Roy Mitchell met with
William O'Neal, a possibly psychopathic infiltrator /provocateur who had managed
to become Hampton's personal bodyguard and chief of local BPP security, at the
Golden Torch Restaurant in downtown Chicago. The agent secured from O'Neal the
accompanying detailed floorplan of Hampton's apartment, including the disposi-
tion of furniture, and denotation of exactly where the BPP leader might be expected
to be sleeping on any given night. Mitchell then took the floorplan to Richard
Jalovec, overseer of a special police unit assigned to State's Attorney Edward V.
Hanrahan; together, Mitchell and Jalovec met with police sergeant Daniel Groth,
operational commander of the unit, and planned an "arms raid" on the Hampton
residence."
On the evening of December 3, 1969, shortly before the planned raid, infiltrator
O'Neal seems to have slipped Hampton a substantial dose of secobarbital in a glass
of kool-aid. The BPP leader was thus comatose in his bed when the fourteen-man
police team - armed with a submachinegun and other special hardware - slammed
into his home at about 4 a.m. on the morning of December 4.92He was nonetheless
shot three times, once more-or-less slightly in the chest, and then twice more in the
head at point-blank range." Also killed was Mark Clark, head of the Peoria, Illinois,
BPP chapter. Wounded were Panthers Ronald "Doc" Satchell, Blair Anderson and
Verlina Brewer. Panthers Deborah Johnson (Hampton's fiancée, eight months preg-
nant with their child), Brenda Harris, Louis Truelock and Harold Bell were unin-
jured during the shooting." Despite the fact that no Panther had fired a shot (with
the possible exception of Clark, who may have squeezed off a single round during
his death convulsions) while the police had pumped at least 98 rounds into the
apartment, the BPP survivors were all beaten while handcuffed, charged with
"aggressive assault" and "attempted murder" of the raiders, and held on $100,000
bond apiece."
A week later, on December 11, Chicago COINTELPRO section head Robert
Piper took a major share of the "credit" for this "success" in the accompanying
memo, informing headquarters that the raid could not have occurred without
intelligence information, "not available from any other source," provided by O'Neal
via Mitchell and himself. He specifically noted that "the chairman of the Illinois BPP,
Fred Hampton," was killed in the raid and that this was due, in large part, to the
"tremendous value" of O'Neal's work inside the party. He then requested payment
of a $300 cash "bonus" to the infiltrator for services rendered, a matter quickly
approved at FBI headquarters."
The Hampton-Clark assassinations were unique in that the cover stories of
involved police and local officials quickly unraveled. Notwithstanding the FBI's
best efforts to help "keep the lid on," there was a point when the sheer blatancy of
the lies used to "explain" what had happened, the obvious falsification of ballistics
and other evidence, and so on, led to the indictment of State's Attorney Hanrahan,
Jalovec, and a dozen Chicago police personnel for conspiring to obstruct justice. This
was dropped by Chicago Judge Phillip Romitti on November 1, 1972 as part of a quid
pro quo arrangement in which remaining charges were dropped against the Panther
survivors. The latter then joined the mothers of the deceased in a $47 million civil
rights suit against not only the former state defendants, but a number of Chicago
police investigators who had "cleared" the raiders of wrongdoing, and the FBI as
wel1.97
The Bureau had long-since brought in ace COINTELPRO manager Richard G.
Held, who replaced Marlin Johnson as Chicago SAC, in order to handle the
administrative aspects of what was to be a monumental attempted cover-up. But
even his undeniable skills in this regard were insufficient to gloss over the more than
100,000 pages of relevant Bureau documents concerning Hampton and the Chicago
BPP he claimed under oath did not exist. Finally, after years of resolute perjury and
12/11/69
A IME!.
TO: DIRECTOR, FBIWirgraggia

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO 4=t:7444.0
4 ,,
SUBJECT: IIMEMISfignall
%!,(
Re•Oureau airte1.12/8/69 and Chicago letter 11/24/69.

Information sot forth in Chicago letter and letterhead
memorandum of 11/24/69, reflects legally purchased firearms
in the possession of the Black Panther Party (BPP) were stored
at 2337 West ::enrce Street, Chicago. A detailed inventory of
the weapons and also a detailed floor plan of the apartment
were furnished to local authorities. In addition, the identities
of BPP members utilizing the apartment at the above address
more furnished. ;,This inforation was not available from any
other source and subsequently proved to be of truendous value
in that it subsequently saved in,Ury and possible: death to
police officers participating in a raid at the address on the
morning of 12/4/69. The raid vas based on the information
furnished by informant.-Durio the resistance by the DPP
members ;It the time of the raid, the Chairman of the Illinois '
Chapter, DPP, FRED P.A1IPTO:t, was killed and a DPP leader from
Peoria, Illinois, was also killed. A quantity of weapons
and ammunitioa:were recovered.
It is felt that this information is of considerable
value in consideration of a special payment for informant
requested in re Chicago letter.
iltpplifmNUflala
1, Chicage
-
Airtel recommending cash bonus be paid infiltrator O'Neal for services rendered
in the Hampton-Clark assassinations. The money was quickly approved.
stonewalling by the FBI and Chicago police, as well as directed acquittals of the gov-
ernment defendants by U.S. District Judge J. Sam Perry (which had to be appealed
and reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court), People's Law Office attorneys Flint
Taylor, Jeff Haas and Dennis Cunningham finally scored. In November 1982,
District Judge John F. Grady determined that there was sufficient evidence of a
conspiracy to deprive the Panthers of their civil rights to award the plaintiffs $1.85
million in damages."
The Hampton-Clark assassinations were hardly an isolated phenomenon. Four
days after the lethal raid in Chicago, a similar scenario was acted out in Los Angeles.
In this instance, the FBI utilized an infiltrator named Melvin "Cotton" Smith who,
like O'Neal, had become the chief of local BPP security. Like O'Neal, Smith provided
the Bureau with a detailed floorplan - albeit, in the form of a cardboard mock-up
rather than a mere diagram - of the BPP facility to be assaulted. Forty men from the
LAPD SWAT squad were employed, along with more than 100 regular police as
"backup" in the 5:30 a.m. attack on December 8, 1969. This time, however, the
primary target, LA Panther leader Elmer "Geronimo" Pratt, was not in his assigned
spot. Unbeknownst to the police, he had decided to sleep on the floor alongside his
bed on the night of the raid; consequently, the opening burst of gunfire which was
apparently supposed to kill him missed entirely." Another major difference be-
tween the events in Chicago and those in LA was that, in the latter, a sufficient
number of Panthers were awake when the shooting started to mount an effective
resistance:10°
The Panthers chose to defend themselves, and for four hours they fought off the
police, refusing to surrender until press and public were on the scene. Six were
wounded. Thirteen were arrested. Miraculously, none of them were killed 1°1
As in Chicago, the raiders were headed, not by a SWAT or regular police

commander, but by a coordinator of the local police Red Squad. The Los Angeles
raid was led by Detective Ray Callahan, a ranking member of the LAPD Criminal
Conspiracy Section (CCS), a Panther-focused "subversives unit" tightly interlocked
with the local FBI COINTELPRO section, headed by Richard Wallace Held, son of
Chicago SAC Richard G. Held.'" Also as in Chicago, the Panthers were immediately
charged with "assaulting the police," an accusation which received considerable
media play until it was quietly dropped when the matter was finally decided by a
jury and the defendants acquitted on December 23, 1971.103 Pratt, meantime, spent
a solid two months in the LA County Jail in the wake of the firefight, until his
$125,000 bond money could be raised.'"
As the U.S. Attorney in San Francisco put it at the time, pointing to a special
"Panther unit" created by the Justice Department specifically to assist federal/local
"cooperation" in "containing" the black liberation movement, "Whatever they say
they're doing, they're out to get the Panthers."'" Hence, although many anti-
Panther actions around the country appeared to be purely local police initiatives,
most were actually coordinated by the FBI's COINTELPRO operatives in each
locality. By 1969, a uniform drumbeat of anti-BPP repression was readily apparent
across the nation:
From April to December, 1969, police raided Panther headquarters in San Francisco,
Chicago, Salt Lake City, Indianapolis, Denver, San Diego, Sacramento and Los
Angeles, including four separate raids in Chicago, two in San Diego and two in Los
Angeles. Frequently Panthers were arrested during these raids on charges such as
illegal use of sound equipment, harboring fugitives, possessing stolen goods and
flight to avoid prosecution, and later released. In September, 1969, alone, police
across the nation arrested Panthers in forty-six separate incidents [at least 348 were
arrested during the whole year] ...Police raids frequently involved severe damage to
Panther headquarters. Thus during a raid in Sacramento in June, 1969, in search of
an alleged sniper who was never found, police sprayed the building with teargas,
shot up the walls, broke typewriters and destroyed bulk food the Panthers were dis-
tributing free to ghetto children. Sacramento Mayor Richard Marriot said he was
"shocked and horrified" by the "shambles" he reported police had left behind.
During raids on Panther headquarters in Philadelphia in September, 1970, police
ransacked the office, ripped out plumbing and chopped up and carted away
furniture. Six Panthers were led into the street, placed against a wall and stripped
as Police Chief [later mayor] Frank Rizzo boasted to newsmen, "Imagine the big
Black Panthers with their pants down 7106
Even in the "out back" of Nebraska, the story was the same:
In August 1971, FBI agents and local police arrested two Black Panthers in
Omaha...David Rice and Ed Poindexter, on charges of killing a local policeman. In
subsequent investigations by Amnesty International and other human rights
agencies, it was revealed that the FBI had collected over 2000 pages of information
on the Omaha chapter of the Black Panthers, and that the actual murderer of the
police officer was a former drug addict who was soon released by authorities, and
who subsequently "disappeared." Both Rice and Poindexter were convicted,
however, and still remain in federal penitentiaries."'
The pressure placed upon the party through such "extralegal legality" was
enormous. As Panther attorney Charles Garry observed in 1970,
In a period of two years — December, 1967 to December, 1969 — the Black Panther
Party has expended in bail-bond premiums alone— just the premiums, that is, money
that will never be returned — a sum in excess of $200,000! How many breakfasts or
lunches for hungry children, how much medical attention sorely needed in the
ghetto communities would that $200,000 have furnished?...In the same two-year
period, twenty-eight Panthers were killed...Let me cite some additional statistics,
though for a complete record, I would recommend you consult the special issue of
The Black Panther (February 21,1970) entitled, "Evidence and Intimidation of Fascist
Crimes by U.S.A." Between May 2, 1967 and December 25, 1969 charges were
dropped against at least 87 Panthers arrested for a wide variety of so-called
violations of the law. Yet these men and women were kept in prison for days, weeks
and months even though there was absolutely no evidence against them, and they
were finally released. At least a dozen cases involving Panthers have been dismissed
in court. In these cases, the purpose has clearly been to intimidate, to frighten, to
remove from operation and activities the Panthers, and to hope the [resultant public]
hysteria against the Black Panther Party would produce convictions and imprison-
ments."°
By 1970, what was occurring was evident enough that Mayor Wes Uhlman of
Seattle, when his police were approached by agents in the local FBI office about
rousting the city's BPP chapter, publicly announced that, "We are not going to have
any 1932 Gestapo-type raids against anyone."109Even SAC Charles Bates in San
Francisco had attempted to protest at least the extent of what the Bureau was doing
Alrtel
To:
From:. Director, FBI (100-448006)

. -
i7
COUNTERDUELLICENCE PROGRAM
PERSONAL ATTENTION
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) ,
BUD}: 6/9/69
ReSFairtel 5/14/69.
A review has been made of referenced airtel which

contains your thoughts on the Counterintelligence Program (CIP).r•
Your reasoning is not in line with Bureau objectives as to our 4
responsibilities under the CIP.
You state that while the Department of Justice con-

eiders the BPP as a violence-prone organization seeking to
overthrow the Government by revolutionary means, "There seems
to be little likelihood of this." All information developed'
to date leads to the obvious conclusion that this group is =
dedicated to the principle of violent overthtnse-WAvill go
to any length to further this aim._
You point out that the activities of the BPP have

reached the black and white communities as evidenced by their
weekly newspaper which has reached a circulation of 45,000.
You have previously been instructed to review your files --
concerning this newspaper to determine whether we could disrupt
the mailings of the publication. Your answer stated that you
were not in a position to do this. You must immediately take -
positive steps to insure that we will be in a position to - _•-
accomplish CIP objectives including the disruption of the mailing
of their publications. You must develop adequate informant
coverage to insure that we are in a position to accomplish all
of our objectives, which include steps to counteract the impact
this group has made. 1
You state that local and national newspapers continue

-to pliblicize information concerning the BPP. This fact automatical
lends itself toward mass media disseminations to capitalize on this
eagerness and to isolate the organization from the majority of
Americans, both black and white. The dissemination of mass media
information to selected and trusted newspapermen, pointing out the
violent and dangerous nature of a group, has contributed - - 7' --
measurably to the decline of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States,
Newspapers will print derogatory information much easier than
they will print commendatory information, especially if the
organization is by its nature violence-prone. For your informatics:
the San Diego Office has waged an effective CIP against the BPI'
which has measurably resulted in declining activities and-
considerable disruption.
L.
It is noted that BPP leader Bobby Seale speaks is -

schools and universities and receives fees of up to $1,000.
This raises counterintelligence opportunities, among which .
are anonymous disseminations of derogatory information to
universities and misuse of funds received.
As it concerns the BPP, you point out that results
achieved by utilizing counterintelligence ideas such as
publicizing the evils of violence, the lack of morals, the •
widespread use of narcotics and anonymous mailings, have not
been outstanding. This is because atypical black supporter -
of the BPP is not disturbed by allegations which would upset
a white community. You must recognize that one of our primary *,
aims in counterintelligence as it concerns the BPP is to keep
this group isolated from the moderate black and white community
which may support it. This is most emphatically pointed out -
in their Breakfast for Children Program, where they are actively
soliciting and receiving support Boa uninformed whites and
moderate blacks. In addition, we have received information --
from San Francisco and other offices indicating that BPP _
officials are extremely suspidous of each other as to monies
received. This also is a fertile ground for CIP and should be
explored.
BeSFairtel states that nation-vide mailings to BPP
chapter offices would automatically indicate that the FBI was :
the source. Failings originating from Oakland, California,
would logically be attributed to someone either at national
headquarters of the BPP or a dissident who has recently resigned
and bad access to the records. . _ -
- -
You state that the Bureau under the CIP should not
attack programs of community interest such as the BPP 'Breakfast
for Children." You state that this is because many prominent
"humanitarians," both white and black, are interested in the ._ id
program as well as churches which are actively supporting it.,
You obviously missed the point. The BIT is not engageei
in the "Breakfast for Children" program for humanitarian
reasons. This program was formed by the BPP for obvious
reasons, including their efforts to create an-image_of
assume community control of Negroes, and to fill adolescent
children with their insidious poison. An example of this is '7V77:-
set forth in the May 11, 1969, issue of "The Black Panther.°
Page seven contains an article captioned "Black Panther - -
Revolutionary Wedding." The article points out that two members
of the Panthers were married at a church in Oakland, California,
whiCh is participating in the Breakfast Program. The crowd
consisted mostly of Panther members and children from the
Breakfast Program. Instead of a Bible, Bobby Seale used tha'=
"Red Book Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung" to perform
the marriage. After the ceremony, the children sang "We Want
a Pork Chop Off the Pig." _ _
The CIP in the San Francisco Office must be - - --
evaluated. During the reevaluation, give thorough consideration
to the adequacy of the personnel assigned. Insure that you are
utilizing the best personnel available in this program. Advise 7--
the Bureau of the results of your reevaluation by June 9, 1969.
Airtel from J. Edgar Hoover reprimanding the San Francisco office for its lack of
vigor in pursuing COINTELPRO operations against the BPP.
to the Panthers. For his trouble, Bates received the accompanying May 27, 1969
Airtel from Hoover informing him that he had "obviously missed the point" and
that his outlook was "not in line with Bureau objectives." The director also used the
opportunity to order Bates to target the BPP Breakfast for Children Program in the
Bay Area. Hoover then unleashed William Sullivan to pull Bates' office back in line:
Sullivan gave Bates two weeks to assign his best agents to the COINTELPRO desks
and get on with the task at hand: "Eradicate [the Panthers'] 'serve the people'
programs...So [Charles] Gain, [William] Cohendet, and the other four agents
assigned to the BPP squad supervised the taps and bugs on Panther homes and
offices; mailed a William F. Buckley, Jr., column on the Panthers to prominent
citizens in the Bay area; tipped off San Francisco Examiner reporter Ed Montgomery
to Huey Newton's posh Oakland apartment overlooking Lake Merritt; disrupted
the breakfast-for-children program "in the notorious Haight-Ashbury District" and
elsewhere by spreading a rumor "that various personnel in [Panther] national
headquarters are infected with venereal disease;" tried to break up Panther mar-
riages with letters to wives about affairs with teenage girls; and assisted with a plan
to harass the Panthers' attorney, Charles Garry...They carried out dozens of other
counterintelligence operations as well
As should be obvious from the Rice, Poindexter and other cases already
mentioned, spurious criminal prosecution was a favorite tactic used in neutralizing
the BPP leadership. For instance, in 1969 Black Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was
charged along with seven other Chicago conspiracy defendants, "although he had
only the most tangential connection with the demonstrations during the Democratic
Convention in Chicago during August of 1968 [which precipitated a major police
riot in full view of national television, and for which the conspiracy charges were
ostensibly brought], having been flown in at the last moment as a substitute speaker,
given two speeches and left."'" Predictably, the charges came to nothing, but not
before Seale was denied the right to represent himself at trial, and the country was
treated to the spectacle of a major Panther leader bound to his chair and gagged in
open court.'u
Meanwhile, on August 21,1969 -before the Chicago trial even began-Seale was
arrested in California in connection with the alleged New Haven, Connecticut
torture-slaying of Alex Rackley, a Panther recruit from New York. Eleven other
Panthers (mostly members of the New Haven BPP chapter) were indicted as well.'"
The main witness against Seale and the others turned out to be one of the defendants,
George Sams, a police infiltrator and former psychiatric patient who had worked his
way into a position in the Panther security apparatus before being expelled from the
party by Seale.11' As it turned out, Sams had accused Rackley of being an informer
and had himself carried the bad-jacketing effort through a week-long interrogation
during which the young recruit was chained to a bed and scalded with boiling water.
Sams had then killed him, dumping the body in a swampy area where it was soon
discovered by fishermen.'"
In the aftermath, one New Haven Panther, Warren Kimbro, pled guilty to
second degree murder, not for having killed Rackley, but for not having prevented
his death; he was sentenced to life in prison."' A second, Lonnie McLucas, was tried
alone, convicted of conspiracy to murder and sentenced to 15 years." Sams, the
actual killer, was also eventually given a life sentence, despite his various police
connections."'
Although it was plain that the culprits in this ugly matter had been dealt with
— even New Haven Police Chief James F. Ahern stated publidy that there was no
evidence that Bobby Seale had been involved in Rackley's death" — the state
proceeded to bring Seale, along with Ericka Huggins (widow of assassinated LA
Panther leader Jon), another "notable," to trial. Apparently, the hope was that the
earlier confession and convictions would have tempered public sentiment against
the BPP to such an extent that these defendants would be found guilty on the basis
of party membership alone. In this the government was disappointed when the
"jury in the trial was ready to acquit Seale but...two jurors refused to vote for
acquittal unless [Ericka Huggins] was convicted. [Judge Harold M. Mulveny then]
ordered both cases dismissed [on May 24, 1971] when the jury reported it was
hopelessly deadlocked."u° State apologists promptly claimed "justice" had been
served, but by then Seale had served more than two years in maximum security
lockup without bail, much of it in solitary confinement, without ever having been
convicted of anything at all, and was never really able to resume his former
galvanizing role in the party.121
While this was going on, in "August, 1969, three Black Panthers were arrested
while riding in a car with a New York City undercover agent, Wilbert Thomas, and
charged with a variety of offenses including conspiracy to rob a hotel, attempted
murder of a policeman and illegal possession of weapons. During the trial, it
developed that Thomas had supplied the car, had drawn a map of the hotel —the only
tangible evidence tying the Panthers to the robbery scheme — and had offered to
supply the guns. The Panthers were eventually convicted only of a technical
weapons charge, based on the fact that a shotgun, which the Panthers said had been
planted by Thomas, was found in the car."122
Moving ahead, the "FBI pressured the Justice Department to get on with the
conspiracy prosecutions," either in federal court or by assisting local prosecutors."
One result was that: "In May, 1971, the so-called Panther Twenty-One' were
acquitted in New York City of charges of having conspired to bomb department
stores, blow up police stations and murder policemen; a number of the defendants
had been held in jail for over two years under $100,000 bails."124 This was the 10%
cash requirement associated with total bonds of $1,000,000 per defendant, making
their aggregate bond a staggering $21,000,000! They had been indicted on April 2,
1969, largely on the basis of accusations tendered by three police infiltrators, Eugene
Roberts, Carlos Ashwood (aka: Carl Wood) and Ralph White (aka: Sudan Yedaw).
Their testimony literally fell apart in court.'" The jury deliberated "less than an
hour" in acquitting the defendants of all 156 charges levied against them by New
York County District Attorney Frank Hogan and Assistant District Attorney Joseph
A. Phillips on the basis of "evidence" provided by "New York police officers and
FBI agents."126But, as had been the case with Seale, the Panther 21 had been held
under maximum security conditions - many in solitary confinement - for months
on end, even though they were ultimately shown to have been innocent of the
accusations leveled against them.1" The New York BPP chapter virtually disinte-
grated during the extended mass incarceration of its entire leadership.
By the beginning of 1970, "the Black Panther Party had been severely damaged
by arrests, trials, shootouts and police and FBI harassment which had jailed, killed
or exiled most of the top leadership of the party. Nevertheless, in March 1970, the FBI
initiated what the Senate Intelligence Committee has labelled a 'concerted program'
to drive a permanent wedge between two factions in the party, one supporting
Eldridge Cleaver [exiled in Algeria]...and the other supporting [Huey P.] Newton,
then still in jail."1" As can be seen in the accompanying May 14, 1970 memo from
George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, this was approached in a quite deliberate
fashion through the use of forged and/or anonymous letters and the like. And, as
is brought out clearly in the accompanying September 16,1970 Airtel (see page 150)
from the director to three SACs, the Bureau considered it "immaterial whether facts
exist to substantiate" the sorts of charges it was introducing into the BPP commu-
nications network.
The sorts of repression which had already been visited upon the BPP had
inevitably engendered among party members a strong sense of being in a battle for
sheer physical survival, a matter lending potentially lethal implications to FBI-
fostered rumors that given individuals or groups of Panthers were, say, police
agents. That Hoover and his men were well aware these sorts of tactics could have
fatal results for at least some of those targeted is readily discernable on the second
page of the September 16 Airtel. As may be seen rather plainly, Hoover disapproved
the sending of a particular anonymous letter only because, if it were traced back to
its source, its wording might "place the Bureau in the position of aiding and abetting
in a murder by the BPP." His instructions were simply to reword the letter in such
a way as to accomplish the same result while leaving the FBI a window of "plausible
deniability" in the event a homicide did in fact result. While there is no evidence that
David Hilliard ever actually responded to COINTELPRO manipulation by attempt-
ing to have Newton killed, murders did result:
[In New York] Robert Weaver, a Cleaverite, was shot dead on a Harlem street corner
in early March [1971]. A month later persons unknown entered the Queens County
office of the Black Panther Party, a Newtonite enclave, bound up Samuel Napier,
circulation manager of The Black Panther, taped his eyes and mouth, laid him face
down on a cot, and shot off the back of his head 129
At least three other murders, all in California, seem likely to have been directly
related to this aspect of the FBI's anti-BPP COINTELPRO. These were the execution
of LA-BPP member Fred Bennett at some point in early 1970 (Bennett's body was
never found), Sandra Lane "Red" Pratt (Geronimo Pratt's wife) in LA on January 13,
Ye SO 00 MI,
r -
O. Mg I MI MD IP II %Iwo --.
iC:OPE
■
UNITEDSTAlTIc ( TFAw -•
INE. F 4
r-z==.7
Memorah um - r. u.-De
1 • Mr. 11. C. Sullivan
Mr. W. C. sumval DATE: May 14, 1970
- Mr Bisb
mom G. C. NooreAC
- 1
1 •
SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST • HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
This is to recommend that the Counterin Oligence

against black extremists be continued. ')MYCPAt
The Counterintelligence Program against black extremist
prganizations and individuals was initiated August 25, 1967, and
bn March 4, 1968, it was expanded from 27 to 42 participating
field divisions. The goals of this program are to prevent violen
by black extremists, to prevent the growth and/or unification of
extremist groups, and to prevent extremist groups from gaining
respectability in the Negro community. Some of the excellent
results of counterintelligence action during the past year are se
out below:
To create friction between Black Panther Party (BPP)
leader Eldridge Cleaver in Algiers and BPP Headquarters, a spuric
letter concerning an internal dispute was sent Cleaver, who
accepted it as genuine. As a result, the International Staff of
the BPP was neutralized when Cleaver fired moat of its members.'
Bureau personnel received incentive awards from the Director for
this operation.
To show the criminal nature of the BPP a write-up cone
ing the convictions of its members was prepared and received
publicity -in a Robert S. Allen and John A. Goldsmith syndicated
column of March 31, 1970. Previously we exposed the BPP Breakfa
For Children Program in these writers' column of June 14, 1969.
Articles concerning the BPP based on information furni
a news media source in Mississippi resulted in the closing of a
BPP Chapter in Cleveland, Mississippi.
• . /f c2c
Counterintelligence aeRfgAgainst other extremist org
izations has also been effective. In San Diego, California, an
anonymous telephone call to the landlord of the US organization
resulted in the group being evicted from its Headquarters. In r
Florida, a television source was helped in the preparation of a r
gram exposing the Nation of Islam. The excellent results of thi
program were contained in a memorandum fr.om-0,...c.Moore to Mr. t
Sullivan, October 21, 1969, on which the Director noted "Excelle
ALLINFORNATioncoinainitn
WETS IS IMICIASSITIleoNT/NuEr2all IVO
1 u 19 u mem .
•GIP" cria•wtsz.
Memo reporting on the progress of a COINTELPRO utilizing disinformation and

anonymous letters to foment a split between the international section of the BPP,
headed by Eldridge Cleaver in Algiers, and Huey P. Newton's organization based in
Oakland, California. The operation was continued with lethal results.
Concerning the first proposal submitted by Detroit,

counterintelligence action by Son Francisco to capitalize on •
uey P. Newton's favorable stone toward honosermals has already
been authorized by the Bureau. The second Detroit proposal to.
consider directing en anonymous communication to Newton accusing'
David Hilliard of stealing DPP funds and dcpositinj than in '
foreign banks does have merit and the Bureau does not concur
with Son Francisco's observation that this would have little
effect siuce there is no record that Hilliari is
large amounts of money. h3urnoae f...S.01pterintaUla!---•-•
is to t a ITmaterialcwh thcr eta ext.s
tiat r res
the success of the proposal but the Bureaufeels that the
skimming of money is such a sensitive issue that disruption
can b d vi41. up.
Accordingly, Detroit immediately furnish Bureau ..-
ansi Son Francisco with specific suggestions and wording to
this effect and San Francisco should then review same and
submit specific proposal in this regard for approval by Bureau.
r With respect to two anonymous letters proposed by
Los Angeles, Bureau concurs with San Francisco that to include-.
the card of a member of a rival black extremist group in a letter
to Hilliard incli atinNewto Iisaoaricedforalls-e,,
S..Allat ...
place the Bureau in the position o aiding_or initiating amurder
bytheSgE. Accordingly, Los Angeles' proposal identified as
tO is not approved, Los Angeles should reword this
letter to convey the same thought without directly indicating .-
that it is from a specific member of a rival group. Ibelettwr
could imply that the writer would soon get in touch with
Hilliard to see what he would bay to have Newton eliminated.'
Resubmit the revised letter to the Bureau for approval. -
-
Excerpt from a September 16, 1970 Airtel from Hoover informing his COIN-
TELPRO operatives that outright lies were appropriate content for anonymous
letters, and that murder was an appropriate outcome to such an operation so
long as the cause could not be traced back to the Bureau.
1972, and the execution-style slaying of former Newton bodyguard Jimmy Carr by
LA Panthers Lloyd Lamar Mims and Richard Rodriguez in San Francisco on April
6,1972130In the case of Fred Bennett, rather than conducting any serious investiga-
tion into his death the Bureau used it as a prop - as the accompanying February 17,
1971 teletype from the SAC, San Francisco to Hoover indicates - in the penning of
a bogus letter to Panther Field Marshall Don Cox ("D.C.") in Algeria as a means to
"further exploit dissension within the BPP." Bennett's murder remains "unsolved,"
as does that of Sandra Lane Pratt.
Such atrocities cannot be separated from the FBI's intervention to exacerbate the
"Newton-Cleaver Split," a COINTELPRO initiative which was by then in full swing,
as was made clear in a January 1, 1971 teletype from the San Francisco SAC to
Hoover. The forged letter proposed in this teletype reads as follows:
Ydat ■
lit.•••• .1:46,
(00
F81
Itansollt the folio-tag Ia

Co
1iliAwcL
1:
an.
2/17/71
p 41.11e XI fp. oast
Via TELETYPE
(Prieroy:
TO: DIRECTOR (100-448006)

FRO SAN FRANCISCO (157-601)
volasS17112Dat
"
OK
INTELPRO - BLACK EXTREMISTS, RM.
TO FURTHER EXPLOIT DISSENSION WITHIN THE BPP AND

SUSP S/REGARDING VARIOUS LEADERS, THE FOLLOWING LETTER
1c- 14 A 4- (4 Ot• Pt--
IS PROPOSED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE: h Al, C3)0)
• D.C. ifr V-I
BY ROW YOU HAVE HEARD ABOUT POOR FRED'. I RAVE WARNED

•
NUEY OF THE POSIIBLE CONSEQUENCES. IT SEEMS 20 BE GETTING
WORSE. J.B. AND ROBERT ARE NOW ALSO HISSING.
•IN VIEW OF THIS Ty7CATIV: TOO BETTER RAVE A LONG TALK
WITH ELDRIDGE BEFORE HE LETS KATHLEEN COME HERE. G. IS REALLY
UP TIGHT. BIG MAN IS JUST JIVING AND HO HELP AT ALL.
A.C.'
•
THIS LETTER IS ALSO SLANTED TO IMPLY THAT IT CAME FROM
WHOSE EXACT WHEREABOUTS ARE NOT KNOWN TO THE 7C.C5)
VIEW :0
2PP AND IS IN THE FORM OF
Jr
cussrnED sr ;11.M.RG
16.41t sr ir2e
-15 :•T
Teletype proposing forged letter playing upon the murder of Fred Bennett as a
means of widening the "Newton-Cleaver split." As the document continues (next
page) it becomes clear that the gambit is also part of a COINTELPRO to isolate LA-
BPP leader Geronimo Pratt (continued on next page).
1.1-M M.- 11-3144) 0 C)

FB I
Dote:
Tecmsmit the following In
(Type in Trued r ott41
Yla
SF 157-601 CONFIbKITIAL
PAGE TWO
THE SITUATION INVOLVING THE DEATH OF FRED BENNETT. THE

J.B. REFERRED TO IN THE LETTER 2S AND ROBERT IS
a Jm
WHO TOGETHER WITH IIIIIHAVE PREVIOUSLY WORKED
WITH AND ARE BELIEVED SYMPATHETIC TO THE DISSIDENT
BPP GROUP REPRESENTED BY GERONIMO. THE WHEREABOUTS OP
bn 11,
IIIIIIIANDIIIIIIIS UNKNOWN AT TRE PRESENT TIME TO THE BPP. IF
INASMUCH AS THE FIRST A.C. LETTER COULD POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN
TAKEN BY NEWTON AS A WARNING FROM THE DISSIDENTS,+TVIS LETTER
WILL FURTHER THIS BELIEF IF THERE IS ANY DISCUSSION BY 09
NEWTON WITH BPP REPRESENTATIVES IN ALGERIA.
TEE LETTER ALSO CASTS REFLECTIONS onall11111, IP;
A
b
CLEAVER STALWART.
IF SUCCESSFUL, THIS MIGHT FURTHER SPLIT THE EPP AND
PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY or THE RETURN TO THE V.S. OF KATHLEEN
CLEAVER WHO MIGHT ATTEMPT TO UNIFY THE DISSIDENT FACTIONS
IN THE PARTY IF SHE APPEARS.
CONF1 I • IiAL
APPeowed: Sent II Peg

Scotia' Mao la Cimino • Ormwsimr most to es Aim • • Wall Ow
Eldridge,
I know you have not been told what has been happening lately. It is a shame
that a person, as well-placed as I am and so desirous of improving our Party, cannot
by present rules travel to or communicate with you. I really don't know where you
stand in relationship to our leaders and really am not confident you would protect
me in the event of exposure. Since this is my life-work, just let me say I have worked
long and well in your behalf in the past, and for the Party in many places on Planet
Earth.
Things around Headquarters are dreadfully disorganized with the Comrade
Commander not making proper decisions. The newspaper is in shambles. No one
knows who is in charge. The Foreign Department gets no support. Brothers and
sisters are accused of all sorts of things. The point of all this is to say I fear there is
rebellion working just beneath the surface. You may know the story about "G" and
his gang. I believe that people like "G" have many sympathizers who are not yet
under suspicion but who should be. They have friends right in Headquarters where
the Minister chooses to ignore them.
I am disturbed because I, myself, do not know which way to turn. While I think
the Comrade Commander is weak, yet I do not like the evidences of disloyalty I see.
I may be wrong but I think the core of this disloyalty (maybe you think what I
consider disloyalty is actually supreme loyalty to the ideals of the Party rather than
the leader himself) is with persons formerly close to the Field Marshall. If only you
were here to inject some strength into the Movement, or to give some advice. One
of two steps must be taken soon and both are drastic. We must either get rid of the
Supreme Commander or get rid of the disloyal members. I know the brothers mean
well but I fear the only sensible course that the Party can take is to initiate strong and
complete action against the rebels, exposing their underhanded tricks to the com-
munity. Huey is really all we have right now and we can't let him down, regardless
of how poorly he is acting, unless you feel otherwise. Remember he is still able to
bring in the bread.
— Comrade C —
The letter was attributed by the Bureau to party member Connie Matthews
("Comrade C"), and designed - according to the text of the remainder of the teletype
- not only to cause general "turmoil among the top echelon [of the BPP; e.g.: by
casting doubt upon Field Marshall Don Cox, a Cleaver ally]," but to specifically
target LA Panther leader Geronimo Pratt ("G") for suspicion by the Cleaver faction.
Note the call for "drastic action" in the letter. This, after at least one Panther (Fred
Bennett) was already thought to have been killed as a result of the Bureau's
deliberate heightening of tensions attending "the split," and in the context of a lively
internal dialogue among COINTELPRO planners concerning the probability that
others would die if such tactics were continued. Under the circumstances, there can
be little doubt as to the Bureau's intent in approving and sending the bogus missive.
Concerning Pratt, he had already been the target of a similar COINTELPRO
operation which had led to his formal expulsion (as a "police agent" and /or a
"Cleaverite") by the Newton faction on January 23, 1971.131This earlier operation,
handled by LA COINTELPRO section head Richard W. Held and two subordinates,
Richard H. Bloeser and Brendan Cleary, included the high priority targeting of Pratt
- as one of the 100-odd "Key Activists" selected for inclusion in the Bureau's Black
Nationalist Photo Album-and LA-BPP associate John William Washington for dis-
crediting as part of the overall strategy to "deny unity of action" to the Panthers, a
1IN El El) STATES C(( r■

IENT
AAvi/Cal7ZOla71thinl
TO rnRECTOR, PSI (loo-448och5) DAZE: 1/28/70
A I t
fSACt LOS ANGELES (157-11054)(P)
susjEorCOUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
-/../ BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
BPP eel
• • • "
• r1%4 )4' •
1),
1',5 Re Los Angeles aiytel and letterhead memoranduln
N6 totho.Bureau dated 11/2B/69, entitled "BLACK PANTHER
PAiTY, RM - DPP", San Francisco letter to the liortau dated
12/14/69, and Los Angeles lettersto the Bureau dated
12/11/69 and 05/70.1cti.w
Enclosed for the Bureau and San Francisco are one

copy each of-two hand prepared proposed counterintelligence
leaflets, numbered 1 and 2 for reference.
Bureau approval is requested in the creation of an

anonymous paper underground to attack expose and ridicule
the image of the BPP in the commun y anc o oment misty
pn amongst t e curren• an s'Igil_e_ip,
pan
V117...FTT.aication and dissemination orivr:z
embarrassing to the BIT. Activities of the underground,
initially to be referred to as "the Los Angeles Three",
therein identifying the source in a form of reference
47,13.h
1)- ry -1 11 •ER GERARD-PRATT
oan 'anc. sc
An”oles
Memo targeting Geronimo Pratt and his lieutenant John William "Long John"
Washington for neutralization, denying "unity of action" to the LA-BPP.
matter brought out in the accompanying January 28 memo and June 26, 1970
teletype from the SAC, Los Angeles, to the director (see page 156).
This tied to a second dimension of a campaign to neutralize the LA party leader
LA lb7-11054
common to Panther rhetoric, would be prepared to sumest

participation by active and pant members of the Los Angeles
Black Panther Party (LA BPP). The selection of the
organization's name is an arbitrary one which lends itself
to a future display of the group's growth if the response
warrants. The necessity for the anonymity of the under-
ground organization could be explained, if necessary, as
animporative precaution in view of the past acts of violence.
and retaliation executed by the LA BPP.
It is anticipated that this counterintelligence
proposal could serve as one phase of a continuous attempt
to deny unity or action 4ln the effort cf the LA BPP by
calling to question the.actions of the organization and the
legitimacy of its leadership.
It is felt that the production and distribution
of these leaflets could be such that the idontity of the
FBI an the source of the proposed organization could be
effectively concealed.
In this respect, Bureau approval is requested in
the preparation and dissemination of leaflets similar to
the enclosed in the vicinities of 4115 South Central,
— 9616 Anzac, and 1610 East 103rd Street, locations. of BPP
activities in Los Angeles. It would be the intention of the
Los Angeles Division to distribute leaflet Ho. 2 seven to
.ten days following the introduction of leaflet No. 3,as
any follow up should not only make the effort a topical one,
but stimulate increased reaction within the Los Angeles BPP.
Operation Number One is designed to challenge the
legitimacy of the authority exercised by EU1ER GERARD PRATT,
BPP Deputy Minister of Defense for Southern California, and
JOHN WILLIAM WASHINGTON, an active member of the BPP in Los
Angeles.
Operation Number Teo is utilized to publicize the
illicit sexual -activities allcedlv encou nr.r,Acr! rircv•c!i
in by -
-2 -
which saw him charged on December 16, 1970 with the so-called "Tennis Court
Murder" (committed on December 18,1968 in Santa Monica, California) 133The "evi-
dence" linking Pratt to the crime was primarily that of an FBI infiltrator, Julius C.
"Julio" Butler, who was to perjure himself during the ensuing trial by testifying that
he had had no paid association with any police agency since joining the BPP.133 At
trial, the FBI also denied the existence of ELSURS logs concerning its wiretapping
and other electronic surveillance of the Panther national headquarters in Oakland,
a record which would have established that Pratt was in the San Francisco Bay area,
some 350 miles north of Santa Monica, on the evening the murder occurred. When
the monitoring was later revealed, the Bureau claimed that its logs covering the two-
week period which might have exonerated Pratt had been "lost.."1" The upshot of
the Bureau's bad-jacketing COINTELPRO was that during the course of his trial, the
EAU. 0.= INVEUIGATION
IA 157-31136
I It is noted that PRATT's photograph is

inlluded in the Black Nationalist Photo Album, •
For the information of the Bureau; in vier
of FRAMs odorant expression of hatred toward law
enforcement personnel in general, no consideration is -
being given to reintervicu PRATT for the purpose of
develop:7.ent es a PRI. It is noted, however, that constant
consideretion 13 given to the possibility or the
utilization of counterintelligence weesures with efforts
being directed toward neutralizing PRATT as an effective
BPP functionary.
It is noted that the investigative period
of this report overlaps that of referenced report in
view of the fact that activities occurring prior to
submission of referenced report were not'reported until
after submitsion of referenced report.
This report is being classified confidential
because it contains information furnished by sources
of continuing value and diiclosure of these sources
could result In their identification thereby affecting
the Internal Security of the United States.
LEADS
LOS ANGELES
AT LOS ANGELES. CALIFORMAt Will continue
to follow and report activities of a•ER PRATT in view
of his being the BPP Deputy Minister of Defense.
INFORMANTS
. .
SOURCE LOCATION
Teletype denoting Geronimo Pratt's inclusion in the Black Nationalist Photo

Album, his refusal to cooperate with the FBI as a "Racial Informant," and the
Bureau's consequent intention to bad-jacket him.
target was isolated from the legal support which might have accrued from his
former party associates, both within the Newton faction and-to some extent at least
- the Cleaver faction as well. He was thus convicted, and sentenced to life impris-
onment.1" At present, he remains incarcerated at San Quentin.136
An equally troubling case in New York involve[s] another COINTELPRO target,

(Richard] Dhoruba Moore. A codefendant in the Panther 21 case who believed
Newton had ordered his assassination, Moore jumped bail, fled the country, and
was acquitted in absentia in March 1971. Police officers arrested him three months
later at an after-hours club in the Bronx, booking him as a John Doe. The officers also
confiscated a .45 calibre [sub]machine gun at the dub. When they discovered
Moore's identity, they charged him with the attempted murder of two patrolmen
[Thomas Curry and Nicholas Binetti] who had been assigned to guard the Riverside
Drive home of Panther 21 prosecutor Frank Hogan. Moore was indicted, tried, and
convicted, with the court handing down a sentence of twenty-five years to life. The
question that [goes] to the heart of the criminal justice system ha[s] less to do with
Dhoruba Moore's guilt or innocence than whether he received a fair tria1137
A similar case is that of the "New York Three" - Herman Bell, Anthony "Jalil"
Bottom and Albert "Nuh" Washington, members of the New York BPP chapter and
alleged Black Liberation Army (BLA) members - sentenced to serve 25-year-to-life
prison terms in 1975 for the 1971 shooting deaths of NYPD patrolmen Waverly Jones
and Joseph Piagentini. Only much later, during the early '80s, did it begin to come
out that the FBI had carefully concealed significant exculpatory material such as a
ballistics report showing conclusively that the crucial piece of "physical evidence"
introduced at trial - a .45 caliber automatic pistol in Bell's possession at the time of
his arrest - was not (as prosecutors claimed) the weapon used to kill the policemen.
Suppressed Bureau documents also record that a key government witness, Ruben
Scott, was first tortured and then offered a deal on a pending murder charge against
him in exchange for his "cooperation" against the three in court; Scott has subse-
quently recanted the entirety of his testimony. Two other witnesses were jailed for
13 months and threatened with loss of custody over their children to induce their
testimony. Each woman was not only released from jail and allowed to retain
custody, but also provided a rent-free apartment and $150 per week stipend for
several years after her stint on the witness stand. At the time Bell, Bottom and
Washington were tried, and during their subsequent appeals, the FBI falsely con-
tended it had "nothing relevant" regarding their case. As is plainly shown in the
accompanying January 24,1974 memo from G.C. Moore to W.R. Wannall, this was
no accident; the Bureau was quite concerned to insure that it could not be identified
as the source of information being presented by the state. It thus avoided being
compelled to disclose evidence which might have served to exonerate the defen-
dants or bring about reversal of their convictions. As of this writing, all three men
remain in prison after 15 years."'
Like the case of Geronimo Pratt, both the Dhoruba Moore case and that of the
isoa
6. do. si• (0
UNITED STATES COVERNNIENT
Memorandum 1 - Office of Legal Counsel

ea •Ms.•
1, •1. • Co.
io tut W. A. WANNALia) v4)1/ uAlt, January 21, 1974 • IL..
1 - me. W. A. Normal; 004.0i.

FRO\I M..t. C. C, tOMEA 1 - HrinC. C. Hoore
1 - Mr. P. V. Duly
subjectNEWKILL, 1.,./
.
/I
• .
PUttPOSE:
Purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the
New York City Police Department (tWYCPD) made available to defense
attorneys copies of its investigative reports eelative to captione,
matter, pursuant to a court order, which reports cohtained infor-
mation furnished by the Bureau. Th 4
eNewYorl
rrra.r .0.fii j391.revc;
that the , Bureau cc,nla eot be ident e n ese re orts as the
source of the l'HYrrmarTnn. 4
BACKGROUND:
___,
Uewkill is the code word used for the 6Ureau'S inve4ti-
gatioo concerning the killing of two New York City police officers
on L/21/71. This investigation was initiated pursuant to request
by Piesident Niaon mane of the Bureau on 3/26/71. P•itinent results
of this luvesti6ation wt.te wade available to the in cliff via letter.
head me:lora:Ida (brills). Le.
The 1/8/74 Issue of "The New York Times" lepccleo that
New York State Supreme Court Justice Roberts ordered the prosecution
in captioned matter to make available any information contained in
police files favorable to the defendants. According to this
article, the Justice, lifter reviewing the police files, turned
over most of this material to defense lawyers .0_ tt r.„ ),;.9/..,..„„,
We queried the New York Office as to whether .•
Jr y'of y4t
information furnished to the defense attorneys originatrid from the
FBI and whether it could be clearly identified as such. New York
Office, after contact with local authorities in New York, determinea ll
that the 1414;44,,eysilable to the police by the Bureau concerning ...
this matter were not turned over to the defense attorneys nor • 4
could the information furnished to the defense attorneys be clearly
identified as originating from these LNHs. To date, there is no
apparent indication that the defense attorneys may make a similar
motion concerning information contained in Bureau fifes relativem•
ouk investigation on Newkill.tt
AU:• 45 14-77 —;1 -i---6' 6. 7
ACTIO't:
157-22002
For information. , /
1.
le .
./ • a 4) c4 lialt...;*Pw-;
,,,!,,
. ,,-
1,
ji 1
1//..E., • ./ •-*1 I ...• ,/ r,, ,....--
r----rc"`=
'VAN 2 8,j 9 4 ' c ---' ; :V L ..'lit.. )11P7 .0
\. I
Memo showing the care taken by the FBI to hide the fact that it had gathered evidence
which might have served to exonerate the New York Three. The coverup continued into the
1980s, and to an unknown extent goes on at present.
New York Three are bound up in the context of the FBI's COINTELPRO activities
regarding the Newton-Cleaver split. These activities- as are partially reflected in the
accompanying excerpt from a February 2, 1971 Hoover Airtel to 29 SACs (see next
page) - left the BPP in divisive opposing factions, each utterly unable to provide
coherent legal defense to its membership. That the FBI and cooperating police
agencies capitalized upon this situation to the utmost has become increasingly
apparent.
On other fronts, the Bureau engaged in a range of anti-Panther counterintelli-
gence operations which ranged from the orchestration of murder to attempts to
deny funding to BPP legal defense efforts. An example of the former may be found
in the FBI's assistance to its allies in the LAPD's CCS to set up the celebrated prison
author (and honorary BPP Field Marshal), George Jackson, for assassination inside
San Quentin on August 21,1971, and its subsequent use of the incident as the basis
for accusations intended to neutralize Angela Y. Davis, head of Jackson's defense or-
ganization and a leading Panther-associated spokesperson.'" On the latter count,
as the accompanying May 21, 1970 memo from the New York SAC (see page 162)
makes clear, efforts were undertaken (successfully, as it turned out) to utilize the
earlier mentioned spurious information concerning BPP "anti-Semitism" to dry up
legal defense contributions flowing from individuals such as Leonard Bernstein,
wealthy conductor of the New York Philharmonic, to the Panther 21.140
According to the Senate Select Committee, other targets dealt with by the
Bureau in a fashion comparable to that used against Bernstein included author
Donald Freed (who headed the "Friends of the Panthers" organization in LA), Ed
Pearl of the Peace and Freedom Party, the actress Jane Fonda, "the [unidentified]
wife of a famous Hollywood actor," an unidentified "famous entertainer," and an
employee of the Union Carbide Corporation, among others.1'1In each case, COIN-
TELPRO actions were undertaken which "would be an effective means of combat-
ing BPP fund-raising activities among liberal and naive individuals." 42
Elsewhere, the FBI utilized the services of an infiltrator to have the Sacramento
chapter of the BPP print a racist and violence-oriented coloring book for children.
When the item was brought to the attention of Bobby Seale and other members of
the Panther leadership, it was immediately ordered destroyed rather than distrib-
uted. Nonetheless, the Bureau mailed copies to companies - including Safeway
Stores, Inc., Mayfair Markets and the Jack-In-The-Box Corporation-which had been
contributing food to the party's Breakfast for Children program, in order to cause the
withdrawal of such support.'" In the same vein, anonymous letters were mailed to
the parishioners and bishop of a San Diego priest, Father Frank Curran, who had
been allowing the Panthers to use his church as a Breakfast for Children serving
facility, in order that use of the church be withdrawn and Father Curran transferred
to "somewhere in the State of New Mexico for permanent assignment."'"
Considerable COINTELPRO attention was also focused upon The Black Panther
newspaper because, as was observed by FBI headquarters in 1970, "The BPP
newspaper has a circulation of...139,000. It is the voice of the BPP and if it could be
r—r4 T 7 •••• - -
JA J IL 114 -Li V IL•
2/2/71
1 - Mr. V. C.41livan
1 Mr. J. P. hr
1 Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. J. J. Casper
1 =p p
1
To: SACS, Albany New Haven 1
Atlanta New Orleans
Baltimore New York
Boston Philadelphia
Charlotte Pittsburgh
Chicago Portland
Cincinnati Richmond
Cleveland Sacramento
Columbia San Francisco
Dallas Savannah
Detroit Seattle
Indianapolis Springfield
Las Vegas Tampa
los Angeles WFO
Newark
From: Director, FBI (100-448006)
ITELPRO - BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) DISSENSION
S
0/71
Increasing evidence points to rising dissension within

BPP causing serious morale problem and strained reTationihip among
Panther hierarchy. Primary cause of these.intep,O# problems
appears to be dictatorial, irrational anttle afiritious conduct of
Huey P. Newton. His extreme sensitivity to any criticism,
jealousness of other Leaders and belief he issemplcOm of deity -
Lt:L-- --- are causing severe problems within the 1rpup.1, Nekton's relation-
"•••______ — — - ship with Cleaver and other top leaders isstrained. He has
.1111..E.P.-- ecently expelled or disciplined several dedicated
11
I.analog - . . ,. fpwrincludin
,e, _____ . I
.;..rd----- F:drl ti4) REV it; • I. .) -' i'-1 ''. " I'
.1..
(69)
69)
SEE NOTE PAGE Tarr
.• I 1 iF
t., h..1(46;i _ 1/,/,. re,s

Tomi
..h... FIRL41
:MP
:: OM? / FER n 1517,0,, 17
..n. rStiP! 4
TreWnerOZITAIfi ,•-4-
sz--97FEB.1 1971
414.,.. I/e
Gmul, sum Immo TEteryftlinwrak ""'„sir.,
0...'
1111 . .
// ....
Self-congratulatory Airtel describing the success of the COINTELPRO attending the

"Newton-Cleaver Split" in terms of "rising dissension within the BPP causing serious
morale problem and strained relationship among Panther hierarchy," which caused a
rapid disintegration of the Party.
rtel to Albany at al
R ; COINTELPRU - Black Panther Party (BPP) - Dissension
1 -448006
and Newton
and companions who were involved
in un ergroun operation (see 1/23/71 edition of
"The Black Panther"); and the "New York 21" who were a
leading cause celebre of Pentherism.
This dissension coupled with financial difficulties

offers an exceptional opportunity to further disrupt,
aggravate and possibly neutralize this organization through
counterintelligence. In light of above developments this
program has been intensified by selected offices and should
be further expanded to increase measurably the pressure on
the BPP and its leaders.
San Francisco and New York are already involved

in counterintelligence actions and should continue to be
alert for further opportunities. All other recipients
should immediately devise at least two counterintelligence
proposals and submit same to Bureau by 2/10/71. 'First
proposal should be aimed strictly at creating dissension
within the local branch. Second proposal should be aimed
at creating dissension or problems between local branch
and/or its leaders and see
national headquarters. Submit
each proposal in a separate airtel referencing this
communication and in first paragraph specifically indicate
whether proposal aimed at local dissension or national
dissension.
In order for these proposals to be effective it

is imperative that a close analysis be made of weaknesses
and problems within the local BPP branch and that all
prirposals submitted be imaginative and timely. No proposal
th
atiould be implemented without specific Bureau approval.
f'
effectively hindered, it would result in helping to cripple the BPP."1" The methods
employed for this purpose included an unsuccessful effort to use the IRS to close The
Black Panther down and the sending of bogus cards and letters, attributed to the
Minutemen organization, to the paper's staff purporting to show that the violent
right-wing group intended to attack them physically (the operation was apparently
intended to frighten the staff into quitting or at least suspending production of their
publication).1" The Bureau also attempted to bring about bankruptcy of the paper
by convincing freight companies to shift from the general rate pertaining to printed
material to the "full legal rate allowable for newspaper shipment."
Officials advise this increase...means approximately a forty percent increase. Offi-
cials agree to determine co signor in San Francisco and from this determine cosignees
throughout the United States so that it can impose full legal tariff. They believe the
11.•■
••1111
MN, •01. ellirn•V
•••• ••••• wal 0.1. •
UNITED STNIES CAt .4.N141ENT.
Memorandum
TO DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006) DAT': 5/21/70
PROM SAC, NEW YORK (100-161140) (P)
SUBJECT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

BLACK NATIONALIST - RATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
ReNYlet to Bureau, 2/25/70.4Y"4•4"
1. Operations Under Consideration
It is felt by the NYO that BPP operations can best be 6
disrupted by exposing them to individuals and groups who would have
a natural or conditioned animosity toward the BP? aims and ideals.
The above can be accomplished through the continued use
of anonymous letters and handbills which would be directed toward
those who may be expected to act through economic or personal
means against the BPP thereby hindering BPP operations.
• The NYO realizes the importance of negating the financial
benefits coming to the BPP through the distribution of their official
newspaper "The Black Panther" and will continue to attempt to derive
a logical and practical plan to thwart this crucial BPP operation.
2. Operations Being Submitted
On 2/27/70, correspondence was directed to individuals
known to have attended a BPP fund-raising function at the home of
the well known musician, LEONARD BERNSTEIN. This correspondence
outlined the BPP's anti-Semetic posture and pro-Arab position.
On 3/5/70, mimeograph copies of a "BPP solicitation
letter" and a "Store owners letter were sent to BPP headquarters
in NYC as per Bureau instructions dated 3/5/70.
On 3/6/70, information was furnished to an established
newspaper contact concerning the source of monies used to raise
bail for one of the "Panther 21", a group of BPP members on trial
in New York City.
2.
ec 17
fillgTAR743)
OANT3
JLL:tf 10 MAY 22 1970
3) ce
Irfr)4211T^:' r•ITP11,3)
ALL ;intik
1‘ u WartyII UT. SW
•t ttACl .
'4Brf.7 U.S. SaYtietiollfr Replarly the Payroll Savings Plan
Memo outlining plan to deny legal defense funding to the BPP in New York from
supporters such as Philharmonic conductor Leonard Bernstein. Note reliance upon the
"anti-Semitic" ploy and involvement of the JDL discussed earlier.
NY loo-161140
On 4/1/70, the NYC, participated in the formulation of
a Counterintelligence proposal submitted by San Francisco office
and directed against black militant leader LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER.
On 4/20/70, the NY0 sent a letter to various individuals
familiar with BPP activities in the New York area concerning
STOKELY CARMICHAEL's views on the late ADOLPH HITLER.
3. Tangible Results
On 5/7/70, both of whom
have furnished reliab e information in the past, advised that
on that date approximately 35 members of the Jewish Defense League
(JDL) picketed the Harlem Branch of the BPP in NYC. The purpose of
this demonstration was to show that the JDL feels the BPP is anti-
Semetic in its acts and words.
Also on the above date approximately 50 members of the JDL
demonstrated outside of the Bronx, New York BPP Headquarters for the
aforementioned reasons.
In view of the above actions by the JDL it is felt that
some of the counterintelligence measures of the NYO have produced
tangible results.
4. Developments of Counter-
Intelligence Interests
As the summer season approaches the NYO will be keenly
aware of the activities of various racial and hate groups in New
York City for the exploitation of such activities within the
continuing counterintelligence program.
The NY0 will immediately inform the Bureau of any situations
or developments that occur where counterintelligence techniques may
be used.
airlines are duethe differences in freight tariffs as noted above for the past six to eight
months, and are considering discussions with their legal staff concerning suit for
recovery of deficit...[T]hey estimate that in New York alone [it] will exceed ten
thousand dollars."'
When such actions failed to engender the desired results, the San Diego field
office came up with the idea of utilizing a stink-bomb to close the paper's production
facility; the San Diego SAC recommended using Skatol, "a chemical agent in
powdered form...[which] emits an extremely noxiously [sic] odor rendering the
premises surrounding the point of application uninhabitable."148 This plan also
failed, probably because a burglary was required to carry it out, and agents could
not "achieve entry" into the "area utilized for production of 'The Black Panther'."149
Overall, the Bureau's counterintelligence offensive against this element of "the free
press" was undertaken because, in the words of the SAC, New York:
[The FBI] realizes the financial benefits coming to the BPP through the sale of this
newspaper. Continued efforts will [therefore] be made to derive logical and practi-
cal plans to thwart this crucial BPP operation.1"
The FBI has admitted that, during the COINTELPRO era proper (1956-71), it ran
some 295 distinct COINTELPRO operations against individuals and organizations
which - using a broad definition - may be considered as part of the black liberation
movement. Of these, 233 were aimed at the BPP between 1967 and 1971.151The total
number of fatalities resulting from these brutally illegal activities on the part of the
nation's "top law enforcement agency" will probably never be known, nor will the
number of years spent by innocent people railroaded into prison cells or the number
of lives wrecked in somewhat more subtle ways. The government has, for obvious
reasons, been loath to offer anything approximating a comprehensive study of what
is known such things, even in the midst of such "housecleanings" as the Church
Committee investigations of the mid-'70s.
Under the weight of such ruthless, concerted and sustained repression - and
despite the incredible bravery with which many of its members attempted to
continue their work - the Black Panther Party simply collapsed. Some of its
survivors moved into the essentially militaristic Black Liberation Army, founded by
BPP member Zayd Malik Shakur (s/n: James Costan) and others in New York as
early as 1971.152Many others dropped out of radical activism altogether. By 1974,
although there was still an Oakland organization bearing the name, the BPP could
no longer be considered a viable political force by any standard of measure. With it,
whatever its defects may have been, passed the best possibility of Afro-Americans
attaining some real measure of self-sufficiency and self-determination which has
presented itself during the 20th century.
Chapter 6
COINTELPRO — New Left

If [SDS] or any group was organized on a national basis to subvert our
society, then I think Congress should pass laws to suppress that activity.
When you see an epidemic like this cropping up all over the country — the
same kind of people saying the same kinds of things —you begin to get the
picture that it is a national subversive activity...[SDS and other new left
activists] should be rounded up and put in a detention camp.
— Richard G. Kleindienst —
U.S. Deputy Attorney General
1969
The "new left" was a primarily white, campus-based, initially non-marxist

oppositional movement which emerged in the aftermath of the 1950s ("McCarthyite")
repression of "old left" political formations such as the CP,USA. Beginning with the
establishment of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) by a handful of college
radicals including Al Haber and Tom Hayden during 1960-61, the new left had by
the end of the decade come to encompass a multiplicity of organizations and literally
hundreds of thousands of participants' Along the way, it had engaged itself in a
range of issues and activities including the pursuit of a vision of "participatory
democracy," support to civil rights and black liberation groups like SNCC and the
BPP, socio-economic reform in the inner cities, transformation of the educational
process, attempts to hammer out a "new working class theory," anti-Vietnam war
endeavors and, ultimately, a neo-marxian form of anti-imperialism.'
In his memoirs, COINTELPRO head William C. Sullivan claims that as of the
spring of 1968 - when an SDS-led student action closed prestigious Columbia
University - "we didn't know the New Left existed."' As Sullivan tells the story:
I teletyped the New York office and asked them what was behind all this and
demanded to know what information they had. That afternoon I received a memo-
randum from New York that had attached to it a number of newspaper articles. I
teletyped New York again, saying, "I don't want newspaper clippings. I want to
know what you have in the files about the student uprising at Columbia University."
New York got back to me again with the terse response, "We don't have anything."
As with many of the assertions contained in the FBI assistant director's "history"
of COINTELPRO, the account is less than truthful. At least as early as mid-1965, J.
Edgar Hoover had asked for, and Attorney General Nicholas deB. "Katzenbach
165
[had] approved requests for taps on SDS."8There is also solid evidence that by this
point, the Bureau had already begun to systematically infiltrate the student organi-
zation.' Such ELSURS and informant activity vis a vis SDS was an integral part of a
more generalized FBI "political intelligence" emphasis during the period 1964-68
which saw the installation of more than 800 wiretaps and some 700 bugs (facilitated
by at least 150 surreptitious entries), and an unknown number of informants and in-
filtrators, all utilized in "non-criminal investigations."' The Bureau had also been
availing itself of the proceeds concerning SDS and other new left organizations
deriving from CIA "mail covers" since at least as early as 1964.8Far from the
Bureau's being unaware of the new left's existence until 1968, Hoover himself had
gone on record in February 1966 describing SDS as "one of the most militant
organizations" in the country and claiming that "communists are actively promot-
ing and participating in the activities of this organization."' The same sort of
perspective prevailed, albeit in somewhat less pronounced fashion, with regard to
other new left individuals and organizations.
Friends of SNCC
Actually, the Bureau's interest in the new left had been lively since as early as
1961, when white activists, often referred to as "Friends of SNCC," began to
accompany that group's civil rights workers on "Freedom Rides" into the Deep
South. The objective of the rides was to integrate public transportation facilities
coming under interstate transport regulations in states such as Alabama, Missis-
sippi, Louisiana and Georgia, as well as to draw public attention to the Jim Crow
laws still governing interracial affairs in the region and the lack of federal action to
address the situation.1° Kenneth O'Reilly recounts the performance of the FBI as the
second of two buses arrived at Anniston, Alabama, about 60 miles from Birming-
ham, on May 13,1961 (the first one, a Greyhound, having already been destroyed by
local klansmen shortly before):
The FBI watched as the second bus, the Trailways, pulled into Anniston within an
hour. Eight toughs boarded, demanded the black riders move to the rear, and then
beat two of the white riders, Dr. Walter Bergman and James Peck...The sixty-one-
year-old Peck, a retired school administrator, suffered permanent brain damage.
When the bus arrived at its terminal in Birmingham about fifty minutes later, a mob
of about forty Klansmen and members of the National States Rights Party [a neo-
nazi group] greeted the Freedom Riders. Most carried baseball bats or chains. A few
had lead pipes. [The FBI looked on again as] one of them knocked down the
unfortunate Peck once more.11
Although the Bureau had been "aware of the planned violence for weeks in
advance, the FBI did nothing to stop it and had actually given the Birmingham police
[headed by the notorious segregationist Eugene "Bull" Connor] details regarding
the Freedom Riders' schedule, knowing full well that at least one law enforcement
COINTELPRO - New Left 167
officer [Thomas H. Cook] relayed everything to the Idan." The Bureau, as journal-
ist I.F. Stone observed at the time, "live[d] in cordial fraternity with the cops who
enforce[d] white supremacy."" More, the FBI had a paid employee, Gary Thomas
Rowe, among the klansmen who actually participated in the beatings administered
at the Birmingham bus terminal. Such performance by the Bureau, which falsely
claimed to be "neutral" and to lack "enforcement jurisdiction" in civil rights matters,
remained consistent throughout the early '60s;" at best the FBI simply watched as
activists were brutalized, at worst it assisted in orchestrating the brutalization."
At the same time the Bureau was actively foot-dragging in its responsibilities to
protect civil rights workers engaged in efforts to secure such fundamental social
prerogativesfor black people as voting and using public restrooms, it was busily
investigating the victims themselves:
Under the pressure of events that began with the Freedom Rides and continued over
the next two years, Hoover escalated FBI intelligence gathering activities. Earlier, in
the mid-1950s, the Bureau conducted investigations of racial disturbances, particu-
larly demonstrations and clashes arising out of school desegregation, but generally
did not file reports with the [Justice Department] Civil Rights Division. Instead, the
Bureau sent its reports to the Department's Internal Security Division, where the
Division bumped them back over to Civil Rights after five or ten days. By organizing
information from the FBI "around the requirements of internal security surveillance
rather than civil rights protection," this procedure focused the Civil Rights Division's
attention on the activities of the Communist party and not disenfranchisement,
segregated schools and transportation, and other obstacles to black equality.16
Between March 1959 and January 1960, the FBI distributed 892 separate reports
on "racial matters" - none having to do with the klan or other white racist
organizations, but many of them dealing with support to the civil rights movement
accruing from the budding new left - not only to the Justice Department, but to the
various military intelligence agencies, as well as state and local police forces."
[FBI Section Head Courtney] Evans' [Special Investigation] Division ran the names
of hundreds of individuals through the files at the request of Kennedy administra-
tion officials. The subjects of these searches ranged from the National Negro
Congress, a communist front that had been dead for fourteen years, to James
Baldwin, William Faulkner, and fifty other Nobel Prize laureates whose names
graced a White House dinner invitation list —part of John and Jacqueline Kennedy's
program to encourage and honor cultural and intellectual achievement. In Faulkner's
case, the Bureau noted his statement to the Civil Rights Congress, another commu-
nist front and successor to the National Negro Congress, on behalf of Willie McGhee,
convicted of raping a white woman in Laurel, Mississippi, in 1945. (McGhee
exhausted all possible appeals by March 1951, when the Supreme Court refused to
hear his case, and to the day the state executed him the FBI seemed most interested
in exploring the "Communist connections" of one of his noncommunist lawyers,
Bella Abzug). 16
Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that when three young

activists- James Chaney, Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman - disappeared
in Neshoba County, Mississippi on June 21, 1963, the FBI had active "subversive"
files open on one of the two whites, Schwerner, as well as Chaney, a 21-year-old
black man. As it turned out, the three were in the area as part of a joint "Mississippi
Freedom Summer" project being run by SNCC and CORE, registering voters in
preparation for the sending of a black "Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party"
(MFDP) delegation to the 1964 Democratic convention in Atlantic City, a significant
step toward dismantling the Jim Crow structure of the "regular" state party
hierarchy. On the fateful morning, they had driven from CORE headquarters in the
sizable town of Meridian, Mississippi to the village of Longdale in order to
investigate the beatings of three local blacks and burning of the Mt. Zion Church by
the klan shortly before. On their return trip, they were arrested - ostensibly for
speeding - by Neshoba County Deputy Sheriff Cecil Price and jailed in nearby
Philadelphia, Mississippi. The deputy held them until approximately 10 p.m.,
released them, followed them out of town, and then stopped them again. This time,
he turned them over to a group of klansmen who killed all three and then buried the
bodies beneath a local dam construction project."
The FBI had long since received informant reports that state klan leader Sam
Bowers, Jr., had advised his followers - which included a high percentage of the
state's law enforcement personnel -of how they might "legitimately" respond to the
"nigger-commie invasion:" "catch [activists] outside the law, then under Missis-
sippi law you can kill them."" The results of Bowers' suggestion had been immedi-
ately forthcoming. By the Bureau's own count, SNCC suffered some 1,000 arrests
and at least 35 murders while engaged in constitutionally protected activities during
Freedom Summer.21But the Bureau did absolutely nothing to protect the activists.
Instead, it escalated its investigations of the intended victims, reporting many of the
results of its intelligence gathering to the very police/klan amalgam which was
perpetrating the violence. When the disappearance of Chaney, Schwerner and
Goodman was reported to FBI agent Hunter E. Helgeson at the Jackson resident
agency (nearest the murder scene), neither he nor his colleagues made any move to
intervene.22
To the contrary, the FBI's sole agent in Meridian, John Proctor, is known to have
accepted an invitation to drink contraband liquor with Deputy Price on the after-
noon following the murders." It was more than 48 hours, after heavy Justice
Department pressure had been exerted because the potential for major negative
publicity attending the case had emerged, that New Orleans SAC Harry Maynor
finally sent a mere five agents to "see if we can find those guys."24Meanwhile, SNCC
leader Robert Moses had already announced the obvious: "The kids are dead."
Schwerner's wife, Rita, and Chaney's mother demanded to see both Mississippi
Governor Paul Johnson and President Lyndon Johnson concerning the fate of their
loved ones, a matter which prompted television anchorman Walter Cronkite to
describe the case during the Six O'Clock News on June 25 as being "the focus of the
whole country's concern."23Unsatisfied that the FBI's paltry performance would

blunt the force of rising criticism, President Lyndon Johnson himself ordered
Hoover to up the ante, dispatching FBI Assistant Director Alex Rosen to Mississippi,
followed by Roy K. Moore (designated as SAC of a new field office in Jackson,
established solely in response to the presidential ultimatum), Associate Director
Cartha D. DeLoach and a total of 153 agents?' Finally, on July 10, Hoover himself put
in a brief appearance to push things along."
FBI Inspector Joseph Sullivan, who was named to head up the investigation in
the field, ultimately commanded 258 agents and captioned his operation MIBURN
(a contraction of "Mississippi Burning," in reference to the torching of the Mt. Zion
Church which had led to Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman's fatal trip). While it
may be true that Sullivan was well-intentioned, "FBI agents resigned rather than go
to Mississippi" as part of the investigation, and those who did go could not
overcome "the Bureau's prior performance, its deference to the rule of white over
black and its indifference to the rule of law."2° Most of the time was spent poking
about in area swamps, trying to locate the bodies, a "process which turned up
several black corpses and parts thereof - including a torso clad in a CORE t-shirt."2°
The remains were finally found on August 4, after the Bureau promised immunity
from prosecution and paid $30,000 to Delmar Dennis, one of the klan participants
in the murders. The Bureau, however, sandbagged even then, filing reports which
contained "no evidence which [could] form the basis for an indictment for these
murders."3° As a result, on October 27, 1967, seven of the 19 remaining murderers
(including klan leader Bowers and Deputy Price) were convicted only of conspiring
to deprive their victims of their civil rights and sentenced to serve three-to-ten years
in federal prison. Charges against the other twelve were dropped or they were
acquitted altogether. As U.S. District Judge Harold Cox put it at the time of
sentencing: "They killed one nigger, one Jew, and a white man. I gave them what I
thought they deserved."31
The Bureau later claimed that, in the wake of MIBURN, a major COINTELPRO
was mounted against the klan. As William Sullivan put it:
Toward the end of the summer of 1964, Roy Wall, the special agent in charge of [the
Philadelphia, Mississippi] office, called me. I told Roy, "Let's destroy these fellows,
just utterly destroy them." I trusted Roy; he was an outstanding agent. He said that
in Mississippi there were three different Klan organizations and that we were in a
position either to keep them separated and have them compete and fight with each
other for support, or to merge them into one organization. I asked Roy, "If we merge
them into one, can you control it and if necessary destroy it?" Roy said, "Yes, we can
do that." I told him to go ahead and merge them, through the use of informants.
From that time on, the Klan never again raised its head in Mississippi.32
Sullivan's interpretation of events is novel, to say the least, insofar as each of the
Mississippi klan organizations were part of a much larger apparatus, all of which
was heavily infiltrated by the FBI and presumably under Bureau control by the end
of 1964. The FBI claimed to have more than 2,000 informants, or some 20% of overall
klan membership across the South, by 1965." Yet, far from never again raising its
head, the klan continued to perpetrate considerable violence - in Mississippi and
elsewhere - during the latter year. In his autobiography, Friend of SNCC organizer
Abbie Hoffman described the situation in McComb, Mississippi during the summer
of 1965:
The Ku Klux Klan was so strong they once held a rally in the middle of Route 80. Cars
had to pass the meeting on side roads. It was hard to believe, but there they were:
two hundred white sheets, flaming cross and all. [Twenty-four] years ago, the Klan
was no outmoded joke. A faceless nightmare, they were furnished by police with a
list of our license-plate numbers, and they patrolled the borders of each black
community, gunning for organizers. "Coon huntin'," the local whites called it...Daily
picket lines were scenes of vicious Klan beatings. Once I was thrown to the curb and
kicked repeatedly. An FBI agent leaned over and asked sarcastically if my civil rights
had been violated. No one ever got arrested except SNCC workers"
A classic outcome of FBI assistance to the klan concerns Viola Liuzzo, a white
mother of three and Friend of SNCC worker from Detroit, who was shot in the head
and killed by a carload of klansmen near Selma, Alabama on March 25, 1965. One
of the four men in the klan car was Gary Thomas Rowe, the FBI plant who had helped
beat Freedom Riders in Birmingham during 1963, and who was a prime suspect in
several bombings - including the infamous blast at Birmingham's 16th Street Baptist
Church which killed four black children - during the same year." The infiltrator was
placed by the Bureau in its "witness protection program" rather than on trial, despite
evidence that it was he who had actually fired the shot which killed Liuzzo." Again,
the FBI's investigation purportedly netted no evidence of use in a murder prosecu-
tion, and Rowe's colleagues - Collie Leroy Wilkins, Eugene Thomas and William 0.
Eaton - were sentenced only to ten-year sentences after being convicted of violating
their victim's civil rights in December of 1965"
While thus proving itself spectacularly unable or unwilling to come to grips
with klan violence, the Bureau was simultaneously devoting its resources to
harassing civil rights and new left activists, and in commissioning whitewashes of
its conduct in the South. The former resulted in at least one major lawsuit against
three FBI officials - Roy K. Moore, James 0. Ingram and Hunter E. Helgeson- while
the latter engendered such "authorized" (and celebratory) "historical works" as
Don Whitehead's Attack on Terror: The FBI Against the Klan in Mississippi and its
subsequent production as a television movie." Meanwhile, the FBI helped to
destroy the MDFP initiative at Atlantic City, an entirely legitimate effort into which
thousands had poured their time and energy - and upon which they had pinned
their best hopes for achieving some form of nonviolent, "due process" change in
American society - and for which Chaney, Schwerner, Goodman and scores of
others had died.
Even though the MDFP delegation had received the required votes to be seated
COINTELPRO — New Left 171
at the convention, replacing Mississippi's Jim Crow delegation altogether, party

regulars (headed by President Lyndon Johnson) contrived to block these legal
rights, preserving the segregationist status quo. In accomplishing this, Johnson
utilized a special 31-person task force of FBI agents — who infiltrated the convention
floor itself, utilizing phony NBC press credentials — commanded by Bureau Assis-
tant Director DeLoach to wiretap and bug such civil rights leaders as Martin Luther
King and Fannie Lou Hamer, as well as CORE's James Farmer and Julius Lester, and
SNCC's Stokely Carmichael, James Forman, Cleveland Sellers, and Ivanhoe
Donaldson.39Not only were the Johnson forces thus made privy to the MDFP's
external communications with Democratic Party dignitaries such as Robert Ken-
nedy, but the group's internal communications — with each other, and with various
new left advisors — as wel1.40Needless to say, the political process was aborted under
such conditions, a matter which inculcated an increasing sense of futility within
much of the civil rights movement.
Under this cumulative cloud of disillusionment with "the system," the arena of
the new left moved northward, an adjustment which paved one of the major routes
to Columbia. Also by early 1965, SNCC itself had shifted much of its focus from the
rural South to organizing within the vast black ghettoes of northern cities such as
New York, Newark, Washington, D.C., Detroit and Chicago. Correspondingly, SDS
placed increasing emphasis upon its Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP),
initiated during the summer of 1964, moving cadres into the inner cities and
attempting to build "an interracial movement of the poor."41
Movement Against the War

The geographical change meshed nicely with developments which began on
September 14, 1964, when the administration of the University of California at
Berkeley, headed by Chancellor Clark Kerr, attempted to prohibit activities on
campus concerning "off-campus political causes." The student response, galva-
nized by Friend of SNCC organizer Mario Savio (who correctly saw the administra-
tion rule as a move to deny new left support to civil rights groups), was to launch
the "Free Speech Movement," a short-lived entity which forced a reversal of the
institutional position as of January 3,1965. Ultimately, Kerr was forced from his job
as the result of the massive student refusal to forfeit their rights in the face of his
arbitrary power. In the interim:
[S]tudents carried confrontation with authority to the point of spontaneously
surrounding a police car for thirty-two hours to prevent the young man inside [Jack
Weinberg] from being taken to jail; the sit-in tactic was successfully transferred from
Southern lunch counters...to the halls of ivy on three separate occasions, first with
200 students, then with 400, and finally with 1000; the police were called in, for
perhaps the first time ever on a major university campus, to arrest, with proven
brutality, 814 students who had engaged in a sit-in; undergraduates, joined by
graduate students and a portion of the faculty, declared a successful strike of classes
that went on for five days, the first time that tactic had been used at a single
university...Here, ab ova, were all the elements of student protest that were to become
familiar at so many campuses in the next six years.42
Within months, the events at Berkeley and their outcome had captured the
imagination of student radicals across the nation and had been transformed into a
generalized demand for "student power" within the institutional context. In sim-
plest terms, the idea was that in redistributing power within the university, students
would be taking a concrete step towards a much broader alteration of social power,
an argument which could hardly be ignored in SDS circles." Another of the primary
tactical and emotional avenues leading to the insurrection at Columbia barely three
years later had thus been paved.
As this was going on, moreover, the undeclared U.S. war in Vietnam heated up
dramatically with the landing of a Marine expeditionary force at Danang on March
8, 1965.44Given the resulting upsurge in student anti-war sentiment, SDS elected to
at least temporarily divert much of its energy to playing a key role in organizing the
first mass demonstration protesting the U.S. role in Indochina; the event, held on
April 17, attracted perhaps 25,000 people (the organizers had expected, at most,
5,000), and featured a landmark speech by SDS president Paul Potter." In December,
SDS co-founder Tom Hayden accompanied Yale historian/anti-war activist
Staughton Lynd and CP theoretician Herbert Aptheker to North Vietnam to explore
the extent to which "the other side" was inclined toward peace." Although there
was a distinct lack of consensus among SDS veterans as to whether and to what
extent the organization should become permanently engaged in the "single issue"
anti-war movement, an emphasis on such activity largely assumed a life of its own,
at least at the local chapter level." By December 1966, SDS had pledged itself to make
opposition to the war a major agenda item and develop "anti-draft unions" on
campuses throughout the country.4° The third road to Columbia had been opened
up.
Although it is unlikely the FBI director (or anyone else, for that matter; the nation
had simply never before been confronted with increasing numbers of its youth
actively rejecting the values and policies of the status quo) realized the full import of
these events, he ordered intensified coverage of SDS as of April 1965 in order that
the Bureau "have proper coverage similar to what we have...[on] the Communist
Party." The directive shortly manifested itself in the large-scale infiltration of SDS
chapters, a crudely ostentatious program of "interviewing" as many organizational
members and supporters as could be identified, and the reinforcement of "coopera-
tive arrangements" between the FBI and campus police and administrators. This
was followed, in February of 1966, by a directive that agents investigate all "free
university" activities associated with student power advocates insofar as the
director had "reason to believe" these to be sponsored by "subversive groups"
(mainly SDS). This led almost immediately (in Apri11966) to distrinution of a Bureau
study of such activities in Detroit to military intelligence, the Secret Service, the State
Department and the Justice Department. Another report, prepared in Philadelphia
at about the same time and based upon information provided by no less than
thirteen infiltrators, was similarly disseminated. In May of 1966, Hoover ordered
that such scrutiny of the new left be both intensified and expanded."
No doubt contrary to Hoover's intentions, such overt FBI harassment seems if
anything to have angered the "militants," stimulating them to higher levels of
activity.The trend towards white radicals organizing around issues within their
own rather than black communities also received sharp reinforcement in the spring
of 1966 with the election of Stokely Carmichael as the president of SNCC, the formal
articulation of that organization's black power position, its abandonment of nonvi-
olence as a philosophical posture, and its determination that it needed henceforth to
be "an all black project."" In clearest terms, Carmichael explained the need for new
leftists (whom Carmichael described as "liberals") to transform their own home
ground:
I have said that most liberal whites react to "black power" with the question, What
about me?, rather than saying: Tell me what you want and I'll see if I can do it. There
are answers to the right question. One of the most disturbing things about almost all
white supporters of the movement has been that they are afraid to go into their own
communities—which is where the racism exists—and work to get rid of it. They want
to run from Berkeley and tell us what to do in Mississippi; let them look instead at
Berkeley. They admonish blacks to be nonviolent; let them preach nonviolence in the
white community. They come to teach me Negro history; let them go to the suburbs
and open freedom schools for whites. Let them work to stop America's racist foreign
policy; let them press the government to cease supporting the economy of South
Africa [and the war in Vietnam1.51
Although SDS was never to abandon the priority it had maintained on collabo-
rative relations with what was rapidly becoming the black liberation movement, it
subsequently concentrated more and more of its energy upon campuses populated
largely by white students, developing the notion of student power into the concept
of "youth as a social class," and striving to create a truly massive popular opposition
to the war.52As it did so, "activating" an ever-greater proportion of Euroamerican
youth in dissident politics, the FBI homed in with increasing intensity, albeit with
little ability to tell the new left from the old at this juncture. For instance, both the FBI
and the "friendly journalists" to whom it habitually fed information at U.S. News and
World Report persisted in confusing both the CP, USA's campus-based W.E.B.
DuBois Clubs and the SWP's Young Socialist Alliance with new left organizations
for some time." Similar misidentifications concerned the Maoist Progressive Labor
Party (PLP) and its anti-war "youth group," the May 2 Movement (M2M).54
Meantime, by the spring of 1967, SDS membership had mushroomed to at least
30,000, with active chapters on more than 250 campuses nationally." The national
SDS organization, in combination with an array of ad hoc, localized or special-focus
organizations such as the Vietnam Day Committee in Berkeley, Spring Mobilization
Against the War, and War Resisters League — most of which found local SDSers at
the core - was proving that the new left could mount a steadily escalating campaign
of opposition to the war effort while simultaneously developing a sense of "commu-
nity self-empowerment." In April, some 200,000 people turned out for an anti-war
march in New York City while at least 65,000 others marched in San Francisco;
several hundred draft-age men burned their Selective Service cards in Central Park
during the New York demonstration." During the summer, more than 30,000
students fanned out into cities across the North to engage in a "Vietnam Summer"
project of anti-war and draft resistance education in local communities." By fall, as
the Johnson administration made it clear that it intended to pursue the war
regardless of the magnitude of "acceptable" forms of public protest - and with the
Indochina theater commander, General William Westmoreland, requesting that the
number of U.S. troops in Vietnam be increase to 543,000 - SDS tactics became more
militant."
On October 18, to kick off a national"Stop the Draft Week,"several thousand
demonstrators at the University of Wisconsin at Madison announced that represen-
tatives for the Dow Chemical Corporation - manufacturers of the napalm utilized
by U.S. forces in Vietnam - would no longer be allowed to recruit on campus.
Chancellor William Sewell, as part of his new "get tough" arrangement with the FBI,
dispatched riot police to break up the previously peaceful demonstration. His
police, apparently getting tough in turn, used tear gas to disperse protestors for the
first time on a major college campus. Unexpectedly, the crowd fought back with
fury, growing rather than diminishing as the day wore on. In the aftermath of the
clash a general boycott of classes was proclaimed, and endorsed even by the
conservative student government, until Dow recruiting at Madison was canceled.
As with Kerr, Sewell was forced to resign." The action in Madison was followed, on
October 20, by a demonstration in which an estimated 10,000 people marched on the
army induction center in Oakland, California. Finding themselves in a head-on con-
frontation with local riot police, the demonstrators forced them to retreat." On
October 21 and 22, the National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam brought
together the largest anti-war demonstration in the history of the nation's capital up
to that point. Some 100,000 people marched to the seat of military authority at the
Pentagon where many of them clashed physically with the large force of troops and
federal marshals which had been assembled to "secure" the premises."
A month later, on November 14, an action organized by the Fifth Avenue Peace
Parade Committee was utilized by Columbia SDS leaders Ted Gold and Ted
Kaptchuk to spark a confrontation designed to prevent Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara from speaking at the New York Hilton." On at least 60 campuses, major
demonstrations occurred during the remainder of 1967 and beginning of '68, all of
them aimed at ending ROTC programs, or recruitment by the military, defense
corporations and CIA." Additionally, SDS chapters on some 50 campuses re-
searched and made public the secret contracts obtaining between the defense/
intelligence community and the "neutral" scientists working on their campuses."
The ability of the U.S. government to conduct a war for reasons other than those
provided to the public, and through a complex of other official lies and secret
arrangements, was being seriously challenged.65 0ne sign of how seriously the gov-
ernment had begun to take the anti-war opposition came in January 1968, when the
Justice Department under the "liberal" Attorney General [Ramsey] Clark initiated
the single most repressive overt act of the Johnson administration — the indictment
of William Sloane Coffin, chaplain of Yale University, nationally known pediatri-
cian Dr. Benjamin Spock and three other anti-war leaders [Harvard graduate
student Michael Ferber, writer/activist Mitchell Goodman and Marcus Raskin,
director of the Institute for Policy Studies]...for conspiracy to "council, aid and abet"
violations of the draft and to interfere with administration of the draft...There is very
strong circumstantial evidence that the indictment was intended as a warning to all
anti-war demonstrators and spokes[persons] that they might well face similar
charges. All the overt actions cited in support of the indictment were public
activities, such as signing statements and making speeches against the war, along
with collecting draft cards turned in by other persons and forwarding them to the
Justice Department. During the trial, the position of the Justice Department was that
all twenty-eight thousand signers of an anti-draft statement, all persons who voiced
support or even applauded at rallies where the defendants spoke, and even
news[people] who reported the defendants' speeches could be indicted as members
of the conspiracy. At one point, government prosecutors stated that the publishers
and booksellers of a book which printed anti-draft statements could also be
indicted...The outcome of the trial was that one of the defendants [Raskin] was
acquitted and [the convictions of the remaining four set aside because of govern-
ment misconduct during the trial; two were thereupon freed from further prosecu-
tion due to lack of evidence upon which charges might reasonably have been
brought in the first place]."
For his part, J. Edgar Hoover - having deployed his agents to gather "evidence"
for prosecution of those who had by then come to be known as the "Boston Five" -
went on to sum up the Bureau perspective with the amazing contradiction of first
announcing that "New Left organizations such as the Students for a Democratic
Society work constantly in furtherance of the aims and objectives of the Communist
Party throughout the nation," then describing SDS as "anarchistic and nihilistic."fi7
In January of 1968, the FBI instituted its "Key Agitators Index," a roster in which SDS
leaders and others in "anti-war groups" who were "extremely active and most vocal
in their statements denouncing the United States and calling for civil disobedience"
featured prominently. Field agents were instructed to maintain "high level infor-
mant coverage" of "key [new left] activists," with emphasis on their "sources of
funds, foreign contacts and future plans."" By March 1968, the Bureau was routinely
sending reports to the White House concerning new left demonstrations and
demonstrators." And then came Columbia. Obviously, contrary to Sullivan's ver-
sion of events, by this point the Bureau's intelligence files on the new left were
brimming, and the apparatus through which the FBI would undertake its COIN-
TELPROs against that poorly-defined entity was well established.
The COINTELPRO Begins
The student explosion at Columbia University during April of 1968 incorpo-

rated all three strains of issues underlying new left activism: 1) institutional racism,
as manifested in university construction of a gymnasium on land previously
devoted to low-rent housing occupied by impoverished black and Puertorriquerio
families, 2) institutional support to the U.S. "war machine," as specifically demon-
strated in the relationship of the university to the Institute for Defense Analysis
(IDA), and 3) student power concerns, as expressed in popular resistance to the
university administration's arbitrary dispensation of "discipline" - probation,
suspension, expulsion and the like - to student radicals." When a series of meetings
between the campus SDS chapter and University President Grayson Kirk, con-
ducted through the spring semester, resulted in no change in policy, the students
undertook direct action, first occupying the gym construction site on April 23, and
then occupying several university buildings over the next few days." Their action
effectively brought Columbia to a standstill, a matter they announced would not
change until a list of demands - including the university's severing its ties with the
"military-industrial complex," halting its gym construction project, and allowing
students a meaningful voice in institutional governance - were met."
Although the Columbia administration ultimately resorted to the massive use
of local rather than federal police force to "restore order,"73the FBI responded to the
events at the university - as is shown in the accompanying May 9,1968 memo from
C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan -by inaugurating a formal COINTELPRO campaign
against the new left. As with other domestic counterintelligence operations, this one
was designed to seize every opportunity to "expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutral-
ize the activities of the various New Left organizations, their leadership and
adherents" by frustrating "every effort of these groups and individuals to consoli-
date their forces or to recruit new and youthful members" by capitalizing "upon
organizational and personal conflicts of the leadership," spreading disinformation
through "cooperation of reliable news media," and to otherwise "inspire action
where circumstances warrant." Another internal Bureau memo, written at about the
same time, specified the justification for the COINTELPRO as being the fact that
"certain New Left individuals" were "calling for revolution in America" and "for
the defeat of the United States in Vietnam," and had upon occasion "viciously and
scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our
investigation of it and to drive us off the college campuses."74
The Bureau's new COINTELPRO effort was quickly linked to illegal (under its
charter) CIA domestic surveillance programs such as Project MERRIMAC, Project
RESISTANCE and Operation CHAOS, which collectively amassed and in some
cases circulated "intelligence information" in the form of "watchlists" on "radical
students, antiwar activists, draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists, anar-
chists and assorted 'New Leftists.'"75Before the last of these programs was allegedly
terminated in 1974, they had caused "national security files" to be opened on at least
Palrikp.SIA4LN
Memorandum
. O Mr. W. C. Sullivan
4//r% I IA
ROM . Brennan (...„
■UBJEr: 1 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM V;/..

"1
INTERNAL SECURITY •
)
4DISRUPTION OF TILE NEW LEFT
c2
,
Our Nation is undergoing an era of disruption and

•
violence caused to a large extent by various individuals

f generally connected with the New Left. Some of these activists
urge revolutionkla America and call for-tWdefmat el thIL:-
d
Malte DI'Vletnam. They continually and falsely allege
police brutality and do not hesitate to utilize unlawful acts
to further their so-called causes. The New Left has on many
occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director
and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigation of it
and to drive us off the college campuses. With this in mind,
it is our recommendation that a new Counterintelligence Program
be designed to neutralize the New Loft and the Key Activists.
The Key Activists are those individuals wfiii are the Nevin% '
-forces behind the New Left and on whom we have intensified our
investigations.
The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt and

•
othervise neutralize the activities of this group and persons
connected with it. It is hoped that with this new program
their violent and illegal activities may be reduced if not
curtailed.
General instructions are being furnished to all office:,
relating to the purpose and administration of this new program.
Briefly, these instructions require all offices to submit an
analysis of possible counterintelligence operations on the New
Left and on the Key Activists on or before G/1/68, including
any specific recommendations for action. Thereafter, all
offices will submit a 90-day status letter setting forth a
summary of their accomplishmenti and future plans. Each
office will maintain a pending case and.nssign experienced /
rnc losuro %., • . 11%98 •
EPG/BAW:jms
(9)
hICT-15 1(1
1 Mr. Felt
1_ A:111'
c/c"'.2
1 - Mr; DeLoach Mil
1 - Mr.41C. Sullivan
1 -_,V -:. ■
117 .
1 - (4, •
-
CONTINUED - OYER I,!' 5
Kickoff document: memo calling for initiation of a formal COINTELPRO against the
new left and neutralization of its key leaders. Note these individuals are described as
subject to ongoing investigation, contrary to the assertion of William C. Sullivan in his
autobiography. Recommendations for action appear on next page.
Memo to Mr. Sullivan

Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
,
personnel to this program. All proposed counterintellfrence
action must be approved at tit6
- Scat of Government prlcr
1 instituting it. This new program rill bn crperv1!, ...4 a:: the
Seat of Government by a Special Age"'. s,::erviso: ku the
Internal Security Section.
RECOMYENDATIONS:
1) That the Domestic Intelligence Division be

authorized to immediately initiate a coordinated Counter-
intelligence Program directed at exposing, disrupting, and
otherwise neutralizing the New Left and Key Activists.
2) That the attached letter setting forth

instructions for the administration and immediate enactment
of the program be forwarded to all offices.
cif
23,500 U.S. citizens, as well as organizations including SDS, Women's Strike for
Peace, the BPP, Clergy and Laity Concerned About the War in Vietnam, and Grove
Press, Inc. In the process of running Operation CHAOS alone, the CIA generated
some 3,500 "domestic security" memos for its own internal use, another 3,000 which
were sent to the FBI as "action items," and "about forty memos and studies which
were sent to the White House and high level executive officials."76Similarly, the
Bureau also tied its new left counterintelligence operation to the National Security
Agency's (NSA's) illegal international telephone and telegram monitoring of citi-
zens, code-named Project MINARET, which targeted watchlisted names of indi-
viduals who "ranged from members of radical political groups to celebrities, to
ordinary citizens involved in protests against the government," and a number of
organizations which were "peaceful and nonviolent in nature."" The FBI also
hooked its anti-new left information-gathering to an illegal surveillance net estab-
lished by the Army Intelligence Corps:
According to Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Froehlke, in testimony before a
Senate subcommittee in 1971, Army directives called for information collection on
"any category of information related even remotely to people or organizations
active in a community in which potential for a riot or disorder was present." Before
the program was terminated in 1971 due to public exposure and criticism, Army
intelligence had about fifteen hundred plainclothesmen assigned to collect political
information on what the Senate Intelligence Committee later termed "virtually
every group seeking peaceful change in the United States." Index cards were
gathered on more than one hundred thousand civilian protesters and on more than
seven hundred and sixty thousand organizations and "incidents." In addition to
centralized Army intelligence files maintained at bases near Washington, D.C. local
army units carried on their operations and investigations, with little central control.
Thus, Fourth Army headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, had its own collection
of one hundred twenty thousand file cards on "personalities of interest.""
Meanwhile, HUAC helped establish the tenor for severe repression by issuing
a "report" claiming that new left and black liberation formations were "seriously
considering the possibility of instituting armed insurrections in this country," and
that SDS was actually planning "guerrilla-type operations against the government."
Although the committee could come up with precious little by which to substantiate
its allegations, it nonetheless proceeded to recommend utilization of the Internal
Security Act's concentration camp provisions to effect the "temporary imprison-
ment of warring guerrillas."" HUAC's recommendations resulted in a formal
review by a Justice Department committee headed by Attorney General Ramsey
Clark of federal "emergency detention guidelines," intended to increase "flexibility
and discretion at the operating level." The resulting revision of the 1950 statute's
implementation procedures allowed for the "preventive detention" of anyone who
evidenced "membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary
organization within the last five years," leadership or "substantive participation" in
a "front organization" within the past three years, or anyone else who "could be
expected" to utilize a national emergency as a format in which to engage in
"interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation" of the govern-
ment, whether or not they could be shown to have committed "overt acts or
statements within the time limits prescribed.""
Within the context of such official sensibilities, among the activists designated
by the Bureau as being "key" to the new left, and therefore targeted for rapid
COINTELPRO neutralization, were - as the accompanying June 10, 1968 memo
from Hoover to the Newark SAC reveals -SDS founder Tom Hayden and long-time
pacifist organizer David Dellinger, a leader of the National Mobilization to End the
War in Vietnam (Mobe). Hayden, Dellinger and a number of other new left activists
were also subpoenaed by HUAC as a result of their FBI "extremisrdesignations."
Hayden himself was already being subjected to a concerted effort to bad-jacket him,
as may be readily seen in the accompanying May 27,1968 memo from the Newark
SAC to Hoover. Such immediate attention was undoubtedly paid to the pair-as well
as self-defined anarchists Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, who had recently
founded a largely mythical organization dubbed Youth International Party (Yip-
pie!) - not on the basis of their supposed "guerrilla" activities, but because of their
1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr.p=7,771 0
1- Mr. UILLIVIIMI
SAC, Newark (100-50166) 6/10/68
EX-103 PESOL
RNA ATTENTION
Director, FBI -(1-00---2145U9H)-.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PRuunam
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW, LEFT
Reurlet 5/27/66.
Bureau letter of 5/10/68 instructed all offices to
Submit a detailed analysis of potential counterintelligence
action against Now Left organizations and Key Activists
,• within their respective territories, together with specific
recommendations and necessary facts on any proposed action.
This letter also instructed that offices which have
investigative responsibility for Key Activists should
specifically comment in the initial letter to the Bureau
regarding those individuals.
Your letter of 5/27/G8 fails to provide the above
information, consists primarily of general observations aLd
indicates a negative attitude. It is also noted that this
letter contains proposed action against Key Activist
Thomas Emmett Hayden, now residing in Chicago, but makes
no mention of David Dellinger, a Key Activist of your office.
Specific(comment on Dellinger should have been included as
• instructed.
The above-requested information should bo submitted
by return mail and conform to the instructions contained in
uroau letter of 5/10/68. It is imperative that this
Counterintelligence Program bo assigned to an experienced,
imaginative Agent, and it is incumbent upon you to see that
it receives tho proper emphasis.
RLR:rsz
(6)
NOTE:
r eon
Referenced letter from Newark failed to provide the

specific information requested by the Bureau..
m..
ttLif2,63.,,o
Memo identifying Tom Hayden and David Dellinger as "Key Activists."

expressed intent to bring about massive street demonstrations during the Demo-
cratic Party's national convention, set for August in Chicago. The purpose of these
DATE: 5/27/66
'-) r rr r r' -1.' ) r- r'i L e r .4.

INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION aF'THE NEW . LEFT
Re Bureau letter to Albany, 5/10/68.°'
It is believed that in attempting to expose,

disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the activities of the
"new left" by counterintelligence methods, the Bureau is
faced with a rather unique task. Because, first, the "new
left" is difficult to actually define; and second, of the
complete disregard by "new left" members for moral and so- 9
vial lava and social amenities.
It is believed that the nonconformism in dress
and speech, neglect of personal cleanliness, use of obsoeni-'
tieh (printed and uttered),publicized sexual promiscuity,
experimenting with and the use of drugs, filthy clothes,
shaggy hair, wearing of sandals; beads, and unusual jewelry
tend to negate any attempt to hold these people up to ridi-
cule. The American press has been doing this with no
apparent effect or curtailment Of "new left" activities.
These individuals are apparently getting strength and more
brazen in their attempts to destroy American society, as
noted in the takeover recently at Columbia University, New
York City, and other universities in the U.S.
It is believed therefore, that they must be
destroyed or neutralized from the inside. Neutralize them
in the same manner they are trying to destroy and neutralize
the U.S. J
It Is Newark's opinion t t this can possibly be
done in two ways:
mcr /ea -q/7
1. The U,S.Government must e co vinced, through
:the proper departments, that it must stop subsidizing its
;- 1.-/?0;•'1" ,--__---.
(2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (INFO)(RM) KO> 32
7L--'--- /
-4.,.c.,: -‘00
L_4_1, , or
.1,.___ ,
2-Chicago TUCUAS BAYDENXINFO)(RM)
(
3-Newark u.: m 2-',:...

(1-100-48095)(711CMAS HAYDEN)
Memo outlining plan to bad-jacket Tom Hayden (continued on next page).
demonstrations being to demand an end to the U.S. war in Southeast Asia, the FBI
appears to have viewed them as an insistence upon "defeat."82
By July 5, 1968 (the date of the accompanying letter from Hoover to the SAC,
Albany), therefore, the Bureau had assembled a 12-point "master plan" through
which it intended to destroy the new left opposition. This was coupled to a Justice
SoWn_liestruarTOn. Each field office should acquire tho names

and backgrounds of all students of the"new left", who have
been arrested for the very type of activity we are now trying
to curtail or halt. Any Government subsidization to these
individuals should be stopped.
They must be taken out of the ranks of this pre-
dominantly college-age movement; separate them and diminish
their power,
2. Certain key leaders must be chosen to become

the object of a counterintelligence plot to ident ify_them_as.
government informants. It appears that this is the only
thing-that =could -eahZe these individuals concern; if some of
their leaders turned out to be paid informers. Attacking
their morals, disrespect for the law, or patriotic disdain
will not impress their followers, as it would normally to
other groups, so it must be by attacking them through their
own principles and beliefs. Accuse them of selling out to
"imperialistic mAfiopoly capitalism".
THOMAS EMMITT,DAYDEN
KEY ACTIVIST, NEWARK DIVISION
.
Newark believes that it might be possibl-‘to attach

the stigma of informant or Government "fink" tekHAYDEN because
of the apparent unlimited finances at his disposal, enabling
him to take numerous trips in and out of the U.S., without any
job or other means of financial support. Also, the ease with '
which he travels to communist countries, his reception there,
the privileges afforded him, and his eventual return with no
actual remonstrations by this Government.
Newark suggests that after HAYDEN visits a certain

city or country, that a news release, datelined Washington,
D.C„, be prepared noting that -according to informed Govern-
ment sources", etc., certain events happened in that certain
city or country which would reflect back on HAYDEN through
similarity of circumstances or events. It is suggested further
that these news released be collected and when several promis-
ing items are collected, they be turned over to a representativ
of a cooperative nows media with a suggestion that a feature
Writerbe Wes 1-h0-talt Of WriTing up a ntory pointing out
the coincidences of HAYDEN's visits to certain cities and
news stories emanating from Washington, D.C., pointing to
BAYDEN an the source. The connection may be spotlighted by
including oertain sidelights or confidential bits of infor-
mation which may only be known to HAYDEN and a Bureau source.
It is realized the above will take time, but in

order for the plan to be effective, it must have a solid
basis and a continual indictment.
One copy of this letter is being sent to Chicago

since THOMAS HAYDEN changed his residence to there.
One copy of this letter is being sent to NYO for

information because of available transportation facilities
which give "new left" demonstrators in this area the oppor-
tunity to choose either New York or New Jersey locations
for disruptive tactics.
1 - ilr.
1 - Mr Felt •
SAC, AlUnnT
1 - Hr. Bannon
DIroctos, 101 (100-4420OP) 1USullivan
1- Mr C D Drennan
(-) 1 -
'0UNITHIN117LLIGUNCE PROGRAM
- 1 -
INTEIINAL SECUMITT
DISRUPTION OF TIM NET LEFT
(COINTLLPRO - ME3112FT)
Bulet 5/10/62 requested suggestions for counter-

intelligence action against the New Left. The replies to
the Bureau's request have been analyzed and it is felt that
the following suggestions for counterintelligence action can
be utilized by all offices:
1. Preparation of a leaflet designed to counter-
act the Impression that Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS) and other minority groups speak for the majority of
students at universities. The leaflet should contain photo-
graphs of New Left leadership at the respective university.
Naturally, the most obnoxious pictures should be used.
2. The imstigeting of or the taking- advantage of
N
1
iF z1.personal
-leaders,
conflicts or animosities existing between New Left
?5.ki27 0
5 3. ThevfieSijiii:of iapressiona-teaLeottaia New-
•
- Left leaderS artrief 00000 ti.for the Bureau or other law
------ enforcement agencies. • , - lc nu l• C64
4. The use of articles from student newspapers .-
and/or the "underground press" to show the depravity of
New Left leaders and members. In this connection, articles
showing advocat ion of the use of narcotics and free sex are
/ ideal to send to university officials, wealthy donors,
members of the legislature and parents of students who are
active in New Left' matters.
5. Since the use of marijuana and other narcotics
is widespread among members of the New Left, you should be
alert to opportunities to have them arrested by local
authorities on drug charges. Any information concerning the
•
1.7.117 2 - All Field Officer
CAW ,Iseca":1 \\ , rarr PACE 1-1181:£

fILA
(t2',?‘30 I!W.P' I / •
-1 t \ • c
The FBI's 12 -point master plan for COINTELPRO — New Left

(continued on next page).
Department initiative, spearheaded by Attorney General Clark, to consolidate what

was called the Interdivisional Information Unit (IDIU) to coordinate "all informa-
tion" on organizations and individuals "who play a role, whether purposefully or
not, either in instigating or spreading civil disorders, or in preventing our checking
them."83By 1970, the IDIU computer was being utilized to coordinate a flow of more
than 40,000 intelligence reports per year concerning "civil disorders and campus
disturbances" involving over 10,000 "anti-war activists and other dissidents."
Organizations targeted for IDIU attention included groups ranging from the NAACP
and Urban League to SDS and the BPP. Individuals included under its rubric
spanned the range from United Farm Workers organizer Cesar Chavez to black
entertainer Sammy Davis, Jr., from folk singer/activist Joan Baez to an unnamed
"bearded militant who writes and recites poetry."'84
fact that individuals have marijuana or are engaging in a

narcotics party should be immediately furnished to local
authorities and they should be encouraged to take action.
6. Theirawing up el anonymems letters regarding
individual!'ttti t an the New Left. These letters should
set out their activities and should be sent to their parents,
neighbors and the parents' employers. This could have the
effect of forcing the parents to take action.
7. Anonymous letters or leaflets describing
faculty.sembers and gvaduatO assistants in the various
institutions of higher learning who are active k New left aattgu.
The activities and associations of the.individusl should be
set out. Anonymous mailings shoOld be made to university
officials, members of the state legislature, Board of
Regents, and to the press. Such letters could be signed .
"A Concerned Alumni" or "A Concerned Taxpayer." '
S. •Whenever New Left groups engage in disruptive
activitie•on college campuses, cooperative press contacts
should be encouraged to emphasize that the disruptive
elements constitute a minority of the students and do not
represent the conviction of the majority. The press shotqd
demand an immediate student referendum on the issue in
question. Inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of students
is not active in New Left matters, it is felt that this
technique, used in carefully selected cases, could put an
end to lengthy demonstrations and could cause embarrassment
to New Left elements.
9. There is a definite hostility among SOS and
other New left groups toward the Socialist Workers Party
(SWP), the Young Social' liance (YSA), and the
Progressive Labor Party This _bractli t should be
exploited mhereverroati
10. The field was previous advised that New Left
groups are attempting to open -.1114161Za• near military
bases in order to influence mem r e Armed Forces •
Wherever these coffeehouses are, friendly news media should
be alerted to them and their purpose. In addition, various
drugs, such as marijuana, will probably be utilized by
individuals running the coffeehouses or frequenting them.
Local law enforcement authorities should be promptly advised
whenever you receive an indication that this is being done.
11. Consider the use of cartoons, photographs, and
anonymom4 1 hick will. have...thm-eifect of ridiculing
the New Leff. Ridicule is one of ther"ioTt potent weapons
which we can use against it.
12. Be alert for oppo -o confuse and
disrupt New Left activities by sin orna For example;
when events are planned, notific on Tttdc e event has
been cancelled or postponed could be sent to various
individuals.
You are reminded that no count ee i ttt lligence
action is to be taken without Bureau approval. Insure that
this Program is assigned to an Agent with all excellent
knowledge of both New Left groups and individuals. It must
be approached with imagination and enthusiasm if it is to be
successful.
As an economy measure the caption "COINTELPRO • NEW LEFT"
should be used on all communications concerning this Program.
NOTE:
See memo C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan dated

7/3/68, captioned as above. prepared by 8AW. jes.
COINTELPRO-New Left had, in the meantime, gotten well under way, as is

evidenced by the accompanying May 29, 1968 memo from Hoover to his Philadel-
phia SAC, calling upon that office to undertake specific counterintelligence activi-
ties - induding the generation of cartoons a la the materials being circulated with
lethal results as a part of COINTELPRO-BPP at about the same time- to disrupt SDS
within its area of operations. By late July, as is indicated in the accompanying August
9,1968 letter from Hoover to the SAC, Los Angeles, the sending of anonymous letters
had entered the arsenal of tactics being applied against SDS. All such efforts seem
., Memorandum
/.
DIRECTOR, FBI
ir •
SAC., PHILADELPHIA (100-49929). (P)
unumr ....„,./€1COIRITFRTNTELLIGEIZZLPROCRAli
INTERNAL SECURITY
O- w I 'Try
UDISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT
Re Bureau letter to all offices 5/10/68.

Enclosed herewith is one copy of a cartoon which appeared
in the 5/7/68 issue of 'The Temple News."
The disruption of the "New Left" through counter-
intelligence activities poses problems which have not been
previously present in this phase of our work. Whereas the
Communist party and similar subversive groups have hidden their
indiscretions and generally shunned publicity, the New Left
groups have flaunted their arrogance, immorality, lack of
respect for law and order, and thrived on publicity. Communal
living quarters for unmarried male and female members of the
New Left have been publicized as a badge of "free-thinking"
individualism. Adherence to principles of Marxism has been
freely acknowledged. Members of the Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) have openly admitted their affiliations and
their adherence to anarchistic aims. /j,
publicity and public exposure of the New Left,
however, can still be used effectively to thwart the growth
of those organized groups such as SDS. It will be recalled
that it was through such measures that we contained the W.S.B.
Du Bois Clubs of Americo (DCA) and exposed it ac a tool of the
Communist Party.
7
As noted in referenced Bureau letter, we must
seize upon every opportunity to capitalize upon organizational
and personal conflicts of the New Left leaders. The creation
of factionalism is a potent weapon which must not be overlooked.
No overall plan can be projected for the use of factionalism
since its use depends upon circumstances at any one given time.
It effective usesdepends upon timely, keen analysis of
ormatton obtailtsehrough investigation and from our sour s.
40 Burea u (zer4)\-1 (Rm) PEC-105
Philadelphia ( 00-49929)
,qt$: //Mk
- S:PSMLill 6 NAY s Ea
( ,
3 1968 t"':. I
Br U.S. S•vinsr Bonk Replarty en de Pojnpll Sdroiffss Piss
Memo detailing plan to disrupt SDS at Temple University through use of cartoons,
pamphlets and anonymous letters (continued on next page).
to have had the short-term objective of preventing the actualization of unified and
coherent anti-war demonstrations in Chicago during early August. The longer term
goal, of course, was to eliminate the new left as a factor in the U.S. political equation.
r
(
1 A moat potent weapon not to be overlooked is the
usof ridicule, In'the paat its use has, been primarily
re ricted against individuals through cartoonp_phd anonymous
le era. Consideration should be given to greater use
technique „to discredit the entire New Left movement. An
of thi4
example is the cartoon attached which appeared in the "Temple
University News," student newspaper at Temple University,
Philadelphia, Pa. photographs of-student—sit-ins," such
as that which occurrFa -gt-Coltiibia University, with appropriate
captions, such as "Give to the College of your Choice," could
be prepared .and-anonymously circulated_among.appropriate
legislators, proMinent alumni members, and others.
Specifically, in Philadelphia, the main target for

counterintelligence under this program will be the SDS. There
are no Key Activists in the Philadelphia Division territory as
of the date of this letter. No_specific recommendations. are.
being made at this time; however, the following avenues of action
are open and under consideration for future use:
r
1. Cooperative news media representatives have
been used in the past. Reliability and discreetness have been
proven. Recommendations for specific action will include
necessary assurances that the Bureau's interest will be pro-
tected.
2. Philadelphia has used cartoons to ridicule
leaders of the CP. It is felt this method has the most
potential for obtaining our goals. Under consideration is
a proposal that a series of cartoons be prepared and that the
anarchistic aims dr tiit sew Lilte b emphasized by labeling them
"Mobocracy." It is apparent that "Mob" action is repugnant
to the majority of college students and other serious-minded
youth. Methods of distributing such cartoons can be done
anonymously or through established sources in each Division.
3. Philadelphia has established contacts with the

Catholic_War„:5Leterans_(CWV). Through these contacts it was
postible to prepare a series of leaflets exposing the DCA which were
printed and published by the CWV on a national basis. It is felt '
similar arrangements can be made for the CWV to issue a pamphlet
q.
exposing the SAS. Such a project would require theassistance
of .the Bureau and Chicago. the Office of Origin in the SDS case.
A leaaing stamper or the CP youth was neutralize
, Le
•
IL
wh n the Philadelphia Office publicized his homosexual activi Y.
We knesses and deficiencies of individual members of-the New
t'should be used by us to neutralize them. Anonymous lett ra
to he parents of individual members of the New Left might vek
well serve the purpose, neutralizing them through parental
discipline.
Although the foregoing is not intended to be
all-inclusive, it represents the basic approach of the
Philadelphia Division to this new program. Appropriate
Special Agent personnel have been alerted to this program.
Recommendations for specific counterintelligence action will
be submitted to the Bureau by separate letter.
As at Columbia, during the convention itself the burden of physically and

overtly repressing the demonstrators — who were, after all, merely exercising
constitutionally protected rights to speech, assembly and petition — was passed to
the tactical units of the Chicago police, a "duty" the CPD performed with a relish
later described even by an official government commission as constituting a "police
riot.." 5In the aftermath, however, with the election of Richard Nixon, the FBI and
First of the cartoons produced and dis-

tributed by the Philadelphia FBI office
as part of its COINTELPRO to destroy
SDS at Temple University. The cap-
tion, in a parody of the rhetoric of Sen.
Joseph McCarthy reads: "I have in my
hand a list of 200 names of people who
don't advocate the violent overthrow of
the government."
Justice Department moved in to "legally" eliminate their quarry by leveling at them

an essentially baseless set of "conspiracy" charges. As Robert Justin Goldstein has
observed:
The Nixon administration instituted an extraordinary series of conspiracy trials

against anti-war leaders —in fact, together with the Spock-Coffin trial of the Johnson
administration, the Nixon administration prosecuted virtually every prominent
anti-war leader. What was perhaps the most extraordinary thing about the prosecu-
tions was that the major charges brought either all collapsed during the judicial
process, or the cases were thrown out due to illegal government activities or refusal
to disclose records of illegal wiretapping...While the prosecutions failed in one sense
— historian William Manchester termed them "an unparalleled series of judicial
disasters for the government" — they succeeded sensationally in another. Namely,
they succeeded in tying up huge amounts of time, money and energy that the anti-
war and radical movements could have used to expand rather than expend on
protracted and costly defense struggles."
Goldstein continues:
The first major conspiracy trial, the so-called Chicago Conspiracy or Chicago Eight
trial, resulted from indictments handed down in March, 1969 of eight anti-war
leaders under the 1968 Anti-Riot Act for conspiring to cross state lines with intent
to incite a riot...On March 20, 1969 [a] Chicago grand jury returned indictments
against...eight demonstrators, six of whom were highly visible radical leaders,
including pacifist David Dellinger, Black Panther Party Chairman Bobby Seale,
[former] SDS leaders [now key members of the Mobe] Tom Hayden and Rennie
Davis, and "Yippie" leaders Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman [the other two
defendants were little-known SDS members John Froines and Lee Weiner]...Seale's
case was severed in mid-trial (and never retried) when Federal Judge Julius
Hoffman found him in contempt of court and summarily sentenced him to an
unprecedented four years in prison, as a result of repeated outbursts by Seale
following Judge Hoffman's refusal to either allow Seale to defend himself or have
the services of a lawyer of his own choosing. After a tumultuous trial — which at one
point featured Seale tied to a chair with a gag in his mouth — the remaining seven
defendants were found innocent of the conspiracy charge...two charged with
teaching the use of incendiary devices were acquitted, and the other five were found
guilty of crossing state lines with intent to incite a riot. Judge Hoffman...sentenced
the five to five years in [prison] and $5,000 fines, and then added 175 contempt
sentences ranging from two and a half months to over four years against all seven
defendants and two of their lawyers [William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass].
Many of the contempt charges were based on the flimsiest possible grounds; for
example, Dellinger was sentenced to six months for calling the judge "Mr." Hoffman,
and Davis was sentenced to twenty-nine days for applauding at one point and
laughing at another. Eventually both the contempt and substantive convictions
were overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals [but the damage had been
done]."
Barely had the Chicago conspiracy trial ended than another began, in December
1970, in Seattle. In this case, eight leaders of an organization calling itself the Seattle
Liberation Front - predictably, they were described as the "Seattle Eight" - were
accused of having conspired to damage federal property, the result of a February
1970 demonstration protesting the contempt sentences handed down in the Chicago
trial which ended with windows broken and slogans spray-painted on the walls on
the Seattle federal building. Although it was obvious that the February demonstra-
tion was a purely local affair, the planning for which had begun barely ten days prior
to the event, four of the defendants were also charged under the 1968 anti-riot statute
used against the Chicago Eight with having crossed state lines with intent to incite
riot the preceding December, while a fifth was accused of having utilized interstate
telephone lines for the same purpose." Although the presiding judge, George H.
Bold t, eventually declared a mistrial in these ludicrous proceedings, he followed the
lead of his Chicago colleague in meting out harsh contempt sentences, based on the
"totality" of the defendants' behavior during the trial. By this point, the once-vibrant
Seattle new left movement was completely wrecked."
This was followed in 1971 by the leveling of conspiracy charges against Catholic
priests Phillip and Daniel Berrigan, along with six others, claiming that they had
conspired to raid draft boards, blow up heating tunnels in Washington, D.C., and
kidnap presidential advisor Henry Kissinger. The case had been devised by the
Bureau, but upon review by Justice Department attorneys was deemed so weak that
it could not even be presented to a grand jury. However, on November 27,1970, J.
Edgar Hoover personally testified before an "appropriations subcommittee" repre-
sented only by a pair of long-time Hoover admirers — Senators Robert C. Byrd (D.,
West Virginia) and Roman L. Hruska (R., Nebraska) — as to the existence of the
"plot," thus forcing matters into court." At trial, however, the Bureau's "case"
turned out to be based exclusively on the testimony of a single infiltrator/provo-
cateur, Boyd Douglass,who had been paid some $9,000 for his "services" by the FBI
and certified by a federal psychiatrist as a "sociopath and pathological liar."91
Although the defense declined to present a single witness, the jury deadlocked ten
to two for acquittal on all major counts with which the Berrigans and their colleagues
had been charged, voting to convict the accused only of having smuggled letters to
one another during previous incarcerations f2Eventually, an appeals court over-
turned six of the seven convictions which were obtained even on this minor charge,
given that Douglass had served as courier of the forbidden mail, and had done so
on the express instructions of the FBI and at least one prison warden." Ultimately,
after all the smoke borne of sensational headlines had cleared, only Father Philip
Berrigan went briefly to prison, the only U.S. citizen ever sentenced by a court for
sending or possessing "contraband" letters."
Another conspiracy case brought in 1971 involved Daniel Ellsberg, a former
high-level defense consultant with a government think tank, the Rand Corporation,
who had shifted from staunch support of the Vietnam War to near-absolute
condemnation of it, and his colleague, Anthony Russo." The government charged
that the pair had conspired to deny the government "its lawful function of withhold-
ing classified information from the public," by virtue of their removing several
thousand pages of secret documentation (the so-called 'Pentagon Papers") concern-
ing the government's systematic deception of the U.S. public with regard to the
country's Indochina policy from Rand facilities. They then passed the material along
to New York Times reporter Neil Sheehan, who saw to it that selections appeared in
the paper. Among other things, Ellsberg and Russo were charged with violating the
1917 Espionage Act, a wartime statute said to be in effect because President Harry
Truman's invocation of it in 1950 — at the onset of the Korean War — had never been
revoked (!)." Although the government was unable to establish that the Ellsberg/
Russo "conspiracy" in any way jeopardized valid national security interests— to the
contrary, federal prosecutors unsuccessfully argued at trial that no such jeopardy
was required under the law — or even that the government possessed a statutory
basis from which to contend that its classification and withholding of information
from the public was "lawful," the case was taken to court.'7
The Pentagon Papers trial was marked by a series of virtually unbelievable instances
of government misconduct, including attempts by the government to suppress
internal memoranda and studies casting doubt on the national security significance
of the papers, an apparent government denial of any wiretaps and then an admis-
sion that Ellsberg and someone connected with the defense had both been overheard
on taps directed at other persons, and the secret offer of the directorship of the FBI
[Hoover being dead by this point] to presiding Judge Matthew Byrne by White
House Domestic Advisor John Ehrlichman in the middle of the trial. The most sen-
sational revelation was that persons associated with the White House Special Inves-
tigations Unit [the so-called 'Plumbers," including former FBI agents G. Gordon
Liddy and James McCord]...had burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist [Dr.
Louis Fielding] after the indictment was handed down...White House papers
released in the course of the Watergate investigation revealed that the purpose of the
burglary was to obtain information which could be used to create a "negative press
image" of Ellsberg in an attempt to, as White House Counsel Charles Colson said,
to "plumber" Howard Hunt in one telephone conversation, "put this bastard into
one hell of a situation and discredit the New Left." With the final straw the
government's temporary inability to uncover its wiretap records on Ellsberg, Judge
Byrne ordered a mistrial and dismissed the case in April, 1973.98
The year 1972 witnessed yet another conspiracy extravaganza with the indict-
ment of the so-called "Gainesville Eight" — thus designated as a result of the site of
trial being set for Gainesville, Florida — all leaders of Vietnam Veterans Against the
War (VVAW). The defendants were charged with conspiring to disrupt the 1972
Democratic and Republican Party national conventions in Miami through use of
weapons ranging from "fried marbles" and ball bearings glued to cherry bombs
(effectively constituting low-powered fragmentation grenades) to "wrist sling-
shots," crossbows, automatic weapons and incendiary devices. The timing of the
federal grand jury which led to the indictments, and to which all eight defendants
were called, was such as to effectively gut any VVAW demonstrations — including
peaceful ones — at the Democratic convention, while the holding of four of the
accused without bond for refusing to testify, and the arraignment of all eight during
the Republican convention ruined their plans for that one as well. At trial, govern-
ment witnesses broadened the array of weaponry the eight allegedly planned to use
to include anti-tank weapons such as bazookas, but it emerged that police infiltra-
tors rather than the defendants had been the primary discussants of higher-powered
weapons such as machineguns. The only physical evidence prosecutors could
produce in this regard were slingshots available at any sporting goods store." The
government's supposed star witness, an FBI infiltrator named William Lemmer,
turned out to have been threatened with a psychiatric discharge by the army, and
recently ordered held for a sanity hearing at the request of his wife after he wrote her
a letter blaming VVAW for the breakup of his marriage explaining that if he decided
to "get" the defendants, it would be silently, in "tennis shoes" and with a "length of
piano wire.”100He had also been only recently released by local police after they
arrested him in possession of a loaded rifle and pistol, and an examining doctor
recommended he receive psychiatric help. The jury deliberated less than three and
a half hours before acquitting all eight defendants of all charges against them, but
by then VVAW had ceased to function as an effective organization.01
Escalation
While the Justice Department was playing out its string of legal charades against
the new left leadership, the FBI was quite busily engaged in more clandestine forms
of repression. In the backwash of the Democratic convention in Chicago, it quickly
set about fostering the divisiveness and fragmentation of dissident groups, a matter
which is readily borne out in the accompanying August 28, 1968 memo from the
director to the SAC, Detroit, calling for the employment of various COINTELPRO
tactics against the Detroit Coalition Committee. Of particular interest to the FBI in
the Detroit area was John Sinclair, head of a Yippie!-oriented organization called the
White Panther Party, so much so that the Bureau provided considerable assistance
to the local red squad in setting Sinclair up to receive an all but unprecedented nine-
and-a-half year sentence for smoking marijuana at a rock concert in the presence of
two undercover police officers."'In a number of other cases across the country, there
was strong evidence that police had actually planted the "controlled substances"
used to "judicially" effect political neutralizations 103As Frank Donner, an ACLU
expert on political surveillance and counterintelligence was to put it in 1971, "The
pot bust has become a punitive sanction against political dissent and the threat of
prosecution [on drug charges] is a favorite method of 'hooking' student inform-
ers 7104
Another favorite tactic was arrest and sometimes prosecution of student activ-
ists for "desecration of the flag." Despite clear first amendment protection, local
police red squads working in collusion with FBI COINTELPRO desks habitually
rousted demonstrators who incorporated the flag into their apparel, altered it to
include peace signs or other movement symbols, burned it, or even flew it upside
down (the international signal of distress). By May of 1971, the ACLU alone reported
that it had at least 100 "flag cases" under consideration 105Eventually, defendants
were tried and a number convicted in Hawaii, Minnesota, New York, Colorado,
Washington state, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and California before the Su-
preme Court finally ruled in Spence v. Washington (1974) that such prosecutions were
unconstitutional."' Still, punishments on such grounds continued to occur through
juvenile courts, as when in August 1974 an Ohio judge sentenced two teenaged girls
to attend flag ceremonies for a week, observe a six-month curfew, and not to
communicate with one another in any way for a year, all because they'd burned a
flag during an anti-war demonstration."
The "underground press," both "cultural" and political, was also a primary
target during the early phases of COINTELPRO-New Left, as is made clear in the
accompanying September 9, 1968 letter from Hoover to the SAC, New York,
requesting a plan of attack; an October 7 proposal by the SAC; and Hoover's October
21 reply approving the operation. Focused upon is Liberation News Service (LNS),
roughly the equivalent of Associated Press for the hundreds of alternative tabloids
- mainly community-based - which had emerged across the country during the
second half of the '60s. Between the point of inception of the COINTELPRO and late
UNITED STATES GC tA1MENT
DIRECTOR, FBI. (100-419698)
COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT

BODED: 8/29/69
Following the National Anti-War Conference in

r • •• Cleveland, Ohio, 7/4-5/69, a coalition of anti-war groups
V l\ in the Detroit
„.1I •) called the Detroit area began meeting and an ad hoc committee
Coalition Committee was formed. The
t••• / 4••• Detroit Coalition Committee meets on Monda • n ion( s at 5705
,tl.,, Woodward Avenue e trot t • Michigan, and Att,.•,;;14--Sft:-•••••f',i?••,>ijt.„4 •
- -,-.'"•4•;••:'•- •."7•^•,•5•7•:•:11-•, -.4.37.443Wfv,i One of the lt.qtr.11:11.r..,--Iferri.rn
I! . • . P' .C,`,Vfri:1- - ribli- ,•- •'•""xt•'"t:l-,- :1::.:4,-..- , who resides in Ann Arl.
...: • ..c4irt.. t), and who is believed to be a member of the .•.4tit"WFtrA;:;...
Z: I :,,,It,v.viiilof the New Mobilization COmmittee to End the War
in Vietnam (NEC). Detroit feels that the present conditions
i •• • • •...: as they exist on
,..1 i t Ion C e n do no
•-•( -• • i, it advisab ,- ,- ko:c-e -,:ztv.zz
"--..,.:7:-••...r:y.-Itf4.
361.) to permit the anti,w ...,i,1 sons Lim lion in tissdlingt on
‘. C 11/15/69 1-'•"t-irt<41 ,rt_;_ri,,:yi,,'4 ..:4:.;•;; 1. : X ,, i,,5
// - • . ....'.,1.vpO
p,N, x.:;-4.4„.,87 •, •••:•f„*si ,i.a.1•14.•,.
.., 1_,
• -.'•,-...w C 1.'4t.•.ZI•1•4 •• 1-;•r..-1•0A1
,..1•!m7::••4 .•-•-••-•21t
.... , '414,4:-.1147.F.,..1/4:2--i.g,..e..*.M,
-,.4-;:le.• • ;:trar,t,...La
,,,;',.,-
.....•22r7
1-./el ",°.:.,.....
-6" 1., ,
- '
One situation that seems to lend itself to the
suggestions in referenced Bureau a irte I would he some counter-
intelligence action directed against who
resides at Ann Arbor, and who is a manu-
facturers represents • Since pc.r.17.M.773A.
appears to hn of theflfte"
one of the of the Detroit Coalition Committee,
De troit feels that a counterintelligence program directed
against. him would have a beneficial effect.
ft 11;
r 2 - hits• eau (WO' 11 ,1, I 4.1
2 - Wash ington Field (itht)
2 - Detroit
(1 - 100-34171) Q. ici
wilft/efc
(6) /- 7,1„ /.1
•
i 4 sEP1. G 1969
13lly U.S. Sarinv Bondi Residarly 1'ajraltS4rinsi Plan
Memo describing plan to block emergence of a political coalition in Detroit.
1971, scores of alternative press workers were arrested (some repeatedly) on a

variety of thoroughly bogus charges.'" In one notable example, Dallas police,
accompanied by FBI "observers," raided the offices of Dallas Notes in October of
1968, using a warrant which allowed them to search for "pornographic" material.
BE 100-35108
The specific suggestion is that a letter could

be written from the BUF at Washington, D. C. to the White
Panther Party (WPP), 1510 Hill Street, Ann Arbor, and also
to the'Michigan Daily", University of Michigan student news-
paper at Ann Arbor, pleading the BUF cause. The letter which
could possibly be initiated by an informant in the BIM' in
Washington, D. C., or which could be a fraudulent letter could
ask the WPP, a white militant group that strongly supports
the Black Panther Party (DPP), to help the BOW collect the
just and modest sum of $25,000.00 from the NMC by making a
direct overture "••••""P —_,T, an NMC leader in Ann
Arbor. The letter the BUF realizes that a
substantial part of this sum could be easily raised by the
NMC in Michigan because of the many professional and academician!
supporting the anti-war demonstration scheduled for Washington,
D. C. The letter could also state that a copy is being directed
to the University of Michigan student newspaper to further
publicize the very just nature of the BUF request.
1
Detroit feels that the "Michigan Daily" would be
delighted to publish this type of a letter. It is' felt that
such a letter would be of a disruptive nature if presented
to the Detroit Coalition Committe end could
develop into a situationiftre
J
Such a letter would also be a disruptive factor to

the amicable relations - between the WPP and Black Nationalist
supporters and groups in Ann Arbor, inasmuch as WPP would be
forced to make a choice between BUF cause and the position
of the white liberals in Ann Arbor who have been critical
of the war and nave to this point supported the WPP. The
issue in the letter would be that the DUE knows that the
while liberals, who are identified with the NMC, have un-
limited sums of money available through their contacts and
the sole issue is whether or not they want to give the
$25,000.00 to the DUE.
Comments of WFO arc requested. If the Bureau
approves of this suggestion, a draft of such a letter will
be prepared by Detroit.
The raiders left with more than two tons of items, including four typewriters and
several credit cards, and ripped the electrical wiring out of the walls before leaving.
The paper's editor was subsequently charged with "possession of pornography," an
accusation which was thrown out as groundless by a local judge. He was then
charged with "obscenity," resulting in another dismissal. Finally, he was brought
into court, charged with "instigating a riot," convicted and sent to prison for three
years. By this time, the paper was in a shambles.109 The Philadelphia Free Press, for its
part, found itself officially banned from all campuses of the Pennsylvania State
University system, and thus denied much of its potential market.11°
Nor is the case isolated. Shortly after the San Diego Street Journal had published
:!, New York (100-163303) 6-0-68
!
- irector,
II YBI X100-449698) 1
1-
- 41.111. •
42 -
COINTELPEO - KEW LEFT . •
Recent issues of the underground press have carried

articles relating to the split which has developed within the
Liberation News Service (LNS).' One such article has even
described a night raid which f as conducted by members of the
New York faction on the faction which is now located in
Massachusetts.
It would seem that this is an excellent opportunity _
to take advantage of the split to further disrupt the under-
groundpress and to attack the New Left.
• Boston and New York consider this situation with a
view to taking some action of a disruptive nature. .
Promptly submit your suggestions in this regard.
2 - Boston (100-38580)
RIW:lrb (8) /J.
NOTE:
Liberation News
/ev
Service, a group which served under- .
ground•presses throughout the country, formerly has its offices
in New York and was run b . A split has
developed within LNS and ove o4Cof the LNS office
in New York in the night g certain equipment and funds for
reestablishing himself at •farm in Massachusetts. The other
faction is quite incensed over this and even went so far as to
conduct a night raid o acilities in Massachusetts. -
We should take the oppor ere to further this split.
-e• •
171-
. 7/.47114'i 4 ■
. 7,j ■
/
Wen
'19 SEP 0 11E8
Document outlining COINTELPRO action designed to disrupt Liberation News

Service in New England, using the standard tactic of sending anonymous letters.
an exposé on the practices of the local business elite during the fall of 1969, the paper
suffered an unwarranted raid of its offices coordinated by the local red squad while,
simultaneously, more than 20 of its street vendors were arrested for "littering" and
"obstructing the sidewalk." Not long afterward, an FBI operative named Howard
Berry Godfrey led a Bureau-financed group of right-wing thugs calling themselves
the "Secret Army Organization" (SAO) in a nocturnal entry of the paper's produc-
And Who Got The Cc. :cs Tare_

I-
• c.
Weise-by the papers c., new Left Notes, Guardian - that the ..
Lib ation News Service has been screwed into the ground whilithe
pea a:movement has just been screwed. A real kindergarten
per rmance by all concerned. Seo the cats run from' the LNS Tice' it
I
with the typewriters. ."" girls dash away with the officit'f.
suppliesv-.See carrying the check for t6,000 skins.:.
See SDS people weep ng and grinding their teeth. (Scene change) -
A •
See the farm at Montague, Massachusetts. See the hip
confrontation. What language' Now, all the men are fighting. '
III
Nw he pigs are near. Will the Stets of Massachusetts charge
with kidnaping? Will he be executed in public? Will LNS
ry ve? Baby, at this point we wonder
New Left Notes described one of the founders of MS
and onetime member of SOS - as su er ng from megalomania. Could be.
has always been a hit of a nut. Nice guy, understand, but
ttle uptight where INS was concerned. He has .c ^
charres of SDS take-over end conspiracy. He's named a
traitor. With it all, he's managed to turn LVS from ent
movement news service into a complete mess. The establishment of .
a bastard ortress Montague" is the most unrealistic bag -
of all. you've left the . scene of tho action in exchange
for assorts uc s and sheep. .
as used the old bat "doctrinaire propaganda" to describe
the mogillintributin of SOS to the LNS subscriber packets. It
just ain't true, nd you know it. SDS contributed
meaningful ideas, . . . e just a squib of intelligence. A little
color. Some meet. How many of the tiCO-odd subscribers complained?
One? Two? The office staff saw the response to the monthly mailing.
Most was favorable, some not so hut. But not one letter was received
by the New
York office accusing LNS of engaging in SDS propaganda.
Actually, after Chicaro, what's wrong with a little SDS spiel? - -
"We paved U'S from withering away", says se. ':e
say ho killed it dead. Sort of a literary euthnn, , . Tice row York
Staff is trying to keen one limb alive at under
the medical care of WI , we
don't know. .
' -
It's a bad scene when a rood movement crganizetion enrages
In civil war. Some of the details might bo termed funny (WC like
'the-kidnaping bit), but dirty wash in public can only hurt. The
ai ation was stupid, stupid, stupid.
. -..--•.
t What now? 4/1111Egot the bread. Others pot the °Mc* junk.
eot the finger. A fink ran off with tho water cooler. And
we pot cookie jar. L'M seems dead. Long live, SNS. -
. 4. , -
• -'-
. ... - A former
•
Staffer
tion facility, stealing over $4,000 of its equipment and "putting it [temporarily] out
of action."111In the South, things were just as bad:
Kudzu, produced in Jackson, Mississippi, served as a major organizational center for
the New Left and counterculture in that area. The tenacity of the paper and its allies
can be gauged by the fact that by 1968 the newspaper had survived a conviction on
obscenity charges, the arrest of salespeople, the confiscation of cameras, and even
eviction from its offices. On October 8,1968, eighteen staff members and supporters
of Kudzu were attacked and beaten by Jackson deputy sheriffs...In 1970, Kudzu was
/ r .
SAC, New fork (100-183303) 10/21 /60

larein •
Director, FBI (4004495 , u,
41ke-4145(011jr4/-34e• :Y.::
COINTILPRO -KEW LRYT
Seurlet 10/7/08.
Authority is granted to make the anonymous mailing
as suggested in referenced letter. The letter submitted as
an enclosure therewith may be used for this purpose.
You must take all necessary steps to insure that
the Bureau is not identified as the source of this letter.
Advise promptly of any reaction noted from the
New Left as a result of this mailing.
REN:11e,V:
(5)
JOTS:
The Liberation News Service, an underground

publishing organization, has recently split over ideological
considerations. One faction, including the founder, moved
to Montague, Massachusetts, where he bought a farm using
part of LMS funds. The faction that remained in New York, .._
subsequently, raided the farm. This resulted in charges
of kidnapping being placed by local authorities against
the raiding faction. Both of these groups have become - .
anxious over the situation, and the New Left press has con-
tained considerable charges and countercharges of these
groups. We are attempting to use this situation to further
split the New Left. New York, along with referenced
letter, submitted • proposed anonymous letter ridiculing:
this situation and, criticizing Montague faction. This
41. proposal has merit sad we are authorizing their anonymous
mailing. t .1••:.
%diet
r ay
_. I* 11,13 .
Letter approving action to split LNS.

put under direct surveillance by the FBI. For more than two months FBI agents
made daily searches without warrants...On October 24 and 25, Kudzu sponsored a
Southern regional conference of the Underground Press Syndicate. The night
before the conference the FBI and Jackson detectives searched the Kudzu offices
twice. During the search, an FBI agent threatened to kill Kudzu staffers. On the
TO DIRECTOR, 'fin (100449698) DATE: February 14, 1999
rxOM 4AC, MILWAUKEE (100-15657)
smear (-COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.PROGRAU
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT
Re Milwaukee letters dated 10/10/68,

and 11/15/68.
1) Potential Counterintelligence Action
At the present time the Milwaukee Office is
exploring the possibi ex osin to al
_u hlir the fact that
both of whom tle Univ si
-onsin - Milwaukee, n articles for
"Kaleidoscope," an underground newspaper published in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Much of the material appearing -
in "Kaleido no e" xtremely pornographic in nature.
have been associated with the
,acts• and have been very sympathetic
war Ica and New Left element. It is believed
that by exposing their connection with "Kaleidoscope"
public indignation could be aroused against them and
( )-~,,:- .
the administration of the University of Wisconsin -
Milwaukee, for permitting instructors at that school to
engage in this type of activity.
• 7(1
•2) Pending Counterintelligence Action
V .L'ec
The pending counterintelligence action as s
forth in referenced letter dated 10/10
ents
, is no longer feasible in
%
g w men
v s 1? irii• "( •,....,,,,
,,,A PIC-4
f\AV r 4:24111riall' '(100-449698)
iat$4, -Milwaukee (100-15657)
7/ • .• '. / '-' ' '
(Registered Mail)
.... /75.—
no longer holds the position
and has changed his employ-
/ •
—1
4.-..-..--;........-t.:7.
e '
4 (3) FEB176E9
-6/
FEB271969
.•
Boo U.S. Savings Bands &priori, in the Payroll Savings Plan
COINTELPRO plan aimed at the Kaleidoscope newspaper in Milwaukee.
morning of October 26, FBI agents again searched the offices. That evening local
police entered the building, held its eight occupants at gunpoint, produced a bag of
marijuana, then arrested them...A Kudzu staff member commented, "The FBI used
to be fairly sophisticated, but lately they have broken one of our doors, pointed guns
in our faces, told us that 'punks like you don't have any rights,' and threatened to
shoot us on the street if they see us with our hands in our pockets."111
In New Orleans, street vendors for the New Orleans Nola Express were repeat-
edly arrested on charges such as "vagrancy" and "peddling without a license." The
harassment continued until the paper pressed a federal discrimination suit; District
Judge Herbert Christenberry then concluded that the plaintiffs had "overwhelm-
ingly established a policy by the police to arrest people selling underground
newspapers under the guise that they were impeding pedestrian traffic," and issued
an injunction against further official actions of this sort."" Comparable situations are
known to have prevailed in Atlanta, Berkeley, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Milwau-
kee, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C., no doubt a rather
incomplete list'"' The accompanying February 14,1969 memo from the Milwaukee
SAC to Hoover gives a clear indication of the real source of most such "problems."
As in most COINTELPROs, FBI counterintelligence operations against the new
left prominently featured efforts to pit group against group within the overall
targeted communities, often through production and distribution of bogus litera-
ture. The accompanying September 19,1968 Airtel from the Newark SAC, proposed
such an operation against Princeton SDS (using a John Birch Society-oriented
student organization as a "counter" in the plan), and Hoover's September 24 Airtel
approved the idea. Similarly, the accompanying October 17, 1968 Airtel from the
director to his New York SAC outlined a scheme through which "anonymous
communications" could be used to bring the New York University SDS chapter
"into conflict" with black student organizations such as Katara, the Afro-American
Student Society, and Black Allied Student Association. On October 21, the SAC
responded with an Airtel concretizing the means by which the original concept
could be implemented, a matter approved by Hoover in the accompanying letter
dated October 25. As Hoover noted in his initial missive, the plan was to bring about
"disruption of both the New Left and black student power forces" on campus, a
concept tying in neatly with an ongoing Bureau effort to repress not only SDS but
Black Student Unions (BSUs) nationally.115
During this same period, the Bureau also began to place increasing emphasis
upon utilization of the strategy pursued against Arizona State University professor
and SWP member Morris Starsky (see Chapter 3). For example, contacts from FBI
officials are known to have played a significant role in the decision of Yale University
trustees to terminate renowned history professor and anti-war activist Staughton
Lynd after his 1966 trip to Hanoi with SDS leader Tom Hayden and CP historian
Herbert Aptheker in defiance of a State Department ban on such travel. There is
strong evidence that the Bureau continued to intervene in Lynd's subsequent
attempts to secure a faculty position, notably in Illinois where the Board of Gover-
nors of State Colleges and Universities reversed decisions to hire him at the Chicago
Circle Campus, Northern Illinois University, and even Chicago State College. The
board, parroting J. Edgar Hoover's rhetoric, publicly stipulated its actions were
predicated in the understanding that Lynd's travel, writings and speeches went
"beyond mere dissent" (exactly how this was so, they didn't say). As a result, Lynd
was forced out of academia altogether."'
rn.ry fr,t.. 5.2f4 41 •

_CO
F B I
Dcle: 0/10/68
TIonsmit lhollowinp In ---____
in e ■code)
•
Vie r
(P ,40, 7)
se-
TO : lisECTOP., 113r (100-720:3983 -
FROM: SAC, ye;ARK (100-50166
SUBJ: COUNTERInELLIGENCli
INTERNAL-SECURrni-------
DISAW,r10N OF NEW LETT
Re NoliArk letter dated 9/12/68.

The gollo,oing concerning the (•ailing of 150 pay•hlets
depicting certain SDS Loefeers at Reincoton University (PU)
as Akin to apes..
It has been deterlained that on 0/27/65, A dinner is
to be hld at Princeton, N.J, uhich in bolos 1::onsered by the
PU Conservative Club. A large imabor of PU students, grionds,
And faculty is ex;, •cted to attend. The Conservative Club is
co,iprised of pro-Aerican students And Adults uho ace outsPe%0o.
in their dislike for $D5 And Any Anti-Arican senpi7.e.nt, /
/00 -
outspoken member of the Conservative c.:lub in I;
yho to also on Ito comrlittce. On occasion she
diiitributeIrpro-Anican Anti-copT:unist lenets on Nassau - •
Street, in Princeton, N.J., And is rerortedly a 5,:p:•orter of the
JOI E( DIM:ll No.,7ark b;?.11e-ies that 120 of the 1):I.,hlets
be stit to her in the hope tort she 9111 distribute them at
the Conservative Club dinner
of PU. Another tlevber of the Cooervative Club,
or on
the streets in vicinity
0J)pQ n,n:tA r__$- ornaritrn t,hr '

"\. _ )A\11-1::,,L.bers
of the CiinsvivativeClub, Are nIsor.iprnAmerican And Anti-
p,,, SDS In their thouL:hts and actions. It la 0111:LC:LCQd that five
CO.)10S 01 the pa.•;thlet b~ sent to each of Above. I-,
Ac c • q 0) q.., p ,:`,.---. /----'5----- - ('•,-- ,A--",-/-" , --.(;-,3
1-):
. \I 3-17,!nark
.OVCAU (R U) rce. GA) ^>U1c,
c ,c.., - 4.L1:,.:,
143 ;- 1-1()o-m73)(;31)sl. _ , ....„. ...Y ,r 7 :1,—S! ::,7X,7.:1‘ - ■33
1.%,L0,...,,,...Alli,,(..H, f
.
Y,)
N s•••••
.,,,, . 1"-g
\____ ..
.1. . '
■
____
- -
)
.y %.. %....</
\::::1,A;,1,roved: _ C ICI 71/47 .______ Sent .. __M
%`• S;nc141 ic-c;i:1 In C:,rge
Airtel outlining COINTELPRO against Princeton SDS.

In another instance, Michael Parenti, a political scientist and anti-war activist at
the University of Vermont, was denied renewal of his teaching contract - despite
unanimous recommendations that he be retained from his dean, department and
9/24/65
To: SAC, Newark (100-50166)

C'S 1-1.13 .....,
From: Director , yik-,..,- (-1-o-0-4496ae) --- 4----71—
//
' -- ///1/1- 9121- 3) --
COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT /Lc(
INTERNAL SECURITY
Reurairtel 9/16/66.
Reairtel states that 120 copies of the .previously
prepared pamphlets regarding the_SDSst Princeton University
would be sent to conservative, E , who would be
expected to distribute them at a-CUh-Servative Club ueeting
scheduled 9/27/68.
It is felt that some of those pamphlets ray be
sent to'---with a handwrtten anonymous note requesting
her to di"ti- ibute them at the Conservative Club meeting.
It is not felt that a number as large as 120 should be
used in this manner. It would appear that 50 would be more
a, realistic,
E It is further noted that reairtel mentions
§ ci nothing of distributing the pamphlets to the various eating
1 a ard debating clubs on campus. You should consider sending
- ome of these to tho above organizations as well as to other
r)rofessional: societies at Princeton. Of course, all
distribution should be sent anonymously with all measures
boing taken to protect the Bureau as their source.
,5
RR11:mms 3
(4) -.p0:
NOTE:
On Newark's suggestion we have previously prepared
a pamphlet which casts SOS in a derogatory light.!The
pa/phlet depicts certain Princeton SOS leaders. as apes.
---Newnrk has suggested that of the 150 parphlets supplied 120
these be sent to an outspoken conservative rho would be
___exi,ected to distribute.them at a Conservative Club a
Univdroity. 'While tho Conservative Club may mate use
of this among conservative people, it is felt that a greater
distribution should be made of the pamphlet so that a broader
rvcs section of the student body at Princeton will receive it.
Airtel approving COINTELPRO against SDS at Princeton.
even the university administration — after the institution's trustees received a spate
of anonymous letters condemning his political activities. The trustees specified that,
although in no way questioning Parenti's "professional competence" or effective-
ness as a teacher, they were nonetheless bound to "protect the image of the
Cartoon used in Princeton COINTELPRO.
University" from new left radicalism."' At UCLA in 1969, the regents fired philoso-
phy professor Angela Y. Davis on the basis of her association with the Black Panther
Party, CP and Soledad Brothers Defense Committee, as well as for having given
political speeches "so extreme...and so obviously false," despite her endorsement by
every relevant university official and by a blue-ribbon faculty committee formed by
the regents themselves to pass judgment on Davis' academic competence 118 The
correspondence of the Los Angeles FBI office during this period suggests the Bureau
played an active part in helping the regents' decision along.
Similarly, George Murray, an English instructor and BPP Minister of Education,
was summarily suspended by Chancellor Glenn Dumke of the California State
College system in 1969, after the BPP leader publicly advised black students to adopt
principles of armed self-defense. Two other San Francisco State professors were also
sacked for their political views at the same time as Murray, and two others denied
tenure, one for protesting Murray's suspension and the other apparently for having
participated in Murray's original hiring. Interestingly, Dumke's action sparked a
sustained student strike which eclipsed those which had earlier occurred at Berkeley
and Columbia - in perseverance and militancy, if not in publicity received - which
paralyzed the institution for several months."' Perhaps the worst case of this sort
involved Peter G. Bohmer, a radical economics professor at San Diego State
To: SAC, New York (100-183303)

From: _Director, FBI (100-449898)
(
1 ---=
COINTELP110 m
Reurtel 10/11/68, captioned "Student Agitation,

New York University 10/11/68 by Students For A Democratic
Society, Eaters, and Afro-American Student Society;
IS - C; RM."
Rotel, in developing the situation created by
SDS, Esters, and the Black Allied Student Association (BASA)
at New York University, stated that ppeared to be
attempting to capitalize on the controversy.
Iatara and BASA, on the other hen are intent on preventing__
SDS from dominating this situation.
It would appear that this situation is • fertile
field for disruption of both the New Left and the black
student power forces.
me--frt‘w-..5/-.1 7
New York, by return airtel, submit suggestions
including anonymous communications whereby SUS, Eaters,
nd BASA can possibly be brought into conflict with
ne another as a result of their grab for power at
New York University. I.•
•.:
1 - (100-448006) "Jae
•
NBB:jas RECS. lb Aa
-(6)
NOTE:
.91 vuT z7 rise
-,-....
moTlecentlyiliplintillan instructor at New/fork - -

V versity, in • pu Iled both Nixon and
V phrey "leftist bastards." As a result, he was dismissed
N York University. As a result of this action, the
1i vq groups instituted student agitation at New York Unive ty.
.,-Betel states that as a result of this agitation,

New York University agreed to allowing/111M to serve as an
advisor to Negro students on the campus; and while he has so
official connection with New York University, he will be
furnished office space. Betel further states that during
the campus agitation resulting from this incillalaim.
appeared to be attempting to capitalize on th
controversy. This seeming grab for power soul appear
to offer an opportunity to drive a wedge between the New Left
and the black student power advocates. This has been
coordinated with Special Agents of the
COINTELPRO to block student coalition at New York University.
University, who was arbitrarily fired by Chancellor Dumke in 1971, despite the fact
that he was in contention for a teaching award (which he won, two weeks after his
dismissal).120This was followed, on the night of January 9,1972, by shots being fired
41111111111g The Black Racist With

A Megaphone Mouth
•
le°Thdrelire times when the movement - especially BD! - allows
itelf to be sucked into beige& rather causes. - During.pb
're 0 . ntation with and NYE over the firing ef "
a member of eters was heard to say "This is-a
bapk thing, . Keep the lowboys in their own building°.
Be bee referring to the occupation of the Gould Student Center
on the uptown NYU campus by the blacks and the ground floor
of the library by the whites, mostly SDS. -
Most students motive in SD! consider the thing a
poor excuse tooccupy anything. This man has a or credibly
-stupid statements on Blaek , .. Jewish relations. In an article c.
•.written for the African - American Teachers Porum,
stated that the minds of black students were being
by "anti ..black Jewish teachers.°As a result, blaok campus
organisations ar usy biting the hands which have helped this
the most. continues to suffer tram diarrhea of the
mouth. The o it all is that by operating alone at m,
Katara, Base an other loose black organisations screwed op
-the bit.: Eaters leader,:led his followers out
of the stu or, shouting'"Beep, beep, bop, bop,'ungawa,
black power. We won. We won..1111111111vould be retained-by.
WYE; black power would be serve hlt. It was a flop,
flo bop. SDS knew it immediately. 111111liand
were up against the wall, not IRTIT—"'
EDS leaders on New York campuses should wake up. Put a
stop to unlimited concessions to demands of black organisations.
And this includes being called a."Jew bastard" to your face‘or
•smiling while a militant - informs us that the blame for the
ghettos rests on the heads of Jewish businessmen who have
ble e blacks for two hundred years". For that matter. Mr.
s the perfect example of a racist. Nellie black
geWallace.' They are two of a kind: only the skin is
different. .
We think SDS should continue the fight for black rights,
but let's be a little choosy. haters' and Bess should be left
to go their own way. No support should be given until asked for.
In the future many students in SDS will refuse to support
black racism in any form. My heritage (Jewish) is as precious
to me as that of any black. I'll not see it shit on, brothers.
WAtre with you but let's knock off racist stupidity. --- -
SDS Member, NIT (Class of 'U)
Anonymous letter used in the NYU COINTELPRO, proposed in an Airtel

dated October 21, 1968. Note the blatant racism employed.
through the windows of Bohmer's home, one of which struck the right elbow of one
of his friends, Paula Tharp, permanently disabling her. It turned out that the
attempted assassination had been performed by the FBI-sponsored Secret Army
Organization, and that Bureau infiltrator Howard Berry Godfrey had been in the car
along with gunman George M. Hoover who had fired the shots. Although Godfrey
immediately informed his handler, SA Steve Christianson, of what had happened,
it was more than six months before the Bureau took action in the matter.121
Some of the gambits employed by the Bureau in COINTELPRO-New Left were
1 - Kr.
. BAC, New YorE (100-183303) 10/25/68
15 F
/;:)!Director. le4100-449698) _. i• ,
) e -/Sic'G c-r— sit — ..?'

amimpogairtem
Reurairtel 10/21/68.
Authority is granted to mail tho letter
submitted as an enclosure to your airtel to selected
New Left and black student power organizations and
individuals. This mailing is to be anonymous.
In preparing this letter you are to assure
that all necessary steps are taken to protect the
Bureau as the source of the letter.
Advise the Bureau promptly of any results
obtained.
RHU:mfs
(4) 77
NOTE:
New York University was the scene of recent
trouble created by 8D8 and black power ■tudent organizations,
Cetera and Vasa. This trouble arose as a result of a
professor by the name of discharged
following his calling Ric on and Vice President
Hubert Humphrey "racist bastards." In the demonstrations
that followed 8D8 tried to assume catrol and was resisted
by the black student groups. New York has prepared an
anonymoys letter purportedly from a New Leftist
criticizing the black power groups for their attitude.
Md.
SE ...
CWOm
eem.
NM
Ate
Tmemm
Tow.
T.M. ..'
Ni f
su113680 ran =TO
LNG
Letter approving NYU COINTELPRO.
not so much sinister as they were weird. A classic example may be found in the
proposal lodged in the accompanying November 21, 1968 memo from the SAC,
Philadelphia, to J. Edgar Hoover. Seriously garbling the realities pertaining to
hippies, Yippies!, and SDSers, the SAC apparently genuinely believed that periodic
UNITED STATES .LAMENT r

Memorandum
TO - DIRECTOR, FBI (100-449698) OATS:
MOM : \SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49929) (P)
susIECT: ■
COINTELPRO - NEW_LEET-
Rebulet to all offices 5/10/68 and Philadelphia

letter to the Bureau 5/29/68.
Enclosed herewith is one copy each of two sketches
prepared by the Philadelphia Office.
Relets refer to the disruption of the New Left
through counterintelligence activities.
1
The emergence of the New Left on the American
Scene has produced a new phenomenon - a yen for magic.
Some leaders of the New Left, its followers, the Hippies
and the Yippies, wear beads and amulets. New Left youth
involved in anti-Vietnam activity have adopted the Greek
letter "Omega" as their symbol. Self-proclaimed yogis have
established a following in the New Left movement. Their incantati s
are a reminder of the chant of the witch doctor. Publicity
has been given to the yogis and their mutterings. The news
media has referred to it as a "mystical renaissance" and has
attributed its growth to the increasing use of LSD and similar
drugs.
Philadelphia believes the above-described conditions
offer an opportunity for use in the counterintelligence field.
Specifically, it is suggested that a few select top-echelon
leaders of the New Left be subjected to harassment by a
series of anonymous messages with a mystical connotation.
Age- ye 9Mff-S7-- J
, L,f
;1'
2 - Bureau (100-449698)(Enc. 71 RH) (
1 - Philadelphia (100-49929)woc..-
Pa Aracer Nov22 1968
EES/lpm ay
(4)
4•
Big U.S. Sovinp Boa, Repriar0 en rbr Pa ref/ Sayinif Piss
Memo detailing plan to use occult mysticism as a mechanism to sow "suspicion,

distrust, and disruption" within new left circles at Temple University. Contrary to
appearances, this seems not to have been a joke. Text and sample cartoon continue
on following pages.
receipt of such nonsense, mailed anonymously, would cause "concern and mental
anguish" on the part of "hand-picked" targets, and that "suspicion, distrust, and
Sample of the cartoons utilized in

the COINTELPRO at Temple (right).
Text of memo continues below.
kk
S'AEAlk h -1
3eETLE.,
r
The enclosed sketches are a sample of such a message. This
could be followed by a series of messages with the same
sketch bearing captions such as "The Siberian Beetle is
Black" or "The Siberian Beetle Can Talk." The recipient
is left to make his own interpretation as to the significance
of the symbol and the message and as to the identity of the
sender.
The symbol utilized does not have to have any
real significance but must be subject to interpretation as
having a mystical, sinister meaning. "The Chinese Scorpion,"
"The Egyptian Cobra," or some such similar name would be
considered to have a sinister, mystical meaning. The
mathematical symbol for "infinity" with an appropriate
message would certainly qualify as having a mystical,
sinister meaning.
Nailing could be done from a specified location
or the mailing site could be changed on each subsequent
message. Consideration might even be given to sending the
first message from outside the United States with subsequent
messages emanating from various cities in the United
States.
It is believed that the periodic receipt of
anonymous messages, as described above, could cause concern
and mental anguish on the part of a "hand-picked" recipient
or recipients. Suspicion, distrust, and disruption could
follow.
The proposed action, suggested above, is
basically a harassment technique. Its ultimate aim is to
cause disruption of the New Left by attacking an apparent
weakness of some of its leaders. It is felt there is a
reasonable chance for success. The cost of such an
operation to the Bureau is minimal. The Bureau's interest
can be protected with the usual precautions taken in such
matters.
L
. SAC1 Philadelphia (100-49929) 12/4/68
' Di ctor, YBI (10B-

A4-96"98) . '
1 -Krilia93626/1/
.t',IN REC-122 ho1"--W,Z:fil'—. 17— -',
coiiritianio - ars LEfl '----;),_AZ
Reurlet 11/21/68.
The observations of your office with regard to the
captioned Program are appreciated and it is felt that with
the proper selectivity of subjects the approach suggested in
relet could be fruitful.
In choosing a subject for such inapproaciai. ■
thorough knowledge of his background and activities is
necessary. In this regard, the subject or subjects chosen
should be individuals with mhos we have close contact
;through live informant coverage. Through these informants,
we might be able to enhance the effect of the mailings by
planning "appropriate" interpretations of the symbols.
The significance of the symbols should be slanted
so as to be interpreted as relating to something that is
currently going on in the New Left. In this regard, the
factional disputes within SDS and the dispute between SRC and
e Radical Organizing Committee readily come to mind.
Prior to instituting such a Program and with the
vs comments in mind, submit your recommendations as to
e appropriate subject to be included in such a Program
ong with the symbolises to be used and the desired
terpretations to be expected.
Take no steps to carry out this phase of the
ogram without prior Bureau approval.
RHEiSes;0/
(4) e
Nom -
By relet, PH took note of the fact that some
14ders of the New Left, particularly the hippies and the
Tipples, follow mysticism and various cults. PH believes
that this propensity for symbolism can be used in the above
Program by selecting a few top-echelon leaders as targets •
for a series of anonymous messages with systical connotations.
According to PH, the recipient of such a message would be
left to wake his own interpretation as to the significance
of the symbol, as well as to the identity of the sender.
PH pointed out that it sight be possible to subject these '
individuals to a certain amount of mental anguish, suspicion,
distrust, and disruption through these means.
J. Edgar Hoover approves the Temple COINTELPRO.
disruption" within the new left would follow. As may be seen in the accompanying
December 4 letter of response from Hoover, the director quickly approved the idea,
and a raft of "Siberian Beetle" cartoons were duly mailed. There is no record of the
results.
In a far more serious vein, the IRS collaborated with the FBI in what amounted
to a counterintelligence campaign. During the period 1968-74:
[Tlhe IRS gave to the FBI confidential tax information on 120 leaders of the anti-war
and militant black movements, as part of the FBI's COINTELPRO activity. Accord-
ing to a February, 1969, FBI memo, the Bureau also succeeded in getting the IRS to
inquire into many of these cases, anticipating that the inquiry "will cause these
individuals considerable consternation, possibly jail sentences eventually" and
would help the FBI achieve its objective of obtaining "prosecution of any kind" in
order to "remove them from the movement." The IRS also furnished the FBI with a
list of contributors to SDS developed in connection with an IRS audit of SDS. The IRS
also passed the list on to the White House.122
Additionally, at the Bureau's behest, the IRS established a Special Services Staff
(SSS) unit devoted to coordinating "activities in all Compliance Divisions involving
ideological, militant, subversive, radical, and similar type organizations." This
purview was shortly broadened to include all persons who traveled to Cuba, Algeria
or North Vietnam, and those who "organize and attend rock festivals."121The
program of punitive (and thus illegal) tax audits and other investigations which
followed was "justified" because of a need to "help control an insidious threat to the
internal security of this country" and because such "enforcement" might "have
some salutary effect in this overall battle against persons bent upon destruction of
this government," to wit: dealing a decisive "blow to dissident elements" within the
U.S.124Altogether, SSS established files on 2,873 organizations including SDS and
the BPP, of course, but also others such as the ACLU, American Library Association,
American Jewish Congress, Common Cause, National Education Association, New
York Review of Books and Rolling Stone. In addition, SSS files were opened on 8,585
individuals including such redoubtable "revolutionaries" as liberal New York
Mayor John Lindsay, U.S. Senators Charles Goodell and Ernest Gruening, newspa-
per columnist Joseph Alsop, singers James Brown and Joan Baez, and actress Shirley
MacLaine.121
War at Home
By 1969, the new left was developing a conscious emphasis on anti-imperialist

analysis, combining its support to the black liberation movement (and Third World
liberation movements more generally), its opposition to the war in Vietnam, and its
belief that it must endeavor to reorganize its own society in a fundamentally
different way than that mandated by the status quo. A central preoccupation of the
movement focused on how to translate such analysis into action.1" One of the ways
in which this was approached was to begin to incorporate more "systematic"
marxian appreciations of politics into the more-or-less theoretically inchoate new
left vision. A second was to attempt to solidify alliances with black liberation
formations such as the BPP. The FBI, of course, upped its COINTELPRO ante in an
effort to prevent either initiative from materializing.
On the first count, as can be discerned in the accompanying November 3, 1969
letter from Hoover to the SAC, San Francisco, the Bureau utilized standard counter-
••
„SAC, can Francisco •••••:.:-..• •
. 4•4 11/3/ell '
• •••. -•• • , -• •
7. Director, FBI (62-111181)
BEN NO! o eesi ■

JiLL PPO - /0Ei0 LLF -r-
. -.ReLAairtel 10/23/19. 1 ' • •-•
,' Referenced airtel states that the New •

Nobilizatioo Committee (NYC) has decided to purge the
Socialist Workers Party (8SP) and the Young Socialist
Alliance (T&A) from the antiwar demonstration to be held
- in San Francisco on 11/15/69 and that all affiliation '
with the ESP and the SSA is to be dissolved.
.• ;
This situation seems to afford an excellent
opportunity to drive a wedge between the ISCP.and the .--
• peace groups in the Lou Angeles area.
consistent with the security of your sources,

. you should prepare an anonymous communication criticizing
1 the action taken by NBC in freezing the SIP and TSA out of
I.... -,- the forthcoming demonstration.
4.4....F.-:: - - ,-' 'Forward a copy of this communication to the

4!'- -.. Bureau along with your recommendations as to the groups '
and individuals who should receive it. In addition, you
should consider furnishing this information to appropriate
cooperative news rep tatives. Take no action in this
respect without first obtaining Bureau authority. -
.1 ... 100-449698
...i . 4,0s Angeles (100-74253)
ICA-)-1-11-110(...
2:-.,,nenonnto
INN•bip/lef
• (6) 14•NOV 8.90
SOTS:
The New Mobilization Committee to !cad war in

Vietnam (NUC)is sponsoring a massive demonstration in
San Francisco on 11/13/62. the An ales has advised that
thejAadership of NW has decided to exclude the Socialist
Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist
Alliance, iron these demonstrations. This would seem to -
offer an excellent opportunity to cause Confusion in the
organizing for this mass demonstration by causing dissent
amongst its sponsors.
COINTELPRO targeting the Mobe and SWP.
intelligence techniques to "drive a wedge" between the new leftist New Mobiliza-
tion Committee to End the War in Vietnam (called "Mobe," like the National Mobi-
lization Committee which preceded it) and the old left SWP (this is the other side of
a COINTELPRO simultaneously aimed at the SWP; see Chapter 3). At the same time,
the Bureau was even more serious about wrecking the emergence of any meaningful
affiance between SDS and the BPP, and other non-white liberation organizations. As
is brought out clearly in the accompanying June 19,1969 memo from Chicago SAC
Marlin Johnson to Hoover-and Hoover's response to Johnson in the accompanying
--
UNITED ETAT MEW
Memorandum
To : DIRICTCR, FBI (100-448006) (100-449698) man: 8/19/69
fa CHICAGO (157-2209) (100-45316)
0
smumcr: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK MATIGUALIST - BATE GROUPS
Yr' RACIAL INTELLIGENCE - (BLACK PANTHER PARTY)
• f COINTELPRO - NEM /F7T

.. • . • .
• •
Re Chicago letter 4/30/69, under the first of

the above two captions and Chicago letter, 5/1/69, under the
caption as carried above.
The referenced letter of May 1, 1969, was directed

toward inhibiting the embryonic alliance formed locally
recently between the Black Panther Party (BPP) and the
Students for a Democratic Society (SOS). It was suggested
that efforts be made to exploit the coalition by depicting
the working relationship as an effort on the part of SUS to
utilize the DPP as ■ mercenary group fighting a black war
for white liberation.
A careful review and analysis of BPP activities 1

locally mime relet of April 30, 1969, reflects that the
tenous working relationship between these two groups continuos
to exist and the activities and programs as recommended is
Chicago letter of May 1, 1969, continue to be valid. Chicago
will await the Bureau's response to this recommendation prior
to initiating any efforts in this direction.
In recent weeks also the local BPP group bee-..-,..';

effected a similar coalition with the Young Lords, a +mar .
north side Puerto Rican ,youth gang and the Young Patriots,
the latter an off -shootNobs or Iacono Now (JOIN), an SOS •
affiliated group of young whites. Chicago will follow this
and related developments closely and as the opportunity
presents itself will submit appropriate couuterintelligeueh
suggestions.
1Isig:i.:
RECSB
, Bureau (RI)
46-
Chicago 2 ,1t+g:7-
(YOUNG LONGS) 410.1 14.. %ft
.. (1 -'100- (YOUNG PATRIOTS)
JCS/bab -- 116
y4i ): 11;•.•lia,-•U.S.•Sepias:
"1 armor Ltplatv If 11.1 ?well Sarin:
e .
PI= - ,- - - •
. -...-. -
Memo proposing COINTELPRO action against the Chicago Rainbow Coalition.

June 21 letter — the FBI was quite active in sabotaging the establishment of a
"Rainbow Coalition" between SDS, the BPP, the Puertorriquefio Young Lords Or-
ganization and a politicized white youth gang called the Young Patriots (this is
another dimension of a COINTELPRO simultaneously aimed at the BPP; see
Chapter 5).
.SAC, Chicago 5/21/69
Director, 781
QUNTERINTELUGENCE PROGRAM
I
111111M
CROUPS .
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(CGFIlE 157-2209) J
(8UFI1E 100-448006) S.
COINTELPRO VEN 'EFT
(CGFILE 100-45316)
(BUFILE 100-44908)
"
(1/Ifdee
ReCGlet 5/1/69, 1
Authority is granted to instruct selected DPP

informants for use in creating a rift between the BPP and
the Students for a Democratic Society. These sources should I
be given different arguments so that this does not look like
plan. Your selection of the sources should be of those
are in a position to influence DPP thinking. Be careful
that the sources do not find themselves isolated from the WP
_.
leadership.
11 •- - ,
The articles appearing in the 4/24/69 edition of
"Mew left Notes" and "The Guardian" are being reviewed
reproduction as suggested in relet. You will be advised 1,7-'
concerning this. Joy-iv/x/1-z,-
- _
1/1.. JAH:ra (6) • MAT 21 1903
•
• NOTE: foo"
UNMAN
The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and .4.,,

the DPP are cooperating in several ways to exploit their
common revolutionary &lib Together these organisations
formidablethreat. Chli:ago has proposed that DPP informants.: -1
be instructed toiia- ntthe ides that the SDS is exiloiting the
Wt. - There are mnious good arguments available to accomplish
this such as the SDS Is using the DPP for their dirty work or the
SDS will relegate the BPP to the status of servants. The planting
of this idea in the minds of DPP leaders should pose no problem.
It would be a definite advantage if these two groups were alienated.
We are authorising Chicago to instruct selected informants to
plant ideas and cautioning them to make sure that the variofte
ideas -are different in nature and, course, will not leave DPP
ladders with the idea that this is a plan. Chicago has also
made available some newspaper articles with the thought in mind
of anonymous mailings. These articles question-the SDS - DPP
alliance. We are reproducing these articles and will consider
fo use as counterintelligence.
The anti-Rainbow Coalition COINTELPRO is approved. Once again, note the

blatant utilization of racism as a means to separate political organizations, a
strategy which could not fail to have profound effects in the society at large.
1.1,1FLD STATES C
.1,1einorandlini
TO :Director. rGI (105-174254) DAM; 10/13/1.
A ',c711-ion: Counterintelligence and Spacial
Operations (Research Section)
7,0m :SAC, Detroit (100-35108) (P)
wklEcT:COUNTERINTELLICENCE PROGRAM
IS - DISRUPTION OF NEW LEFT
Detroit is proposing the disruption of the

physical plant of the Radical Education Project (REP), 280a
Michigan Avenue, Detroit, Michigan. REP is a full tire
publishing outfit of the New Left thr,ugh whose auspices
numerous virulent revolutionary treatises reach the Left.
In addition, the Black Panther Party (BPP) in

Detroit receives DPP publications from San Francisco.
Detroit has easy access to these papers after they arrive
in Detroit.
The Bureau is requested to prepare and furnish

to Detroit in liquid form a solution capable of duplicating
a scent of the most foul smelling feces available. . In this
case, it might be appropriate to duplicate the feces of the
specie sus scrofa.
A quart supply, along with a dispenser capable

of squirting a narrow stream for a distance of aopromimatelv
throe feet would satisfy the needs of this proposed technique.
Memo targeting the Radical Education Project in Detroit.
In Detroit, the COINTELPRO tactics utilized in preventing a coalition between

the Panthers and SDS (through the latter's subsidiary Radical Education Project
[REP]) were rather more innovative, as is demonstrated in the accompanying
October 13, 1970 memo to the director from the SAC in that city. In Newark,
however, the techniques employed were far more orthodox, a matter indicated in
the accompanying October 16,1970 Airtel from the local SAC to Hoover, detailing
a bogus letter attributed to the city's SDS chapter and designed to instigate hostility
between the new leftists and the Panthers. Similar methods were employed, albeit
usually through "friendly press representatives," against individuals - especially
celebrities - endeavoring to forge new left/BPP links through fundraising for such
things as Panther legal defense. For instance, when BPP leader David Hilliard was
arrested in 1970 for allegedly threatening the life of President Nixon during a public
speech, actress Jane Fonda engaged in such activity in Hilliard's behalf. As a result,
Richard Wallace Held, head of the local COINTELPRO section, tendered the
accompanying June 17, 1970 Airtel outlining the sending of a bogus letter to
Hollywood Daily Variety gossip columnist Army Archerd, expressly intended to
Dote; 10/16/70
0--
Transmit thelollowing In
Type se pioinirsI or code)
AtEL
..Vla
(",' TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-449698)
ROM: SAC, NEWARK(100-50166) (P)

co, - .
0INTELPRb - NEW LEFT •

_.•-
Re Newark letter, 9/28/70.
In the 10/10/70 issue of, "The Black Panther", there

are cartoons on pages 3, 4, and 5 depicting a woman holding
a gun, a boy holding a gun and a "molotov cocktail" and an
elderly man holding a gun.:
It is suggested the following lett6r, handwritten

on "5 0 10" store-type paper, be sent to the BPP at 93 Summit
Ave., Jersey City, NJ, BPP Headquarters:
"Dear Pussycats:
"I just read the 10/10/70 issue of your paper,

.particularly pages 3, 4 and 5 and was much im-
pressed with the people's Army. A woman, a boy
and an old man.' Man, you sure are tough. You're
a Joke man. You're some vanguard of the oppressed
. black.
"With your lea rzEi fleeing the country and

"Huey the Homo" a raid to raise his voice for fear
he'll get busted again, I guess all you got left
are -the vaiten, kids and old men. The rest are
so dumb they can't be trusted with a weapon
because they keep forgetting which end the bullet
comes out of.
"So go ahead, get high On wine and dream.:
your alcoholic dreams of conquest. About the
only. successful conquest you can accomplish is
over your modest and proper (what a Joke)
mattress back ladies auxiliary.
-"If you'd have Joined us last year you'd have

been a lot.better off. Youd have had some. ...
brainpower behind you, but1now? :
'with-a revolving'deer aders
Newark 5DS"
Full precaution Wh-

1-5-E-t-5i;Protect the Bureau\
as the source of the letter, which will be written by a Spacial
Agent.and . mailed in Newark, NJ. .
Airtel outlining plan to set SDS and the BPP at odds with one another in the
Newark area. Note the blatant appeal not only to racism, but to sexism and
homophobia in the bogus letter proposed. Unlike similar missives employed to
inflame relations between US and the BPP during the same period (see Chapter
V), this COINTELPRO engendered no lethal results, an outcome attributable
more to the restraint of the Panthers than of the FBI.
Dom 6/17/70
limit the following in Godel

(7.1.0 in plainiesa or
AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES

t'
.7BrACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
Re Los Angeles teletype to Bureau, 6/15/70,

entitled "COMMITTEE UNITED FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS (CUPP),
IS-MISCELLANEOUS, THREAT AGAINST PRESIDENT NIXON".
Bureau authority is requested in sending the followir..
letter from a fictitious person to ARMY ARCHERi, licllywood
"gossip" columnist for, the "Daily Variety", who noted in his
6/11/70 column that JANE FONDA, noted film actress, was to be
present at the 6/13/70 Black Panther Party fund raising
function sponsored by CUPP in Los Angeles. It is felt that
knowledge of FONDA's involvement would cause her embarrassment
and detract from her status with the general public.
"Dear Army,
I saw your article about Jane Fonda in 'Daily
Variety' last Thursday and happened to be present
for Vadim's 'Joan of Arc's" performance for the
Black Panthers Saturday night. I hadnIt been
confronted with this Panther phenomena before but
we were searchea upon entering Embassy Auditorium,
encouraged in revival-like fashion to contribute to
defend jailed Panther leaders and buy guns for
'the coming revolution,, and led by Jane and one of
(E)- Bureau (RN) REC 16
2 - San Francisco (RM)
2 - Los Angeles
(6)
Moved: L,04 Sent
Special Agent in.4illKie
Airtel targeting actress Jane Fonda.
cause Fonda "embarrassment and detract from her status with the general public."
Held appears to have specialized in such things. Only two months previously,
he had launched a similar operation (and for similar reasons, albeit compounded by
a sexual twist) against the actress Jean Seberg:
LA 1574054
the Panther chaps in a 'we will kill Richard
Nixon, and any ,other 14 F who stands
in our way' refrain (which was shocking to say
the leastl). I think Jane has gotten in over
her head as the whole atmosphere had the 1930's
Munich beer-hall aura.
"I also think my curiosity about the Panthers
has been satisfied.
"Regards
/8/ "Morris"
If approved, appropriate precautions will be taken
to preclude the identity of the Bureau as the source of this
operation.
In April 1970, when Seberg was in her fourth month of pregnancy, the Bureau sought
a way to make her an object lesson to any other parlor pinks who might be thinking
of supporting the Panthers. According to one former FBI agent [M. Wesley Swear-
ingen] who worked in Los Angeles at the time, a culture of racism had so permeated
the Bureau and its field offices that the agents seethed with hatred toward the
Panthers and the white women who associated with them. "In the view of the
Bureau," [Swearingen] reported, "Jean was giving aid and comfort to the enemy, the
BPP...The giving of her white body to a black man was an unbearable thought for
many of the white agents. An agent [allegedly Held] was overheard to say, a few
days after I arrived in Los Angeles from New York, 'I wonder how she'd like to
gobble my dick while I shove my .38 up that black bastard's ass [a reference to BPP
theorist Raymond "Masai" Hewitt, with whom Seberg was reputedly having an
affair] "127
On May 27,1970, Held sent the accompanying Airtel to headquarters requesting

approval to plant a story with Hollywood gossip columnists to the effect that Seberg
was pregnant, not by her husband, Romaine Gary, but by a Panther. As indicated in
the accompanying May 6 response by letter from Hoover, Held's idea was ap-
proved, although implementation was postponed "approximately two additional
months," to protect the secrecy of a wiretap the Bureau had installed in the LA and
San Francisco BPP headquarters, and until the victim's "pregnancy would be more
visible to everyone." The director also took the time to stipulate that Seberg deserved
to be "neutralized" simply because she'd been a "financial supporter" of the Black
Panther Party. The schedule was apparently accelerated, because on June 6, Held
sent Hoover the accompanying letter and attached newspaper clipping demonstrat-
ing the "success" of his COINTELPRO action: a column by Joyce Haber laying out
the Bureau fiction, which had run in the Los Angeles Times on May 19. Known by the
FBI to have been emotionally unstable and in the care of a psychiatrist before the
operation began, Seberg responded to the "disclosure" by attempting suicide with
an overdose of sleeping pills. This in turn precipitated the premature delivery of her
4/27/10.
Transmit the following In
(rype Is plaildesl or said
Via A TRTFT. REGISTERED MAIL

(Priority)
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-44800E)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (157-4054) (P)
C7
SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE - BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Re San Francisco airtel to the Bureau dated 4/23/70,

entitled, "BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP), LOS ANGELES DIVISION,
RM-BPP."
Bureau permission is requested to publicize the
nan N SEBERG, well-known movie actress, b
Slack Panther Party, (BPP)
y advising Hollywood Gossip-Columnists n
the Los ngeles area of the situation. It is felt that
the possible publication of SEBERG's plight could cause
her embarrassment and serve to cheapen her image with the
general public.
It is proposed that the following letter from a
fictitious person be sent to local columnists:
"I was just thinking about you and remembered
I still owe you a favor. So I was in Paris
last week and ran into Jean Seberg, who was heavy
with baby. I thought she and Romaine had gotten
- Bureata&A
- San Francisco (Info) (RM
2 - Los Angeles
fE" /0() -
t.
RWH/fs MAY ,1 1970
(6)
Airtel initiating COINTELPRO against Jean Seberg.
fetus; it died two days later. Henceforth, a shattered Jean Seberg was to regularly
attempt suicide on or near the anniversary of her child's death. In 1979, she was
successful. Romaine Gary, her ex-husband (who all along maintained he was the
father of the child) followed suit shortly thereafter.'" There is no indication Richard
Wallace Held ever considered this to be anything other than an extremely successful
COINTELPRO operation.
iA 1:50ot4
Ai., •
together aga onfided the child
belonged to f the Black
Panthers, one The dear girl
is getting aroun .
"Anyway, I thought you might get a scoop
on the others. Be good and I'll see you soon.
"Love,
Sol?
Usual precautions would be taken by the Los

Angeles Division to preclude identification of the Bureau
as the source of the letter if approval is granted.'
Meanwhile, the Bureau continued to undertake COINTELPRO-New Left op-

erations through various municipal police departments, inculcating its view of the
opposition - and preferred modes of combatting it - among rank-and-file cops not
only via its already pronounced interlocks with local red squads, but through a more
broadly-focused program of publications such as Anti-Terrorist Digest, seminars,
briefings and training sequences.' One outcome, according to a government
commission assembled in 1969, was that grassroots police - never tolerant of or
friendly toward "deviants" of any sort - rapidly and increasingly came to view
"students, other anti-war protestors and blacks as a danger to our political system,
[and] themselves as the political force by which radicalism, student demonstrations
and black power [could] be blocked." They reported that the corresponding "police
response to mass protest [had] resulted in steady escalation of conflict, hostility and
violence" within U.S. society as a whole.'"
Tangible examples of this trend were legion. In March 1968, for example, police
suddenly and without warning attacked a Yippie! demonstration being conducted
inside New York's Grand Central Station, frenetically dubbing demonstrators and
bystanders alike 131A month later, in April, New York's finest followed up with a
comparable attack against peaceful anti-war demonstrators assembled at Washing-
ton Square (and with the already-mentioned assault upon the students at Colum-
bia).132 The same month, as a prelude to the massive police violence directed against
demonstrators during the Democratic convention, the Chicago police tac squad bru-
tally assaulted an anti-war rally in the Loop."'
In June, police attacked a peaceful crowd assembled in Berkeley to hear
speeches supporting the then-ongoing student uprising in France; there followed a
week-long reign of terror during which police tear-gassed private residences,
indiscriminately beat members of a crowd leaving a movie theater, gassed at least
two first aid stations, broke into and vandalized a church, smashed the cameras of
newspaper photographers, and sent at least 37 people to the hospital.'" An official
SAC, Los Angeles (157-4054) 5/6/70

;AG 541• P7/ / 1 -111111111111.111111r
Direcar, FBI (100-448006)—:/ Ci .
•'11,
CUUNTORINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE - BLACK PANTHER PARTY
Reurairtel 4/27/70.
Reairtel requests Bureau authority to forward a

letter from a fictitious person to Hollywood, California,
. gossip columnists to publicize the re anc of JeanASeberg,
well-k own white movie actress, by see_
to possibly cause er embarrassment
anti tarnis er image with the general public. Information
from indicated that Scberg was four months
pregnant by
To protect the sensitive source of information

from possible compromise and to insure the success of your
plan, Bureau &elk:, would be better to wait approximately
two additional until Seberg's pregnancy would be
obvious to everyone. If deemed warranted, submit your
recommendation at that time.
1 - San Francisco
JFM:drl
(5)
NOTE:
Jean Seberg has been a financial supporter of the

Tel ma
BPP nd should be neutralized. Her current pregnancy by
▪ lose■ while still married affords an opportunity for such
▪ . effort. The plan suggested by Los Angeles appears to have
BOW.
Comm
merit except for the timing since th‘ sensitive source
Collahm
Comad
might be compromised if implemented prematilrely. A copy is
F.11
Cale
designated to San Francisco since its Sensitive source
coverage is involved.
Sralli as
T4 ni
TM 901r kW
11arm
1. ' 8 ovfie
Approval of the Seberg COINTELPRO.
investigation revealed that "the most common [civilian] observation was that the
police appeared to have 'gone berserk" or 'lost their cool' or otherwise acted in a non-
rational way."135During the August convention in Chicago, the violence was even
more gratuitous. Over a thousand persons - including more than 65 of the approxi-
mately 300 media personnel assigned to cover street demonstrations - suffered
significant injuries at the hands of the police during convention week. As the Walker
Commission later put it:
lOYCE 'TABER
.• • ; j
Miss A Fltes as
• ..•..
4s. iti L. Nroi.1- CI' Lai
*
•
Let us cell her Missli.1;ecause she's the eurrent

topic of chatter amone the Ins' of Inteshmional
burins circles. She It bautiful and she I, bkmde. •
Miss A came to blollywond some years ago with the
Item by Los Angeles Times gossip columnist tantalising fluor of a basket of ftesh-picked berrjes.
Joyce Haber (right) which caused Jean Seberg ▪ '• • • - The critics plukcd at her
acting debut, and In time.
to miscarry and ultimately commit suicide. " a handsome Et:ropes:1
•: • ' • 7 • • picked her(n,- his wife. %f-•
Excerpt from SA Richard Wallace Held's letter ••... 1•4 ter they married. Miss. A
. 1h•etl' in sembretiremeni
(below) taking credit for the column as a from• he ll.S. mecte scene.
Ali j But recently the burst
"successful" COINTELPRO. forth as the star of a
dollar musical.
Meanwhile, the outcolng
Miss A was pursuing a
-1 number of Irce-seined
• cases. among them the
••• •••• Mack revoluthm. RI., lived
j what she believed which
• • raised a• few 3.:stablish--
:. ' • • ..;. . : ment eyebrov.i: Not be-
• cause her escorts were of-
1.Inyce Kober
5. . , . ten .blacks, but because ••
s•• 4: • they were black nationa-
lists. i ..,
And now, according to all those really 'In' interns-
Mona! sources, Topic A Is the baby Miss A Is expecting,
and Its father. raga's said to be a rather prominent
Black Panther. •. ' • • ' - •
0 •
• DIRECT011, FBI (] ,'148006)
: t •
1 1SAC,
( LOS ANGELES (157-P054)
Nucv COUNTER rraaJOENCE PREGRAmS. ,.

BLACK V 17CRALIET HATE OREUPS
IN
RACIAL n'ELLIGEgCE —
BLACK P TITER PARTY
, ....-
44%).i Re Los Angeles airtel to the Bureau dated .:: $ 110

4 27/70, and Bureau letter.to Los Arteles dated 5/6/70.
. .
Enclosed for the Bureiu is a copy of an article
by Hollywood "gossip" columnist JOYCE HABER, extracted
from pate 12, part IV, the 5/19/70 issue-of-the,•Los .%.
Angeles Tines-,"Presumably regard' r- . he P^na cv ofAN n[
SED movie actress,•by
.11
1
g!
The violence was made all the more shocking by the fact that it was often inflicted
upon persons who had broken no law, disobeyed no order, made no threat. These
included peaceful demonstrators, onlookers, and large numbers of residents who
were simply passing through, or happened to live in, the areas where confronta-
tions were occurring 136
In December 1969, the New York police once again attacked a peaceful demon-
stration, this time on the occasion of an appearance at a local hotel by President
Nixon. Among other things, the cops yanked six people from a passing van, beat
them with riot batons and trundled them into paddy wagons, apparently for the sole
reason that they'd made a gesture indicating "peace" while driving by, and one had
shouted from the window of the vehicle: "This is what Richard Nixon's fascist police
are going to be like, and don't you forget it."1"
May 1969 saw the so-called 'People's Park" confrontation in Berkeley when
students and community people attempted to prevent an area owned by the
University of California, formerly devoted to low-cost housing, from being con-
verted into a parking lot. When activists began to create a community park on the
lot construction site, police attacked in a fashion which prompted even so establish-
mentarian a publication as Newsweek to observe that they "had gone riot, displaying
a lawless brutality equal to that of Chicago, along with weapons and techniques that
even the authorities in Chicago did not dare employ; the firing of buckshot at fleeing
crowds and unarmed bystanders and the gassing - at times for no reason at all - of
entire streets and portions of Ethel college campus."'" During the week of this wave
of repression in Berkeley, even peaceful marches and demonstrations were arbitrar-
ily banned, tear-gas was sprayed from helicopters, some 200 persons were badly
injured by police clubs and gunfire (including one who was permanently blinded),
and one man - James Rector - was killed 139During the week, California Governor
Ronald Reagan strongly backed these police atrocities, asserting that, "If it's blood
they want, let it be now.."f40
The deaths of student demonstrators at the hands of FBI-prepped local police
was hardly a novelty. The first such fatality had occurred in May 1967 during
demonstrations at Jackson State College (Jackson, Mississippi) when cops fired
shotguns into an unarmed crowd, killing one and wounding two others?" Three
students - Samuel Hammond, Delano Middleton and Henry Smith - were killed
and 28 others wounded when South Carolina state troopers fired without warning
on another group of peaceful demonstrators, this time from South Carolina State
College in Orangeburg during February 1968. Most of those shot were hit while
lying prone on the ground, attempting to get out of the line of fire (in the aftermath,
the nine highway patrolmen identified as having done the shooting were "cleared
of wrongdoing" and promoted). 42In May 1969, another student, Willie Ernest
Grimes, was shot and killed by police during demonstrations at North Carolina
Agricultural and Mechanical College."' During February 1970, a student named
Kevin Moran was killed and two others wounded by police gunfire - and several
more otherwise injured by police and national guardsmen - during demonstrations
which ultimately resulted in the burning of a Bank of America branch facility." In

March of the same year, 12 students were shot and 57 others injured by police during
demonstrations at SUNY, Buffalo.'4s
Probably the most notorious incident involving the shooting of student demon-
strators occurred at Kent State University in Ohio on May 4, 1970, when national
guardsmen opened fire on a crowd protesting the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, killing
four - Allison Krause, Jeffrey Miller, Sandra Scheuer and William Schroeder - and
wounding nine (several of the dead and wounded were bystanders rather than
demonstrators; one - Schroeder - was even a member of the campus ROTC unit)."
Only days before, however, the Ohio guard had fired on a similar group at Ohio State
University, wounding 20." This was followed, on May 14, by Mississippi highway
patrolmen actually firing into a dormitory at Jackson State (again), killing two -
Phillip Gibbs and James Earl Green - and wounding twelve'" During July, two
students - Rick Dowdell and Harry Rice - were killed by police at the University of
Kansas in Lawrence," another - Randy Anderson - shot to death on the campus of
the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee," and black organizer Carl Hampton
was gunned down in Houston, Texas."' Even as late as November 1972, police were
still shooting student activists; two died as the result of a volley fired by deputy
sheriffs at Southern University in New Orleans."
In the last incident, a special commission created by the Louisiana state attorney
general quickly determined there had been "no justification for the shootings," but
the deputies went free." It was by then an old story. In May 1971, a government
commission investigating the murders at Kent State concluded - after a county
grand jury had absolved local guardsmen of any wrongdoing - that the actions of
the Ohio guard had been "unnecessary, unwarranted and inexcusable."1" Ohio
officials nonetheless refused to bring charges against those implicated, and U.S.
Attorney General John Mitchell declined to convene a federal grand jury to follow
Up.155Ohio, in the meantime, had indicted 25 Kent State students, ex-students and
faculty on felony charges such as "inciting to riot.." A county grand jury activated
after the fatalities at Jackson State perhaps summed up the official attitude most suc-
cinctly when it not only found police killings of unarmed demonstrators to be
"justified," but declared that protestors "must expect to be injured or killed when
law enforcement officers are required to reestablish order."'"
With the active assistance of the FBI, local police and national guard units
consistently "explained" such conduct as being necessitated by the violent behavior
of the victims themselves. It steadily came out, however, that much or most of the
alleged new left violence was either fabricated or actually the result of Bureau/
police tactics designed to rationalize the virulence of the repression before the
public. At Kent State, for example, "during the ten days following the shootings,
while the campus was closed, police ransacked every room among [the university's]
thirty-one dormitories, without warrants, in search of weapons; they found a total
of two hunting weapons [one of which was inoperable], sixty knives, three sling-
shots, several BB guns and a yellow button which stated, 'Dare to struggle, dare to
win.'"128Still, the state - with active connivance by the FBI - pursued attempts to
blame students in court for the actions of the Ohio National Guard, a matter which
eventually led to Student Body President Craig Morgan and two others winning
$5,000 judgments in malicious prosecution suits.'"
At Ohio State, the official story was that activists closing and chaining the gates
to the campus - allegedly preventing "crowd control" - had "forced" the guard to
fire on demonstrators. It was later revealed that those who had committed the act in
question were in reality members of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, deliberately
attired in such a way as to impersonate demonstrators before the news media."° The
use of such provocateurs to create the appearance of "justification" for even the worst
forms of repression was consistent. Aside from such earlier-mentioned FBI infiltra-
tors of the new left as William Divale, Phillip Abbott Luce, and provocateurs such as
William Lemmer, Boyd Douglass and Howard Berry Godfrey:
Probably the most-well known agent provocateur was Thomas Tongyai, known as
Tommy the Traveler. Tongyai, who was paid by both the FBI and local police, spent
over two years travelling among colleges in western New York state urging
students to kill police, make bombs and blow up buildings. He supplied students
with radical speakers, literature and films, tried to organize an SDS chapter at
Hobart College, organized SDS conferences in Rochester and urged students to
participate in the Weatherman "Days of Rage" in Chicago in October, 1969. Tongyai
constantly talked violence, carried a grenade in his car, showed students how to use
an M-1 rifle and offered advice on how to carry out bombings. After some students
at Hobart College apparently took his advice and bombed the Hobart ROTC
building, and Tongyai's cover was exposed, the local sheriff commented, "There's
a lot of difference between showing how to build a bomb and building one." As a
result of disturbances connected with Tongyai's activities on the Hobart campus,
nine students and faculty faced criminal charges, but Tongyai was cleared by a local
grand jury and went on to become a policeman in Pennsylvania 161
Similarly, "Horace L. Packer, an FBI informer who was the chief government
witness in the Seattle Eight conspiracy case, testified he was under FBI instructions
to 'do anything to protect my credibility.' He testified that while infiltrating SDS and
Weatherman at the University of Washington he supplied campus radicals with
drugs, weapons and materials used for preparing molotov cocktails. Packer even
admitted he supplied and the FBI paid for paint used to spray the Federal court-
house in Seattle during a demonstration in February, 1970 - a key element in the
charge of conspiracy to damage federal property which was one of the major charges
of the case. Packer also testified that he used drugs, including 'acid, speed, mesca-
line' and cocaine while acting as a [provocateur], that he 'smoked dope all the time,'
that he was arrested several times during campus demonstrations, and that he had
violated the conditions of a suspended sentence he had received for participating in
a Weatherman assault on ROTC facilities at the University of Washington.""2Also
in Seattle:
Probably the most incredible provocation incident involved an FBI and Seattle
police informer, Alfred Burnett, who lured Larry Eugene Ward into planting a bomb
at a Seattle real estate office on the morning of May 15, 1970, by paying Ward $75,
providing him with the bomb and giving him transportation to the bombing scene.
Ward, a twenty-two year old veteran who had been twice wounded and decorated
three times for service in Vietnam, was shot and killed by waiting Seattle police as
he allegedly fled after the bombing attempt, although he was unarmed, on foot and
boxed in by police cars.1"
Burnett, the key player in this Cerro Maravilla-like ambush (see Chapter 4), was
"a twice-convicted felon who had been released from jail as the result of FBI
statements that he could provide valuable information...Burnett said later, 'The
police wanted a bomber and I got one for them. I didn't know Larry Ward would be
killed.' Seattle Police Intelligence Chief John Williams blamed the FBI, stating, 'As
far as I can tell Ward was a relatively decent kid. Somebody set this whole thing up.
It wasn't the police department.' Subsequently, Seattle's mayor publicly advocated
killing convicted bombers before a Senate committee, and citing the Ward case,
noted the incidence of bombings in Seattle had declined since the slaying. He added,
Ì suspect killing a person involved in a bombing...might be somewhat of a deter-
rent.'"1"
In the so-called "Camden Twenty-Eight" case, the defendants were acquitted of
all charges accruing from their breaking into a New Jersey Selective Service office
and attempting to destroy the draft files therein after the trial judge instructed the
jury to return verdicts of "not guilty" if it felt the government had gone to "intoler-
able lengths"and otherwise conducted itself in a manner "offensive to the basic
standards of decency and shocking to the universal standards of justice" in setting
up the "crime." The prosecution's star witness, Robert W. Hardy, had admitted on
the stand that he had - upon instructions of the Bureau - infiltrated the group,
proposed the action, provided "90 percent" of the burglary tools utilized, and
offered his "expertise at breaking and entering" to allow the plot to go forward.1"
Elsewhere, "Another campusagent provocateur was Charles Grimm, who functioned
as a local police and FBI informant on the campus of the University of Alabama at
Tuscaloosa. Among his activities were the burning of Dressler Hall on the campus
on May 7, 1970 (at the direction of the FBI, he said), the throwing of three molotov
cocktails into a street on May 14, 1970 and the throwing of objects at police officers
on the campus on May 18,1970."166
Among those indicted by a federal grand jury in Detroit on March 6, 1970 for
conspiracy to bomb police and military installations was Larry G. Grathwohl - re-
putedly one of "the most militant members" of the SDS Weatherman faction - an
FBI infiltrator, known as a demolitions expert, who gave bomb-making lessons to
the group, regularly brandished both a .357 magnum revolver and a straight razor,
and admitted to the New York Times having personally participated in the bombing
of a public school near Cincinnati in 1969.1" Charges were dropped against Grath-
wohl (but not against his alleged co-conspirators who, by then, had gone under-
ground), and he "retired" into the Bureau's witness protection program, eventually
writing a sensationally self-serving account of his exploits entitled Bringing Down
America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen.1"
Meanwhile, William Lemmer was hardly the only infiltrator/provocateur at-
tempting to make the VVAW appear "violence prone." For instance, Reinhold
Mohr, a secret member of the Kent State University police force, was arrested in
April of 1972 by local cops while carrying in his car a rocket launcher and subma-
chinegun he'd been trying to peddle to the campus chapter of the veterans'
organization as a means - as he put it to the intended buyers - of "furthering the
armed struggle against imperialism." Perhaps ironically, it was Kent State VVAW
which tipped the city police that "there's a nut running around out there with a
bunch of automatic weapons." Although Mohr was clearly in violation of a number
of state and federal statutes, he was quickly released without charges when the chief
of campus security and local FBI agents confirmed he'd "only followed orders" in
attempting to foment violence 1"
Another individual who, by his own account, expended a considerable amount
of time and energy working to subvert VVAW was Joe Burton, a provocateur active
in the Tampa, Florida area from 1972 to '74 (i.e.: after COINTELPRO had supposedly
ceased to exist in 1971). Describinghis assignment as being the "disruption of radical
groups" from both the U.S. and Canada, Burton explained how the Bureau had
dispatched counterintelligence specialists from headquarters to assist him in forg-
ing various documents and to establish a bogus radical organization dubbed the
"Red Star Cadre." This front was used as a prop upon which Burton could "argue
from the left" that various bona fide groups such as VVAW, the United Electrical
Workers Union (UE), the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees (AFSCME), and the United Farm Workers (UFW) were "not militant
enough" and to attempt to lure their members into violence and other illegal
activities.170A comparable - if less effective - operation was run by a husband and
wife team, Jill and Harry E. ("Gi") Shafer, III, through a bogus entity called the Red
Star Collective in New Orleans. The Shafers were later used to infiltrate the support
apparatus of the American Indian Movement (see next chapter), boasting after-
wards that they'd managed to "divert" substantial funds raised for legal defense. 1"
In much the same fashion, Howard Berry Godfrey, the Bureau's operative
within the right-wing Secret Army Organization in southern California hardly
contented himself with participation in the attempted assassination of Peter Bohmer.
To the contrary, as Godfrey later testified, he had served as a conduit during 1971
and '72 through which the FBI had pumped more than $60,000 worth of weapons
and explosives into the terrorist group. Further, he admitted to having provided not
only the explosive device, but also the demolitions training utilized by the SAO in
its June 19, 1972 bombing of the left-leaning Guild Theater in San Diego.172As he
himself subsequently acknowledged, by the time Godfrey's cover was blown he had
participated in the burglaries of several southern California new left organizational
offices, infiltrated the staff of the radical Message Information Center in Los
Angeles, and was working with SAO gunmen to compile a comprehensive list of
left-wing activists to be liquidated" over coming months. He was, of course, never
prosecuted for even his most plainly criminal activities."'
On other fronts, an agent for the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division
managed to work his way into a position as co-chair of the SDS chapter of the city
of Columbia,1" while a Texas state police infiltrator became chair of the University
of Texas chapter."' In Chicago, a member of the red squad successfully infiltrated
the SDS chapter at Northwestern University, led a sit-in action in 1968, and then
participated in a 1969 Weatherman action involving the throwing of the college
president off a stage which caused him to be expelled from the campus."' Yet
another Chicago undercover operative admitted having provided explosives to the
Weatherman group, while another - also posing as a Weatherman - acknowledged
having led an assault upon a uniformed police sergeant during a demonstration
widely publicized as "proving the violence" of the new left."' Another Chicago cop
who infiltrated new left organizations admitted before a grand jury that he used the
high position he attained in one group to advocate the shooting of police, and that
he had "demonstrated the most strategic placement of snipers in downtown
Chicago which would make possible the highest number of [police] casualties.""'
The list of examples goes on and on.
As former infiltrators/provocateurs such as Godfrey and Louis Tackwood (see
Chapter 5) exposed the emergence of a systematic interlock between the FBI and
state/local police units in southern California (particularly in Los Angeles), so too
did a blue ribbon grand jury discover a similar development in Chicago. According
to the grand jury report, released in November of 1975, beginning in early 1969 the
CPD had "launched a massive intelligence campaign," filled with "unwarranted,
unsupported and erroneous characterizations, assumptions and conclusions" - all
of which it shared as a matter of course with the Bureau and other federal agencies
- against a wide array of new left and other community groups, none of which
exhibited any history of criminal activity. The entire operation "assaulted the
fundamental freedoms of speech, association, press and religion, as well as the
constitutional right to privacy of hundreds of persons," in the grand jury's view."'
The grand jury also noted the existence of a strong COINTELPRO-style
dimension to the whole thing, not only by virtue of the activities of the police
infiltrators mentioned in the preceding paragraph, but because the police and
federal entities such as the FBI and Army Intelligence had cooperated in financing
and directing a right-wing terrorist organization against new left activists through-
out the Chicago area. Called the "Legion of Justice," this SAO-type group had for
years beaten up police-selected targets, broken into movement offices and vandal-
ized their property. Several Chicago red squad members testified to the effect that
they considered it a "patriotic duty" to use Legion thugs to "disrupt the activities of
[new left] organizations by destroying mailing lists, lists of financial contributors,
office equipment and even stealing money," as well as to administer summary
corporal punishment to those deemed politically objectionable by the Chicago status
quo. The grand jury report also specifically noted that both the CPD and federal
agencies (the 113th Military Intelligence Group, based in the Chicago suburb of
Evanston, was mentioned by name), had destroyed evidence and generally refused
to cooperate with the investigation.'"
Within this panorama of infiltration, provocation, officially-sponsored vigilan-
tism and extreme police brutality, the Bureau was able to pursue all manner of
specific COINTELPRO actions designed to intimidate new left activists into political
paralysis. For example, the accompanying postcard - attributed to the "Minute-
men," a right-wing group well-known to have carried out a number of violent
actions during the '60s - was sent to author Churchill during a period when he was
serving as the Peoria, Illinois at-large organizer for SDS."1The card, also deployed
against the staff of The Black Panther (see Chapter 5), was sent to a number of SDS
members - usually those operating in locations remote from the urban hubs of new
left activities - during the fall of 1970.
Such things were part of a generalized COINTELPRO strategy intended to
"enhance the paranoia endemic to [new left] circles," and "get the point across that
there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox."'" Hence, in Chicago during the June
1969 SDS national convention, the Bureau and local red squad combined to assign
over five hundred men to 'undercover' work. Most of them clustered outside the
convention site - in full view of the SDS delegates - taking pictures of everyone in
the area'") In another Chicago incident, in May of 1969:
Chicago police and firemen appeared at the [SDS national headquarters, 1608 W.
Madison], in response, they declared, to reports of a shooting and a fire in the office.
When SDS [National Secretary Mike Klonsky] told them there was no shooting or
fire, an agreement was reached to the effect that the fire chief alone could inspect the
premises. However, a group of firemen attempted to enter the office, and when SDS
staff members resisted, police joined the fray. Five SDS staffers were arrested and
held on $1,000 bail on charges of "battery on an officer," "interfering with a
fireman," and "inciting mob action."'"
Under the circumstances, Brian Glick's description of what was happening as

constituting a "war at home" seems entirely apt 1"8However, it also appears that
participation in the hostilities was not entirely two-sided. To the contrary, it is quite
likely that the widely-publicized "resort to violence" by the new left of the late 1960s
and early '70s was largely the creation of the national police establishment rather
than of the radicals themselves. Certainly, of the 862 bombings and attempted
bombings which supposedly occurred between January 1969 and April 15, 1970, a
decided majority entailed the direct involvement of FBI and local police provocateurs.'86
A good case can be made that the same rule pertains to many of the other more
spectacular acts of physical confrontation attributed to the new left in the "friendly
news media."1"
Perhaps even more to the point, such COINTELPRO maneuvering established
the context in which such new left violence as was not directly police-produced
Our nation can still be saved.

History will remember those who
help to save it. We will remember
those who don't.
"Minutemen"
TRAITORS BEWARE
See the old man at the ownersil
pspere? He may have a silencer
w ier
p
erou buy your Mr. Ward Churchill
pistol under
the cost. That extra fountain pee pocket of the
insurance talesman who calls on you might be •
Box 1368
cyanide •gas gun. Tibet about your milk eau? Arsenic
weeks slow but sum. Your auto mechanic may stay up
Peoria, Illinois
nights studyinebooby trope. These patriots are not
g to let you take their freedom away from thaw.
61601
Fi have learned the silent knife, the strength?*
the tarot rifle that bits sparrows at T0O yards.
Traitors ,heware. Evan now the areas hake are on the
back of your necks.
tilNUTEMEN
"Minutemen" death threat card utilized in COINTELPRO-New Left in the Midwest.

might occur: a combination of frustration at official repression of entirely legitimate
dissident activities visa vis institutionalized domestic racism and poverty, and an
international pattern of imperialism signified by the government's patently crimi-
nal prosecution of an undeclared war in Indochina; rage at the violently physical
form assumed by the repression (beatings, shootings, gassings), coupled to a

consistent official policy of lying, victim-blaming and other misrepresentation in the
media; and an increasing belief - often fostered by agents provocateurs - that some
form of violence might in itself serve to rectify the situation. Arguably, even those
few new left groups such as Weatherman SDS, which eventually placed their
primary reliance upon armed struggle, did so largely for such reasons.'"
Demise of the New Left
By the end of 1972, the mass movement which had comprised the new left had
generally disintegrated, for a number of reasons, but notably because of COIN-
TELPRO and its related forms of police pressure. There were, to be sure, some
spectacular incidents of generalized repression during the finale, as when the
Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Force, supplemented by army and national
guard troops - working in direct collaboration with FBI and Justice Department
officials - conspired to suspend the constitutional rights of the 50,000 people
assembled in the nation's capital to participate in the "Mayday" anti-war demon-
strations held May 3-5, 1971.
On May 3, seventy-two hundred persons were arrested, the largest total in Ameri-
can history, with the possible exception of the Palmer Raids. In the course of making
the arrests, police abandoned all normal arrest procedures, including recording the
names and alleged misdeeds of the arrestees. Hundreds of innocent bystanders,
including journalists and government employees on their way to work, were
scooped up in the police dragnet, and then held in overcrowded jail cells or in a
hastily erected outdoor stockade. In subsequent days, another sixty-two hundred
persons were arrested, including twelve hundred arrested while peacefully listen-
ing t o a speech on the Capitol steps on May5. President Nixon subsequently praised
Washington police for a "magnificent job" and Attorney General John Mitchell
urged local police [elsewhere] to follow the example. Deputy Attorney General
Richard Kleindienst announced that police procedures had been justified under the
doctrine of "qualified martial law," a constitutional doctrine which was previously
unknown, but which had the virtue, as the Washington ACLU branch pointed out,
of imposing "the conditions of martial law in fact" while avoiding a "formal
proclamation with its legal requirements.""'
In the wake of Mayday, literally thousands of "cases" were dropped by federal

prosecutors or summarily dismissed by the courts, clarifying the fact that the arrests
themselves had been intended as punishment (for purely political reasons, and
without so much as a pretense of due process). Of the total of approximately 13,400
individuals arrested during the demonstrations, only 122 were convicted of minor
offenses. Another 625 pled guilty or nolo contendere on uniformly petty charges, a
matter which was followed up in 1974 by a federal district judge ordering - on the
grounds of police coercion - that all such pleas be nullified and corresponding arrest
records destroyed. In January of 1975, another federal court awarded the victims of
the Mayday repression a total of $12,000,000 in "punitive damages," but in the

meantime, the government had established quite clearly that mass demonstrations
would not be an effective means of bringing about an alteration in U.S. Indochina
policy.1"
Also employed by the Nixon administration as a means of neutralizing the new
left, undoubtedly as an adjunct to other such "legal" expedients as mass false arrests
and bogus conspiracy trials, was an extraordinary series of federal grand jury
"investigations."
Beginning in 1970, federal grand juries throughout the country were convened for
what clearly were general "fishing expeditions," coordinated by the Internal
Security Division of the Justice Department, into the activities of radical and anti-
war groups...Between 1970 and January, 1973, over one hundred grand juries in
thirty-six states and eighty-four cities looked into dissident activities, and over one
thousand persons were subpoenaed to appear before such bodies...Witnesses
appearing before these grand juries were forced to testify in secret and without
presence of legal counsel in the grand jury room, and under threat of contempt or
jail sentences...Witnesses were asked detailed questions about their personal beliefs
and associations and about their general [rather than criminal] knowledge of
radical and anti-war activities...In several cases, grand juries interrogated witnesses
with regard to alleged crimes in which indictments had already been handed down,
indicating that one of the purposes of the investigations was to bolster indictments
which did not have enough evidence behind them to sustain convictions."'
None of the normal safeguards of due process pertain to grand jury procedures;
in the 1974 case, U.S. v. Calandra, the Supreme Court even ruled that a grand jury
witness could be compelled to testify concerning evidence derived from illegal
searches and seizures (such as FBI black bag jobs).1" Refusal of subpoenaed radicals
to cooperate in such inquisitional processes resulted in imprisonment without trial
on charges of contempt, with the duration of incarceration left to the discretion of
the presiding judge (but usually running for the duration of the period in which the
grand jury was empaneled, as long as 18 months). The alternative, cooperation, left
witnesses politically suspect, at best, in the eyes of their peers. Even when witnesses
refused to cooperate with these secret proceedings, the FBI — which served as the
primary investigative resource of the grand juries — sometimes opted to utilize
COINTELPRO techniques to make it appear otherwise, neatly bad-jacketing them
as informers. Hence, the grand jury became "an effective means by which the gov-
ernment [could] jail politically suspect persons [more-or-less at its discretion]" or
destroy their political credibility."'
According to the Church Committee, the FBI engaged in 290 separate COIN-
TELPRO actions between the formal start-up of its program against the new left in
mid-1968 and the program's official termination in April 1971. Of these, some 40%
were designed to keeping targeted activists from speaking, teaching, writing or
publishing."' When one considers the far broader forms of legalistic and physical
repression deliberately provoked by the Bureau as adjuncts and enhancements to its
anti-new left COINTELPRO campaign, it is rather easy to see how and why the
movement disintegrated when and as it did.
This is not to argue that the new left was free of defects, both in outlook and in
practice, which might ultimately have led to its undoing. But, as even so staid a
publication as the Los Angeles Times was willing to admit, such things "might not
have destroyed the movement." However, the new left's internal confusions,
disagreements and problems were "exploited [and] exaggerated by the government's
planned program of sabotage and disruption," making solutions virtually impos-
sible. This, in combination with the increasing viciousness with which Bureau-
coached local police assaulted demonstrators, the steady string of gratuitous kill-
ings of activists on and off campus, the systematic infiltration and provocation, the
relentless series of grand juries and conspiracy trials, as well as consistent media dis-
information all served to sap "the movement's leadership, funds and morale,"
precipitating its collapse.195With it went by far the greatest potential for consolida-
tion of a socially positive Euroamerican mass movement since the New Reconstruc-
tion period during and immediately following World War I (see Chapter 2).
By the mid-'70s, some former new left leaders had abandoned the struggle for
social justice in favor of the very values they'd most vociferously opposed 196Others,
such as Yippie! leader Abbie Hoffman had been driven underground when faced
with lengthy prison sentences on extremely dubious charges.197Entire organiza-
tions, such as the Weatherman SDS faction, had transformed themselves into a series
of clandestine cells with little hope of obtaining appreciable above-ground sup-
port.198What had been the broad-based and quite inclusive new left was reduced for
all practical purposes to a gender-defined liberal feminism on the one hand, and a
scattering of male-dominated, tiny and rabidly sectarian organizations such as the
Communist Workers Party, Progressive Labor Party and Revolutionary Commu-
nist Party, USA on the other. Such emergent politics as these can only be viewed as
being as fundamentally irrelevant to the flow of events in the United States as those
of the old left SWP and CP,USA.1" From the FBI perspective, COINTELPRO-New
Left could have been assessed as little other than a tremendous success.
Chapter 7
COINTELPRO AIM
They [the Indians] are a conquered nation, and when you are conquered,
the people you are conquered by dictate your future. This is a basic
philosophy of mine. If I'm part of a conquered nation, I've got to yield to
authority... [The FBI must function as] a colonial police force.
— Norman Zigrossi —
ASAC Rapid City
1977
In this brief statement, Assistant Special Agent in Charge Zigrossi summarized

over two centuries of U.S. jurisdiction and law enforcement" in Indian Country.
From the country's founding through the present, U.S. Indian policy has consis-
tently followed a program to subordinate American Indian nations and expropriate
their land and resources. In much the same fashion as Puerto Rico (see Chapter 4),
indigenous nations within the United States have been forced to exist - even by
federal definition - as outright colonies' When constitutional law and precedent
stood in the way of such policy, the executive and judicial branches, in their turn,
formulated excuses for ignoring them. A product of convenience and practicality for
the federal government, U.S. jurisdiction, especially within reserved Indian territo-
ries ("reservations"), "presents a complex and sometimes conflicting morass of
treaties, statutes and regulation.."2
The FBI in Indian Country
The entrance of the FBI in law enforcement into Indian Country began in the
1940s - under clear congressional provisos that it should be neither primary nor
permanent - as wartime funding cuts rendered staffing levels for Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) Special Officers inadequate.' Initially, the Bureau offered mere "inves-
tigative assistance" to the BIA, but over time all federal offenses came to be
investigated by the FBI. By 1953:
...apparently because of FBI leadership, most U.S. Attorneys, and U.S. District Judges,
recognized the FBI as having primary investigative jurisdiction for Federal law
violations committed in Indian country, notwithstanding the wording of Congres-
231
sional appropriation acts since FY-1939 and Opinion M. 2%69 dated August 1,1938,
issued by the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior [indicating that such respon-
sibilities were included in the duties of BIA Special Officers]!
The current situation is that:

The BIA has trained criminal investigators on most reservations. These special
officers conduct the initial investigation for the majority of serious crimes which
occur on Indian reservations. Most U.S. Attorneys however, will not normally
accept the findings of a BIA special officer as a basis for making a decision on
whether to prosecute. Instead, most U.S. Attorneys require that the FBI conduct an
independent investigation, often duplicative of the BIA investigation, prior to
authorizing prosecution.... 3
All law enforcement on American Indian reservations has been made to revolve
around the actions (and inactions) of the FBI. It is undoubtedly significant that while
the typical BIA police officer is Indian, FBI agents and U.S. Attorneys are over-
whelmingly white.'
Far from enhancing law enforcement, the FBI impedes it by slow response and
insistence upon repeating the investigative work of BIA, often well after the fact.
Until this process is completed, no arrests can be made and suspects remain at
large.' Once an offender has been apprehended and charged, there is little chance
they will be tried: "Precise statistics are not maintained by Federal law enforcement
agencies, but it appears that in excess of 80 percent of major crimes cases, on the
average, presented to the United States attorneys are declined for prosecution."'
Unlike crimes committed off-reservation, there is no other jurisdiction under which
the defendant can be tried if the U.S. Attorney declines to prosecute. The effect on
many reservations has been that defendants have a better chance of going to jail for
a traffic violation - tried in the tribal courts - than for rape or first degree murder.
Indian/Indian crimes or crimes perpetrated by non-Indians against Indians -
ranging from fraud to extreme violence - have received only minimal (if any)
attention from police and prosecutors. Only those allegedly criminal acts under-
taken by Indians against whites have tended to receive attention, filling the country's
prisons with a disproportionately high number of Indians.' In this sense, it is entirely
appropriate to observe that federal police functions in Indian Country are not
devoted to law enforcement per se, but rather to maintenance of the status quo
represented by Euroamerican domination and profiteering at the expense of American
Indian people. The message has been that only those who rock the politico-economic
boat risk criminal punishment.
With the passage of PL-280 in 1953, state and local agencies-also almost entirely
white - assumed responsibility for on reservation law enforcement in many in-
stances."' The overall effect of these policies has been that the quality of law
enforcement in Indian Country has been egregious when measured by the standard
of providing for the safety and security of the communities. Law enforcement
COINTELPRO—AIM 233
concerning the most serious crimes is the responsibility of individuals who do not
reside in the community and whose attitudes toward Indian people and their
customs range from ignorance to hostility and contempt, a la Norman Zigrossi. In
the case of state and local jurisdiction under PL-280, law enforcement is provided by
reservation-adjacent communities with a reputation for vehement racism aptly
summarized by an Itasca County, Minnesota, deputy sheriff: "[I]f all those Indians
would just kill each other off, we wouldn't have to go up there [to the reservation]."11
Slow to respond to complaints lodged by Indians, the police are viewed — justifiably
— with suspicion by the community.12
Rise of the American Indian Movement
The late 1960s saw a resurgence of militant Indian activism focused on resistance
to further depredation of Indian lands and resources, recovery of illegally expropri-
ated land, preservation of cultural identity and opposition to racist attacks on Indian
people and their culture. During the mid-'60s, a Cherokee college student named
Clyde Warrior founded the militant National Indian Youth Council (N1YC) and
began publishing a political broadside entitled Americans Before Columbus.13Even
the typically staid National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) adopted an
increasingly forceful tone under the leadership of Lakota law student Vine Deloria,
Jr., who before the end of the decade was to write the seminal Custer Died for Your
Sins and We Talk, You Listen." It was in this atmosphere that the American Indian
Movement (AIM) was founded in Minneapolis in 1968 by Dennis Banks and George
Mitchell (both Anishinabes [Chippewas]). Patterning itself after the Black Panther
Party, AIM initially focused itself on urban issues such as combating police harass-
ment of Indian people. During the next two years members such as Clyde Bellecourt
(Anishinabe), Russell Means (Oglala Lakota), Herb Powless (Oneida), John Trudell
(Santee Dakota) and Joe Locust (Cherokee) changed its emphasis from a local to a
national focus and from specifically urban issues to issues of treaty rights and the
preservation of traditional Indian culture.15
In November 1969, national attention was suddenly focused on Indian issues
when a coalition of Indian organizations, headed first by Richard Oaks (Mohawk)
and later Trudell, and railing itself Indians of All Tribes (IND, occupied Alcatraz
Island. Citing an 1882 federal statute (22 Stat. 181) which provided for the establish-
ment of Indian schools in abandoned federal facilities, the protestors demanded the
creation of a Center for Native American Studies and other cultural facilities on the
abandoned island. The occupation ended after nineteen months with an assault by
a task force of U.S. marshals and the arrest of the occupiers. A prior agreement by
the Department of Interior to convert Alcatraz to a national park featuring Indian
themes never materialized. However, the massive media attention and resultant
public support garnered by the Alcatraz occupation demonstrated its tactical
effectiveness 16During the next two years, Indians occupied other abandoned
military facilities across the country and Pacific Gas and Electric sites on Indian land
in northern California." AIM also engaged in a series of high-profile demonstrations

- including the occupation of the Mayflower/Ion Thanksgiving Day 1970 and of Mt.
Rushmore on July 4, 1971 - which continued to keep Indian issues in the public eye."
In January 1972 an Oglala man named Raymond Yellow Thunder was tortured
and murdered by two white men, Melvin and Leslie Hare, in the reservation-
adjacent town of Gordon, Nebraska. When it became clear that local law enforce-
ment agencies intended to take no action against Yellow Thunder's murderers, a
force of over 1,000 Indians - mostly from the nearby Pine Ridge and Rosebud
Reservations - headed by AIM leaders Dennis Banks and Russell Means, occupied
Gordon for three days.19The result of the occupation was that Yellow Thunder's
assailants were charged and jailed, a police officer suspended, and Gordon's
authorities forced to take a stand against discrimination toward Indians. The effect
of this action was described by historian Alvin Josephy, Jr.: "Although discrimina-
tion continued, AIM's reputation soared among reservation Indians. What tribal
leaders had dared not to do to protect their people, AIM had done."2° According to
those FBI documents assembled by the Bureau in its reading room, it was at this
juncture that agents were first assigned to keep close tabs on "AIM and related
militant Indian nationalist organizations."
In the light of growing public and reservation support, the AIM leadership met
at the home of Brills Lakota spiritual leader Leonard Crow Dog's home - called
Crow Dog's Paradise - on the Rosebud Reservation in July of 1972 to plan their next
action. From this meeting emerged the concept for The Trail of Broken Treaties.
Caravans from reservations across the country would travel to Washington, D.C.,
arriving immediately before the November presidential elections. AIM hoped that
given the timing and attendant press coverage, the Nixon administration might be
willing to enter into negotiations to resolve Indian grievances.21The Trail began in
San Francisco and Seattle in October and gathered support from reservations along
its route as it moved eastward. A list of proposed federal actions for redressing
grievances and restructuring the relationship between Indian nations and the U.S.
- known as the "Twenty Points" - was formulated during a stopover in St. Paul,
Minnesota." When the caravan reached Washington, D.C. on November 3, a series
of events rapidly led to the Indians seizing the national BIA headquarters and
occupying it until November 5.23The unplanned confrontation ended when the
administration - embarrassed by sensational news reporting - formally agreed to
review and respond to the Twenty Points, as well as to non-prosecution of the
occupiers and provision of $66,650 in travel expenses for caravan participants to
return home."
When the government recovered the BIA building, they discovered that a large
number of "confidential" documents - primarily concerned with the low-yield
leasing of reservation land - had been removed by the occupiers. One of the Trail's
leaders, Hank Adams (Assiniboin/Lakota), volunteered to recover the documents
and return them in batches, as they were copied and provided to the Indians to
whom they pertained. After returning two loads of material, he was set up by an FBI
COINTELPRO-AIM 235
provocateur named Johnny Arellano and arrested by the FBI in the process of return-
ing another." While the government made much in the media of the damage
allegedly done to the building by caravan participants:
Later events would indicate that the federal government had a substantial number
of agents among the protesters, and some were so militant and destructive that they
were awarded special Indian names for their involvement in the protest. It became
apparent why the government had been so willing to agree not to prosecute the
Indians: The presence of agent-provocateurs and the intensity of their work would
have made it extremely difficult for the government to have proven an intent by the
real Indian activists to destroy the building?'
It was thus during and immediately following the Trail of Broken Treaties that
evidence emerges of the initiation of a counterintelligence program to neutralize
AIM and its perceived leadership. An FBI document released to journalist Richard
LaCourse under the FOIA reveals a program which closely parallels that directed
against RAM in Philadelphia (see Chapter 5). It recommends that "local police put
[AIM] leaders under dose scrutiny, and arrest them on every possible charge until
they could no longer make bail."" This tactic was immediately implemented against
activists returning home from Washington, D.C. For instance, on November 22,
1972, Trail security coordinator Leonard Peltier was attacked in a Milwaukee
restaurant by two off-duty policemen; he was beaten severely and then arrested and
charged with the attempted murder of one of his assailants. Peltier was eventually
acquitted when trial testimony revealed that one of the cops had shown his
girlfriend a picture of Peltier and boasted of "help[ing] the FBI get a big one."28At
about the same time, in South Dakota:
As Russell Means led the Oglala Sioux remnants of the Trail of Broken Treaties
through the town of Pine Ridge, the seat of government of the Oglala reservation,
he may have noticed a stir of activity around police headquarters. Unknown to
Means, tribal president Richard Wilson had secured a court order from the Oglala
Sioux tribal court prohibiting Means or any other AIM member from speaking or
attending any public meeting...Since the Oglala Sioux Landowners Association was
meeting in Pine Ridge, Means, a member of this group, decided to attend and report
what had actually happened in Washington. Before he had a chance to speak his
mind, he was arrested by BI A special officer Delmar Eastman for violating this court
order...The arrest was a blatant violation of the First Amendment, for it denied
Means freedom of speech on the reservation where he was born and was an enrolled
member?'
Documents released through the FOIA, such as the accompanying January 12,
1973 report from the Denver field office, show that the Bureau was compiling
detailed profiles of AIM members and leaders as part of an "Extremist Matters"
investigation. As is demonstrated in the accompanying January 10 teletype, almost
entirely deleted under a national security classification, the Bureau was (for reasons
° 0
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE
FEDERAL SOREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Denver, Colorado
So Arty. Mom ittior to
January 12, 1973
N.
AFIRICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT (AIM)

EXTREMIST MATTERS -
AMERICAN INDIAN ACTIVITIES
ated that he was

quite aware of tnose ncividuals a filiated with the
American Indian Movement (AIM) in enver. Source stated
that the Denver chapter,' located a 847 East Colfaig, Denver,
Colorado, telephone number 222-151 , has a board of
directors, a larger group of board members, and an offi
staff.
Co ji 71)
(4011' Wary Day 1
ter of the
of directors. Debb y Elk Pace is &1-AL—__
e is the daughter (of John lyly Elk Face. •
A-cmqst" Aff .
,e boarc members includetJoNYtE . Elk Fee
re,1^••r•ir rod viar;;; cust
47°
other board - --;-,-__ I
member is J Large Another '°'''
member, Alice Blackhorse was killed in an automobile .-
accident in Nebraska recelgy. JohanuafileW Elk Face, &Le.
daughter of John, Richard , o Elk, and Jeremiah Easchief
I
I 1
are also board members.
The staff of the Denver 1FM.; is as follows:

-
111.111.
111, 1111111.
;PeggLaw- eot; de, . • ""i
au 110001010111:011TAWIES
ifiti lIFStAL1011
1
PAM • •
6S
WOOS
Early report showing intensive surveillance of Denver AIM chapter. The "100" coding
prefix at bottom of page indicates an "Extremist Matters" investigation.
1 V; COMIOD
? F. .f •
"PN) e l: ',As:SITIO
oirAsiTSC
c .1
vJ•
;• b CODE TELETYPE JNITEL 1
TO LEGAT OTTAWA (157-391)
FROM 'CMG DIRECTOR FBI (

re.-as)26:8 1
0/73
Washita by 12.31t1GRHC
Declassify on: OADR
AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT (Am) IOVIREMIST MATTERS - AMERICAN
elt7siild Dv
INDIAN ACTIVITIES. ate Of
.6I
141
bt
/00-4/6aLig3 - a Ldl6
co Foreign Liaison Desk (Route through for reviev)
=Faso (6) 5-1-

----03 REC:13
r
0
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::::::=D11111NICAJIONS SECTION
irmwi
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*Jim It —
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Early teletype demonstrating distribution of intelligence information on AIM within the

international arena. Heavy deletion results from "National Security" classification.
which have never been specified) keeping the U.S. embassy in Ottawa apprised of
AIM activities. On January 14, Russell Means and several other AIM members were
arrested on fabricated charges in Scottsbluff, Nebraska while participating in a
Chicano-Indian Unity Conference with the Denver-based Crusade for Justice. That
night, Means' cell door was unlocked, a gun was placed in his cell and he was told
by the police to "make a break for it." As the AIM leader later put it, "They wanted
to off me during an escape attempt." When a complaint was filed on the incident,
police claimed that Means had not been "properly searched" when he was booked
and that the weapon was found in his cell. The accompanying January 15, 1973
teletype from the Omaha ASAC to the director proves the Bureau was well aware
of the situation, but - in a manner reminiscent of the FBI's handling of police abuses
against SNCC and other civil rights activists in Mississippi during the early '60s -
local agents did absolutely nothing to intervene. Bureau records also show the unity
conference was heavily surveilled and infiltrated."
During the meeting in Scottsbluff, AIM received word that a 20-year-old Oglala,
Wesley Bad Heart Bull, had been brutally stabbed to death by a white man, Darld
Schmitz, in the reservation-adjacent town of Buffalo Gap, South Dakota. When
Schmitz was charged with only the relatively minor offense of second degree
manslaughter, AIM national coordinator Dennis Banks arranged a meeting with
Custer County state's attorney Hobart Gates to discuss upgrading the charge to
murder. Banks issued a call for Indians to assemble at the county courthouse in
Custer to demonstrate support during the February 6 meeting. Two days prior to the
event, however, a mysterious caller - believed to have have been an agent assigned
to the Rapid City (South Dakota) resident agency - engaged in a COINTELPRO-
style telephone conversation with Rapid City Journal reporter Lyn Gladstone claim-
ing the action had been "canceled due to bad weather," an untruth which appeared
in the paper on February 5."
As a result - and in sharp contrast to the massive turnout in Gordon concerning
the Yellow Thunder case only a few months before - only about 200 AIM members
and supporters turned out to caravan to Custer." Once there, they were confronted
by an equal number of riot-equipped local police and county deputies, a state riot
squad, representatives of the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation and
the FBI." Although county officials had agreed to an open meeting with the Indian
community, they now insisted they would meet with only Banks, Means and Utah
AIM leader Dave Hill (Choctaw); although the courthouse was a public building, the
remainder of the group was not allowed inside, and was forced to remain outdoors
in a heavy blizzard. The AIM leaders found prosecutor Gates to be adamantly
against upgrading the charges. After insisting that justice was already being done,
he declared the meeting at an end and told the AIM delegation to leave. When they
refused, police attempted to forcibly evict them and a melee broke out which quickly
spread to the crowd waiting outside as riot police attacked them with clubs and tear
gas. The courthouse and nearby chamber of commerce building were set ablaze by
teargas cannisters and 27 Indians were arrested on charges such as "incitement to
k
Mx. lk
kb. CaDahen
AR NOG OM P A MTh:ad —
=MAL ttrIAtl of EVT.STICATON Kr. tamed —
3120 PM GENT 1/15/73 BJP COMMLN:iCATIONS SECTION M. Lel•.
Mr. Ga is _
Mx. )e-'r
701 ACTING DIRECTOR (403-te54704-6 973 14r..
Mx.
FR OMAHA (110•8746) (P) 2P Mt. P- mrls
Mr. Ige7cfre
%Vek.
twteLic. AA.) t1o0;..41par - T.. Nom —
AIM - AIA ti./DIAAJ ACT IV ;10

Mt. ruder —
Mx. Amstrosq
Ms. firmni.
Mn &..M
ON 1/14/73, RUSSELL MEANS, AIM COORDINATOR, WAS ARRESTED b1 c.

BY PD, SCOTTSBLUFF, NEBRASKA, AND CHARGED WITH INTOXICATION,
DISORDERLY CONDUCT, RESISTING ARREST AND CARRYING A CONCEALED
/
WEAPON, WHIC VAS DESCIBED AS A .22 CALIBER PISTOL. ONE
v r. i
WAS lL-SO ARRESTED WITH MEANS AND CHARGED
WITH RESISTING ARREST, DISTURBING THE PEACE AND ASSAULTING
A POLICE OFFICER. THE ARREST GREW OUT OF A DISTURBANCE
WHICH OCCURRED AT THE PARK MOTEL, SCOTTSBLUFF, NEBRASKA, 1 Yr--
WHERE A MEETING BETWEEN AIM AND CHICANOS VAS BEING SIELD.
BOTH MEANS AND111.1111111WERE RELEASED ON BOND.
I
by 4
AIM AT SCOTTSBLUFF HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE AT LINCOLN RE ARREST OF ABOVE IAIEIWUALS
AND CHARGES OF BRUTALITY ON THE PART OF Sliii1BLUFF PD IR-54(210U 74
OFFICERS. THE GOVERNOR STATED THE COMPLAINTS WOULD BE LOOKED
INTO; HOWEVER, ANY FORCE ON THE PART OF AIM WOULD BE MEI bl--
WITH FORCE BY THE STATE OF NEBRASKA TO INSURE THAT PEACE LP
wO J 157? . .-.?
NEBRASKA PREVAILS. arc S6.•
11( END PA,ONX IC
/C
55
/417 if.ta
tdv/F 4014e:
4
egb &sea; ex-
ir 5
75
INFORMATION CONTAINER
ALL INFORMATION
DATE.Htt-114.4Y $P5461.
idgc4
Teletype concerning police attempt to murder Russell Means. (Cont. on the next page.)
riot." Among those beaten by police and arrested was Sarah Bad Heart Bull, the
victim's mother. She ultimately served five months in jail on charges resulting from
the Custer police assault, while her son's murderer never served a day.34
OM 100 8746
-
PAGE TWO
AFTER BEING LODGED IN THE SCOTTSBLUFF COUNTY JAIL, MEANS
CHARGED THAT A POLICE OFFICER PLACED A SUN IN HIS CELL AND
TAUNTED HIM TO TRY AND ESCAPE BUT HE REFUSED. POLICE
OFFICIALS STATE MEANS WAS NOT SEARCHED PROPERLY WHEN BOOKED
AND THE SUN WAS NOT LOCATED ON HIM UNTIL HE WAS SEARCHED
AGAIN IN THE CELL.
ON INSTANT DATE MEANS AND OTHER AIM LEADERS AT
SCOTTSBLUFF REQUESTED A MEETING WITH THE COUNTY COMMISSIONER.
THEY WERE ADVISED THAT THE COMMISSIONER WAS CURRENTLY IN
SESSION AND COUNCIL MEETINGS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
ACCORDING TO SCOTTSBLUFF COUNTY OFFICIALS, MEANS AND OTHER
AIM LEADERS WANT A MEETING WITH COUNTY COMMISSION OFFICIALS
TO DISCUSS DISCRIMINATION OF INDIANS IN THAT AREA.
ri5iiNISTRATIVEt
•
SOURCE OF ABOVE INFORMATION IS
LHM FOLLOWS.
The violence and perversion of justice directed at the AIM group in Custer did
not result from happenstance or mere "overreaction" on the part of local officials. As
' shown in the accompanying excerpt from a January 31, 1973 teletype sent to FBI
headquarters by Minneapolis SAC Joseph Trimbach, the Rapid City office was by
this point actively coordinating the activities of state and local police, state's
attorneys in western South Dakota, and agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (BATF), with regard to "AIM activities." The excerpted teletype also
demonstrates that local police - with full knowledge of the FBI - had stonewalled
U.S. Justice Department Community Relations Service representatives who were at-
tempting to defuse the situation because the latter "appeared to favor AIM's cause."
By early 1973 the Bureau had, with the enthusiastic cooperation of area police, set out
to effect the physical repression of AIM while deliberately squelching attempts -
from both governmental and dissident quarters - to achieve peaceful resolution of
the racial/political conflicts around Pine Ridge, and elsewhere in Indian Country.
Wounded Knee
The smoke and tear gas had barely cleared from the streets of Custer when the
ON 1-29-73, ERNIE PEPIN, SHERIFF, CUSTER, ADVISED THAT
HE SPOKE TO CHIEF OF POLICE (COP), SCOTTSBLUFF, NEBRASKA
WHO TOLD HIM TWAT FIFTY TO SIXTY HARD.. CORE AIM MEMBERS LEFT
SCOTTSBLUFF ON 1-27-73 AND HEADED NORTH TOWARD SOUTH DAKOTA.

COP, SCOTTSBLUFF, FURTHER ADVISED THAT AIM MEMBERS, WHILE
IN SCOTTSBLUFF, COLLABORATED WITH A CHICANO TAMED RAMON
PEREZ AID REPORTEDLY MADE A DEAL FOR APPROXIMATELY SIXTY
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS WHICH RESEMBLE THE THOMPSON SUBMACHINE GUN
OF MEXICAN MA NUFA CI WE. SCOTTSBLUFF COP ADVISED PEPIN TWAT
HIS DEPARTMENT CONFISCATED TWEE OF THESE GUNS AM) THAT AIM

MEMBERS WERE CARRYING SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF MEXICAN MANUFACTURED
AMMUNITION. HE ALSO ADVISED THAT SOME AIM MEMBERS WERE OPENLY
CARRYING WEAPONS, WHICH THEY DID NOT EMPLOY. HE FURTHER

REPORTED THAT MANY AIM MEMBERS WERE HIGH ON ''POT' DURING THEIR
OCCUPATION OF THE SCOTTSBLUFF AREA.
PEPIN ADVISED THAT SCOTTSBLUFF COP RECEIVED CALLS LAST
WEEK FROM MESSRS. TORREZ AID MARQUIS (PHONETIC) WHO CLAIMED

TO BE FROM JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, FROM CHICAGO AP) WERE IN
SCOTTSBLUFF BECAUSE OF THE ItO IA II SITUATION. HE ADVISED THAT
THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR AIM'S CAUSE AN) IN ASKING MA NY
QUESTIONS, CAUSED THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES MA NY PROBLEMS. PEPIN

ADVISED THEY DID KNOW IF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF
THESE IND IV IDUALS WAS MADE.
PEPIN CONTINUING, ADVISED TWAT HE RECEIVED CALL LAST
WEEK FROM JESSE TAD. (PHONETIC) WHO CLAIMED TO BE A_ REPRESENTATIVE

Pep4armr*3-
OF CCMMUNIT IVE SERVICES', U. S. JUSTICE DErNiiii.. INQUIRING ABOUT
WESLEY BAD HEART BILL INCIDENT. TAIL APPEARED TO SYMPATHIZE
WITH IICIANS AM) PEPIN GAVE HIM NO MORE INFORMATION THAN

WHAT WAS ALREADY PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.
PEPIN ADVISED THAT ON 1-27-73, A 1970 FORD, HAULM
A HALL TRAILER, WITH RHODE ISLAM) PLATES ON THE TRAILER.
Excerpt from a January 31,1973 teletype falsely suggesting AIM was equipping
itself with automatic weapons and delineating FBI collaboration with South
Dakota police in preparing for AIM's arrival in Custer (continued on next page).
AFTER A SHORT PERIOD, DEPARTED AND HEADED NORTH. PEPIN ADVISE))

TIT THE COP, SCOTTSBLUFF, TOLD HIM THERE WERE MANY SOUTH
DAKOTA AND MONTANA INDIANS PRESENT AND THAT THE FOLLOWING
NUMBER OF CARS, BEARIN3 AIM PARTICIPANTS FROM OUT-OF-STATE

WERE NOTED: TEXAS, 4; SOUTH DAKOTA, 12; COLORADO, 13;
WYOIING, 4; KANSAS, 1; OKLAHOMA, 2; MINNESOTA, 2; WISCONSIN, I.
ON 1-29-73, IN PREPARATION FOR AIM'S ANTICIPATED ARRIVAL AT

RAPID CITY, STURGIS CO. SHERIFF AM) REPRESENTATIVES FROM
SOUTH DAKOTA HIGHdAY PATROL, LOCAL POLICE, STATES ATTOR NEY'S

BuRiw OF
OFFICE, TEDEITAL ALCOHOL , TAX AND FIREARMS AGENTS, AND AGENTS
OF FBI, HELD A STRATEGY SESSION AND DISCUSSED HOW TO PREVENT
VIOLENT CONFRONTATION FROM DEVELOPING, WHLE AT THE SAME TIME,
MAINTAINING LAW AN) ORDER.
next round of confrontation between AIM and the federal government began. This
time the locus of activity centered on Pine Ridge itself, and concerned a struggle
between the "progressive" administration of the Oglala Sioux tribal president, Dick
Wilson - who had already imposed an illegal ban on AIM members speaking or
participating in meetings within what he apparently considered to be his private
domain - and grassroots Indians on the reservation. Wilson, who had already held
an office and been accused of having used the position to embezzle tribal funds, had
been ushered into office with substantial government support in 1972.33Almost
immediately, he had been bestowed with a $62,000 BIA grant for purposes of
establishing a "tribal ranger group" - essentially his own private army - an entity
which designated itself as "Guardians of the Oglala Nation" (GOONs or GOON
Squad).36The Indian bureau also allowed him to hire his relatives into the limited
number of jobs available through the tribal government, as well as to divert the
virtual entirety of the tribal budget into support for his immediate followers rather
than the Oglala Lakota people as a whole." When traditionalist Oglalas complained,
Wilson dispatched his GOONs. When victims attempted to seek the protection of
the BIA police, they quickly discovered that perhaps a third of its roster - including
its head, Delmar Eastman (Crow), and his second-in-command, Duane Brewer
(Oglala) - were doubling as GOON leaders or members." For their part, BIA officials
- who had set the whole thing up - consistently turned aside requests for assistance
from the traditionals as being "purely internal tribal matters," beyond the scope of
BIA authority.
By mid-year, the quid pro quo attending federal support to the regime emerged.
COINTELPRO-AIM 243
In exchange for being allowed to run Pine Ridge as a personal fiefdom, Wilson was
to sign over title to the northwestern one-eighth of the reservation - an area known
as the Sheep Mountain Gunnery Range - to the National Park Service (which, like
the BIA, is part of the Department of Interior)." Thus faced not only with Wilson's
continued financial malfeasance and outright terrorizing of opponents, but with a
significant loss of their already truncated landbase as well, the traditionals at-
tempted to avail themselves of their legal right to impeach the corrupt official. The
BIA responded by naming Wilson to serve as chair of his own impeachment
proceedings, and the Justice Department dispatched a 65-member U.S. Marshals
Special Operations Group (SOG) to Pine Ridge, to "maintain order."• Under such
circumstances, Wilson was able to maintain his position when he finally allowed the
impeachment vote to be taken on the afternoon of February 23, 1973. The same
evening, he proclaimed a reservation-wide ban on any further political meetings."
On February 24, more than 200 people - including most of the traditional Oglala
chiefs - defied the meeting ban to assemble at the Calico Hall (north of Pine Ridge
village). They vowed to continue meeting until "something was done about Dickie
Wilson." At their request, Russell Means traveled from Rapid City to meet with the
Calico Hall group; he then attempted to meet with Dick Wilson to discuss the
traditionals' grievances." The meeting was aborted when Means was attacked in the
parking lot outside tribal headquarters by several of Wilson's GOONs." When
Justice Department Community Relations official John Terronez (incorrectly re-
ferred to in the excerpted January 31 teletype as Torrez) attempted to go through the
marshals to arrange a parlay between the traditionals and Wilson, the head of the
SOG unit, Reese Kash, instructed his subordinates to "inform Mr. Terronez that CP
[Command Post] was unable to contact me.""
Attempts at negotiation having failed, the Calico Hall group decided on the
evening of February 27 to join forces with AIM and caravan to the hamlet of
Wounded Knee, about 15 miles east of Pine Ridge village. They intended to remain
overnight in a local church and hold a press conference at this symbolic location the
following morning." They had agreed to release a statement demanding congres-
sional hearings on the actions of the Wilson government, as well as treaty rights and
BIA abuses generally. Ted Means and other AIM representatives were assigned to
notify the media and coordinate transportation of reporters from Rapid City to the
press conference site. However, at dawn on the 28th, those assembled at Wounded
Knee found the roads to the hamlet blockaded by GOONs later reinforced by
marshals service SOG teams and FBI personnel." By 10 p.m., Minneapolis SAC
Joseph Trimbach had flown in to assume personal command of the GOONs/BIA
police, while Wayne Colburn, director of the U.S. Marshals Service, had arrived to
assume control over his now reinforced SOG unit. Colonel Volney Warner of the
82nd Airborne Division and 6th Army Colonel Jack Potter-operating directly under
General Alexander Haig, military liaison in the Nixon White House - had also been
dispatched from the Pentagon as "advisors" coordinating an illegal (under provi-
sions of the Posse Comitatus Act; 18 USCS § 1385) flow of military personnel, weapons
and equipment to those besieging Wounded Knee." As Rex Weyler has noted:
Documents later subpoenaed from the Pentagon revealed that Colonel Potter di-
rected the employment of 17 APCs [armored personnel carriers], 130,000 rounds of
M-16 ammunition, 41,000 rounds of M-40 high explosive, as well as helicopters,
Phantom jets, and personnel. Military officers, supply sergeants, maintenance tech-
nicians, chemical officers, and medical teams remained on duty throughout the 71
day siege, all working in civilian clothes [to conceal their unconstitutional involve-
ment in this "civil disorder"]."
By 3 a.m. on March 1, the colonels were meeting secretly with Trimbach and
Colbum, as well as Colonel Vic Jackson of the California-based Civil Disorder
Management School (CDMS), at nearby Ellsworth Air Force Base." Jackson, a
specialist in irregular warfare, seems likely to have been brought in to implement of
one of two "domestic counterinsurgency scenarios" code-named "Garden Plot" and
"Cable Splicer," which CDMS had been created to perfect." By March 3, F-4
Phantom jets were making regular low-level reconnaissance runs over the hamlet,
and the outright military nature of the federal buildup had otherwise become
obvious. AIM proposed a mutual withdrawal of forces and negotiations, but the
government, expressing a clear intent to settle the confrontation by force, declined
this offer." On March 5, Dick Wilson - with federal officials present - held a press
conference to declare "open season" on AIM members on Pine Ridge, declaring
"MM will die at Wounded Knee."" For their part, those inside the hamlet an-
nounced their intention to remain where they were until such time as Wilson was
removed from office, the GOONs disbanded, and the massive federal presence
withdrawn.
Attempts at negotiation during the next few days were consistently rebuffed by
government hardliners and, on March 8, AIM was warned that women and children
should leave the defensive perimeter." That evening an APC fired on an AIM patrol,
wounding two men." This was followed by a firefight on March 9 during which
thousands of rounds of automatic weapons fire were poured into the hamlet by
federal forces. AIM responded by firing a single magazine of ammunition from their
only automatic weapon, a Chinese AK-47 brought home by a returning Vietnam
veteran. This led to the circulation of disinformation in the media by FBI "public
relations specialists" that the defenders were firing on federal positions with an M-
60 machinegun."
On the morning of March 11, the government temporarily lifted the siege (over
protests by the FBI), apparently hoping its show of force had intimidated AIM into
surrendering. Instead, more than 100 supporters streamed into Wounded Knee,
bringing with them supplies and weapons." The traditionals also utilized the
opportunity to proclaim themselves an "Independent Oglala Nation" (ION), with
rights specifically defined within the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, entirely separate
from the IRA government headed by Dick Wilson. SAC Trimbach, along with
several of his men disguised as "postal inspectors," then attempted to enter the
hamlet to survey its defenses; detained at the perimeter by AIM security personnel,
they were told to leave or be arrested by the ION." His ploy to end the cease fire with
COINTELPRO-AIM 245
a provocation successfully completed, Trimbach immediately used this incident as

a basis for reestablishing his portion of the siege lines; faced with a fait accompli, the
marshals shortly followed suit." The Minneapolis SAC was reinforced in this course
of action by veteran COINTELPRO specialist Richard G. Held, who had been sent
to Pine Ridge from his position as SAC in Chicago (where he was even then
orchestrating the cover up of the Bureau's role in the Hampton-Clark assassinations;
see Chapter 5) to "consult" on the sorts of operations the FBI should undertake
against AIM." Trimbach's move was entirely consistent with a string of "reports"
Held was at the time sending to headquarters asserting that other law enforcement
agencies were not sufficiently tough in dealing with the "insurgents" - a bit of
outright counterinsurgency vernacular which stuck, as is evidenced in the accom-
panying October 31, 1973 predication for investigation - stressing that all police
personnel on the reservation should have been placed under direct Bureau control
from the outset, and protesting a Justice Department prohibition on "shoot-to-kill"
techniques on the siege line." Given that the BIA police (and, by extension, the
GOONs) had all along come under command of the FBI, these remarks could only
have been directed at the U.S. Marshals Service.
Probably the most immediate result of Held's and Trimbach's renewed siege
was the precipitation of a firefight on the afternoon of March 12, in which SA Curtis
Fitzpatrick was wounded slightly, in the wrist. Bureau propagandists seized the
opportunity to engage in an incredible bit of theatrics, arranging for Fitzpatrick to
be "med-evacked" by military helicopter to Ellsworth Air Force Base, where a full
complement of media personnel had been assembled to see him arrive with his head
swathed in bandages.'' Simultaneously, an active campaign to "develop infor-
mants" and infiltrate provocateurs within Wounded Knee was under way. Among
the former was Leroy Little Ghost, (Hunkpapa Lakota) from the Fort Totten
Reservation in North Dakota, who was recruited with the guarantee of $2,000-20,000
(depending on how well he did) in cash for his services.62Among the latter were Gi
and Jill Shafer, withdrawn by the Bureau from running the bogus "Red Star
Collective" in the South to serve as volunteer "medics" within the besieged hamlet.63
Another provocateur sent into Wounded Knee by the FBI during this period was
Douglass Durham - a former CIA operative, police officer, affiliate of organized
crime in the Midwest and suspected murderer- who posed as a "part-Minneconjou
Lakota" (at other times "part-Chippewa") and reporter for the radical Iowa periodical
Pax Today." The Bureau was also, as the accompanying excerpt from a teletype
concerning KIXI radio reporter Clarence McDaniels makes clear, using media
personnel as intelligence agents, both with and without their knowledge.
Meanwhile, the policy conflict between the FBI (and its BIA police/GOON
surrogates) on one side and the U.S. Marshals Service and military on the other was
sharpening. As the FBI's role in the siege increased under Richard Held's tutelage,
so did the intensity of firefights and GOON depredations. Beginning on March 13,
federal forces directed fire from heavy .50 caliber machineguns into the AIM
positions, greatly increasing the probability of lethal injury to those inside. The
/ ;•T ■f'•-• 0' 1 " I;
AlhuT:ercue, New Mexico

October 31, 1973
EXTRZMIST nA'i:a -
AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT
This investic:sti2n is based on information which

indicates that 110.=7=1, is engaged in activities
which could invo,ve a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code,
Section 2383 (Rebellicp or InsUrrection) or 2384 (Seditio,,:s
Conspiracy), as indicated hereinafter.
has been identified as being actively

involved in militant activities of the American Indian
Movement (AIM). Since January, 1973, AIN has been actively
involved in demonstrations and violent confrontations with
local authorities in Scottsbluff, Nebraska, and the Rapid
City and Custer areas of South Dakota. From February 27
through May 8, 1973, AIM leaders and members and their
supporters occupied the community of Wounded Knee, South
D.aota, by force of arms, taking a number of the community's
resi.:Ients as hostages. Before surrendering to Federal
authorities, they engaged in numerous violent and destructive
acts: and gunfire was exchanged with Federal authorities
resulting in the death of two of the insurgents.
(b1c:
auvised that during the course or A11 rioting -Luster,
South uakota, on February 6, 1973, an old white Dodge panel
true: was parked near the curb on the west side of the
Custer (..;:Courthouse. This truck bore Utah License
PN7007.1ffaigirtated that the individuals in this truck
were in tne rioting with the AIM group and had criticized law
enforcement officers who were attempting to prev-'
- further
destruction and burning of buildings in Custer.
otated tht es the riots subsided he noticed the.: zrcup
returned to the truck, so he proceeded tn tt? truck in en
attempt to ioentify these individuals. 1021:,:-.:
intled that
Predication for an investigation of the American Indian Movement. Note adoption of the
vernacular of counterinsurgency warfare.
following month was characterized by alternating periods of negotiation, favored

by the army and the marshals - which the FBI and GOONs did their best to subvert
- and raging gun battles when the latter held sway. Several defenders were severely
wounded in a firelight on March 17, and on March 23 some 20,000 more rounds were
fired into Wounded Knee in a 24-hour period." During the latter, the government
COINTELPRO-AIM 247
REPORTER, CLARENCE MC DANIELS, HAD RETURNED TO SEATTLE FROM
WOUNDED KNEE (HE), SOUTH DAKOTA, BUT AT THE REQUEST OF uP1,
NEW YORK, HAD;AGREED TO RETURN.TO VK. ACCORDING TO UPI, NEW

CORK, WK INDIANS HILL NOT TALK TO THEIR CORRESPONDENT; HOWEVER,
THEY HAVE IMPLICIT TRUST IN MC DANIELS AND WILL TALK TO HIM.
MC DANIELS:, LEFT SEATTLE 3-13-73 EN ROUTE WK, WAS LAST HEARD
FROM 160 MILES FROM WK STUCK IN SNOW STORm; HAD NOT REACHED WK
AS OF 10:00 AM, 3-16-73. MC.DANIELS IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE
FURNISHING COMPLETE COVERAGE OF ACTIVITIES AT wK TO KIXI BY
PHONE AND TAPES. HE WILL BE REQUESTED TO DO SPECIAL STORY

ON SEATTLEAREA PARTICIPANTS. HZ IS UNAWARE THAT HIS STORIES
ARE NOT BEIM POUCHED IN FULL OR THAT THE INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION AND HIs TAPES ARE BEING FURNISHED THE FBI. KIXI
OFFICIALS REQUEST HE NOT BE -CONTACTED AT UK; HOWEVER, IF ANY
- SPECIFIC INFORMATION IS NEEDED BY FBI, KIXI wILLIN3 TO PASS

ON REQUEST AS NORMAL DUTY ASSIGNMENT wITH NO REFERENCE TO FBI.
MC DANIELS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO FOX, SEATTLE, FOR FULL
INTERVIEW UPON RETURN TO SEATTLE AI WHICH TIME IT IS HOPED
ALL OF THE SEATTLE AREA PARTICIPANTS WILL BE IDENTIFIED WITH
Excerpt from teletype describing manipulation of news content and use of

suppressed stories of reporter Clarence McDaniels as intelligence source,
apparently without his knowledge.
forces suffered their only serious casualty when a marshal, Lloyd Grimm, was
struck in the torso by a .30 caliber slug (probably fired by a GOON) and paralyzed."
Apparently with the intent of denying even biased first-hand coverage of the events,
and in anticipation of another escalation in hostilities, the FBI banned further media
access to the Wounded Knee area; on the day Grimm was hit, the Bureau announced
that reporters who continued to report from inside the AIM/ION perimeter would
face federal indictments when the siege ended 67At about the same time, the Bureau
announced that anyone found attempting to bring supplies into Wounded Knee
would be arrested on charges such as "conspiracy to abet a riot in progress.""
On April 6, AIM, ION and government moderates mustered another serious
attempt to avoid further bloodshed, reaching a cease-fire agreement and the basis
for a negotiated settlement." The agreement was, however, violated by the govern-
ment within 72 hours of its signing and the siege continued .1° Consequently, on
April 17, the government fired more than 4,000 rounds into the village, much of it
.50 caliber armor-piercing munitions. Frank Clearwater (Apache) from North
Carolina, was fatally wounded in the back of the head by one of these heavy slugs
as he lay sleeping in the hamlet church; he died on April 25. Five other AIM members
were wounded less seriously."
The FBI's "turf battle" with the "soft" elements of the federal government
rapidly came to a head. On April 23, Chief U.S. Marshal Colbum and federal
negotiator Kent Frizzell (a solicitor general in the Justice Department) were detained
at a GOON roadblock and a gun pointed at Frizzell's head. By his own account,
Frizzell was saved only after Colbum leveled a weapon at the GOON and said, "Go
ahead and shoot Frizzell, but when you do, you're dead." The pair were then
released. Later the same day, a furious Colbum returned with several of his men,
disarmed and arrested eleven GOONs, and dismantled the roadblock However,
"that same night... more of Wilson's people put it up again. The FBI, still supporting
the vigilantes, had [obtained the release of those arrested and] supplied them with
automatic weapons."" The GOONs were being armed by the FBI with fully
automatic M-16 assault rifles, apparently limitless quantities of ammunition, and
state-of-the-art radio communications gear. When Colbum again attempted to
dismantle the roadblock:
FBI [operations consultant] Richard [G.] Held arrived by helicopter to inform the
marshals that word had come from a high Washington source to let the roadblock
stand...As a result, the marshals were forced to allow several of Wilson's people to
be stationed at the roadblock, and to participate in...patrols around the village."
On the evening of April 26, the marshals reported that they were taking auto-
matic weapons fire from behind their position, undoubtedly from GOON patrols.
The same "party or parties unknown" was also pumping bullets into the AIM/ION
positions in front of the marshals, a matter which caused return fire from AIM
security. The marshals were thus caught in a crossfire." At dawn on the 27th, the
marshals, unnerved at being fired on all night from both sides, fired tear gas
cannisters from M-79 grenade launchers into the AIM/ION bunkers. They followed
up with some 20,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. AIM member Buddy
Lamont (Oglala), driven from a bunker by the gas, was hit by automatic weapons fire
and bled to death before medics, pinned down by the barrage, could reach him.76
When the siege finally ended through a negotiated settlement on May 7, 1973,
the AIM casualty count stood at two dead and fourteen seriously wounded. An
additional eight-to-twelve individuals had been "disappeared" by the GOONs.
They were in all likelihood murdered and - like an untold number of black civil
rights workers in swamps of Mississippi and Louisiana - their bodies secretly buried
Somewhere in the remote vastness of the reservation."
Wounded Knee marked the beginning rather than culmination of the FBI's
campaign against AIM and its allies on Pine Ridge. As the military advisers and
Colbum's marshals were withdrawn the FBI was now free of their scrutiny. The
Bureau beefed up its Rapid City resident agency (within which area of responsibility
the reservation falls) to fill in behind them. Although Richard G. Held returned to
his post in Chicago, the tactical groundwork he had laid during the siege — a matter
partially illuminated in the accompanying report, 'The Use of Special Agents in
Paramilitary Law Enforcement Operations in the Indian Country," which he wrote
at the time but which was not generally disseminated until April 24, 1975 (under the
signature of J.E. O'Connell) — supported counterinsurgency war on Pine Ridge over
the next three years.
COINTELPRO AIM —
During the 36 months roughly beginning with the end of Wounded Knee and
continuing through the first of May 1976, more than sixty AIM members and sup-
porters died violently on or in locations immediately adjacent to the Pine Ridge
Reservation. A minimum of 342 others suffered violent physical assaults.78 As
Roberto Maestas and Bruce Johansen have observed:
Using only these documented political deaths, the yearly murder rate on Pine Ridge
Reservation between March 1, 1973, and March 1, 1976, was 170 per 100,000. By
comparison, Detroit, the reputed "murder capital of the United States," had a rate
of 20.2 in 1974. The U.S. average was 9.7 per 100,000, with the range for large cities
as follows: Detroit, 202; Chicago, 15.9; New York City, 163; Washington, D.C., 13.4;
Los Angeles, 12.9; Seattle, 5.6; and Boston, 5.6. An estimated 20,000 persons were
murdered in the United States in 1974. In a nation of 200 million persons, a murder
rate comparable to that of Pine Ridge between 1973 and 1976 would have left 340,000
persons dead for political reasons in one year; 132 million in three A similar rate for
a city of 500,000 would have produced 850 political murders in a year, 2,550 in three.
For a metropolis of 5 million, the figures would have been 8,500 in one year and
25,500 in three...The political murder rate at Pine Ridge between March 1, 1973, and
March 1, 1976, was almost equivalent to that in Chile during the three years after the
military coup supported by the United States deposed and killed President Salvador
Allende...Based on Chile's population of 10 million, the estimated fifty thousand
persons killed in three years of political repression in Chile at the same time (1973-
1976) roughly paralleled the murder rate at Pine Ridge."
Of these 60-plus murders occurring in an area in which the FBI held "preem-
inent jurisdiction," not one was solved by the Bureau. In most instances, no active
investigation was ever opened. The same is true for the nearly 350 physical assaults,
despite eye-witness identification the killers and assailants, who in each instance
were known members of the Wilson GOON Squad. When confronted with the
magnitude of his office's failure to come to grips with the systematic slaughter which
was going on within its area of operations, Rapid City ASAC George O'Clock
pleaded "lack of manpower" as a cause.8° Yet O'Clock's office, which was custom-
arily staffed with three agents before Wounded Knee, grew by nearly 300% — to
eleven agents — during the first six months of 1973.81In March of that year, this force
was doubled, augmented by a ten-member FBI SWAT unit to the tiny village of Pine
Ridge, on the reservation itself.82This aggregate force of 21 was maintained for more
1V-lemorah4ain
/ey(
TO : Mr. Gebhaidt OATE,4/24/75
/ I
4 00-
1 - Mr. Gebhardt...7•
FROM : J. E. O'C 1 - Mr. Bates Wer t.
1 - Mr. O'Connell
1 - Mr. Gordon
SUBJECT: THE USE OF 'SPECIAL AGENTS 1 - Mr. Wannall
OF THE FBI IN A PARAMILITARY 1 - Mr. Mosher Legel .
Tote0....
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATION IN 1 - Mr. Gallagher Di...ter 1.4. 1
THE INDIAN COUNTRY 1 - Mintz

1 - Mr. Mooney
1 - Mr. McDermott
PURPOSE: This position paper was prepared for use of th

Director of the FBI to brief the Attorney General and the
Deputy Attorney General (DAG) on the role of the FBI
in the event of a major confrontation in-Indian country
(Federal jurisdiction) where (1) the President decides
against the use of troops; and (2) the FBI is ordered
by the President and/or the Attorney General to deploy
FBI Special Agents in.a paramilitary law enforcement
situation, in lieu of the use of troops.
There is attached for ready reference a document

captioned "Background Paper on(tI)e American Indian and the
Takeover of Wounded Knee by the-American Indian Movement (AIM)."
This study outlines early history oftheAizie.ii-can Indian,
jurisdiction of the FBI 'o investigate within the Indian
country, background on AIM and their record for violence,
history and background concerning the Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation of the Oglala Sioux Tribe in South Dakota,
a prelude to the occupation of Wounded Knee, the occupation
of Wounded Knee by AIM and the use of FBI, U. S. Marshals
and Bureau of Indian Affairs (DIA) Police at Wounded
Knee, South Dakota, during the period February 27 - May 8, 1973,
in a paramilitary law enforcement situation.
Enclosure //4/j - CONTINU7- OVER z,
NOT RECORDZEff
JCG:Inel/rlf (11) 40 lUG 1 1 1975 SEE: A DDEN DUMP 101:E), 197 5 V/(,\
()iX
1.
'
, 0Y1 C-e)-,rtt(L/Lo...
j z1Z.4.e.
1975 expanded version of COINTELPRO specialist Richard G. Held's 1973 field notes
taken at Wounded Knee insisting that thenceforth the FBI would assume immediate and
absolute control over "paramilitary operations in Indian Country." Note strenuous
objection raised concerning official "shoot to wound" orders (continued on next 4 pages).
COINTELPRO-AIM 251
FBI INVOLVEME( : The FBI was instructed() the Department

Of Justice (DOJ) in the latter part of 1972 to conduct
extremist and criminal investigations pertaining to AIM.
During the afternoon of February 27, 1973, approximately
200 members and supporters of AIM, carrying weapons, left
Calico Hall, Pine Ridge, South Dakota, in a car caravan and
Were under surveillance by a few FBI Special Agents. Under
the leadership of Dennis James Banks and Russell Charles Means,
the caravan moved into Wounded Knee, South Dakota, on the
Pine Ridge Indian Reservation where they took eleven hostages
and burglarized the Wounded Knee trading post in violation of
Federal statutes involving crime on an Indian reservation. A
decision was made by SAC Joseph H. Trimbach, Minneapolis
Division, to set up roadblocks to contain the militants,
which roadblocks were manned by FBI Agents, U. S. Marshals,
and BIA Police. This is how the FBI first became involved
in the Wounded Knee armed standoff against the U. S. Government.
ROLE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES:
becrsions were made by the AG after regular and continuous
consultation with responsible officials representing the
White House, namely Mr. John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the
President for Domestic Affairs, Mr. Leonard Garment, Special
Consultant to the President, and his assistant, Bradley Patterson,
and officials in the U. S. Department of the Interior. On
February 28, 1973, the situation at Wounded Knee was evaluated
in a series of meetings between former AG Richard G. Kleindienst,
former DAG Joseph T. Sneed, former Associate DAG Charles D.
Ablard, and others. These three officials were responsible-for_
the decision making of the DOJ. Department-o-f the Interior
OFfierirs-and thd-BIA- Tid-ilved as these agencies administer
Indian-reservations under Federal jurisdiction.
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE FBI: The various other Federal

agencies involved in the Wounded Knee '..akeover were the U. S.
Marshals Service (USMS), BIA Police, DOJ Attorneys, public
information officers and Community Relations Service, the U. S.
Attorneys (USAs), Department of Defense, and the U. S. Army.
The DOJ sent Ralph Erickson, Special Assistant to the AG, to
Wounded Knee as the senior U. S. Government representative on
the scene. He was subsequently followed by 4 other DOS
and/or Department of the Interior officials who assumed this
role during the. 71-day siege from February 28 - May 8, 1973.
Throughout the operation there was a definite lack of
continuity as each senior representative replaced another.
Colonel Volney Warner (now General), Chief of Staff, 82nd
Airborne Division, was dispatched to Wounded Knee at the
outset to assess the situation and to recommend whether or
not troops should be utilized. The AG issued instructions
there was to be no confrontation and negotiations with the
militants by representatives of the DOJ were to be entered
into to resolve the matter and have the hostages released.
There was a divided authority among the many
agencies present at Wounded Knee, including church and
social groups. The senior Government representative,
Departmental Attorneys, and members of the USA's Staff
issued conflicting instructions. Each representative
present on the scene took instructions for the most part
from superiors of his own agency. For example, on
March 4, 1973, after consulting with Colonel Warner,
Ralph Erickson issued orders that the use of deadly force
by the law enforcement officers on the scene could only
be used in self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily
harm. In the application of force the officers, including •

FBI Agents, were to aim to wound rather than kill. This was
in direct conflict with the policy of the Bureau that an
Agent is not to shoot any person except when- necessary in
.self-defense, that is, when he reasonably believes that he
or another is in danger of death or grievous bodily harm.
Special Agents are not trained to shoot to wound. Special
Agents are trained to shoot in self-defense . to neutralize the
deadly force. The SACs on the scene and officials at FBIHQ
strenuously objected to orders such as this which had
previously been approved by the AG without consultation with
any FBI official.
On a number of occasions the Acting Director and

officials of the FBI requested the Administration and the -
Department to consider the use of troops at Wounded Knee. In-
Washington, D. C., DOJ officials in conjunction with other
Governmental agencies explored the possibility of using
troops. - Colonel- Warner on the scene recommended to the Chief
Of Staff of the Army against the use of troops. The Government
concluded that such use would be undesirable because (1) it
would substantially increase the risk of loss of life, (2) the
full prestige of the U. S. Government would be committed to
What was primarily a dispute between rival tribal factions
and (3) the use of Army troops against these Indians might
be misinterpreted by the press and some citizens. . _ _ _
The FHI encountered extreme problems, both in the

field and at FBIHQ, in adapting to a paramilitary role.
The FBI was not equipped logistically to operate
in a paramilitary situation in open terrain which
ultimately ended in a 71-day siege. The FBI and USMS had
to be equipped with military equipment, including Armored
Personnel Carriers (APCs), M-16s, automatic infantry weapons(, )
chemical weapons, steel helmets, gas masks, body armor,
illuminating flares, military clothing and rations. Authority
had to be obtained from both the AG (and/or his representative)
and from. the General Counsel, Department of Defense, prior to
requesting the military logistics adviser, Colonel Jack Potter,
to obtain the weapons and material through the Directorate
of Military Support (DOMS). This clearance was often'not
forthcoming when clearance had to be obtained during the
night hours. This phase of the operation required the FBI
to maintain a constant 24 hour vigilance so as to equip
our Special Agents and the other law enforcement officers with
the weapons and material needed for a defensive operation.
OPINIONS OF THE SACS WM:1W= ON THE SCENE: SACs Richard C.

Held, Chicago; Herbert E. Hoxie, Milwaukee; Wilburn K. DeBruler
Atlanta; and Joseph H. Trimbach, Minneapolis,-, furnished their
observations regarding the Wounded Knee SpecCal. In essence,
they advised complete confusion existed as there were a number
of DOJ representatives on the scene, each issuing conflicting
orders There was no coordination between the agencies other
than that pr-O7id-ed bY-EFCFBI, ffor-was--therTY-anS, advance
planningdone. -For example, DOJ officials and Director Wayne
Colburn, USMS, would fly back to Washington, D. C., presumably
for conferences and would return with new policy of which
FBIHQ was not aware. The military did not realize in many
3a —t-h-a-t—they-wcie there to assist and not direct the FBI.
SAC Held at the .time advised FBIHQ to have any success at
lloundeclKnee_l_t_would_be_necessary_. to withdrw-the-.2-Ipolitical
tves" and make it an FBI op r 'on under FBI dird-ction and
leadership. SAC Hoxie stated at Wounde Knee—there was a
constant vacillation of instructions and policy which wan

devastating. SAC DeBruler believed the ill-advised
instructions given prolonged the incident at'Wounded Knee
and in some measure resulted in unnecessary risk to law
enforcement personnel and others at the scene. All SACs
recommended should we in the future become involved in
another situation similar to Wounded Knee where Special
Agent personnel are deployed that the entire operation
be under the direction of FBI officials and when law
enforcement personnel from other agencies are involved
it should be clearly understood the FBI is in the
decision making role.
OPINIONS OF FOIHO PERSONNEL:FBIHQ supervisory personnel
were confronted with the major task of coordinating all
phases of the Wounded Knee paramilitary raw enforcement
operation with the Department and other interested agencies,
including USHS, the Department of the Interior, and the
BIA. Many of the officials from the other agencies, including
the staff in the DAG's Office, were not trained law enforcement•
pe'rsonnel. It was necessary to constantly explain matters
and give advice from a law enforcement standpoint. As the
FBI was utilizing approximately 3 SACs and 150 Agents per
day at Wounded Knee in a defensive perimeter along with other
Federal officers which were receiving hostile fire, it was
necessary to insure that nothing was done in a decision
making role at the White House or DOS which might result in
Federal law enforcement officers taking heavy casualties.
It was reported in the initial phase of Woundcl Knee that the
militants were in possession of an M-60 machine gun and
AK-47s (Communist automatic assault rifles), which could
result in heavy casualties. It was necessary to convince
the decision makers that APCs were necessary for the protection
of the Special Agents and U. S. Marshals. When the APCs
came under hostile fire they could not be moved to a more
secure position without authority from the AG. It is the
consensus of opinion among the headquarters supervisors that
no Government official who is not a trained law enforcement
officer be permitted to direct a law enforcement operation the
magnitude of Wounded Knee.
RECOMMENDATION: The Director meet with the AG and DAG to
brLei them on the Wounded Knee incident so that they fully
understand if such an incident occurs in the future or an
incident similar to Wounded Knee and the FBI is involved,
the FBI will insist upon taking charge from the outset and
than two years, until it was tripled during June and July of 1975, affording the Rapid
City office with the heaviest sustained concentration of agents to citizens in the
history of the Bureau.83
While claiming to lack the resources to investigate the literal death squad
activity occurring beneath his nose, O'Clock managed to find the wherewithal to
compile more than 316,000 separate investigative file classifications on AIM mem-
bers with regard to the siege of Wounded Knee alone.° His agents also found the
time and energy to arrest 562 AIM members and supporters for participation in the
siege, while another 600 individuals across the nation were charged for supporting
the defenders.° These 562 arrests resulted in the indictments of 185 persons, many
on multiple charges (none involving a capital crime). In the two years of trials which
Will not countenance any interference on an operational basis

With respect to our actions. They should understand the
PBX due to its long years of experience and training is able
to make law enforcement decisions without over-reacting
to protect the general public, its Special Agent personnel,
and the violators of the law. The AG and DAG should be
advised it'is our broad policy in such instances as this to
"get in and get out as quickly as possible" with complete
regard for the safety of all concerned. The FBI furthermore
would seize control quickly and take a definite, aggressive
stand where necessary. It should be clearly stated that the
FBI does not desire to become involved in any political
situations and definitely not participate in any discussion
where it is obviously political in nature.
ADDENDUM: J. B. ADAMS:ams 5/19/75
We should hold up any action in contacting the Deputy Attorney

General and Attorney General as we are presently engaged in attempting to
clarify the respective roles of the Marshals, FBI, BIA and tribal police in
confrontations such .as the recent Yankton incident. Appropriate recommenda-
tions in this latter area are forthcoming.
followed, there were a total of fifteen convictions - mostly on minor charges - an ex-
traordinarily low rate for federal prosecutions." As Colonel Volney Warner later put
it, "AIM's most militant leaders are under indictment, in jail or warrants are out for
their arrest...the government can win, even if no one goes to jail.""
Although the Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Committee (WKLDOC)
- a largely non-Indian coalition of attorneys established by National Lawyers Guild
activist Ken Tilsen to represent AIM in criminal proceedings undertaken against its
members and leadership - formally challenged U.S. jurisdiction over the Pine Ridge
Reservation, the government forged ahead with the prosecution of those it consid-
ered "key AIM leaders."88Indicative of the quality of justice involved in these
COINTELPRO - AIM 255
"Wounded Knee Leadership Trials" was that of Russell Means and Dennis Banks
before District Judge Fred Nichol during 1974. Based on an FBI "investigation," the
defendants were charged with 13 offenses each, including burglary, arson, posses-
sion of illegal weapons, theft, interfering with federal officers and criminal conspir-
acy; cumulatively, each faced more than 150 years in prison as a result." The crux
of the case was the "eyewitness" testimony of a young Oglala named Louis Moves
Camp—whom Banks had earlier expelled from AIM due to his persistent miscon-
duct—concerning the AIM leaders' actions inside Wounded Knee. The case col-
lapsed when the defense established that Moves Camp was testifying about events
allegedly occurring in South Dakota at a time when he had been on the west coast.'
But that was hardly all that was wrong with the federal case. Moves Camp had
been recruited as a witness by David Price and Ronald Williams, two agents recently
assigned to the Rapid City FBI office.' His participation as a prosecution witness
was apparently obtained in exchange for a "deal" concerning charges of robbery,
assault with a deadly weapon (two counts) and assault causing bodily harm (two
counts)—adding up to a possible 20-year sentence—facing him in South Dakota.'
He was also paid by the Bureau for his services.' Further, while staying at a resort
in Wisconsin with SAs Price and Williams, awaiting his turn to testify against Means
and Banks, Moves Camp appears to have raped a teenaged girl in nearby River
Falls; after meeting for several hours with local police, Agent Price was able to fix
this charge as well.' Minneapolis SAC Joseph Trimbach refused to allow prosecutor
R.D. Hurd to administer a polygraph examination to Moves Camp prior to putting
him on the stand;" Hurd lied to the court, asserting that the River Falls situation
was "only a minor matter," such as "public intoxication."' Then it came out that
the FBI and prosecution had—despite the filing of proper discovery motions by the
defense—deliberately suppressed at least 131 pieces of exculpatory evidence which
might have served to exonerate the defendants." With this magnitude of govern-
ment misconduct on the record, Judge Nichol responded by dismissing all charges
against Means and Banks. In his decision, the judge observed that it was difficult
for him to accept that "the FBI [he had] revered so long, [had] stooped so low," and:
Although it hurts me deeply, I am forced to the conclusion that the prosecution in

this trial had something other than attaining justice foremost in its mind... The fact
that the incidents of misconduct formed a pattern throughout the course of the trial
leads me to the belief that this case was not prosecuted in good faith or in the spirit
of justice. The waters of justice have been polluted, and dismissal, I believe, is the
appropriate cure for the pollution in this case."
The dismissal of charges occurred before it became known that, contrary to Hurd's
and Trimbach's sworn testimony, the FBI had infiltrated Banks' and Means' defense
team." The operative used for this purpose was Douglass Durham, then AIM's national
security director and Dennis Banks' personal bodyguard. In this capacity, Durham
attended all the defense team's meetings (enabling him to report their strategy to the
FBI, thence to prosecutors), and exerted near-total control over the defendants' office
("Nobody saw Banks or Means without going through me. Period." ).'°°
He also maintained free access to defense funds, from which he is suspected of

having embezzled more than $100,000 during the course of the trial."' Far from the
Bureau's having been unaware of the "problem," FBI records reveal that Durham
met with his handlers, SAs Ray Williams and Robert Taubert, "regularly" and was
given a raise because of the quality of his services during the trial.'°=
Such behavior on the part of the prosecution and the FBI might be considered
anomalous were it true that Hurd was brought up on ethics charges before the
American Bar Association (as Judge Nichol clearly desired), Louis Moves Camp
charged with perjury, Trimbach removed from his position as SAC and the involved
agents at least reprimanded, and Durham's undercover operation suspended. It
was Nichol, however, who was removed from trying any further AIM-related
cases'" Nothing at all was done to Moves Camp'" Far from being disbarred, R.D.
Hurd was promoted and received an award for his performance, and was assigned
a lead role in seeking convictions against other AIM leaders, such as Stan Holder,
Carter Camp and Leonard Crow Dog."5 Trimbach and his agents continued in their
positions with no official censure, while spearheading the Bureau's anti-AIM
campaign on Pine Ridge.'" For his part, Douglass Durham remained in his capacity
as a provocateur within AIM until the organization itself discovered his true identity.'"
Before this occurred, he played a leading role in the perversion of justice attending
the notorious Skyhorse/Mohawk case in southern California'" After his exposure,
he is thought to have been involved in the violent elimination of at least one of the
witnesses to his grossly illegal "investigative techniques,"1" and - still on the FBI
payroll - served as the sole witness before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal
Security, "establishing" that AIM was a "violent revolutionary organization.'/no
These results are consistent with a Bureau thrust, revealed in the accompanying
May 4, 1973 teletype from the Los Angeles field office to Acting Director L. Patrick
Gray, even before the Wounded Knee siege had ended, in which agents were busily
concocting all manner of allegations concerning AIM's acquisition of "automatic
weapons, bazookas, rocket launchers, hand grenades, land mines, and mortars"
(none of which ever materialized). As the document makes clear, the compilation of
such "information" was intended as a means of securing Gray's authorization to
undertake to divide AIM from major finders such as Sammy Davis, Jr. It is
instructive that in the same document there is an attempt to link AIM directly to the
LA chapter of the Black Panther Party, against which similar methods and rationales
had long been utilized as part of COINTELPRO-BPP (see Chapter 5). Such tech-
niques couple nicely to the accompanying May 4,1973 Airtel from Gray to his SAC,
Albany, which recommends employment of typical counterintelligence measures
against AIM and inclusion of AIM leaders in the Bureau's Administrative Index as
"Key Extremists."
Far more explicit was a November 26, 1973 teletype from SA Richard Wallace
Held's counterintelligence group in Los Angeles - which had handled the lethal
repression visited upon the LA-BPP - to Gray, suggesting that "Los Angeles and
Minneapolis consider possible COINTELPRO measures to further disrupt AIM
COINTELPRO-AIM 257
Mr. CI,evvvnd —
Ms. C.nrssI
—.
M,.
14.
NR r) 31 LA CODE 41
tIt s.. rn
t It. Thca•pwa
23 PM NITEL 5/4/73 RWM
0
TV1ACTING DIRECTOR !b. rel-.
C...vs
L.
LAS VEGAS 1,. Fr nr Itte
C.Onny
MINNEAPOLIS vis
M.. n•d!sy —
Mrs.
OKLAHOMA CITY
SEATTLE
FROM LOS ANGELES (157-6224) (P) 4P.
AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT; Eti - AIM.
04 5/3/73 SOURCE 'MO HAS FAINISHED REAL1AELE INFORMATION ,
IN PAST ADVISED THAT
ACTIVIST IN AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT, (AIM),
::; ALLEGEDLY pc
iri l I
RECEIVED $55,000 FROM ATTORNEY WHO REPRESETIS SAMMY DAVI4.... 97,3
JR., NOTED ENTERTAINER. MONEY ALLEGEDLY DONATED SY

I/
DAVIS FOP AIM, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, IS GOING TO CE USED 5- pY
,
1 -,---
17i;%;7:
7
V;: -E-..4-77 TO 2UY MEAPONS FOR ULTIMATE USE AT ).;
'OUHDE) KNEE, SCUTH DAKOTA.
SECOND SOURCE, NHO. HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION
Excerpts from May 1973 teletype itemizing never-substantiated arms acquisitions by AIM
and detailing COINTELPRO-type operation to deny the organization funding from
Sammy Davis, Jr. (continued on next two pages).
leadership."m This leaves little doubt that counterintelligence specialists such as the
younger Held continued to view their job assignments vis a vis AIM in precisely the
same terms as they had with regard to organizations such as the BPP two years
earlier, even if headquarters had in the meantime forbidden use of the customary
vernacular. In a superficial exercise in "plausible deniability" the acting director
replied in a December 4 teletype:
IN PAST, ADVISED THAT
•'E.PS ALL INVOLVED "ITS{ AIM AND HAD
APPROXIMATELY S61,00? RECEIVED FROM SAMMAVIS,JR., A.;p

ANOTHER SIAT,MS1 FROM VARIOUS ROCK MUSIC GROUPS IN LOS ANGELES.
THIS HOFEY ACCORDING IS TO BE USED
TO BUY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONRY FOR USE AT WOUNDED
KNEE., SOUTH DAKOTA.

SOURCE ALSO ADVISED THAT HXXX THE GROUP INDICATED UPRISINGS
tERE TO OCCUR IN OKLAHOMA'FOLLOPIOG WOUNDED KNEE.
THIRD SOURCE, WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION
IN PAST ADVISED THAT ACTIVIST IN CLEAVER
FACTION OF BLACK PANTHER PARY IN LOS ANGELES, INDICATZ.O DESIRE
TO LCCATE SOME .AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AS HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED 3Y SOME
INDIANS WHO WERE ATEiESTED IM PURCHASIVG YEARO::S.

• i
SOURCE UNAUF TniAS'ZERTAIN IDENTIFY OF IMIANS.
BUREAU REQUESTED TO ADVISE LAS VUAS AS TO DESIRACILITY
OF CONTACTING SAMMY DAVIS, JR., TO (A) DETERMINE IF
DONATION MADE, (B) IF SO, TO CONSIDER ADVISING HIM AS TO WHAT
FUNDS APE BEING USED FOR.
IT IS FELT DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION TO DAVIS WOULD
NOT .IEOPAnCIZE SOURCES.
IN REFERENCE TO BUTEL CALL MAY 4, I973, OOMcERN/N1G
PURCHASE OF cLnyror: MIrES011-0.00NOWOrAND SUBSMENT

DELIT:RY TO . 000DED •f;!FE, CONTACT WITH ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND
FIR7A7N1S, LOS ANGELES, PEFLECTS THEY HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH
INFORMATION. II SHONID BE VOTED THAT INFORPATIO" FROM SOURCE WNW'

INDICATED THAT AIM WOULD BE IN POSITION TO PURCHASE
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, DAZOCKAS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, HAND GRENADES

LAND MTNES, AND MORTARS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT INFORMATION
RECEIVED FY DEPARTMENT CONCERNING CLAYMORE MINES IS
BASED UPON INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SOURCE !MICH WAS FURNISHED
TO ATF, LOS ANGELES. LOS ANGELES HAS NOT VERIFIED PURCHASE OF ANY
KAPONS AND INFORMATION FROM INFORMANTS RAS
INDICATED DROPPED OUT OF 4Ir
Los Angeles suggested that there appears to be a split between Means and Banks
based on [deleted's] dismissal from AIM and suggested possible counterintelli-
gence measures be taken to further disrupt AIM leadership...Your attention is
directed to Bureau airtel to All Offices, dated 4/28/71, captioned "Counterintelli-
gence Programs; IS - RM," setting forth that effective immediately all counterintel-
ligence programs operated by the Bureau were being discontinued .n2
What seems to have been at issue was Held's telltale use of terminology rather than
the sort of tactics he was recommending. Indeed, as Bureau conduct in its use of
Douglass Durham and the nature of its other involvement in the Banks/Means trial
readily indicate, there is every indication that the FBI had already adopted the
methods Held advocated for use against AIM.
As was noted above, a far more striking example of this than the utilization of
agents provocateurs , disinformation and legal fabrications to neutralize AIM was the
Bureau's reliance upon Wilson's GOON Squad to decimate the ranks of organiza-
tional members and supporters on Pine Ridge. Deployed in much the same fashion
as appears to have been intended for the SAO by Held's LA COINTELPRO Section
during 1971 and '72 (see Chapter 6), the GOONs functioned essentially as a
reservation death squad. Among their first victims was Pedro Bissonette, the young
head of the grassroots Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Organization (OSCRO), who had
emerged as an ION leader at Wounded Knee. In the aftermath of the siege, the FBI
had offered Bissonette a "deal" wherein all charges would be dropped against him
in exchange for his testifying against the AIM leadership.113He refused, and
countered that it was his intention to testify instead to the specifics of the graft and
corruption permeating the Wilson administration, and the role of the government
in perpetuating the situation. Subsequently, he was accosted by a GOON named
Cliff Richards in the reservation-adjacent hamlet of White Clay, Nebraska on the
afternoon of October 17, 1973. In the ensuing scuffle, Bissonette knocked his attacker
to the ground, then got in his car and drove away.114
Although White Clay is outside BIA police jurisdiction, Pine Ridge police/
GOON head Delmar Eastman immediately mobilized his entire force — assisted by
several FBI spotter planes — in a reservation-wide manhunt for the "fugitive."115 At
To: SAC, Albany

5/4/73
From: Acting Director, FBI
1 - R. E. Gebhardt
1 - G. C. Moore
AMERICAN INDIAN ILVEMOIT (AIM)
FATREMIST MATTERS
ReBuairtela 12/6/72 and 1/16/73 captioned "American Indian

Activities, Extremist Matters."
foi47044-tOffiSelP
ati chapters. ti.1444164-
if not already done, media t
i
x' sulfa of investigation conducted to date in form suitable for

dissemination under caption of individual chapter with,recommen alion
relative to additional investigation. Vhereevidoneg,gt..e4tx
aqivit4Or involvement by a chapter is determined 9p,guspeP$
'institute full and continuing investigatiolfthefogOW44S
activities, leaders, membership, and finaiidES. dilevelop info
sources in or close to each chapter. Also, institute individual
'investigations of Members of such chapters to develop background andi
determine their activities and propensity for militancy or violence."
Submit results thereof in form suitable for dissemination'under )
individual's caption with your recommendation relative to further /
investigation.
Institute similar individual investigations Of all AIM
members and unaffiliated Indians arrested or involved in tolocover of
Wounded Knee, South'Dakota, or similar confrontations or disorders
elsewhere. Submit results under individual's caption in a form
suitable for dissemination. If warranted, consider subject for
inclusion inMaiinistrative Index and ice 77.7..777::.:7:7777-77:777 :'7>anai
'
for designation as a Kcy Xx. ..ft. R EC-49 /06 //6 3-Y,..3 - \D i
2 - All Offices' (;.xcept Honolulu and San Juan)
MAILED a .... .. ---..)
K. M.,. MAY - 7 1973

K. CA ■1,1g1 _ SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
*. Clei.ci ir.el _ .f CAM:aso (117)
K. G...1 ___.
K. CI, Wu., —
r ,/ •
Mr. M•11.1. E 3. _ A
Mt St,,.• _____ V
1/\ litJP
* 'Wm* _
Tr*. Pia*
K. .i.tir, --____ till
Ms Ii.,,,,..
_,. ..,. . . . . . . .-. ri (/; 01-
""ii. N.',Elt ..--., "It ROOM ,, _. ..,. 'I.. ET Y PE UNIT F,:n•-f---
t 0 r NI.: , i - . 4 ._..
May 1973 teletype initiating a nation-wide, "forceful and penetrative interview program"
of all individual AIM activists with an eye toward their designation as "Key Extremists."
Note similarity to earlier COINTELPRO practice of convincing new left activists there was
"an agent behind every mailbox" (continued on next page).
COINTELPRO-AIM 261
IVTprtfut,ti knetratimp interview progrism otindividuj

gictivista should be instituted: Conduct interviews in accordance
with existing instructions under SAC authority if facts. necessitating
Bureau approval are not present. Such a program should present
excellent opportunity for developing extremist informants among
Indian activists dedicated to violence and confrontations best exempli-
fied by the Wounded Knee situation.
ROTE:
Initial instructions to the field requested preliminary

inquiries regarding Individual AIM chapters. In view of recent militant
and violent activities culminated by Wounded Knee on the part of
its members, unaffiliated Indiana-as well as some confusion by:the -
field as to when investigation should be instituted, further instructions
are necessary to insure full and continuing investigations are
instituted where appropriate. Minneapolis and Omaha are fully identi-
fying individual Indians involved in and arrested during violent
confrontations within their respective divisio n s and offices covering
residences of ruch individuals are, being advised and designated office
of origin.
some point between 9 and 9:50 p.m. the same evening, Bissonette was stopped at a
roadblock near Pine Ridge village and shot in the chest by a BIA police officer (and
known GOON) named Joe Clifford. In Clifford's official report, he had been forced
to shoot the victim, who had resisted arrest, jumping from his car brandishing a
weapon. He recorded that he'd used a 12-gauge shotgun and that the shooting
occurred at 9:48 p.m. Bissonette was pronounced dead on arrival at the Pine Ridge
hospital at 10:10 p.m." No weapon attributable to Pedro Bissonette was ever
produced by the police. Several witnesses who drove by the scene, however, later
submitted affidavits that a pool of blood indicating that Bissonette had already been
shot was evident at shortly after 9 p.m., suggesting that the GOONs had delayed the
victim's transport by ambulance to the nearby hospital (and medical attention) for
approximately an hour, until he bled to death."
Moreover, when WKLDOC attorney Mark Lane viewed the corpse in the
hospital morgue at around midnight, he discovered that rather than having suffered
a shotgun blast, Bissonette appeared to have been shot seven times with an
"approximately .38 calibre handgun" in the chest. The shots, "any one of which
might have killed him," were placed in a very tight cluster, Lane insisted, as if they'd
been fired at point-blank range." The attorney also recounted that it appeared
Bissonette had been beaten prior to being shot." He therefore quickly called Gladys
Bissonette, the dead man's grandmother, and convinced her to demand an inde-
pendent autopsy be performed. She agreed. Lane then phoned Assistant U.S.
Attorney Bill Clayton in Rapid City, to notify him of the family's intent to pursue its
legal right to commission such an autopsy. Clayton appears to have immediately
called Delmar Eastman and instructed him to remove the body from the morgue -
at 3 a.m. - and have it transported, not only off the reservation, but out of the state,
to Scottsbluff, Nebraska.'" There, W.O. Brown, a government-contracted coroner,
dissected the body, turned over whatever slugs he recovered to the FBI, and reached
a conclusion corroborating Clifford's version of events. There was little left of the
corpse for an independent pathologist to examine.'21Despite the controversy
swirling around Bissonette's death, and the existence of witness accounts contra-
dicting the police story, the Bureau pursued no further investigation of the matter.
OSCRO collapsed as a viable organization as a direct result of its leader's elimina-
tion.
Two years later, with the number of unsolved murders of AIM members and
supporters on Pine Ridge having reached epic proportions,'" and despite Wilson's
loss in his third bid for the tribal presidency, the GOONs and their FBI cohorts were
still pursuing the same lethal tactics. For instance, in the early evening of January 30,
1976, three cars containing 15 members of the GOON Squad pulled into the tiny
hamlet of Wanblee (located in the northeastern sector of the reservation), a strong
bastion of anti-Wilsonism. Spotting the car of Byron DeSersa, a young Oglala tribal
attorney and AIM supporter who had announced his intention to bring criminal
charges against a number of Wilsonites once the regime was disbanded, they gave
chase, firing as they went. About four miles out of town, a bullet passed through the
driver's-side door of DeSersa's car, catching him in the upper left thigh, nearly
amputating his leg. DeSersa pulled over and dragged himself into a ditch, screaming
at several friends who had been his passengers to run for their lives. He bled to death
alongside the road as the GOONs chased the others through adjoining fields.123
The GOONs then returned to Wanblee, where they apparently passed a pleas-
ant evening shooting up the homes of those who had opposed Wilson. The following
morning, they firebombed several buildings and continued to drive around town
taking random potshots. As the Commission on Civil Rights later determined, that
afternoon - with the smoke still billowing from the GOONs' incendiary attacks - a
pair of FBI agents arrived in Wanblee and were quickly informed by residents as to
what had transpired. George Bettelyoun (Oglala), a passenger in DeSersa's car,
provided precise identification of the killers, who included Dick Wilson's son Billy
and son-in-law, a GOON leader named Chuck Richards."' The agents declined to
make arrests, stating that they were there in a "purely investigative" capacity. They
nonetheless managed to arrest Guy Dull Knife, an elderly Cheyenne who lived in
Wanblee; Dull Knife, the agents declared, had disturbed the "peace" by protesting
their inaction against the GOONs too loudly."' The citizens of Wanblee finally
formed a vigilance committee on January 31, giving the marauders until sundown
to be gone from their community or suffer the consequences. Delmar Eastman then
dispatched a group of BIA police to escort the GOON contingent safely back to Pine
Ridge village; again, no arrests were made. The Bureau, as usual, conducted no
further investigation into either the DeSersa murder or the firebombings and other
aspects of the GOONs' two-day terrorization of the hamlet.'"
Later, while sparring with a congressional committee critical of the Bureau's
COINTELPRO-AIM 263
performance on Pine Ridge during the mid-'70s, FBI Director William Webster was
to cast his agents' role there as having been that of "peacekeepers." "Frankly [the
Bureau] took...a little bit of a beating during those days in Wounded Knee period
and afterwards," Webster asserted, "[but] our role should be an investigator's role,
not a peacekeeper's role."127The director's use of the word "peacekeepers" in such
a context is illuminating, insofar as this is the standard term in military and police
parlance applied to counterinsurgency operatives.'" The real meaning imbedded in
the director's semantics is further revealed in the fact that FBI documents through-
out the period in question - such as the accompanying February 6,1976 memoran-
dum from SAC, Portland to Director - openly and consistently refer to dissident
Indians as "insurgents." Official protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the
FBI not only undertook a full-fledged COINTELPRO against AIM, it escalated its
conceptual and tactical approach to include outright counterinsurgency warfare
techniques. Only within this framework can the events discussed above be rendered
comprehensible.
"RESMURS"
By early 1975, it had become clear to the opposition of Pine Ridge that its
attempts to achieve resolution of its grievances through due process - whether by
impeachment of Dick Wilson, electing another individual into his office, or the filing
of formal civil rights complaints - were being systematically aborted by the very
government which was supposed to guarantee them.129The FBI and BIA police
structures were reinforcing rather than interfering with the pervasive GOON
violence. Reservation conditions were being officially described by the U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights as a "reign of terror."1" The message was unequivocal: the
dissidents could either give in and subordinate themselves to Wilson's feudal order,
allowing the final erosion of Lakota rights and landbase, or they would have to
physically defend themselves and their political activities. Hence Oglala tradition-
als requested that AIM establish centers for armed self-defense at various points on
the reservation.
During the spring of 1975, the Northwest AIM Group - including Leonard
Peltier, Frank Black Horse (adopted Oglala), Bob and Jim Robideau (both Anishi-
nabes), and Darelle "Dino" Butler (Tuni) - set up a defensive encampment at the
request of elders Harry and Cecilia Jumping Bull. The camp, was situated in a
strongly pro-AIM area, on a property known as the Jumping Bull Compound, near
the village of Oglala. It was referred to as "Tent City" in FBI communications, and
became an immediate preoccupation of the Bureau and its GOON surrogates."' As
was noted in a June 6, 1975 memorandum captioned "Law Enforcement on the Pine
Ridge Indian Reservation:"
There are pockets of Indian population which consist almost exclusively of Ameri-
can Indian Movement (AIM) members and their supporters on the Reservation. It
UNITED STATES r FOMENT

so 0
andum
TO DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 2/6/76
FROM SAC, PORTLAND -
SUBJECT:
00: PORTLAND
PDfile: 157-1600 (P)
RESMURS
Bufile: 89-3229
PDfile: 89-94 (P)
r.
This investigation is based on information which V
indicates the subject is engaged in activities which could"
involve a violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2383 c.
(Rebellion or Insurrection) or 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy) as ,
indicated hereafter. The subject has been identified as being

actively involved in militant activites of the American
Indian Movement (AIM). Since January, 1973, AIM has been
actively involved in demonstrations and violent confrontations
with local authorities in Scottsbluff, Nebraska, and the
Rapid City and Custer areas of South Dakota. From 2/27-5/8/73,
AIM leaders and members and their supporters occupied the
community of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, by force of arms
taking a number of the community's residents as hostages.
Before surrendering to Federal authorities, they engaged
in numerous violent and destructive acts and gunfire was
exchanged with Federal authorities resulting in the death
of two of the insurgents.
was arres
4 - Bureau (AM
(2 - 157
3 - Portland 7-1600) NOT
(1 - 89-94) (RESMURS)
47BCC:mlm 415 FEB 20 1976 _
) IN■
r RIM %SI')
_ t 1.) 'Bay U.S. Savings Bond) Regularly on the Payroll Sating: Plan /\,‘°
COINTELPRO as counterinsurgency. By 1976 the FBI's misrepresentation of AIM activi-

ties was down pat, and its characterization of AIM members as insurgents was standard.
COINTELPRO-AIM 265
is significant that in some of these AIM centers the residents have built bunkers
which would literally require military assault forces if it were necessary to overcome
resistance emanating from the bunkers "2
A later memorandum continued, "To successfully overcome automatic or

semiautomatic weapons fire from such 'bunkers' it appears as though heavy
equipment such as an armored personnel carrier would be required."13Whether or
not the FBI actually believed this to be true, the fact is that no such bunkers ever
existed. The alleged fortifications were later disclosed to have been abandoned root
cellars and broken-down corrals. However, by then the Bureau had utilized such
flights of fancy (or cynicism) as the rationale by which to justify provocation of a
major "incident" and then a massive escalation of force by which it intended to
destroy AIM and its Pine Ridge support base once and for all.
On the afternoon of June 25, 1975, SAs Ronald Williams and Jack Coler,
accompanied by BIA police officers (both Oglalas and known GOONs) Robert
Ecoffey and Glenn Little Bird, entered the Jumping Bull Compound, ostensibly
searching for a 19-year-old Oglala AIM member, Jimmy Eagle, on what they said
were charges of "kidnapping, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery."134
When they were told Eagle wasn't there and hadn't been seen in weeks, they left, but
shortly picked up three Dine (Navajo) teenagers from the AIM camp - Norman
Charles, Wilfred "Wish" Draper and Mike "Baby AIM" Anderson - hitchhiking
along Highway 18, which runs between Oglala to Pine Ridge village. Williams and
Coler questioned the three, not about Eagle, but about who else was residing in Tent
City. The three were then released and returned to camp.1"
Before mid-morning, June 26, local residents knew that something ominous was
in the offing. Indians in and around the village of Oglala noted large numbers of
paramilitary personnel - GOONs, BIA police, state troopers, U.S. Marshals, and FBI
SWAT teams - massing in the area."' Around 11:30 a.m. SAs Coler and Williams
returned to the Jumping Bull property. They were allegedly sent to serve an arrest
warrant on Jimmy Eagle. However, it is clear they'd already ascertained he was not
there and, in any event, the warrant for his arrest was not issued till July 7.137 The
agents drove past the buildings of the compound proper and directly toward the
AIM camp. They stopped their cars, got out, and began firing their weapons.
Members of the camp, believing themselves to be under attack from GOONs,
returned fire." This was apparently the cue for the prepositioned reinforcements to
arrive; radio transmission logs from SA Williams indicate that he and his partner
expected reinforcements to be immediate and massive once the firefight had been
initiated."9Unfortunately for them, three teenagers who had been breakfasting in
the compound quickly positioned themselves to cover the route intended by the
relief force."' Using .22 caliber squirrel rifles, the youngsters shot out the tires of the
first two backup cars - driven by SA J. Gary Adams and Fred Two Bulls, a BIA
policeman and known GOON. Confronted with these meager potshots, Adams and
Two Bulls promptly retreated, abandoning Coler and Williams. 41Not until 6 p.m.,
when federal forces had swelled to over 250 men, including a SWAT unit airlifted
in from the Bureau's training facility at Quantico, Virginia, and a vigilante force
headed by South Dakota Attorney General William Janldow,142 did the FBI finally
mount an assault.'" By this point, Williams and Coler were long since dead, and the
Indians who had been in the AIM camp that morning had - other than a Coeur
D'Alene named Joe Stuntz Killsright who had been killed, ostensibly by a long range
shot fired by BIA police officer Gerald Hill"' - made their escape.
Although the deaths of Coler and Williams were probably an unintended
consequence, the provocation of the firefight achieved its intended objective: the
public justification for a truly massive paramilitary assault on AIM and the Pine
Ridge traditionals. As is shown in the accompanying memo from R.E. Gebhardt to
J.E. O'Connell, dated June 27, 1975, the FBI's top COINTELPRO specialist, Richard
G. Held - assigned as the Bureau's Chicago SAC, but already prepositioned in
Minneapolis - immediately assumed control over the RESMURS ("Reservation
Murders") investigation. Among those accompanying Held to South Dakota was
"public information specialist" Tom Coll who immediately undertook a series of
sensational press conferences in which he pronounced that the agents had been
"lured into an ambush" by AIM and attacked from a "sophisticated bunker
complex" where they were wounded and "dragged from their cars" before being
"riddled" by "15-20 rounds each" from "automatic weapons." In Coll's accounts,
Williams and Coler died while disabled and "begging for their lives." Both agents
were "stripped," as part of their "executions," according to Coll.'" Although
literally none of this was true - a matter well known to Bureau investigators at least
a day before the first press conference presided over by Tom Coll - such stories
produced the lurid headlines necessary to condition public sentiment to accept
virtually anything the FBI wished to impose upon AIM.'" An additional advantage
of Coll's media ploy was that it caused a senate select committee planning to
investigate those FBI operations already directed against AIM to be indefinitely
postponed, "under the circumstances."'" It was a week before FBI Director Clarence
Kelley quietly "corrected" this welter of disinformation, offered in the finest
COINTELPRO style.14"
Another star performer the Chicago SAC brought along was Norman Zigrossi,
a young counterintelligence protégé whose mission it was to replace ASAC George
O'Clock in Rapid City for the duration of the anti-AIM campaign.'" The elder Held's
son, Los Angeles COINTELPRO section head Richard W., was also involved in
RESMURS from the outset, as is evidenced in the accompanying June 27,1975 memo
from O'Connell to Gebhardt. As is revealed in the accompanying July 26 memo, he
had by that date joined his father at Pine Ridge, a locale in which the experience he
had acquired while heading the Bureau's counterintelligence campaign against the
LA-BPP (see Chapter 5) could be deployed against AIM, and his background
overseeing SAO attacks against the left in southern California (see Chapter 6) might
be used in connection with the GOONs. Actually, the younger Held probably
arrived in South Dakota earlier, as is evidenced by the fact that RESMURS corn-
— uA IT.: 27,-1975-- —
Set forth below is a chronological recitation of information

received and instructions given by Associate Director Callahan and
Assistant DliectOr Gcbhardt regarding this matter.
'7 •
At approximately 10:50 p.m. , 6/26/75, we talked to
Director Kelley.: We brought him up to date as best we could at that
time, namely, that two Agents were apparently attempting to execute
an arrest warrant for an Indian charged with Assault with a Deadly
Weapon amfrobbery when the shooting took place. There were four
warrants billl on four individuals. Preliminary reports indicate .
one of the Agents said on the radio that they had been hit. Agents on
the reservation responded. They came under fire but they were able to
verify the two Agents had been killed. At that time the Agents who
were brought into the area under the command of SAC Trimbach were
moving into the area of the shooting on a gradual basis. They were
approximately 1/2 mile on a perimeter. The area was described as .
a "group of houses" surrounded by "trees and foliage." At that time
there were approximately 42 Agents present with 60 to 75 law enforce-
ment officers and the firing being received was rifle-type fire. A •
quick check determined that the firing had ceased and that the area
was secured but apparently there was some question as to whether
some Indians were still in the houses. After _a_discussion with the:tick
Director it wa ould o • r o head
l_6IAllarTrinthads
wes atioi No. 1 Man arest
release as read by Mr. CallMi7:as approv
At 12:30 a.m. SAC Held Was contacted in MinneapVi3 ll 0191
vroval was given to him to charter a plane to get him theme.. ....-- "--.
REG :mcw
f
CONTINUED - OVER
01;1/ Irta-'4°41V
Memo assigning COINTELPRO specialist Richard G. Held, at the time Chicago SAC, to
head up the RESMURS investigation. He had been prepositioned in Minneapolis.
•.
•
.10 .11.1111.•
tl■
UN! 11:1) STA .S CA.' ANNWNT
••..
Menioranduine IN,. A9
A.... thy..
1..
TO Mr. Gebhardt DATE: Igloo
6/27/75 G...
A'
,LM ,_Mr.__Q1connelL_ (
1 - Mr. Cook
1 - Mr. Gordon
1 - Mr. Warman.
L.AIL
1.0 Cram....
1 - Mr. Held Ph. PAO.
sulucer: itESMURS - INFORMANTS
fwrh
09.4 ∎Seep —..
On 6/21/75, SA Richard W. Held, Section IS-1,

Intelligence Division, furnished the following information
to SA John C. Gordon, General Crimes Unit, General
Investigative Division.
slvirvro„,
— .
This has been done as an investi ative aid for

the General Investigative Division
U •e"
t za ,. -;;L1
ACTION: For information.
"All in the family." Memo showing participation of COINTELPRO specialist Richard W.

Held, son of Richard G. Held, in the RESMURS investigation from its earliest moments.
munications - such as the accompanying June 30, 1975 memo from B.H. Cook to
Gebhardt - suddenly adopted the practice of referring to Richard G. Held as "Dick"
in order to distinguish him from his namesake.
The sorts of operations this stable of COINTELPRO aces had in mind had
become apparent as early as June 27, when a task force of at least 180 SWAT-trained
agents, supported by significant numbers of GOONs/BIA police and a scattering of
federal marshals, began running military-style sweeps across Pine Ridge.15° Outfit-
ted in Vietnam-issue jungle fatigues, and equipped with the full panoply of
counterinsurgency weaponry-M-16 assault rifles, M-14 sniper rifles, M-79 grenade
launchers, plastic explosives, Bell UH-1B "Huey" helicopters, fixed-wing "Bird
Dog" spotter planes, jeeps, armored personnel carriers, army-supplied communica-
tions gear and tracking dogs - this huge force spent nearly three months breaking
into homes and conducting warrantless searches.151Their activities included out-
right air assaults upon the property of AIM member Sylvester "Selo" Black Crow
near Wanblee (on July 8), and Crow Dog's Paradise (on September 5)'52On July 12,
an elderly resident of Oglala, James Brings Yellow, was frightened into a fatal heart
COINTELPRO-AIM 269
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
RECTOR, FBI (89-3229) I, DATE: 7/26/75
TO
AS.STP NT nT §tANTIOND__Al ,
ANNAW„.. .78LLIGENCEDIVISIOT
FA011 :
. -n
•
suD.VAIT: RESNURS
;INE RIDGE (70-10239) (P)
§U7E.-11VIS OR rtroilgalbaWATIELD,
NTELLIGENCE1OIVIS ION
SupervisorlWpc- ived at Fire Ridge„ South

Dakota, Indian ReservaElan -Command Poit - opjb/29/75,-ta__,
assist in §F.51fURS investigatione yas issignd three!
4,cportantiolLases of this inyestigatiori naicely,-the-----
Oorreletioniof Bureau-wid, informants.2into_the investigation;•
he establishent of_the confidential-turd;and-Lhe =. ., .
oordination of all intelligence -information as it relates
to the American Indian Vovernant IAIM):11114 the ....._ - --
,.._RESWES
investigatio.
n'
-SupervisorFED's presence wasspecially
inecessarydurin-pthe initial stages ;of -his investigation-
ari,his background in the intelligence - end informant fields7
proved most beneficial:- Fie 11Ln3led all of his assign:rants
in an outstanding manner, including the evaluation of all
intelligence information developed throu:;hout the country
and on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.
FBIP.C4 should continue to consider utilization of
supervisors of Supervisor HELD's caliber to afford on-the-spot
supervision in cases of this magnitude.
Memo showing Richard W. Held's presence on Pine Ridge as a supervisor at the peak of
the RESMURS-related repression. The younger Held's "caliber" in such a capacity was no
doubt proven by his earlier leadership of COINTELPRO-BPP in Los Angeles.
attack when a group of agents led by J. Gary Adams suddenly kicked in his door for
no apparent reason.153With that, virtually the entire Oglala community - MM and
non-AIM alike - launched a petition drive demanding the FBI withdraw from Pine
Ridge, and even the typically prostrate Sioux tribal councils endorsed the position.'"
The Bureau's July performance on Pine Ridge was such that the chairman of the U.S.
Civil Rights Commission, Arthur J. Flemming, characterized what was happening
as "an over-reaction which takes on aspects of a vendetta...a full-scale military type
invasion." He went on to say:
[The presence of such a a massive force] has created a deep resentment on the part
of many reservation residents who feel that such a procedure would not be tolerated
in any non-Indian community in the United States. They point out that little has been
UNITED STA:&S EOM ENT - 40 M.

•• —
Meinorandum ••
:Mr. Gebhardt A. DATE: June 30, 19

0.1))1 - Mr. Callahan
FROM B. H. Clook ar e, 1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Cooke
simJEcT.RESMURS 110191171k 1 - Mr. Gordon •!
No,
1 - Mr. Moore .
1 - Mr. Wannall'
G
SAC Dick Held was instructed in a phone call a 10:15 a.m.,
EDT, to have SA diry Adams fly to California to meet with the •
Director in Los Angeles "e.t. 8:00 p.m. and to brief the Directory„
concerning the details of the incident at Pine Ridge. SA Mans was
to bring with him FD-302s for the Agents who were present the at
time of the shooting and these FD-302s are to be facsimiled
to the Los Angeles Office and to be received prior to 8:00 p.m.
tonight so that they will be present for the briefing session.
One of the chief concerns by the way of inconsistencies
that should be resolved today, is the autopsy report saying
that SA Williams was instantly killed by the first bullet
at close range, wherein the teletype received from Minneapolis
6/29/75 indicated that Agent heard Williams on the radio
transmit the message "I'm hit." The Director has stated
that it is obvious that this transmission would be impossible !
if the autopsy report was accurate and he desires this clarified
before any statement to the press is made.
above information is also being furnished 'J:1.
SA at the Command Post with the instructions that the
Agents ge together and resolve anv_i.nc.casistencies so that
SA 'Adams will have complete information when he arrives at
Los Xngele6for;the briefing.
Memo referring to Richard G. Held as "Dick" to distinguish him from his son during their
joint participation in RESMURS. Note also the Bureau's belated concern with getting its
story straight, "before any statement to the press."
done to solve numerous murders on the reservation, but when two white men are
killed, "troops" are brought in from all over the country at a cost of hundreds of
millions of dollars 155
Undeterred, SAC Held not only continued his sweeping operations, by which
he sought to finally cow the traditionals, but requested a series of special grand juries
be convened in Rapid City.'" This last was an expedient by which he might exercise
broad subpoena powers to compel testimony of Indian against Indian - thus
undercutting the cohesion of the Pine Ridge resistance - and/or bring about the
indefinite incarceration (for "contempt") of those who were perceived alternatively
as "weak links" or as "hard cases" who refused to go on the stand.'" By mid-July a
strategy was emerging to at last divide the local reservation community from
COINTELPRO-AIM 271
"outside agitators" such as the Northwest AIM group. Only in giving up their allies,
so the reasoning went, would the Oglalas be able to save their own from what was
being inflicted upon them. Cannily, Held seemed to realize that once the AIM/
traditional solidarity which had been so painstakingly solidified over the previous
four years was to some extent eroded in this fashion, it would be unlikely that it
could ever be completely reconstituted. Hence, although by this point the FBI
already had the names of some 20 Oglalas it thought had participated in the firefight
which left the agents dead, the RESMURS investigation was geared almost exclu-
sively toward obtaining a basis for prosecuting only non-Oglalas.154As is demon-
strated in the accompanying July 17,1975 teletype from Held to Director Kelley and
"all offices via Washington," a high priority was already being placed on developing
"information to lock [Northwest AIM member] Leonard Peltier into this case." The
same document, of course, also points out that Held really had no clear idea at all as
to "the actual events of the afternoon of June 26,1975." Identification/apprehension
of whoever truly shot Coler and Williams was playing a clear second fiddle to
satisfaction of the Bureau's political agenda on the reservation.
Correspondingly, on November 25, 1975, federal indictments were returned
against four individuals on two counts each of first degree murder and two more of
"aiding and abetting" in the murders of SAs Ronald A. Williams and Jack R. Coler.
Three of those targeted - Leonard Peltier, Dino Butler and Bob Robideau - were
considered by the Bureau to be key leaders of the "outsider" Northwest AIM group.
The other, Jimmy Eagle, appears to have been temporarily included merely to justify
the presence of the agents on the Jumping Bull property in the first place. Eagle had
turned himself in to the U.S. Marshals Service in Rapid City on July 9.159Butler was
arrested on September 5, during the air assault on Crow Dog's Paradise."° For his
part, Robideau was arrested near Wichita, Kansas on September 10, when the car he
was driving caught fire and exploded on the Kansas Turnpike.1" Thus, by October
16 - as is shown in the accompanying teletype of the same date - SAC Held
considered his plan far enough along that he might return to his post in Chicago
(where "urgent matters" attending the Hampton-Clark cover-up claimed his atten-
tion) despite the fact that Leonard Peltier was still at large, having in the meantime
fled to Canada."
In actuality Held's departure hardly marked the conclusion of his RESMURS
involvement. To the contrary, as is evidenced in the accompanying January 29,1976
memo written by R.J. Gallagher at FBI headquarters, he remained a guiding force at
least until Peltier was arrested by Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Inspec-
tor Edward W.J. Mitchell and a corporal, Dale Parlane, at the camp of traditional
Cree leader Robert Smallboy (near Hinton, Alberta) on February 6.163Despite the fact
that he was already well beyond normal retirement age, and undoubtedly as a result
of the quality of the counterintelligence services he had rendered over the years,
Held was promoted to serve as FBI associate director on July 20, 1976.164In this
capacity as the Bureau's second in command, he was able to bring his unique talents
to bear on the culmination of the RESMURS operation in particularly effective ways.
:71-ESMURS)
DAILY SUMMARY TELETYPE
RE RAPID CITY DAILY SUMMARY TELETYPE TO BUREAU AND OTHER
OFFICES DATED JULY 16, 1975. 147404

OSCAI(BEAR RUNNER 113 JUL
BEAR RUNNER APPEARED AT THE FEDERAL BUILDING IfrRAPfIr 1
JULY 16, 1975, AND PUBLICLY TORE UP THE COPY OF THE SUBPOENA
HAD BEEN ISSUED FOR HIM. HE STATED THE SUBPOENA WAS NOT VALID AST
HAD BEEN SERVED ON HIS FATHER. HE WAS SERVED HITH ANOTHER SUBPOENA
BUT MADE, THE STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD NOT HONOR IT AS HE HAD NOT
kPlINTEIATO:IcIA T LOCATION VOLUNTARILY.
TIW II:V,::711iiATIOO OF THIS CA;!' 1uwac0;;;
1) tAirll'LE(c:LY IDENTIFYING ALL OF THE SUSPECTS, AD;:li:O
OR ELIMJATING THEM AS APPROPRIATE;
2)STA3LISDING THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE SUSPECTS DURING THE
PERTINENT PERIOD;
3) IDENTIFY AND LOCATE ALL OF THE RESIDENTS OF "TENT CITY" WHO
WERE THERE DURING ANY PCRIOD OF ITS EXISTENCE AND/OR WHOSE FINGER-
PRINTS HAVE BEEN FOUND ON MATERIAL TAKEN FROM "TENT. CITY;"
4) EXAMI N ING THE EVIDENCE AND CONNECTING IT TO THE SUSPECTS;
5) ri 07? rik-07.1iiity 107Tarc11

---- W4C?1-74oTerfiriat
) •
--cortnipperIALINFORMANTS:013.-S0 uagss
7) COORDINATE WITH AUXILIARY OFFICES IN ORDER TO FULLY DEVELOP
BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF SUSPECTS WHO EITHER LIVE IN THEIR AREA
OR HAVE ASSOCIATES THERE;
8) ATTEMPTING. TO DEVELOP WITNESSES AND SOURCES WHO CAN AND WILL
TESTIFY AS TO THE ACTUAL EVENTS OF THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 26, 1975 ,
AS THE BUREAU IS AWARE, THE GRAND JURY IS BEING USED Iii AN
EFFORT TO FACILITATE THIS LATTER ASPECT WHERE WITNESSES ARE
RELUCTANT TO FURNISH INFO RMAT 10 N
Teletype showing the FBI's use of a grand jury to coerce "reluctant witnesses" to "lock
Peltier...into" the RESMURS case.
COINTELPRO-AIM 273
&art ti
Y..__
-16/915 c .....p
Svnt.
Es. _Affair' _
1
/- , ry \) Eily9a
\ 110132 RC CODE Cen jn•.'.
...A
/den(
0' In ■
rn,tion —
1:10PM URGENT OCTOBER 16, 1975 AMJ i. IntAt.
Lat....tory
D IR (.t.
TO:' TOR, FBI a1 Plan. & E•aL
B-• Svc Inn.
Training
FROM: RAPID CITY (70- 10239)
Cum ....—
Telephone Rm.
ATTENTION: NICHOLAS P. CALLAHAN, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR; JAMES B Director Ewer
ADAMS, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR; AND J. GALLAGHER, ASSISTANT
SAC, CHICAGO HAS BEEN ON THE SCENE IN CHARGE OF CAPTIONED
SPECIAL SINCE THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF FRIDAY, JUNE 27, 1975.
THE CUIRENT STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION IS SUCH THAT ALL BUT
TWO OF THE OUT-OF-DIVISION AGENTS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO -'THEIR

fT)
OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT. THE CASE IS IN THE FINAL STAGES OF BEING
PREPARED FOR PROSECUTION BY MINNEAPOLIS FERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO
THIS DIVISION. IN VIEW OF THIS AND IMPORTANT MATTERS REQUIRING
MY PERSONAL ATTENTION IN CHICAGO, IT IS MY INTENTION TO
RETURN TO CHICAGO O'N SATURDAY, OCTOBER 1E, 1575, UAC3•
THE PROSECUTION STAFF AND USDC JUDGE ANDREW W. BOGUE FOR
THE WESTER N D ISTRICT OF SOuTHi.i

kOAKOTA HAVE REQUESTED THAT SAC,
CHICAGO BE A VA ILABL-- FOR CO NMYVON, CASE PREPARATIO ' ND

HEL-50
TESTIMNY IF NEEDED. IT SHOULD BE NO4/101T JUDGE BO.0
ADDITION TO HEARING CASES, IS COORDINATING THE ACTIVITIES
Teletype noting the departure of Richard G. Held from the Pine Ridge area. The Chicago
SAC returned to his home office where he continued his orchestration of the cover-up
masking FBI involvement in the 1969 Hampton-Clark assassinations.
The RESMURS Trials
The murder trial of Dino Butler and Bob Robideau was conducted in Cedar
Rapids, Iowa during June of 1976. Although Jimmy Eagle had been in custody even
longer than they, and had supposedly confessed to participation in the killing of
Coler and Williams, he was not docketed as a defendant. The trial was marked by
a concerted effort on the part of the FBI and federal prosecutors to shape local
opinion - especially that of the jury - against Butler and Robideau by casting AIM
UNI 11:1) ST,1 I ES C.ok . .IENT t t•!L,
Memorandum
111 Mr., Adams mil.• January 29, 1976
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Gallagher
ROM R. J. GallagrPOlt
hE 1 - Mr. Cooke
1 - Mr. Sheer
RESMURS 1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Moore
SAC Richard ':t k: telephonically advis . me this

0.1
afternoon that he had beeonn:Y*. .f.;;),A
0ouY- pecial Prosec a riiAlc: who
and • k the ro of Pine Ridge, f•iOilt4, .-
rtit.0-tiN,e _NN
. . fll 10' a :40:440*oncerning this case. SAC Held
state. that e p anned to leave on Monday, February 2, 1976, to go to
Pine Ridge. He wasn't sure how long the conference would last but fe
it would be a couple of day SAC Held stated he planned to take SA
Li.. " with him. 7_jiad been in Pine Ridge with SA Held. bl
Judge Andrew
404:140, agtikt; kW!' Wr:e60ikl!. SAC Held sat
did not know what U. S. District Judge Bogue's Interest was but he wou d
see him while he was out there. •
Memo showing Richard G. Held's continuing involvement in RESMURS after his

departure. Note Held's intention of meeting with Judge Andrew Bogue who, in the
preceding document, appears to have been coordinating the prosecution's case.
as a "terrorist" organization. Despite the fact that, during the course of scores of
trials, AIM had never attempted to free any of its members through armed action,
the FBI launched a pretrial campaign to convince the citizenry and local law
enforcement that they should expect "shooting incidents and hostage situations" to
occur during the proceedings.165Then, on May 28, just before the trial began, the FBI
began circulating a series of teletypes within the federal intelligence community
alleging that AIM "Dog Soldiers" were planning to commit terrorist acts throughout
the midwest. This was followed up on June 18 by the accompanying entry on AIM
in the FBI's widely-circulated Domestic Terrorist Digest.
On June 21, the Bureau leaked one of its 'Dog Soldier Teletypes" to local law
enforcement and, not coincidentally, the media. It contended that, "Rudolfo 'Corky'
Gonzales, a leader of the Brown Berets [sic: Gonzales was a leader of the Denver-
based Crusade for Justice] reportedly [had] a rocket launcher and rockets either in
his possession or available to him along with explosives, hand grenades and ten to
fifteen M-16 rifles with banana clips." Gonzales' organization, the teletype went on,
was on the verge of joining with ATM's supposed Dog Soldiers and the long-defunct
SDS to use this array of weaponry "to kill a cop a day," using "various ruses" to "hire
law enforcement officers into an ambush" On June 22, the accompanying follow-up
COINTELPRO-AIM 275
RA E11: 0
- ' LE V:r21-...;.2 c.:31,1Ei EEG
'
fV ol. VII, No. 3 June 18, 197G
BICENTENNIAL OVERVIEW
Indicators of violence have increased in connection with Bicentennial

celebrations scheduled for July 4, 1976. In nddition to previously
repoked statements from the American Indian Movement threatening
to "blow out the candles" on America's birthday cake and from the
Weather Underground to "bring the fireworks." the possibility of
Puerto Rican independence groups engaging in terrorist adtivity
exists.
While-Bicentennial activities are set for virtually every city and town in the
country; national attention is expected for celebrations in Washington. D. C.,
Philadelphia, and New.:York-City'. Large-scole-counterdemonstrations are
being organized for WaShingtoryand Philadelphia and a large number of
foreign diplomats are expected to participate in "Operation Sail" (the arrival
of sailing ships from many nations) in New York.
PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE
The slogan "Independence for Puerto Rico--A Bicentennial Without Colonies10 .

has been adopted by organizers of a planned.'massive July 4 demonstration
in-Philadelphia. The Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC), the above-
ground support arm of the Weather Underground , appears to be the driving
.force behind this _demonstration , along with'the -Socialist Party of Puerto Ricb
(PSP), a Marxist-Leninist group which advocates independence for Puerto Rico.
Five members of the PSP were arrested in Puerto Rico on March 29. 1976, in
possession of automatic weapons and 1,350 pounds of stolen i•emite explosives.
Reportedly, some of these explosives were earmarked for use in the U. S. •
during the Bicentennial and more than 1,000 pounds of the explosives remain
in the hands of the PSP. All five of these individuals arc reported to have
traveled to Cuba in the past two years. '
1
1, In addition, Puerto Rican independence has been one of the demands of the' .
Armed Forces of Puerto Rican Libei'ation (TALN). This group.most recently
claimed ten simultaneous bombings in New York City, Washington, D. C.,
and Chicago in October, 1975. The FALN took responsibility for simultaneous
bombings the year before in New York and the Trounces Tavern bombing in
January, 1975, which killed four and injured over 50 persons.
1
TI lin 0010LICNI In TIII: PROPERTY OF TI IC FCl AND In LOhNUO 10 YOUR Acscr4cY:
••• . ■ • r•rINTi- NT!.1 ARC NO ( TO OE DISTRIpul CO Oul .510c yourt AGENCY.
WEATHER UNDERGROUND
The WeatherUnderground (WU) , which has taken credit for over 25 bombinf
since 1970, has repeatedly suggested in its magazine Osnwatornia that
revolutionaries should "bring the'firewol•:s" to the Bicentennial. -The
latest issue also adopted the theme of Puerto Rican independence.
Jennifer.Dohrn, a national leader of the•PFOC, the WU support arm, urged .8

mass mobilization for July 4 in Philadelphia at the (lard Times Conference
held in Chicago the first of this year. PFCC organized that conference, as
Ivell as the National Conference for a Peoples July 4th.licld in New York the
end of March. •
AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT (AIM)
Supporl -for...American Indian protests was•also a theme of the National

Con:forence for =•iPoc-■
plcs:July-4th-. A-NT-spokesman -told-this conference
that:the :eandlesTzon•Americabirthdr.-y7eake-IcouldlefibilelY be blown- out:
Indian militants thave -scheduled -a-earavan-toarriveat4,ittle-Big-llor:n
Montana, on June :26-i.the:100th Anniversary- of General Custer's defeat there
Further ,- a shoot-outlast November between Indian militants and an Oregon
State Police officer Tevcaled Indian interest in Bieentennial activities, and
their possession of a large amount of explosives and 'Weapons.
AIM's inclusion in the FBI's Domestic Terrorist Digest.
leak was made, asserting that 2,000 Dog Soldiers, trained for guerrilla warfare in the
'Northwest Territory," were to meet at the residence of AIM supporter Renee
Howell in Rapid City, and begin an incredible campaign of "terrorist acts." Al-
though Butler-Robideau defense attorney William Kunstler put FBI Director Clar-
ence Kelley on the stand and forced him to admit the Bureau had "not one shred"
of evidence to support these allegations, the disinformation continued to generate
headlines through the remainder of the tria1.166And, as the accompanying June 28,
1976 memo from J.G. Deegan to T.W. Leavitt makes plain, this was by conscious
design of the FBI rather than through the story's having simply acquired "a life of
its own."
Application of such time-honored COINTELPRO expedients was hardly the
only step undertaken by the FBI in seeking to undercut the judicial process at Cedar
Rapids. The Bureau also managed to get trumped-up allegations of an attempted jail
break by Butler and Robideau into the trial record?" brought in a demonstrably
bogus witness named James Harper to claim that both defendants had confessed to
him in their cell,168and - if their subsequent testimony during the trial of Leonard
Peltier is any indication - allowed agents such as J. Gary Adams to perjure
themselves.169It was also established in court that Adams, Olen Victor Harvey and
other agents blatantly coerced false testimony from several key witnesses?" Still,
presiding judge Edward McManus - "Speedie Eddie," certainly no friend of AIM -
allowed the defense to base its case in an argument for self-defense, contingent upon
examination of the context of anti-AIM violence fostered on Pine Ridge by the FBI
COINTELPRO-AIM 277
651,3 V3F.G
94210 R 0-21-01-024106
/TuZykr/ AuEh781P693 1 431845*LIP,Iti--RiEVM- C.

--
NR LrJULP.1 ZZH
f-:,J FAY 76
r. DIFa.:CTOR, FBI
3 RJE9WJA/C5PUTY ATTOF4EY t-ZPAL
ATTN: tNALYsts AN0cvp1.13ATTON UNIT
,IECVJA/ASSISTAVT ATTORtZ.y Gw RAL, CRI IINAL DIVISIoN
- rd: INTERNAL SECJRITY SE CTION
ATTN: r-Z.IZRAL CRIPES Sa- CTION
leARSHAL*5 SERVICE
jr:/(4).S. SECRET S7..RVICE CPID)
JEBHISAICEPARVENT Or TIC. INTE.RIOR
Jct. A 5
;;;; I C tr.elp.4 1-0 t:Z:
A SCURCE• PITH JHOtt INSUIFICIENT CONTACT HAS ixE.e4 rape TO
--Tr AMINE RELIABILITY 8.1T WHO IS IN A POSITION TO FURNISH

r
INPO4•ATIO14 ADVIMO AS FOLLOWS ON PAY 21. 1916.
The second of the so-called "Dog Soldier Teletypes" (continued on next 3 pages).
and its GOON cohorts from 1972 onwards. Butler and Robideau were thus able to
call expert witnesses such as Idaho Senator Frank Church, who had headed up a
major investigation of COINTELPRO and who testified that what the defendants
were contending was quite in line with known FBI counterintelligence practices."1
Similarly, U.S. Civil Rights Commission investigator William Muldrow went on the
stand to testify that the Bureau had implemented a "reign of terror" at Pine Ridge."
Butler and Robideau never claimed not to have fired on Williams and Coler; they
claimed instead that, under the circumstances the FBI itself had created on the
reservation, they were justified in doing so. On July 16, 1976 the jury agreed,
returning verdicts on "not guilty by reason of self-defense" upon both men."
Confronted by this unexpected defeat in court, the government was placed in
PRO -APERICAn INDIAN l'O‘E TtliT CADS tSOMR.S
HO IdIL0(111. FOR: Tke ADJANCt *ENT V Ark ()LEL-n4':5i HALT. Mtn
riAIN 'NG TIE WOINCED HNZE. SOUTH DAROTA. INCIMNT IN 1973.
SL DOG SOLD IE; AS, PPPROX I fATELY 2003 It: IUt R.. HAVE. ECE-ti TRAINING
tv —7 - ■
NORTH V.:ST TERRITORY" Ct,.131' FURTBZR L'EnCR1t.ED) 15. :-D Al 50 Al
HAVZ T ri1 TRAINIhr IN Tr7e: Cr ARIZONA.
24' EE--COG scLor.Rs ALLE flLY ATE tINOERC.31NG Ca.EPRILLA
AWING CXF-z:RIENCES (NOT_ irtiPTEER ClETE_R61W03.
TK-7. DOG SOLDIERS AR= TO ARRI11.

-AT TF.:E. YANKTON SIOUX
_---.Sr VATION. SOU TH D AI< Cri: C VA .5_?4-111.0 50TH DAKOTA) In ORt R TO
TT ND -11-1E TRADITIONAL SIOUX SUN DANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TATY
SIN DANM A.'4D 'UST: CCiYEf_'HG A TO OCCUR D1 TiE
SERVATION IN EARLY JUNI Cr ITU, AND THIS C3Jt; -DAVC AND
..NFER-E.NCE ARE. TO SERVE AS A

,". COVER TOR II-Z. IN7--1-UX OF DOG SOLDIEPS
SE CCND BIENNIAL INTERNATIoNAL 1IZUAN TR-2:ATY CONFIEINCE IS
;CIZ- CULED FOR YAT So I 976 • YANKTON.1.0.1.4"1-103) •
AT THE CONCLUSION OF "Ilit ACTIVITIES ON U SIOUX Pt SERVATIO-:.:
D.C. COG SOLDIERS AFB TO FEET ON .11NE 2S. 1976. OR 11. /-EDIATELY Tii:_
"14C-
;:iTrIl. AT 20 NORTH STrzET. RAPID CITY. SOUTH DAXCTA. Tyr.. FESICZN
OF RENEE HOwELL. AT THIS tEETING FINAL ASSI GNI:: NTS GIsIEN
10 71- DOG SOLDIERS FOR TARTS THROUGHOUT Tif: STATE ON FCURTH
JJLY kEEKEND• NTLY SOK: DOG SOLDIERS CROY THE 'N0R7HIEST
TERRITORY" ARE IN 71.r4.- STATE Di-SCJTH DAL:OTA WATCHING TF tOIZAENTS
EMPLOYEES AT TUBLIC FJILDINGS. TFIE DOG• SOLDIERS
ASSIC,NNENTS A TO M CARRIED CUT EZTREE- ii ..*JLY I AND ..SLY S. 1576.
ALLT:EzD TAR j5 ARE AS FCLLOVSt I. -ENE CHARLES FIX CO.INTY COURT
HE.` Lc..K.E t.,:U2 S. SC-4 TR DAW,DTA 4i.TE V LUI S ON THE MATING SYS-PE V.S
B3 /ILE R A 70 C I TCLUDING SArE TY VA.

'L / IN &ICH A i'AT
THAT TKE BOILER WILL BLOW UP. P. STATE CAPITO.4.• PIERRE. SOUTH
PANOTA• (NO FURTHER DE.TAIL). 3. FT. RANDALL DAP. . PICKSTOLN.

SaiTH t- OLILD HATS TU BIFZS ELO:.'N UP, SHORT CIRCUITING
" Cl
POUSR, .4. THE DOG SOLDIERS tZFr LI3ZE" TO ASSASSINATE
CD',ERNOR OF SOUTH DAKOTA- S. SNIPING G TOURIST.; ON I truts-rArt:

HIGHWAYS IN SOJTH DAKOTA. 6. TAKING ACTION TO 3T- PJF-IMORT..•
7 . TO 'EJRN PARPERS" AND SHOOTING ENIFI-ENT IN TEE VAGNER.
:a.' TM DAKOTA. AA• E. TO ASSAULT THE STATS PENITENTIARY Ili
SIOUX FALLS. SO1TH DAKOTA. TO ASSASSINATE AN IN ►Arf.• 9* TO ELOd
UP P-IFEF.'J OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (DIA 'fillILDINGS IN Tie. WAVER• SOUTH
DAKOTA. AF AI.
DOG SOLDIERS AFE ALLEGEDLY TO FE AR FED IITH r+165 AND
r`_5 1.i1 CH AFC. HI OM N I N FoRan-ne. s711111 DAKOTA, AAA, Os't
'O INDIc4 SERVATION.
SAM roLFS DA3P, AN ACTING M3I MEMEER. PINE. RIDGE, SOUTH DAKOTA,
=-- DL Y TRANSPORTS THE AE01E -.CAPONS FR03 MAN STREET
ONK10.4N) , NEERACA. TO THE RE SIDE NU; OF CHARLIE
PORCLIPV• SOUTH DAKOTA. .N0 IS I(`voLvE.D
TH' DDO SOLDIERS IS TIES SON Cr A UNITED STATES SENATOR, JAMS
SO'JIN DA_KOTAJ, •ADDITIONALLY. sar 301-.ES CAM? - A1.1-EL'-D1.Y
S A 194, 0 OLDStOSIL.C, FT-UR-DOOR. CLACK otizn BR-oli-1.4., S

AND REST:
VISTA, LIE V.7: D TO BE A SU g9 O f- AHA• B•ASKA).
S(..!..JR LEARNED THAT DYNArITE. VAS STOD AT TME HOPZ OF TONY
R. G:E=7INSiDOD, SCUTH DAKOTA, IN EPU7.. .3E:Rs 1975s AND DYNAPITE
ALSO. STCF€D AT IKE HOitE OF- -GEORY FRANCIS nPHIERs SR.. ALSO
AS GREG. WAGNER. ",;t3JTH DAKOTA,. IN FEERJAR:YI, 1975.
, ARD THAT VILELIRT

SCF.JRCE HAS PE pnws-T. ALSO KNOWN AS WILLIE,
- LL
:LE OF FtISSF M NS•"HIT Ft.fe" AND THAT b AM. LITTLE. JP. •
KNOWN AS ..7.13E LITTLE. 1.1i0 IS EXERT WITH EXPLOSIVES 13A-S ON=
ErER CF T DOG SOLDIERS 13:FTIC -119.1rat sr Rrar oPY"
GILGG rrIPHIER, 1.r.u.;,v_IR. SOUTH DAKOTA• IS LISTED AS TIE: DIrr-CTOR
AI lrr SCUM DAKOTA, ACCO/SVING TO JANICE STARK, CLEF?(.

;'.-ORPORATI ON R.-COROS• SOUTH DAMOTA CrETARY 07 STATZ a AS 07
10. 1975.
A 1..COND SCUP: A34.1 I .5 D THAT FalSfr:LL r ANS HOLDS HO NATIO ?•AL
1M In Ain }10V-.:(47.R, 1 IS ti:tirr.. R c;,-: AI;' C:.:NTRAL COYVITTtE• TH
;: C1 al -Pax it/ G BODY AI P.
Yam AtZRICAN INDIA,') HO :t t-ENT CAI P)in5 FG,R4 t4-"D IAPINtsZSOTA
1965• DEDICATED TO 14PROv1N5 caNDITIONs FOR A?EPICA.4
/am tr.!) PAPTICIPATE'D I14 CO,:-.-"RONTAtIesS tilTH LOCAL
THORI -TIES IN SCOTTSSLUF . H SRA5KA. !ND Tht RAPID CITY-CUS-rEP
AS SaITH DA:10TA. Afli T AK-- 0 V.: 1 AND DcajfATIOS OF
t:,ilso-F.D KNEE. SOUTH DA140TA. Iti nJARY - PAY. 1973■
something of a quandary as to what to do next. By July 20,1976, as is shown in the

accompanying teletype sent by ASAC Norman Zigrossi to Director Kelley and his
associate, Richard G. Held, the Bureau had begun to analyze "what went wrong"
during the Cedar Rapids prosecution. Zigrossi's conclusions - such as the defense
being "allowed freedom of questioning of witnesses" and the allowing of testimony
"concerning past activities of the FBI relating to COINTEL PRO [sic]" - had been
accepted by the Bureau leadership. As is evidenced in the accompanying August 10
memo from B.H. Cooke to Richard J. Gallagher, a meeting was convened between
Kelley and Held, along with FBI officials James B. Adams, Gallagher, John C.
Gordon, and Herbert H. Hawkins, Sr., on the one hand and U.S. Attorney Evan
Hultman, along with his director, William B. Gray, on the other. At the meeting, it
was decided to pursue Held's strategy of prosecuting only non-Oglalas by dropping
charges against Jimmy Eagle "so that the full prosecutive weight of the Federal
Government could be directed against Leonard Peltier."
The next step was to do a bit of shopping for a judge. Just as McManus was used
to replace Judge Fred Nichol after the latter reached conclusions unfavorable to the
prosecution during the Banks-Means trial of 1974, so too was McManus arbitrarily
replaced after allowing a semblance of due process during the first RESMUR trial.
He was replaced by Judge Paul Benson, a former AUSA from North Dakota and
Nixon appointee who had made considerable personal investment in Indian lands.
After a series of meetings conducted in Rapid City with ASAC Zigrossi and his FBI
colleagues, as well as prosecutor Hultman (defense attorneys were neither invited
nor informed) - ostensibly held, in contradiction of every tangible shred of evidence
concerning the organization's conduct during the many trials of its members, to
1 -.1111) ,I.,11'. (,■ ,, 1 1?,,:•11 :.;1' rTh

L - Mr c.•1 1.,1 - n
/ Id( iillo(1:i 1111I1 1 - rr. 1. Ad..•rr.
1 - lir. I). I,.'. 11, .iro
1. - M r . J. A. Mi.til,z
ro : Mt•. T. ti. I o.wil.t. rv,ir: 6/•V76
1 - Mr. R. .1. Gallac;her
---(,)2
1 - :'1r. .r. U. Le,vitt
IROM : J. C. D.,,e6anA 1. - Mr. V. V. Koloatuvic
I - Mr. F. A. T,-dyley I. -
1 - Mr. J.G. Deci;an
f rip,:r: '..)ISS';:iaNI.TION TWC-..',NfRAI. .

INf.:111CN:.F. AGI:.NGY (GIAY OF
I - Mr. J. Ti. !:trice
ei INVI'll)N COO,::i::G Tic:M 0.
if...VC.Lill..) IN CO:);NECTIO4 W1TIP
DDN'I.STIC OFNONSTEATION' ■ t, ..... I
. /1_...._)
<-7.a :
7 -; C.- ,- - -.
Porpos is to r,-,1-,m,1 to Director Kelley , ∎

asked in conneLtion in
ash;n:,;ton Star" cccernin the CBI. o?
tiOn to CIA en..:.onling a ecn ,h -,trotion the
ca,- ried pl.lcayds donouncing !!le FT1T and
1‘,
On 6/24-25/76, arLicicis ;n
5tar" (atthcd) thc. t
security ir]ror,--,:tion to Cl. A The antic],-s
to a I.,-1('Lypc 3/1Z176 (LULch•d) from our
Office 1- cp.Irtin.; on a c•:,mJnstration in Bowling GY,=,
prote,=tir,g tri.71 of t.11., 01;:la lour. This ".
th:t I& individuAs a.,pered in front of the irde:d
Bowlin,; Green, Kentucky, carrying placards duri:J=i.n,;„ the Ghl
aw! CI4 .7.7.,1 pretesting the trial of the "Ogli-Ila Four."
Directoi Kelley asked the follo.. - int, clu,Aions in coi.-iecLic,n
,v:Ith this disscHlintion: (1) Did 1,e d'sscr.inLt2? (2) To
'did C:s:.c:.;Inaii(:? (I) How (.1:1 we deu.111H.t_e? (4)
dise.lio.:Lion within the Guidelines? (5) lees
• ,:cot
typo .of infori:1.7,tion? 170.3n receiving thi aL
it vus dine, Onatr,d in ous nortaal course of business by relay
teletyoe to •Lhe DL,pr, rtment of lu7.tice, U. S. Secret L]ervice,
Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Direct 2r of. CIA. The
Enclm:ures
62-60/50
cy ✓
JCD:In j at
(i
2) ..2)1 ote —77
NOT
- OVE F:
Ile JUL 13 1576
lilly U.S. Sell b.W.i 130/A Rtgldlriy to i'!an

ai 1r:1076
Memo discussing sharing of RESMURS information with the CIA (continued

on next page).
disFJ.etoination was made to CIA on the basis of the fact that

tl , t i)•ency was being denounced during the course of the
clenstration reported on and this is in ar.._orda with t:he
Attorney (AC) ..;:tt,rs in that
we arc aathorized Lo collect_ and disoc.'jn ..,: zdjs to-)e of
infornation. In rr,::,pons^ to press ii)miri, ,s thc CIA, a
repreenl_ative el the CIA advised the presL,, LL.dt this
disse:nination should not have been made to CIA. Lcwevcr, it
is now developed that the CIA ropfesentatio.7, sit cLng this
statement to the press was un.ware at the tir, thH . the di--
se!oinated docu,,A:At contalned inor.natir; rearr, the
against the CIA- Linion Officer rsccrt-Ined the fi ...c.cter
of Security of CIA asked that the FBI meet him on r:)nd.ly,
6/28/76, for further discussions concerning 711tter.
For information. Results of conference with CIA on

6/?P/75, will h- furairMcd along ••th
concerning the t -Ind13.ng of matters described ahove.
APDROvr.D, 4 Ett. Aff,irs ... .., 1. , `, :...,•!:,,y.. .

Assoc Mr. 11. '1 I" eit. C. re,. i C,..51 r:(:, -).•;
Dep. AD A ■;r71 0.,, . Inv. , P., - L `_von ..
f', ,,,, D,p. AD Ipv..- • .11,.t. Rec. t.;;• nit
Asst. Mr.: 1 , . ,,,,- ;.., • ., .1..:. 5: , • ,,,..
AIM. 5.,I. V.. .. _... 111 1:;11.W.TIJR:11 ilainotc
develop security plans countering "expected AIM terrorism" - Benson staged a

pretrial hearing on January 14, 1977.174 During the proceeding, he announced the
trial of Leonard Peltier would be moved from its scheduled location in Cedar
Rapids, where AIM had developed strong support, to the far more conservative
Fargo, North Dakota. He also began a sequence of evidentiary rulings which
precluded Peltier's attorneys from developing the sort of self-defense case - center-
ing on the FBI's COINTELPRO operations against AIM and other dissident groups
- which had proven successful in the Butler-Robideau tria1.175
Meanwhile, the U.S. was engaged in fraudulently extraditing Peltier from
Canada. This was done on the basis of a single piece of substantive evidence, an
affidavit sworn to by an Oglala woman named Myrtle Poor Bear, who was suppos-
edly an eyewitness to the deaths of Williams and Coler. As it turned out, Poor Bear
had a history of deep psychological disorder, for which she had undergone exten-
sive treatment. This seems to have been a matter well known to FBI agents David
Price and William Wood when they essentially abducted her - she was charged
with, and apparently suspected of, no particular crime - and held her incommuni-
cado in motels in Gordon, Nebraska and Sturgis, South Dakota for approximately
one month.'" During this period, the agents prepared, and Poor Bear signed, not one
but three mutually contradictory affidavits concerning Peltier's "guilt" in the
RESMURS matter.177 In the documents (which accompany this text), Poor Bear
variously claimed to have witnessed and not to have witnessed the shootings, and
to have been a "girl friend" of Peltier, to whom he "confessed" his deeds. At more
or less the same time, Poor Bear was also signing affidavits prepared by Price and
COINTELPRO—MM 283
.P11,
.•lv
ne
Al
Der.:
Men S. rt. _
.1UL .' Ext.,AfMr,
1, 4
NROP5 RC PLAIN r. II Cr re Z:—.1---ee
7:28PM URGENT JULY 2P, 1976 BOW

TOs DIRECTOR, FBI
F CHICAGO
Tr:lievitz — e
FROM: ' ASAC, RAPID CITY (70—L0239) (P) Tulepile no Rot.
ATTENTION: GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION: GENERAL CRIMES

------iN T.
RESMuRS/ RE ANALYSIS OF ROBIDEAU AND BUTLER TRIAL.
__---
RE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL JULY L9, L976 REQUESTING
INFORMATION AS TO POSSIBLE REASONS WHY JURY FOUND DEFENDANTS
ROBIDEAU AND BUTLER NOT GUILTY ON JULY L6, L976.
IT IS FELT THAT SUFFICIENT TESTIMONY FOR CONVICTION
OF DEFENDANTS WAS PRESENTED TO THE JURY. FOR EXAMPLE,
AN EYE WITNESS, I/M NORMAN BROWN TESTIFIED THAT HE OB-
SERVED BOTH DEFENDANTS FIRING SHOULDER WEAPONS AT SA'S
WILLIAMS AND COLER. ANOTHER EYE WITNESS, I/M, WILFRED
DRAPER, OBSERVED ROBIDEAU LEAVE CRIME SCENE CARRYING
SHOTGUN WITH "FBI DENVER' ON STOCK AND ALSO PLACED WEAPONS
IN THE HANDS OF THE DEFENDANTS WHICH WERE LINKED TO HE
-11.-Cf-. ;
1-
CRIME SCENE THROUGH SHELL CASINGS LOCATED AT TN RIP,)E ''' i ---- --.C)1)
.----
SCENE. IN ADDITION, DRAPER TESTIFIED TO A CONVERSATION 2 2 JUL — ;:376
HE OVERHEARD BETWEEN PELTIER, ROBIDEAU AND BUTLER WHEREBY
PELTIER STATED HE MOVED THE AGENTS AROUND THE CAR SO THAT
tkif2 10 CO, L. -1--C-o
5-,.)
Lit4UP L 1
0767jo
r,
June 1976 teletype analyzing the recently concluded Cedar Rapids trial of Dino Butler and
Bob Robideau. The purpose of the document is to determine "what went wrong" with the
case against the first two RESMURS defendants, with an eye towards rigging the rules of
the upcoming Peltier trial in order to obtain a conviction (continued on next 3 pages).
ROBIDEAU AND BUTLER COULD FINISH THEM OFF.

A CELLMATE OF BUTLER'S TESTIFIED REGARDING DETAILED
ADMISSIONS BY BUTLER RE KILLINGS OF AGENTS.
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED LINKING DEFENDANTS
TO CRIME SCENE INCLUDING ROBIDEAU'S FINGERPRINT FOUND INSIDE
THE DOOR HANDLE OF WILLIAMS' CAR. ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY
REVEALED THAT COLER'S .30B CARBINE WAS FOUND IN
ROBIDEAU'S CAR AT.w1CHITA, KANSAS, WITH ONE OTHER
WEAPON LINKED TO THE CRIME SCENE.
THE ABOVE ARE ONLY SOME EXAMPLES OF KEY EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE TRIAL.
ACCORDING TO NEWS ACCOUNTS SETTING FORTH RESULTS
OF INTERVIEW OF CERTAIN JURORS, THE JURY APPARENTLY WANTED
THE GOVERNMENT TO SHOW THAT ROBIDEAU AND BUTLER ACTUALLY
PULLED THE TRIGGER AT CLOSE RANGE. EVIDENTLY, DRAPER'S
STATEMENT SET OUT ABOVE DID NOT ACCOMPLISH THIS.
SET FORTH BELOW ARE SOME OF THE REASONS POSSIBLY LEADING
TO ACouITTAL.
L. DURING COURSE OF TRIAL, THE COURT, APPLYING
...COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL", PROHIBITED GOVERNMENT FROM
ENTERING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN-KEY EXHIBITS; SIX CASINGS
FIRED FROM SA 'OLER'S REVOLVER, SIX CASINGS FIRED FROM
SA WILLIAMS' REVOLVER. THESE ITEMS LOCATED IN ONE-ROOM
CABIN WHERE DEFENDANT BUTLER WAS ARRESTED SEPTEMBER 5, L975.
IN ADDITION, pN M-L RIFLE LINKED TO CRIME SCENE BY SHELL
CASINGS, LOCATED IN SAME CABIN WHERE BUTLER WAS ARRESTED
WAS NOT ALLOWED TO BE CONNECTED WITH DEFENDANT BUTLER UNDER
THIS RULING. THE JUDGE'S RULING IN THIS MATTER
IS INCONSISTANT WITH PREVIOUS JUDICIAL RULINGS.
2. OVER STRONG OBJECTIONS BY GOVERNMENT, THE
DEFENSE WAS ALLOWED FREEDOM OF QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES
RAISING INNUENDO WITH IRRELEVANT, IMMATERIAL AND
HERESAY TESTIMONY.
COINTELPRO-AIM 285
3. THE COURT ALLOWED TESTIMONY CONCERNING PAST

ACTIVITIES OF THE FBI RELATING TO;THE COINTEL PRO AND SUB-
SEQUENTLY ALLOWED THE CHURCH REPORT INTO EVIDENCE.
4. THE COURT RULINGS RELATING TO BRADY AND
JENCKS MATERIAL FORCED THE GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH THE
DEFENSE WITH ALL FD-302'S PREPARED BY SPECIAL AGENTS
WHO TESTIFIED FOR THE' GOVERNmENT. THIS AGAIN
IS INCONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF THE JENCKS
RULE.
5. THE JUDGE RECESSED TRIAL FOR TEN DAYS FOLLOWING
PRESENTATION OF GOVERNMENTS CASE TO ATTEND A JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE. THIS ALLOWED THE DEFENSE ADDITIONAL TIME TO
REBUT GOVERNMENT'S CASE AND: CAUSED A GREATER TIME SPAN
FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENTATION TO TIME OF DELIBERATION
BY THE JURY.
6. THE COURT CONTINUALLY OVERRULED GOVERNMENT
OBJECTIONS AND ALLOWED IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE; FOR EXAMPLE,
INTRODUCTION OF SEVEN BuRE4 DOCUMENTS (SIX TELETYPES AND
ONE TERRORIST DIGEST) WHICH: WERE DISSEMINATED AT HEADQUARTERS
LEVEL TO OTHER LAW ENFoRcEr:ENT AGENCIES. AS A RESULT,
I-. -
tw
THE DEFENSE INFERRED THE FBII CREATED A CLIMATE OF FEAR ON
THE RESERVATION WHICH PRECIPITATED THE MURDERS. THE
DEFENSE, THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE DOCUMENTS,
•
ATTEMPTED TO REDUCE THE CREDIBILITY OF SPECIAL AGENT

TESTIMONY.
7. THE DEFENSE WAS UNCONTROLLED IN ITS DEALINGS WITH
THE NEWS MEDIA DUE TO LACK OF 'GAG" RULE, HOWEVER, THE
PROSECUTION WAS UNABLE TO COMMENT TO THE NEWS MEDIA.
B. THE JURY WAS NOT SEQUESTERED, THEREFORE, IT HAD
AVAILABLE NUMEROUS HEADLINES ADVERSE TO THE GOVERNMENT
AND THE RESULTS OF DAILY CONFERENCES WITH NEWS MEDIA
BY DEFENSE COUNSEL. DURING TRIAL NUMEROUS PRESS REPORTS
DETRIMENTAL TO THE FBI IN UNRELATED MATTERS APPEARED IN
LOCAL NEWSPAPER.
9. IT APPEARED THAT THE JURY HAD A DIFFICULT TIME
PUTTING THE CASE TOGETHER BECAUSE OF THE NUMEROUS SIDEBARS
WHICH DETRACTED FROM THE PRESENTATION AND FLOW OF THE
CASE TO THE JURY, NOTING THAT THIS CASE IS MOST COMPLI-
CATED.
ON JULY L7, L976, THE CEDAR RAPIDS "GAZETTE" CARRIED
A NEWS ARTICLE RECORDING THE RESULTS OF AN INTERVIEW WITH
JURY FOREMAN. THE FOREMAN IN THIS ARTICLE STATED IT WAS
THE CONCENSUS OF THE L2 INDIVIDUALS THAT THE GOVERNMENT
JUST DID NOT PRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF GUILT". HE
STATED THAT IN THE END ANALYSIS THOSE JURORS WHO ARGUED
FOR CONVICTION ADMITTED THAT REASONABLE DOUBT DID EXIST.
2
THE JuRY- FOREMAN STATED ALL AGREED THAT EXCESSIVE FORCE
ON JUNE 26, L975, BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT
VAS USED'
SHOW THAT EITHER OF THE DEFENDANTS DID IT. THE ARTICLE
FURTHER RELATED AND WHILE IT WAS SHOWN THAT THE DEFENDANTS
WERE FIRING GUNS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE AGENTS, IT WAS HELD
BY THE JURORS THAT THIS WAS NOT EXCESSIVE IN THE HEAT OF
PASSION. HE SAID AN IMPORTANT FACET WAS THE DEFENSE'S
CONTENTION THAT AN ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR AND VIOLENCE EXISTED
ON THE RESERVATION AND THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARGUABLY COULD
HAVE BEEN SHOOTING IN SELF-DEFENSE. THE AIDING AND ABETTING
THEORY WAS, IN THE END, DISMISSED BECAUSE THE JURORS WERE
NOT CONVINCED THE DEFENDANTS KNEW THE AGENTS WERE TO BE
KILLED, AND THEREFORE, ACCORDING TO THE LAW, COULD NOT BE
HELD RESPONSIBLE".
THIS NEWS ARTICLE, ALONG WITH OTHERS APPEARING IN THE
"GAZETTE" BEING FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU FOR ITS REVIEW.
IT IS NOTED THE DEFENSE UTILIZED DURING THIS TRIAL
THE SERVICES OF NINE ATTORNEYS, MANY OF WHICH WERE VASTLY
EXPERIENCED IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE.
CHICAGO BEING FURNISHED COPY FOR SAC INFORMATION.
%,-SITED -;(),,,RNNIF.Nr
Memorandum
• L Acs.
C. ■ AP 1\.
1 - Mr. Held
1 - Mr. Adams
TO : Mr. Gallejher DiTE: 8/10/76
1 - Mr. Gallagher
1 - Mr . O'Connell
rxom : B.I11. Cooke I - Mr. Cooke
1 - Mr. Gordon
1 - Mr. Hawkins
'_
SUBJECT RESMURS\- CONTEMPLATED 1 - Mr. Mintz
DISMISSAL OF PROSECUTION OF 1 - Mr. Leavitt
JAMES Tr ODDRE EAGLE;
CONTINUIi,G PROSECUTION OF
LEONARD PELTIER
E • To record the decision to dismiss prosecution of,

PUP°0S.
James Theodore Eagle and to vigorously prosecute Leonard Peltier
in the murders of SAS Jack R. Coler and Ronald A. Williams.
RECOMMENDATION: For information and record purposes.

APPI■O.W. C ■t. _
'
•
• I Ass! ID,: s:•,t ■Dn, .....
DETAILS: On 8/9/76, Director Clarence K,' 1:(Mey conferred with

U. S. Attorney (USA) Evan Hultman, Northern District of Iowa,
prosecutor in the Resmurs trials, who was accompanied by
William 8. Gray, Director, Executive CEfice for USAs. Present
at this conference were Associate Director Richard G. Held,
Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams, Assistar.t Director
Richard J. Gallagher, and Unit Chief John. C. Gordon and
SA Herbert H. Hawkins, Jr. of the General Crieea Unit.
Y 1 C.1la
USA Hultman stated that th e Rcsmues case n Ja...es a
Theodore Eagle was weak and he felt there was not sufficient
evidence to get it to the jury. The presecutive aspects of
this case ware fully discussed and all present concurred with
the Director and USA Hultman that this case be dismissed,- so------ -----
that the QUIliergaSIV:675TIV6.1.='gh=1:01.Lthee:E6Era-LCMra=lat
'Ccmlat4gr:. YEEM2ITSIlarni:t7innWHIFPerIT6Y. 22 3c. TG
On 8/9/76, Departmental Attorney Foger Cubbege Vas-- ---

advised of this decision, inasmuch as Mr. Cubbago wanted to know
the FBI's position prior to meeting with USA Hultman and
Departmental Attorney Alfred Hantman, Chief of the General Crimes
Section, on 8/10/76. Mr. Cubbage subsequently advised on 8/10/76
a eision has been made in the DoparlJne.,t to allow the USA
to disxiss the charges against James Theodore Eagle. 1 • '
").1
(10)
JCG:mer
•
.)
CONTINUED - OVER
Buy C.S. Si: ;055 Bonds Kt:c71,110. 511 the P,:).17,7 S.:: i ,:21
5(
\,\
/1"
.\
12
7 . I
1
• V‘
• t;-
August 1976 memo capsulizing the decision to drop RESMURS charges against Jimmy
Eagle in order to place "full prosecutive weight of the Federal Government" upon Leonard
Peltier It should be noted the FBI earlier alleged that Eagle had "confessed."
Affidavit
Myrtle Poor Bear, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states:
L I am an American Indian born February 20, 1952,
and reside at Allen, South Dakota, one of the United States
of America.
2. I first met Leonard Peltier in Bismarek, North Dakota,
during 197L During March, 1975, I again met Leonard
.Reltier at St. Francis, South Dakota, :United States of
America. During April, 1975, I went to North Dakota to
see bins as a girl friend of his. About the last west of May
during 1975 I and Leonard Peltier went to the Jumping
Bull Hell near Oglala, South Dakota, United States of Affidavit 1, in which SAs David
America. There were several houses and about four or free Price and William Wood have
tents. When Leonard Peltier arrived, he gave orders on Myrtle Poor Bear recounting how
what man to be done. I was his girl friend at this time.
About a week after we arrived, about the second week of it was she who overheard the plan-
June, 1975, Leonard Peltier and several others began ning of the Northwest AIM group
planning how to kill either Bureau of Indian Affairs to lure SAs Coler and Williams to
Department, United States Government police or Federal
Bureau of Investigation, United States Government, agents their deaths in an ambush. Note
who might come into the area. Leonard Peltier was mostly that there is no claim Poor Bear
in charge of the planning. All persons involved in the witnessed the firefight, but that she
planning had special assignments. There was also a de- heard Leonard Peltier order the
tailed escape route planned over the hills near the Jumping
Bull Sall area I was present during this planning. agents killed beforehand, and that
Leonard Peltier always had a rifle and usually had a he later "confessed to her."
pistol near him. The pistol was usually under a car seat.
About one day before the Special Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation were killed, Leonard Peltier said
be knew the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Bureau.
of Indian Affairs were coming to. serve an arrest warrant
on Jimmy Eagle. Leonard Peltier told people to get ready
to kill them and he told me to get my car filled with gas to
be ready for an escape. I left Jumping Bull Hall at this
point and did not return. During August, 1975, I met
Leonard Peltier again at (how ', Dog's Paradise on the
Rosebud Indian Reservation, South Dakota, United States
of America. We talked about the killing of the two Federal
Bureau of Investigation agents near Jumping Bull Hall.
Leonard said it makes him sick when he thinks about it
Be said that one of the agents surrendered, but be kept
shooting. Be said it was Me a.movir he was watching but
it was real, he was acting right in it. He said he lost his
mind and just started shooting. He said he shot them and
just kept palling the trigger and couldn't stop.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of
Fehmary, 1970.
Is/
Deputy Clerk
United Staten District Court
District of South Dakota
Myrtle Poor Bear

Alidenti
Myrtle Poor Bear, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states:
L I am an American Indian born February 20, 1952,
and reside at Allen, South Dakota, one of the United States
of America.
2. I first met Leonard Peltier in Bismarck, North Dakota,
during 1971. During March, 1975, I again met Leonard
Peltier at St. Francis, South Dakota, United States of
America. During April, 1975, I went to North Dakota to
see him as a girl friend of his. About the last week of May
during 1975 I and Leonard Peltier went to the Jumping
Affidavit 2, in which SAs Price and Bull Hall near Oglala, South Dakota, United States of
America. There were several houses and about four or five
Wood not only have Poor Bear, as tents. When Leonard Peltier arrived, he gave orders on
Peltier's "girl friend," overhear what was to be done. I was his girl friend at this time.
RESMURS planning, but witness About a week after we arrived, about the second week of
June, 1975, Leonard Peltier and several others began
Peltier killing both agents. Note planning how to kill either Bureau of Indian Affairs
details on escape route designed to Department, United States Government polies or Federal
explain away the Bureau's embar- Bureau of Investigation, United States Government, agents
rassing inability to apprehend sus- who might come into the area Leonard Peltier was mostly
in charge of the planning. All persons involved in the
pects at the scene of the firefight. planning had special assignments. There was also a de-
Also note how the method of kill- tailed escape route planned over the hills near the Jumping
ing corresponds to the FBI's con- Bull Hall area I was present during this phuneing.
Leonard Pettier always had a ride and usually bad a
trived "execution" scenario. pistol near him. The pistol was usually under a ear seat.
About one day before the Special Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation were lulled, Leonard Peltier said
he knew the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Bureau
of Indian Affairs were coming to serve an arrest warrant
on Jimmy Eagle. Leonard Peltier told people to get ready
to kill them and be told me to get my ear filled with gas to
be ready for an escape, which I did. I was present the day
the Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
were killed. I saw Leonard Peltier shoot the FBI agents.
During August, 1975, I met Leonard Peltier again at Crow
Dog's Paradise on the Rosebud Indian Reservation, South
Dakota, United States of America. We talked about the
killing of the two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents
near Jumping Hull Hall. Leonard said it makes him sick
when he thinks about it. He said that one of the agents
surrendered, but he kept shooting. He said it was Lie a
movie he was watching but it was real, he Was acting right
in it. He said he lost his mind and just started shooting.
He said he shot them and just kept pulling the trigger and
couldn't stop.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of
February, 1976.
Deputy Clerk
United States District Court
District of South Dakota
Myrtle Poor Bear

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

STATE OF S017TE DAKOTA
COUNT! OF TOMMOTON
la mix Mamas or Tim Erman:non Acr. RS.C. 1970 CEA?.

E-23 AND 121 THE MATTER Or LEONARD PELTED, ALSO
KNOWN AS LEONARD LITTLE SEIDL, LEONARD WILLIAMS,
Join: Yeu.ow Ross, Eawiw Yerzow Ross, Leos.=
JOHN PELTED
Affidavit
Myrtle Poor Bear, being first duly sworn, deposes and Affidavit 3, actually submitted to
states: the Canadian courts, in which the
1. That I am the Myrtle Poor Bear, of Allen, South agents totally abandon the notion
Dakota, United States of America, who was the deponent of Poor Bear's having overheard
in an affidavit sworn the 23rd day of February, 1976. This
affidavit is sworn by me to give further information. planning for an ambush. Instead
they have their victim provide
2. Attached hereto and marked Exhibit "A" to this, my
Affidavit, is a photograph marked February 12, 1976, and considerable additional detail as
T testify and depose that the person shown on the said an "eyewitness." Note also the ab-
photograph is a person known to me as Leonard Peltier sence of any alleged confession
and is the person I spoke of in my deposition of February on the part of Leonard Peltier.
23, 1976, and the person referred to herein as Leonard
Peltier.
3. I recall the events of June 26, 1975, which occurred
at the area of Jumping Bull Hall near Oglala on the Pine
Ridge Indian Reservation in the State of South Dakota,
United States of America..
4. Sometime during the early part of that day, at ap-
proximately 12:00 Noon, Leonard Peltier came into the
residence of Harry Jumping Bull which is located in the
area of Jumping Bull Hall and said, "They're corning."
I understood this to mean that police or agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation were in the immediate
area. A short time later, I saw a car which I recognized
to be a government car near Harry Jumping Bull's house.
I went down to the creek bottom a couple of hundred yards
from the house. I heard shooting. I left the creek bottom
area and walked approximately 50 yards to where I saw
two cars, both of which I recognized to be government
cars, because of the large radio entennaes mounted on the
rear of these cars and I had previously seen many cars of
a similar type driven by government agents in the same
area When I got to the car, Leonard Peltier was facing a
man which I believed to be a special agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. This man was tall with dark hair.
This man threw a handgun to the aide and said something
to the effect that he was surrendering. Leonard Peltier
was pointing s rifle in the direction of this man. The man
was holding his arm as if he was wounded and was leaning
against the car previously mentioned. There was another
man who I believed to be a special agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation lying face down on the pound
and there was blood underneath him. I started to leave and
was grabbed by the hair by another person and could not
COINTELPRO-AIM 291
Wood to the effect that she was get away. I turned again and saw Leonard Peltier shoot the
the girl friend of another AIM man wbo was standing against the ear. I heard a shot some
leader, Richard Marshall, to from the rifle that Leonard Peltier was holding and I saw
that rifle jump up still in his bands. I eaw that man's
whom he had confessed the body jump into the air and fall to the ground. The man fell
murder of an Oglala named face down on the ground. This happened in an instant I
Martin Montileaux. The Poor freed myself from the person that was holding me and ran
up to Leonard Peltier just as he was aiming his rifle at the "
Bear "information" was the deci- man who had just fallen to the ground. I pounded Leonard
sive factor in Marshall's first Peltier on the back. Ho yelled something at me which I
degree murder conviction and cannot recall. I turned, ran and left the area. As I was
running away, I heard several more shots from the area
receipt of a life sentence on April , from which I had just fled.
6, 1976.1" It was also the key
ingredient in Canadian Justice Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of
W.A. Schultz's determination March, 1976.
that Leonard Peltier should be /si
extradited to the U.S., reached on Deputy Clerk
United States District Court
June 18, 1976, and Minister of District of South Dakota
Justice Ron Basford's order that
/s/
the extradition be executed on Myrtle Poor Bear
December 16,1976.1"
Poor Bear later recanted all
"evidence" she'd offered - both by affidavit and through direct testimony - against
Peltier and Marshall, contending that she had been grossly coerced by the FBI into
providing false information (e.g.: she'd witnessed nothing, and knew neither man in
any way at all).1" Among the methods used to achieve these results, aside from her
virtual kidnapping by Price and Wood, appear to have been the use of morgue
photos of the body of AIM member Anna Mae Aquash, who had earlier reported
being threatened with death by Price unless she cooperated in the RESMURS
investigation?" Having been hustled back to South Dakota from Oregon by SA J.
Gary Adams on February 10, after being arrested in the Brando motor home, Aquash
had promptly disappeared. Her body - dead for several days -was discovered in a
ravine near the village of Wanblee by Oglala rancher Roger Amiotte on February 24,
1976. Price was among a number of lawmen who atypically gathered to view the
corpse in situ at this remote location, but claimed not to recognize the victim?" He
and his partner, William Wood, then followed the ambulance carrying the body all
the way to the Pine Ridge Hospital morgue (some 115 miles) where an autopsy was
performed by the faithful coroner, W.O. Brown. Brown pronounced death to have
been caused by "exposure," and ordered burial in a common grave at the nearby Red
Cloud Cemetery. Prior to burial, Wood caused "Jane Doe's" hands to be severed and
shipped - as is shown in the accompanying February 26, 1976 airtel from the
Minneapolis SAC to Kelley - to the FBI crime lab in Washington, D.C., for "identi-
fication purposes."183
The hands were identified as belonging to Anna Mae Pictou Aquash on March
3 (see accompanying Identification Division report, dated March 10, 1976) and the
2/26/76
DIRRCTOn, FBI 0,72.2.2. werma FIUCIIRPREIT SECTIMO

SAC, mrva•rous (70-117)
TX:CT: VSSUB; tr7:72o1222 VICTI”-DECCASED
VOTA:1 71:: ALL LOCA71) AT
WAT;1..77:, SO= DAW:A
2/24/76
- P1r4TUE MA:;SLUIGHTER
oo, 24=zwous
Re: - Ralid City nit,:.1 dated 2/26/76.
D:loped herewith is one pair of hands taken iron

.rub cirri of aut:noy on 2/25/76. Unsub located by
L.:7;lc..ra iii: %,:at.:VoiLity:g, 2/24/7G.
alimivary autopsy failed to deternino cause of danth,
7atholosisc determiner! unsul: to he Indian ferule,
-25 years of ago, 5'2" tall, weiphin7 110 pounds, havins
dersone sell blader sursery and childbirtL.
The Laboratory is reeuestod to conduct aTTroprinte
amination in an effort to obtain and identify fin,,erprints.
- Bureau
1 - Pacisa:.a
- ninneapolis
"Enclosed...one pair of hands." Airtel sent as cover with the box containing
Anna Mae Aquash's body parts to the FBI crime lab. It should be noted that
had the Bureau followed usual procedures in attempting identification by
dental x-ray, the bullet lodged in the victim's skull would havebeen revealed.
victim's family in Nova Scotia, suspecting foul play, requested that WKLDOC
attorney Bruce Ellison file for exhumation of the body and an independent autopsy.1"
This was conducted by Minneapolis pathologist Garry PeterSOn on March 11. In less
than five minutes, Peterson concluded that death was caused, not by exposure, but
by a lead slug "consistent with being of either .32 or .38 caliber" having been fired
point blank into the base of the skull 1°' In Rapid City, ASAC Zigrossi thereupon
announced a homicide investigation was being opened into the matter (it is
apparently still ongoing, nearly 14 years later).1" But by then, according to subse-
COINTELPRO-AIM 293
FEDERM BUREAU.,OF INVES. 3ATION

REPORT
"I I
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION
:111.V.M)
March 10, 1976
ILI. NO.
\'■ V. V. NO 3-26932
SAC, Minneapolis
1NSU3.;
- DECEASED
PEMALE =ATM AT
111437,,EC, SOUTH DAKOTA
3/26/76
SIR - POSSIBLE MANSLAUGUTZR
In AM, Airtel 2/26/76

ui 1;r1J1'1X11,1111%:
Minneapolis
One set of hands
This report eonfirms and su•?li•nehts Cctol of

/3/76. This report also confirms and supplements Ducal
n Rapid City, RA on 3/3/76.
See attached pace for result of comparison of

inger impresSion obtained from submitted hands with
inserprints of Annie Mae Aquash, FBI 0275229P1.
Specimens being returned under serusrate

over.
Lab report confirming positive identification of "Jane Doe,"

dead on Pine Ridge of alleged exposure, as Anna Mae Aquash,
who in reality had been shot, execution-style, in the back of the
head. Note return of "specimens" to Rapid City.
quent testimony, agents Price and Wood had already-long since - taken to showing
the morgue photos to Myrtle Poor Bear, identifying the "unidentified" corpse as
being that of Aquash, and explaining to their captive that she'd end up "the same
way" unless she did exactly what they wanted. Poor Bear quoted Wood as informing
her, in specific reference to Aquash, that "they [Price and Wood] could get away with
killing because they were agents."1°'
In any event, with Peltier illegally but securely in custody, and with the
defense's hands tied by Judge Benson's odd assortment of evidentiary rulings, the
FBI set about fabricating a "factual" basis upon which prosecutor Hultman could
obtain a conviction. First, Bureau ballistics experts "established" — on the basis of no
tangible evidence whatsoever — that Williams and Coler had been killed by shots
fired from a 223 caliber AR-15 rifle.1" A highly circumstantial case that an AR-15
had been fired into the agents at close range was made through introduction of a
single shell casing allegedly found in the trunk of Coler's car (which had been open
during the fighting),supposedly discovered, not during the FBI's initial examina-
tion of the car, but at some point well after the fact.189Then, the head of the Bureau's
Firearms and Tool Marks Unit, Evan Hedge, falsely cast the impression — the FBI
already having (and hiding) conclusive evidence to the contrary — that only one AR-
15 was used by the Indians during the Oglala firefight.19° From there, Hodge went
on to testify that he had been able to link the cartridge casing purportedly recovered
from Coler's trunk to a weapon used by the Northwest AIM group and found in Bob
Robideau's burned out car on the Kansas Turnpike. However, as is shown in the
accompanying October 2, 1975 teletype from Hodge to Clarence Kelley, these
ballistics tests had produced the exact opposite results.191But once the ballistics
chiefs assertions on the stand were accepted by the jury, it followed that whoever
among the Northwest AIM group could be shown to have carried an AR-15 during
the firefight would be viewed, ipso facto, as the "murderer."
Then came the pike de resistance. SA Fred Coward was put on the stand to testify
— as he had not been at Cedar Rapids — that in the midst of the firefight he had been
peering through a meager 2x7 rifle scope. At a distance of "approximately 800
meters" (about one-half mile), through severe atmospheric heat shimmers, he
claimed to have recognized Leonard Peltier, whom he admitted he had never seen
before that moment. Peltier, Coward claimed, was running away from the location
of the dead agents' cars — at an oblique angle to Coward's position, so that the
identification had necessarily to be made in profile — carrying an AR-15 rifle.192 With
that, AUSA Lynn Crooks, who at Cedar Rapids had vociferously contended that
Coler and Williams had died at the hands of a "gang of ruthless ambushers,"reversed
himself before the Fargo jury arguing that Peltier had been a "lone gunman":
Apparently Special Agent Williams was killed first. He was shot in the face and hand
by a bullet...probably begging for his life, and he was shot. The back of his head was
blown off by a high powered rifle...Leonard Peltier then turned, as the evidence
indicates, to Jack Coler lying on the ground helpless. He shoots him in the top of the
head. Apparently feeling he hadn't done a good enough job, he shoots him again
through the jaw, and his face explodes. No shell even comes out, just explodes. The
whole bottom of his chin is blown out by the force of the concussion. Blood splattered
against the side of the car.193
Under the weight of such cynical and deliberately sensational dosing argumen-
tation, unhampered by a number of exculpatory documents the FBI had secretly
withheld despite defense discovery motions, the jury found Peltier guilty on two
counts of first degree murder on April 18, 1977. Judge Benson then again did his part,
passing life sentences on each count, to run consecutively. Contrary to stated U.S.
Bureau of Prisons (BoP) policy — which held at the time that the facility was reserved
for "incorrigible" repeat offenders (Peltier had no prior convictions) and those who
have created major problems within other facilities of the federal prison system — the
defendant was taken directly to the super-maximum security federal prison at
Marion, Illinois.
An appeal of Peltier's conviction was immediately filed with the U.S. Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, based more-or-less equally on Judge Benson's evidentiary
rulings and documented FBI misconduct both in and out of court. The appeals case
was compelling, as is reflected in the observation of one of the judges on the three
member panel, Donald Ross, in connection with the Poor Bear affidavits:
But can't you see...that what happened, happened in such a way that it gives some
credence to the claim of the...Indian people that the United States is willing to resort
to any tactic in order to bring somebody back to the United States from Canada. And
if they are willing to do that, they must be willing to fabricate other evidence as well[emphasis
added].194
In the end, however, while noting serious problems with the FBI's handling of
"certain matters," and consequently expressing considerable "discomfort" with
their decision, the judges opted to allow the judgment against Peltier to stand on
February 14, 1978.195An explanation of this strange performance may perhaps be
found in the fact that shortly thereafter, William Webster — Chief Judge of the Eighth
Circuit Court, and initial chair of the panel which considered Peltier's appeal — left
the court for a new job: he had been named Director of the FBI, a matter of which he
was aware well before the Peltier decision was tendered.196On February 11, 1979, the
U.S. Supreme Court refused, without explanation, to review the lower court's
decision."'
In 1981, as a result of an FOIA suit filed by Peltier's attorneys, some 12,000 pages
of previously classified FBI documents relating to the Peltier case were released
(another 6,000-odd pages were withheld under the aegis of "national security" in
this purely domestic matter).1" Based upon precedents that the withholding of ex-
culpatory evidence — such as the accompanying October 2, 1975 ballistics teletype
— by the prosecution was grounds for retrial, an appeals team filed a motion in this
regard with Judge Paul Benson in April of 1982. Since certain documents obtained
through the FOIA also revealed what appear to have been improper pretrial
meetings between the prosecution, the FBI and Benson, the judge was simultane-
ously asked to remove himself from further involvement in the proceedings.199 This
was essentially pro forma; given his previous record in the Peltier case, few were
surprised when Benson rejected both of these motions on December 30, 1982.
A new appeal was then filed with the Eighth Circuit Court and, on April 4, 1984,
the appeals court reversed Benson's decision. Citing the apparent contradiction
PLALITEXT TELETYPE URGENT.

1-Mr. Cal
1-Mr. rin pi/
E.tHod00-4(40
TO SAC, RAPID CITY (70-10239)
COMMICATONS SECT1Elli
IRECTOR FBI (89-3229)
OCT 0 2.».
1907p e""
REFERENCE YOUR TELETYPE 9/12/75 AND LABORATORMPORTPE

PC :.0133 NM, 8/5/75.
THE .308 WINCHESTER CALIBER REMINGTON MODEL 760, CARBINE,
SERIAL NUMBER OBLITERATED, OBTAINED FROM SPECIAL AGENT MIKE
GAMMAGE, BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO.AND FIREARMS, (SATE) U.S.
MEASURY DEPARTMENT, WAS IDENTIFIED AS SWING FIRED .308
WINCHESTER CALIBER CARTRIDGE CASE, Q336 IN REFERENCED LABORATORY
REPORT, RECOVERED AT RESMURS SCENE FROM DENVER BUCAR.
TRAINING DIVISION, QUANTICO, ADVISES TEAT NO FIRED
SPECIMENS-FROM THE .308 WINCHESTER CALIBER REMINGTON, MODEL
760, CARBINE, SERIAL NUMBER 6967042 ON FILE.
EFFORTS CONTINUING AT REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY TO SUPPLY
BUREAU WITH SERIAL NUMBERS OF ALL MODEL 760 CARBINES •= .308
WINCHESTER CALIBER PRODUCED AND SHIPPED TO,CUSTOMERS FROM
itEC-61 E51_ j_
TO DECEMBER, 1969, IN ATTEMPT TO PROVE IDENTITY OF RE
CARBINE BY PROCESS OF ELIMINATION METHOD AS IT IS BELIEVED
MAJORITY OF TItENE WEAPONS WERE PRODUCED FOR AND RECEIVED DY .
TIME BUREAU.
izcovEnno%223 CALIEEB- CaT.RIFLE RECEIVED FROM SA
SATE, INS P 4 IT F RING I THAN THAT'IN RIFLE USED 37:.
ATTESMUKSJUUt
EXAMINATIO”S CONTINUING.
REPORT FOLLOWS.
This teletype, among the exculpatory documents withheld by the FBI during the trial of
Leonard Peltier, shows that Bureau ballistics tests conclusively determined that the rifle
attributed to the defendant had not fired the cartridge casing allegedly recovered from the
trunk of SA Coler's car. FBI fireams expert Evan Hodge testified to the opposite at trial.
COINTELPRO-AIM 297
FBI lab notes detailing firing pin test performed with the "Wichita AR-15," showing that
it did not match the crucial casing recovered at RESMURS scene. At trial, Evan Hodge
testified that the test was "inconclusive."
implied by the October 2, 1975 teletype, and the critical nature of the .223 casing to
the government's case, the court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the ballistics
evidence.2013The hearing was held in Paul Benson's regular courtroom in Bismarck,
North Dakota at the end of October 1984. There, a very nervous Evan Hodge
explained that the obvious conflict between his trial testimony and the documentary
record arose from a "misinterpretation."201Although Hodge steadily dug the hole
deeper and was eventually caught by William Kunstler committing what would for
"civilians" be described as outright perjury, Benson still allowed the distraught
agent to resume the stand and retract his testimony.202The judge then ruled that
Peltier's conviction would stand.
This decision was anticipated, and the appeals team went straight back to the
Eighth Circuit Court. In oral arguments heard before the court on October 15,1985,
prosecutor Lynn Crooks was forced to abandon his flamboyant assertions - made
at trial - that Peltier was a "cold blooded murderer." Instead, as Crooks now
admitted, the government "[didn't] really know who shot those agents."2"Thus, he
was willing to concede that the murder case conjured up against the defendant by
the FBI no longer really existed. Peltier, the prosecutor now lamely contended -
again in stark contrast to his trial presentations - wasn't even in prison for murder,
but rather for aiding and abetting in two murders 204Faced with official contradic-
tions of this magnitude, the appeals court deliberated for nearly a year, finally
handing down a decision on September 11, 1986. Although they rejected Crooks'
argument concerning aiding and abetting - noting that Peltier had plainly been
convicted of performing the murders himself - while detailing how the evidentiary
basis for such a conviction had been eroded, probably beyond hope of repair, they
still allowed the conviction to stand. Their collective motivation in reaching this
untenable conclusion was put straightforwardly in one brief passage of their
opinion:
There are only two alternatives...to the government's contention that the .223 casing
was ejected into the trunk of Coler's car when the Wichita AR-15 was fired at the
agents. One alternative is that the .223 casing was planted in the trunk of Coler's car
either before its discovery by the investigating agents or by the agents who reported
its discovery. The other alternative is that a non-matching casing was originally
found in the trunk and sent to the FBI laboratory, only to be replaced by a matching
casing when the importance of a match to the Wichita AR-15 became evident...We
recognize that there is evidence in this record of improper conduct on the part of some FBI
agents, but we are reluctant to impute even further improprieties to them [emphasis
added) 205
Thus, the appellate court left Peltier in the midst of a double-life sentence for
"crimes" both it and the trial prosecutor acknowledged had never been proven
rather than delve more deeply into the illegal FBI activities attending his case. The
defense immediately petitioned for reconsideration by the full Eighth Circuit Court
rather than the three member panel - composed of Judges Gerald Heaney, Donald
Ross and John Gibson - which had rendered the decision.2" The en bane hearing was
denied several months later, a development which left the appeals team with no
alternative but to once again petition the Supreme Court."' On October 5, 1987, the
high court refused, for the second time and again without explanation, to review the
case of Leonard Peltier?" Judge Heaney later described the decision as the most
difficult of his legal career because, in his view, "the FBI was at least as responsible
for what happened as Leonard Peltier."2" The judge failed to explain why, if this is
the case, only Peltier is sitting in prison - without legal recourse - while the FBI
agents involved have been allowed to simply go on about their business.
COINTELPRO-AIM 299
Implications of COINTELPRO—AIM
In many ways, the stark unwillingness of the federal government to accord
Leonard Peltier even a modicum of elementary justice is symbolic of the entire AIM
experience during the 1970s and, more broadly posed, of the U.S. relationship to
American Indians since the first moment of the republic. The message embedded,
not only in Peltier's imprisonment, but in the scores of murders, hundreds of
shootings and beatings, endless show trials and all the rest of the systematic
terrorization marking the FBI's anti-AIM campaign on Pine Ridge, was that the
Bureau could and would make it cost-prohibitive for Indians to seriously challenge
the lot assigned them by policy-makers and economic planners in Washington, D.C.
The internal colonization of Native America is intended to be absolute and un-
equivocal.
Thus it was that AIM, arguably the most hopeful vehicle for some meaningful
degree of indigenous pride and self-determination in the U.S. during the late 20th
century was destroyed as a viable national political organization. In the end, as
Dennis Banks has observed:
The FBI's tactics eventually proved successful in a peculiar sort of way. It's
remarkable under the circumstances - and a real testament to the inner strength of
the traditional Oglalas -that the feds were never really able to divide them from us,
to have the traditionals denouncing us and working against us. But, in the end, the
sort of pressure the FBI put on people on the reservation, particularly the old people,
it just wore 'em down. A kind of fatigue set in. With the firefight at Oglala, and all
the things that happened after that, it was easy to see we weren't going to win by
direct confrontation. So the traditionals asked us to disengage, to try and take some
of the heaviest pressure off. And, out of respect, we had no choice but to honor those
wishes. And that was the end of AIM, at least in the way it had been known up till
then. The resistance is still there, of course, and the struggle goes on, but the
movement itself kind of disappeared 210
At another level, the nature of the FBI's assault against AIM during the mid-
1970s demonstrated the willingness and ability of the Bureau to continue COIN-
TELPRO-style operations even at the moment such methods were being roundly
condemned by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, and FBI
officials at the highest levels were solemnly swearing before congress that all such
"techniques" had been abandoned, long since. Indeed, as has been shown in this
chapter, there is ample evidence that - at least in terms of sheer intensity and lethal
results - the counterintelligence program directed at AIM represented a marked
escalation over what had been done when such things had been designated by the
formal COINTELPRO acronym. As Russell Means has put it, "COINTELPRO is
COINTELPRO, no matter what they choose to call it."211
Further, getting away with COINTELPRO-AIM at the precise instant it was
supposedly being chastised and "reformed" due to earlier COINTELPRO "ex-
The government's right to continue full

triveetigation of AIM and certain affiliated organization'e
isei.treate relevant danger to a few citizen's privacy and
ft* expression. but this'danger must be weighed against
society's right to protect itself against current domestic
-threats:
The Supreme Court has observed that "unless the

government safeguards its own capacity to function and
to preserve the security of its people, society itself
could become so disorderly that all rights and liberties
would be endangered." United States v. United States
District Court,407 U. S. 297,-3E2 (1972).
2. Scope of Investigation
Investigative Techniques
Thikey to the successful investigation of
AIM is substantial, live, quality informant coverage of
its leaders and activities. In the past, this technique
proved to be hi hlt,effective.777777,7777177^Z .
result of certain disclosures regarding informants, AIM
leaders have dispersed, have be come extremely security
conscious and literally suspect everyone. This paranoia
works both for and against the mpvement and recent events
support this observation. 77777-
When necesiary, coverage is supplemented by
certain techniques which would be sanctioned in preliminary
and limited investigations.
Physical surveillance is another useful

technique and should be utilized when deemed appropriate.•
L
,& mail covers or electronic surveillance have /
fiTVestigate AIM and noTle173 anticipated at /
this time. r77 1- 777TI
The logic of COINTELPRO, as evidenced in this excerpt from a 1976

document concerning the basis for an "investigation" of AIM and its
supporters. Note the mention of the deliberate fostering of "paranoia"
among AIM leaders through the use of informers, and insistence on the
right of government to suppress dissent outweighs the rights of citizens to
"privacy and free expression" (continued on next 2 pages).
cesses" appears to have inculcated within the Bureau hierarchy a truly overweening
sense of arrogance.212They were quite prepared to openly defend the rationale of
COINTELPRO, even while pretending to disavow it, a matter readily evidenced in
the accompanying excerpt from the FBI's June 1976 "Predication for Investigation
of Members and Supporters of AIM," a position paper drafted by Richard G. Held
and delineating the thinking underlying what was being done to the organization.The
right of the government to "defend itself' from dissent, in this official Bureau view,
clearly outweighs the rights of citizens to "privacy and free expression."
In 1953, just prior to the passage of PL-280, Felix Cohen, one of the foremost
scholars of Indian law compared the role of the Indians in America to that of the Jews
COINTELPRO-AIM 301
Review of existing publications dealing with

AIM is, of course, a useful investigative tool.
It is noted, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, at the conclusion of its recent investigation
concerning United States Intelligence agencies, recommended
among other restraints, that court orders would be
required for almost all "intrusive techniques including
wiretaps, electronic bugs, mail covers, and etc., but not
secret informants." Interestingly, the committee found
that electronic surveillance had been used in only
about 5% of all domestic investigationi; whereas informanteL
have played a role in 80%.
Dissemination
Reports are disseminated when anorooriete, to

in rested agencies, including the Ttpartment of Justice,
Secret Service, DIA, and Military Intelligence. In
of foreign travel by AIM leaders and interest in AIM
abroad, periodic reports from and to foreign agencies,
for information relative to above activities, as well as
an interchange of information between the FBI and the CIA,
is necessitated.
Due to the AIM's violence potential, which is
frequently directed toward local and state governments
and police officers, timely dissemination of specific
intelligence information affecting their agencies, is
of utmost importance.
Repo rt lini
Reports concerning AIM will continue to be
submitted semi-annually. Initial reports on leaders and
members are evaluated to determine the need for future
investigation and thereafter additional reports will be
submitted annually or to meet dissemination requirements.
Teeming AIM is cagaged in activition which
involve, the one of force or violence and the violation
of Federal laws, it in rocounendod a full investigation
be conducted of the movement and its national leaders.
Full investigation of local AIMS chapters its leaders,
and monbero, ohould be rocornended on no individual Main
shore information in coniirmed after conducting a proliuinarn
or limited investigetion that the chapter or individual
member in engaged in activiti•.e an not forth obovo.
If above rocormendation in approved, additional
investigation of individuala should ha initiated based
on allegations of involvement with thin organization and
involvement in activities indicating the ponsiblo nee 32
Force or violence and the violation of Federal laws. Teo
purpose of such an investigation should be to fully
identify the individual and determine the nature and eztena
of his activities'. This investigation uould normally be
completed at the preliminary level, unlesa it is doterninod
that the individual is in a position of leadership.
Any full investigation involves a degroo of
priiacp invasion and that of a person's right to free
expression. Informant coverage in the leant intrusive
investigative technique capable of producing the desired
results. Thus. because of epecific factors surrounding
this case, it in recomuendod that a lull investigation

be conducted.
It is necessary that the federal government
do what is reasonable to protect itself. Many Americans
tend tO overlook the fact that the United States has
constitutionally guaranteed rights which are just as
inviolate as those of the individual. To accept at face
Value, an AIM argument, that it is being set upon by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FBI, and Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), as part of a government conspiracy
to destroy the movement, and as a result, back off, would
result in the eventual abdication of this governmental
responsibility.
The government's right to investigate such
groups should be recognized'and maintained.
The highest court in this country has ruled on
'numerous occasions that the United States has the right
and duty to protect iseif from anarchy and safeguard
itself from violence.
The Supreme Court has also stated, "We recognize.
that domestic security surveillance may involve 'different
policy and practical considerations from the surveillance
of an 'ordinary crime.' The gathering of security intelligence
is often long -- range and involves the interrelation of
various sources and types of information.
The exact targets of such surveillance may be
sore difficult to identify than in surveillance operations
against many types of crimes in Title III. Often, too,
the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on
the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement
of the government's preparedness of some possible future
crises or emergencies. Thus, the focus of domestic
surveillance, may be less precise than that directed
against more conventional types of crime." United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 312 (1972).
The outcome of future AIM agitation is unclear,
particularly in light of the possibility of two of its
main leaders being temporarily removed from society and
sent to prison in the near future. Although a number
of AIM lieutenants are "waiting in the wings," they
appear to lack charisma and backing the original leaders
enjoy.
in modem Germany. He noted that, "Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the
shift from fresh air to poison air in our political atmosphere...our treatment of
Indians, even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall
of our democratic faith."213Given that all that happened on and around Pine Ridge
occurred long after COINTELPRO allegedly became no more than a "regrettable
historical anomaly,"214Cohen's insight holds particular significance for all Ameri-
cans. In essence, if we may ascertain that COINTELPRO remained alive and well
years after it was supposed to have died, we may assume it lives on today. And that,
to be sure, is a danger to the lives and liberties of everyone.
Conclusion
COINTELPRO Lives On
I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just.
- Thomas Jefferson -
According to the official histories, COINTELPRO existed from late 1956 through
mid-1971. During this period, the FBI admits to having engaged in a total of 2,218
separate COINTELPRO actions, many of them coupled directly with other sorts of
systematic illegality such as the deployment of warrantless phone taps (a total of
2,305 admitted) and bugs (697 admitted) against domestic political targets, and
receipt of correspondence secretly intercepted by the CIA (57,846 separate instances
admitted). The chart on the following page illustrates the sweep of such activities
during the COINTELPRO era proper.'
This however, is dramatically insufficient to afford an accurate impression of
the scope, scale and duration of the Bureau's domestic counterinsurgency function.
None of the FBI's vast proliferation of politically repressive operations conducted
between 1918 and 1956, covered to some extent in the preceding chapters, are
included in the figures. Similarly, it will be noted that certain years within the formal
COINTELPRO period itself have been left unreported. Further, it should be noted
that none of the Bureau's host of counterintelligence operations against the Puerto
Rican independentistas during the years supposedly covered were included in the
count. The same can be said with regard to COINTELPRO aimed at the Chicano
movement from at least as early as 1967. 2
Even in areas, such as its campaign against the Black Panther Party, where the
FBI disclosed relatively large segments of its COINTELPRO profile, the record was
left far from complete. During the various congressional committee investigations,
the Bureau carefully hid the facts of its involvement in the 1969 Hampton-Clark
assassinations? Simultaneously, it was covering up its criminal withholding of
exculpatory evidence in the murder trial of LA Panther leader Geronimo Pratt?
Recently, it has also come to light that the FBI denied information to congress
concerning entirely similar withholding of exculpatory evidence in the murder trial
of New York Panther leader Richard Dhoruba Moore.5How many comparable
coverups are at issue with regard to the anti-Panther COINTELPRO alone remains
a mystery. Given the Bureau's track record, on this score, however, it is abundantly
clear that much of the worst of the FBI's performance against the Panthers remains
"off record."
303
Admitted FBI Illegalities During the COINTELPRO Era
Year COINTELPROs Taps Bugs Mail Openings
1956 N/A N/A N/A N/A

1957 35 N/A N/A N/A
1958 51 N/A N/A 666
1959 65 N/A N/A 1964
1960 115 114 74 2342
1961 184 140 85 3520
1962 147 198 100 3017
1963 128 244 83 4167
1964 230 260 106 5396
1965 220 233 67 4503
1966 240 174 10 5984
1967 180 113 0 5863
1968 123 82 9 5322
1969 280 123 14 5384
1970 180 102 19 4975
1971 40 101 16 2701
1972 N/A 108 32 1400
1973 N/A 123 40 642
1974 N/A 190 42 N/A
Then there is the matter of the Bureau's continuation of domestic political

counterintelligence operations after 1971 despite well-publicized governmental
claims that the program ceased, and the FBI's abandonment of the acronym COIN-
TELPRO itself. One indication of this is revealed in the accompanying chart. During
the three years (1972-74) following the point at which COINTELPRO was suppos-
edly terminated, the frequency with which the Bureau engaged in warrantless
bugging and wiretapping increased dramatically (bugging from 16 instances in 1971
to 42 in 1974; wiretaps from 101 instances in 1971 to 190 in 1974). The relationship
between these ELSUR activities and the fact that the FBI maintained an ongoing in-
volvement in de facto COINTELPRO is brought out clearly in the accompanying July
29,1975 teletype from Director Clarence Kelley to all SACs inquiring as to the pro-
portion of "warrantless electronic surveillance" then being devoted to "counterin-
telligence purposes" associated with "domestic security investigations."'
The reality of COINTELPRO's continuation was masked not only behind the
dropping of the descriptive title, but a retooling of the terminology utilized to define
its targets as well. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Bureau typically followed
the McCarthyesque practice of defining those subject to "neutralization" as being
Conclusion 305
N. P.,f:alia)an
1 - Hr. J. B.'Adems
COD; TELETYPE NITEL
1 - Each Assistant Director
TO AIX SACS JULY 29, 1975
• ALL
A LEGATS
- Mr. A. B. Fulton
FRO:? DIRECTOR, F111 • PERSONAL ATTE::TION•
Pak in
11111:40t
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, NOTING THE 1,1111r45111:
$" jJARRATITLE$.4' E LECTRONIC'-ssityk;wriaff, FOREIGN
ir
INTELLIGENCE, INCLUDING TELLIGE PURPOS REQUESTED
....TERIN
Ult
A REVIEW OF ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE OR CAN BE CONDUCTED
BY THE BUREAU INVOLVING NONCONSENSUAL, WARRANTLESS INTRUSION
UPON 'MEAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY; NONELECTP.ONIC EAVESDROPPING
UPON ',CONVERSATIONS THOUGH •BY THE PARTICIPANTS TO BE PRIVATE;
INTERCEPTION OR OTHER RECEIPT NOT AUTHORIZED BY VIE SENDER
OR RMCEIVER OF THE CONTENTS OF WIRE, RADIO OR WRITTEN
COMMUNICATIONS; AND ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES, WHETHER OR NOT
INVOLVING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OR PHYSICAL INTRUSION, THAT
MIGHT BE CALLED INTO QUESTION OR SHOULD BE REVIEWED.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL REQUESTED A DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPES
OF SUCH ACTIVITIES NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY THE BUREAU, AND ALSO
ANY ADDITIONAL TYPES wuicii TEE BUREAU CONSIDERS ITSELF
AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT. IN ADDITION, A REPORT Ott ANY SUCH
PAST ACTIVITIES WAS ALSO REQUESTED:BY THE ATTORNEY ccuErim,.
EiVASS YOUR pERsopEkyoR AIIY SLCII2ITPES:517 ACTIVITI
PCONDUCTED Xii YOUR orricif AND NOTE WHETHER. usED ill ORGANIZED
Ti • •
CRIME, GENERAL cram:um, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, OR
directly linking warrantless ELSURs with counterintelligence and domestic

security operations, four years after COINTELPRO had supposedly been terminated.
"subversives." By the second half of the latter decade, however, such vernacular was
archaic and discredited. Hence, COINTELPRO specialists shifted to habitual use of
the phrase "political extremist" in defining their quarry; the organizations and
individuals focused upon during this peak period of COINTELPRO might also be
described as "violent" or "violence prone," but they were acknowledged as being
politically so nonetheless.
After 1971, with the FBI increasingly exposed before the public as having con-
ducted itself as an outright political police, the Bureau sought to revise its image,
ultimately promising never to engage in COINTELPRO-type activities again. In this
context, it became urgently necessary - if counterintelligence operations were to
continue - for any hint of overt orientation to subjects' politics to be driven from
agents' vocabularies, preferably in favor of a term which would "inspire public
support and confidence" in the Bureau's covert political mission. This pertained as
much to internal documents as to public pronouncements, insofar as the possibility
of FOIA disclosure of the former was emerging as a significant "menace."
The Advent of "Terrorism"

r-
This was accomplished in the immediate aftermath of COINTELPRO's alleged
demise, as is shown in the accompanying April 12, 1972 Airtel from Director L.
Patrick Gray to the SAC, Albany. The word selected was "terrorist," applied here to
members of the Black Panther Party cum Black Liberation Army who had only
months earlier still been designated as "agitators" and "key extremists."' Such a
word-choice allowed the deployment of a raft of associated terms such as "guerril-
las" and - in the case of the American Indian Movement - "insurgents." The public,
which experience had shown would balk at the idea of the FBI acting to curtail
political diversity as such, could be counted on to rally to the notion that the Bureau
was now acting only to protect them against "terror." Thus, the Bureau secured a
terminological license by which to pursue precisely the same goals, objectives and
tactics attending COINTELPRO, but in an even more vicious, concerted and
sophisticated fashion.
The results of such linguistic subterfuge were, as was noted in the introduction
to this book, readily evidenced during the 1980s when it was revealed that the FBI
had employed the rubric of a "terrorist investigation" to rationalize the undertaking
of a multi-year "probe" of the nonviolent CISPES organization - extended to
encompass at least 215 other groups, including Clergy and Laity Concerned, the
Maryknoll Sisters, Amnesty International, the Chicago Interreligious Task Force,
the U.S. Catholic Conference, and the Virginia Education Association - opposed to
U.S. policy in Central America .° Needless to say, the CISPES operation was attended
by systematic resort to such time-honored COINTELPRO tactics as the use of
infiltrators/provocateurs,9disinformation," black bag jobs," telephone intercepts,"
conspicuous surveillance (to make targets believe "there's an agent behind every
mail box")," and so on.
Conclusion 307
0-n gin,. 6 , c,711
Transmit in Via
(1'”,e in prom err or code) .
To: SAG, Albany

Director, FBI
URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE Att11,1ForcnIam CONTA ku. .
EXTREMIST MATTERS . HEREIN IS WICLK;SIFIED o-:
DATE I-15.,- CO_13Y5P-3 1)/3ku-I .
' ' As terrorist acts increase across this country, a pressing
need exits for careful analysis of and penetrative investigative :
efforts concerning matters relating to urban guerrilla activity. ' •
F. We must be in a position to recognize urban guerrilla acts so that
appropriate measures can be taken to identify and control these
terrorists wherever they may appear. ": -:,.:.:.- • "'
Representatives of all field Offices at the recently
concluded Seat of Government conferences concerning attacks on laii.
enforcement officers an' related urban crimes agreed that there is
an urgent need for the .losest possible coordination of investiga-
tions involving urban guerrilla activity between personnel handling
criminal and extremist matters. This need exists in view of the
widespread criminal activity involving extremist individuals and
groups. Close coordination of our efforts is necessary to control
these terrorists. . . . ..' ' ,:-:'
Responsibility for coordination of these matters in each
Y ield office is being placed hereby on the desk of the field super.
visor handling extremist, matters investigations. Such coordination
will involve analysis of pertinent data received from the Bureau
and other field offices so that your officewill be in a position
to recognize indicators o-f ur'W.iguerrilla activity occurring
within your division and to insure that full investigative attention
is being given to these matters. Careful evaluation of the potential
for urban guerrilla activity within your division to mandatbry so
that any weaknesses in our coverage can be corrected. Further, it
will be necessary that close liaison exists with local law enforcement,
officers so that incidents involving possible urban guerrilla activity
are immediately biought to our attention.
.
1 -- You should give special attention to this matter so as to
insure that every effort is being made to effectively identify, .. •
investigate, and control urban guerrilla terrorists in this country.
Early Airtel applying the term "terrorist" to those previously described

as "activists," "radicals," "agitators" or "political extremists."
The same veneer of "counter-terrorism" has also been applied to operations

conducted against the devoutly pacifist Silo Plowshares organization - committed
to anti-nuclearism/anti-militarism - a situation so ludicrous as to provoke COIN-
TELPRO veteran John Ryan to refuse to participate. Ryan, who had two commen-
dations to his credit during a 21-year career, and who was less than two years short
of retirement at the time, was fired as a result of his stand." Meanwhile, Plowshares
"terrorists" such as Katya Komisaruk, Jerry Ebner, Helen Woodson, Lin Romano,
Joe Gump, Ann and Jim Albertini, George Ostensen, Richard Miller and Father Carl
Kabat were being ushered into long prison sentences for such things as "conspiring"
to trespass at U.S. nuclear facilities."
Even in instances involvi g actual armed struggle on the part of liberation

movements - leaving aside e probability that earlier applications of COIN-
TELPRO tactics had done mu to convince adherents that no other route to effect
positive social change lay o •- to them - the Bureau had been duplicitous in its
approach. One need only ex ne the case of Assata Shakur (s/n: Joanne Chesi-
mard) to get the picture. Publi ly and sensationally accused by the FBI of being the
"revolutionary mother hen" • f a BLA cell conducting a "series of cold-blooded
murders of New York City • lice officers," Shakur was made the subject of a
nationwide manhunt in 1972 On May 2, 1973, she, BLA founder Zayd Malik
Shakur (her brother-in-law) a d Sundiata Acoli (s/n: Clark Squire) were subjected
to one of the random harass nt stops of blacks on the New Jersey Turnpike for
which the Jersey state troope are so deservedly notorious. Apparently realizing
who it was they'd pulled over, e two troopers-Werner Foerster and James Harper
- opened fire, wounding Assa Shakur immediately. In the fight which followed,
both Zayd Shakur and troope Foerster were killed, trooper Harper and Sundiata
Acoli wounded. Both survivi BLA members were captured."
Assata was, however, cha ged with none of the killings which had ostensibly
earned her such celebrated s tus as a "terrorist." Instead, the government con-
tended she had participated i bank robberies, and the state of New York accused
her of involvement in the kil ing of a heroin dealer in Brooklyn and the failed
ambush of two cops in Quee on January 23, 1973." She was acquitted of every
single charge in a series of trial lasting into 1977. Meanwhile, she was held without
bond, in isolation and in espe ally miserable local jail facilities." Finally, having
exhausted all other possibilitie of obtaining a conviction, the authorities took her to
trial in New Jersey in the deat of trooper Foerster. Despite the fact that Sundiata
Acoli had long-since been con icted of having fired the fatal bullets - and medical
testimony indicating her wou •s had incapacitated her prior to the firefight itself -
Assata Shakur was convicted f first degree murder by an all-white jury on March
25, 1977. She was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The travesty imbedded i all this was unmistakable, and Shakur's circum-
stances remained the topic of uch discussion and debate. This became all the more
true on the night of Novem r 2, 1979, when a combat unit of the BLA set the
prisoner free from the maxim m security building of the Clinton Women's Prison
in New Jersey." It is instructiv that this organization of what the police and the FBI
were busily portraying as "ma • dog killers" appear to have gone considerably out
of their way to insure that no o including the guards, was hurt during the prison
break. For her part, Assata S akur - now hyped by the Bureau as "the nation's
number one terrorist fugitive" despite the state's failure to link her to any concrete
"act of terrorism"" - was quie ly provided sanctuary in Cuba where she remains
today.
Meanwhile, the FBI was u lizing the spectacle of the BLA cases - in combina-
tion, it claimed, with threats cr • ted by the Puertorriqueno FALN and two right-wing
clandestine groups, the Cuba exile Omega 7 and the "Serbo-Croatian Liberation
Conclusion 309
Front"22- as a rationale to establish the sort of instrument of political repression

which had been only embryonic during the COINTELPRO era proper. What
emerged in 1980 was a formal amalgamation of FBI COINTELPRO specialists and
New York City red squad detectives known as the Joint Terrorist Task Force (J110,
consolidating the more ad hoc models of such an apparatus which had materialized
in cities like Chicago and Los Angeles during the late '60s.23
In many ways, the J and the way it has been able to project the image of
organizations and individuals engaged in armed struggle, has been the defining
characteristic of domestic political repression during the 1980s. We will examine
three cases which demonstrate this point.
The Revolutionary Armed Task Force
The Revolutionary Armed Task Force (RATF) evolved from a multi-organiza-

tional community service project in the South Bronx known as the Lincoln Detox
Center, dedicated to combatting the plague of heroin addiction afflicting black inner
cities during the mid-70s. Nominally headed by an acupuncturist and RNA member
named Mutulu Shakur (s/n: Jeral Wayne Williams), Lincoln Detox proved highly
successful in applying the cures to heroin addiction pioneered by Malcolm X during
the early '60s. Working from an increasing base of activists and ex-addicts, it
pursued the Black Panther Party's agenda of developing programs leading to
increased community self-control and self-sufficiency. It was perhaps because of the
project's very success that government funding was withdrawn and police used to
evict staffers on November 29, 1978.24
After Lincoln Detox was forcibly returned to the orbit of conventional (and
typically unsuccessful) heroin treatment programs, Mutulu Shakur acted to estab-
lish a private entity dubbed the Black Acupuncture Advisory Association of North
America (BAAANA) to continue the work. The organization established a heroin
treatment facility in Harlem. According to the JTTF, a subset of BAAANA was the
BLA-led RATF, formed in 1978 to provide a funding base for the heroin clinic by
robbing banks and armored trucks?' On October 20, 1981, the BAAANA/BLA/
RATF ensemble came unwrapped as the result of a failed armored truck robbery in
West Nyack, New York, in which two guards were killed and several RATF
members captured?' Mutulu Shakur and several others escaped, but were forced
underground; BAAANA rapidly dissolved thereafter?'
In the aftermath, the JTTF rapidly captured a number of other RATF members,
killing one (Mtyari Sundiata; sin: Samuel Lee Smith) on October 23.28In the trials
which followed, the defendants were tried under "RICO" (Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act; 18 USCS § 1961-1968) charges - anti-racketeering
statutes, seldom utilized against organized crime - and sentenced to long stretches
in prison.2'Relatedly, after RATF supporter Susan Rosenberg and an associate, Tim
Blunk (a neurology researcher), were captured at a cache of explosives in Cherry
Hill, New Jersey on November 29,1984, they received utterly unprecedented 58 year
sentences for possession. This is compared to the seven year sentence received by
Dennis Malvesi, a right-wing fanatic convicted of actually using explosives to blow
up abortion clinics during the early 1980s.3°
Far more instructive with regard to the JTTF's (and, more broadly, the FBI's)
handling of the "Brinks Case" than the way in which it dealt with the RATF per se,
is the way it utilized the matter as a pretext by which to conduct operations against
other elements of the left. For instance, in the wake of the West Nyack incident, U.S.
Attorney John S. Martin, Jr. convened (at the request of the Bureau) a federal grand
jury in New York, casting an extremely wide net across east coast dissidents in what
one attorney described as "not so much an effort to gather evidence in the Brinks case
itself, as to compel testimony which provides comprehensive general intelligence on
personal and organizational relationships within the left as a whole."31Thirteen key
activists were jailed for as long as eighteen months because of their "contempt" in
refusing to cooperate with this fishing expedition?'
The New York grand jury gambit proved so successful that by late 1983 the FBI
had requested a second be convened in Chicago, ostensibly to explore links
discovered between the RATF and Puerto Rican independentista formations such as
the FALN. This led in due course to the imprisonment of five key members of the
Movimiento de Liberacion National (MLN) - Ricardo Romero, Marfa Cueto, Steven
Guerra, Julio Rosado and Andres Rosado - for up to three years for the "criminal
contempt" of refusing to cooperate?' Yet a third such grand jury was set in place
during 1984, this one assigned to probe the John Brown Anti-Klan Committee
(JBAKC), an organization said to have "fraternal relations" with the RATF, the
FALN, and other "terrorist" entities. Another six key activists went to jail for refusal
to collaborate?'
Symptomatic of the sort of "hard information" generated by the grand juries
and other JTTF investigative activities related to the RATF are the following
"proofs" that the May 19th Communist Organization was part of a "terrorist
network" (a characterization extended by the Bureau in the New York Post as early
as October 1981):
• A 1985 Profile in Terrorism lists as a "terrorist incident," the arrest of nine
"May 19th Communist Organization members" for trespassing during a
sit-in at the ticket office of South African Airways in New York City.
• Other May 19th Organization activities posited by the Bureau as "evidence
of terrorism" include attending peaceful demonstrations sponsored by
CISPES, conducting an educational forum at Boston University, holding a
nonviolent public rally in New York, publicly advocating solidarity with
the Southwest African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), and having inter-
organizational contact with CISPES.
• Advocacy of the right of oppressed peoples to engage in armed struggle and
specifically endorsement of the escape of Assata Shakur are listed as
Conclusion 311
"terrorist activities" undertaken by the "May 19th Communist Coalition

[sic; Organization]."
• FBI Director William Webster offered as "links" between the May 19th
Communist Organization and the FALN the fact that May 19th members
were known to have attended "rallies and functions" supportive of Puerto
Rican independence. Similarly, Webster claimed to have uncovered links
between May 19th and the RATF based on the facts that the organization
openly engaged in "support of New Afrikan Freedom Fighters" and "one
person [Silvia Baraldini] associated with May 19th was arrested in the Nyack
incident [emphasis added]."38
Being thus gratuitously (or maliciously) cast by the FBI as a terrorist group is not
a laughing matter as the experience of a black Harlem study group headed by
Coltrane Chimarenga (s/n: Randolph Simms) bears out. Infiltrated by a JTTF
provocateur named Howard Bonds in 1984, the membership was shortly arrested en
masse on criminal conspiracy charges and publicly branded "Son of Brinks."36 They
were accused of planning at least two bank robberies and to free RATF members
Sekou Odinga and Kuwasi Balagoon. Despite the prosecutor's introduction of some
450 pages of affidavits - including lengthy excerpts from wiretap logs - and testi-
mony of Bonds, the jury appears to have ended up believing that most or all of the
"conspiracy" was a product of the infiltrator's own actions and/or imagination.
They voted for acquittal on all substantive charges, convicting seven of the eight
defendants only on charges of possession of restricted weapons and phoney IDs."
Afterwards, several jurors publicly commented that the JTTF tactics revealed at trial
had constituted a "clear violation of the civil rights and liberties of the accused," and
that the conduct of the "counter-terrorists" themselves represented "a far greater
threat to freedom" than anything Chimarenga's group might have contemplated S8
The defendants in the "Son of Brinks" case ultimately went free, even though
they had spent nearly a year bound up in legal proceedings - and were thus
thoroughly neutralized in terms of their political organizing- in what turned out to
be, at best, an utterly frivolous case on the part of the government. Less lucky was
Dr. Alan Berkman, a founder of JBAKC whose long history of activism included a
stint as a medic at Wounded Knee, several years working at Lincoln Detox, and
staunch support of the black liberation and independentista movements. Indicted in
1983 for having rendered medical assistance to Marilyn Buck, an RATF member
allegedly wounded in the leg at Nyack, Berkman successfully went underground
before being captured in Philadelphia in mid-1985. He was then held without bond
for two years, until a 1987 trial which resulted in his conviction as an "accessory" in
the Brinks case. He was the first individual since Dr. Mudd, the man accused of
rendering medical aid to John Wilkes Booth after the Abraham Lincoln assassina-
tion, to be so charged. Berkman was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment for his
"involvement in terrorism.""
Organizations as such also suffered direct physical consequences from the

JTTF's RATF-related "investigation." For instance, on January 31, 1983, "the FBI
carried out a massive raid on the Madame Binh Graphics Collective in Brooklyn,
New York. The May 19th Communist Organization used this studio for its First
Amendment protected organizing activities. The warrant to search the graphics
studio falsely stated it was the home of Donna Borup [a May 19th activist]. In the
course of the search the FBI destroyed printing equipment and seized large quan-
tities of political literature and art work."" No charges were ever brought against
Borup, the ostensible focus of the raid, a matter which has prompted many people
to conclude her pursuit was merely a pretext by which the Bureau accomplished its
real objective of disrupting the Madame Binh Collective's ability to function.
Ironically, many supposedly progressive groups and individuals have joined
the chorus supporting the FBI's "campaign against terrorism" on the left, arguing
that the "menace" posed by armed struggle somehow "justifies" virtually any
politically repressive activity in which the Bureau might care to engage, and that
those who engage in or support "terrorism" deserve whatever fate the state wished
to accord them, no matter how cruel, unusual or "anomalous."" Such victim-
blaming attitudes are precisely what the FBI requires as a basis for its conduct of the
broadest forms of ideological warfare, a matter the CISPES investigation should
have proven beyond any reasonable doubt.
To underscore the matter even further, it is only fair to observe that the Bureau
has shown no inclination to cast such broad nets over the radical right. This holds
true even when the FBI has investigated such unabashed terrorist organizations as
the neo-nazi "Bruder Schweigen" - or "Silent Brotherhood," otherwise known as
"The Order" - a group which admittedly performed the cold-blooded murder of
Alan Berg (a Jewish talk show host in Denver), killed a Missouri state trooper,
"executed" a third individual and conducted a series of armored car and bank
robberies netting several times the amount attributed to the RATF.42The group was
also heavily involved in counterfeiting.
The Resistance Conspiracy Case
Stemming to some extent from the FBI's anti-RATF operation, the "Resistance
Conspiracy Case" (U.S. v. Whitehorn, et al., CR 88-145-05) concerns seven long-term
white activists accused of planning and involvement in the execution of "a terrorist
bombing campaign" during the early '80s. Among the more notable actions they are
alleged to have carried out were the placing of explosives at the National War
College and U.S. Capitol Building in 1983 as protests against the U.S. invasion of
Grenada. One of the seven accused, Betty Ann Duke, has evaded capture to date.
Five of the six in custody- Marilyn Buck, Susan Rosenberg, Tim Blunk, Linda Evans
and Dr. Alan Berkman - are already serving lengthy prison sentences on RATF-
related matters." The sixth, Laura Whitehorn, has been held in "preventive deten-
tion," without bond or trial for more than four years." The defendants face 40 years
apiece in prison if convicted.
Conclusion 313
There are certain glaring defects in the government's approach to the case. All
the defendants except Whitehorn have already been convicted of the specific acts
they are accused of having conspired to commit. This blatant exercise in double
jeopardy has been challenged in a motion to dismiss, addressed recently by a federal
court decision that - while the case could go forward - prosecutors would be
required to demonstrate additional actions on the part of the defendants in order for
the matter to be bound over to a jury." For its part, the Justice Department has
expressed strong displeasure at not being allowed to simply try the same case over
and over, under a variety of billings, stacking up virtually limitless penalties against
those it wishes to persecute.
In some ways even more problematic, FBI and prosecutors have already been
caught trying to withhold exculpatory evidence from the defense. Contrary to the
seeming federal certainty embodied in the indictment handed down on May 11,
1988 that these particular individuals were guilty as charged, it has become increas-
ingly evident the Bureau really has no idea who was involved in the bombings. For
instance,
...in a Washington Post newspaper article run several days after the capitol bombing,
the FBI apparently had evidence tending to show similarities between the 8 to 11
bombings in the New York and Washington, D.C. areas and the capitol bombing. On
the basis of facts unknown to the defendants, they suspected (1) the Farabundo
Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), (2) the United Freedom Front (UFF), (3) the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), (4) the Democratic Revolutionary Front
(FDR), or (5) the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) of
the bombing... Suspicions of involvement in the bombing by groups 1 through 4
were voiced by the FBI Director William H. Webster and Special Agent Theodore M.
Gardner to the Washington Post in an article printed November 13, 1983."
Subsequently, in a Post article run on March 15, 1984, an FBI spokesperson

announced that the Armed Resistance Unit (ARU) - the organization to which the
six present defendants all belonged - was not involved in the bombings. Further:
While testifying before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism in 1985, Mr. Webster stated that the FBI believed the UFF to
have been responsible for the bombing(s). He testified...categorically that "the prog-
ress we have made with the group called the United Freedom Front will reflect itself
in diminished activity by the group that claims credit for the Capitol bombing."'
As is pointed out by the defense, "information generated and possessed by the

FBI's National Bomb Data Center must have aided the FBI, and others, [in] casting
its suspicions over groups and persons other than the Revolutionary Fighting Group
(RFG) [ARU], and the Red Guerilla Resistance (RGR)."" Susan Rosenberg also
points out that she and several other defendants were in prison at the time several
of the bombings were carried out." Despite bona fide discovery motions, the govern-
ment has refused to divulge the documents relevant to how it arrived at its various
conclusions that entities other than those now accused are responsible for the actions
at issue.
As Mary O'Melveny, a defense attorney, put it: "The defendants' direct guilt or
innocence...appears immaterial to the government, which has constructed an indict-
ment to convict the six on charges of aiding and abetting and of 'conspiracy to
influence, change and protest practices of the United States...through the use of
violent and illegal means.'" In this instance, "aiding and abetting" can be construed
to mean ideological solidarity. "Influence, change and protest" can mean statements
of advocacy or support of the bombers. No concrete action, or demonstrable
interaction with those engaged in the action, is technically necessary for the
defendants to be "guilty." This affords an interesting perspective upon U.S. Attor-
ney Jay Stephens' assertion at the time of the indictment: "Let this be a warning to
those who seek to influence the policies of the U.S. through violence and terrorism
that we will seek unrelentingly to bring them to justice.""
The Resistance Conspiracy group is thus to stand as a symbol of the government's
ability to define dissidents as terrorists at its own discretion and regardless of the
facts. Under such circumstances it follows that dissent per se can be made punishable
by long prison terms, a matter which, as O'Melveny puts it, makes a point "which
says to people, 'Shut up. And don't even consider stepping out of very narrow
bounds of protest' That's what I think this case is all about."" Certainly, such an
objective is well within the spirit of COINTELPRO, and would represent a major
"accomplishment" in terms of political repression, if achieved.
The question nonetheless arises as to why this particular group of people has
been selected to serve as the example. On the one hand, an answer of sorts may lie
in the fact that they are convenient, already in custody and found guilty of "terrorist
involvements." On the other hand, as O'Melveny points out, there is little to be
gained by adding 40 years more to the 70 year sentence now carried by Marilyn
Buck, the 58 year sentences carried by Susan Rosenberg and Tim Blunk, or the 45
years Linda Evans is now serving. Tactically at least, it would make far more sense
for the FBI to try to neutralize a whole new group of activists.
The truth of the matter may well lie in something as simple as pique and
vindictiveness on the part of certain Bureau officials. Evans, Buck and Whitehorn are
former members of SDS aligned with the Weatherman faction who made the
transition to the clandestine Weather Underground Organization in 1970. Berkman
also had an affinity to the latter through its above ground support entity, the Prairie
Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC). Rosenberg and Blunk, who are younger,
appear to have more-or-less cut their activist teeth on Weather politics. Collectively,
they participated in a process of greatly embarrassing the FBI in its spectacular
inability to apprehend WEATHERFUGS (Weatherman Fugitives) throughout the
1970s.
Worse for the Bureau, the very methods employed in trying to break the
Weather Underground's political apparatus came back to haunt individual FBI
officials in court, perhaps the only time this has ever happened. In 1978, former FBI
Conclusion 315
Director L. Patrick Gray, former acting Associate Director W. Mark Felt, former
Assistant Director for the Domestic Intelligence Division Edward S. Miller, and
former supervisor of the New York field office's Squad 47 (the COINTELPRO
section) John Kearney were indicted for having conspired to "injure and oppress
citizens of the United States" in their anti-Weatherman operations. After a lengthy
1980 trial, Felt and Miller were found guilty by a jury, the only FBI personnel ever
tried and convicted of COINTELPRO-related offenses. They were freed on appeal
bond, but were apparently losing, given Ronald Reagan's April 1981 intervention to
pardon them rather than see two such "loyal public servants" go to prison for their
misdeeds." Several of the resistance conspiracy defendants were extremely active
during the course of the officials' trial, utilizing its precedent value to increase public
consciousness concerning the FBI's true nature. Their organizing seems to have been
deeply humiliating to FBI officials, especially after their colleagues were convicted.
This humiliation undoubtedly increased dramatically when, shortly after Rea-
gan bestowed his pardons, former WEATHERFUGS Judy Clark and Dana Biber-
man entered a lawsuit (Clark v. U.S., 78 Civ. 2244 (MEL)) against the FBI, seeking
$100 million in damages on behalf of those victimized by the anti-Weatherman op-
erations and injunctive relief to insure the Bureau never utilized such tactics again:
Several of the defendants in [the Resistance Conspiracy] case were active partici-
pants in the Clark v. United States civil lawsuit against the FBI. They assisted in legal
research, built public support for the case, conducted community organizing,
received discovery and were, along with the plaintiffs, subject to continuing acts of
government harassments'
There being no presidential remedy available to fix this particular problem, the
Bureau was forced to reach "a monetary settlement favorable to the plaintiffs."" In
the end, then, the Resistance Conspiracy case may have nothing at all to do with
bullets and bombs. To the contrary, it seems likely-notwithstanding the undeniable
chilling effect it is intended to impart across the entire spectrum of left politics in the
U.S. - it is designed to salve the wounded egos of the Bureau's COINTELPRO
specialists. It is, as Susan Rosenberg would say, "pay-back time."
The Ohio 7
The cases of the Ohio 7 concern a group of white activists who formed the United
Freedom Front (UFF) - otherwise known as the Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson
Brigade (SMJJ)5' - and are accused of engaging in a series of bombings during the
early 1980s. Among the many such actions they are alleged to have undertaken was
detonating an explosive charge at a South African Airways office on December 16,
1982, as a protest against ongoing cordial relations between the U.S. government
and South Africa's apartheid regime. The same day, they are said to have bombed
an office facility of the IBM Corporation because of the computer giant's provision
of sophisticated computer systems to the South African military and police. On
March 19, 1984, according to the state, they bombed a second IBM office complex,
this time in commemoration of the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre in which South
African police murdered seventy unarmed black men, women and children. In Sep-
tember of 1984, they are charged with having carried out one of two bombings of
offices belonging to the Union Carbide Corporation because of its economic activity
in South Africa." As was the case with the bombings attributed to the Resistance
Conspiracy defendants, warning phone calls prevented anyone from being killed or
injured by those associated with the Ohio 7.*
The seven - Jaan Laaman, Barbara Curzi-Laaman, Richard Williams, Carol and
Tom Manning, Pat Gros Levasseur and Ray Luc Levasseur - were the focus of the
most intensive and wide-ranging JTTF campaign to date, at least so far as is known.
This assumed the form of BOSLUC (an acronym derived from combining the first
three letters of Boston, the city in which the operation was headquartered, and Ray
Luc Levasseur's middle name), an effort initiated in 1982 and eventually drawing
not only the FBI and New York police establishments, but the BATF and police
representation from Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey as well.•
BOSLUC initially concentrated its energies in the Boston area, largely due to an
incident in 1982 in which black community activist Kazi Toure (s/n: Christopher
King) was stopped by state police on Route 95, near Attleboro, Massachusetts. A
sharp exchange of gunfire followed, leaving two troopers wounded and Toure in
custody, a passenger in the latter's car having escaped." The fugitive was identified
as UFF member Jaan Laaman. The Attleboro firefight closely followed a similar
event on Route 80 in rural New Jersey when state trooper Philip Lamonaco stopped
a car driven by Tom Manning and, apparently recognizing the occupant, opened
fire. Lamonaco ended up dead. Police subsequently contended Richard Williams
had been with Manning at the time of the shooting."
By early 1984, frustrated at coming up dry in Massachusetts, the JTTF expanded
the scope of BOSLUC to encompass all of New England in what was dubbed
"Western Sweep":
Agents of the task force seized many citizens resembling the Ohio 7 and subjected
them to public humiliation and physical abuse prior to any positive identification.
A family was surrounded by police after leaving a diner, and the father was beaten
and searched in front of his [wife and children] in the parking lot. Another family
was pulled over on the highway and forced at gunpoint to lie face-down in the rain
on the pavement. Another man's teeth were broken with the barrel of a gun. In
Pennsylvania, a paramilitary team landed in a field, surrounded a family in their
home and held them hostage for six hours. These people had the simple misfortune
[of looking] like members of the Ohio 7."
No expense was spared, as "surveillance by electronic means, paid informants
" Some Ohio 7members have been accused of a 1976 courthouse bombing in Suffolk County,
Massachusetts, in which people were injured. No credible evidence of this has, however,
been produced (See Note 72, this chapter).
Conclusion 317
and photographic methods yielded 500,000 pages of material from investigations of

the Ohio 7. In designated areas, numerous pen registers [electronic devices which,
when installed on a phone, reveal the number of any phone calling it] were obtained,
then hundreds of BOSLUC agents would conduct an intelligence sweep; the idea
was that the increased police activity would generate more phone calls [from UFF
members] to sympathizers and all [such] calls would be subject to FBI investigation.
A casual mention by a distant relative of Tom Manning of the name 'Tommy' in a
telephone conversation brought a small army of agents into the bedroom of a
stranger in less than an hour.""
The newly minted agents of Western Sweep went out, knocked on doors, stopped
cars, set up roadblocks and saturated the area with wanted posters [including
photos of the children of the accused]. They contacted schools, day-care centers and
medical facilities with photos and medical and dental records. Many activists were
repeatedly interviewed, followed and harassed. The women's community in west-
ern Massachusetts was contacted by FBI agents offering assistance after a rash of
telephone threats. The FBI assistance turned out to hinge on cooperation with
Western Sweep. In the estimation of the government, one out of every three
residents of [Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont and New Hampshire] was
contacted during Western Sweep."
Ultimately, such heavy-handedness was for naught. BOSLUC was finally able
to home in on the first of the SMJJ group through use of a mainframe computer
donated by the Grumman Corporation. Utilizing a sophisticated database and
name-matching program, agents were able to trace Patricia Gros Levasseur through
a series of aliases to a post office box in Columbus, Ohio." They then staked out the
postal facility and, when she showed up for her mail on November 3, 1984, they
followed her home to a house in nearby Deerfield. Ray Luc and Pat Gros Levasseur,
along with their three daughters, were captured the following morning." At about
the same time, some 75 FBI SWAT-team members, armed with a warrant for Richard
Williams and an armored personnel carrier known as "Mother," had surrounded a
house at 4248 West 22nd Street in Cleveland; Williams, Jaan and Barbara Curzi-
Laaman, and the Laaman's three children were captured." The Mannings initially
evaded the roundup, but were eventually traced via the serial numbers on a gun
seized in the raid on the Cleveland address and captured, along with their children,
on April 24, 1985."
Federal treatment of the children of the captured Ohio 7 members is instructive.
Upon the arrest of their parents, the three Levasseur girls were whisked away for a
solid five hours of interrogation by the FBI and representatives of the New Jersey
State Police. Afterwards, they were turned over to welfare department officials
despite the fact that a number of relatives — none accused of any crime, and all
gainfully employed — lived in the area and expressed their willingness to take them
in. Later, Carmen Levasseur, the eldest daughter at age eight, recounted how, when
she expressed that she'd grown hungry during the initial interrogation, an agent had
offered her a pizza and $20 to provide incriminating information against her mother
and father, as well as the whereabouts of Tom and Carol Manning." The three
Laaman children underwent much the same experience 69As for the Manning
children - Jeremy (aged 11), Tamara (aged five) and Jonathan (aged three) - they
were repeatedly interrogated and arbitrarily placed in a foster home despite
repeated attempts by Tom Manning's sister Mary, and her husband, Cameron
Bishop, to obtain custody." The Mannings were finally compelled to began a hunger
strike in prison in order to force authorities to release their children into the custody
of Carol's sister."
In the series of trials which followed the capture of the Ohio 7, the government
relied heavily upon the testimony of an informant named Joseph Aceto (aka: Joseph
Balino), a former member of Statewide Correctional Alliance for Reform (SCAR), a
prisoners-rights organization founded in Portland, Maine during the early 1970s by
Tom Manning and Ray Luc Levasseur." Aceto offered considerable "evidence"
concerning the original formation of the SMJJ, its evolution into UFF, and suppos-
edly first-hand recollections of the defendants' having described their bombing and
bank-robbing exploits to him. Only later did it emerge conclusively that the
government's star witness had consistently lied under oath, passing off third-hand
gossip and utter fabrications as conversations in which he himself had partici-
pated." It also came out that Aceto had been diagnosed as psychotic and admini-
stered heavy doses of the tranquilizer Mellaril - to "increase his veracity" - prior to
testimony." To top things off, it was revealed that, in exchange for such testimony,
the FBI had arranged for him to be released from prison where he was serving a life
sentence for a brutal stabbing murder and placed on the federal witness protection
program (a package with an $800 per month stipend)." All this information had
been withheld from the defense - and consequently from the jury - at trial.
As the prosecutorial smoke cleared in 1987, Ray Luc Levasseur had been
convicted of six bombing charges and had been sentenced to 45 years imprisonment.
Tom Manning had also been convicted of six bombing charges and sentenced to 53
years, as well as murder in the death of New Jersey state trooper Lamonaco (a life
sentence to run consecutively to the bombing sentence). Richard Williams had been
convicted on six bombing charges and sentenced to 45 years; he was not convicted
in the Lamonaco killing, but is to be retried. Jaan Laaman was convicted on six
bombing charges and sentenced to 53 years. Carol Manning and Barbara Curzi-
Laaman were convicted of lesser accessory charges and sentenced to 15 years apiece.
Pat Gros Levasseur was convicted of harboring a fugitive (her husband), and
sentenced to five years."
Apparently unsatisfied with the virtually permanent incarceration meted out to
each of the male "principles" in the Ohio 7 case, hoping to secure heavier sentences
against the women, and generally seeking to set a more spectacular "example," the
government next resorted to the same double-jeopardy ploy being utilized in the
Resistance Conspiracy case. All seven defendants were charged - on the basis of
actions for which they had already been convicted - of "seditious conspiracy" and
Conclusion 319
violation of the RICO statute. The holes in the case became almost immediately
apparent as charges were dropped against both Tom Manning and Jaan Laaman, in
order to "simplify proceedings," according to prosecutors." Next, Barbara Curzi-
Laaman was severed from the trial after the court (finally) ruled that the FBI's 1984
SWAT raid on her home, which resulted in her capture, had been illegal." The
government then began offering reduced sentence deals to any defendant who
would enter a guilty plea; Carol Manning accepted the offer."
In the end, after a trial lasting ten months (February-November 1989), costing
more than $10 million, and in which nearly 250 witnesses took the stand, the jury
acquitted the three remaining defendants - Ray Luc and Pat Gros Levasseur, and
Richard Williams-of both charges on November 27,19898° Pat Gros Levasseur was
released from custody on a "time served" basis, while her husband was returned to
the federal prison at Marion, Illinois to continue serving his existing sentence.
Williams was transferred to the custody of New Jersey authorities, pending a retrial
in the death of state trooper Lamonaco.
The Most Imprisoned People on Earth?

The verdicts reached in the final Ohio 7 trial represent something of a victory for
political liberty and common sense in the U.S. They demonstrate that a jury of
average citizens will, when exposed to a reasonable amount of factual information
and given adequate time to think through the issues, reject as implausible govern-
ment contentions that any small group of radicals - no matter how "secretive and
violent" - are capable of seriously plotting to "overthrow the government by force
of arms." So much for the notion of seditious conspiracy. Similarly, the verdicts
show clearly that, under appropriate conditions, the same jury will conclude that
political formations which engage in bank expropriations and similar activities -
while they may have engaged in criminal behavior under the law - are no more
guilty of "racketeering"than were the founding fathers at the Boston Tea Party.
Other recent verdicts also offer glimmers of hope, as when on August 26,1989
a jury acquitted Puertorriqueflo independentista leader Filiberto Ojeda Rios of at-
tempted murder of a federal agent and seven other charges stemming from Richard
W. Held's island-wide ride in 1985.8' As was the case in the 1976 Cedar Rapids trial
of Bob Robideau and Dino Butler, the outcome of Ojeda Rios' ordeal proves that an
ordinary jury - once again assuming it is presented with a sufficient range of facts
- will arrive at the conclusion that armed self-defense is an entirely legitimate
response to the sorts of tactics employed by the FBI against political dissidents.
Other examples are more grim. Leonard Peltier, Geronimo Pratt, the New York
3 and many other victims of earlier COINTELPRO operations remain in prison
despite overwhelming evidence that they were railroaded into their respective
cells." And additional casualties continue to accrue. For instance, there is Mumia
Abu-Jamal, a former BPP member in Philadelphia, convicted and sentenced to death
on July 3, 1982, ostensibly for having killed a cop, despite eyewitnesses having
identified an entirely different individual as the assailant. On March 6, 1989, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Abu-Jamal's last possible appeal prior to the
electric chair even while acknowledging that "genuine doubt" exists as to the killer's
identity."
Indeed, use of the prison system for purposes of political neutralization appears
to have become the preferred mode for the FBI and associated police agencies by the
end of the 1980s. At present, the U.S. enjoys the dubious distinction of having a
greater proportion of its population incarcerated than any western industrialized
country. Its imprisonment just of its Euroamerican citizens is tied-at 114 per 100,000
-with Austria for first place. Its rate of imprisonment of African-Americans-713 per
100,000 - is, however much higher: 25 times the Netherlands' 28 per 100,00 rate of
incarcerating its citizenry." The proportion of the black population presently
imprisoned in the U.S. is almost exactly double that in South Africa." More, both
federal and state policymakers have lately made no secret of their intention to dou-
ble the number of available prison beds during the coming decade, "privatize" an
additional large number of penal facilities, and to develop extensive application of
"electronic incarceration techniques" which will require the building of no new
physical structures. Following these projections, even the most conservative arith-
metic makes it plain the U.S. elite is fully prepared to triple or even quadruple the
already burgeoning North American prison population. At the point such plans are
consummated, the U.S. citizenry will have become - barring unforeseen eventuali-
ties elsewhere - the most imprisoned people on the face of the earth."
While such a trend represents an exercise in social engineering going well
beyond any conceivable definition of "counterintelligence" per se, it obviously
affords modern COINTELPRO operatives a perfect cover under which to conduct
their business; hence, the increasing emphasis upon criminalizing political dissi-
dents as "terrorists" and "racketeers" throughout the 1980s. Of late, this process of
criminalization has been accelerated considerably under the rubric of a national
"war on drugs," headed up by such veteran COINTELPRO specialists as Richard W.
Held in San Francisco. Little is said about the fact that the "black street gangs" now
decried by the FBI as sources of "drugs and violence in our cities" are exactly the
same entities secretly supported by the Bureau in its COINTELPROs against such
anti-drug political formations as the Black Panther Party twenty years ago." Even
less is mentioned of the CIA's role in establishing these gang-based drug distribu-
tion mechanisms during the same period (for the dual purposes of narcotizing
political unrest at home and generating revenues with which to fund covert "off the
shelf" operations abroad)." SAC Held has, however, proven quite vocal in extend-
ing utterly unsubstantiated assertions that contemporary political organizations
such as the Black Guerrilla Family are important components of the drug scene."
Meanwhile, the "drug wars" veneer may well already be in use as a screen behind
which the selective assassination of key political activists may be carried out. A
notable example of this last was the execution-style murder of Panther founder
Huey P. Newton in Oakland, on August 22,1989.90
Condusion 321
In some ways more to the point of what is occurring is the nature of the prison -I
facilities the federal system hasbegun to spawn. Based generally on the "Stammheim
Model" perfected by West Germany during the early 1970s, these include the
Marion "super-max" prison for men in southern Illinois, and the Marianna prison's
high security unit (HSU) for women in northern Florida" The Marianna facility was
piloted at the federal women's prison at Lexington, Kentucky during the 1980s. Its
purpose was unabashedly political as is demonstrated in the U.S. Bureau of Prison's
official criteria for incarceration:
[Al prisoner's past or present affiliation, association or membership in an organiza-
tion which has been demonstrated as being involved in acts of violence, attempts to
disrupt or overthrow the government of the U.S. or whose published ideology
include advocating law violations in order to "free" prisoners.. 92
Constructed some thirty feet underground in total isolation from the outside
world, painted entirely white to induce sensory deprivation, with naked florescent
lights burning 24 hours per day and featuring rules severely restricting diet, corre-
spondence, reading material and visits, the HSU was deliberately designed to psy-
chologically debilitate those imprisoned there. This was coupled to a program of
intentional degradation in which the incarcerated women were strip searched, often
by male guards, and observed by male guards while showering and using the toilets.
Perhaps worst of all, the Bureau of Prisons (BoP) refused to set any formal criteria
by which the women might work their way back out of the HSU once they were
confined there. The objective was to invoke in them a sense of being totally at the
mercy of and dependent upon their keepers.93In the polite language of the John
Howard Association:
Through a year or more of sensory and psychological deprivation, prisoners are
stripped of their individual identities in order that compliant behavior patterns can
be implanted, a process of mortification and depersonalization."
The techniques involved have been described by Amnesty International in the

accompanying chart. As early as 1962, Dr. Edgar Schein described the methodology
at issue rather more straightforwardly in an address to all federal maximum security
prison wardens in Washington, D.C.:
n
In order to produce marked changes in behavior, it is necessary to weaken,
undermine, or remove supports for old attitudes. I would like you to think of
brainwashing not in terms of... ethics and morals, but in terms of the deliberate
changing of human behavior by a group of men who have relatively complete
control over the environment in which the captives live... [These changes can be
induced by] isolation, sensory deprivation, segregation of leaders, spying, tricking
men into signing written statements which are then shown to others, placing
individuals whose will power has been severely weakened into a living situation
with others more advanced in thought reform, character invalidation, humiliations,

sleeplessness, rewarding subservience, and fear [emphasis added]."
L
Dr. Richard Korn, in a 1987 report on Lexington commissioned by the ACLU,
framed the matter even more clearly. In Korn's estimation, the purpose of an HSU-
style facility is to:
...reduce prisoners to a state of submission essential for their ideological conversion.
That failing, the next objective is to reduce them to a state of psychological incom-
petence sufficient to neutralize them as efficient, self-directing antagonists. That
failing, the only alternative is to destroy them, preferably by making them desperate
enough to destroy themselves 96
Of the three political women incarcerated in the Lexington HSU - Susan Rosen-
berg and Silvia Baraldini of the RATF case and independentista Alejandrina Torres -
all had ceased menstruating, were afflicted with insomnia and suffered chronic hal-
lucinations before the facility was ordered closed in 1988." By then, the HSU had
been condemned as a violation of elemental human rights by organizations ranging
from Amnesty International to the ACLU." The BoP response was that it was
"satisfied" with its Lexington experiment, and would replicate the HSU's essential
features at its Marianna facility, designed to hold several hundred women rather
than a mere handful.99
Marion is even more entrenched. Established in 1963 as a replacement for the
infamous Alcatraz super-maximum prison, which had grown cost-prohibitive to
maintain, it contains the first (created in 1972) of the federal government's formal
Stammheim-style behavior modification "control units."'" The ideological func-
tion intended for control units was made apparent virtually from the outset when
independentista Raphael Cancel Miranda was sent there to undergo "thought re-
form" after having served more than fifteen years in confinement.'" By 1983, the
control unit model was deemed so successful by BoP authorities that the occasion
of an "inmate riot" was used as a pretext by which to convert the entire prison into
a huge behavior modification center."' Since that year, all of Marion has been on
"lock down" status, with prisoners confined to their cells, in isolation 23 hours per
day, often chained spread-eagled - for "disciplinary reasons" - to their cdncrete slab
"bunks." Strip searches are routine, prisoners are shackled upon leaving their cells
for any reason, all contact visits are forbidden and reading material is tightly
restricted. As was the case at Lexington, no clear criteria for getting out of Marion
have ever been posited by the BoP; the length and extent of prisoners' torment is left
entirely to the discretion of prison officials."'
Also as was the situation in the Lexington HSU, a significant number of those
incarcerated at Marion are political prisoners or Prisoners of War. At present, these
include independentista Oscar Lopez-Rivera; black liberationists Richard Thompson-
El, and Kojo Bomani Sababu; Virgin Islands Five activist Hanif Shabazz Bey;
Euroamerican Prisoners of War Bill Dunne and Ray Luc Levasseur; and Plowshares
activist Larry Morlan. Scores of others have spent varying lengths of time there. In
Conclusion 323
Biderman's Chart on Penal Coercion

Source: Amnesty International Report on Torture, 1983.
General Method Effects (Purposes) Variants
1. Isolation Deprives victim of all social Complete solitary confine-

supports of his ability to re- ment, complete isolation, semi-
sist. Develops an intense con- isolation, group isolation.
cern with self. Makes victim
dependent upon interrogator.
2. Monopolization of percep- Fixes attention upon immedi- Physical isolation, darkness or

tion. ate predicam ent; fosters in LTO- bright light, barren environ-
spection. Eliminates stimuli ment, restricted movement,
competing with those con- monotonous food.
trolled by captor. Frustrates
all actions not consistent with
compliance.
3. Induced debility; exhaus- Weakens mental and physi- Semi-starvation, exposure, ex-
tion. cal ability to resist. ploitation of wounds, induced
illness, sleep deprivation, pro-
longed constraint, prolonged
interrogation, forced writing,
overexertion.
4. Threats Cultivates anxiety and despair Threats of death, threats of

non-return, threats of endless
interrogation and isolation,
threats against family, vague
threats, mysterious changes of
treatment.
5. Occasional indulgences. Provides positive motivation Occasional favors, fluctuations

for compliance. Hinders ad- of interrogation attitudes,
justment to deprivation. promises, rewards for partial
compliance, tantalizing.
6. Demonstrating "omnipo- Suggests futility of resistance. Confrontation, pretending co-

tence." operation taken for granted,
demonstrating complete con-
trol over victim's fate.
6. Degradation Makes cost of resistance ap- Personal hygeine prevented.

pear more damaging to self- Filthy, infested surroundings,
esteem than capitulation. demeaning punishments, in-
Reduces prisoners to "animal sults and taunts, denial of pri-
level" concerns. vacy.
7. Enforcing trivial demands. Developshabit of compliance. Forced writing, enforcement

of minute rules.
another parallel with Lexington, Marion has been repeatedly condemned by a broad
range of organizations, including Amnesty International, as systematically violat-
ing United Nations proscriptions against torture and other minimum standards
required by international law with regard to the maintenance of prison popula-
tions."' Rather than favorably altering the situation inside Marion, the BoP has
indicated that it considers the lockdown permanent, and has begun to clone off
comparable environments - such as the N-2 "death unit" at Terre Haute (Indiana)
federal prison - in other maximum security facilities for men.
Although U.S. District Judge Barrington Parker ordered the Lexington HSU
closed on August 15,1988 - on the specific basis of its use as a political prison - his
decision was overturned by a federal appeals court on September 8, 1989.1" As
Susan Rosenberg has put it: "The appeals court held that the government is free to
use the political beliefs and association of prisoners as basis for treating us more
harshly and placing us in maximum security conditions. Further, the appeals court
ruling means that no court can question or dispute the prison's decision even if those
decisions involve the prisoner's politics or political identity...This legal decision
gives official sanction to the BoP to place political prisoners into control units."1"
The rulers of Orwell's totalitarian empires could not have put it better than the
judiciary of the United States.
The Shape of Things to Come
This may well be the shape of things to come, and in a frighteningly generalized
way. A pattern is emerging in which the "attitude adjustment" represented by police
and prison becomes a normative rather than exceptional experience of power in the
U.S. If the present dynamics of spiraling police power and state sanctioned secrecy,
proliferating penal facilities and judicial abandonment of basic constitutional prin-
ciples is allowed to continue unabated, it is easily predictable that upwards of 20%
of the next generation of Americans will spend appreciable time behind bars in
prison environments making present day Sing Sing and San Quentin seem benign
by comparison. Another not inconsiderable percentage of the population may be ex-
pected to undergo some form of "electronic incarceration," either in their homes or
at some government-designated "private" facility. The technologies for this last
have been developed over the past twenty years, are even now being "field tested"
(i.e.: used on real prisoners), and will undoubtedly be perfected during the coming
decade."'
In such a context, the classic role of domestic counterintelligence operations will
logically be diminished; any hint of politically "deviant" behavior will likely be met
with more-or-less immediate arrest, packaging as a "criminal" by the FBI and its
interactive counterparts in the state and local police, processing through the courts
and delivery to one or another prison for an appropriate measure of behavior modi-
fication. The social message - "don't even think about rocking the boat, under any
circumstances" - is both undeniable and overwhelming. At this point, it will be
necessary to assess the legacy of COINTELPRO not only as having perpetuated, but
of having quite literally transcended itself. It will have moved from covert and
Conclusion 325
relatively selective or "surgical" repression of dissent to the overt and uniform

suppression of political diversity per se, from a secretive safeguarding of the
parameters of "acceptable" political expression to the open imposition of ortho-
doxy, from somewhat constrained service to to socio-economic status quo to outright A'
social pacification and maintenance of a rigid social order.
It is perhaps ironic that it is at precisely the moment the police state apparatus
inherent to the Soviet Union and its various eastern European satellites appears to
be crumbling that the U.S. police state shows every indication of consolidating itself
at a new and unparalleled level of intensity and sophistication. But it should
certainly come as no surprise. The entire 70 year history of the FBI has given fair
warning. The COINTELPRO era provided a detailed preview of what was to come.
And, not only the continuation, but the systematic legitimation of all that was worst
about COINTELPRO during the 1970s and '80s has been sufficiently blatant to set A-
alarm bells ringing loudly in the mind of anyone wishing to consider the matter. The
sad fact is, however, that other than during certain peak periods of repression -
notably the Palmer Raids, the McCarthy period, and at the very end of the COIN-
TELPRO era - such things have received only scant attention from the left. Instead,
concern with questions of police power and the function of prisons has been
consigned mainly to lawyers and a scattering of researcher-activists whose work has
been typically viewed as "marginal," "esoteric" and even "paranoid," and thus of
little utility to the "positive" and "more important" agendas of progressives.
A dismal -but entirely plausible - prospect is that such circumstances have long
since foreclosed on our collective ability to do much about the danger in which we
are now engulfed. U.S. progressivism presently seems to stand vis a vis the "law
enforcement" establishment like a person who has walked to the middle of a railway
bridge and suddenly faces a locomotive bearing down on him or her at miles per
hour. There is no way to outrun the engine of destruction, and no place to turn for
safety. Worse, the posture of far too many people on the left suggests they are
continuing to amble along with their backs to the train, still remaining unaware that
they are just about to be run over. This last is readily borne out by the number of
progressives who have rallied nationally to the cause of removing assault rifles and
other semi-automatic weapons from the hands of the populace, while doing nothing
to confront the rampant proliferation of SWAT capabilities among police forces
throughout the country."' Another choice indicator may be apprehended in the
range of ostensibly progressive individuals and groups which have lately queued
up to "take back...streets" they never had in the first place, righteously endorsing a
government-sponsored "war on drugs" entailing unprecedented police prerogatives
to engage in no-knock entry, warrantless search and seizure, the routine "interdic-
tion" of people of color driving along the nation's highways, uncompensated
impoundment of personal property, massive applications of physical and electronic
surveillance, the use of preventive detention on a wholesale basis, and myriad other
abridgements of civil rights and liberties which would have remained unthinkable
just five years ago."9
Grounds for Hope, Program for Action

A cynic might argue, and with considerable justification, that a people which
follows such a course will eventually get exactly what it deserves: fascism (and,
Bertram Gross' phrase notwithstanding, the form is hardly "friendly"110). Demon-
strably, we are at or very near this point. Yet, despite all, we remain very far from
a social consensus on either the acceptability or inevitability of such an outcome. As
the very existence of the RATF, Resistance Conspiracy, Ohio 7, Los Macheteros and
the FALN, and a range of other entities makes abundantly dear, there are still many
who are prepared to struggle with every fiber of their beings to prevent the
culmination of fascist reality in the U.S. And, as the jurors who acquitted Filiberto
Ojeda Rios, the "Son of Brinks" group, and those of the Ohio 7 tried for seditious
r conspiracy and RICO violations have shown beyond any real question, there remain
numerous "plain, ordinary, apolitical folk" who can and will respond favorably to
such a stance when afforded a tangible opportunity to do so. These people, activists
and jurors alike, regardless of the issues and perspectives which may divide them,
are nonetheless bound together in what the German theoretician Rudi Dutschke
once defined as the "anti-authoritarian impulse."'" Herein lies the hope - perhaps
the only hope - of an alternative to the specter described herein.
To be sure, mere hope is no solution to anything. It represents a point of
departure, no more. The development of viable options to avert consummation of
a full-fledged police state in North America will require a deep rethinking, among
many who purport to oppose it, of priorities and philosophical positions, including
the near hegemony of pacifism and nonviolence on the left. The emphasis accorded
confrontation with the police and penal systems will have to increase rapidly and
dramatically within virtually all groups pursuing progressive social agendas, from
environmentalism to abortion rights. The fates of prisoners, particularly those
incarcerated for having been accused of engaging in armed struggle against the
state, must thus be made a central concern-and primary focus of activism- in every
politically conscious sector of the U.S. population. Understandings mustbe achieved
that what is currently being done to political prisoners and prisoners of war, in
,kv,, "exemplary" fashion, is ultimately designed for application to far wider groups than
is now the case; that the facilities in which such things are done to them are intended
to eventually house us all; that the enforcement apparatus which has been created
to combat their "terrorism" simultaneously holds the capacity to crush all that we
hold dear or seek to achieve, soon and perhaps irrevocably. In sum, if we do not
move - and quickly - to overcome our tactical differences to the extent that we can
collectively and effectively confront the emergent structure of "law enforcement" in
this country, all the rest of our lofty and constructive social preoccupations will
shortly be rendered meaningless by the very forces we have all too frequently
elected to ignore.
There are many points of attack open to us, places where important victories can
and must be attained. These include renewed and concerted efforts to extend real
Conclusion 327
community control over local police forces, the dismantling of localized police
SWAT capabilities, the curtailment or elimination of national computer net partici-
pation by state and local police forces, the abolition of police "intelligence" units,
and deep cuts in the resources (both monetary and in terms of personnel) already
allocated to the police establishment. The judicial system, too, must become an
increasing focus of broad-based progressive attention; not only is substantial
support work vitally necessary with regard to activists brought to court on serious
charges, but every judicial ruling - whether or not it is rendered in an overtly
political trial - which serves to undercut citizen rights while legitimating increased
police intervention in the political process must be met with massive, national ex-
pressions of outrage and rejection. It is incumbent upon us to infuse new force and
meaning into "the court of public opinion," using every method at our disposal. By
the same token, maximal energy must be devoted to heading off the planned
expansion of penal facilities across the U.S. and securing the abolition of "control
units" within every existing prison in the country. The BoP and state "adult
authorities" must also be placed, finally, under effective citizens' control, and the
incipient "privatization" of large portions of the "prison industry" must be blocked
at all costs. Plainly, this represents a tremendously ambitious bill of fare for any
social movement.
Coming to grips with the FBI is of major importance. The Bureau has long since
made itself an absolutely central ingredient in the process of repression in America,
not only extending its own operations in this regard, but providing doctrine,
training and equipment to state and local police, organizing the special "joint task
forces" which have sprouted in every major city since 1970, creating the computer
nets which tie the police together nationally, and providing the main themes of
propaganda by which the rapid build-up in police power has been accomplished in
the U.S. Similarly, the FBI provides both doctrinal and practical training to prison
personnel - especially in connection with those who supervise POWs and political
prisoners - which is crucial in the shaping of the policies pursued within the penal
system as a whole. Hence, so long as the FBI is able to retain the outlook which
defined COINTELPRO, and to translate that outlook into "real world" endeavors,
it is reasonable to assume that both the police and prison "communities" will follow
right along. Conversely, should the FBI ever be truly leashed, with the COIN-
TELPRO mentality at last rooted out once and for all, it may be anticipated that the
emergent U.S. police state apparatus will undergo substantial unraveling.
In the concluding chapter of Agents of Repression, we offered both tactical and
strategic sketches of how the task of bringing the Bureau to heel might be ap-
proached. In his book, War at Home, Brian Glick extends these ideas in certain
directions. At the same time, both we and Glick indicated that our recommendations
should be considered anything but definitive, and that readers should rely upon
their own experience and imaginations in devising ways and means of getting the
job done. Since publication of those books, a number of people have contacted us to
expand upon our ideas and to enter new ones. Although the specifics vary in each
case, there are two consistent themes underlying such contributions. These are first
that is it is imperative more and more people take the step of translating their
consciousness into active resistance and, second, that this resistance must be truly
multifaceted and flexible in form. We heartily agree.
Hence, we would would like to close with what seems to us the only appropri-
ate observation, paraphrasing Malcolm X and Huey P. Newton: We are confronted
with the necessity of a battle which must be continued until it has been won. That
choice has already been made for us, and we have no option to simply wish it away.
To lose is to bring about the unthinkable, and there is noplace to run and hide. Under
the circumstances, the FBI and its allies must be combatted by all means available,
and by any means necessary.
Organizational Contacts
The following are organizations currently involved in the sorts of work described in
the conclusion to this book. People wishing to become involved in the sorts of struggles
thus represented should contact one or more of them for further information.
Emergency Committee for Committee to End the Marion Center for Constitutional
Political Prisoners Lockdown Rights/Movement Support
P.O. Box 28191 343 S. Dearborn, Suite 1607 666 Broadway, 7th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20038 Chicago, IL 60604 New York, NY 10012
National Committee to Free National Committee Against New Afrikan People's
Puerto Rican Prisoners Repressive Legislation Organization
P.O. Box 476698 501 C Street, NE P.O. Box 11464
Chicago, IL 60647 Washington, DC 20002 Atlanta, GA 30310
Justice for Geronimo National Alliance Against National Emergency Civil
Campaign Racist/Political Repression Rights Committee
214 Duboce Avenue 126 W. 119th Street 175 Fifth Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94103 New York, NY 10026 New York 10010
The National Prison Project Comm. to Fight Repression Peltier Defense Committee
1616 P Street, NW Box 1435, Cathedral Station P.O. Box 583
Washington, DC 20035 New York, NY 10025 Lawrence, KS 66044
Saxifrage Group Anti-Repression Resources National Lawyers Guild
1484 Wicklow P.O. Box 122, 55 Ave. of the Americas
Boulder, CO 80303 Jackson, MS 39205 New York, NY 10013
Nuclear Resister People's Law Office The Real Dragon

P.O. Box 43383 633 S. Dearborn, No. 1614 P.O. Box 3294
Tucson, AZ 85733 Chicago, IL 60604 Berkeley, CA 94703-9901
Political Rights Defense Partisan Defense Committee Free Puerto Rico Committee
Fund do R. Wolkensten, Esq. P.O. Box 022512
P.O. Box 649, Cooper Station P.O. Box 99, Canal St. Station Cadman Plaza, Brooklyn
New York, NY 1000 New York, NY 10013 New York, NY 11202
End Papers
I say it has gone too far. We are dividing into the hunted and the hunters. There is
loose in the United States today the same evil that once split Salem Village between
the bewitched and the accused and stole men's reason quite away. We are informers
to the secret police. Honest men are spying on their neighbors for patriotism's sake.
We may be sure that for every honest man two dishonest ones are spying for
personal advancement today and ten will be spying for pay next year.
- Bernard De Voto -
1949
Notes
Preface
1.Churchill, Ward, and Jim Vander Wall, Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret War Against the Black
Panther Party and the American Indian Movement, South End Press, Boston, 1988.
2. Glick, Brian, War at Home: Covert Action Against U.S. Activists and What We Can Do About It, South
End Press, Boston, 1989.
3.Taylor, Flint, and Margaret Vanhouten (eds.), Counterintelligence: A Documentary Look at America's
Secret Police, National Lawyer's Guild, Chicago, 1982.
4. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, The FBI and CISPES, 101st Congress, 1st Session,
Rep. No. 101-46, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1989.
5. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Consti-
tutional Rights,Break-Ins at Sanctuary Churches and Organizations Opposed to Administration Policy in
Central America, Serial No. 42, 100th Congress, 1st Session, Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1988, Hearing of February 19-20,1987, pp. 432 ff. Also see Harlan, Christi, "The Informant Left Out
in the Cold," Dallas Morning News, April 6,1986; Gelbspan, Ross, "Documents show Moon group aided
FBI," Boston Globe, Apri 1 18, 1988; and Ridgeway, James, "Spooking the Left," Village Voice, March 3,
1987. For more on Varelli's role and the FBI's attempt to scapegoat him, see Gelbspan, Ross, "COIN-
TELPRO in the '80s: The 'New' FBI," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 31 (Winter 1989), pp. 14-16.
6.See, for example, the FBI teletype on p. 18. Also see Buitrago, Report on CISPES Files Maintained
by FBI Headquarters and Released Under the Freedom of Information Act, Fund for Open Information and
Accountability, Inc., New York, 1988; Groups Included in the CISPES Files Obtained from FBI Headquarters,
Center for Constitutional Rights, 1988; Ridgeway, James, "Abroad at Home: The FBI's Dirty War,"
Village Voice, February 9, 1988.
7. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights,CISPES and FBI Counter-Terrorism Investigations, Serial No. 122, 100th Congress,
2nd Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1989, Hearing of September 16,1988,
pp. 116-27. The changing public positions taken by Webster and Sessions concerning the FBI's CISPES
operations are well traced in Buitrago, Ann Mari, "Sessions' Confessions," Covert Action Information
Bulletin, No. 31 (Winter 1989), pp. 17-19.
8. Zinn, Howard, A People's History of the United States, Harper and Row Publishers, New York,
1980, p. 543. Also see Johnson, Loch, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation, University
of Kentucky Press, Lexington, 1985, pp. 221, 271; and Hersh, Seymour, The Price of Power, Simon and
Schuster, New York, 1983, p. 295.
9. The campaigns against Church and Bayh are documented in the files of Political Research
Associates, Cambridge, Mass. On Wright, see Barry, John M., The Ambition and the Power: The Fall of Jim
Wright, A True Story of Washington, Viking, New York, 1989.
10.The FBI and CISPES, op. cit., p.15.
11. Break-Ins at Sanctuary Churches and Organizations Opposed to Administration Policy in Central
America, op. cit., pp. 515-6.
12.The FBI and CISPES, op. cit., p.l.
13.Tolan, Sandy, "Tough Guys Don't Dance: How the FBI Infiltrated Earth First," Village Voice, July
25,1989, p. 19; Ridgeway, James and Bill Gifford, 'The Gritz Gets His," Village Voice, July 25,1989, pp.
18; Kuipers, Dean, "Raising Arizona," Spin, September 1989, p. 32.
14."U.S. Targets NLG Attorney in Grand Jury Contempt," National Lawyers Guild Notes, May-June
1990, pp. 11-2.
15.A Report from the City of Birmingham, Alabama to the United States Senate Judiciary Committee on the
Harassment of African-American Birmingham City Officials by Offices of the United States Attorney, The Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Internal Revenue Service (Criminal Division), reprinted in Congressional
Record, Vol. 136, No. 23, March 9,1990. "Harassment of African American Elected Officials," Resolution
of the National Council of Churches, November 16, 1989; Sawyer, Mary R., Harassment of Black Elected
331
Officials: Ten Years Later, Voter Education and Registration Action Inc., Washington, D.C., 1987.
16. Gitlin, Todd, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage, Bantam Books, 1987, pp. 363-4. The
discovery of the covert operation is described in War at Home, op. cit., p. 47.
16."Quoted from "Racial Matters:" The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972, was published
by The Free Press, New York, 1989, pp. 297, 293-4, 322-3, 295, 316.
Introduction
1. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Operations, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans,13ook II, 94th Congress, 2d Session, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C, 1976.
2.Theoharis, Athan, "Building a File: The Case Against the FBI," Washington Post, October 30,1988.
3.Theoharis' credentials in being cast as an expert in this regard are rather impressive on their face,
and include several books on or related to the topic. These include The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S.
Politics, 1945-1955 (University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1970), The Seeds of Repression: Harry S.
Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1971), Spying on Americans: Political
Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1978), The Truman
Presidency: The Origins of the Imperial Presidency and the National Security State (EM. Coleman Enterprises,
New York, 1979), Beyond the Hiss Case: The FBI, Congress, and the Cold War (Temple University Press,
Philadelphia, 1982), and, with John Stuart Cox, The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition
(Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1988). He has also co-edited, with Robert Griffith, The Specter:
Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism (New View Points, New York, 1974).
Hence, he had ample reason to know better than most of the things he claimed to believe in his review.
One explanation of why he said them anyway is that we failed to cite any of his proliferate material in
Agents. His ego appears to have suffered mightily as a result
4. It's a bit surprising Theoharis elected to challenge our contention that COINTELPRO was
continued after the FBI claimed it was ended. In his own Spying on Americans (op. cit.,p.150), he observes,
"The decision to terminate COINTELPRO was not then a decision to terminate COINTELPRO-type
activilies...In Apri11971, [J. Edgar] Hoover had simply ordered discontinuance of a formal, and for that
reason vulnerable, program. In the future such activities could still be instituted ad hoc." Nor is this mere
theorizing on the author's part, a matter he makes quite clear on the following page: "The Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities investigation of COINTELPRO [to which Theoharis served as a
consultant], moreover, uncovered at least three COINTELPRO-type operations conducted after Hoover's
April 28, 1971, termination order." We will be forgiven for observing that this is exactly the thesis in
Agents 'Theoharis chose to attack most vociferously.
5. It should be noted that the reviewer's reasoning here runs directly counter to that which he
himself expressed (Ibid., p. 151) when he quoted staff counsel to the Senate Select Committee Barbara
Banoff in 1975: "The Committee has not been able to determine with any [great] precision the extent to
which COINTELPRO may be continuing. Any proposals to initiate COINTELPRO-type actions [or
reports on such actions] would be filed under the individual case caption. The Bureau has over 500,000
case files, and each one would have to be searched." Certainly, this rule applies to AIM and its members
as much as to any other organization or individuals. For the record, Banoff refers to five previously
undisclosed COINTELPROs rather than the three Theoharis acknowledges having been ongoing after
1971 (see note 3, above).
6.For starters, it should be mentioned that thousands of documents and the testimony of scores of
witnesses went into preparation of the Select Committee's report on the COINTELPRO waged against
the Black Panther Party (The FBI's Covert Program to Destroy the Black Panther Party, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976). By contrast, when the Senate Subcommittee on Internal
Security prepared its report on AIM during the same year (Revolutionary Activities in the United States:
The American Indian Movement, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), no official documents and only
one witness — FBI infiltrator/provocateur Douglass Durham — were utilized as a basis.
7. This led directly to one of the three post-1971 "COINTELPRO-type" operations Theoharis
acknowledges: "The leaking of derogatory information about Daniel Ellsberg's lawyer to Ray McHugh,
chief of the Copley News Service." (Spying on Americans, op. cit., p. 151).
8. The break-in at the Media resident agency, which occurred on the night of March 8, 1971,
compromised the secrecy of COINTELPRO and thereby set in motion a process of high level "re-
Introduction Notes 333
evaluation" of the program's viability. This led to an April 28 memorandum from Charles D. Brennan,
number two man in the COINTELPRO administrative hierarchy, to his boss, FBI Assistant Director
William C Sullivan. Brennan recommended the acronym be dropped, but that the activities at issue be
continued under a new mantle "with tight procedures to insure absolute secrecy." Hoover's famous
"COINTELPRO termination" memo of the following day was merely a toned-down paraphrase of the
Brennan missive. In another connection, it should be noted that publication of the COINTELPRO docu-
ments taken from the Media office was not in itself sufficient to cause the FBI to admit either the long-
term existence or the dimension of its domestic counterintelligence activities. Instead, this required a
suit brought by NBC correspondent Carl Stern after the reporter had requested that Attorney General
Richard Kleindienst provide him with a copy of any Bureau document which "(i) authorized the
establishment of Cointelpro — New Left, (ii) terminated such program, and (iii) ordered or authorized
any change in the purpose, scope or nature of such program" on March 20,1972. Kleindienst stalled until
January 13, 1973 before denying Stern's request. Stern then went to court under provision of the 1966
version of the FOIA, with the Justice Department counter-arguing that the judiciary itself "lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint." Finally, on July 16, 1973 U.S. District Judge
Barrington Parker ordered the documents delivered to his chambers for in camera review and, on
September 25, ordered their release to Stern. The Justice Department attempted to appeal this decision
on October 20, but abandoned the effort on December 6. On the latter date, Acting Attorney General
Robert Bork released the first two documents to Stern, an action followed on March 7,1974 by the release
of seven more. By this point, there was no way to put the genie back in the bottle, and the Senate Select
Committee as well as a number of private attorneys began to force wholesale disclosures of COIN-
TELPRO papers.
9.The classic articulation of how this was rationalized came in the 1974 Justice Department report
on COINTELPRO produced by an "investigating committee" headed by Assistant Attorney General
Henry Peterson. After reviewing no raw files (innocuously worded FBI "summary reports" were
accepted instead), but still having to admit that many aspects of COINTELPRO violated the law, the
Peterson committee nonetheless recommended against prosecuting any of the Bureau personnel
involved: "Any decision as to whether prosecution should be undertaken must also take into account
several other important factors which bear on the events in question. These factors are: first, the
historical context in which the programs were conceived and executed by the Bureau in response to
public and even Congressional demands for action to neutralize the self-proclaimed revolutionary aims
and violence prone activities of extremist groups which posed a threat to the peace and tranquility of
our cities in the mid and late sixties; second, the fact that each of the COINTELPRO programs were
personally approved and supported by the late Director of the FBI; and third, the fact that the
interference with First Amendment rights resulting from individual implemented program actions
were insubstantial." The Senate Select Committee and other bodies went rather further in their research
and used much harsher language in describing what had happened under COINTELPRO auspices, but
the net result in terms of consequences to the Bureau and its personnel were precisely the same: none.
10.Examples abound. Early instances come with Jimmy Carter's Executive Order 12036, signed on
January 24,1978, which moved important areas of intelligence/counterintelligence activity under the
umbrella of "executive restraint" rather than effective oversight, and the electronic surveillance
loopholes imbedded in S. 1566, a draft bill allegedly intended to protect citizens' rights from such police
invasion of privacy, which passed the senate by a vote of 99-1 on April 20,1978. This was followed on
December 4,1981 by Ronald Reagan's Executive Order 12333, expanding the range of activities in which
U.S. intelligence agencies might 'legally' engage. Then there was the Intelligence Identities Protection
Act of 1982 which made it a "crime" to disclose the identities of FBI informants, infiltrators and
provocateurs working inside domestic political organizations. And, in 1983, Reagan followed up with
Executive Order 12356, essentially allowing agencies such as the FBI to void the Freedom of Information
Act by withholding documents on virtually any grounds they choose. Arguably, things are getting
worse, not better.
11.For an in-depth analysis of the disinformation campaign at issue, see Weisman, Joel D., "About
that 'Ambush' at Wounded Knee,"ColumbW Journalism Review, September-October 1975.
12.To the contrary, as Theoharis quotes Barbara Banoff in Spying on Americans, op. cit., p. 151, "a
search of all investigative files" rather than merely those the FBI consents to release in any given instance
stands to reveal hidden COINTELPRO activity.
13.U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Report of Investigation: Oglala Sioux Tribe, General Election, 1974,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1974.
14.U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Monitoring of Events Related to the Shootings of Two FBI Agents
on the Pine Ridge Reservation, Mountain States Regional Office, Denver, CO, July 9, 1975.
15.The statement comes from the trial transcript of U.S. v. Dennis Banks and Russell Means, (383
F.Supp. 368, August 20, 1974) as quoted in the New York Times, September 17, 1974. For further
information, see Dennis Banks and Russell Means v. United States (374 F.Supp. 321, April 30, 1974).
16.Public summary of jury foreman Robert Bolin, quoted in the Cedar Rapids (Iowa) Gazette, July
17, 1976.
17.In fact, the Senate Select Committee for which Theoharis worked reached exactly the opposite
conclusion: "While the FBI considered federal prosecution the 'logical' result, it should be noted that key
activists [such as the Panther leadership] were chosen not because they were suspected of having
committed or planning to commit any specific federal crime." N.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee
on Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report: Supplementary Detailed
Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, 94th Congress, 2d Session, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1976).
18.See Ji Jaga (Pratt), Geronimo, Report on the Prison Suit Pratt v. Rees, Geronimo Pratt Defense
Committee, San Francisco, 1982. For a fuller elaboration of the overall case, see Churchill, Ward, and Jim
Vander Wall, "COINTELPRO Against the Black Panthers: The Case of Geronimo Pratt," Covert Action
Information Bulletin, No. 31, January 1989, pp. 35-9.
19.Means finally served a year in the South Dakota State Prison at Sioux Falls, but not for any charge
among the original forty. Rather, he was sentenced for his "contempt" of South Dakota Judge Richard
Braithwaite, signified by refusing to stand when the judge entered the courtroom, and by defending
himself when the judge ordered armed deputies to physically assault him as a consequence. At the time
of his release from prison, Means was on the Amnesty International list of persons to be adopted as a
prisoner of conscience; see Proposal for a commission of inquiry into the effect of domestic intelligence activities
on criminal trials in the United States of America, Amnesty International, New York, 1980.
20.The Moves Camp affair is covered exceedingly well in Matthiessen, Peter, In the Spirit of Crazy
Horse, Viking Press, New York, 1984, pp. 93-8.
21. Ibid., pp. 113-6.
22.This was admitted by the government before the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on April
12, 1978 (United States v. Leonard Peltier, C77-3003).
23.See Matthiessen, op. cit., pp. 345-6.
24.For a synthesis of this sort of material documented in Agents, see Churchill, Ward, "Renegades,
Terrorists, and Revolutionaries: The Government's Propaganda War Against the American Indian
Movement," Propaganda Review, No. 4, April 1989.
25.Note once again that both the Senate Select Committee and Theoharis himself long ago reached
the conclusion that the FBI had simply abandoned tell-tale headings like "COINTELPRO" while
continuing political counterintelligence operations hidden under individual file captions. Such conclu-
sions correspond very well with statements made under oath by former agents such as M. Wesley
Swearingen that, "The program had been 'officially' discontinued in April, 1971, but agents...continued
to carry out the program's objectives." (Swearingen Deposition, Honolulu, Hawaii, October 1980, p. 2).
26.See, for example, Harassment Update: Chronological List of FBI and Other Harassment Incidents,
Movement Support Network and Center for Constitutional Rights/National Lawyers Guild Anti-
Repression Project, New York, January 1987 (Sixth Edition).
27.For a solid examination of the government conspiracy to "get" Garvey by whatever means it
could conjure up, see Hill, Robert A., "The Foremost Radical of His Race: Marcus Garvey and the Black
Scare, 1918-1920," Prologue, No. 16, Winter 1984. A broader view of the man and his accomplishments
is offered in Vincent, Ted, Black Power and the Garvey Movement, Nzinga Publishing House, Oakland, CA,
1987. Also see Cronon, E. Davis, Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the United Negro Improvement
Association, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1955.
28.A massive collection of documents on the Hiss case is available in book form, edited by Edith
Tiger under the title In Re Alger Hiss (Hill and Wang Publishers, New York, 1979). There are also a num-
ber of good books available on the subject. A particularly interesting early example is Cook, Fred J., The
Unfinished Story of Alger Hiss, William Morrow Company, New York, 1958. Also see Chabot Smith, John,
Alger Hiss: The True Story, Holt, Rinehart and Winston Publishers, New York, 1976. Perhaps the
Chapter 1 Notes: Understanding Deletions 335
definitive treatment of the matter may be found in Weinstein, Allen, Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case,
Alfred A. Knopf Publisher, New York, 1978.
29.For further information on the FBI's anti-CISPES operations, see Buitrago, Ann Mari, Report on
CISPES Files Maintained by the FBI and Released under the Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, Inc., New York,
January 1988.
30.There was another ostensible COINTELPRO conducted during the 1960s with which we do not
deal (the FBI itself lists a total of twelve in its reading room catalogue, but several of these were directed
against the same general target, e.g.: COINTELPRO-CP,USA and Operation Hoodwink). This was the
so-called Counterintelligence Program — White Hate Groups, directed primarily at the ku klux klan,
undertaken by COINTELPRO head William C. Sullivan during the period of the most significant civil
rights activism in the South, and continued for several years. Although writers such as Athan Theoharis
(see Spying on Americans, op. cit.) and Don Whitehead (see his Attack on Terror: The FBI Against the Ku Klux
Klan in Mississippi, Funk and Wagnall's Publishers, New York, 1970) have made much of this undertak-
ing, we have elected not to indude it along with our analyses of operations directed against progressive
organizations because it seems to have been altogether different in intent.While we recognize that there
was (and probably is) a genuine counterintelligence dimension to the Bureau's dealings with the klan,
its purpose seems all along to have been not so much to destroy the klan and related groups as to gain
control of them in order to use them as surrogate forces against the left. As Glick (op. cit.) observes at
pages 12-3, "This unique 'program' functioned largely as a component of the FBI's operations against
the progressive activists who were COINTELPRO's main targets. Under the cover of being even-handed
and going after violent right-wing groups, the FBI actually gave covert aid to the Ku Klux Klan,
Minutemen, Nazis, and other racist vigilantes. These groups received substantial funds, information
and protection — and suffered only token FBI harassment — so long as they directed their violence against
COINTELPRO targets. They were not subjected to serious disruption unless they breached this tacit
,
understanding and attacked established business and political leaders."
Chapter 1: Understanding Deletions in FBI Documents

1.Buitrago, Ann Mari, and Leon Andrew Immerman, Are You Now or Have You Ever Been in the FBI
F Hes? Grove Press, New York, 1981, p. 53.
2. This, in the vernacular, is called an "XGDS [Exempt from General Declassification Schedule],"
defined in E.O. 11652, Section 5 (A), 5 (B), and is a Bureau favorite.
3. Buitrago and Immerman, op. cit., p. 61.
4. There was an earlier Reagan executive order, E.O. 12333, signed on December 4, 1981, which
paved the way for this. See Editors, 'The Executive Order," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 16,
March 1982.
5.Buitrago and Immerman, op. cit., p. 72.
6.See "Former Agent [M. Wesley Swearingen] Challenges Claims on Withholding Files in SWP
Case," Access Reports 5, January 23, 1979, pp. 8-9. The former agent's understanding of the situation is
corroborated by no less an authority on the subject than J. Edgar Hoover, who, in a 1968 memorandum
to the attorney general, conceded that: "...as a general rule, all of our security informants are available
for interview by Department attorneys and for testimony if needed"; cited in "ACLU Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motion to Reconsider June 7, 1977 Order Relating
to Informer's Privilege," American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago (N.D. Ill. No. 75 C 3295, 1978),
p. 14.
7. Buitrago and Immerman, op. cit., p. 69.
8.See the US. House of Representatives report on operational definitions under the 1966 version
of the Freedom of Information Act reproduced in Marwick, Christine M. (ed.), Litigation Under the
Amended Freedom of Information Act, Center for National Security Studies, Washington, D.C., (Fourth
Edition) 1978, p. 15.
9. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 45 U.S. 352, 369-70 (1976).
10. Access Reports, Access Reference File, 14.05.
11.Buitrago and Immerman, op. cit., p. 78.
12.The Pratt FOIA documents are stored by the law offices of Jonathan Lubell, New York.
13.The Hampton-Clark FOIA documents are stored by the People's Law Office, Chicago.
Chapter 2: COINTELPRO—CP,USA
1. U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, 94th Congress, 2d Session, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976, pp. 14 (esp. n. 82), 66, 211.
2. Quoted in U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Hearings on Intelligence Activities, Vol. 6: The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 94th
Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 372-6.
3. Quoted in Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book H, op. cit., pp. 66-7.
4. Actually, there were two left factions which broke off from the SPA in September 1919: the CP
and the Communist Labor Party (CLP), headed byJohn Reed, Benjamin Gitlow and Alfred Wagenknech t.
The differences between the CP and the CLP were both sectarian and miniscule, and they were ordered
merged by the Comintern in 1921. See Draper, Theodore, The Roots of American Communism, Viking
Press, New York, 1963, pp. 50-79. Also see Rosenstone, Robert A., Romantic Revolutionary: A Biography
of John Reed, Vintage Books, New York, 1981, pp. 354-5.
5.See Goldstein, Robert Justin, Political Repression in Modern America,1870 to the Present, Schenkman
Publishing Co./Two Continents Publishing Group, Ltd., Cambridge/ London, 1978, p. 141. Also see
Noggel, Earl, Into the Twenties: The United States from Armistice to Normalcy, University of Illinois Press,
Urbana, 1974, pp. 31-45; and Murray, Robert K., Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, McGraw-Hill
Publishers, New York, 1964, pp. 7-9.
6.Quoted in Coben, Stanley, A. Mitchell Palmer: Politician, Columbia University Press, New York,
1963, p. 209.
7.Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 149-50. Also see Murray, op. cit., pp. 193-4; Jensen, Vernon H., The Price of
Vigilance, Rand-McNally Publishers, Chicago, 1968, p. 275; and Lowenthal, Max, The Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Harcourt-Brace Publishers, New York, 1950, pp. 83-143.
8. See Jaffe, Julian K., Crusade Against Radicalism: New York During the Red Scare, Kennikat
Publishers, Port Washington, NY, 1972, pp. 179-81. Also see Warth, Robert, "The Palmer Raids," South
Atlantic Quarterly, No. 48, January 1949, pp. 1-23; Murray, op. cit., pp. 196-7; and Coben, op. cit., pp. 219-
21.
9.See Chafee, Zechariah, Free Speech in the United States, Atheneum Publishers, New York, 1969, pp.
247-60. Also see Murray, op. cit., p.198; Coben op. cit., pp. 221-2; and Warth, op. cit., p.7. It should be noted
that J. Edgar Hoover went personally to the dock to watch the Buford depart.
10.Goldstein, op. cit., p. 156. Also see Preston, William Jr., Aliens and Dissenters, Harper and Row
Publishers, New York, 1966, pp. 217-21; Murray, op. cit., pp. 210-7; Coben, op. cit., pp. 222-9; and Chafee,
op. cit., Pp. 204-5.
11.Goldstein, op. cit., p. 157. Also see Howe, Irving, and Lewis Coser, The American Communist
Party, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1962, p. 51.
12.Goldstein, op. cit. Also see Muzik, Edward J., "Victor L. Berger: Congress and the Red Scare,"
Wisconsin Magazine of History, No. 47, Summer 1964.
13.Goldstein, op. cit. Also see Warth, op. cit., pp. 16-17 and Coben, op. cit., p. 241.
14.Curiously, Secretary Wilson was to decide in May of the same year that membership in the CLP
was not sufficient grounds for denaturalization and deportation.
15.Quoted in Johnson, Donald, The Challenge of American Freedoms, University of Kentucky Press,
Lexington, 1963, p.163. The judge also noted that GID infiltration of the CP and CLP had been so great
by January 2, 1919 that J. Edgar Hoover had actually been in a position to instruct his operatives to
convene party meetings to fit the schedules desired by his raiders.
16.Goldstein, op. cit., p. 101. Although the mass pressure subsided, such was not the case with
targeted leaders. CP head Charles E. Ruthenburg, to name a prominent example, never spent a day free
of trials and/or appeals from 1919 until his death in 1927; see Howe and Coser, op. cit., pp. 52-64 and
Draper, op. cit., pp. 197-395. On the Non-Partisan League, see Morlan, Robert L., Political Prairie Fire: The
Non-Partisan League, 1915-1922, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1955.
17.See Shannon, David, The Socialist Party of America, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967, p. 163.
Also see Draper, op. cit., pp. 158, 190, and 206-7.
18.On Passaic, see Johnpole, Bernard K., Pacifist's Progress: Norman Thomas and the Decline of
American Socialism, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1970, p. 48. On New Bedford, see Bernstein, Irving, The
Chapter 2 Notes: COINTELPRO — CP, USA 337
Lean Years, Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1966, p. 203. On Gastonia, see Howe and Coser, op. cit., pp. 243-
5. All three strikes were accompanied by extreme police violence and other gross violations of
constitutional rights without so much as a hint of interference from the federal government.
19. On the Unemployed Movement, see Schlesinger, Arthur M., The Crisis of the Old Order,
Houghton-Mifflin Publishers, Boston, 1966, pp. 219-20. On the Bonus Army, see Lisio, Donald J., The
President and Protest: Hoover,Conspiracy and the Bonus Riot, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1974.
A sample of the methods used comes in the form of a May 1932 incident in Melrose Park, Illinois in which
police lined movement protestors up against a wall and hosed them down with submachineguns,
wounding eight; see Bernard, Edgar, et. al., Pursuit of Freedom: Civil Liberty in Illinois, Chicago Civil
Liberties Union, 1942, p. 163.
20.Examples of this abound. CP National Secretary Dennis was arrested five separate times in Los
Angeles between November 1929 and March 1930 on charges such as "speaking without a license." Such
treatment was typical; in 1948, he was among the first US. citizens actually convicted under the Smith
Act (see Digest of the Public Record of Communism in the United States, Fund for the Republic, New York,
1955, pp. 31-6). Barton, Secretary of the Alabama branch of the party, was arrested in the town of
Bessemer during the summer of 1936 and charged under a local "seditious literature law" with
possessing copies of The Nation and The New Republic; a magistrate informed him that, "It's all
communist stuff and you cannot have it in Bessemer," before sentencing him to 180 days at hard labor
and a $100 fine (see Auerbach, Jerold S., Labor and Liberty: The IaFollette Committee and the New Deal,
Bobbs-Merrill Publishers, Indianapolis, 1966, pp. 94-6; also see Kreuger, Thomas A., And Promises to
Keep: The Southern Conference on Human Welfare, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, TN, 1967, pp.
1-10). At the specific request of Franklin D. Roosevelt, San Francisco CP branch leader Sam Darcy and
Harry Bridges, president of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, were un-
successfully targeted for deportation in the aftermath of the 1934 San Francisco general strike. From
there, Bridges' saga is all but unbelievable. Roosevelt persisted and, in 1940, the House of Representa-
tives voted 330-42 to proceed with deportation even without a legal basis. The victim appealed and
showed evidence that he had severed all connection with the CP in early 1937. Roosevelt nonetheless
instituted executive deportation proceedings in February 1941. In September of that year, a "special
examiner" appointed by the president determined that the labor leader was indeed "subversive" and
warranted deportation. Bridges appealed to the Board of Immigration, which ruled in his favor. Acting
Attorney General Francis Biddle then overruled the board and ordered that deportation should occur
in May 1942. Bridges filed an emergency appeal with the Supreme Court, which issued a stay until it had
time to review the matter more thoroughly. This did not occur until after Roosevelt's death in 1945, at
which time the high court ruled in Bridges' favor. But all was not over. In May 1949, congress indicted
Bridges, ostensibly for having perjured himself when he claimed in a deposition entered before the
Supreme Court that he was not a communist in 1945. He was convicted, but appealed and the Supreme
Court upheld him in 1953 (meanwhile, two committees formed to assist in his legal defense were placed
on the attorney general's list of subversive organizations solely because of their affiliation with his case).
Finally, in 1956, the Eisenhower administration tried unsuccessfully to have Bridges deported under
provision of the Taft-Hartley Act (Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 [1947]). Hence, for
more than twenty years, the government pursued an unrelenting quest to banish Harry Bridges,
apparently for no reason other than objections to his ideological perspective (see Larrowe, Charles P.,
Harry Bridges: The Rise and Fall of Radical labor, Lawrence Hill Publisher, New York, 1972).
21.On Imperial Valley, see Jamieson, Stuart, Labor Unionism in American Agriculture, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1954, pp. 80-6; also see McWilliams, Carey, Factories in the Fields,
Peregrine Press, Santa Barbara, CA, 1971, pp. 212-5. On Harlan County, see Bubka, Tony, "The Harlan
County Coal Strike of 1931," Labor History, No. 11, Winter 1970, pp. 41-57; also see Tindall, George B.,
The Emergence of the New South, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1967, pp. 383-6.
22.The estimate is extrapolated from Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 228-9: "The American Communist
Party had made major gains during the war. CP membership...doubled during the war years, reaching
about seventy-five thousand to eighty-five thousand by May, 1945." These figures accord well with the
post-war estimate of 80,000 CP members advanced by FBI Assistant Director William C Sullivan in his
letter of resignation to J. Edgar Hoover on October 6,1971 (the letter is reproduced verbatim as Appendix
C in Sullivan, William C, with Bill Brown, The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI, W .W. Norton Co.,
New York, 1975). Hence, we have simply divided the 80,000 figure in half to arrive at a rough estimate
of party membership during the late 1930s.
23. On formation of HUAC (also called the 'Dies Committee" in its early days, after its founder),
see Patterson, James T., Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, University of Kentucky Press,
Lexington, 1967; also see Ogden, August R., The Dies Committee, Catholic University Press, Washington,
D.C., 1945. On the effect of the Non-Aggression Pact upon U.S. domestic politics, see Bell, Leland V., In
Hitler's Shadow: The Anatomy of American Nazism, Kennikat Publishers, Port Washington, NY, 1973; also
see Smith, Geoffrey S., To Save aNation: American Countersubversives, the New Deal and the Coming of World
War H, Basic Books, New York, 1973. This context, of course, led to legislation, and not only the Smith
Act of 1940. hi March of 1938, congress approved a measure which called for the deportation of any alien
who advocated "any changes in the American form of government [emphasis added]" (see Swisher,
Carl, "Civil Liberties in Our Time," Political Science Quarterly, No. 55, September 1940, p. 340). This was
followed, on October 14, 1940, by passage of the Nationality Act (54 Stat. 1137) which provided for
deportation of communists, and exdusion of anyone who, during the decade prior to applying to
immigrate, had been affiliated with communist parties or ideologies. On October 17 of the same year,
the Voorhis "Anti-Propaganda" Act (54 Stat. 1201) was passed, requiring the registration of all
organizations "advocating the overthrow of any government [emphasis added]." Ironically, about all
this last statute accomplished was to bring about the registration of five anti-nazi organizations which
listed their purpose as the pursuit of overthrowing the Hitler government in Germany. For its part, the
CP simply severed all formal ties with the Soviet Comintern, and thus avoided the whole thing. See
Nissen, D.R., Federal Anti-Communist Legislation, 193141, unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of
Illinois, Urbana, 1955, pp. 24, 65-9. Also see Chafee, op. cit., p. 461.
24. The full text of Roosevelt's 1939 directive is reproduced in U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Internal Security, Hearings on Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes,
Part I, 93d Congress, 2d Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp. 3336-7.
25. Sullivan and Brown, op. cit., p. 128.
26.Ibid., p. 21. The Bureau was also engaged in a considerable amount of wiretapping of the CP
during this period, in direct violation of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1064; Section
605), which reads in part, "No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communi-
cation and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person [emphasis added]." In the 1937 case U.S. v. Nardone (58 S.Ct.
275, 302 U.S. 379, 82 L.Ed. 314), the Supreme Court dearly determined that the prohibition against wire-
tapping applied equally to federal agencies as to private citizens; Attorney General Robert H. Jackson
therefore issued Order No. 3343 (March 15,1940) forbidding all FBI wiretapping. On May 21, however,
Franklin D. Roosevelt secretly invoked "executive privilege" to reverse the high court position,
informing Jackson: "You are authorized and directed in such cases as you may approve...to authorize
investigating agents that they are at liberty to secure information by listening devices direct to the
conversation or other communications of persons suspected of subversive activities against the
Government of the United States, including suspected spies." Jackson proceeded to allow Hoover to
exercise his own "best judgment" concerning when, where and whom to tap. It is dubious that
Roosevelt's directive was ever of legal standing, given that both other branches of the federal
government had specifically expressed the opposite view. Roosevelt's directive might have provided
the FBI a form of legitimation for its wiretapping activities had director Hoover not chosen to ignore the
president's qualifying language in the same document — "You are requested to limit (wiretapping and
bugging! to a minimum and to limit them insofar as is possible to aliens [emphasis added]." — when engaging
in anti-CP operations. That this was intentional distortion rather than an "error" on the part of the
Bureau was plainly revealed when Hoover convinced Attorney General Tom Clark to persuade Harry
Truman to "reaffirm" the Roosevelt directive in 1946 providing a text which avoided the qualification
altogether, thereby finally establishing a presidential directive for what the FBI had been doing all along.
Truman duly complied with what was requested, but stipulated (at the suggestion of Assistant Attorney
General Payton Ford) that the directive be kept secret. Hence, on July 8, 1949, Hoover issued Bureau
Bulletin No. 34, instructing his agents to protect the FBI (and the administration) from the embarrass-
ment which might accrue if the extent of electronic surveillance (and the illegal entries of various
premises which usually went with the task of installing bugs) became known. This, he said, should be
done by the simple expedient of not including "sensitive" information in their memoranda and reports
to FBI headquarters: "[Hereafter], facts and information which are considered of a nature not expedient
to disseminate or would cause embarrassment to the Bureau, if distributed" should be omitted from
Chapter 2 Notes: COINTELPRO — CP, USA 339
everything but the "administrative pages" of Bureau documents. This allowed both Clark and Hoover
(and, by extension, Truman) to simply deny what had become official policy.
27. The full text of the 1943 directive is contained in Hearings on Domestic Intelligence Operations for
Internal Security Purposes, Part 1, op. cit., p. 3337.
28. Quoted in U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Final Report: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the
Rights of Americans, Book III, 94th Congress, 2d Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1976, p. 16.
29. See Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, op. cit., pp. 66, 211 (n. 1). Also see
Caute, David, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower, Simon and
Schuster, New York, 1978. Cronin, it should be noted, was provided FBI files from which to prepare a
1945 report on "American Communism" for the American Catholic archbishops, and a 1946 sequel
which went to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
30. Memorandum, Attorney General Tom Clark to President Harry S. Truman, August 17, 1948;
Truman draft statement undated. Both documents are lodged in the Harry S. Truman Library.
31. Truman Papers, PPF 1-F, January-July 1950; Harry S. Truman Library.
32. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 319. For embedded quote, see Carr, Robert K., The House Committee on Un-
American Activities, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1952, p. 169.
33. Spying on Americans, op. cit., p. 134; Theoharis goes on to note that "FBI investigative
reports...served to popularize the conclusion of bureau officials that radicals were subversive, to
sensitize the American public to the internal security threat, and concomitantly to discredit individuals
and/or organizations active in radical politics." The Subversive Activities Control Board was estab-
lished by the McCarran Act and bore responsibility for implementing the law's "communist registra-
tion" provisions. The loyalty and security programs came into formal existence on June 20, 1940 with
the U.S. Civil Service Commission's issuance of Circular No. 222, ostensibly banning all members of "the
Communist Party, the German Bund, or any Communist, Nazi or Fascist organizations" from govern-
ment employment. To create an enforcement mechanism, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
House Resolution 66 on January 8, 1941, authorizing the FBI to "make such investigation as it might
deem proper with respect to employee loyalty and employment policies and practices in the Govern-
ment." H.R. 66 and corresponding FBI investigations were used in turn as the basis for a demand by the
House, tendered on July 25,1946, that the federal executive establish "a complete and unified program
that will give adequate protection to our Government against individuals whose primary loyalty is to
governments other than our own" (US. House of Representatives, Committee on the Civil Service,
Report of Investigation with Respect to Employee loyalty and Employment Policies and Practices in the Govern-
ment of the United States, in A. Devitt Venech Papers, Harry S. Truman Library). On March 22, 1947,
President Truman effected Executive Order 9835, creating a full-blown "loyalty program" and assign-
ing the FBI a prominent role therein. The matter of the "twelve Communist party leaders...indicted
under the Smith Act of 1940" refers to the so-called Dennis Case [U.S. v. Dennis, et. al., 183 F.2d 201 (2nd
Cir. 1950)]. As Sanford J. Ungar puts it in his FBI: An Uncensored Look Behind the Walls (Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, 1976, p. 131): "[T]he Justice Department used the Smith Act and enormous legal
resources in an effort to destroy the American Communist party. In the Dennis Case, which took nine
months to try in 1949, the government prosecuted Eugene Dennis and ten other top leaders of the
[CP,USA]; the case resulted in a Supreme Court declaration in 1950 [Dennis v. U.S., 71 S. Ct. 857, 341 U.S.
494, 95 L. Ed. 1137, reh'g. denied, 72 S. Ct. 20, 342 U.S. 842, % L. Ed. 636 and 78 S. Ct. 409, 355 U.S. 936,
92 L. Ed. 419] that the Smith Act was a constitutional means for a society to protect itself. Even if the
people and organizations prosecuted had little actual prospect of successfully overthrowing the govern-
ment, the majority ruled, a conspiracy to try and do so could be punished." The nature of the high court's
logic in this is taken up in Chapter 3. Ultimately, in addition to the twelve defendants in the Dennis case,
68 "second string" CP members were prosecuted under the Smith Act during 1951 and 1952; Goldstein,
op. cit., p. 332.
34. Hoover is quoted from Mollan, Robert, "Smith Act Prosecutions: The Effects of the Dennis and
Yates Cases," University of Pittsburgh Law Review, No. 1126, June 1965, pp. 707-10. The director also
appears to have claimed that the Bureau "knew every Communist in the United States" during May of
1950. Nonetheless, the numbers proved exceedingly slippery. For instance, in his 1953 report to
congress, Hoover claimed — probably to influence the newly-installed Eisenhower administration — that
CP membership was more than double his 1950 estimate, 24,796, despite a further three years of
unrelenting anti-communist activity having passed. See Cook, Fred J., The FBI Nobody Knows, Pyramid
Press, New York, 1965, p. 44.
35.Quoted in Theoharis, Seeds of Repression, op. cit., p. 137.
36.The pertinent portion of Eisenhower's statement reads, "On September 6,1939, January 8,1943,
and July 24, 1950, Presidential Directives were issued requesting all law enforcement officers, both
Federal and State, to promptly report all information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive
activities and related matters to the nearest field office of the [FBI];" the statement is reproduced in
Hearings on Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, Part 1, op. cit., pp. 3337-8.
37.Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book H, op. cit., pp. 46-7. It should be noted that
the FBI always maintained that COMINFIL was an intelligence rather than counterintelligence program
(as it has maintained that its anti-CP activities during World War II and the McCarthy period consisted
of intelligence operations). In fact, the distinction between such terms is, in Bureau vernacular, murky-
to-nonexistent. Counterintelligence requires an "intelligence" basis — infiltrators and informers, (often
illegal) surveillance and "black bag jobs" (burglaries and other illegal entries of premises) — in order to
be actualized. On the other hand, FBI Associate Director (and COINTELPRO specialist) William C.
Sullivan tended to refer to the "counterintelligence measures necessary" to conduct adequate intelli-
gence operations. For him — and he had operational control of such things for a decade — the terms were
virtually synonymous. At one point in his memoirs, while describing what was dearly a counterintel-
ligence program against the new left, he actually says, "We used the same investigative techniques
against the New Left that we used successfully against the Communist party: wiretapping, informants,
hidden microphones — the lot" (Sullivan and Brown, op. cit., p. 149). The chances are that COMINFIL
included an ample measure of counterintelligence activity, just as COINTELPRO induded intelligence-
gathering characteristics.
38.Spying on Americans, op. cit., p. 133; on page 136, the author notes that "Hoover's 1956 decision
[to launch COINTELPRO-CP,USA] was unique not because the bureau began to 'disrupt' radical
organizations — the FBI had been doing that at least since 1941 — but [only] because it initiated a formal
program based on written directives and responsive to direct supervisory control of the FBI director."
Such "uniqueness" is, to say the least, not particularly important at all. The issue is, plainly, the nature
of the Bureau's domestic counterintelligence activities, not its reporting channels. Verbal directives
obviously serve the same purpose as written ones, albeit they are harder to confirm, so long as they are
carried out by agents in the field (as it is dear they were, both before 1956, and after 1971).
39. Ibid., p. 136; "By August 1956 bureau officials no longer considered the Communist party an
actual espionage or sabotage threat [if, indeed, they ever did]."
40.Ibid., p. 135; the high court rulings were Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
35 U.S. 115 (1956); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Service
v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Watkins v. United States, 354 US. 178 (1957);
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); and Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657(1957). It is worth noting,
in connection with this quote, that many FBI infiltrators achieved high rank in the CP, and thus helped
set the very policy for which the party was ostensibly being persecuted. Others — three of whom testified
to this effect during the Dennis trial — recruited actively for the CP, one even admitting he had done so
among his "friends and relatives" in order to be "convincing" (!); see Lowenthal, op. cit. Such activities
hardly ended when Eisenhower came into office. According to the Department of Justice, in a statement
issued in August 1955, the FBI had paid a total 47 infiltrators a sum of $43,000 to operate within the CP
during the period July 1953 through April 1955;see Emerson, Thomas I.,David Haber and Norman
Dorsen, Political and Civil Rights in the United States, Little, Brown Publishers, Boston, 1967, p. 392.
41.Quoted in Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book U, op. cit., p. 281.
42."Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, November 6, 19587 lodged in the Dwight David Eisenhower
Library, Abilene, Kansas; partially reproduced in Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book
III, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
43.Goldstein, op. cit., p. 407.
44.The letter is quoted in Hearings on Intelligence Activities, Vol. 6, op. cit., pp. 821-6. Hoover also sent
a letter outlining "internal security investigations" to the White House on July 25, 1961 at the explicit
request of John F. Kennedy. Although the FBI director again failed to detail some of the more extreme
activities involved in COINTELPRO-CP,USA, he revealed more than enough — as he had on several
Chapter 3 Notes: COINTELPRO — SWP 341
earlier occasions — to cause anyone even vaguely concerned with fundamental political freedom to
become alarmed. John Kennedy, as with Eisenhower and Truman, made no move to intervene.
45. Hearings on Intelligence Activities, Vol. 6., op. cit., p. 601.
46. Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 447-8. Also see Donner, Frank J., "Let Him Wear a Wolf's Head: What the
FBI Did to William Albertson," Civil Liberties Review, No. 3, April/May 1978, pp. 12-22; Berman, Jerry
J., and Morton H. Halperin (eds.), The Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies, Center for National Security
Studies, Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 28; Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, op. cit.,
pp. 214, 240-8; Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans,Book III, op. cit., pp. 46, 59, 72 ; and Hearings
on Intelligence Activities, Vol. 6, op. cit., pp. 18-9, 763-5.
47. On the number of COINTELPRO actions undertaken against the CP, see Goldstein, op. cit., p.
407. On estimates of CP membership in 1946 and 1941, see Sullivan resignation letter in Sullivan and
Brown, op. cit.., pp. 265-77. The information on the average age of CP members comes from the text of
the latter book, at p. 148.
48. Ibid., pp. 148-9.
49. Ibid., p. 149; the plan was never consummated because the Soviets never shipped the horses.
50. Sullivan letter to Hoover, op. cit.
51.See Ungar, op. cit. , p. 306. Sullivan's talk was delivered to the United Press International Editors
and Publishers Conference in Williamsburg, Virginia.
52. Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to William C. Sullivan, dated September 11, 1971, reproduced in
full in Sullivan and Brown, op. cit., p. 264.
Chapter 3: COINTELPRO—SWP
1.Ungar, op. cit., p. 131; the other case was brought against a tiny pro-nazi group. In the SWP case,
the defendants — which included top party leaders such as James Cannon and Farrell Dobbs — appealed,
unsuccessfully, upon conviction in December 1941; see Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1944). The FBI's actions against the SWP were also supposedly predicated
on the party's possible violation of the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act (22 U.S.C. § 611 et. seq.), a
matter which never resulted in the filing of charges. Concerning the SW P's formation in 1938, it occurred
as a result of Leon Trotsky's loss of a power struggle with Josef Stalin in the USSR, resulting in the
former's expulsion from the Bolshevik Party in 1927 and deportation from the Soviet Union in 1929.
Meanwhile, in 1928, the Comintern had ordered the CP, USA to expel all followers of Trotsky within the
U.S., which it did. The outcasts immediately reformed themselves as the Communist League (CL),
began publishing a weekly newspaper titled The Militant, and merged themselves in 1934 with the
American Workers Party (AWP), forming the Workers Party (WP). In 1936, the WP itself merged briefly
with the SPA. When this arrangement did not work out, allegedly due to the SPA's "reformist
tendencies" (the SPA version is that the WP was expelled for being "disruptive"), the former WP
membership broke off, establishing itself this time as the SWP; the group joined Leon Trotsky's newly
created Fourth International — which had emerged from Trotsky's International Left Opposition
organization, to which the CL/WP/SWP group had belonged all along — the same year. The party's
youth arm, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), was not formed until 1957.
2. Zinn, op cit., p. 411. An interesting sidebar to the SWP Smith Act case is that it may well have been
used to propel racketeer Teamster leader Jimmy Hoffa into power. As Goldstein (op. cit.) puts it at pp.
252-3: "[T]he SWP bastion among Minneapolis truckers was an increasing threat to conservative
Teamsters leadership under Dan Tobin and Jimmy Hoffa, who were political allies of the Roosevelt
administration. By 1938, the SWP faction of the Teamsters Union had organized two hundred fifty
thousand men in eleven states in the northwest...In June, 1941, the SWP Teamsters withdrew from the
AFL and joined the CIO. Tobin complained to Roosevelt on June 13 about the switch and referred to his
own support to Roosevelt in 1940 and the 'radical Trotskyite' nature of the CIO teamsters. He asked
Roosevelt to move against 'those disturbers who believe in the policies of foreign radical governments.'
The White House press secretary shortly afterwards told the press that Roosevelt condemned the CIO
for chartering the SWP group and had asked that the 'government departments and agencies interested
in this,' be immediately notified. TheJune 28 [FBI] raid followed, resulting in indictments of twenty-nine
members of the SWP, including the top union leadership in Minneapolis, under the Smith Act. Acting
Attorney General Francis Biddle publicly termed the arrests the beginning of a nationwide drive against
dangerous radicals and communists. Despite the fact that no evidence was ever presented indicating
any 'actual danger to either our government or our democratic way of life' eighteen SWP leaders were
convicted and sent to jail for twelve to sixteen months. The trial succeeded in destroying the SWP in
Minneapolis, and in the long run helped bring about the rise of Jimmy Hoffa instead of Trotskyites in
the leadership of the Teamsters Union." On the Tobin/Roosevelt meeting, see Bernstein, Irving, The
Turbulent Years, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1970, p. 781. On the Biddle statement, raid and
trial, see Pahl, Thomas L., "The Dilemma of a Civil Libertarian: Francis Biddle and the Smith Act,"
(Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science, No. 34, 1967, pp. 161-3), and "The G-String Conspiracy,
Political Reprisal or Armed Revolt? The Minnesota Trotskyite Trial" (Labor History, No. 8, Winter 1967,
pp. 30-52).
3. The Jackson opinion, and brilliant analysis of it, appear in Davis, David Bryan, The Fear of
Conspiracy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1971. It should be noted that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the constitutional reality in this instance, could it have been retroactively applied,
would have led to the immediate imprisonment of Thomas Jefferson, who felt it was the moral "duty"
of the citizenry to forcibly overthrow the federal government approximately once every ten years. It was
perhaps for this reason that Jefferson's were among the books banned from government libraries during
the period in which Jackson's opinion was rendered (Zinn, op. cit., p. 422).
4. Wilkinson, Frank, The Era of Libertarian Repression - 1948 to 1973: from Congressman to President,
with Substantial Support from the Liberal Establishment, University of Akron Press, Akron, Ohio, 1974.
5. 96 Congressional Record, 1950, pp. 15520-1.
6. Ungar, op. cit., p. 132.
7. Concerning the level of FBI activity against the SWP during this period, the government's own
record of the matter "enumerates 20,000 days of wiretaps and 12,000 days of listening 'bugs' between
1943 and 1963. It documents 208 FBI burglaries of offices and homes of the SWP and its members,
resulting in the theft or photographing of 9,864 private documents"; Jayko, Margaret (ed.), FBI on Trial:
The Victory in the Socialist Workers Party Suit Against Government Spying, Pathfinder Press, New York,
1988, p. 6.
8. The document appears in Hearings on Intelligence Activities, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 377.
9. The defendants were Robert Williams, Mae Mallory (his assistant), local Monroe residents
Richard Crowder and Harold Reade, and Robert Lowry, a white Freedom Rider from New York. The
group was charged with kidnapping as the result of an incident occurring on the evening of August 27,
1961. Williams managed to get out of the country, remaining exiled in Cuba, China and elsewhere for
more than a decade. See Williams, Robert, Negroes with Guns, Third World Press, Chicago, 1973. Also
see Williams' "1957: The Swimming Pool Showdown," Southern Exposure, No. 8, Summer 1980, pp. 22-
4.
10.Perkus, Cathy (ed.), COINTELPRO: The FBI's Secret War on Political Freedom, Monad Press, New
York, 1975, p. 93. Jayko, op. cit., also details at p. 62 how: "In 1962 the FBI sent an anonymous letter to
Berta Green, an SWP member and leader of the CAMD, accusing a black group involved in CAMD of
misusing funds. The FBI also placed an anonymous telephone call about this accusation to one of the
defendants. These communications were designed to cause strife between CAMD and the black
group...In 1962 the FBI learned from an informant that CAMD was receiving financial support from the
NAACP. The New York FBI office sent an anonymous letter to the NAACP stating that the CAMD was
dominated and controlled by 'the Trotskyist branch of the communist movement.' The FBI believed the
anonymous letter stopped the NAACP aid to CAMD...In 1962 Mayor Leo Carlin of Newark designated
a certain day as CAMD Day in Newark. The Newark FBI office sent a memorandum to a newspaper
contact, describing the SWP as 'a militantly revolutionary group.' The letter stated that the function of
the CAMD was to instigate militant action and demonstrations. Mayor Carlin sharply curtailed the
intended ceremonies...In 1964 the FBI sought to use an incident relating to CAMD in an effort to discredit
the SWP in the civil rights field. There was a theft of CAMD funds from the home of a Monroe, North
Carolina civil rights leader, whom an SWP member, George Weissman, was visiting at the time. The FBI
sent an anonymous communication to various persons, including the black author James Baldwin and
a New York Times reporter. The communication contained a sardonic poem, which in effect charged that
Weissman had stolen the money."
11.Jayko, op. cit., pp. 93-4.
12. Ungar, op. cit., pp. 127-8; Paton ultimately had to go to court to force the FBI to destroy the file
it had opened on her as a result. Such cases were hardly unusual during the late 1960s.
Chapter 3 Notes: COINTELPRO — SWP 343
13.Ibid., p. 411; the case at issue was Socialist Workers Party, et al. v. Attorney General of the United
States, et al., No. 73 Civ. 3160 (463 F.Supp. 515 [1978]).
14. As Perkus, op. cit., points out at pp. 164-5, 'Three thousand students and over 250 professors
signed petitions supporting Starsky's right to academic freedom... But the regents refused to renew his
contract and he lost his job in June 1970... Since ASU he has lost two other teaching jobs in California for
political reasons." Nor was Starsky alone among SWP members, both inside and outside academe, in
being targeted in this fashion. For instance, as Judge Greisa observes (Jayko, op. cit., p. 65): "In 1964 the
Newark FBI office sent an anonymous letter to Murray Zuckoff s employer. Zuckoff was an organizer
of the SWP Newark branch and an alternate member of the SWP National Committee. The employer
then told Zuckoff that he must discontinue his SWP activities if he wanted to retain his job." Relatedly,
the judge recounts (at p. 66) how an "SWP member named [Will] Reissner testified..that he was informed
by his supervisor at work that the FBI questioned the supervisor every six months over a period of three
years. The FBI also questioned the minister who married Reissner and his wife. Finally, Reissner testified
that when he re-applied for an apartment in New York City, after having left the city and returned, the
landlord refused to rent to him again, and said that during his earlier tenancy, the FBI had come to the
landlord's office 'constantly' and had questioned the landlord and his secretary about Reissner. The
landlord did not want 'to go through that again.'"
15. Chomsky, Noam, "Introduction," in Perkus, op. cit., pp. 9-10. He goes on to note that, "There
is a fundamental difference between Watergate and Detroit. In the case of the events surrounding
Watergate, the victims were men of power who expected to share in the ruling of society and the
formation of ideology. In Detroit, the victims were outsiders, fair game for political repression of a sort
that is quite normal. Thus, it is true, in a sense, that the punishment of Nixon and his cohorts was a
vindication of our system, as this system actually operates in practice. The Nixon gang had broken the
rules, directing against the political center a minor variant of the techniques of repression that are
commonly applied to radical dissent."
16. Perkus, op. cit., p. 40-1.
17. The document is reproduced in Ibid., pp. 58-9; the anti-Halstead endeavor was markedly
harsher than those aimed at other major SWP candidates such as John Clarence Franklin (1960-61) and
Clifton DeBerry (1964). See ibid. for documents. Judge Greisa, in his 1986 decision, reproduced in Jayko,
op. cit., pp. 23-133, makes note of similar sorts of COINTELPRO operations aimed at the SWP's black
mayoral candidate in San Francisco, Sam Jordan, in 1963 (p. 61); Paul Boutelle, the SWP's black candidate
for vice president in 1968 and mayor of New York in 1969 (pp. 61-2); and black SWP senatorial candidate
Larry Stewart from New Jersey in 1964 (p. 65).
18. Quoted in Perkus, op. cit.., p. 63.
19. Quoted in ibid., p. 102.
20. See Judge Greisa's 1986 decision, quoted in Jayko, op. cit., pp. 63-5.
21.Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., p. 73. The case at issue is Stern
v. Richardson, 367 F.Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973).
22. Lobash, Arnold H., "316 Used by FBI in Informer Role," New York Times, September 5, 1976, p.
24; the author indicates these activities had been continued without interruption from the point of
COINTELPRO-SWP's initiation in 1961 through the point of his report in 1976 (i.e.: five years after the
COINTELPRO supposedly ended, and a full decade after the Bureau claimed to have ended its practice
of burglarizing its targets for other reasons). Judge Greisa, in Jayko (op. cit.), condudes among other
things that: "During the period 1960-76 there were a total of about 300 member informants and about
1,000 non-member informants used by the FBI in the SWP investigation" (p. 48), that the total percentage
of SWP membership ran at about 10% throughout the '60s and still stood at least as high as 3% in 1976
(pp. 51-2), that many of these individuals consistently fit the role of provocateurs (pp. 53-4), "[a]bout 55
FBI informants held offices or committee positions in SWP and YSA between 1960 and 1976 [while]
approximately 51 informants served on executive committees or executive boards (pp. 54-5), and that
during the period in question these infiltrators "supplied the FBI with about 12,600 SWP and YSA
documents, about 7,000 of which were intended to be available only within the organizations. These
private documents included membership lists, financial records, financial budgets and projections,
minutes of meetings, mailing lists, and correspondence. The member informants generally obtained the
documents from SWP and YSA offices, although at least one member informant obtained confidential
documents from the residence of another member...Many of the member informants served over
lengthy periods of time. This provided the FBI with a steady and voluminous flow of detailed
information. [O]ne unidentified informant worked in a local SWP office over a ten-year period opening
all mail and regularly furnishing the FBI with [information] not publicly available" (p. 55). Greisa also
identifies two of the more effective infiltrators of the SWP/YSA during this period as having been
Edward Heisler in Chicago and Ralph DeSimone in Berkeley. "Those offices were also entered twice in
1947. By far the largest number of surreptitious entries took place in New York City between 1958 and
1966 and occurred at SWP and YSA offices. There were 193 such inddents...Other cities in which the FBI
entered into SWP or YSA offices include Newark (in 1947 and 1957), Chicago (1949), Detroit (1954),
Boston (1959), and Milwaukee (1965). In addition, the FBI entered the homes of SWP members in Detroit
(1957), Newark (1951), Hamden, Connecticut (1960), and Los Angeles (1960)."
23.See Judge Greisa's decision, quoted in jayko, op. cit., pp. 56-7.
24. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 420. Judge Greisa, in Jayko (op. cit.) at pp. 72-3, summarizes the matter as
follows: "In toto the FBI made at least 204 surreptitious entries of SWP and YSA offices and at least four
such entries of SWP members' homes. During these entries at least 9,864 documents were removed or
photographed. The first such entry was of the SWP offices in Minneapolis in January 1945.
25. Chomsky in Perkus, op. cit., pp. 34-5. He goes on to observe that, "As for the state instruments
of repression, one can expect little change in coming years, at least until the rise of mass-based popular
organizations devoted to social change and an end of oppression and injustice."
26. Ungar, op. cit., p. 128. It should be noted that only three of the 1,388 separate COINTELPRO
actions admittedly carried out by the FBI against the CP-USA directly impacted upon the SWP; see
Greisa in Jayko, op. cit., at p. 59.
27. The case is the same as that cited in Note 13 (above). The Political Rights Defense Fund is a
coalition consisting of six members of congress, the NAACP and several other black rights organiza-
tions, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and other union formations,
the CP, USA, SWP and Democratic Socialists of America.
28.For examples of the federal motions, see In re United States, 556 F.2d 19 (2d Cir 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 962 (1978), and In re Attorney General, 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903 (1979).For
SWP discovery motions, see Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 458 F.Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
and Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 458 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
29. The SWP was awarded $42,500 with regard to damages suffered from COINTELPRO disrup-
tion activities, $96,500 related to FBI surreptitious entries, and $125,000 because of what was done by
informants and infiltrators. The damages were charged against the federal government, listing not only
the FBI Director, but the Attorney General of the United States, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of
Defense, Postmaster General, Secretary of the Army, Director of Central Intelligence, Director of the
Secret Service, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Civil Service Commissioners, President of
the United States, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, Secretary of State and
United States as a whole as being culpable insofar as each party had cooperated in or known of at least
some of the actions undertaken under COINTELPRO-SWP, had reason to know these actions were
wrong or illegal, but had done nothing to stop them.
30. In response to Greisa's broad injunction, several of the agencies designated by the judge as being
culpable in the suit — including the FBI, Justice Department, INS and Department of Defense — filed
affidavits with the court attempting to show cause why they should be able to maintain access to the
illegal files: "The Justice department...argued that if an injunction was issued, federal police agencies
must have the right to use the information in the sealed files in self-proclaimed 'emergency' situations,
either by obtaining an exemption from any federal judge anywhere in the country, or, in cases of extreme
urgency, by simply using the information and notifying the court later. Flatly rejecting this demand,
Greisa ruled that on the 'very rare' occasion that any government agency should ever want access to any
information covered in the injunction, it must apply to him and inform the SWP and YSA that it is doing
so to afford them the opportunity to respond...The court also rebutted the attempt of the Secret Service
to use the specter of potential violence against public officials to justify continued use of the files.'As far
as the evidence shows,' wrote Greisa, 'the materials involved have little or no information bearing on
national security, and no information about actual or planned violence against public officials, but
rather a mass of information about peaceful political activities and the private lives of individuals.' The
Secret Service, 'like the other agencies, should be bound to perform their tasks on the basis of lawfully
obtained information [emphasis in the original].'"See Jayko, op. cit., p. 11.
31. Boudin, Leonard, "Foreword," in thid, pp. 1-4.
Chapter 4 Notes: COINTELPRO - Puerto Rican Independence 345
Chapter 4: COINTELPRO—Puerto Rican Independence Movement

I. See Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, op. cit., p. 422. Ladd mentions that
there were 10,763 Security Index cards on members of the two groups in question as of 1946. The index
was continued and, in a July 25, 1961 report to President John F. Kennedy, presidential adviser
McGeorge Bundy explained its use as being "the list of individuals to be considered for apprehension
and detention...in a period of emergency" (Paid., pp. 465.6).
2. Fernandez, Ronald, Los Macheteros: The Wells Fargo Robbery and the Violent Struggle for Puerto Rican
Independence, Prentice-Hall Publishers, New York, 1987, p. 133; the Pacific islands of Guam and the
Philippines were also extracted as territorial concessions from Spain. It should also be noted that the
appropriation of Puerto Rico was not simply a result of the war, as is commonly argued. Rather, the
island was an object of North American desire well before hostilities commenced. Consider, for
example, a passage from a letter from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, even
as the opening guns were being fired: "Puerto Rico is not forgotten, and we mean to have it [emphasis
added]." Or, again, contemplate Secretary of State William Day's assurance to Lodge, offered in June
of 1898, that, "There is no question on Puerto Rico, everyone is agreed on that." Both quotations, and
several in the same vein by Roosevelt himself, appear in Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore
Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, Vol. 1, New York, n.d., p. 267.
3. Carr, Raymond, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment, Vintage Books, New York, 1984, pp. 36-9. The
"Insular Cases" are Downes v. Bidwell (21 S.Ct. 770,182 U.S. 244, 45 L.Ed. 1088, 1901) and De Lima v. Bidwell
(21 S.Ct. 743, 182 U.S. 1, 45 L.Ed. 1041, 1901); they were reaffirmed in Balzac v. Puerto Rico (42 S.Ct. 343,
258 U.S. 298, 66 L.Ed. 627, 1922). Representative Richardson's statement appears in the Congressional
Record, 56th Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1900, p. 2266.
The best overall view of the processes in question may be found in Berbusse, Edward J., The United States
in Puerto Rico, 1898-1900, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1966.
4. Carr, op. cit., p. 36.
5. Ibid., pp. 37-8. The initial Puertorriqueffo counter-arguments were often less than distinguished,
as is witnessed by the complaint that "a people with 400 years of civilization in back of them [would be
forced by U.S. colonialism] to conditions below those freely granted to the Zuiii Indians and the lower
and more barbaric inhabitants of the Southwest Territories;" see U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the
Committee on Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico (Senate Document 147), 56th Congress, 1st Session, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1900, p. 249.
6. Pagan, Bolivar, Historia de los Partidos Politicos Puertorriqueffos ,1898-1956, Tomo I, San Juan, Puerto
Rico, 1972, pp. 176, 184. The Jones Act ultimately superceded the Foraker Act in 1928, allowing Puerto
Rico at least nominally to elect its own parliament. It should be noted, however, that this was not done
until well after U.S. economic penetration of the island had been completed, citizenship/conscription
had been imposed, and the general grip on the island's polity otherwise consolidated. As the indepen-
dentistas argue, the "liberalization" was thus more illusory than real. A good overview of the arguments
may be found in Blaut, James, "Are Puerto Ricans a National Minority?" Monthly Review, Vol. 29, No.
5, May 1977.
7. Vardaman, Senator James K, in the Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 2d Session, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1917, p. 7474.
8. Carr, op. cit., p. 164. The author explains that Albizu was educated at Harvard where he formed
close relationships with supporters of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). He seems to have incorporated
what he learned of the Irish armed struggle with his own sense of the Puertorriqueffo tradition of
nationalism, forging a revolutionary perspective which remains potent on the island to this day.
9. Quoted in El Mundo, San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 28, 1933. Also see Torres, J. Benjamin, Pedro
Albizu Campos Obras Escogodes, 3 Volumes, Editorial Jelofe, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1975.
10.See Ungar, op. cit., pp. xvii-xviii. No estimate of actual FBI manpower on the island during the
1930s is available.
11.Riggs is quoted from El Mundo in Ribes Tovar, Federico, Albizu Campos, Plus Ultra Press, New
York, 1971, p. 61.
12. Carr, op. cit., p. 62.
13.Riggs was shot to death on February 23,1936 by two independentistas, Hiram Rosado and Elias
Beauchamp. As Fernandez, op. cit., observes at p. 144, "Taken into custody, [Rosado and Beauchamp]
were first beaten and then, within an hour of their capture, murdered by the police."
14.Ibid.
15./bid., p. 145. The author notes that, "Even the composition of the first jury was suspect because
Puerto Rico had two million native residents and five thousand American residents." Further, federal
prosecutor Cecil Snyder is known to have named the individual members of the second jury at a cocktail
party held at the residence of Blanton Winship, the island's governor, before the first trial had even
concluded; see Kent, Rockwell, It's Me 0 Lord, Dodd-Mead Publishers, New York, 1955, p. 504. The
appeal history may be found in Albizou [sic] v. U.S., 88 F. 2d 138 (1st Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 707,
57 S. Ct. 940, 81 L. Ed. 1361 (1937).
16. Cecil Snyder is quoted in Matthews, Thomas, Puerto Rican Political Parties and the New Deal,
University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1960, pp. 268-9.
17. Gautier, Carmen, Marfa Teresa Blanco and Marfa del Pilar Arguellas, Persecution of the Puerto
Rican Independence Movements and Their Leaders by the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) of the
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),1960-1971, unpublished study provided by the authors
(copy on file), 1979, p. 10. The paper was produced as an intervention to the United Nations Special
Commission on Puerto Rico (of the Commission on Decolonization) in 1980. Also see Editors, "COIN-
TELPRO En Puerto Rico," Pensamiento Critico, Summer 1979.
18. Ibid. The authors indicate that in a discussion with Corretjer in 1978, Representative Vito
Marcantonio of New York pointed out "that this case was both the first time that a judge imposed such
a brutal sentence in Grand Jury proceedings, and [that it] served as a precedent for similar actions against
American Communists after the [Second World] War." They refer readers, for further information, to
Clark, Larry D., The Grand Jury: The Use and Abuse of Political Power, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1975,
pp. 23-5. Also see Neufield, Russell, "COINTELPRO in Puerto Rico," Quash: Newsletter of the National
Lawyers Guild Grand Jury Project, August/September 1982.
19. Fernandez, op. cit., p. 145.
20. Hays, Arthur Garfield (Chair), "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Civil Rights in Puerto
Rico," reprinted in Jose Lopez (ed.), Puerto Rican Nationalism: A Reader, Editorial Coqui, Chicago, 1971,
p. 89. There remains some confusion as to who exactly fired the first shot; see Johnson, R.A., Puerto Rico:
Commonwealth or Colony? Praeger Publishers, New York, 1980, pp. 24, 36-8.
22.See the testimony of the chair of the Comiti unitario contra la represion y per la defense de los presos
politicos before the United Nations Commission on Decolonization, 1980; UN A/A 109/PV 1175, p. 37.
23.See Anderson, Robert W., Party Politics in Puerto Rico, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA,
1965, p.104. For a broad "liberal imperialist" overview of the context, see Wells, Henry, The Moderniza-
tion of Puerto Rico: A Political Study of Changing Values and Institutions, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1969.
24.See Morales Carri6n, Arturo, Puerto Rico: A Political and Social History, W.W. Norton Publishers,
New York, 1983, pp. 203-4. For contextual information on the Nationalist-PIP link during this period,
see Zavala, Iris, and Rafael Rodriguez (eds.), The Intellectual Roots of Independence: An Anthology of Puerto
Rican Political Essays, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1972.
25. "I am going to ask the people of the United States, if the people of Puerto Rico allow it with their
votes, to establish this high precedent: to finish in the world the liquidation of the colonial system which
began to be liquidated on the Fourth of July, 1776." The more militant segment of the PIP termed Munoz'
strategy "treason." See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Public Lands, Hearings Before the
Committee on Public Lands: Puerto Rico Constitution, 81st Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C, 1950, pp. 94-5.
26. Fernandez, op. cit.; Munoz' testimony may be found in Hearings Before the Committee on Public
Lands: Puerto Rico Constitution, op. cit.
27. For example, the following appeared in El Imparcial, a thoroughly "responsible" San Juan daily,
on May 12,1950: "We do not want intermediate solutions...The constitution [offered by congress] is only
a colonial modality. The people do not want a little liberty. They want full liberty."
28. The full text of this speech appears in Ribes Tovar, op. cit.
30.Ibid. Three of these individuals -Lolita LebrOn, Irwin Flores, and Rafael Cancel Miranda -along
with the surviving Truman assailant, Oscar Collazo, became the "longest held political prisoners in the
Western Hemisphere;" see Gautier, Blanco and Arguellas, op. cit., p. 11. Lebr6n was finally released on
the order of Jimmy Carter in 1979.
Chapter 4 Notes: COINTELPRO — Puerto Rican Independence 347
31.On the relative disarray of the independentistas during the late 1950s, see Matthews, op. cit. Also
see Figueroa, Loida, History of Puerto Rico, Anaya Books, New York, 1974.
32.Memorandum from Director, FBI, to the SAC, San Juan, December 15,1967; it is reproduced en
toto in Gautier, Blanco and Arguellas, op. cit., p. 28.
33.Memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the SAC, San Juan, dated June 1, 1962; reproduced en
toto in Gautier, Blanco and Arguellas, op. cit., p. 68.
34. Ibid., pp. 61-5. The authors cite the April 26, 1961 memo from the San Juan SAC to the Director
(reproduced herein) with regard to El Mundo; a Mardi 31,1966 memo from Hoover to the SAC San Juan,
with regard to the San Juan Star; a memo from the San Juan SAC to Hoover on January 3, 1969 with regard
to El Imparcial; and a memo from the SAC, San Juan, to COINTELPRO head William C. Sullivan on
February 8,1962 with regard to El Vigfa. It is interesting to note that while Sullivan was in charge of the
COINTELPRO in Puerto Rico throughout the duration of its formal existence, he never so much as
mentions it — nor even the island — in his "frank" and "candid" memoirs (Sullivan and Brown, op. cit.).
On the other hand he refers continuously to counterintelligence activities against the CP, discusses them
in the context of the new left, repeatedly mentions operations against the black liberation movement,
and devotes several pages to his exploits against the ku klux klan. One doubts this was an oversight. But,
before judging Sullivan too harshly in this connection, one would do well to note that former Church
Committee consultant Athan Theoharis, in his exploration of COINTELPRO (Spying on Americans, op.
cit.), repeats exactly the same pattern, albeit Theoharis devotes rather more emphasis to how the Bureau
supposedly deprived the klan of its civil rights (Theoharis devotes 4 pages to COINTELPRO — CP,USA,
less than half a page to COINTELPRO— SWP, 6 pages to "COINTELPRO — White Hate Groups," 2 pages
to the COINTELPROs against the black liberation movement overall, and 2 pages to COINTELPRO —
New Left, most of it devoted to the break-in at the Media, Pennsylvania resident agency which disdosed
the fact that COINTELPRO existed at all). There are obviously aspects of what has gone on in North
America's Caribbean colony that no "responsible" commentator wants brought up. Such are the
mechanics of apology and distortion.
35.The FCC appears to have cooperated in this; Memorandum from the SAC, San Juan, to the FBI
Director, January 28, 1963.
36.Memorandum from the SAC, San Juan, to the Director, FBI, dated May 29, 1963.
37. Gautier, Blanco and Arguellas, op. cit., pp. 69-72. The authors point out that while there is
presently no documentation available from the FBI itself linking the Bureau to the bombings, the blatant
pattern of non-arrest/non-prosecution of perpetrators fits well within the mold of COINTELPRO
"pseudo-gang" operations (documented in the COINTELPRO-Black Liberation Movement chapter of
this book).
38. Ibid., p. 74.
39.Memorandum, SAC, San Juan to Director, FBI, November 13, 1967.
40.Memorandum, (name deleted), San Juan to William C. Sullivan, dated May 31, 1966.
41.A memorandum discussing this, from W.R. Warman to William C Sullivan is dated May 31,
1966.
42.Editorial, "The Puerto Rican Revolution," Soulbook, Vol. I, No. 3, Fall 1965.
43.Memorandum from the SAC, New York to the Director, FBI, November 30, 1965. Also see the
return memo from Hoover to the New York SAC on December 9, in which the mailing was approved.
44. Memorandum, SAC, New York to Director, FBI, October 23, 1967; the reason specified as
"justifying " this action was that "[name deleted], an MPIPR leader" had spoken at an anti-Vietnam war
rally in New York on August 6, 1967.
45.Memorandum from (name deleted) to William C Sullivan, dated April 26, 1966.
46.The cartoon was proposed in a memo from COINTELPRO specialist J.F. Bland (in San Juan) to
William C. Sullivan (no date; FBI file number 005-93125). Sullivan evidently approved, as a memo dated
August 29,1966 from the San Juan SAC to the director indicates it had been "successful" and that the
MPIPR believed "the cartoon originated with either the CIA or the police of Puerto Rico."
47.Memorandum from the SAC, New York to the Director, FBI, October 10,1961; the SAC seems
to have felt it would be a good idea to spread disinformation that Dofia Laura was Juarbe's mistress
although he acknowledged there was no substance to the idea. Such deliberate sexual smears appear to
have been considered an especially effective COINTELPRO tactic.
48.Memorandum, (name deleted), to C.D. Brennan, February 12,1971; memorandum, SAC, San
Juan to Director, FBI, January 29, 1971.
49. Mari Bras, Juan, speech before the United Nations Commission on Decolonization, September
24, 1977. The matter of his son's assassination has never been resolved despite the "best efforts" of the
FBI and island police.
50. Quoted in Lopez, Alfredo, Doffa Licha's Island: Modern Colonialism in Puerto Rico, South End
Press, Boston, 1988, p. 145.
51. Ibid., p. 146.
52. The information derives from the sworn deposition of Gloria Teresa Caldas de Blanco, a former
secretary in the San Juan field office, taken by attorney Ludmilia Rivera Burgos at Hartford, Connecticut,
December 25, 1984.
53. Lopez, op. cit., p. 146; the PIP offices were bombed three times during the 1970s, the PSP office
once.
54. Blanco deposition, op. cit.
55. Gautier, Blanco and Arguellas, op. cit., p. 111.
56.Ibid., p. 67.
57. Lopez, op. cit., pp. 147-8.
58. According to Lopez (bid., p. 147), "Randall had been legal counsel to the National Labor
Relations Board during the period when that board outlawed the militant National Union Construction
Firm... As legal counsel to some of the top [U.S.] firms operating in Puerto Rico - firms specializing in
using the law to obstruct worker organizing - Randall was the epitome of the corporate militant."
59.Ibid., pp. 147-59; jury foreman Antonio Fuentes later remarked that, "It was an easy decision [to
acquit]. There was really a lot of talk and evidence, but absolutely nothing showing the defendants
guilty."
60. Quoted in bid., p. 149.
61. Carr, op. cit., p. 372; Lopez, op. cit., p. 149.
62. See Nelson, Anne, Murder Under Two Flags: The U.S., Puerto Rico and the Cerro Maravilla Cover-
Up, Ticknor and Fields Publishers, New York, 1986. Also see Berkam, Judy, "The Crime of Cerro
Maravilla," Puerto Rico Lrbre, May/June 1979; and Suarez, Manuel, "Ex-Puerto Rican Police Agent
Guilty in Slaying of Two Radicals," New York Times, March 9, 1988.
64. The police were charged with a total of 46 counts of perjury and obstruction of justice, and
convicted of 45 of them. Sentenced were Angel Perez Casilla, commander of the Puerto Rican police
intelligence division (20 years), intelligence division agent Rafael Moreno (30 years), intelligence
division agent Rafael Torres Marrero (20 years), special arrests squad agent Luis Reveron Martinez (25
years), intelligence division sergeant Nelson Gonzalez Perez (24 years), intelligence division agent Juan
Bruno Gonzalez (16 years), special arrests squad agent Jose Rios Polanco (10 years), intelligence division
lieutenant Jaime Quiles (12 years), intelligence division agent William Colon Berrios (12 years), and
intelligence division sergeant Nazario Mateo Espada (6 years). See Suarez, Manuel, Requiem on Cerro
Maravilla: Police Murders in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Government Coverup, Waterfront Press, Maplewood,
NJ, 1987, p. 300.
65. Ibid., p. 328. This correction of Gonzalez Molave's behavior has been attributed to the
independentista clandestine armed formation Los Macheteros.
66.Ibid., p. 361. This "resolution" of the Cerro Maravilla assassinations is entirely similar to that
which pertained vis e 1 vis the 1969 assassinations of Illinois Black Panther leaders Mark Clark and Fred
Hampton (see next chapter).
67. Jaimes, M. Annette, and Ward Churchill, "Behind the Rhetoric: English-Only as Counterinsur-
gency Warfare," Issues in Radical Therapy: New Studies on the Left, Vol. XIII, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring 1988,
p. 46. Also see "Secret Counter-Insurgency Conference Held in Puerto Rico," SI Research Papers, October
1982, p. 1. It should be noted that Louis 0. Giuffrida has been a favorite government consultant on
matters of political repression since at least the late 1960s. At the outset, he was active mainly in
California, where he helped devise the consortium of federal, state and local police units used against
the black liberation movement in that state (see next chapter). His advice was subsequently sought by
the White House with regard to putting down the American Indian Movement on Pine Ridge during
the mid-197( (see Chapter 7). And, shortly after the San Juan conference, he became the Reagan
administration's head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the entity charged with
authority to round up "political undesirables" for "preventive detention" in concentration camps
during periods of "national emergency." For further information, see Conclusion, Note 23.
Chapter 5 Notes: COINTELPRO - Black Liberation 349
68. Jaimes and Churchill, op. cit. Also see Butler, R.E. "Rusty," On Creating a Hispanic America: A
Nation Within a Nation? Center for Inter-American Security, Washington, D.C, 1985.
69. A good example of this was the raid upon the home of San Juan Star reporter Coqui Santana'
residence in which the manuscripts to a novel she was writing and a book of poetry she had finished
were seized, along with assorted notebooks and tapes of interviews and music. Santaliz was arrested,
detained, and interrogated for more than twelve hours before being released without ever having been
charged with a crime. Much of her property was never returned. Meanwhile, as "the events at Ms.
Santaliz's house were taking place, other commandos were doing the same things at the houses and
offices of some thirty-seven other people. As military helicopters hovered in support, the agents held
people in their homes for as long as eighteen hours, sometimes physically abusing them...They took
reams of notes, tapes, film, mountains of books from several lawyers, writers, and scholars. They
wrecked dozens of original celigraphs of the renowned painter Antonio Martorell. And they ransacked
the offices of Pensamiento Critico, a respected journal of critical thought, confiscating notes, tapes, film,
typesetting equipment, and the rollers of the printing press...the FBI had trained for this type of action
in Puerto Rico...their raids were skillfully conducted and coordinated;" Lopez, op. cit., pp. 140-1. Also
see Fernandez, op. cit, pp. xi-xiv.
70. Ojeda Rios and several of his co-defendants have been held in isolation, without bond, on non-
capital indictments for several years. For further information on such "preventive detention" measures,
accruing under the so-called "Bail Reform Act of 1984," see Chapter 8. Also see Churchill, Ward, "The
Third World at Home: Political Prisoners in the United States," Zeta, June 1990.
71. Both quotations accrue from Edwin Meese's stint on Meet the Press during September 1985. It
should be remembered that the Wells Fargo expropriation, which is what the FBI claimed the raid was
all about, involved no deaths or even injury to anyone. So much for "bloody acts of terrorism." For a
broad analysis of the use of similar rhetoric in the context of U.S. policy, see Herman, Edward S., The Real
Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda, South End Press, Boston, 1982.
72. The quotation comes from a press conference given by Berrios in San Juan, September 9, 1985.
73. The government was specifically outraged that the FBI hadn't bothered to inform it of the
incipient action, as required under the island's constitution, and that the Bureau had engaged in
wholesale wiretapping, which is expressly prohibited. See Fernandez, op. cit., p.
74. On Grupo pro-Uso Voto del MPI, see memorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, dated
May 4,1967; as is shown in a memo from the San Juan SAC to Hoover on December 21,1963, the Grupo
had first been created in that year to subvert the Puerto Rican elections; it was resurrected in 1967
specifically to undercut the U.N. process. Concerning the formation of the Committee Against Foreign
Domination, see memorandum from the FBI Director to the San Juan SAC, September 2, 1966. On
Committee disinformation activities, see memorandum from (name deleted) to William C. Sullivan,
September 28, 1966, and a memo from Hoover to the SAC, San Juan, October 20, 1966.
75. Memorandum, Director, FBI to SAC, San Juan, May 2,1967.
76. Carr, op. cit, p. 353. Perhaps the best articulation of the meaning of this finding, albeit from a
reverse perspective, comes in the testimony of PIP head Ruben Berrios Martinez before the Decoloni-
zation Committee in 1981 (A/AC 109/L 1344 Add. 1, p. 11).
77.See, for example, the press release of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 68(79), August 15,
1979.
78.Carr, op. cit., p. 363. The U.N. measure in question was an Omnibus Resolution (A /36/L20). The
question of Puerto Rican independence was to be on the agenda prepared by the U.N. Secretariat for
1982.
Chapter 5: COINTELPRO Black Liberation Movement

1. Hill, "Foremost Radical of His Race," op. cit., p. 215. On St. Louis and Houston, see Pinkney,
Alphonso, The American Way of Violence, Vintage Books, New York, 1972. For what may be the best
assessment of the meanings of Garvey and Garveyism in light of subsequent black nationalist
developments, see Pinkney, Alphonso, Red, Black, and Green: Black Nationalism in the United States,
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1976.
2. For further information on the ugly status occupied by blacks at this juncture, see Woodward,
C. Vann, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, Oxford University Press, New York, (Third Revised Edition)
1974. Another very useful exposition may be found in DuBois, W.E.B., The Autobiography of W.E.B.
DuBois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life From the Last Decade of Its First Century, International Publishers,
New York, 1968.
op. cit. Among those considered as representative of "New Negro" leadership were A. Philip
Randolph, Chandler Owen, Cyril V. Briggs, William Bridges, W.A. Domingo, Hubert H. Harrison and
Marcus Garvey. They are contrasted by Hill to an "old guard" composed of individuals such as Robert
Russa Moton, Emmett Scott, Kelly Miller, W.E.B. DuBois and William Monroe Trotter.
4. Ibid., pp. 215-6. For further general information, see Levin, Murray, Hysteria in America: The
Democratic Capacity for Repression, Basic Books, New York, 1971. On the wave of lynching in 1919, see
Chadbourn, James H., Lynching and the Law, Unversity of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1933. Also
see White, Walter, Rope and Faggot: A Biography of Judge Lynch, Arno Press, New York, 1969; and Roper,
Arthur S., The Tragedy of Lynching, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1932.
5. Vincent, op. cit., p. 202. Also see Garvey, Amy Jacques (ed.), Philosophy and Opinion of Marcus
Garvey, or Africa for the Africans, Frank Cass and Co., London, 1967, p. 148. Garvey was indicted on
February 15, 1923 on technical charges of conspiracy and mail fraud as a result of his fundraising
activities intended to capitalize autonomous black business enterprises within the U.S. He was arrested
on February 20. His trial began on March 18, 1923, and lasted about a month. Convicted on one count
of fraud, he was sentenced to five years in federal prison, plus a $1,000 fine. He appealed the verdict and
lost, serving some two and one-half years in Atlanta before President Calvin Coolidge commuted his
sentence on November 18, 1927. Coolidge's action was designed to allow Garvey's deportation as an
"undesirable alien" to his native Jamaica. As Otto Kirchheimer has observed in his Political Justice: The
Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1969), Garvey's was
the "classic case."
6.Vincent, op. cit., p. 203.
7.See Harris, William H., Keeping the Faith: A. Philip Randolph, Milton P. Webster, and the Brotherhood
of Sleeping Car Porters, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1977. Also see Marable, Manning, "A. Philip
Randolph: A Political Agses4;ment," in his From the Grassroots: Social and Political Essays Towards Afro-
American Liberation, South End Press, Boston, 1980, pp. 59-88; Bontemps, Ama, "Most Dangerous Negro
in America," Negro Digest, September 1961; and Murphy, Paul L., "Sources and Nature of Intolerance
in the Twenties," Journal of American History, No. 51, June 1964.
8.Johnson, op. cit., p. 165. The documented inception of FBI surveillance of the NAACP occurred
in 1924. Actually, government scrutiny of the organization probably began in 1910, when it was founded
by W.E.B. DuBois in the wake of a lethal race riot in Springfield, Minois. See Zinn, op. cit., p. 340.
9.Hoover's memorandum is reproduced and attendant analysis offered in Intelligence Activities and
the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., pp. 412-44.
10.Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 253-4.
11.See Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, op. cit., pp. 319, 450-4.
12.See Emerson, Thomas I., The System of Freedom of Expression, Vintage Books, New York, 1970.
13.The more important cases include NAACP v. Alabama ex. rd. Patterson (1958), Louisiana ex. rel.
Gremillion v. NAACP (1961), Gibson v. Florida State Investigating Committee (1963), and Dombrowski v.
Pfister (1965). Also, as Howard Zinn points out in his SNCC: The New Abolitionists (Beacon Press, Boston,
1964, pp. 17-74, 183), an important related decision was reached in 1962 when four civil rights workers
were charged with "inciting to insurrection" under a Georgia statute. A three-judge Supreme Court
panel reviewed the matter, determined the law (which carried the death penalty) was unconstitutional,
and ordered the prisoners' release.
14.Garrow, David J., The FBI and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Penguin Books, New York, 1981, p. 22.
15. Kelly's memorandum is reproduced in U.S. Department of Justice, Report of the Justice
Department Task Force to Review FBI Martin Luther King, Jr., Security and Assassination Investigations,
Washington, D.C., January 11, 1977.
16.Cross is mentioned in a memorandum from Atlanta agent Robert A. Murphy to J. Stanley
Pottinger, at FBI headquarters, in July 1958. Interestingly, Murphy suggests the "SWP connection" is not
a sufficient basis from which to undertake a COMINFIL investigation. Pottinger apparently did not
agree; see Pottinger, J. Stanley, "Martin Luther King Report" (to U.S. Attorney General Edward H. Levi),
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C, April 9, 1976.
17.The King file was opened by the New York rather than Atlanta field office. It should be noted
that although the Bureau has always maintained that there was no COMINFIL activity directed at King
and the SCLC during the 1950s, the code prefixed to the files on both was "100," indicating they were
viewed as "internal security" or "subversive" matters. The numerical file prefix for material accruing
from what was considered an investigation of dvil rights activities per se would have been "44."
18.See U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, FBI Statutory Charter - Appendix to Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Part 3, 95th Congress, 2d Session, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979, pp. 33-73.
19.Concerning King, see Lee v. Kelly, Civil Action No. 76-1185, U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, "Memorandum Opinion and Order" (by U.S. District Judge John Lewis Smith, Jr.), January
31,1977. Certain of the information on both King and Walker was attributed by FBI Associate Director
Cartha D. DeLoach to NAACP head Roy Wilkens (see report on the SCLC from Atlanta agent Robert R.
Nichols to DeLoach, dated July 1961). Wilkens later vehemently denied any such interaction between
himself and the Bureau; see Lardner, George Jr., "Wilkens Denies Any Link to FBI Plot to Discredit
King," Washington Post, May 31, 1978.
20. Levison's CP membership was never established although it was demonstrable that he
maintained dose relations with party members from roughly 1949 through '54. The speech attributed
to Wofsy was actually drafted by Levison and can be found in Proceedings of the Fourth Constitutional
Convention of the AFL-CIO, Vold, American Federation of Labor -Congress of Industrial Organizations,
Washington, D.C., 1962, pp. 282-9. Levison also had much to do with the preparation of the manuscript
for King's first book, Stride Toward Freedom (Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1958); see King,
Coretta Scott, My Life With Martin Luther King, Jr., Holt, Rinehart and Winston Publishers, New York,
1969.
21. Such Bureau activities with regard to Levison were nothing new and seem to have stemmed
largely from reports coming from "Solo," two brothers - Jack and Morris (Chilofsky) Childs - who
served from as early as 1951 as highly placed FBI informants within the CP,USA. It was they who appear
to have originally "linked" Levison to the party even though they could never attest to his actual
membership and essentially stopped referring to him by early 1954. J. Edgar Hoover's predictable (and
quite unsubstantiated) response was to declare Levison a "secret" CP member; see Garrow, op. cit., pp.
21-77.
22. Memorandum, SAC, New York, to Director, FBI, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C,"
and dated June 21,1962. Shortly thereafter, the New York field office began to openly affix a COMINFIL
caption to correspondence concerning King and the SCLC The Atlanta field office followed suit on
October 23. The designation was officially approved by FBI headquarters supervisor R.J. Rampton in
identical letters to the SACS on the latter date.
23. Targeting the SCLC under COINTELPRO-CP,USA was first proposed by the SAC, New York
in a memorandum to Hoover dated September 28, 1962. The operation was approved by memo in an
exchange between Assistant Director William C. Sullivan and one of his aides, Fred J. Baumgardner, on
October 8. The initial five newspapers selected for purposes of surfacing the anti-King propaganda were
the Long Island Sta•-Journal, Augusta (GA) Chronicle, Birmingham (AL) News, New Orleans Times-Picayune,
and the St. Louis Globe Democrat (where the reporter utilized in spreading the lies was Patrick J.
Buchanan, later part of the White House press corps under Presidents Nixon and Reagan, as well as a
current host on the Cable News Network Crossfire program).
24. King's index placement was accomplished through a series of memoranda, culminating in one
sent by Hoover via T.W. Kitchens to Kenneth O'Donnell on May 4, 1962. On the implications of being
placed on the Reserve Index, see Goldstein, Robert Justin, "The FBI's Forty Year Plot," The Nation (No.
227, July 1, 1978) and "An American Gulag? Summary Arrest and Emergency Detention of Political
Dissidents in the United States," Columbia Human Rights Law Review (No. 10, 1978).
25. The ELSURS authorization was signed by Kennedy on October 10, 1963 and provided to FBI
liaison Courtney A. Evans. The attorney general's main concern, detailed in the minutes of his meeting
with Evans, seems to have been not that the bugging and tapping of King and the SCLC for purely
political purposes was wrong, but that it might be found out. Once Evans convinced him that this was
genuinely improbable, "the Attorney General said he felt [the FBI] should go ahead with the technical
coverage of King on a trial basis, and to continue if productive results were forthcoming." See Denniston,
Lyle, "FBI Says Kennedy OKed King Wiretap," Washington Evening Star, June 18,1969. Also see O'Leary,
Jeremiah, "King Wiretap Called RFK's Idea," Washington Evening Star, June 19, 1969. Concerning
continuation of the taps after the "trial period" had concluded, see Rowan, Carl, "FBI Won't Talk about
Additional Wiretappings," Washington Evening Star, June 20,1969.
26. The New York SAC reported in a memorandum to Hoover, dated November 1, 1963, and
captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C; CIRM (JUNE)," that his agents had tapped all three SCLC
office lines in his area of operations, with coverage on two lines beginning October 24. He also
recommended installation of a tap on the residence line of civil rights leader Bayard Rustin; the tap was
approved and installed in early January 1964. On November 27,1963, the Atlanta SAC informed Hoover
by a memo captioned "COMINFIL, RM; Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C (JUNE)," that Atlanta operatives
had tapped King's home phone and all four organizational SCLC lines in that city as of November 8.
27.The document was entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement — A Current Analysis." It
was completed on October 15,1963 and submitted to Assistant Director Sullivan, who passed along a
copy to headquarters supervisor Alan H. Belmont. From there, it was "distributed through the
government-wide intelligence community" and "the various military services" despite the fact that
Belmont concluded it lacked substance and might be seen as little more than "a personal attack upon
Martin Luther King." See Garrow, op. cit., pp. 73-5.
28.Memorandum, William C. Sullivan to Alan H. Belmont, August 30,1963, captioned "Commu-
nist Party, USA, Negro Question, IS-C." The document is quoted in full in U.S. Congress, Joint
Committee on Assassinations, Hearings on the Investigation of the Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Vol. 6, 95th Congress, 2d Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978, pp. 143-4.
For interesting insights in this connection, see Jacobs, James, An Overview of National Political
Intelligence," University of Detroit Journal of Urban Law, No. 55,1978, pp. 854-6.
29.For its disinformation campaign, the Bureau made ample use of "friendly media contacts" such
as the nationally-syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop, who proved quite willing to smear King in print
on the basis of FBI "tips" lacking so much as a shred of supporting evidence. Concerning the IRS, as
Garrow (op. cit.) notes at p.114, "In mid-March [1964] the Internal Revenue Service reported that despite
careful scrutiny it had been unable to discover any violations in either King's or SCLC's tax returns.
Director Hoover scrawled 'what a farce' on the margin when the disappointing memo reached his desk."
30.The instructions by Sullivan to Whitson and others are summarized in a memorandum from
a member of the Internal Security Section named Jones to FBI Associate Director Cartha D. DeLoach on
December 1, 1964, captioned simply "Martin Luther King, Jr." For further information, see Lardner,
George, Jr., "FBI Bugging and Blackmail of King Bared, Washington Post, November 19, 1975. Also see
Horrock, Nicholas M., "Ex-Officials Say FBI Harassed Dr. King to Stop His Criticism," New York Times
(March 9,1978), and Kunstler, William, "Writers of the Purple Page," The Nation (No. 227, December 30,
1978).
31.Garrow, op. cit., p. 127. It appears DeLoach had to content himself with the "contributions" of
right-wing hacks like Victor Riesel. However, Bureau efforts to place the "story" in more respectable
quarters are known to have included overtures to — at the very least — reporters John Herbers of the New
York Times, James McCartney of the Chicago Daily News, David Kraslow of the Los Angeles Times, Eugene
Patterson of the Atlanta Constitution, Lou Harris of the Augusta Chronicle, and syndicated columnist Mike
Royko. Herbers appears to have passed word of what was happening to civil rights leader James Farmer,
who confronted DeLoach with the matter during an appointment on December 2, 1964.
32.Memorandum, William C. Sullivan (via R.F. Bates) to Cartha D. DeLoach, dated January 21,
1966 and captioned 'Martin Luther King, Jr., SM-C (JUNE)." Also see a memo from Fred J. Baumgardner
(via Bates) to Sullivan, dated January 14, 1966 and captioned COMINFIL SCLC, IS-C (JUNE).
33.In his memoirs, Sullivan makes much of the "wrongness" of Hoover's largely cosmetic attempt
to bring certain of the FBI's political operations within some sort of bounds of legality. The former
assistant director is unequivocal that he believes this to have been a weakness in the director's character,
and that the Bureau should have been allowed to operate free of any legal or moral constraints when
"fighting subversives." See Sullivan and Brown, op. cit., especially p. 205, for this interesting commen-
tary on a top COINTELPRO official's perspective on "law enforcement"
34.There are serious questions concerning the possibility that the FBI might have been involved
in the assassination of Martin Luther King. See, for example, Lane, Mark, and Dick Gregory, Code Name
"Zorro:" The Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., Prentice-Hall Publishers, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1977.
Also see Lawson, James, "And the Character Assassination That Followed," Civil Liberties Review, No.
Chapter 5 Notes: COINTELPRO — Black Liberation 353
5, July-August 1978. Of further interest, see Lewis, David L., King: A Biography, University of Illinois
Press, Urbana, 1979, especially pp. 399-403.
35. Gid Powers, Richard, Secrecy and Power: The Life of I. Edgar Hoover, The Free Press, New York,
1987, p. 458.
36. Marable, Manning, Race, Reform and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945-
1982, University of Mississippi Press, Jackson, 1984, p. 124.
37. Garrow, op. cit., p. 154. Also see a memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Herbert
Brownell (who approved the initial taps on "national security" grounds), dated December 31,1956 and
captioned ELIJA MOHAMMED [sicl, INTERNAL SECURITY —MUSLIM CULT OF ISLAM; memo from
Fred J. Baumgardner to William C Sullivan, September 8, 1961, captioned NATION OF ISLAM — IS-
NOI; memo from SAC, Phoenix to FBI Headquarters, June 30, 1965, captioned NATION OF ISLAM —
IS-NOI; and a memo from Hoover to Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach dated July 1, 1966 and
captioned NATION OF ISLAM — IS-N01.
38. Garrow, op. cit., p. 281. The file classification prefix code pertaining to the Nation of Islam and
its leaders was "05," indicating they were viewed collectively as an internal security matter.
39. For additional information and reproduction of documents relevant to the killing of Malcolm
X, see Breitman, George, Herman Porter and Baxter Smith (eds.), The Assassination of Malcolm X,
Pathfinder Press, New York, 1976. It should be noted that, during the last year of his life, Malcolm X
adopted the Islamic name, El Hajj Malik El Shabazz; see Breitman, George, The Last Year of Malcolm X:
The Evolution of a Revolutionary, Schocken Publishers, New York, 1968.
40. See Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in
America, Vintage Books, New York, 1967; and Lester, Julius, Look Out, Whitey! Black Power's Gon' Get Your
Momma, Grove Press, New York, 1969. Also see Carmichael's "What We Want," in Mitchell Cohen and
Dennis Hale (eds.), The New Student Left: An Anthology, Beacon Press, Boston (Revised and Expanded
Edition), 1967, pp. 109-19; Kilson, Martin, "Black Power: The Anatomy of a Paradox," Harvard Journal
of Negro Affizirs," No. 2,1968, pp. 30-4; Franklin, Raymond S., 'The Political Economy of Black Power,"
Social Problems, No. 16, Winter 1969, pp. 286-301; and Ofari, Earl, 'W.E.B. DuBois and Black Power," Black
World, No. 19, August 1970, pp. 26-8. For a succinct overview of the transformation in SNCC politics
during this period, see Roberts, Gene, "The Story of Snick: From 'Freedom Rides' to 'Black Power'," New
York Times Magazine, September 25,1966. More developed views of the predicates for the shift may be
found in Morris, Alden D., The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Social
Change, The Free Press, New York, 1984.
41. See Brown, H. (Hubert) Rap, Die Nigger Die!, The Dial Press, Inc., New York, 1969. Also see
Barbour, E.D. (ed.), The Black Power Revolt, The Sargent Press, Boston, 1968; and Forman, James, The
Making of Black Revolutionaries, Macmillan Publishers, New York, 1972. Of further interest, see Leonard,
Edward A., "Ninety-Four Years on Non-Violence," New South, No. 20, April 1965, pp. 4-7; Wilkens, Roy,
"Whither Black Power?" Crisis, August-September 1966, p. 354; and Rustin, Bayard, '"Black Power' and
Coalition Politics," Commentary, No. 42, September 1966, pp. 35-40.
42. Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion, op. cit., pp. 102-3. For more on the Detroit rebellion, see
Hersey, John, The Algiers Motel Incident, Allied A. Knopf Publishers, New York, 1968. Of related interest,
see Hayden, Tom, Rebellion in Newark: Official Violence and Ghetto Response, Vintage Books, New York,
1967; and Gilbert, Ben W., et. al., Ten Blocks From the White House: Anatomy of the Washington Riots of 1968,
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1968. For an overall appraisal of the motivations underlying
the urban rebellions from the perspective of a former CORE field secretary, see Wright, Nathan Jr., Black
Power and Urban Unrest: Creative Possibilities, Hawthorn Books, Inc., New York, 1967. In general, see
Boesel, David, and Peter H. Rossi (eds.), Cities Under Siege: An Anatomy of the Ghetto Riots,1964-1968, Basic
Books, New York, 1971.
43. "Project Build" was an apprenticeship program funded through the Department of Labor
which would supposedly bring large numbers of blacks into the construction crafts (from which they
had historically been almost totally excluded) as highly paid skilled workers. The government, however,
conscientiously failed to utilize its power to force exclusionary unions to comply with the law by hiring
the blacks thus trained. Thus, in Philadelphia, the Operating Engineers Union was allowed to accept
federal funds to run a training program while simultaneously excluding blacks (by definition) from full
union membership and corresponding employment. In Boston, Sheet Metal Workers' Union head James
Kelly, who also accepted training funds, became at the same time an open member of a white
paramilitary organization which systematically terrorized the families of the union's own black
trainees. Needless to say, under such conditions very few blacks ever actually benefited from Project
Build. Indeed, after a full decade of existence and millions of dollars spent, barely 25 percent of all black
apprentices accepted into the program had completed it, and those who had were almost universally
unemployed or dramatically under-employed. See Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion, op. cit., pp. 132-
3.
44. The sheer cynicism embodied in the passage of such legislation is glaringly revealed in the fact
that the amendments to the Civil Rights Act, passed in 1968, contained a "conspiracy" provision —
popularly known as "The Rap Brown Law" — which made it a federal crime to cross state lines "with
intent to incite riot." In practical terms, the provision meant that it would henceforth be considered
illegal to agitate for social change. On the 1965 Voting Rights Act, see Thernstrom, Abigail M., "The odd
evolution of the Voting Rights Act," Public Interest, No. 55, Spring 1979, pp. 49-76.
45. Much of the thinking here centered itself in the revolutionary theoretical work of Frantz Fanon
during the Algerian war of liberation during the 1950s; see Adam, Hussein A., "Frantz Fanon: His
'Understanding'," Black World, No. 21, December 1971, pp. 4-14. For early articulations running in this
vein, see Meier, August, "The Revolution Against the NAACP," Journal of Negro Education, No. 32,
Spring 1963, pp. 146-52, and "The Dilemmas of Negro Protest Strategy," New South, No. 21, Spring 1966,
pp. 1-18; Gregor, A. James, "Black Nationalism: A Preliminary Analysis of Negro Radicalism," Science
and Society, No. 26, Fall 1963, pp. 415-32; and Williams, Robert F., "USA: The Potential of a Minority
Revolution," The Crusader Monthly Newsletter, No. 5, May-June 1964, pp. 1-7. More developed, but still
seminal views may be found in Zangrando, Robert L., "From Civil Rights to Black Liberation: The
Unsettled 1960s," Current History, No. 62, pp. 281-99; Allen, Robert L., "Black Liberation and the
Presidential Race," Black Scholar, No. 4, September 1972, pp. 2-6; Cleaver, Eldridge, "On Lumpen
Ideology," Black Scholar, No. 4, November-December 1972, pp. 2-10; Antarah, Obi, "A Blueprint for
Black Liberation," Black World, No. 22, October 1973, pp. 60-6; and Ofari, Earl, "Black Labor: Powerful
Force for Liberation," Black World, No. 22, October 1973, pp. 43-7. For a broader view, see Marable,
Manning, Blackwater: Historical Studies in Race, Class Consciousness, and Revolution, Black Praxis Press,
Dayton, OH, 1981.
46. Quoted in Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 450.
47. Clark's memorandum is reproduced en tote in Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans,
Book II, op. cit., pp. 491-3.
48.Ibid. On the Congress of Racial Equality, see Meier, August, and Elliott Rudwick, CORE; A Study
in the Civil Rights Movement, Oxford University Press, New York, 1973. Also see Bell, Inge Powell, CORE
and the Strategy of Nonviolence, Random House Publishers, New York, 1968; and Farmer, James, Lay Bare
the Heart, Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, New York, 1985.
49. Memorandum, Hoover to the SAC, Albany, August 25,1967; reproduced in full in Hearings on
Intelligence Activities, Vol. 6, op. cit., p. 383.
50. Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., pp. 492-3. TOPLEV and
BLACPRO functioned more or less along the lines of COMNFIL. One of the more notable successes of
the latter was to secure the services of James A. Harrison, comptroller of the SCLC, as an informant. By
the fall of 1967, every FBI field office was assigned at least one, and in some cases as many as four, agents
devoted exclusively to development of "quality non-organizational sources...for the purpose of expe-
ditiously infiltrating militant black nationalist organizations." The Ghetto Informant Program, also
called "Ghetto Listening Post," was launched at this time and, by the summer of 1968, employed some
3,248 snitches, in addition to an "unknown number" of such "assets" already in place under TOPLEV
and BLACPRO. Hoover described this small army of contract spies as being "inadequate," and
demanded a major expansion of its ranks during the fall of 1968. See also, New York Field Office
Inspection Report (no date; circa May 1968); New York Field Office Inspection Report, October 27,1968;
and memorandum from George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, September 3, 1968.
51. Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion, op. cit., pp. 124-5. On pp. 106-7, he notes that Sellers'
indictment stemmed from his February 7,1968 organization of a black student demonstration at South
Carolina State College which"later culminated in a white police riot, leaving 3 students killed and 33
wounded." Sellers himself was among those shot, but that did not prevent his being held in a tiny death
row cell on both a pending federal draft resistance charge and the new state "incitement to riot" count.
He was convicted of the Selective Service charge seven weeks after what was by then called the
"Orangeburg Massacre," and ultimately of incitement as well (nearly two years later). This last was
solely on the basis of a speech he'd given two nights before the fatal outbreak, a matter which led columnist
Tom Wicker to muse in the pages of the New York Times on September 29, 1970 that the whole affair
showed, "how casual is this country's sense of justice for black people, how careless it is of its own
humanity." Meanwhile, Stokely Carmichael experienced a near-Garveyite fate: "When a Carmichael
appearance at Vanderbilt University [during the fall of 1967] accidentally coincided with an urban
rebellion [in Nashville, four days later] in which 94 persons were jailed, Tennessee legislators demanded
that Carmichael be deported from the US [presumably to his native Trinidad]." For further information
see Sellers, Cleveland, and Robert Terrell, The River of No Return: The Autobiography of a Black Militant and
the Life and Death of SNCC, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1973.
52.O'Reilly, Kenneth, "Racial Matters:" The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972, The Free
Press, New York, 1989, pp. 275-6. Also see Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op.
cit., pp. 491-2. By the time the Ghetto Informant and Rabble Rousers Index projects got under way, "the
main listing [of the Security Index, from which alleged rabble rousers were drawn] included the names
of Martin Luther King and 1,497 other black Americans. The FBI added the names of an additional 400
blacks during the Kennedy and Johnson years. The largest category listed 673 Black Muslims, followed
by 476 communists (or former communists or suspected fellow travelers), 66 SNCC activists, 60 Revolu-
tionary Action Movement members, and 222 persons in the general black nationalists' category...The
percentage of communists listed in the Security Index declined steadily throughout the [1960s] — from
83.8 percent in 1961, to 55.9 percent by the time LBJ left the White House."
53.Powers, op. cit., p. 425.
54.The text of the report on the anti-RAM operation, from the SAC, Philadelphia to Hoover on
August 30, 1967 (i.e.., it had been executed in large part before COINTELPRO-Black Liberation
Movement had ostensibly begun) appears in Churchill and Vander Wall, Agents of Repression, op. cit., pp.
45-7. It leaves no doubt as to Hoover's intent in recommending replication of the tactic elsewhere.
55.O'Reilly, op. cit., pp. 281-2.
56.Ibid., pp. 330-1.
57.Memorandum, SAC, Boston, to FBI Director, May 4,1973. As O'Reilly observes (op. cit., p. 276),
"In March 1968 the Rabble Rouser Index received a new name, the Agitator Index, and headquarters
directed the field to submit 'visual material relating to violence by black extremists.' Division Five
[Sullivan's COINTELPRO Section] wanted 'dear, 8" by 10" photographs.' Sullivan's men also requested
a photograph of each of the one hundred or so persons listed on the Agitator Index. Upon receiving and
pasting the photos in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album, Division Five sent copies of this mug
book to the field, along with a Racial Calendar highlighting 'the dates of...racial events.' To make sure
that his agents could track any 'militant black nationalist' who might 'turn up' in another country,
Hoover approved distribution of the Black Nationalist Photograph Album to the CIA and Royal
Canadian Mounted Police." Photo album subjects such as Hakim Jamal were thus obviously high-
priority targets for COINTELPRO "neutralization." Also see Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
Americans, op. cit., pp. 510-2, 517-8.
58.Quoted in Hinds, Lennox S„ Illusions of Justice: Human Rights Violations in the United States, Iowa
School of Social Work, University of Iowa, Iowa City, 1978, p. 121.
59.For further information on the case, see Obadele, !man Abubakari, Free the Land! The True Story
of the Trials of the RNA 11 in Mississippi, House of Songhay, Washington, D.C., 1984. Aside from Obadele,
the other members of the RNA 11 were Karim Njabafudi (s/n: Larry Jackson), RNA Vice President
Hekima Ana, Offoga Quddud (s/n: Wayne Maurice James), Addis Ababa (s/n: Denis Shillingford),
Chumaimari Askardi (s/n: Charles Stalling), Tamu Sena (s/n: Ann Lockhart), Njeri Quddus (s/n: Toni
Rene Austin), Spade de Mau Mau (S.L. Alexander), Aisha Salim (s/n: Brenda Blount), and Tawwab
Nkruma. It should be noted that three weeks after the raid in Jackson, some 65 Detroit police raided RNA
national headquarters in that city at the behest of the head of the local FBI COINTELPRO section. Nine
key RNA cadres were arrested on charges such as "spitting" and "talking back to a police officer."
Concerning the RNA political agenda, see Obadele's Foundations of the Black Nation: A Textbook of Ideas
Behind the New Black Nationalism and the Struggle for Land in America, House of Songhay, Detroit, 1975.
60.See Lumumba, Chokwe, "Short History of the U.S. War on the R.N.A.," Black Scholar, No. 12,
January-February 1981, pp. 72-81. Several defendants were convicted on the automatic weapons charge
despite the fact that they contended that it was actually a perfectly legal semi-automatic rifle, and a
federal firearms expert at trial — in a live-fire demonstration — could not show that the weapon was
capable of delivering automatic fire.
61. See Marine, Gene, The Black Panthers, New American Library, New York, 1969, pp. 7-27. Also
see Schanche, Don A., The Panther Paradox: A Liberal's Dilemma, David McKay Publishers, New York,
1970. Hoover's remark is quoted from the New York Times (September 8, 1968) in Intelligence Activities
and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., p.187. It also appeared in memo form and in letters to private
individuals.
62.The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party tends to speak for itself: "1) We Want freedom.
We want power to determine the destiny of our black community. 2) We want full employment for our
people. 3) We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our black community. 4) We want decent
housing, fit shelter for human beings. 5) We want education for our people that exposes the true nature
of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in
the present day society. 6) We want all black men to be exempt from military service. 7) We want an
immediate end to police brutality and the murder of black people. 8) We want freedom for black men held
in federal, state, county, and city prisons and jails. 9) We want all black people when brought to trial to
be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the
Constitution of the United States. 10) We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and
peace [emphasis in the original]."
63. This exercise of constitutional rights by the Panthers in California caused those same rights to
be suspended in that state. Debate on the "Panther Law," which was to prohibit the carrying of any
weapon by citizens without the express permission of the state, led to a group headed by party chairman
Bobby Seale taking weapons into the California State Assembly itself on May 2, 1967. Although the
action itself was a perfectly legal symbolic gesture under then-prevailing California law, Seale himself
entered through the wrong door and ended up — shotgun in hand — on the floor of the assembly rather
than in the spectator's gallery. Since carrying a weapon onto the assembly floor was technically illegal,
the error cost Seale a year in jail and was quickly latched onto by anti-Panther propagandists as evidence
of party "violence." See Seale, Bobby, Seize the Time: The True Story of the Black Panther Party and Huey P.
Newton, Vintage Books, New York, 1970, pp. 153-71.
64.The mainstay of FBI and police contentions that Panther policy equalled "violence" concerned
the shooting death of Oakland, California police officer John Frey (and the wounding of officer Herbert
Heanes) on the night of October 28,1967. Panther leader Newton, who received severe gunshot wounds
to the abdomen during the altercation, was acquitted of murder but found guilty of manslaughter in the
matter on September 8, 1968. He was sentenced to serve fiftenn years. Even this conviction was,
however, overturned (on evidentiary grounds) by the California Supreme Court less than two years
later, and sent back to trial. When it became clear to the jury that officers Frey and Heanes had stopped
Newton's car for no particular reason on the fatal night (as part of a deliberate harassment campaign
ordered by Oakland 'Panther Squad" head Ray Brown), that there were other non-police parties
involved in the confrontation, that police shots had probably been fired first, that there was no evidence
that Newton had fired a weapon at all and that he was probably the first party wounded, the state was
unable to obtain a conviction on any charge. See Keating, Edward M., Free Huey! The True Story of the Trial
of Huey P. Newton for Murder, Ramparts Press, Berkeley, CA, 1971.
65.Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion, op. cit., p. 122. The party also consciously based much of its
public posture on the pronouncements of Thomas Jefferson (despite the fact that Jefferson had been a
slave owner). See, as but one of myriad examples of this, Newton, Huey P., "What We Want Now! What
We Believe," in John J. Bracey, Jr., August Meier and Elliott Rudwick (eds.), Black Nationalism in America,
Bobbs-Merrill Publishers, Indianapolis, 1970, pp. 526-33. The prevailing federal view of the evolution
of the BPP during its first five years of existence may be found in U.S.House of Representatives,
Committee on Internal Security, Gun Barrel Politics: The Black Panther Party ,1966-1971 (92d Congress, 1st
Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C, 1971) and The Black Panther Party: Its
Origins and Development as Reflected in Its Official Weekly Newspaper, The Black Panther-Community News
Service (92d Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1971).
66. For the 5,000 figure see Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion, op. cit., p. 123. Gid Powers (op. cit.,
at p.458) estimates party membership at 3,000. Goldstein (Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit.,
p. 524) accommodates both numbers: "By October, 1968, 'healthy and functioning size' chapters were
in operation in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Denver, and Omaha, as well as the San Francisco Bay
area. In New York City, nearly eight hundred members were recruited in June, 1968 alone. In the fall of
1968, the Panthers had a membership of over two thousand, and claimed a readership of over one
hundred thousand for their weekly newspaper [The Black Panther].. .At its peak in 1969, before repression
began to decimate the party, the Panthers had an estimated membership of five thousand." Also see
Major, Reginald, A Panther is a Black Cat: A Study In Depth of the Black Panther Party - Its Origins, Its Goals,
Its Struggle for Survival, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1971.
67.See Newton, Huey P., Revolutionary Suicide, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., New York, 1973,
especially Chapter 11 ("The Brothers on the Block"), pp. 73-7. Also see Cleaver, op. cit.
68.See Newton, Huey P., "Huey Newton Speaks to the Movement About the Black Panther Party,
Cultural Nationalism, SNCC, Liberals and White Revolutionaries," in Philip S. Foner (ed.), The Black
Panthers Speak, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia/New York, 1970, pp. 50-66.
69.Seale, op. cit., pp. 211-22. The event not only cemented the alliance between the BPP and SNCC,
it raised more than $10,000 in defense funds for party founder Huey P. Newton, at the time appealing
his conviction in the Frey killing (see Note 63 above).
70. Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion, op. cit., p. 124. Also see Brown, Die Nigger Diel op. cit.
71. At p. 133, COINTELPRO head William C Sullivan (Sullivan and Brown, op. cit.) describes
Cardoza as a "tough customer." While what Sullivan meant by this is left unclear, the infiltrator is
suspected of involvement in the earlier-mentioned March 9, 1970 car bomb assassinations of SNCC
activists Ralph Featherstone and Che Payne.
72. The Bureau was also busy trying to split up the SNCC leadership during this period. In Agents,
op. cit., at p. 50, we reproduce a document proposing a bogus letter designed to achieve this effect vis d
vis H. Rap Brown, Stokely Carmichael and James Forman.
73. See Newton, Huey P., To Die for the People, Vintage Books, New York, 1972, p. 191.
74. Memorandum, SAC, New York, to Director, FBI, September 5, 1978.
75.Seale (op. cit., p. 207) places the date of the BPP decision to work with the Peace and Freedom
Party as being "three weeks after I got out of jail" (December 8, 1967) on the earlier-mentioned
Sacramento weapons charge (see Note 62 above). The decision was thus taken on roughly December 29
or 30. He also notes Bay Area SDS members Bob Avakian and Rick Hyland as being primary white
radical initiators of the alliance.
76.Cleaver, Eldridge, Soul on Ice, Delta Books, New York, 1968. Cleaver had written the book while
in California's Soledad and San Quentin prisons while serving nine years of an indeterminate sentence
for rape. His 1967 parole to work for Ramparts and subsequent induction into the BPP went far toward
solidifying the party's desired links with "the lumpen behind the walls."
77. Seale, op. cit., pp. 207-11. Some 25,000 votes were actually cast for Newton, despite his
manslaughter conviction, in California's Seventh Congressional District.
78. Scheer, Robert, "Introduction," in Eldridge Cleaver, Post-Prison Writings and Speeches, Ram-
parts/Vintage Books, New York, 1969, p. xix. The artide in question appeared in the Ramparts May 1968
issue.
79.Scheer, op. cit., pp. xix-xxi. While this may appear on its face to have been a purely local police
action, it is a matter of record that Ray Brown maintained close liaison with the San Francisco FBI office
on matters relating to the BPP during the whole period. What happened thus appears to have happened
with at least FBI foreknowledge, if not outright complicity.
80.Judge Sherwin's decision is quoted in ibid., p. xx.
81. Ibid., pp. xx-xxi.
82.1b id., p. xxi. Cleaver made maximal use of the appeal period, continuing his Peace and Freedom
Party appearances, and engaging in a vociferous first amendment campaign against California
Governor Ronald Reagan and the Regents of the University of California for their actions in blocking
his teaching of an invited course at Berkeley. The attendant publicity - and support Cleaver's position
attracted -no doubt further unnerved the political and police establishments, increasing their collective
desires to get him out of the picture.
83. On Cleaver's periods in Cuba and Algeria, see Lockwood, Lee, Conversation with Eldridge
Cleaver, Algiers, Delta Books, New York, 1970. On Algeria and France, see Cleaver, Eldridge, Soul on Fire,
World Books, Waco, TX, 1978. It becomes readily apparent in the latter book that Cleaver had lost his
mind. The role of the various COINTELPRO operations which were aimed at him in producing this
result is unclear, but must be assessed as having been significant.
84. Freed, Donald, Agony in New Haven: The Trial of Bobby Seak, Ericka Huggins and the Black Panther
Party, Simon and Schuster Publishers, New York, 1973, p. 65. The estimate of police numbers is taken
from the trial testimony of LA Panther leader Elaine Brown, quoted at p. 279.
85. Memorandum, SAC, San Diego, to Director, FBI, February 20,1969.
86. Memorandum, Newark SAC to FBI Director, August 25,1969; memorandum, Director, FBI to
SAC, Newark, September 16, 1969.
87. Baraka, Amiri, The Autobiography of LeRoi Jones, Freundlich Books, New York, 1984, pp. 250-84.
Also see Karenga, Maulana (Ron), Roots of the US/Panther Conflict (Kawaida Publications, San Diego,
1976, p. 7): "[The FBI] interjected violence into...Ethel normal rivalries of two groups struggling for
leadership of the black movement...We're still recovering and rebuilding from that. We knew it wasn't
going to be a tea party, but we didn't anticipate how violent the U.S. government would get."
88. O'Reilly, op. cit., p. 317.
89. Years later, SAC Johnson denied under oath in a federal court that his intent had been to incite
violence in this matter. A "hit," he claimed to have believed, the explicit language of his own memoranda
to the contrary notwithstanding, was "something nonviolent in nature." See Greene, Bob, "Laundered
Box Score? No hits, no guns, no terror," Chicago Sun-Times, February 12, 1976.
90. The Mau Mau letter is covered in a memorandum from SAC Johnson to Hoover dated De-
cember 30,1968, and a reply to Johnson from Hoover on January 30,1969. The operations vis a vis other
organizations are detailed in the evidentiary display incorporated into Iberia Hampton, et. al., Plaintiffs-
Appellants v. Edward V. Hanrahan, et. al., Defendants-Appellees, Civ. Nos. 77-1968, 77-1210, and 77-1370,
U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as Appeal), Exhibit PL#26.
91. See Appeal, PL#412 (Dep. pp. 307-8 and 310) and 413 (Dep. pp. 234 and 305-7). For more on
O'Neal, see McClory, Robert, "Agent Provocateur," Chicago Magazine, February 1979, pp. 78-85.
Reportedly, there were three FBI infiltrators within the Chicago BPP chapter.
92. The police raiding team was composed of Groth, Joseph Gorman, William Corbett, Raymond
Broderick, Lynwood Harris, George Jones, John Ciszewsld, Edward Carmody, Phillip Joseph "Gloves"
Davis, John Marisuch, Fred Howard, and William Kelly.
93. Davis, a black cop notorious in Chicago for his brutality, appears to have administered the first
(relatively minor) wound to the unconscious Hampton, using an M-1 carbine, and to have earlier killed
Clark with a point-blank shot to the chest from the same weapon. As concerns the fatal wounds to
Hampton, an exchange between police was overheard by Panther survivors after the BPP leader had
been shot once: "(Voice) That's Fred Hampton. (Second Voice) Is he dead? Bring him out [of his
bedroom]. (First Voice) He's barely alive; he'll make it. (Two shots ring out and a third voice, believed
to be Carmody's states) He's good and dead now." The information on Hampton having been drugged
prior to the raid accrues from a thin-layer chromatography examination performed on a sample of the
victim's blood by Cook County Chief Toxicologist Eleanor Berman. For further details, see Agents, op.
cit., pp. 68-76.
94. Appeal (Transcript) at 3462-3. Satchell was hit four times, Anderson twice, and Brewer twice. No
police officer was injured in any way. See Gottleib, Jeff, and Jeff Cohen, "Was Fred Hampton Executed?"
The Nation, No. 223 December 25,1976. Also see Anonymous, "FBI Harassment of Black Americans,"
Bilalian News, January 1980.
95. Arlen, Michael J., An American Verdict, Doubleday, Inc., Garden City, NJ, 1974, p. 59. On the
overall raid, see Commission of Inquiry into the Black Panthers and the Police, Search and Destroy,
Metropolitan Applied Research Center, New York, 1973. Also see Moore, Gilbert, A Special Rage, Harper
and Row Publishers, New York, 1972. Of further interest, see the 1970 Newsreel film, The Murder of Fred
Hampton, produced in Chicago by an anonymous crew. The forensic conclusions concerning who fired
first, how many rounds were fired by each side, and how this was determined by Herbert MacDonell,
an independent expert in criminalistics, may be found in Lewis, Alfred Allen, and Herbert Leon
MacDonell, The Evidence Never Lies: The racebook of a Modern Sherlock Holmes, Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
New York, 1984 (see Chapter 3, "The Black Panther Shoot-out/in").
96.See 'Panther Trial," New York Times, February 18,1977: "FBI documents in evidence show that
O'Neal was rewarded for his efforts with $300 bonus." The article also notes that in "1969-70, O'Neal
earned $30,000 as a paid FBI informant." Appeal, PL#94, is a Bureau memo, dated December 17, 1969,
authorizing payment of the bonus. O'Neal was paid on December 23.
97. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., pp. 528-9; Ungar, op. cit., pp. 465-6. Also
see Anonymous, "A Collective Dedication: Ten Years After the Murder of Fred Hampton," Keep Strong,
December 1979/January 1980.
98.See Levin, S.K., "Black Panthers get bittersweet revenge," The Colorado Daily, November 10,
1982. Also see O'Reilly, op. cit., p. 315, where he quotes People's Law Office attorney Flint Taylor as
observing the settlement constituted an "admission of the conspiracy that existed between the F.B.I. and
Hanrahan's men to murder Fred Hampton." For more on Richard G. Held, see Churchill, Ward,
"COINTELPRO as a Family Business," Zeta Magazine, March 1989, pp. 97-101. Provocateur William
O'Neal apparently committed suicide in late February 1990 via the messy expedient of running down
an embankment onto Chicago's Stevenson Expressway and being hit by an oncoming taxi.
99.Pratt's sleeping habits derived from a spinal injury suffered while serving in Vietnam as a
member of the Army's elite 82nd Airborne Division during 1967. The much decorated combat veteran
— he was awarded some 18 medals for valor while in Southeast Asia — was placed in the FBI's Key Black
Extremist portfolio within a year of his discharge, apparently because of his obvious military skills and
because he'd succeeded the murdered Bunchy Carter as head of the LA-BPP chapter. The personal
information on Pratt accrues from a summary of his case, entitled G's Life and Times, 1967-72, prepared
by Brian Glick for the Geronimo Pratt Defense Committee in 1979. It is available through the Jonathan
Lubell law offices in New York City.
100.See Durden-Smith, Jo, Who Killed George Jackson? Fantasies, Paranoia and the Revolution, Alfred
A. Knopf, Publishers, New York, 1976, pp. 134-5. Interestingly, infiltrator Cotton Smith seems to have
been trapped inside, along with the bona fide Panthers, when the firing broke out. By all accounts, he
acquitted himself well in the defense.
101.Ibid., p. 134. As in Chicago, the police later daimed the raid was necessitated by reports that
illegal weapons were being kept in the Panther facility. In Chicago, O'Neal had informed SA Mitchell
days before the event, however, that he'd checked and all weapons in Fred Hampton's apartment were
"dean." In LA, the "hook" was that a Panther named George Young, who was also a member of the
Marine Corps, was known to have been at Camp Pendleton, California, on the night a batch of M-14 rifles
was stolen from the armory there. This, according to LAPD Criminal Conspiracy Section Detective Ray
Callahan, was sufficient basis for the police to have "reason to suspect" the weapons were being kept
at the LA party headquarters. What the detective neglected to mention was that he and his colleagues
also knew that Young had been serving time in the stockade at the Marine base on the night in question,
and had thus been in no position to steal anything. When queried about this odd circumstance by LA
Municipal Judge Antonio Chavez during the subsequent trial of the Panther defenders, Callahan
responded, "I didn't think it was important."
102.As CCS infiltrator of the BPP Louis Tadcwood later put it in a book he prepared in conjunction
with the Citizens Research and Investigation Committee (The Glass House Tapes: The Story of an Agent
Provocateur and the New Police-Intelligence Complex, Avon Books, New York, 1973, pp. 237-8): "[T]he FBI
works hand in hand with [CCS]...Los Angeles has more power as a Police Department goes, because of
the proximity of working with CII [the Criminal Intelligence and Investigation unit of the California
State Police] and also the FBI." At pp. 213-4, he observes that, "There ain't nowhere they can't go. CCS,
they're like federally sponsored. Like J. Edgar Hoover says, 'They're my boys, they're my boys.'" Also
see the interview with former FBI infiltrator Cotton Smith (currently serving a life sentence for murder
in Kentucky) which appeared under the title "Ex-FBI Agent Exposes Use of Informants to Destroy the
BPP," in Freedom Magazine, Vol. 18, No. 5, January 1985, pp. 28-40.
103.See "63 Verdicts End Panther Trial," Los Angeles Tribune, December 24, 1971.
104.See memorandum from (deleted), Los Angeles, to (deleted), Intelligence Division, captioned
"Elmer Gerard Pratt," February 9, 1970.
105.Quoted in Elliff, John T., Crime, Dissent and the Attorney General, Sage Publications, Beverly
Hills, CA, 1971, p. 140.
106.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., pp. 526-7. For further information on
the killing of Panthers by law enforcement personnel, see Epstein, Edward J., "The Panthers and the
Police," New Yorker, February 13,1971, pp. 45-77. For further information on the gratuitous arrests of
party members, see Donner, Frank, "Hoover's Legacy," The Nation, June 1,1974, p. 613.
107.Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion, op. cit., p. 143. For further information on Rice and
Poindexter, see Hinds, op. cit., pp. 119-22.
108.Garry, Charles R., "The Persecution of the Black Panther Party," in Foner, op. cit., pp. 257-8.
109.Quoted in Harris, Richard, Justice, Avon Books, New York, 1970, p. 239.
110.O'Reilly, op. cit., pp. 302-3. SA Charles Gain is quoted in Bergman, Lowell, and David Weir,
"Revolution on Ice: How the Black Panthers Lost the FBI's War of Dirty Tricks" (Rolling Stone, September
9,1976, at p. 49), as saying the San Francisco office performed as it did because, "There was a tremendous
fear of Hoover out there. It was almost all they talked about. They were afraid of being sent to some awful
post in Montana." If this is indeed some sort of honest explanation of agent motivations, Gain's
persistent use of the word "they" is peculiar at best, since he was a prime mover in the office's anti-
Panther COINTELPRO operations.
111.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 529.
112.The case in question was U.S. v. David T. Dellinger, et. al., No. 69-180, 1969. Perhaps the best
handling of Seale's part in the legal proceedings may be found in Schultz, John, Motion Will Be Denied:
A New Report on the Chicago Conspiracy Trial, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1970, pp. 37-
84. For literal transcript material, see Clavir, Judy, and John Spitzer (eds.), The Conspiracy Trial, Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1970.
113.Aside from Seale, the defendants in the Racldey murder case were Warren Kimbro, Lonnie
McLucas, George Sams, Ericka Huggins, Frances Carter, George Edwards, Margaret Hudgins, Loretta
Luckes, Rose Smith, Landon Williams and Rory Hithe.
114.The FBI has never admitted that George Sams was an infiltrator, but there are telltale dues.
First, Sams was the only first-hand prosecution witness ever called to the stand with regard to the
RacIdey case, even when the state was losing. One may assume he was thus the only such witness they
had. And the state's predication for charges held the basis as being material provided by "a trusted ten
year informant [emphasis added]." Meanwhile, as Freed (op. cit.) recounts at p. 25, during the summer
of 1969, before Sams had been apprehended and supposedly "turned state's evidence," as the
supposedly vagrant fugitive "traveled around the country, spending large sums of money, certain
things began to happen to the Panthers. Each city he visited [Washington, Denver, Indianapolis, Salt
Lake City, Des Moines, Detroit, San Diego and Chicago among them] was thereafter subjected to
predawn raids by combinations of city, state and federal police. But Sams was never caught; he always
managed to leave before the raids were made." In fact, the "harboring" of this alleged "fugitive" was
the basis for many of the neutralizing arrests of local BPP chapter members during this period. Although
virtually none of these charges were ever taken to court, the cumulative bail involved both financially
strapped the party and, once it was broke, left many of its cadres in jail for extended periods without
having been convicted of anything at all. Such is the stuff of COINTELPRO, not of coincidence.
115.See "8 Panthers Held in Murder Plot," New Haven Register, May 22, 1969; "Second 'Victim'
Sought in Panther Case," New Haven Journal-Courier, May 23, 1969; and "8 Suspects in Killing to Face
High Court," New Haven Register, May 23, 1969.
116.Kimbro entered his plea on January 16, 1970, a few days after receiving a visit from his older
brother, a police officer. It is doubtful that either he or his brother expected the life sentence handed
down on June 23,1971.
117.McLucas was convicted of conspiracy to murder and sentenced in August 1970; charges of
murder, kidnapping, conspiracy to kidnap, and binding with intent to commit a crime were dismissed.
118.Sams was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment on June 23,1971. It seems
likely that he'd crossed the line of exposure beyond which the FBI could no longer protect him and the
Bureau simply gave him up, much as it did another of its star performers, Gregory Dewey Clifford,
convicted of the 1987 dismemberment murder of a woman named Gerri Patton in Denver. See Hogan,
Frank, "Witness for the Prosecution: Accused murderer Gregory Clifford doesn't have any friends —
except in the FBI," Westword, Vol. 11, No. 20, January 13-19, 1988.
119.Associated Press Wire Service, "Ex-Chief Says New Haven Police Had No Evidence Against
Seale," April 4,1972. Chief Ahern stated that he had been "astonished" when prosecutor Arnold Markle
had decided to try Seale for the Rackley murder. The only pretense of a link between Seale and the crime
turned out to be the fact that the BPP leader had had a speaking engagement at Yale University in New
Haven on April 19, 1969, two days before Racldey was killed. It was this circumstance which caused Yale
President Kingman Brewster to make his much publicized 1971 remark doubting whether a black
revolutionary "could get a fair trial anywhere in the United States." For further information on Panther
activities in New Haven during the Seale/Huggins trial, see Burstein, Robert, Revolution as Theater: Notes
on the New Radical Style, Liveright Publishers, New York, 1971; also see Erikson, Erik H., and Huey P.
Newton, In Search of Common Ground, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1973.
120. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 529. The case at issue is State of
Connecticut v. Bobby G. Seale, Superior Court of New Haven (Connecticut), No. 15844, 1971.
121. For Seale's own assessment of the impact of what was done to him in the name of "due
process," see his A Lonely Rage, Times Books, New York, 1978.
122.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 527. Also see Chevigny, Paul, Cops
and Rebels, Pantheon Press, New York, 1972. Thomas, like all police infiltrators of the New York BPP, was
a member of the NYPD's Special Services Department, an entity that worked hand-in-glove with the
local FBI COINTELPRO section in exactly the same fashion as CCS in Los Angeles, Ray Brown's
Oakland Panther Squad, and the State's Attorney's Police did in Chicago. During the late 1970s, the
Special Services Department was utilized as the basis for the NYPD to become a participant in a formal
federal/local political police combine called the joint Terrorist Task Force (see Chapter 8).
123.O'Reilly, op. cit., p. 299. The author points out on the same page that a certain amount of such
activity was constrained by the FBI's concern that its massive electronic surveillance of the BPP would
be disclosed in court. For example, Hoover ultimately quashed the planned 1970 prosecution of Panther
Chief of Staff David Hilliard for having "threatened the life" of President Richard M. Nixon during a
speech, precisely because defense discovery motions were homing in on Bureau taps of the defendant's
home and several BPP offices. However, as Garry (op. cit., p. 259) points out, before charges were
dropped Hilliard was forced to ante a $30,000 bail secured from a bondsman with 190% collateral in
order not to spend several months in jail without trial.
124. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 527. The 21 defendants were
Lumumba Shakur (s/n: Anthony Coston), Afeni Shakur (s/n: Alice Williams), Analye Dhoruba (s/n:
Richard Moore), Kwando Kinshasa (s/n: William King), Cetewayo (s/n: Michael Tabor), All Bey
Hassan (s/n: John J. Casson), Abayama Katara (s/n: Alex McKeiver),Suncliata Acoli (s/n: Clark Squire),
Curtis Powell, Robert Collier (a former RAM member, convicted of a conspiracy to blow up the Statue
of Liberty in 1965), Baba Odinga (s/n: Walter Johnson), Shaba Om (s/n: Lee Roper), Joan Bird, Jamal (s/
n: Eddie Joseph), Lonnie Epps, Lee Barry, Mshina (s/n: Thomas Berry), Sekou Odinga (s/n: Nathaniel
Burns), Larry Mack, Kuwasi Balagoon (s/n: Donald Weems) and Richard Harris. A 22nd defendant,
Fred Richardson, was added in November 1969. Of these, only thirteen actually went to trial. Two
defendants, Balagoon and Harris, were incarcerated in New Jersey awaiting trial on charges of robbery
and attempted murder (of which they were acquitted) when the case went to court. Two others, Jamal
and Epps, being under age, were separated for trial in juvenile court. One, Lee Barry, an epileptic, had
been rendered too ill by the conditions of his confinement to stand trial at all. And four others, Sekou
Odinga, Larry Mack, Mshina and Richardson, escaped to join Eldridge Cleaver in Algeria. Acquittal of
the first thirteen on all counts, however, caused the cases to evaporate against the remaining nine (see
Kempton, Murray, The Briar Patch: The People of the State of New York v. Lumumba Shakur, et. al., E.P. Dutton
Company, New York, 1973). The state hardly lost interest in the defendants, even after the resounding
"not guilty" verdicts. As of this writing, all but a handful are either dead or serving lengthy sentences
in maximum security institutions. The biographies of several appear in Committee to End the Marion
Lockdown, Can't Jail the Spirit: Political Prisoners in the U.S., Chicago, 1989.
125.At least five police infiltrators —Eugene Roberts, Ralph White, Carlos Ashwood, Roland Hayes
and Wilbert Thomas — had moved into the New York BPP from almost the moment it was established
by SNCC organizer Joudon Ford in April 1968. Three of the five were called to testify at trial. Even with
this ground-level coverage, however, the police could produce no physical evidence of the alleged
conspiracy — or the Panthers' "military" propensity in general — other than the fact that Kwando
Kinshasa had authored a "training manual" entitled Urban Guerrilla Warfare, and Collier had been in
possession of some short lengths of brass pipe and enough black powder to fill a small talcum box. With
this, the jury and public were meant to believe, the defendants were going to blow up five department
stores and several police stations. Infiltrator Ralph White (a police detective) was revealed in open court
to be a drunkard, womanizer and habitual law violator (despite having a pristine personnel file) who
could ultimately testify only that he had heard Afeni Shakur "say some rough things" (a sample of her
dismantling his assertions on cross examination may be found in Kempton, op. cit., at pp. 234-40), and
that he "knew" Lumumba Shakur and Kwando Kinshasa had been keeping blasting caps (which were
not found by police raiders on the day of the arrests) in the Harlem Panther headquarters. Patrolman
Ashwood, the second infiltrator, was also forced to admit that he'd never really seen anyone do any-
thing, although he'd "heard some things" (an excerpt from Afeni Shakur's cross examination of
Ashwood may be found in ibid., at p. 245). Eugene Roberts, who had worked "undercover" since joining
the New York police in 1964 and had infiltrated Malcolm X's break-away organization to become one
of the Muslim leader's bodyguards — Roberts was the man who attempted to revive Malcolm by mouth-
to-mouth resuscitation on the night of the assassination — could do no better than produce tapes of
conversations between various of the defendants. See Zimroth, Peter L., Perversions of Justice: The
Prosecution and Acquittal of the Panther 21, Viking Press, New York, 1974.
126.O'Reilly, op. cit., p. 318. No charges were dismissed. The 13 defendants who actually went to
trial were found innocent of all 156 counts filed against them.
127.For a juror's-eye view of the government's case, see Kennebeck, Edwin, Juror Number Four: The
Trial of Thirteen Black Panthers as Seen From the Jury Box, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1973.
For the defendants' perspectives, see Look For Me In the Whirlwind, Revolutionary People's Communi-
cation Network, New York, 1971.
128. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modem America, op. cit., pp. 529-30. The Senate document
referred to is Final Report: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
Americans, Book III, op. cit., p. 200. The basic disagreement within the BPP, upon which the Bureau was
able to build this particular COINTELPRO, was entirely induced by FBI and police actions over the
preceding two years. This issue distilled to what proportion of the party's dwindling legal defense
resources should be apportioned to the needs of the "old guard" such as Newton (on appeal), Seale
(fighting the Rackley murder charge) and David Hilliard (charged with "threatening the life of the
President of the United States") vis d vis the needs of relative newcomers such as the Panther 21. As
O'Reilly (op. cit.) observes at p. 318: "The Cleaver faction revolved around [defense of] the so-called
Panther 21."
129. Kempton, op. cit., p. 189. Again, such outcomes can hardly be said to have been the furthest
thing from COINTELPRO specialists' minds. In a January 28, 1971 Airtel to his SACS in Boston, Los
Angeles, New York and San Francisco, J. Edgar Hoover pointedly observed that "Newton responds
violently to any question of his actions or policies or reluctance to do his bidding. He obviously responds
hastily without getting all the facts or consulting with others...[Therefore] recipients must maintain the
present high level of counterintelligence activity...It appears Newton may be on the brink of mental
collapse and we must [thus] intensify our counterintelligence [emphasis added]." Cleaver adherent
Weaver was killed shortly thereafter, and Newtonite Napier appears to have been killed as a retaliation.
In 1972, four New York BPP members, including Panther 21 defendants Jamal and Dhoruba Moore,
were tried for murder in the Napier slaying; the jury hung ten to two for acquittal. Rather than undergo
retrial on the murder charge, all four entered subsequent guilty pleas to second degree manslaughter
and were sentenced to less than four years each.
130.An FBI infiltrator named Thomas E. Mosher later testified before congress that Bennett had
been killed by Jimmy Carr as a result of a "successful" bad-jacketing operation, and that he had assisted
Carr in cremating Bennett's remains. He contended that he had informed the FBI of what had happened,
guided agents to the cremation site in the Santa Cruz Mountains, and had helped them gather bone
fragments and other remains; Mosher was extremely upset because the Bureau had taken no action as
a result of the murder. Instead (as is shown in the document accompanying the text) the murder was
utilized to up the ante in exacerbating the Newton-Cleaver split. An FBI reporting document dated
January 14, 1972, and captioned BLACK PANTHER PARTY, LOS ANGELES DIVISION, EXTREMIST
MATTER, reveals that Sandra Lane Pratt had been shot five times at close range, stuffed into a sleeping
bag, and dumped alongside an LA freeway. Concerning the assassination of Carr, see Carr, Betsy,
"Afterword," in Bad: The Autobiography of James Carr, Herman Graf Associates, New York, 1975, pp. 207-
35. The Bennett murder is also mentioned as part of the FBI's fomenting the "Newton-Cleaver Split' in
Newton, Huey P., War Against the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America, (dissertation), University
of California at Santa Cruz, 1980.
131.See "Let Us Hold High the Banner of Intercommunalism and the Invincible Thought of Huey
P. Newton," The Black Panther, Center Section, January 23, 1971. Prates wife, "Red," and other LA-BPP
members, including Will Stafford, Wilfred Holiday and George Lloyd were also expelled in the same
statement. The piece was apparently proposed and prepared by Elaine Brown, widely suspected among
former party members of having been a police agent.
132. The victim was a 28-year-old white school teacher named Caroline Olsen. Her husband,
Kenneth — who was playing tennis with her at the time of the assault — was wounded but survived. He
testified at trial that one of the two black assailants who first robbed and then shot him and his wife was
Geronimo Pratt. Immediately after the murder (on December 24, 1968), however, he had positively
identified another black man, Ronald Perkins (who looked nothing like Pratt), as having been the culprit.
His story on this changed only after having been extensively "coached" by LAPD detectives utilizing
"photo spreads" to believe Pratt was actually the man he'd seen.
133. Julio Butler testified at trial that Pratt had "bragged" to him of having killed Caroline Olsen.
Butler also testified that he had severed all ties with the LA County Sheriff's Department, by which he'd
been employed prior to joining the BPP, and that he'd never worked for the FBI or CIA. He was, however,
a paid "informant" of the FBI beginning at least as early as August of 1969, and continuing until at least
as late as January 20,1970. Although his pay records (if any) for the year have not been disclosed, he filed
monthly informant reports with the LA FBI office throughout 1970. His "Racial Informant" file was not
closed until May of 1972, immediately prior to his going on the stand in the Pratt trial. After he entered
his perjured testimony against Pratt, he was given suspended sentences on four separate felony
convictions, and received federal assistance in completing law school. See Glick, G's Life and Times, op. cit.
134. See Amnesty International, Proposal for a commission of inquiry into the effect of domestic
intelligence activities on criminal trials in the United States of America, op. cit., p. 29: "[The defense obtained]
over 7,000 pages of FBI surveillance records dated after 2 January 1969. Elmer Pratt claimed earlier
records would reveal that he was at a meeting in Oakland at the time of the murder on 18 December 1968
but the FBI's initial response to this was that there had been no surveillance before 1969. This was later
shown to be untrue." Also see Pratt a. Webster, et. at., 508 F.Supp. 751 (1981) and the dissenting remarks
of Judge Dunn in In Re Pratt, 112 Cal. App. 3d 795 - Cal. Rptr. - (Grim. No. 37534. Second Dist., Div. One,
3 December 1980).
135. Pratt might have established his whereabouts on the night of the murder as having been
Oakland rather than Santa Monica through the direct testimony of others who had attended.
These individuals—including Bobby and John Seale, David and June Hilliard, Rosemary Gross
and Brenda Presley - were all aligned with the Newton faction and therefore declined to speak in the
defendant's behalf. Several movement attorneys have also indicated they refused to represent Pratt,
based upon requests received from Newton or his delegates. Under such conditions, no local raising of
defense funds was possible. The COINTELPRO also seems to have been quite effective with regard to
the other side of the split. Of the Cleaver faction, only Kathleen (Neal) Cleaver appears to have made
any serious attempt to assist the target. See Glick, G's Life and Times, op. cit.
136. It should be noted that by the time Pratt became eligible for parole, Ray Brown - former head
of the Oakland Panther Squad - was chair of the state parole board. Despite the obvious implications,
Brown refused to recuse himself in deliberations upon Panther paroles. When Pratt finally came up for
review in 1987, LA Deputy District Attorney Diane Visani was allowed to object to his release after more
than 15 years' incarceration on the basis that, "1 think we still have a revolutionary man [here]. He does
have a network out there. If he chooses to set up a revolutionary organization upon his release from
prison, it would be easy for him to do so [emphasis in original]." (Visani's comments are recorded in a
60 Minutes report on the Pratt case aired on November 29,1987.) This, of course, has nothing at all to do
with the Olsen murder; Geronimo Pratt's imprisonment is thus overtly political, in the words of the very
office which prosecuted him.
137.O'Reilly, op. cit., p. 321. As of this writing, new evidence has surfaced which makes it clear that
Dhoruba Moore was tried as part of a COINTELPRO operation - jointly undertaken by the FBI and the
NYPD Special Services Division - to neutralize him through "the judicial process." It appears his case
will be ordered back to trial, and that he may very well be acquitted. But, in the interim, he has served
19 years in a maximum security prison. See Conclusion, Note 5 for further detail.
138. See Glick, Brian, A Call for Justice: The Case of the N.Y. 3, Committee to Support the New York
Three, New York, 1983. Also see, "Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus," Herman Bell, et. al. v. Thomas
A. Coughlin, et. al., (89 Civ. 8408), United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,1989.
139. The Jackson matter is extremely complicated, and is covered in more detail in Agents, op. cit.,
pp. 94-9. A thumbnail sketch is that the victim was convicted of a $70 gas station stickup at age 18 and
sentenced to serve one-year-to-life under California's indeterminate sentencing law. In 1970, he had
already served ten years, when he was accused, along with two other black inmates -John Quchette and
Fleeta Drumgo, the three became known as the "Soledad Brothers" - in the killing of a prison guard, John
V. Mills, in retaliation for the killing of three black prisoners (W.L. Nolen, Cleveland Edwards and Alvin
"Jug" Miller) by other guards (the best source on the Soledad Brothers case is probably Yee, Min S., The
Melancholy History of Sokdad Prison: In Which a Utopian Scheme Turns Bedlam, Harpers Magazine Press,
New York, 1973). At about the same time, Jackson's Soledad Brother (Coward-McCann Publishers, New
York, 1973) was released, with an introduction by Jean Genet, making him an international politico-
literary figure; a second book, Blood In My Eye (Random House Publishers, New York, 1972) was
published posthumously. There then began a frenzied period of slightly more than a year — captured
very well in Armstrong, Gregory, The Dragon Has Come: The Last Fourteen Months in the Life of George
Jackson (Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1974) — in which the BPP inducted him to an honorary
position within its leadership, a major defense effort was assembled in order to combat the murder
charge against him (and to secure his release from prison), the authorities moved him to San Quentin,
and a COINTELPRO was apparently launched through which to neutralize both Jackson and as many
of his supporters as possible. This induded an August 7, 1970 operation at the Marin County Civic
Center, near the prison, in which Jackson's 17-year-old brother, Jonathan, was lured into attempting to
liberate George by armed force from a courtroom in which he was supposed to appear at a hearing
involving three other black prisoners, Ruchell McGee, William Christmas and James McClain. In the
event, George Jackson was held at San Quentin on the fateful day, Jonathan walked into a police trap
and, in the fusillade which ensued, was killed along with Marin County Judge Harold J. Haley,
Christmas and McClain; Assistant District Attorney Gary Thomas was paralyzed for life by a police
bullet, while McGee and a juror were badly wounded. Tellingly, the police action was commanded by
CCS detectives Ray Callahan and Daniel Mahoney — more than 350 miles out of their LA jurisdiction —
and backed up by FBI agents from southern California (see The Glass House Tapes, op. cit.) In the
aftermath, the Bureau claimed that Soledad Brothers Defense Committee head Angela Y. Davis had
coordinated the whole affair — although it turned out there was absolutely no evidence to support such
a contention — President Richard M. Nixon proclaimed her to be "the country's number one terrorist
fugitive," and she became the focus of a much-publicized nation-wide search. Captured in New York
on the night of October 13,1970, Davis was transported back to California without the legal protocol of
extradition and confined for more than a year before being found innocent of all charges (see Davis,
Angela Y., et. al., If They Come In The Morning, Signet Books, New York, 1971). Meanwhile, according to
provocateur Louis Tackwood, the plot to assassinate Jackson himself — involving CCS, CII, the FBI and
California penal officials — proceeded apace. It culminated on August 21, 1971, whenJackson was
gunned down in a courtyard of San Quentin during an alleged escape attempt (see Tackwood, Louis E.,
"My Assignment was to Kill George Jackson," The Black Panther, April 21,1980, pp. 4-6). Officials offered
a bizarre "explanation" of what had happened, contending that Jackson had utilized a huge 9 mm.
Astra-600 pistol provided by BPP Field Marshal Landon Williams to attempt an escape. Supposedly, the
weapon had been smuggled into the prison by an attorney named Stephen J. Bingham and then
concealed by Jackson under an Afro wig and used to take over the prison's "adjustment center" before
the attempted breakout (on the utter implausibility of these and other aspects of the official version of
events, see the San Francisco Chronicle, August 28,1971). Four guards were killed during the adjustment
center takeover. On October 1,1971, a Mahn County grand jury indicted seven persons, six prisoners
— including Fleeta Drumgo and another prisoner named Johnny Spain, known collectively as the "San
Quentin Six" — and attorney Bingham, on 45 counts of murder, conspiracy and assault concerning the
events of August 21. The six went to trial in July of 1975, and three —including Drumgo —were acquitted
on August 12, 1976.The remaining three — including Johnny Spain — were convicted and sentenced to
multiple life terms of imprisonment. For his part, Stephen Bingham was forced underground for fifteen
years, finally surfacing during the spring of 1986 and being acquitted of any wrongdoing in early '87.
Meanwhile, Drumgo and Cluchette were also acquitted of the murder charge against them in the death
of guard John Mills — the original Soledad Brothers case — and both were paroled. Fleets Drumgo was
mysteriously shotgunned to death on an Oakland street corner on November 24, 1979. In 1988, new
evidence concerning police and FBI involvement in the death of George Jackson caused the case of
Johnny Spain to be reopened; he is currently free, pending further developments. For further informa-
tion on the aftermath of the Jackson assassination, see Clark, Howard, American Saturday, Richard Manek
Publishers, New York, 1981, pp. 301-19.
140.For more information on the Bernstein/Panther connection, see Wolfe, Tom, Radical Chic and
Mau Massing the Flak Catchers, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1970.
141.Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., pp. 208-9.
Chapter 6 Notes: COINTELPRO - New Left 365
142.Memorandum from Hoover to the SAC, San Francisco, dated March 5, 1970.
143. Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., p. 210.
144. Ibid., pp. 210-1.
145.Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago and seven other field offices, dated May 15,
1970.
146. Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit.., pp. 214-5. A memorandum
from the New York field office to Hoover, dated October 11,1969, also describes contacts made by agents
with offidals of United Airlines in an effort to cause an air freight rate increase vis d vis the Panther
newspaper in hopes that it will bankrupt the publication, or at least curtail its distribution.
147.Memorandum from the SAC, New York, to Hoover and the San Francisco field office, dated
October 11, 1969.
148.Memorandum from the San Diego SAC to Hoover, dated May 20, 1970.
149. Ibid.
150.Memorandum from the SAC, New York to Hoover, dated August 19, 1970.
151. Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., pp. 406-7. All 233 anti-Panther
COINTELPRO operations acknowledged occurred between August 1968 and early 1971. It should be
noted that there could well have been a number of additional actions aimed at the BPP during the critical
period which were never acknowledged by the FBI. It is also apparent that a number of the admitted
operations were continued after 1971, all FBI avowals and Senate Select Committee assurances to the
contrary notwithstanding. During the latter period, it is highly probable that new (unacimitted)
COINTELPROs were also launched. The Senate committee, after all, never really assumed physical
control over the FBI's filing system, and was thus always dependent upon the Bureau's willingness to
tell the truth when stating that all relevant records had been produced. This is a dubious proposition at
best, as the Hampton-Clark suit and many other examples abundantly demonstrate. The 233 figure must
therefore be considered as a conservative estimate rather than a hard fact.
152.There are no good historical accounts of the BLA. A rather biased sketch, from a bourgeois
perspective, but containing at least some of the salient information, may be found in Castellucd, John,
The Big Dance: The Untold Story of Weatherman Kathy Boudin and the Terrorist Family That Committed the
Brinks' Robbery Murders, Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1986. A sectarian view from the left may
be found in Tani, E., and Kee Sera, False Nationalism/False Internationalism: Class Contradictions in Armed
Struggle, Seeds Beneath the Snow Publications, Chicago, 1985. Additional information may be found in
Shakur, Assata, Assata: An Autobiography, Lawrence Hill Publishers, Westport, CT, 1987.
Chapter 6: COINTELPRO -New Left

1.The earliest attempt to articulate the SDS vision in book format seems to have been Newfield,
Jack, A Prophetic Minority, New American Library, New York, 1966. What is perhaps the best account
of the origins and early evolution of SDS can be found in Miller, James, "Democracy is in the Streets:" From
Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago, Simon and Schuster Publishers, New York, 1987. Several of the seminal
documents of the organization are included in Albert, Judith Clavir, and Stewart Edward Albert (eds.),
The Sixties Papers: Documents of a Rebellious Decade, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984. Other critical
documents may be found in older books, such as Cohen and Hales, op. cit.; Jacobs, Paul, and Saul Landau
(eds.), The New Radicals, Random House Publishers, New York, 1966; Kenniston, Kenneth (ed.), The
Young Radicals, Harcourt, Brace and World Publishers, New York, 1968; Teodori, Massimo (ed.), The New
Left: A Documentary History, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1969; and Long, Priscilla (ed.), The
New Left, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1969.
2.The most comprehensive account of the evolution of the new left through time, issues and actions
may be found in Sale, Kirkpatrick, SDS, Random House Publishers, New York, 1973. Less exhaustive,
but in some ways more interesting accounts may be found in Calvert, Greg, and Carol Neiman, A
Disrupted History: The New Left and the New Capitalism, Random House Publishers, New York, 1971; and
Potter, Paul, A Name for Ourselves, Little, Brown and Company, New York, 1971. For more on the concept
of participatory democracy, see Lynd, Staughton, 'The New Radicalism and Participatory Democracy,"
Dissent, Summer 1965.
3.Sullivan and Brown, op. cit., p.147. For information on the Columbia student uprising, see Grant,
Joanne, Confrontation on Campus, Signet Books, New York, 1969.
4. Sullivan and Brown, op. cit., p. 147.

5. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 443. Although the Bureau allegedly discontinued its wholesale use of
unwarranted bugs and wiretaps on June 1, 1965 as a result of a ban imposed upon such practices by
Lyndon Johnson, it is obvious that this imposed no real curtailment of FBI ELSURS activities. Johnson's
order banning unwarranted wiretaps and bugs was drafted by Attorney General Katzenbach on April
10, 1965. Hoover wrote to Katzenbach assuring discontinuance on September 14 of the same year. The
director also issued an order purporting to ban further surreptitious entries on July 19,1966. For further
information, see U.S. Department of Justice, "Wiretaps," in Administrative History, Vol. III, lodged in the
Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas. Also see "Unwarranted FBI Electronic Surveil-
lance," in Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., pp. 271-351.
6. See Divale, William Tulio, with Joseph James, I Lived Inside the Campus Revolution, Cowels Book
Company, Los Angeles, 1973. Divale claimed, with corroboration from the FBI, that he infiltrated "the
student left" at UCLA in early 1965 and, among other things, organized an SDS chapter at Pasadena City
College. He proudly admitted to having served as a provocateur within the southern California
movement — "I was a leader, not a follower" for at least three years before he surfaced in 1969. He was
paid more than $15,000 by the FBI for his "services." Another individual who is known to have acted
in such a capacity is Phillip Abbott Luce, who infiltrated the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) and its
affiliate, the May 2 Movement (M2M; also associated with SDS) in 1962. In 1965, he surfaced to offer a
sensational article to the Saturday Evening Post entitled "Why I Quit the Extreme Left" (it was run on May
8, 1965). Later the same year, he was called to testify before the House Un-American Activities
Committee to "prove" the new left was "communist controlled,"and went on to author a book on the
subject (with ample help from the HUAC staff) entitled The New Left, David McKay, Inc., New York,
1966.
r 7. Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, op. cit., pp. 105,110; Intelligence Activities
and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., pp. 146-54.
8.Ibid., pp. 146-54, 301. The FBI officially discontinued its own mail cover program in 1964, largely
because it was duplicating that of the CIA, from which it had been receiving information accruing from
the Agency's illegal reading of U.S. radicals' letters since at least as early as 1958. Consequently, during
the period 1958-1973, the Bureau received a total of 57,846 pieces of mail illegally intercepted by the CIA,
with the greatest quantities coming during the late 1960s: 5,984 pieces in 1966, 5,863 in 1967, 5,322 in 1968,
and 5,384 in 1969. Only 666 pieces had been received in 1968, and 642 in 1973, allegedly the final year
of the arrangement (-bid., p. 632). Also see U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Volume IV: Mail Opening, 94th Congress, 1st
L Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975.
9. Quoted in Fireman, Ted, and Stewart MacCaulay, "Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and
the Words of Public Officials," Wisconsin Law Review, Summer 1966, pp. 676-7.
10. The Freedom Rides were conceived and organized by SNCC activist James Forman, utilizing
two Supreme Court rulings, Morgan v. Virginia and Boynton v. Virginia, prohibiting racial discrimination
in interstate transportation and terminal accommodations as a basis to try to force federal intervention
in the South. Many embryonic new leftists participated.
11. O'Reilly, op. cit., p. 84. The fate of the first bus is described as follows at pp. 83-4: "When the
Greyhound parked for its scheduled fifteen-minute rest stop, an angry mob surrounded it and began
smashing windows and slashing tires. Police officers diverted the mob and the bus pulled out, but Ku
Kluxers pursued in cars, catching up to the bus six miles out of town, when the tires either went flat from
the earlier slashing or were shot out. A homemade bomb came through one of the windows. The bus
quickly filled with smoke. The passengers tried to flee, but the mob held the door shut. The realization
that the bus might explode finally forced them to back up, and they beat the riders as they left the bus."
The FBI had been present through the whole affair, but had done absolutely nothing to intervene.
12. Ibid., p. 86. At p. 87, the author continues, "Sergeant Cook exercised little restraint when
forwarding material to the Klan. Gary Rowe [an FBI informant whom Cook believed to be a bona fide
klansman], described his access to police files as complete. Cook once opened two file drawers in his
office [concerning civil rights activists) and told Rowe to help himself, 'for the use of the KLAN, in
general.' Material leaked to Rowe and other Klansmen, [Birmingham SAC Thomas] Jenkins advised
headquarters, included 'information concerning potential violence given [Cook] by the Birmingham
Chapter 6 Notes: COINTELPRO — New Left 367
FBI office.' The Klan, in turn, supplied ad hoc personnel for the police department's surveillance squad.
Klansmen covered black churches and movement meetings, jotting down license plate numbers, and
sometimes rode around on patrol in squad cars." At p. 86, O'Reilly notes that local FBI agents
"suspected" close ties between the Klan and the Birmingham police since at least as early as September
1960. Yet the flow of civil rights movement-related material to the police continued unabated. See
additionally, memoranda, SAC, Birmingham, to Director, FBI, September 30, 1960; May 5, 1961; April
19, 1961; April 24, 1961; April 25, 1961; and April 26, 1961.
13.Stone is quoted in Overstreet, Harry, and Bonaro Overstreet, The FBI in Our Open Society, W.W.
Norton Publishers, New York, 1969, pp. 167-8.
14.FBI jurisdiction — for enforcement as well as investigation —dearly accrued from the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 (Title 18 U.S.C. § 241, § 242). The former section made it a felony punishable by ten years in
prison and a $5,000 fine for two or more persons to conspire to deprive "any citizen" of his or her civil
rights. The latter section, describing a misdemeanor, composed what is popularly referred to as the
"color-of-law statute," making it illegal under federal law for any local official (including police officers)
to use his or her office to deny any citizen his or her civil rights.
15.The "FBI had a consistent history of avoiding civil rights work." See U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights (report by Arnold Trebach to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy), Report — Book 5, Justice, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1961. Also see U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Law
Enforcement: A Report on Equal Protection in the South, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1965. None of this is intended to indicate that the brunt of anti-civil rights violence was not borne
by black activists. Consider, as just a few examples of what was going on in this regard, the matter of
SNCC leader Bob Moses, beaten bloody on August 22, 1961 by Billy Gaston, cousin of the local sheriff,
while attempting to register blacks to vote in Amite County, Mississippi; SNCC organizer Travis Britt,
beaten senseless by a white mob while trying to register voters in the same location on September 5;
SNCC organizer John Hardy, pistol-whipped by registrar of voters John Q. Woods for trying to register
blacks in Tylertown, Mississippi on September 7; SNCC supporter Herbert Lee, shot and killed by
Mississippi state legislator Eugene H. Hurst on September 25; Louis Allen, a black witness to the Lee
murder, shot to death by local police in order to prevent his testimony against State Congressman Hurst
in 1962; the handcuffing and shooting (three times, in the back of the neck) of activist Charley Ware
(whose pregnant wife was also pistol-whipped) by Baker County (Georgia) Sheriff L. Warren "Gator"
Johnson; SNCC members Moses, and Randolph T. Blackwell beaten, and Jimmy Travis shot in the head
while the three were doing voter registration work near Greenwood, Mississippi in 1963; the gratuitous
beating of SNCC activist Marion King, seven months pregnant, by sheriff's deputies at the Mitchell
County (Georgia) Jail when she attempted to take food to her husband, Slater, and other SNCC activists
incarcerated there (she suffered a stillbirth as a result); the beating (with a cane) of C.B. King, Slater's
brother, by Dougherty County (Georgia) Sheriff Cull Campbell, also in 1963. The list could be extended
through hundreds of such incidents. For additional information, see Carson, Claybourne, In Struggle:
SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981.
16.O'Reilly, op. cit., p. 80. Also see Elliff, John T., "Aspects of Federal Civil Rights Enforcement: The
Justice Department and the FBI," Perspectives in American History, No. 5,1971, pp. 605-73. An interesting
participant account of this period may be found in Peck, James, Freedom Ride, Simon and Schuster
Publishers, New York, 1962.
17.See Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., p. 456. Also see memoran-
dum, (deleted) to Alex Rosen (FBI General Intelligence Division head), February 26, 1960.
18.O'Reilly, op. cit., p.103. The author quotes former head of the FBI's Inspection Division, W. Mark
Felt, as observing that the Kennedys tended to view the Bureau as their "own private police force" with
regard to surveillance of civil rights activists. A nice summary of some portions of this may be found in
a memorandum from James F. Bland to William C. Sullivan, dated April 10, 1962. Also see Horne,
Gerald, Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946-1956, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,
Rutherford, NJ, 1988.
19.See Cagin, Seth, and Philip Dray, We Are Not Afraid: The Story of Goodman, Schwerner, and Chaney,
and the Civil Rights Campaign in Mississippi, Macmillan Publishers, New York, 1988. Also see U.S.
Department of Justice, "Prosecutive Summary," No. 1613, Washington, D.C., December 19, 1964. It
should be noted that Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman worked for CORE rather than SNCC. The
Mississippi Freedom Summer Project was an initiative of COFO, the Council of Federated Organiza-
lions, consisting of SNCC, CORE, SCLC and the NAACP. Also see Belfrage, Sally, Freedom Summer,
Viking Press, New York, 1965. Of further interest, see Woodley, Richard, "It Will Be a Hot Summer in
Mississippi," The Reporter, May 21, 1964.
20.Bowers is quoted in a report on the "racial situation in Mississippi" tendered by the Atlanta field
office of the FBI, dated September 28,1964, with reference to the comment having been reported by the
Bureau's Klan infiltrators in "early 1963." For further contextual information, see Rothschild, Mary
Aikin, A Case of Black and White: Northern Volunteers and the Southern Freedom Summers, 1964-1965,
Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1982.
21. This conservative count accrues from Bureau monograph number 1386 (author unknown),
entitled Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (FBI File No. 100-43190), completed in August 1967.
The document draws upon information available to agents at the time. Also see Spain, David M.,
"Mississippi Autopsy," Ramparts (Special Edition), 1964.
22.On SA Helgeson's response, or lack of it, see King, Mary, Freedom Song, William Morrow and
Company, New York, 1987, pp. 378-85. The agent interacted similarly, not only with Sherwin Kaplan,
a Friend of SNCC volunteer who reported Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman missing at about 10 p.m.
on the fatal evening (i.e.: as they were being released, when an FBI inquiry with the Neshoba County
Sheriff's Office might actually have done some good), but with another white activist, Robert Weil, and
the author, a SNCC activist, as well as Justice Department Attorney Frank Schwelb, all around 11 p.m.
When SNCC activist Aaron Henry called again a bit later, Helgeson "took the information curtly and
did not allow a chance for further conversation."
23.O'Reilly, op. cit., p. 165.
24.Ibid.; the Jackson FBI office, meanwhile, was still sandbagging with a vengeance, telling SNCC
activist Bill Light in response to a question as to whether the Bureau would attempt to find the missing
men that SNCC should direct all such "inquiries...to the Justice Department." Also see Holt, Len, The
Summer That Didn't End, Morrow Publishers, New York, 1965.
25.Moses put his message out in the form of a letter to the parents of all Mississippi Freedom
Summer volunteers, circa June 22,1964. This is noted in a memorandum from FBI official Alex Rosen to
Alan H. Belmont on July 8,1964. The FBI's concern with the actions of Mrs. Schwerner and Mrs. Chaney
may be discerned in a memorandum (names deleted) concerning the wiretap log of a phone call from
Rita Schwerner to the White House on June 25, 1964, and another call to May King on the same date
(WATS Reports, Box 37). Cronkite's comment is recorded in the transcript of the CBS News Report, June
25,1964. Also see Huie, William Bradford, Three Lives for Mississippi, WCC Books, New York, 1965; and
McCord, William, Mississippi: The Long Hot Summer, W.W. Norton Publishers, New York, 1965.
26.On the FBI buildup and its causes, see Von Hoffman, Nicholas, Mississippi Notebook, David
White Publishers, New York, 1964, p. 38. Also see Sutherland, Elizabeth (ed.), Letters From Mississippi,
McCraw-Hill Publishers, New York, 1965, p.118. Corroboration accrues in a letter from J. Edgar Hoover
to Walter Johnson, dated July 13, 1964.
27.On the director's visit to Mississippi, see Welch, Neil J., and David W. Marston, Inside Hoover's
FBI, Doubleday Publishers, Garden City, NY, 1984, pp. 102,106-7. Also see Navasky, Victor, Kennedy
Justice, Atheneum Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 107.
28. See Doar, John, and Dorothy Landsberg, "The Performance of the FBI in Investigating
Violations of Federal Laws Protecting the Right to Vote, 1960-1967," in U.S. Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Hearings on FBI Counterintelligence Programs, 93d
Congress, 2d Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp. 936-7.
29.O'Reilly, op. cit., p.173. The t-shirt dad torso was never identified, as was the case with several
other black bodies found in Mississippi swamps during the search for Chaney, Schwerner and
Goodman. Two other torsos discovered in the Old River near Tallulah, Louisiana were correlated with
names. They were Charlie Eddie Moore and Henry H. Dee, both non-activist black 19-year-olds,
apparently murdered by the klan in the Homochitto National Forest because of the mistaken notion that
they were part of a nonexistent "Black Muslim gun-running plot." No particular effort seems to have
been made to solve any of these apparent homicides, or even to identify the bodies, which undoubtedly
were among the more than 450 separate inddents of racist violence SNCC chronided as having occurred
in Mississippi during Freedom Summer (June 15 - September 15, 1964); see Minnis, Jack, Mississippi —
A Chronology of Violence and Intimidation Since 1961, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(internal document), Atlanta, 1963. Also see Moody, Anne, Coming of Age in Mississippi, Dial Press, New
York, 1968, p. 338.
30. Memorandum, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to President Lyndon B. Johnson,

September 4,1964. Also see U.S. Department of Justice, "Prosecution Summary," No. 1613, op. cit., and
"Supplemental Summary," No. 1822, March 5, 1965.
31.Quoted in Cagin and Dray, op. cit., p. 452. Sentencing is covered at p. 435. Also see United States
v. Cecil Ray Price, a. al, Crim. No. 5291, Federal District Court of Southern Mississippi, October 11-21,
1967. Of further interest, see Woodley, Richard, "A Recollection of Michael Schwerner," The Reporter,
July 16, 1964; and Goodman, Carolyn, as told to Bernard Asbell, "My Son Didn't Die in Vain!" Good
Housekeeping, May 1965.
32.Sullivan and Brown, op. cit., pp. 129-30.
33.The Bureau's claimed "coverage" of the klan derives from a letter from Hoover to Attorney
General Katzenbach, dated September 2, 1965.
34.Hoffman, Abbie, Soon to be a Major Motion Picture, G.P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York,
1980, p. 69.
35. As O'Reilly, op. cit., puts it at p. 217, Rowe was actively suspected of "involvement in the
firebombing of the home of a wealthy black Birmingham resident, A.G. Gaston, the detonating of
shrapnel bombs in black neighborhoods, and the murder of a black man in the 1963 demonstrations,"
and there was speculation the FBI had covered for him on each of these matters. The author also notes
that Rowe had appeared to inform on a plot to kill a civil rights activist, the Reverend Fred Shuttles-
worth, but that the supposed assassin, John Wesley Hall, also turned out to be an FBI infiltrator. As to
the 16th Street church bombing which left four children dead (they were Carole Robertson, Denise
McNair, Addle Mae Collins and Cynthia Wesley, ages four through fourteen), the Bureau opened what
it dubbed the BAPBOMB (for "Baptist Bombing") investigation. As O'Reilly observes on p. 112,
"Another informant, John Wesley Hall, named Rowe as a member of a three-man klan security
committee that held veto power over all proposed acts of violence; this raised the possibility that Rowe
might have been involved in the Baptist Church bombing. In fact, the Birmingham police considered
Rowe a prime suspect. But the FBI did not investigate. Hall, who went by the nickname of 'Nigger,"
went on the Bureau payroll two months after the explosion despite a polygraph test that convinced FBI
agents in Alabama that he had been involved in the crime. Hall also admitted having moved some
dynamite for the principle BAPBOMB suspect, Robert E. ("Dynamite Bob") Chambliss, a fifty-nine-
year-old truck driver for an auto parts company who had joined the Ku Klux Klan in 1924. Two weeks
after the bomb exploded on Sixteenth Street, the Birmingham Recorder's Court sentenced Chambliss,
Hall, and another suspect, Charles Arnie Cagle, on a misdemeanor charge — possession of an explosive
without a permit." Despite this wealth of readily available information, the FBI was for some reason
never able to "crack the case." So much for BAPBOMB. Also see Raines, Howell, "The Birmingham
Bombing Twenty Years Later: The Case That Won't Close," New York Times Magazine, July 24,1983.
36.See Rowe, Gary Thomas Jr., My Undercover Years with the Ku Klux Klan, Bantam Books, New
York, 1976. Also see Sullivan and Brown, op. cit., pp. 131-3, and O'Reilly, op. cit., pp. 217-23. At p. 221,
the latter notes that in the fall of 1978, a Lowndes County, Alabama grand jury finally acted against
Rowe, indicting him as the man who had in fact pulled the trigger in the Liuzzo murder.
37.The defendants appealed and were freed on appeal bond until the circuit court upheld their
conviction on April 27, 1967. Thomas and Wilkins were then ordered to federal prison, where neither
served more than five years of his ten-year sentence. Eaton, meanwhile, had died of a heart attack while
awaiting the appeals decision and never served any time at all.
38.The case is Muhammad Kenyatta v. Roy Moore, et. al., No. 377-0298 (R) (N.D. Miss., 1985). The book
in question is Whitehead, Don, Attack on Terror, op. cit. Other examples of the genre include Sentner,
David, How the FBI Gets Its Man, Avon Books, New York, 1965, and Tully, Andrew, The FBI's Most Famous
Cases, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1965. In 1975, when the television movie of the
Whitehead potboiler was aired, Michael Schwerner's father was provoked into attempting to refute at
least the more obvious lies involved; see Schwerner, Nat, "Mississippi: Whitewashing the FBI," Rights,
April-May, 1975.
39.See memorandum, E.T. Turner to W.A. Branigan, dated August 23,1964. Also see Wise, op. cit.,
pp. 288-91.
40.An interesting summary of the Bureau's Atlantic City operation may be found in Lasky, Victor,
It Didn't Start With Watergate, Dell Books, New York, 1978, pp. 178-85. The author notes that DeLoach
utilized the services of Atlantic City SAC Leo Clark, pledging Clark to secrecy even where the Secret
Service was concerned. Also see Miller, Mike, 'The MFDP," The Movement, May 1965.
41. Miller, op. cit., pp. 184-217. Also see Lynd, Staughton, 'Toward an Interracial Movement of the
Poor," Liberation, July 1969. For participant accounts of ERAP efforts in specific cities, see Gitlin, Todd,
and Nand Hollander, Uptown: Poor Whites in Chicago, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1970 (this
concerns the "Jobs Or Income Now" - JOIN - project; and Hayden, op. cit. (concerning the Newark
Community Union Project, NCUP). Also see Sale, op. cit., pp. 131-50.
42. Sale, op. cit., pp. 162-3. Weinberg was the individual who coined the absurd phrase, quickly
popularized by the mass media, "Never trust anyone over thirty."
43. For a fairly comprehensive elaboration of the thinking involved, see Lipset, Seymour M., and
Sheldon S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt, Doubleday Publishers, Garden City, NY, 1965. Also
see Wolin, Sheldon S., and John H. Schur (eds.), The Berkeley Rebellion and Beyond, New York Review of
Books, New York, 1970. Another thoughtful and succinct articulation may be found in Davidson, Carl,
The New Radicals and the Multiversity, Students for a Democratic Society (pamphlet), Chicago, 1968.
Davidson was SDS Interorganizational Secretary, 1967-68.
44. The initial commitment of U.S. ground troops (other than "advisors") on March 8,1965 was only
3,500 men. Within nine weeks, however, the number had grown to more than 90,000 as units such as the
elite 1st Air Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions were committed. On July 28, President Lyndon
Johnson publicly announced that he had already slated 125,000 U.S. troops for combat duty, and that
the number might go as high as 200,000 by the end of the year. (See MacLear, Michael, The Ten Thousand
Day War: Vietnam, 1945-1975, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1981, pp. 128-50.) The attention of student
radicals - virtually all of whom were of draft age - was riveted by these developments.
45. The text of Potter's speech is included in Albert and Albert, op. cit., at pp. 218-25.
46. For the best account of the trip, see Lynd, Staughton, and Thomas Hayden, The Other Side, New
American Library, New York, 1966.
47. On the practical outcome of the debate within SDS concerning the emphasis (or lack of same)
to be placed on anti-war organizing, see the text of a speech delivered in Washington, D.C., during an
October 27, 1965 demonstration against the war, by SDS president Carl Oglesby (who replaced Potter
in this position during the summer of that year); included in Teodori, op. cit., at pp. 182-8.
48. Goodman, Mitchell (ed.), The Movement Toward a New America: The Beginnings of a Long
Revolution, Knopf/Pilgrim Press, New York/Philadelphia, 1970, p. xi. An interesting participant
perspective on one of the core aspects of new left opposition to the Vietnam war may be found in Ferber,
Michael, and Staughton Lynd, The Resistance, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971; a good view on other
dimensions of the anti-war effort may be obtained in Foster, Julian, and Durward Long, Protest! Student
Activism in America, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1970.
49. Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., pp. 249, 487-90.
50 See Student National Coordinating Committee, 'The Basis of Black Power," New York Times,
August 5,1966.
51. See Carmichael, Stokely, "What We Want," New York Review of Books, September 26, 1966. By
February 17,1968 - at the point of the merger between SNCC and the BPP - Carmichael's position had
hardened to the point where he delivered "A Declaration of War" as a speech, the text of which was
printed in the San Francisco Express Times on February 22.
52. For an excellent reading on "new class theory" in its formulation during this period, see
Hayden, Tom, "The Politics of the Movement," Dissent, January/February 1966. Also see Calvert,
Gregory, "In White America: Radical Consciousness and Social Change," The National Guardian, March
1967; as well as Rowntree, John, and Margaret Rowntree, "Youth as Class," Midpeninsula Observer,
August 12, 1968. A more contemporary tracing of the theory's evolution may be found in Walker, Pat
(ed.), Between Labor and Capital: The Professional-Managerial Class, South End Press, Boston, 1979.
53. Probably the best example of this is Editors of U.S. News and World Report, Communism and the
New Left: What They're Up to Now, Collier/Macmillan Company, London, 1969, in which the anonymous
authors (thought to include several FBI "public relations specialists") worry at great length about the
nonexistent influence of Bettina Aptheker, head of the Berkeley DuBois Club and daughter of CP, USA
historian Herbert Aptheker, on "the anti-war movement." Attention is also paid to the effects of
participation by the YSA and PLP in "New Left affairs." Another, somewhat earlier but delightfully
ridiculous treatment of the same subject matter assembled with ample assistance of the Bureau - is
Allen, Gary, Communist Revolution in the Streets, Western Islands Publishers, Boston and Los Angeles,
1967. Ironically, it was the largely sterile DuBois Clubs rather than the vibrant new left organizations
which suffered most from such misinformation. In March 1966, after FBI reports prompted inflamma-
tory statements about them by Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, DuBois Club members were
assaulted outside their Brooklyn headquarters by neighborhood toughs who had previously ignored
them; a few hours later, a bomb blew up the group's national headquarters in San Francisco (see Cray,
Ed, The Enemy in the Streets, Doubleday Publishers, Garden City, NY, 1972, p. 223). In 1967, J. Edgar
Hoover described the tiny and rather impotent organization as being "the new blood of international
communism" (quoted in Firm= and MacAulay, op. cit., at p. 633), with the result that it was quickly
banned from campuses such as those of the University of Illinois and University of Indiana systems (see
Chicago Sun-Times, February 16 and March 15, 1967).
54. Kirkpatrick Sale (op. cit., p. 64) describes the formation of PLP as follows: "On July 1,1962, some
fifty people meeting at the Hotel Diplomat in New York City established a new political organization
on the left. Its fourteen-member coordinating committee consisted entirely of people who had been
members of the Communist Party and quit or were purged in late 1961 and early 1962 for being 'ultra-
leftists' and 'agents of the Albanian party' — i.e., 'Maoists.' Among them: Milton Rosen, who became
chairman of the new group; Mortimer Scheer, vice chairman and head of West Coast operations; Fred
Jerome, the editor of the group's five-month-old magazine; and Bill Epton, a black man. The name of the
organization: the Progressive Labor Movement [changed to 'Party' on April 18, 1964]." On pp. 121-2,
Sale describes the creation of M2M by PLP. At least some portion of the right-wing confusion as to who
or what, exactly, comprised the new left may have been genuine, given SIDS' staunch adherence to the
principle of not excluding self-proclaimed communists; see Haber, Alan, Nonexclusionism: The New Left
and the Democratic Left, Students for a Democratic Society (pamphlet), New York, 1965.
55. Sale, op. cit., p. 351. The budget of the SIDS national office was $87,000 — virtually all of it raised
by the membership — for the year.
56. Teodori, op. cit., p. 481.
57. Ibid., p. 482.
58. MacLear, op. cit., p. 169. The troop level at the time of Westmoreland's request was approxi-
mately 470,000. The U.S. absorbed more than 16,000 combat fatalities during 1967, more than three times
the number sustained in 1965. By this point, perhaps 750,000 Vietnamese had died as a result of the U.S.
intervention, with another 1.3 million rendered homeless.
59. Sale, op. cit., pp. 369-74.
60. Ibid., pp. 375-7. The confrontation led to the first "conspiracy to incite a riot" charge being levied
against SDSers, the so-called "Oakland Seven": Frank Bardacke, Terry Cannon, Reese Erlich, Steve
Hamilton, Bob Mandel, Mike Smith and Jeff Segal. They were later acquitted after Oakland policeman
Robert Wheeler was forced to admit that he'd provided demonstration organizers with the hand-held
walkie-talkies which allowed them to listen in on police communications, and the possession of which
was used by the prosecution as evidence that a conspiracy had occurred. Another Oakland cop, Bruce
Coleman, confessed on the stand that, acting in an "undercover [infiltrator /provocateur] capacity," he'd
provided firecrackers for use in unnerving police during the demonstrations, and had explained the
tactic to demonstrators at an SDS meeting before the event. See Rothschild, Emma, "Notes from a
Political Trial," in Paul Lauter and Florence Howe (eds.), Trials of the Resistance, Vintage Books, New
York, 1970, pp. 114-5.
61. An interesting participant account of the Pentagon demonstration may be found in Mailer,
Norman, The Armies of the Night: History as a Novel, The Novel as History, New American Library, New
York, 1968.
62. Sale, op. cit., pp. 377-9. The Hilton confrontation resulted in the second "conspiracy to incite a
riot" charge against SDS leaders, this time Ted Gold, Mark Rudd, and Ron Carver. The charges were later
dropped. An excellent participant summary, not only of this action, but of the whole sweep of SDS anti-
war activity in New York during this period may be found in Rader, Dotson, I Ain't Marchin' Anymore,
Paperback Library, New York, 1969.
63. Anti-ROTC demonstrations occurred at Arizona, Brandeis, Howard, Louisiana State, Rutgers
and San Francisco State Universities, among others. Anti-military recruitment protests were under-
taken at Ade1phi, Berkeley, U/Cal Irvine, University of Colorado, Harvard, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan
State, Oberlin, Pratt Institute, Princeton, Stony Brook, Washington University and Yale. Anti-CIA
recruitment actions were to be found at Brandeis, Brown, University of Colorado, Kentucky, Pennsyl-
vania, and Tulane. Demonstrations against Dow recruiters were also conducted at Boston University,
Brandeis, California (Berkeley, Los Angeles State, San Jose, San Fernando Valley, and UCLA campuses),
Chicago, CCNY, Connecticut, Harvard, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, NYU, Pennsylvania, Roch-
ester, Vanderbilt, and Wisconsin. The list is hardly complete.
64. A partial list of examples includes exposure of a $125,000-per-year contract between the CIA
and Columbia's School of International Affairs which had been repeatedly denied by Dean Andrew
Cordier; "Project Michigan," part of a $21.6 million contract with the Pentagon by which the University
of Michigan was to perfect infrared sensing equipment for use in jungle warfare; uncovering of a multi-
million dollar Penn State contract to run an ordnance laboratory and assist in the development of the
U.S. nuclear submarine fleet; production of a 21-page report by SDS at MIT, detailing how the "private"
institution was dependent on the government for 79% of its financing, a situation engendering
substantial military research; other discoveries included the participation of fifty universities in the
Pentagon's 'Project Themis" and working in everything from a $30 million-per-year counterinsurgency
research effort to developing chemical and biological warfare techniques. See New Left Notes, Septem-
ber 25, 1967.
65. The extent and systematic nature of government lying vis k vis its Indochina policy and
prosecution of an undeclared war in that region was fully documented in secret reports, studies and
memoranda. Although much remains hidden to this day, a sufficient quantity of such information was
eventually "leaked" by Rand Corporation consultant Daniel Ellsberg to establish the case beyond any
vestige of reasonable doubt. A selection of the pertinent documents were published as The Pentagon
Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision making on Vietnam (Senator Mike Gravel
Edition, Four Volumes), Beacon Press, Boston, 1971.
66. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., pp. 440-1. Also see Mitford, Jessica, The
Trial of Dr. Spock, The Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Jr., Michael Ferber, Mitchell Goodman, and Marcus
Raskin, Vintage Books, New York, 1970. The case at issue was U.S. v. William Sloane Coffin, Jr., et.al., 50
U.S.C. App. 462 (a). The defendants were charged with such "misdeeds" as distributing a pamphlet
entitled A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority, produced by an anti-war organization, RESIST, nominally
headed by Noam Chomsky and Dwight MacDonald. Ferber was specifically cited in the indictment for
having delivered a speech entitled "A Time to Say No" at Boston's Arlington Street Church on October
16,1967. Coffin and Spock were also cited for giving certain speeches. During the period encompassing
the trial (December 1,1967 through December 1,1968), 537 students who had turned in their draft cards
as an act of resistance lost their student deferments and were declared eligible for immediate conscrip-
tion by Selective Service Director General Lewis Hershey. An SDS member at the University of
Oklahoma in Norman was also reclassified for immediate induction into the army because his draft
board (in its own words) "did not feel [his] activity as a member of SDS [was] to the best interest of the
U.S. government." See Civil Liberties, June 1969. Also see Sale, op. cit., p. 407.
67. Finman and MacAulay, op. cit.
69. Department of Justice Press Release, November 18, 1974.
70. In March 1967, the Columbia Daily Spectator confirmed a report disseminated by a local SDS
research committee headed by Ted Gold that the university was secretly affiliated with IDA, and had
been since 1959. Student protest was immediately forthcoming, meeting with a promise from President
Kirk to form a committee to "study" the question and recommend "guidelines" concerning the nature
of such institutional relationships. A year later, in March 1968, when not much had resulted from the
committee's work, SDS led a militant demonstration inside Columbia's Low Library, demanding the
IDA connection be immediately broken. It was for this that SDS leaders were to be "disciplined" by the
Kirk administration; Kirk also banned further demonstrations of any sort inside university buildings.
See Avorn, Jerry, Andrew Crane, Mark Jaffe, Oren Root, Jr., Paul Starr, Michael Stern and Robert
Stulberg, Up Against the Ivy Wall: A History of the Columbia Crisis, Atheneum Publishers, New York, 1969,
pp. 15-21. Concerning the gym site and related issues, see Faculty Civil Rights Group of Columbia
University, The Community and the Expansion of Columbia University, Columbia University, December
1967.
71. The action represented the first time that SDS and Columbia's Student Afro-American Society
(SAS) had undertaken a joint effort. The first building occupied — by SDS — was Hamilton Hall; this
subsequently became an exclusively SAS-occupied facility. Low Library, Mathematics, Avery and
Fayerweather Halls were also occupied. See Kahn, Roger, The Battle for Morningside Heights, William
Morrow and Company, New York, 1970.
Chapter 6 Notes: CONTELPRO — New Left 373
72.The initial six demands of the Columbia demonstrators read as follows: 1) All disciplinary
action now pending and probations already imposed upon six students (as a result of the earlier anti-
IDA demonstration) be immediately terminated and a general amnesty be granted to those students
participating in this demonstration. 2) President Kirk's ban on demonstrations inside University
buildings be dropped. 3) Construction of the Columbia gymnasium in Momingside Park cease at once.
4) All future disciplinary action taken against University students be resolved through an open hearing
before students and faculty which adheres to standards of due process. 5) Columbia disaffiliate, in fact
and not merely on paper, from the Institute for Defense Analysis; and President Kirk and Trustee
William A.M. Burden resign their positions on IDA's Board of Trustees and Executive Board. 6)
Columbia University use its good offices to obtain dismissal of charges now pending against those
participating in demonstrations at the gym construction site in the park. See Avorn, et al., op. cit., pp. 52-
3.
73.The police assault at Columbia, involving at least 1,000 men of the NYPD (the bulk of them
members of the "Tactical Police Force," or riot police) came on the night of April 30, 1968. 712 students
were arrested and at least 148 injured, some of them seriously. See Nevard, Jacques, Interim report
prepared by the First Deputy Commissioner of Police: Arrests Made on the Complaint of Columbia University
Administration of Students Trespassing in School Buildings, New York City Police Department, May 4,1968.
When the administration moved to expel SDS members Mark Rudd, Nick Freudenburg and Morris
Grossner in the wake of this event, students reoccupied Hamilton Hall, declared a strike and did open
battle with the police on May 21. In this exchange, 138 more students were arrested and an unknown
number injured. 66 students were ultimately suspended. Meanwhile, Harlem community activists,
supported by SDS, had seized a Columbia-owned tenement in Morningside Heights on May 17, and
held it until the police moved in and arrested 117 persons (56 of whom were Columbia students). See
Avorn, et. al., op. cit., p. 301. For an SDS leader's perspective on these developments, see Rudd, Mark,
"Notes on Columbia," The Movement, March 1969.
74.The memo is quoted at length in Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit.,
pp. 516-7. One of the reasons for the vociferousness of the FBI's response to new left actions at Columbia
may well have been that student activists were very nearly bringing down the government of Charles
DeGaulle in France at virtually the same time. See Priaulx, Allan, and Sanford J. Ungar, The Almost
Revolution: France — 1968, Dell Books, New York, 1969; and Touraine, Alain, The May Movement: Revolt
and Reform, Random House Books, New York, 1971. A partidpant account of the thinking which led to
the French student revolt may be found in a book written by one of the movement's leaders: see Cohn-
Bendit, Daniel, Obsolete Communism: The 14t-Wing Alternative, McGraw-Hill Publishers, New York,
1968. A broader conceptual analysis is offered in Hirsh, Arthur, The French New Left: An Intellectual
History from Sartre to Gore, South End Press, Boston, 1981. A worldwide perspective on the evolution of
the student movement during this crucial year may be found in Katsiaficas, George, The Imagination of
the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968, South End Press, Boston, 1987.
75. Project MERRIMAC, begun in February 1967, was a relatively small and localized (in
Washington, D.C) effort employing perhaps a dozen infiltrators which collected information on the
general plans, associations, activities and funding of fifteen targeted area groups including Women's
Strike for Peace and the Washington Urban League. Project RESISTANCE, initiated in December 1967,
was a much larger effort to obtain information on dissident individuals and organizations, included
production of weekly situation reports which were secretly distributed within the U.S. intelligence
community, and amassed 600-700 files containing the names of between 12,000-16,000 people. The
project was ostensibly terminated in June 1973. See Rockefeller, Nelson, Report to the President by the
Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, Manor Publishers, New York, 1975, pp. 151-9.
Operation CHAOS, launched in August 1967, continued until March 1974, when it was supposedly
abandoned. In 1976, a senate staff report noted that, "A major purpose of CHAOS activity in actual
practice became its participation with the FBI in the Bureau's internal security work." See Intelligence
Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., p. 716.
78.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 458. The author goes on to note that,
"Among the stranger activities of Army intelligence agents were the monitoring of protests by welfare
mothers in Milwaukee; infiltration of a coalition of church youth groups and young Democrats in
Colorado; attending a Halloween party for elementary school children in Washington, D.C. on the
suspicion a local 'dissident' might be present; monitoring classes at New York University, where a
prominent civil rights leader was teaching; attending a conference of priests in Washington, D.C, held
to discuss birth control; and using government money to buy liquor and marijuana in order to infiltrate
a commune in Washington, D.0 during a counter-inaugural demonstration in January, 1969. Informa-
tion collected and/or sought for indusion in Army files included information on the political, financial
and sexual lives of individuals and information on the leaders, plans, purposes and funding of dissident
organizations." Also see U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights, Army Surveillance and Civilians: A Documentary Analysis, 92d Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1971. Of further interest, see Pyle, Christopher, "CONUS
Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics," in Charles Peters and Taylor Branch (eds.), Blowing
the Whistle, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972; and Pyle, Christopher, "Spies Without Masters: The
Army Still Watches Civilian Politics," Civil Liberties Review, Summer 1974, pp. 38-49.
79.See Emerson, op. cit., p. 145. Also see Sale, op. cit., p. 443.
80.Quoted in Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., pp. 515-6.
81.Excerpts from Hayden's testimony before both HUAC and the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence (to which he was also called as a witness) form a volume entitled
Rebellion and Repression, World Publishing Company, Cleveland, OH, 1969. Among the others who were
called before HUAC were Abbie Hoffman and former SDSer/Vietnam Day Committee organizer Jerry
Rubin. An account of their experience may be found in Rubin, Jerry, Do It!, Simon and Schuster
82.Established policymakers in Washington, D.C. were experiencing something far different from
a consensus on the matter by this point. After the Vietnamese Tet Cfensive of January-February 1968
proved beyond question that General Westmoreland's "light at the end of the tunnel" to victory was a
hoax - and the good general resultantly requested an additional 206,000 troops beyond the half-million
he already had at his disposal, a move which would have necessitated calling up the reserves as well as
raising the already huge numbers of men being conscripted - Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford
(previously a firm supporter of the war) himself began to call upon Lyndon Johnson to begin as rapid
as possible a U.S. withdrawal. The secretary was hardly alone in adopting this position. For his part,
realizing his Vietnam policy was untenable, Johnson announced on March 31,1968, that he would not
seek reelection as president. Meanwhile, at least two major Democratic contenders for the presidential
nomination - Senators Robert Kennedy of New York and Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota - had begun
to explicitly orient their campaigns to promises of ending the war. Similarly, the Republican candidate,
Richard M. Nixon, campaigned on the basis of having a "secret plan" to bring hostilities to a close. There
is no evidence that the FBI launched COINTELPROs to neutralize these defeatists. See Joseph, Paul,
Cracks in the Empire: State Politics in the Vietnam War, South End Press, Boston, 1981.
83.Quoted in Hearings on the Federal Bureau of Investigation, op. cit., p. 534.
84.Rockefeller, op. cit., pp. 117-21; Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit.,
pp. 495-505.
85.The commission report was published under the byline of its chair as Walker, Daniel, Rights in
Conflict, the Violent Confrontation of Chicago During the Week of the Democratic National Convention: A Report
to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Bantam Books, New York, 1968. A
number of useful participant insights are to be found in Hoffman, Abbie ("Free"), Revolution for the Hell
of It, Dial Press, New York, 1968. An excellent overview of the "police riot" thesis offered by the Walker
Commission, and one in which the idea is implicitly found to amount to a cover up of what actually
happened (a police riot might accurately be said to have occurred had the police rank and file gotten out
of control of their superiors; instead, the police simply followed orders tendered by higher-ups) may be
found in Schultz, John, No One Was Killed: Convention Week, Chicago - August 1968, Big Table Publishing
Company, Chicago, 1969.
86.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 487. For participant views on the
meaning of this government strategy of repression to various tendencies within the new left, see
Hoffman, Abbie, Woodstock Nation, Vintage Books, New York, 1969; and Hayden, Tom, Trial, Holt,
Rinehart and Winston Publishers, New York, 1970.
87.Ibid., pp. 487-8. This is the same case referred to in the preceding chapter. Also see Epstein, Jason,
The Great Conspiracy Trial: An Essay on Law, Liberty and the Constitution, Random House Publishers, New
York, 1970; and Lukas, J. Anthony, The Barnyard Epithet and Other Obscenities: Notes on the Chicago
Conspiracy Trial, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1970. Other excellent readings on the trial may
be found in Levine, Mark, et al. (eds.), The Tales of Hoffman, Bantam Books, New York, 1970; and Meltsner,
Michael, and Victor Navasky (eds.), The "Trial" of Bobby Seale, Priam Books, New York, 1970.
88. A good summary of the charges and the context in which they arose may be found in Weiner,
Bernard, "What, Another Conspiracy?" The Nation, November 2,1970. The Seattle Eight included seven
SDSers: Joe Kelly, Roger Lippman, Michael Justesen, Susan Stern, Jeffrey Dowd, Chip Marshall and
Michael Ables.
89. An assessment of the Seattle Eight contempt sentences and the effect of the trial upon the
movement in the Washington region accrues in Weiner, Bernard, 'The Orderly Perversion of Justice,"
The Nation, February 1, 1971. In March of 1973, seven of the defendants (the eighth had gone
underground and missed the entire trial), apparently exhausted by the ongoing appeals process,
entered nob contendere pleas to the contempt charges and served sentences ranging from thirty days to
five months (as opposed to the one-year-minimum sentences originally handed down by Judge Boldt).
At that point, mission accomplished, the government dismissed all the substantive charges which had
caused the trial in the first place.
90. See Donner, Frank, and Eugene Cerruti, "The Grand Jury Network," The Nation, January 3,1972,
pp. 11-2. The other conspiracy defendants named were Sister Elizabeth McAlister, the Reverend Joseph
Wenderoth, the Reverend Neil McLaughlin, Anthony Scoblick (an ex-priest), and Eqbal Ahmad (a non-
christian Pakistani). Although several were not Catholic, all were members of a "Catholic left" anti-war
group called the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives. At the time of Hoover's statement and the
subsequent conspiracy indictment, both Berrigans (leading members of a direct action organization
called the Resistance, as well as the East Coast Conspiracy) were in jail, serving sentences resulting from
their participation in the destruction of draft records at the Selective Service Office in Cantonsville,
Maryland on May 17, 1968 (an act which led to the trial of the so-called "Cantonsville Nine:" both
Berrigans, Thomas Lewis, George Mische, David Darst, Mary Moylan, Thomas and Mary Melville, and
John Hogan). Phillip Berrigan was also serving a sentence for his participation in a similar destruction
of draft records at the Selective Service Office in Baltimore on October 27,1967 (bringing about the trial
of the "Baltimore Four:" Berrigan, David Eberhart, Thomas Lewis and James Mengel).
91. The psychiatrist's report is quoted in Nelson, Jack, and Ronald J. Ostrow, The FBI and the
Berrigans: The Making of a Conspiracy, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, Inc., New York, 1972, pp. 476-
7. Douglass' profile induded desertion from the army, two attempts at suicide, and numerous arrests
and conviction on such charges as passing bad checks, impersonating an army officer and assaulting an
FBI agent. His own father testified in court that, "He has told me so many lies practically all his life that
I can't believe nothing he tells me."
92. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 489.
93.New York Times, June 28,1973. For further information, see Berrigan, Daniel, America is Hard to
Find: Notes from the Underground and Danbury Prison, Doubleday Publishers, Garden City, NY, 1972.
94. Nelson and Ostrow, op. cit., p. 197.
95. An indication of the evolution of Ellsberg's thinking on Vietnam — based upon his virtually
unlimited access to classified documents and firsthand experience in the combat zone — can be found
in his Papers on the War, Pocket Books, New York, 1972. The government attempted to block publication
of the papers in the press, temporarily securing an injunction banning publication; this was overruled
by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. U.S. An excellent synthesis of the material contained in the
Pentagon Papers may be found in Stavins, Ralph, Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, Washington
Plans an Aggressive War, Random House Publishers, New York, 1971.
96. Civil Liberties, January 1965. Also see Schrag Peter, Test of Loyalty, Simon and Schuster
Publishers, New York, 1974. As charged, Ellsberg faced 155 years in prison, Russo 25. A good overview
of the case, both in and out of court, is to be found in Ungar, Sanford J., The Papers and the Papers: An
Account of the Legal and Political Battles Over the Pentagon Papers, E.P. Dutton Publishers, New York, 1975.
97. See Wicker, Tom, 'The Iron Curtain," New York Times, November 19,1972. About all the papers
showed was that "the American people had been systematically misled by their elected and appointed
leaders." The prosecutor argued that there was no need to establish that the documents were actually
"vitally important or that their disclosure would be injurious to the United States," only that they were
officially classified. As to the lawfulness" of the government's withholding information, no statutory
authority existed at that time; the whole system of classification was predicated on executive orders.
98. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., pp. 490-1. Also see Schrag, op. cit., pp.
260-72. Concerning the attempt to discredit Ellsberg, see Editors, The Senate Watergate Report, Bantam
Books, New York, 1975, pp. 64-71. Charles Colson pleaded guilty on June 3,1974 to obstruction of justice
for his masterminding of a scheme to obtain, prepare and disseminate derogatory information on
Ellsberg prior to and during the course of the latter's trial. He was sentenced to a year in prison. On July
12,1974 John Ehrlichman and plumbers G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard Barker and Eugenio Martinez were
themselves convicted of conspiracy to violate Ellsberg's civil rights in connection with the burglary of
Dr. Fielding's office. Ehrlichman was also convicted of three counts of perjury for having denied under
oath his role in the "bag job." See Sussman, Barry, The Great Cover-up: Nixon and the Scandal of Watergate,
Signet Books, New York, 1974.
99. See Cook, Fred, "Justice in Gainesville," The Nation, October 1, 1973.
100.See Donner, Frank J., and Richard I. Lavine, "Kangaroo Grand Juries," The Nation, November
29, 1973.
101.Cook, "Justice in Gainesville," op. cit. It should be noted that, at trial, Major Adam Klimkowski,
commander of the Miami Police Special Investigation Unit (red squad) admitted that it was not the
defendants, but one of his undercover agents, who proposed acquiring machineguns for use at the
convention. The accused made no effort to take the infiltrator up on his offer to finance the purchase of
such hardware. See the New York Times, August 9, 1973.
102. On the Sinclair case, see Goodell, Charles, Political Prisoners in America, Random House
Publishers, New York, 1973, pp. 199-206. The only longer sentence on so trivial an "offense" went to
SNCC organizer Lee Otis Johnson, sentenced in Texas to serve thirty years for having given a single joint
to an undercover cop. Both men served over three years before their convictions were overturned on
appeal.
103.One of the better known examples of this concerns the case of Martin Sostre, a black Buffalo,
NY anarchist and head of a community anti-drug program convicted in 1967 of having dealt heroin from
his radical book store. Sostre was sentenced to life as an "habitual felon," but finally paroled in February
1976 after the recantation of the chief witness against him, and the suspension and indictment on drug
charges of the main police witness against him. He had by then served eight years for a crime it is more
than dubious he ever committed. See Copeland, Vincent, The Crime of Martin Sostre, McGraw-Hill
Publishers, New York, 1970. The case is also covered in Amnesty International, Report on Torture, Farrar,
Straus and Giroux Publishers, New York, 1975, p. 193.
104. Donner, Frank, "Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence," New York Review of
Books, April 22, 1971.
105.Civil Liberties, May 1971. One of the earliest and most celebrated of the desecration cases
occurred when Yippie! leader Abbie Hoffman attempted to honor his 1968 HUAC subpoena while
wearing a shirt fashioned from a flag. Arrested by federal marshals and charged with violation of Title
18 U.S.C. - a statute purportedly "protecting" not only the flag, but the 4-H Club doverleaf and Smokey
the Bear from "defacing and defiling" - Hoffman was convicted and sentenced to thirty days in jail. The
conviction was subsequently overturned on first amendment grounds. See Soon to be a Major Motion
Picture, op. cit., pp. 166-70.
106.Civil Liberties, September and October 1970; February 1971.
107. See Gunther, Gerald, and Noel T. Dowling, Constitutional Law and Individual Rights, 1974
Supplement, Foundation Press, New York, 1974, pp. 307-14. Also see Thomas, William R., The Burger
Court and Civil Liberties, King's Court Press, Brunswick, OH, 1976, pp. 97-108.
108.See Burks, John, "The Underground Press," in Editors of Rolling Stone, The Age of Paranoia,
Pocket Books, New York, 1972, pp. 21, 56-7.
109.See Learner, Laurence, The Paper Revolutionaries: The Rise of the Underground Press, Simon and
Schuster Publishers, New York, 1970, pp. 138-41.
110.The ban is covered in Glessing, Robert J., The Underground Press in America, Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1971, p. 37.
111.Learner, op. cit., pp. 131-5. Also see Time , March 23,1970.
112.See Rips, Geoffry, "The Campaign Against the Underground Press," (A Pen American Center
Report), in UnAmerican Activities, City Lights Books, San Francisco, 1981, p. 112. Also see Learner, op. cit.,
pp. 141-6. Even such small, short-lived and erratic papers as Spiro, in Peoria, Illinois, came in for dose
FBI and local police scrutiny and harassment, as author Churchill's own FBI files readily attest.
113.Learner, op. cit., pp. 146-53. Also see Mackenzie, Angus, "Sabotaging the Dissident Press,"
Columbia Journalism Review, March 3, 1981.
114.Civil Liberties, October 1%9. Also see, Armstrong, David, A Trumpet to Arms: Alternative Media
in America, South End Press, Boston, 1981.
115.See, for example, Raymond, John, 'Tiles Recently Released: FBI Spying on the Black Student
Union Revealed," Common Ground, Vol. III, No. 7, April 18, 1978.
116.See the New York Times, July 18 and October 20,1967; August 9,1968. In some ways, Lynd got
off easy. In 1974, a University of Arkansas professor was convicted of violating the state's criminal
anarchy law as well as a statute forbidding communists from holding positions of employment funded
by the state, apparently solely on the basis of his membership in the Progressive Labor Party. See Lyons,
Gene, "Letter from the Land of Opportunity," New York Review of Books, May 30, 1974, pp. 33-6.
117.See The Chronicle of Higher Education, February 14,1972 and Champaign-Urbana Courier, April
2,1974. Parenti sued the trustees for $175,000 in damages; the trustees ultimately settled the matter out
of court for an undisclosed sum.
118.See Manchester, William, The Glory and the Dream, Bantam Books, New York, 1975, pp. 1201-
1205.
119.See McElvoy, James, and Abraham Miller, "The Crisis at San Frandsco State," in Howard S.
Becker (ed.), Campus Power Struggles, Aldine Publishers, Chicago, 1970. Also see Sale, op. cit., pp. 518-
9.
120.See the San Diego Union, May 9 and May 17,1972.
121.See Zoccino, Nanda, "Ex-FBI Informer Describes Terrorist Role," Los Angeles Times, January
26,1976; and Viorst, op. cit. Also see Parenti, Michael, Democracy for the Few, St. Martin's Press, New York,
1980, p. 24.
122.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., pp. 481-2. Also see Intelligence Activities
and the Rights of Americans, Book III, op. cit., pp. 850-1.
123.Quoted in Berman and Halperin, op. cit., p. 90.
124.The statements accrue from IRS internal memoranda quoted in Intelligence Activities and the
Rights of Americans, Book HI, op. cit., pp. 881-2, 884-5.
125.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., pp. 482-3.
126.Probably the clearest expressions of this may be found in "You Don't Need a Weatherman to
Know Which Way the Wind Blows," a collective position paper introduced by Karen Ashley, Bill Ayers,
Bernardine Dohrn, John Jacobs, Jeff Jones, Gerry Long, Howie Matchinger, Jim Mellen, Terry Robbins,
Mark Rudd and Steve Tappis at the June 1%9 SDS national convention in Chicago and published in New
Left Notes, June 18, 1969. Another significant articulation of this trend came in a speech entitled "A
Strategy to Win," delivered by SDS Education Secretary Bill Ayers at the Midwest National Action
Conference held in Cleveland, August 29-September 1,1969, and published in New Left Notes, September
12,1969. Both items are reproduced in Jacobs, Harold (ed.), Weatherman, Ramparts Press, San Francisco,
1970 (at p. 51 and p. 183, respectively). This is not to argue that Weatherman was somehow the
manifestation of anti-imperialist consdousness within the new left. To the contrary, as Sale (op. cit.)
makes quite dear in his definitive study, the roots of conscious anti-imperialism within SDS reach back
to at least as early as the 1965-66 period. Further, it seems fair to say that by 1969, virtually all new left
formations had adopted the rhetoric and trappings of anti-imperialism in one form or another. For an
alternative view of the locus of anti-imperialism within the white movement, one drawn from a
Progressive Labor perspective, see Adelson, Alan, SDS: A Profile, Charles Scribners's Sons, Publishers,
New York, 1972.
127.Gid Powers, op. cit., p. 459. Also see deposition of former FBI agent M. Wesley Swearingen,
taken in October 1980, Honolulu, Hawaii.
128.See Richards, David, Played Out: The Jean Seberg Story, Playboy Press, New York, 1981,
especially PP. 237-8.
129.See Stark, Rodney, Police Riots, Wadsworth Publishers, Belmont, CA, 1972, pp. 110-3, 163-6.
130.Quoted in Skolnick, op. cit., pp. 282, 289.
131.Stark, op. cit., p. 6.
132.Skolnick, op. cit., p. 347.
133.Civil Liberties, September 1968.
134.Stark, op. cit., pp. 32-54.
135. Quoted in ibid., pp. 53-4.

136. Walker, op. cit., pp. 1, 5.
137.See Kerry, Peggy, "The Scene in the Streets," in Theodore Becker and Vernon G. Murray (eds.),
Government Lawlessness in America, Oxford University Press, New York, 1971, pp. 59-68.
138. Quoted in Harris, op. cit., p. 176.
139. See Lewis, Grover, "Prisoners of the War in Sunny California," in Becker and Murray, op. cit.,
pp. 133-8. The sprayed gas saturated U/Cal classrooms (ironically affecting hundreds of "apolitical"
and "reactionary" students, faculty and administrators, many of whom actively opposed the demon-
strators), a Berkeley hospital, and a nearby swimming pool where neighborhood mothers and their
children were attempting to escape the hostilities and the heat. Ten deputies and two ex-deputies were
subsequently indicted under federal statutes for having fired their weapons at demonstrators and
bystanders with intent to inflict summary punishment. Also see Wolin and Schaar, op.'cit., pp. 73-95.
140. Reagan is quoted from Newsweek, January 6, 1975.
141. Scranton, op. cit., p. 338.
142. Pinkney, op. cit., p. 178. Clark, op. cit., p. 157.
143. Sale, op. cit., p. 641.
144.Ibid., p. 632. In December 1974, a federal judge ordered the arrest records of more than 600
people dragooned during the Santa Barbara police action expunged on the basis of systematic violation
of even their most elementary civil rights. See the Los Angeles Times, December 10, 1974.
145. Sale, op. cit., p. 632.
146. See Scranton, op. cit., pp. 233-410, for the official version of the events at Kent State. Also see
Davies, Peter, The Truth About Kent State: Challenge for the American Conscience, Farrar, Straus and Giroux
147. Sale, op. cit., p. 632.
148. Scranton, op. cit., pp. 411-65.
149. Sale, op. cit., p. 641.
150.Ibid.
151. Ibid. Carl Hampton was engaged in building a city-wide Rainbow Coalition (called the
People's Party II) similar to that attempted in Chicago a year earlier. SDSer Bartee Haile was seriously
wounded in the police raid which left Hampton dead.
152.Newsweek, November 27,1971.
153.Champaign-Urbana Courier, July 12, 1973.
154. Scranton, op. cit., p. 289.
155. Mitchell's successor, Elliot Richardson, did convene a grand jury which indicted eight
guardsmen - Leon Smith, Barry Morris, Matthew McManus, James McGee, Lawrence Shafer, Ralph
Zoller, James Pierce, and William Perkins - for having conspired to deprive their victims of their civil
rights. Federal District Judge Frank Battisti, however, took the killers off the hook in November of 1974
by ordering a directed verdict of acquittal rather than leaving the matter to the jury. See Kelner, Joseph,
and James Munves, The Kent State Coverup, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1980.
156. The Portage County (Ohio) Grand Jury indicted 24 students and ex-students, as well as one
professor, on October 16, 1970. On November 14, Judge William K. Thomas upheld the constitutionality
of the state anti-riot statute under which the indictments were effected. The trial of the first five
defendants began on November 22,1971 in Ravenna, Ohio, resulting in the conviction of or entry of
guilty pleas by three persons, all on minor rather than substantive charges. Two of the five were
acquitted entirely on December 8, whereupon the state dropped all charges against the remaining
twenty defendants. See the Chicago Sun-Times, December 26, 1971.
157. Quoted in Scranton, op. cit., p. 458.
158. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 512.
159.See Stone, I.F., The Killings at Kent State, Vintage Books, New York, 1971. Also see Civil Liberties,
April 1973.
160. See the New York Times, October 31, 1970.
161. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., pp. 474-5. Also see Donner, Frank,
"The Agent Provocateur as Folk Hero," Civil Liberties, September 1971.
162. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 475. Also see the Seattle Times,
December 7, 1970. More generally, see Marx, Gary T., "Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social
Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and Informant," American Journal of Sociology, No. 80,
September 1974, pp. 402-42.
164. Ibid., pp. 473-4. For another discussion of the death of Larry Ward, see the Chicago Sun-Times,
May 30, 1971. The mayor's statement is quoted in Dormer, "Hoover's Legacy," op. cit., p. 693.
165. New York Times, May 21 and August 9,1973.
166.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 477. Also see Chevigny, op. cit., pp.
251-2; and Civil Liberties, July 1973.
167. New York Times, May 20, 1973. Also see anonymous, "Unsettled Accounts," Berkeley Tribe,
August 21,1970, reprinted in Jacobs, Weatherman, op. cit., pp. 464-70. Those named in the initial Detroit
indictment included virtually the entire national leadership of the Weatherman SDS faction: Mark
Rudd, Bill Ayers, Kathy Boudin, Bernardine Dohrn, Linda Evans, Bo Burlingham, Dianne Donghi,
Ronald Fleigelman, Naomi Jaffe, Russ Neufield, Jane Spielman, and Cathy Wilkerson, as well as
Grathwohl. A second indictment, replacing the first and handed down on December 7,1972, deleted the
names of Grathwohl and Spielman, but retained the remainder of the original list while adding John
Fuerst, Leonard Handelsman, Mark Real and Roberta Smith. Although the government charged those
named with specific acts involving the construction and transportation of explosive devices in
Cleveland, San Francisco, Tucson and St. Louis - and with the firebombing of a police officer's home in
Cleveland on March 2, 1970 - no one was ever taken to trial. Another federal indictment against the
Weatherman leaders, handed down in Chicago on April 2,1970, and charging that they'd crossed state
lines with intent to incite riots in the Windy City during the Weatherman "Days of Rage" (October 8-
11, 1969) netted precisely the same result although the combination of unsubstantiable charges was
sufficient to propel the "Weather Fugs" - all of whom had gone underground prior to the indictments
-into the FBI's "most wanted" category for several years. Named in the Chicago indictment were Rudd,
Ayers, Boudin, Evans, Dohrn, Jeff Jones, Judy Clark, John Jacobs, Howie Matchinger, Terry Robbins,
Mike Spiegel and Larry Weiss.
168.Grathwohl, Larry, as told to Frank Reagan, Bringing Down America: An FBI Informer in the
Weathermen, Arlington House Publishers, New Rochelle, NY, 1976. Grathwohl's cover was blown on
Apri115, 1970, when he fingered Linda Evans and Dianne Donghi for arrest on the Weather indictments
and federal fugitive charges. The supposed federal cases against both women were immediately
dropped.
169.Stone, op. cit., p. 124. Mohr, of course, was allowed to continue his career as a "public servant"
in the police.
170.See Crewdson, John, "FBI Reportedly Harassed Radicals After Spy Program Ended," New York
Times, March 23, 1975. Also see Glick, War at Home, op. cit., pp. 27-8.
171.Weyler, op. cit., pp. 169-70. Also see Lawrence, Ken, The New State Repression, International
Network Against the New State Repression, Chicago, 1985, pp. 4-5.
172. The Glass House Tapes, op. cit., pp. 161-4. Also see Zoccino, op. cit.
173. San Diego Union, January 11-18, 1976.
174.Sale, op. cit., p. 408.
175.See Herbert, Barbara, lack Weatherford," in Cowan, Paul, Nick Egelson and Nat Hentoff,
with Barbara Herbert and Robert Wall (eds.), State Secrets: Police Surveillance in America, Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, Publishers, New York, 1974, p. 227.
176.See Donner, "Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence," op. cit.. Also see Levine,
op. cit., pp. 60-1.
177.San Diego Evening Tribune, October 16, 1975.
178.See Cook County (Illinois) Grand Jury, "Improper Police Intelligence Activities: A Report of
the Extended March, 1975, Cook County Grand Jury," First Principles I, January 1976, p. 9.
179. Ibid., pp. 3-11.
180. Ibid., inclusive. Also see the Chicago Sun-Times, April 13 and October 16, 1975. The grand jury
report prompted a series of suits against the CPD and various federal intelligence agencies - including
the FBI - by Chicago activist groups. These were largely scuttled by a court-imposed "settlement;" see
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 Fid, 1984. For further information, see Editors, "The Red
Squads Settlement Controversy," The Nation, July 11, 1981.
181.The card, which was a standard COINTELPRO item in such areas as down-state Illinois, was
mailed on September 29,1970 from the small town of Lacon (near Peoria). It thus followed hard on the
heels of a September 9 letter from the SAC, Springfield (Illinois) to Hoover, captioned SM — ANA
(WEATHERMAN), in which it is stated that Churchill — at the time affiliated with the Weatherman
faction of SDS — "in addition to being investigated in connection with New Left activities in the Peoria
area, has been the subject of inquiry in connection with the report of SA [name deleted] Milwaukee 8/
14/70, captioned UNSUB: Bombing of Telephone Exchange, Electric Substation and Water Reservoir,
Camp McCoy, Wisconsin." The document concludes, after much further deletion, with the observation
that "appropriate recommendations" will be "maintained for Cointelpro action, which may neutralize
the activities of this individual." The person within the Peoria resident agency assigned "the Churchill
case" from 1969-71 — and who was thus in all probability responsible for the COINTELPRO actions
aimed against him — was SA Bill Williams. Churchill, of course, had nothing whatsoever to do with the
August 1970 bombings at Camp McCoy.
182.The quote is taken from a document excerpted in Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
Americans, Book II, op. cit., p. 127, n. 635.
183.Sale, op. cit., pp. 532-3.
184.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 517. Also see Sale, op. cit., p. 348.
185.Glick, War at Home, op. cit. Also see Powers, Thomas, The Warta Home: Vietnam and the American
People, 1964-1968, Grossman Publishers, New York, 1973.
186.The estimated number of bombings comes from Scanlon's Magazine, January 1971.
187.An excellent study of the mainstream media handling of information on the new left may be
found in Gitlin, Todd, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New
14 University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980. Also see Porter, William E., Assault on the Media: The
Nixon Years, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1976; and Murdock, Graham, "Political
Deviance: The Press Presentation of a Militant Mass Demonstration," in Cohen, Stanley, and Jock Young
(eds.), The Manufacture of the News, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, 1973, pp. 156-75. Of further
interest, see Winick, Charles (ed.), Deviance and the Mass Media, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA,
1978.
188.On the thinking which went into Weatherman, see Jacobs, Weatherman, op. cit.; and Sale, op. cit.
Also see Powers, Thomas, Diana: The Making of a Terrorist, Houghton-Mifflin Publishers, New York,
1971; and Daniels, Stuart, 'The Weatherman," Government and Opposition, No. 9, Autumn 1974, pp. 430-
59. On an "unaffiliated" group which followed more-or-less the same trajectory, see Melville, Samuel,
Letters From Attica, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1972; and Alpert, Jane, Growing Up
Underground, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1981. For an excellent topical counterargu-
ment to the "Weather" response to conditions in the U.S., see Albert, Michael, What Is To Be Undone,
Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1974.
189.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., pp. 498-9. Also see Glasser, Ira, "The
Constitution and the Courts," in Alan Gartner, Colin Greer and Frank Riesman (eds.), What Nixon is
Doing to Us, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1973. The police response to Mayday was the result
of "lessons learned" during the largest mass demonstration in U.S. history, the so-called "Moratorium"
held in Washington, D.C. from November 13 through November 15,1969. It should be noted that in the
earlier event, the Nixon administration called out 40,000 troops and had machineguns set up on the steps
of the capitol building. For its part, the FBI intensified its anti-new left counterintelligence operations
by ordering up the bank records of persons who'd written checks to cover the cost of transportation of
some groups of demonstrators, visiting bus companies to threaten the management with federal
subpoenas if they rented vehicles to demonstration organizers, and so on. See Civil Liberties, July 1972.
Also see Hoffman, Paul, Moratorium: An American Protest, Tower Books, New York, 1973.
190.See Civil Liberties, November 1975; Los Angeles Times, January 17,1975; and Cray, op. cit., p. 235.
191.Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America, op. cit., p. 493. Also see Cowan, Paul,
"Inquisition in the Courtroom," in State Secrets, op. cit.
192.For example, a grand jury investigating the Pentagon Papers case jailed Harvard professor
Samuel Poppin for refusing to reveal research sources to whom he'd promised confidentiality; see
Donner and Lavine, op. cit., pp. 5224. In another instance, five new left activists were jailed for refusing
to testify before a grand jury convened in Phoenix. They served five months before the term of the jury
expired. Upon release, they were immediately served with subpoenas to a new grand jury proceeding,
thus beginning the whole thing over again; see Donner and Cerrutti, op. cit.
Chapter 7 Notes: COINTELPRO — AIM 381
193.See Mead, Judy, "Grand Juries," First Principles II, September 2, 1976. Also see Fine, David,
"Federal Grand Jury Investigations of Political Dissidents," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review, No. 7,1972, pp. 432-77; and Bendant, James R., "A Disturbing Shift in the Grand Jury's Role,"
Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1974. Of further interest, see Cowan, op. cit.; Donner and Lavine, op. cit.; and
Goodell, op. cit., pp. 233-54.
194.Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, op. cit., pp. 214-5.
195.Los Angeles Times, September 22, 1975.
196.Probably the worst example of this is former SDS, Vietnam Day Committee and Yippie! leader
Jerry Rubin; see his Growing Up at 37, M. Evans Publishers, New York, 1976. Unfortunately, while Rubin
may be most prominent in this regard, he is hardly alone.
197. Concerning Hoffman's period underground avoiding prosecution on spurious cocaine
trafficking charges which could have resulted in mandatory life imprisonment, see Hoffman, Anita, and
Abbie Hoffman, To America With Love: Letters from the Underground, Stone Hill Publishing Company,
New York, 1976. Also see Hoffman, Abbie, Square Dancing in the Ice Age, South End Press, Boston, 1982;
and Soon to be a Major Motion Picture, op. cit.
198.Probably the best articulation of the logic of the Weather Underground Organization (WUO)
comes in the form of a 1975 film entitled Underground by Emile de Antonio, Mary Lampson and Haskell
Wexler. Information on this score may also be obtained from the 1974 book, Prairie Fire, produced by the
WUO and distributed by its above-ground link, the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC). Also see
the various issues of the WUO tabloid, Osawatomie, distributed by the PFOC during the second half of
the '70s.
199.The essence of the drift into remote sectarianism may be discerned in Franklin, Bruce, From the
Movement Toward Revolution, Van Nostrand Reinhold Publishing Company, New York, 1971. Franklin
was, at the time, a professor of English at Stanford University and head of Venceremos, an entity which
emerged as a "left tendency" from what had been called the Bay Area Radical Union (BAYRU). The
"right tendency" of BAYRU, headed by Bob Avaldan, became the Revolutionary Communist Party,
USA. Both Franklin and Avakian had been associated with the Revolutionary Youth Movement II
faction of SDS after it splintered off from the main Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) group which
was by then (summer 1969) calling itself Weatherman. RYM itself had come into being as an expedient
to expel the Progressive Labor Party which had invaded and was attempting to subvert SOS for its own
purposes. Avakian's main claim to fame seems to have been his connection with the Oakland group of
the BPP, for whom he served as Huey Newton's errand boy. Of such idiocy do movements collapse, with
a squish rather than a crash. See Sale, op. cit., pp. 557-657. An interesting analysis, dealing in part with
this sort of dynamic, is to be found in Lasch, Christopher, The Agony of the American Left, Random House
Chapter 7: COINTELPRO AIM

1.ASAC Zigrossi's observation, offered in his official capacity, would seem dear enough in this
regard. The perspective — and use of the term "colony" to describe the status of American Indian nations
—is hardly isolated; see, for example, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Navajo Nation: An American
Colony, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., September 1975.
2. Clinton, Robert N., "Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The Historical
Perspective," Arizona Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4,1975, p. 951. In this article Clinton offers a comprehen-
sive summary of U.S. jurisdiction over Indian lands from 1776 to the end of the 19th century. Also see
Price, Monroe, Law and the American Indian: Readings, Notes and Cases, Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Indianapolis, 1973.
3. See American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Report, Task Force 9: Law Consolidation,
Revision and Codification (hereinafter referred to as Task Force 9 Report), Vol. 2, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. 173-4.
4.Ibid. The appropriation act and opinion mentioned make it clear that neither the congress nor the
Interior Department intended the FBI role on Indian reservations to become prominent or entrenched.
5. Ibid., P. 174.; see p. 176 for a profile of BIA Special Officers.
6. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Indian Tribes: A Continuing Quest for Survival, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C, 1981 , p.145. As late as 1982, the FBI Section Chief for Indian Matters
and Government Crimes, Allan Meyer, was forced to admit that the Bureau had a total of only "approxi-
mately 30" agents who were American Indians, and many of these were not assigned to deal with
enforcement on reservations; see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcom-
mittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Hearing on FBI Authorization on Indian Reservations, (Serial No.
138), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., March 31 and June 17, 1982, p. 15.
7.Ibid., p. 149.
8. Ibid., pp. 154-5.
9. According to the 1970 census, American Indians comprised only about .5% of the aggregate U.S.
population. Yet, according to the Bureau of Prisons, they comprised in excess of 3% of the federal prison
population throughout the '70s. In states with proportionately high Indian populations, the situation in
state prisons is much the same.
10.Quest for Survival, op. cit., pp. 143-5. Using South Dakota as an example, local (state, county and
municipal) law enforcement during the mid '70s was composed of more than 95% white personnel; see
Stevens, Don, and Jane Stevens, South Dakota: The Mississippi of the North, or Stories Jack Anderson Never
Told You, Self-Published Pamphlet, Custer, SD, 1977. Surrounding states, such as Nebraska, Wyoming,
Montana, Minnesota and North Dakota follow much the same pattern, as do other states with sizable
Indian populations, like Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, Oregon and Washington. On jurisdiction,
see Goldberg, Carol E., "Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians,"
UCLA Law Review, No. 22,1975.
11. Quoted in Quest for Survival, op. cit., p. 143.
12.Ibid.., pp. 143-50.
13. The most accessible material on Clyde Warrior and the establishment of NIYC may be found
in Steiner, Stan, The New Indians, Delta Books, New York, 1968.
14. Deloria, Vine Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (Macmillan Publishers, New
York, 1969) and We Talk, You Listen: New Tribes, New Turf (Macmillan Publishers, New York, 1970).
15.See Burnette, Robert, with John Koster, The Road to Wounded Knee, Bantam Books, New York,
1974, pp. 196-7.
16.See Blue Cloud, Peter (ed.), Alcatraz is Not an Island, Wingbow Press, Berkeley, CA, 1972. The
author makes it clear that IAT was on firm legal footing in undertaking its occupation, relying not only
upon the 1882 statute, but upon Title 25 U.S.0 194 - "In all trials about the right of property in which
an Indian may be a party on one side, and a white person on the other, the burden of proof shall rest upon
the white person, whenever the Indian shall make out a presumption of title in himself upon the fact of
previous possession or ownership" - in pressing their claim. On December 23, 1969, Joint Resolution
1042 (115 C.R. 215, H 12975) of congress concurred with the Indian position, and instructed the executive
branch to negotiate an acceptable resolution to the IAT demands. Hence, the Interior Department
agreement mentioned in the text. Despite the dearly illegal nature of its actions in doing so, however,
the Nixon administration simply ignored its obligations to follow through once IAT was removed from
the island. No subsequent administration has improved upon the Nixon record.
17. On the occupations of military facilities, see Blue Cloud, op. cit. pp. 86-96. Concerning the
struggles over PG&E landholdings, see Jaimes, M. Annette, "The Pit River Indian Land Claim Dispute
in Northern California," Journal of Ethnic Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, Winter 1987, pp. 47-64.
18. Burnette and Koster, op. cit., pp. 196-7.
19.Weyler, op. cit., pp. 48-9. Russell Means has been quoted as informing the city fathers that, "AIM
has come here today to put Gordon on the map. And if justice is not done in this case, we're coming back
to take Gordon off the map."
20. See Josephy, Alvin Jr., Now That the Buffalo's Gone: A Study of Today's American Indians, Alfred
A. Knopf Publishers, New York, 1982, p. 237. The significance of Yellow Thunder's murder, and AIM's
response, should be assessed in the context of a veritable wave of such grotesque crimes against
individual Indians sweeping across the country at that time. These included the gunning down of IAT
leader Richard Oaks in California on September 20; his killer, a white man named Michael Morgan, was
freed on the basis of "self-defense" even though it was established at trial that Oaks was unarmed at the
time of his death. On July 1, a 19-year-old O'Otam (Papago) youth named Phillip Celay had been shot
to death by Sheriff's Deputy David Bosman near Ajo, Arizona; this was ruled "justifiable homicide,"
although Celay was also unarmed when killed. In Philadelphia, Leroy Shenandoah, a highly decorated
Onandaga Special Forces veteran of Vietnam, who had been selected to serve in the honor guard
attending the casket of John F. Kennedy, was also shot to death by police while unarmed; another
"justifiable homicide." It was in this context that Means observed, "It seems Indian-killing is still the
national pastime," and declared AIM had assumed responsibility for putting a stop to it.
21. See Burnette and Koster, op. cit., pp. 197-9.
22.See Deloria, Vine Jr., Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence, Delta
Books, New York, 1974, pp. 47-8.
23. The confrontation and occupation arose because of Interior Department officials reneging on
pledged support to the Trail (primarily food and housing) when it reached Washington. They then
proceeded to deny requests by the Indians to hold ceremonies at the grave of Ira Hayes, a Pima who had
helped in the famous flag raising above Mt. Suribachi during the battle for the island of Iwo Jima during
World War II, in Arlington National Cemetery. With that, caravan members simply overpowered police
at the BIA building, evicted employees, and established the facility as a shelter and headquarters for
themselves. See Editors, BIA, I'm Not Your Indian Anymore: Trail of Broken Treaties, Akwesasne Notes,
Mohawk Nation via Rooseveltown, New York, 1973, pp. 8-13.
24.Weyler, Rex, Blood of the Land: The U.S. Government and Corporate War Against the American Indian
Movement., Vintage Books, New York, pp. 53-4 describes how the travel expenses were delivered by the
Nixon administration: "The administration, unable to cut such a a deal officially without rocking the
boat at the Department of Interior, executed the agreement in fine Nixon-era, Watergate style...The
negotiators shuffled off to the White House. An hour later, Means saw a large black limousine pull up
in the rear of the BIA building. Out of the car stepped black-trenchcoated Presidential Counsel John
Dean and Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman. Dean carried a briefcase. Inside the building the two man
opened the briefcase, exposing fresh, crisp hundred-dollar bills — travel expenses in cash." Then White
House aides Leonard Garment and Frank Carlucci (more lately Ronald Reagan's chief of the National
Security Council and Secretary of Defense) are also reported to have delivered several brown paper bags
full of old bills coming from the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP); see BIA, I'm Not Your
Indian Anymore, op. cit., p. 16.
25. Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties, pp. 58-60. Arellano's services seem to have been shared by the
Bureau and the Washington, D.C. metropolitan police force during this period; he was noted as being
among the "most militant AIM members," continuously "pushing for physical confrontation," during
the BIA building occupation itself.
26. Deloria, op. cit., p. 57. Among the other government media ploys utilized to attempt to publicly
discredit AIM during this period was to trot out National Tribal Chairman's Association (NTCA) head
Webster Two Hawk (then president of the Rosebud Sioux tribe) to condemn the caravan participants
as being composed of "irresponsible self-styled revolutionaries" before the media. NTCA was wholly
government funded during this period, and Two Hawks' expenses related to this D.0 junket were
underwritten by the White House. Two Hawk was promptly defeated for reelection on the Rosebud
Reservation by Trail leader Robert Burnette after claiming that AIM lacked "a base of support among
grassroots Indians."
27. The Circle, March 1979, p. 8.
28. Matthiessen, op. cit. , pp. 56-8. Others arrested at various points around the country while
returning from the Trail included Alida and Andrea Quinn (in Rialto, California), Myron C. Thomas
(in Chicago), David Molino (in Redlands, California), Whitney Grey (on the Salt River Reservation, near
Phoenix), and Steve Mesa and Cynthia J. deVaughn (in Los Angeles).
29. Burnette and Koster, op. cit., 220. Burnett recounts having called the White House directly to
obtain Means' release after this bogus arrest. Weyler (op. cit., pp. 70-1) also notes that the Means brothers
— Russell, Ted, Bill and Dale ("Dace") — owned a 190 acre land parcel they'd inherited on Pine Ridge. The
land was held in trust and leased to a non-Indian rancher by the BIA; after they joined AIM, monies
accruing from the lease were withheld. The same tactic appears to have been used consistently to
"punish" others perceived as AIM members or supporters on the reservation as well.
30. For a description of the Scottsbluff meeting, see Burnette and Koster, op. cit., p. 221. Also see
Weyler, op. cit., p. 68. "Unity conference of minorities held in Scottsbluff," Rapid City Journal, January 15,
1973, p. 3. Others arrested with Means in this instance included AIM members John "Two Birds"
Arbuckle, Stan Holder, Carter Camp, and Leroy Casades (a suspected FBI infiltrator, then involved with
the Chicano Crusade for Justice); see "Another AIM leader arrested in Scottsbluff," Rapid City Journal,
January 16, 1973.
31. Gladstone, Lyn, "Custer Demonstration Canceled," Rapid City Journal, February 5, 1973.
32. The count of caravan participants accrues from Weyler, op. cit., p. 68.
33. See Matthiessen (op. cit., p. 64) for a description of the array of police and intelligence personnel
on hand.
34. This description of the Custer events and Sarah Bad Heart Bull's incarceration derives from
Burnette and Koster, op. cit., pp. 221-3. It should be noted that most of those arrested were badly beaten
with riot batons, as were a number of those who were not charged. No police were injured in this much-
publicized incident of "AIM violence."
35. During the early 1960s, Wilson and his wife had fled Pine Ridge for Arizona ahead of conflict-
of-interest charges in which she was director of and he a contract plumber for the Oglala Sioux Housing
Authority. Upon his return, Wilson went to work for then tribal secretary Robert Mousseau until both
were indicted on misappropriation charges. Wilson fled again, but his boss went to jail. See Burnette and
Koster, op. cit., p. 8. According to former tribal council member Severt Young Bear and numerous other
sources, Wilson also managed a thriving bootlegging business on Pine Ridge during his periods of
residence there.
36. The purpose of the GOON Squad was always frankly political. As Wilson himself put it in
testimony before a committee headed by South Dakota Senator James Abourezk in 1974, "[They are] an
auxiliary police force...we organized this force to handle people like Rucsell Means and other radicals";
this portion of Wilson's testimony is included in Saul Landau's film, Voices From Wounded Knee (Institute
for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., 1974). In addition to the $62,000 in BIA "seed money," Wilson is
thought to have expended as much as $347,000 in federal highway improvement funds meeting his
GOON payroll between mid-1972 and early-1976. A 1975 General Accounting Office report, however,
makes it dear that since the Wilsonites essentially kept no books, it was impossible to determine exactly
how large sums of money had been spent.
37. Wilson hired his brother, Jim, to head the tribal planning office at $25,500 (plus a reported
annual take of $15,000 in "consulting fees"); New York Times, April 22, 1975. Another brother, George,
was retained to help the tribe manage its affairs at a rate of approximately $20,000 annually, while his
wife was named director of the reservation Head Start Program at a salary of $18,000. Wilson's son
"Manny" (Richard Jr.) was put on the GOON payroll, as were several cousins and nephews. Wilson also
raised his own salary from $5,500 to $15,500 (plus lucrative consultancies at tribal expense) within the
first six months he was in office; Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 62. At the time all this was happening, the annual
per capita income among Pine Ridge residents was less than $1,000; McCall, Cheryl, "Life on Pine Ridge
Bleak," Colorado Daily, May 16,1975. When questioned about the propriety of such practices, Wilson
responded, "There's no law against nepotism;" quoted in Editors, Voices From Wounded Knee, 1973,
Akwesasne Notes, Mohawk Nation via Rooseveltown, NY, 1974, p. 34.
38. Weyler, op. cit., p. 60. Matthiessen (op. cit., p. 62) notes that both Eastman and Brewer were
"notorious" on Pine Ridge in this regard.
39. The so-called Sheep Mountain Gunnery Range is an area "borrowed" from the Oglalas by the
U.S. War Department in 1942 in order that Army Air Corps flyers could practice aerial bombardment
there. It was supposed to be returned at the end of World War II, but wasn't. By the late 1960s, Pine Ridge
traditionals were beginning to press for recovery of the land. The government might even have
complied, but, in 1971, a National Uranium Research Evaluations (NURE) satellite orbited by NASA
detected rich deposits of uranium in the area. While this was kept secret, the Wilson regime was installed
and maintained on the reservation, apparently for the primary purposes of assigning dear title over the
land to the U.S. Wilson did in fact sign a document on June 24,1975 which purportedly transferred 76,200
acres of the Sheep Mountain area to the Badlands National Monument; this culminated on January 2,
1976 with the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Oglala Sioux Tribe of South Dakota and
the National Park Service of the Department of Interior to Facilitate Establishment, Development, Administration
and Public Use of the Oglala Sioux Tribal Lands, Badlands National Monument. Congress followed up by
passing Public Law 90-468, stipulating that while the Oglalas could recover the surface area at such time
as they indicated a desire to do so by referendum — an interesting inversion of the 1868 Fort Laramie
Treaty provision requiring express consent from three-fourths of all adult Lakotas in order to legitimize
any Lakota land cession — but not the mineral rights. The National Park Service then incorporated the
added territory into its Master Plan: Badlands National Monument (Rocky Mountain Regional Office,
Denver, 1978). For information on the precise disposition and quality of the Sheep Mountain uranium
deposits, see Gries, J.P., Status of Mineral Resource Information on the Pine Ridge Reservation, BIA Report
No. 12, U.S. Department of Interior, Washington, D.C, 1976.
Chapter 7 Notes: COINTELPRO - AIM 385
40. On the impeachment initiative, see "Pine Ridge Conspiracy Charge Made," Rapid City Journal,
February 17, 1973. Concerning the buildup of marshals, see Weyler, op. cit., pp. 71-2.
41. See Impeachment Charges Against Wilson Dropped," Rapid City Journal, February 23, 1973.
Although there were nineteen members of the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council at the time, the vote to retain
Wilson was 4-0; fifteen members of the council actively boycotted the proceedings rather than run the
gauntlet of GOONs, marshals and BIA police, only to have Wilson rule them out of order. See Voices From
Wounded Knee,1973, op. cit., pp. 17-26.
42. Regarding AIM's community relations effort, see "Police, AIM to keep things cool," "Coalition
to work on race issues," and Harold Higgins' 'Hot Springs meeting 'productive," all in the Rapid City
Journal, February 16, 1973.
43. The "meeting...ended when five of Wilson's supporters [GOONS] cornered the AIM leader in
a parking lot and tried to beat him up. Means broke through the cordon and escaped;" Burnette and
Koster, op. cit., p. 74.
44.Voices From Wounded Knee,1973, op. cit., p. 75.
45.As traditional Lakota elder Ellen Moves Camp (quoted in Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 68) puts it: "We
didn't know we were going to be crowded in there by a bunch of guns and stuff, military and FBI and
marshals and GOONs. We didn't talk about going there and taking over Wounded Knee. That was the
furthest thing from our minds. But what choice did the government give us?" Every other Wounded
Knee veteran the authors have spoken with - more thanthirty - agree with Moves Camp on this point.
46. Weyler, op. cit., pp. 76-9.
47. Trimbach was operating in fine fashion: When, at about 11 a.m. on the first day of the siege,
Justice Department community relations representative Terronez phoned him to attempt to arrange for
the Bureau to allow AIM to hold its press conference and for both sides to then stand down, Trimbach
threatened to have him arrested for "interfering with federal officers"; see Voices From Wounded Knee,
1973, op. cit., p. 23. Colburn, for his part, had already brought an additional fifty SOG personnel into the
area, as is evidenced in a memo sent by him to Reese Kash at Pine Ridge on February 20. This made the
total number of U.S. marshals participating in the siege of Wounded Knee at least 135, at the outset.
48. Ibid., p. 81. Warner and Potter were specifically ordered to wear civilian clothes, in order to hide
the fact of direct military participation at Wounded Knee. They arranged for supply sergeants,
maintenance personnel and medical teams to be present on the federal perimeter throughout the 71-day
siege, all similarly attired in civilian garb. Further, the colonels placed a special army assault unit to be
placed on 24-hour-a-day alert at Ft. Carson, Colorado for the duration of the siege. See The Nation,
November 9, 1974. Also see University Review, the same month.
49. The meeting was first reported in Akwesasne Notes, Early Summer 1974.
50. CDMS is a subpart of the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI), founded at govern-
ment request during the late 1960s by Louis 0. Giuffrida, an exponent of the theories of British
counterinsurgency specialists Frank Kitson and Robin Evelegh. The purpose of the whole operation is
to develop a coherent doctrine for the physical repression of political dissent, and to train personnel in
its application. Garden Plot and Cable Splicer were officially (if secretly) commissioned plans to utilize
the entire apparatus of state repression - the military, national guard, police and intelligence forces, as
well as "private" organizations - in a coordinated manner to put down "civil disorders" within the U.S.
See Lawrence, op. cit., and Butz, Tim, "Garden Plot: Flowers of Evil," Akwesasne Notes, Vol. 7, No. 5, Early
Winter 1975. Also see The Glass House Tapes, op. cit., and Jaimes and Churchill, op. cit. For the thinking
of Evelegh, see his Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society: The Lessons of Northern Ireland, C. Hurst and
Company, London, 1978. Regarding Kitson, see his Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and
Peace-Keeping, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA, 1971. Another good reading is Butz, Tim, "Garden Plot
and Swat: US Police as New Action Enemy," Counterspy, Fall 1974.
51.The government instead offered to allow the defenders to leave through the roadblocks without
being immediately arrested. They would, however, have been subject to later arrest and prosecution. See
Voices from Wounded Knee, op. cit., p. 45.
52. Ibid., pp. 46-7.
53. Those attempting to negotiate a cease fire now included not only Justice Department commu-
nity relations officials such as Terronez, but clergymen like the Methodist minister, Reverend John
Adams. Reportedly, Adams was threatened with death on March 9,1973, by a federal marshal, unless
he ceased his attempts to mediate. The individual who delivered the ultimatum concerning women and
children was Ralph Erikson, Justice Department liaison to the FBI; Ibid., pp. 51-2.
54.Burnette and Koster, op. cit., p.234.

55.See Voices from Wounded Knee, op. cit., pp. 50-2. On the report of the M-60, see :bid., p. 41. Also
see Weyler, op. cit., p. 82. It should be noted - as any Vietnam combat veteran can readily attest - that
the AK-47 assault rifle and the M-60 machinegun sound nothing alike when fired. Given the number of
such veterans among the federal forces manning the siege lines, it seems highly unlikely that the FBI's
false reporting in this instance was born of genuine error or confusion.
56. See Ciccione, F. Richard, "New peace talks set with Indians," and "Tentative agreement
reached," Rapid City Journal, March 7, 1973; also see "Abernathy visits Wounded Knee; Kunstler,
Berrigan plan to come," Rapid City Journal, March 8, 1973. Of further interest, see Ciccione, F. Richard,
"Indians seek removal of lawmen at Wounded Knee," Rapid City Journal, March 10, 1973.
57.Burnette and Koster, op. cit., p. 58. Burnette also suggests (at p. 238) that a female U.S. marshal
was successfully infiltrated into Wounded Knee on the same afternoon (March 11), disguised as a
reporter. Trimbach's gambit paid a perhaps unexpected dividend in addition to providing an immedi-
ate rationale to reopen hostilities: the detention of the six "postal inspectors" provided a basis for three
of the very few successful prosecutions the government was able to achieve as a result of Wounded Knee.
In June of 1975 - as part of the "Wounded Knee Leadership Trials" - AIM leaders Leonard Crow Dog,
Stan Holder and Carter Camp were found guilty of "interference with federal officers in performance
of their lawful duty" in this regard.
58.See Voices from Wounded Knee,op. cit.,pp. 54-8. Also see Ciccione, F. Richard, "Federal authorities
re-establish barriers around Wounded Knee," Rapid City Journal, March 13, 1973. Of further interest, see
Gladstone, Lyn, "Tension grows on reservation," Rapid City Journal, March 9, 1973.
59.On Held's presence and function, see Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 109.
60.On the contents of Held's reports, see thid., p. 134.
61.The firefight had been initiated by Fitzpatrick and another agent attempting to chase an AIM
vehicle through the defense perimeter, into Wounded Knee. FBI spokespersons subsequently claimed
they thought the vehicle - a rented van - was "either overdue at a rental agency [!V] or stolen." It was
neither. See Ciccione, F. Richard, "FBI agent shot, 'sovereign state' proclaimed: Wounded Knee
circumstances jury topic," Rapid City Journal, March 12,1973. Also see Burnette and Koster, op. cit., pp.
237-8. The issue of when the FBI had decided it was appropriate to use lethal force to recover cars
"overdue at rental agencies" seems never to have been raised by "responsible media representatives."
62. Other than initial expense money, Little Ghost never collected. Shortly after arriving at
Wounded Knee, he "defected" to AIM and told his story to Tom Cook, a reporter from the Indian
quarterly tabloid, Akwesasne Notes. See Voices From Wounded Knee, 1973, op. cit., p. 123.
63.Weyler, op. cit., pp. 169-70. The Shafers managed little damage, as they were shortly detected.
Also see Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
64.Between 1959 and 1961, Durham worked in Guatemala in the CIA operation to support the Bay
of Pigs invasion of Cuba. In late 1961, he was hired by the Des Moines, Iowa police force. On July 5,1964,
his wife died as the result of a beating administered by him. Examined by a police psychiatrist, he was
diagnosed as a "violent schizoid...unfit for office involving public trust." The psychiatrist who per-
formed the examination recommended immediate institutionalization. The Des Moines police, appar-
ently more concerned with avoiding further scandal than anything else, arranged simply for his
resignation and a promise that he would seek out patient therapy. With charges dropped, he opted to
ignore the latter aspect of the agreement, moving instead into an active association with organized
crime. Over the next several years, he made his living - by his own account - running a prostitution
operation out of a Des Moines bar, as well as by brokering drug deals and serving as a fence for stolen
goods ("everything from cars to toasters"). He was apparently recruited as a clandestine operative by
the FBI in 1971, in exchange for non-prosecution on a number of charges stemming from his activities.
See Giese, Paula, "Profile of an Informer," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 24, Summer 1985, pp.
18-9.
65.Three persons were shot inside Wounded Knee during this exchange, including a Chicano
medic from southern Colorado named Rocky Madrid, who was hit in the abdomen. See the account by
Los Angeles Free Press reporter Ron Ridenour, who witnessed the whole thing, contained in Weyler, op.
cit., p. 83.
66.Burnette and Koster, op. cit., p. 243; Voices From Wounded Knee,1973, op. cit., p. 128. The several
Wounded Knee veterans with whom the authors have discussed this matter uniformly suggest that
Grimm was probably struck by a GOON round fired from behind his position.
Chapter 7 Notes: COINTELPRO — MM 387
67.The ban was actually imposed on March 21, that is, before the heavy firefight which wounded
Rocky Madrid. When it became clear that direct reporting was still going on, the threat of prosecution
was added on March 23. Virtually all mainstream media representatives bowed to such intimidation —
apparently with little protest — and subsequently reported as "news" the contents of packaged "press
briefings" offered by the FBI each afternoon in Pine Ridge village (miles from the scene). The only
holdouts against this domestic replication of the Vietnam "five o'clock follies" syndrome were
alternative press representatives such as Tom Cook and Betsy Dudley, who opted to remain inside the
AIM/ION perimeter for the duration of the siege. Both were arrested by the FBI on May 7,1973 and their
notes impounded. Charges were later dropped. See Voices From Wounded Knee,1973, op. cit., pp. 118-23.
68. Ibid., pp. 124-5. This national effort was begun on March 20, 1973. On that, often utilizing
information derived from infiltrators of organizations which had expressed support for AIM's actions
at Wounded Knee, the Bureau began alerting state and local police concerning activist-driven vehicles
leaving for South Dakota. These would then be stopped on "routine warrant checks" or other spurious
excuses. If they were discovered to contain supplies of food, medicine or winter dothing, they would
be impounded and the occupants turned over to the FBI for federal charges. In such cases, the Bureau
falsely and habitually informed the media that the confiscated cargo induded "weapons" and "ammu-
nition." Minnesota attorney Karen Northcott has estimated that "several hundred" arrests took place
across the country in this connection; almost all such charges were dropped prior to trial, but the AIM
supply network was seriously undercut as a result (see "Negotiations halted by storm; Indians low on
supplies," Rapid City Journal, March 15, 1973). By mid-April, the situation inside the hamlet was so
serious that a Boston-based support group organized an air drop to provide at least some food and
medication for the sick. Federal forces fired on the little planes when they made their parachute runs on
Apri117, and then fired on several children who attempted to run to one of the bundles which had landed
outside the AIM/ION perimeter. While none of the children was hit, the federal action in shooting at
them provoked a heavy — and this time lethal — firefight. As usual, the FBI utilized the direct presence
of media representatives to announce that what had been parachuted into Wounded Knee had been
"arms and ammunition" — the flight manifest listed nothing but food, soap and cigarette tobacco — and
filed charges against the participants accordingly. These were later dropped. See Zimmerman, Bill,
Airlift to Wounded Knee, The Swallow Press, Chicago, 1976.
69. There were five principle points to the agreement: 1) Both sides would cease fire to allow while
settlement negotiations were undertaken, and federal forces would withdraw to at least 400 yards
distance from the AIM/ION position. 2) Russell Means would leave Wounded Knee and submit to
arrest. He would then be allowed to go to Washington, D.C. to negotiate directly with the Nixon
administration concerning points 3 and 4.3) A federal investigation into the abuses of the Wilson regime
would be followed by legal action to remedy the situation on Pine Ridge. 4) A presidential commission
would review the status of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. 5) There would be a sixty-day moratorium on
further arrests pending grand jury indictments, if any.
70. When Means arrived at the White House, along with AIM spiritual leader Leonard Crow Dog,
he discovered that — contrary to the terms of the cease-fire — the administration position had shifted to
one of refusing to talk further until everyone inside Wounded Knee surrendered. Means then proceeded
to Los Angeles to raise funds through a speaking engagement at UCLA. While he was there, news
arrived of Clearwater's killing. In a rage, Means announced he was returning to "the combat zone"
immediately. The FBI then moved in and, after a wild automobile chase, captured him. He was held on
a whopping $125,000 bond although accused of no violent crime. See Burnette and Koster, op. cit., pp.
244-5.
71. Frank Clearwater and his wife Morning Star, a North Carolina Cherokee, had only arrived at
Wounded Knee in the small hours of the morning. SAC Trimbach delayed his emergency medical
evacuation for some 45 minutes. Although the Marshals Service granted Morning Star a safe conduct
pass, she was promptly arrested by the FBI when she attempted to accompany her husband to the
hospital, and held at the Pine Ridge jail until after his death. Dick Wilson then denied permission for the
victim to be buried at Wounded Knee, as his widow requested, on the false grounds that "only Oglalas
can be buried on this reservation." The Bureau went Wilson one better, falsely informing the media that
Clearwater had not been an Indian at all, but was instead a "white man impersonating an Indian." See
Voices from Wounded Knee, op. cit., pp. 176-9. Also see Zimmerman, op. cit., pp. 277-8.
72. Frizzell, Kent, personal interview with National Public Radio reporter Scott Schlagle, 1989 (tape
on file).
73.Voices from Wounded Knee, op. cit., p. 190.

74.Ibid., p. 193. Also see Butz, Tim, "Bringing Vietnam Home," Akwesasne Notes, Early Winter 1975.
75.The situation caused a rather interesting radio dialogue- recorded in Butz, Ibid. at 213 -between
the marshals and AIM security inside Wounded Knee in which the government Red Arrow command
post stated that it had honored a cease-fire agreement, but was taking automatic weapons fire. When
AIM security replied that it too was taking fire, and had thought it was coming from the marshals, Red
Arrow responded: "Ten-four. A couple of our RBs (Road Blocks) have reported firing and they don't
know who is in those positions. They report that it is being fired into Wounded Knee." AIM security then
queried, "You're pretty sure we've got a third party out there firing on us with automatic weapons?"
Red Arrow replied, "That's what it sounds like."
76. Ibid., p. 202-22. Unlike the Clearwater case, Wilson was unable to block Lamont's burial at
Wounded Knee insofar as the victim was an enrolled Oglala. His grave now stands beside the mass
burial site containing the remains of the more than 300 of his ancestors slaughtered by the 7th Cavalry
in the same location in 1890.
77. On the night of April 23, 1973 the U.S. Marshals Service and AIM security at Wounded Knee
monitored a GOON radio communication stating that eight of their number, armed with M-16s, had
captured "a dozen hippies" trying to backpack supplies into the AIM/ION positions. The marshals
dispatched a BIA police unit (which had been brought in from another reservation) to take charge of the
prisoners, but the GOONs fired upon this patrol when it approached them. None of the captives was
ever seen or heard from again. The Justice Department apparently considered the possibility that they'd
been murdered and disposed of en masse by the GOONs quite credible; shortly after the siege ended, the
department requested Rosebud Tribal President Robert Burnette accompany Solicitor General Kent
Frizzell and two FBI agents in a search for the bodies of at least eight unknown individuals thought to
have been murdered and secretly buried "by white vigilantes or Wilson's men." See Burnette and
Koster, op. cit., p. 248. Also see Voices From Wounded Knee, 1973, op. cit., p. 193.
78. The number of those murdered accrues from a list, induding names and dates - and in some
cases locations of the homicides - in 61 cases compiled by Candy Hamilton, a legal researcher for the
Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Committee during 1975 and '76 (copy on file). Hamilton has
stated to the authors that she believes her compilation is incomplete, and should include at least "eight
or nine" more individuals, the details on whom she was unable to pin down.
79.Johansen, Bruce, and Roberto Maestas, Wasfchu: The Continuing Indian Wars., Monthly Review
Press, New York, 1979, pp. 83-4. The authors rely on the FBI Uniform Crime Report for 1975 in obtaining
much of their data.
80. Johansen and Maestas, op. cit., p. 88.
81.Ibid. These figures apply only to regularly assigned agents, and say nothing of the extraordinar-
ily high volume of agent "through traffic" - personnel sent to perform a particular task and who depart
upon its completion - in the Rapid City office during the same period.
82. Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 173. These agents lived off-reservation, largely at the Hacienda Motel in
Gordon, Nebraska. They made the commute, approximately forty miles each way, every working day.
83. For details on the super-saturation of agents on Pine Ridge during 1975, see U.S. Department
of Justice, Report of the Task Force on Indian Matters, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 42-3. The data is exclusive
of the nearly 250 agents sent to perform special duty on Pine Ridge during July and August of 1975.
84. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Revolutionary
Activities Within the United States: The American Indian Movement, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., August 1976, p. 61.
85.Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Committee, "Letter to Contributors," Minneapolis,
February 1976, p. 1.
86. See U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, 97th Congress,1st Session on FBI Authorisation, March 19,24,25; April 2, 8,1981, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1981.
87. Quoted in Garbus, Martin, "General Haig of Wounded Knee," The Nation, November 9, 1974.
88. The jurisdictional hearing was held as a part of U.S. v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases, CR. 73-
5019, and was heard in the federal court in Lincoln, Nebraska by District Judge Warren K. Urbom,
beginning December 16, 1974. On January 17,1975, Urbom rendered a decision which said that although
the Lakota were indeed "once a fully sovereign nation," both time and continuous violation of the
principles of that status had rendered them otherwise. Hence, despite the still-binding nature of the 1868
Fort Laramie Treaty, the judge held that the government did have jurisdiction to try the defendants even
though their alleged crimes had occurred exclusively within Indian territory. As Vine Deloria, Jr.
subsequently pointed out, if his reasoning was applied to statutes such as those pertaining to murder,
it would mean they too are now invalid, given that they are "old, and have been constantly violated over
the years." Perhaps due to the glaringly tenuous nature of the government's logic in asserting
jurisdiction against the Wounded Knee defendants, a compromise agreement was reached in which
charges were dismissed against all rank and file AIM members/supporters while prosecution went
forward against only a handful of selected leaders. Much of the testimony entered during the "Sioux
Sovereignty Hearing" may be found in Dunbar Ortiz, Roxanne, The Great Sioux Nation: Sitting in
Judgement on America, International Indian Treaty Council/Moon Books, New York/San Francisco,
1977. Also see Tilsen, Ken, "Fair and Equal Justice," Quare, September 1976.
89. The case in question is U.S. v. Banks and Means, Nos. Cr. 73-5034, Cr. 73-5062, Cr. 73-5035, and
Cr. 73-5063, (374 F.Supp. 321 [1974]).
90. "Judge Nichol expressed astonishment that the FBI, which had been 'developing' this witness
for six weeks, had not verified a story that the defense had shot to pieces overnight"; Matthiessen, op.
p. 94. Records of a Monterey, California cable television company showed dearly that Moves Camp
had been appearing — live — on its local origination channel at some of the very moments he was
supposedly witnessing Banks and Means engaging in illegal acts at Wounded Knee. It was also
established that he had been active on the San Jose State College campus throughout the month of April
1973. In other words, he'd spent most of the entirety of the Wounded Knee siege in northern California
(Weyler, op. cit., p.119). Banks had expelled Moves Camp from AIM due to his persistent abuse of drugs
and alcohol, and general disruptive behavior.
91. Price and Williams conducted secure and secret meetings with Moves Camp at Ellsworth Air
Force Base, near Rapid City, during the period August 5 through August 10,1974. It appears they drew
up a series of false affidavits for the "witness" to sign in the course of these meetings. It would also have
been at this time that the quid pro quo for Moves Camp's testimony was arranged.
92. On the charges against Moves Camp, see Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 94. The witness was also a
suspect in several Rapid City area rapes at the time.
93. Federal records, disclosed at trial, showed Moves Camp had been paid $2,074.50 in "expenses"
—although he had been housed, fed and transported by the FBI since the moment he became a witness
—and "fees."
94. As defense attorney Larry Leaventhal summarized the testimony presented on the matter at
trial: "At the time of the alleged rape incident Louis Moves Camp was spending a few days in the
presence of FBI agents Williams and Price [at the J&R Dude Ranch, just across the Minnesota line, in
Wisconsin]... [who] by their own testimony consumed great amounts of alcohol in the presence of Moves
Camp. Moves Camp thereafter left their company. The following morning a young [River Falls,
Wisconsin] woman attempted to press rape charges against Louis Moves Camp, with the county
attorney's office. Her complaint was initially processed, and than following contact between the FBI
agents and the county attorney the complaint was sidetradced."Quoted in Weyler, op. cit., p. 119.
95.As the matter is put in First Session on FBI Authorization (1981), op. cit., p. 282: "[Prosecutor] Hurd
himself met with the witness [Moves Camp] three times before putting him on the stand, and apparently
he had some doubts about his truthfulness, since he requested a lie detector test that [SAC] Trimbach
refused." Also see Adams, J.P., "AIM and the FBI," Christian Century, No. 92, April 2,1975.
96. When confronted with the River Falls incident at trial, Hurd attempted to stonewall, insisting
that Moves Camp had been charged only with "public intoxication," and that his witness could not be
impeached on such basis. The real situation was then brought out by defense attorneys, who demon-
strated that Hurd was aware of it prior to making his false assertions to the court (he had been informed
by Minneapolis ASAC Philip Enloe at least a week earlier). Judge Nichol thereupon called the attorneys
into his chambers and informed Hurd that "the whole sordid [River Falls] situation is going to come
out," and the prosecutor apparently broke down and cried. Nichol formally censored Hurd for his
performance: "Mr. Hurd deceived the Court up here at the bench in connection with the Moves Camp
incident in Wisconsin. It hurts me deeply. It's going to take me a long time to forget it..to that extent,
I think the prosecutor in this case was guilty of misconduct; it was certainly not in accordance with the
highest standards we ought to expect from those officers that represent what I used to think was the
majesty of the United States Government. I guess its been a bad year for justice, a bad year for justice."
Transcript, quoted in Weyler, op. cit., p. 121.
97. As Judge Nichol put it: "It is my feeling that the prosecution's offering testimony that was
directly contradicted by a document [FBI affidavits signed by another discredited witness, Alexander
Richards] that was in its possession is inexcusable and possibly a violation of American Bar Association
Standards on the Prosecutive Function...if [this] was not deliberate deception, it was grossly negligent
conduct...131 discoverable or arguably discoverable pieces of [exculpatory] evidence which weren't
turned over [to the defense]...The defendants have expressed a profound distrust of the FBI...The
expression of distrust is understandable...The FBI was negligent at best." Quoted in Weyler, op. cit., pp.
116-7.
98. Trial transcript quoted in New York Times, September 17, 1974.
99. Prosecutor Hurd tendered an affidavit to Judge Nichol on April 3,1974, in response to a defense
motion for disclosure of any federal infiltration of the defense team, stating categorically that no such
infiltration had occurred. This was a lie. Hurd later admitted that SAC Trimbach — who also professed
to the court that he was "unaware" of any such infiltration — had earlier informed him that the FBI had
an informant "very close to one of the defendants."
100. As WKLDOC coordinator Ken 'Men summed up the situation, "There was no person other
than the defense counsel and the defendants themselves who knew more about the total plans, and
stratagems of the defense than Douglass Durham." Ironically, one of the tasks assigned to Durham in
his role as security director was to insure that no government infiltrators penetrated the defense
organization. This allowed him to isolate Banks in particular from many bona fide AIM members. Tilsen
is quoted in Brand, Johanna, The Life and Death of Anna Mae Aquash, James Lorimer Publishers, Toronto,
1978, p. 99. As Durham himself put it in Revolutionary Activities Within the United States: The American
Indian Movement (op. cit., p. 61), "I was the one who issued the passes for the defense attorneys to get into
their own rooms. I cleared the defense attorneys...I controlled security all around them [the defen-
dants]." Also see Tilsen, Kenneth, "The FBI, Wounded Knee and Politics," The Iowa Journal of Social Work,
Fall 1976.
101. The $100,000 figure is raised in Brand, op. cit., pp. 98-9. At p. 123, Matthiessen, op. cit., quotes
AIM member Nilak Butler as concurring with the figure, and observing that the money was being
diverted into "a second account under the name of Douglass Durham." Although this was ultimately
reported to the FBI, no investigation is known to have occurred.
102. Durham's Bureau compensation was raised from $900 to $1,000 per month midway through
the trial. Brand (op. cit., p. 99) quotes SAC Trimbach as admitting to having known that just one of
Durham's two handlers had met with the infiltrator "nearly 50 times" during the eight-month
proceeding. This hardly squares with the SACs pretense that he "had no knowledge" of Durham's
infiltration of the defense team.
1(13. Nichol was replaced by U.S. District Judge Edward McManus, nicknamed "Speedie Eddie"
by AIM defendants, for the rapidity with which he processed them through to conviction and
sentencing. See Deloria, Vine Jr., "Who Knows What Violence We Can Expect?" (Los Angeles Times,
August 17, 1975) for background.
104. To the contrary, the FBI appears to have arranged suspension of the perjurer's prosecution on
the pending charges in both South Dakota and Wisconsin. In April of 1975, Moves Camp was critically
wounded by a rifle bullet in the hamlet of Wanblee (on Pine Ridge) after having been accused of raping
a local woman. See Matthiessen, op. cit., p.100.
105. Hurd's commendation was bestowed shortly after charges were dismissed because of his
consistent misconduct during the Banks/Means trial. He was then named as chief prosecutor against
Crow Dog, Camp and Holder in their "leadership trial" in Cedar Rapids, Iowa during June 1975 on
charges stemming from the Wounded Knee siege. The trial judge was Edward McManus. In these
changed circumstances, Hurd was able to obtain convictions, but no prison time against the defendants.
He was then assigned to prosecute Crow Dog in two consecutive cases in Rapid City involving alleged
assaults against suspected FBI operatives who had invaded his home on the Rosebud Reservation. In
the first instance — in which even William McCloskey, one of the supposed victims, ultimately stated
under oath that the Brnle spiritual leader had not done what he was accused of doing — Hurd was able
to win a conviction from an all-white jury. U.S. District Judge Robert Merhige (who had been sent on
special assignment to South Dakota from his bench in Virginia expressly to "dear the docket of AIM
cases by Thanksgiving") imposed a maximum five-year sentence on November 28, 1975 under the
stated logic that, even if Crow Dog was not guilty as charged, he should have used his "religious
position" to "avert violence." In the second case, in which Crow Dog had to be returned to Rapid City
from his prison cell in the federal facility at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania to stand trial, Hurd was again
successful despite the fact that numerous witnesses testified that it had been Crow Dog's alleged victims
who had attacked him and his wife, Mary, rather than the other way around. Merhige again cooperated
by imposing a second five-year sentence, to run consecutive with the first, making the defendant subject
to a total of ten years imprisonment. Crow Dog ultimately served 27 months before his sentence was
commuted on March 21,1977, after Amnesty International indicated its intention of adopting him as a
"prisoner of conscience," and the National Council of Churches, World Council of Churches and U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights all began investigating the circumstances of his convictions. No doubt as
a result of all this good work, RD. Hurd was named to a judgeship in South Dakota in 1981. See Proposal
for a commission of inquiry into the effect of domestic intelligence activities on criminal trials in the United States
of America, op. cit. Also see Erdoes, Richard, "Crow Dog's Third Trial," Akwesasne Notes, Vol. 8, No. 1,
Early Spring 1976; and Weyler, op. cit., pp. 187-9.
106. Trimbach remained SAC in Minneapolis, in overall charge of the Bureau's focal anti-AIM
operations, until June 27,1975, when he was temporarily replaced by COINTELPRO expert Richard G.
Held, sent in to manage the FBI's "final assault" against AIM on Pine Ridge. Price and Williams were
both assigned to work directly on the reservation against AIM.
107. Durham's true identity was discovered on March 7, 1975, when WKLDOC attorneys
discovered an informant report signed by him among papers released pursuant to a discovery motion
in one of the Wounded Knee cases. When confronted with the document by WKLDOC director Ken
Tilsen and others, he admitted his relationship to the FBI. Tilsen's recollections on Durham's confession
are contained in Weyler, op. cit., p. 169.
108.The Skyhorse/Mohawk case involved the brutal stabbing murder of Los Angeles cab driver
George Aird on October 10, 1974. His body was found at what was called "AIM Camp 13," in Box
Canyon (in Ventura County), near the location of the former Manson "family" headquarters at the
Spahn Movie Ranch. The facility had some months earlier been ordered closed by Dennis Banks because
it was attracting a "rabble of dopers and crazies." Douglass Durham, in his capacity as AIM national
director of security and apparently using funds funnelled to him by Virginia "Blue Dove" DeLuse, an
actress and FBI infiltrator of LA-AIM, quietly kept the camp open, even going so far as to install a new
sign announcing its "AIM sponsorship." In the wake of the discovery of Aird's body, the Ventura
County Sheriff's department apprehended three individuals — Marvin Redshirt (an Oglala, non-AIM
member), Holly Broussard (Redshirt's non-Indian girlfriend), and Marcella "Makes Noise Eaglestaff"
McNoise (another non-Indian) — in possession of the murder weapon. It was quickly established that
Aird was last seen alive with the three in the back seat of his cab, shortly before his death. Redshirt
admitted having committed the crime. The case seemed rather open and shut. However, the Ventura
County Sheriff was shortly visited by agents from the LA FBI office who explained that they had
information from a "confidential source" (never disclosed, but thought to have been Durham) that the
real killers of Aird were two LA-AIM leaders named Paul "Skyhorse" Durant (Anishinabe) and Richard
"Mohawk" Billings (Mohawk). In a strange chain of events which has never been adequately explained
by Ventura County prosecutors, charges were then dropped against Redshirt, Broussard and McNoise
(against whom there was considerable evidence), and levied against Skyhorse and Mohawk. The three
culprits were then deployed as "eyewitnesses" of what the accused had done to Aird. Press coverage
of the charges — prominently featuring photos of Durham's sign — was sensational. Durham utilized his
position within AIM to convince Banks and others that Skyhorse and Mohawk were "probably guilty"
of the sordid act, thereby depriving them of organizational legal support until well after Durham's own
exposure as an FBI infiltrator. The defendants ultimately received AIM support and were freed after a
mistrial, but not before they had served 31 months apiece without bond. This last was in no small part
due to the fact that after his exposure, in February 1976, Durham had gone into court disguised as a
"psychologist from the University of Iowa" to offer "expert testimony" that the accused were "psy-
chotic" and would represent a "danger to society" if granted bail. Redshirt finally went to prison, but
not for the Aird slaying. Instead, he was convicted and sentenced for having stabbed Holly Broussard
during a 1978 dispute in Hot Springs, South Dakota; at the time of the incident, both were still receiving
federal support for their services in what had ostensibly been a local California case. More detailed
background is provided in Matthiessen, op. cit., 114-6. Also see "FBI Pins Brutal Slayings on AIM," The
Guardian, December 1, 1974; and Blackburn, D., 'Skyhorse and Mohawk: More Than a Murder Trial,"
The Nation, December 24, 1977.0f further interest, see Anonymous, "Wounded Knee Trials Go On — The
Invisible Man in Phoenix and an FBI Behind Every Mail Box" (Akwesasne Notes, Early Spring 1975), and
"Anatomy of an Informer" (Akwesasne Notes, Early Summer 1975).
109.The victim was a young Brele Lakota woman named Jancita Eagle Deer, whose battered body
turned up alongside a lonely Nebraska blacktop, just south of the Rosebud Reservation, on April 4,1975.
The official cause of death was listed by Aurora, Nebraska coroner Donald J. Larson as being "hit and
run," although no autopsy was performed. The coroner also noted Eagle Deer also appeared to have
been beaten prior to having been run over. She had been the "companion" of Douglass Durham for more
than a year, since he had brought her from Iowa to testify in tribal court that a virulently anti-AIM
candidate for South Dakota attorney general, William Janklow, had raped her on January 14,1967, when
he had been attorney for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and she had been his fifteen-year-old babysitter.
Durham then arranged for her charges to be trumpeted as AIM accusations in the area press, knowing
full well that the results of a 1967 FBI investigation of the charge would be withheld and that Janklow
would simply refuse to appear before the tribal bench. Thus left with no evidentiary basis other than
Eagle Deer's testimony to support the allegations, AIM would be made to appear to have gratuitously
smeared the candidate, a matter virtually guaranteed to garner him a large sympathy vote. This is
precisely what happened, as Janklow rode in on a last-minute landslide while promising to "put AIM
leaders either in jail, or under it" He was true to his promise, a situation which afforded an obvious boon
to the FBI's anti-AIM campaign. After this rather sophisticated electoral ploy, Durham seldom allowed
Eagle Deer out of his sight. "She knew too much," as WKLDOC researcher Candy Hamilton later put
it. For her part, Eagle Deer seems to have become psychologically dependent upon her "benefactor." In
any event, she remained with him even after he was unmasked as a provocateur. The victim was last seen
leaving the home of her brother, Alfred, on the Rosebud, at about 1 p.m. on April 4 in the company of
a man matching Durham's description, driving a car matching the description of one belonging to the
infiltrator's father. No FBI investigation was ever undertaken in the matter. Much of this reconstruction
accrues from direct interviews with Hamilton and AIM member Nilak Butler.It is also worth noting that
surviving member of the Des Moines, Iowa AIM chapter leadership, Aaron Two Elk (Oglala), believes
that Durham was "probably" the party who tampered with the brake lines of an automobile belonging
to chapter head Harvey Major, causing Major's death in a 1974 car crash. Major had, at the time of his
death, become convinced that Durham was a provocateur. No investigation into the causes of the fatal
"accident" was ever undertaken. For further information, see Kantner, Elliott, "The FBI Takes Aim at
AIM," Seven Days, Aprilll, 1977. Also see Giese, Paula, "Secret Agent Douglass Durham and the Death
of Jancita Eagle deer," North Country Anvil, March-April 1976. For more on Janklow, see Churchill,
Ward, "The Strange Case of 'Wild Bill' Janklow," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 24, Summer 1985.
110.Durham's testimony may be found, en tote, in Revolutionary Activities Within the United States:
The American Indian Movement, op. cit. It should be noted that immediately after his stint before the
subcommittee, Durham — while still on the FBI payroll — undertook a speaking tour throughout the
midwest on behalf of the John Birch Society, whipping up anti-AIM sentiment in the region. For further
information, see Adams, LP., "AIM, the Church, and the FBI: The Douglass Durham Case," Christian
Century, No. 92, May 14,1975. Also see Paula Giese's pamphlet, Anatomy of an Informer (American Indian
Movement, White Earth, MN, 1976).
111. Quoted in First Session on FBI Authorization (1981), op. cit., p. 294. Original documents have
never been released.
112.Ibid.
113.Details of the deal may be found in Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 100.
114.See Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Organization, The Murder of Pedro Bissonette, circular released
from Manderson, SD, October 18, 1973.
115. The BIA police logs at Pine Ridge for October 17, 1973 bear out that despite his lack of
jurisdiction in the matter (which, even if it could have been established that Bissonette started the fracas,
would have amounted to no more than a simple assault charge), Eastman ordered a full mobilization
and reservation-wide manhunt for Bissonette. At least five roadblocks were set up for this purpose.
Several spotter aircraft were used in the search and since the BIA were not thus equipped, it has been
presumed by researchers and reservation residents alike that at least some of these were provided by
the FBI.
116.Clifford's report also states dearly that Bissonette was shot almost immediately after exiting his
vehicle, which is to say at a location very dose to it. Non-police witnesses, however, consistently place
the blood pool marking the body's location as having been at least 45 feet from the nearest vehicle. See
Churchill, Ward, and Jim Vander Wall, "Strange War on the Lakota: The Case for a Congressional
Investigation of FBI Activity on Pine Ridge Reservation, 1972-1976," Rolling Stock, No. 14, 1987.
117. The witness affidavits were collected by WKLDOC attorneys and researchers during the week
following Bissonette's death. Copies were provided to ASAC George O'Clock at the Rapid City resident
agency. The originals were lodged in the WKLDOC files, turned over by Ken Tilsen to the Minnesota
Historical Society during the early 1980s.
118. In an unpublished report prepared for WKLDOC and submitted on October 20, 1973, Lane
indicated that the duster of seven holes centered on Bissonette's breastbone in a "very tight group,
approximately three by five inches." According to Lane's observations, there was no evidence of
burning or blast such as would have resulted had the victim been hit by a shotgun at a range dose enough
to have made such a pattern; he therefore deduced that a weapon on the order of a "38 calibre police
revolver" had been used to inflict the wounds from a somewhat longer range (at least ten feet distance).
Lane also noted that the corpse had three bullet holes in a tight pattern in the right hand, indicating the
victim had not been holding a weapon when shot, but had instead had been vainly attempting to ward
off the fatal shots; a grazing wound to the right side of the neck was also observed. Finally, in addition
to bruises on the body's face and rib cage, suggesting that a beating had been administered prior to the
shooting, Lane detected irritation of the skin in numerous places, suggesting burns "by teargas or some
other caustic substance" prior to death. None of this, of course, remotely squares with the police version,
either of what happened, or of the wounds inflicted. Hence, Lane's desire for an autopsy conducted by
an independent pathologist.
119. In an interview conducted by WKLDOC researcher Candy Hamilton in 1974 (copy on file),
Gladys Bissonette indicated that she'd already decided to demand such an autopsy. Lane's call, by her
account, simply confirmed her decision and accelerated the timing of her notification to federal
authorities (she'd planned to do this several hours later on the morning of October 18).
120. According to Lane, U.S. Attorney Clayton assured him during the early-morning call verbally
that the body would not be removed from the morgue at Pine Ridge hospital, "or otherwise tampered
with," until an independent pathologist could be brought in to perform the autopsy, "either alone, or
in conjunction with a pathologist retained by the federal government." They agreed that this shouldn't
take "more than 24 hours, 48 at most." According to Pine Ridge BIA police head Delmar Eastman,
however, Clayton phoned him only minutes after the recorded time of Lane's call demanding an
independent pathologist, and ordered that the body be removed to Scottsbluff "immediately." When
queried by reporters on the matter, Eastman responded that he'd acted "under direct orders from Bill
Clayton;" see the Rapid City Journal, October 19, 1973.
121. Although Brown had facilities to store the body in Scottsbluff until arrival of an independent
pathologist, he appears to have performed his autopsy hurriedly and alone, destroying much of the
physical evidence Lane and Gladys Bissonette wished to have examined. His conclusion corroborating
the police version of events should hardly be considered conclusive; W.O. Brown is the same coroner
who determined that AIM activist Anna Mae Aquash - killed by a bullet to the base of the skull - died
"of natural causes" in 1976 (see below). In the entirety of his career as a federal contract coroner, Brown
never once found cause to contradict an of fidal version of a death, no matter how outlandish. For further
information, see Anonymous, "Pine Ridge After Wounded Knee: The Terror Goes On," Akwesasne Notes,
Early Summer 1975.
122. An incomplete list of AIM members and supporters killed on or near Pine Ridge from March
1973 through March 1976 would read as follows: Frank Clearwater (4/17/73), between eight and twelve
individuals packing supplies into Wounded Knee (4/73), Buddy Lamont (4/27/73), Clarence Cross (6/
19/73), Priscilla White Plume (7/14/73), Julius Bad Heart Bull (7/30/73), Donald He Crow (8/7/73),
Philip Black Elk (9/21/73), Melvin Spider (9/22/73), Aloysius Long Soldier (10/5/73), Philip Little
Crow (10/10/73), Pedro Bissonette (10/17/73), Allison Fast Horse (11/20/73), Edward Means, Jr. (2/
18/73), Edward Standing Soldier (2/18/74), Lorinda Red Paint (2/27/74), Roxeine Roark (4/19/74),
Dennis LaComte (9/7/74), Jackson Washington Cutt (9/11/74), Robert Reddy (9/16/74), Delphine
Crow Dog (11/9/74), Elaine Wagner (11/30/74), Floyd S. Binias (11/30/74), Yvette Lorraine Lone Hill
(12/28/74), Leon L. Swift Bird (1/5/75), Stacy Cattier (3/20/75), Edith Eagle Hawk and her two
children (3/21/75), Jeanette Bissonette (3/27/75), Richard Eagle (3/30/75), Hilda R. Good Buffalo (4/
4/75), Jancita Eagle Deer (4/4/75), Ben Sitting Up (5/20/75), Kenneth Little (6/1/75), Leah Spotted
Eagle (6/15/75), Joseph Stuntz Kffisright (6/26/75), James Brings Yellow (7/12/75), Andrew Paul
Stewart (7/25/75), Randy Hunter (8/25/75), Howard Blue Bird (9/9/75), Jim Little (9/10/75), Olivia
Binias (10/26/75), Janice Black Bear (10/26/75), Michelle Tobacco (10/27/75), Carl Plenty Arrows, Sr.
(12/6/75), Frank LaPointe (12/6/75), Lydia Cut Grass (1/5/76), Byron DeSersa (1/30/76), Lena R. Slow
Bear (2/6/76), Anna Mae Pictou Aquash (approximately 2/14/76), Hobart Horse (3/1/76), Cleveland
Reddest (3/26/76). This tally, which totals 60-64 individuals - depending upon whether one counts
eight or twelve dead among those missing along the Wounded Knee perimeter -results from combining
a list entitled "The Murder of AIM Members and Supporters on Pine Ridge to Date," compiled by
WKLDOC researcher Candy Hamilton in September 1976, and another published as "The Deaths at Pine
Ridge in the Reign of Terror, 1973-1976," in Akwesasne Notes, Vol. 8, No. 5, Midwinter 1976-77. Both
sources stipulate their itemization is far from complete. Nor does the count include individuals
murdered after March 1976, including Betty Jo Dubray (4/28/76), Marvin Two Two (5/6/76), Julia
Pretty Hips (5/9/76), Sam Afraid of Bear (5/24/76), Kevin Hill (6/4/76), Betty Means (7/3/76), and
Sandra Wounded Foot (7/19/76).
123. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Events Surrounding Recent Murders on the Pine Ridge
Reservation in South Dakota, Rocky Mountain Regional Office, Denver, March 31, 1976, pp. 1-2. It should
be noted that Byron DeSersa was the nephew of Aaron DeSersa, the vociferously anti-Wilson editor of
a Manderson, South Dakota newspaper titled the Shannon County News. Aaron's home had been
firebombed by GOONs on the night of March 1,1973 and his wife, Betty, badly burned. See Burnette and
Koster, op. cit., p. 228.
124. "The FBI was notified, but the Bureau...did nothing but drive around the area," see U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, Hearing Held Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: American Indian
Issues in South Dakota, Hearing Held in Rapid City, South Dakota, July 27-28, 1978, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 33. It is worth noting that Chuck Richards was a member of
a GOON clan so brutal that it was commonly referred to as the "Manson Family" on Pine Ridge. He
himself was known, of course, as "Charlie Manson."
125. On the arrest of Guy Dull Knife - as well as the overall context of the DeSersa murder - see
Matthiessen, op. cit., pp. 258-9.
126. There was a breakthrough, of sorts, in the DeSersa murder case on the night of January 31,1976.
Apparently unapprised of the FBI/BIA police policy of non-arrests in the matter, local police in the off-
reservation town of Martin, South Dakota, apprehended one of the GOONs, Charles David Winters.
Winters seems to have made statements implicating several of his colleagues, including Chuck Richards
and Billy Wilson, before being released on a paltry $5,000 bond (a sum which should be compared to
the $125,000 bonds routinely set for the release of Russell Means and other AIM leaders on Wounded
Knee charges involving no physical violence). As the legal situation threatened to unravel, a deal was
arranged wherein Richards and Wilson were acquitted on the basis of "self-defense," although it was
amply demonstrated that DeSersa and his passengers had been unarmed and fleeing at the time of the
killing. In exchange, Winters and a GOON leader named Dale Janis accepted plea bargained convictions
on charges of second-degree manslaughter. They ultimately served less than two years apiece for what
had clearly been a cold-blooded murder. See Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 259.
127.1st Hearing on FBI Authorization, op. cit., p. 896. Webster's argument essentially reduces to the
suggestion that if congress would not look too deeply into what the Bureau had already done on Pine
Ridge, he would promise to insure it wouldn't happen again. This is, of course, a time-honored FBI
subterfuge - perfected by J. Edgar Hoover - designed to avoid both scrutiny and accountability while
continuing business as usual.
128. See, for example, Evelegh, op. cit., and Kitson, op. cit. Also see Klare, Michael T., and Peter
Kornbluh (eds.), Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Antiterrorism in the Eighties,
Pantheon Publishers, New York, 1988. The official military view of the matter may be found in U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict,
TRADOC Pamphlet No. 525-44, Ft. Monroe, VA, 1986.
129.Some 150 official civil rights complaints were filed against the Wilsonites were filed during the
Wounded Knee negotiations alone. The FBI investigated none of them. Dennis Ickes of the Justice
Department "pursued" 42 on the basis of other "departmental resources," and determined that two
looked "very good" in terms of prosecuting members of the GOON Squad. They were never submitted
Chapter 7 Notes: COINTELPRO — MM 395
to a grand jury, however; consequently, no indictments were returned or arrests made. The same
situation prevailed through the end of 1976. See Weyler, op. cit., p. 95.
130.Events Surrounding Recent Murders on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, op. cit. Civil
Rights Commission investigator William Muldrow, from the Rocky Mountain Regional Office, would
later apply the same description on the witness stand when he testified as an expert in behalf of Dino
Butler and Bob Robideau, defendants charged with murdering two FBI agents and who argued their
innocence on the basis of having acted in self-defense.
131. See Matthiessen, op. cit., pp. 139-51, for an account of the establishment of the camp at the
Jumping Bull Compound.
132. The document is quoted in a July 8, 1975, memorandum titled "RESMURS Press Coverage
Clarification." It has never been released in full.
133.Ibid.
134.The charges stemmed from a brawl involving Eagle and several other teenagers who had been
drinking together. During the altercation, Eagle and his friends had taken a pair of well-worn cowboy
boots from one of the other youths who later filed a complaint. There had been no kidnapping or
allegations that such an act had occurred. So, with scores of homicides uninvestigated due to a professed
lack of FBI manpower on Pine Ridge, two agents were assigned to pursue a teenager accused of the theft
of a pair of used cowboy boots. Such a prioritization of Bureau resources, is questionable, to say the least.
Additionally, the warrant Williams and Coler claimed to be trying to serve on June 25 and 26,1975 did
not exist. The only warrant issued for Eagle (or anyone else) with regard to the "Cowboy Boot Caper,"
was dated July 7 — well after the FBI had publicly announced its service was the reason for Coler's and
Williams' repeated forays into the Jumping Bull Compound — and was for misdemeanor robbery. He
was ultimately acquitted of even this.
135.Concerning the questioning of Draper, Charles and Anderson, see Matthiessen, op. cit., p.156.
They appear to have more-or-less willingly revealed that, as things stood, only eight males of fighting
age might be expected to be in the AIM camp: themselves, Leonard Peltier, Bob Robideau, Dino Butler,
Norman Brown and an Oglala named Dusty Nelson (aka John Star Yellow Wood).
136.Ibid., p. 194. Matthiessen quotes Oglala traditional (and AIM supporter) Edgar Bear Runner
to the effect that at least 150 such personnel were hovering in the immediate Oglala area before Williams
and Coler went onto the Jumping Bull compound. This is substantially corroborated by a New York Times
account published on June 27,1975 which also notes that at least 100 more FBI SWAT personnel appear
to have been on alert at the Bureau's training facility at Quantico, Virginia, awaiting word to move to
South Dakota; at least they were mobilized, outfitted, shipped halfway across the country, and placed
on line at Pine Ridge within five hours of the first shot being fired. Another strong due that the Oglala
firefight was preplanned by the FBI rests in the fact that Chicago SAC — and leading COINTELPRO
specialist — Richard G. Held, who would head up the Bureau's Pine Ridge operations in the wake of the
shooting, had already been detached from his position and prepositioned in Minneapolis two days
before the fact; Minneapolis SAC Joseph Trimbach, who was subordinated to Held, left for Pine Ridge
less than an hour after the first shot was fired (well before it was known that any agents had been killed).
Held himself arrived on the reservation at about the same time as the Quantico SWAT personnel,
bringing with him a counterintelligence protégé named Norman Zigrossi, already selected to replace
ASAC George O'Clock in Rapid City.
137.A copy of the warrant is on file.
138.The authors have received this information directly from AIM members who were there: Nilak
and Dino Butler, Bob Robideau, as well as several individuals who prefer to remain anonymous. All
accounts — which were obtained individually— concur that the Indians did not initially realize they were
exchanging shots with FBI agents. They responded simply to the fact that they were being fired on "by
party or parties unknown," as Nilak Butler puts it.
139.Linda Price, a stenographer at the Rapid City resident agency (and wife of SA David Price) who
monitored and logged Williams' radio transmissions at the outset of the firefight, was interviewed
concerning what she'd heard by ASAC George O'Clock a short while later. According to Ms. Price,
Williams had urgently and repeatedly called upon "somebody" to "get to the high ground" near his and
Coler's position to cover their line of retreat. At one point, he radioed that if such cover were provided,
he and his partner could "still get out of here." A bit later, just before he ceased transmitting altogether,
he urged: "Come on guys! Come on guys!" During the subsequent trial of Bob Robideau and Dino Butler
in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for the deaths of Williams and Coler (U.S. v. Butler and Robideau, CR76-11 N.D.
Ia., 1976), other agents such as J. Gary Adams, Dean Hughes, and Edward Skelly also testified to having
received such transmissions. This, of course, raises the obvious question of who the trapped agents
expected to come rapidly to their assistance in a remote area of the reservation other than the 150-odd
SWAT personnel prepositioned in the immediate area, a matter lending considerable weight to the idea
that the firefight was preplanned by the FBI. Further enhancing this concept are the facts that the
complete Bureau radio logs of Williams' transmissions on June 26, 1975 have been dassified as secret.
Similarly, tapes of these transmissions inadvertently made by the South Dakota State Police on the
morning in question were withheld as being "confidential," at the specific request of the FBI, according
to then South Dakota Attorney General William Janidow (see the Washington Post, July 9, 1975).
140. The three teenagers were Mike Anderson, Norman Charles and Norman Brown (Navajos,
each 15-to-16-years-old), all members of the "core eight" the Bureau expected to encounter on the
Jumping Bull property. Other Indian men the FBI subsequently identified — rightly or wrongly — as
having been "shooters" during the firefight were David Sky (Oglala), Sam Loud Hawk (Oglala), Kenny
Loud Hawk (Oglala), June Little (Oglala), Bruce "Beau" Little (Oglala), Jerry Mousseau (Oglala), Hobart
Horse (Oglala), Cris Westerman (Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota), Richard Little (Oglala), Frank Black
Horse (aka Frank DeLuca, an Italian from Cleveland adopted by a Pine Ridge family), Leon Eagle
(Oglala), Herman Thunder Hawk (Oglala), Jimmy Eagle (Oglala), Melvin Lee Houston (Oglala /
Anishinabe), Dave Hill (Choctaw), and Joe Stuntz Killsright (Coeur D'Alene).
141. Adams, who was on-site and seems to have been the FBI agent in charge during at least the
early phase of the firefight, spent a considerable period of time hiding in a ditch once his tire had been
shot out. It appears to have been largely his decision to withhold the approximately 150 reinforcements
to Coler and Williams he had at his immediate disposal until even more "help" arrived. By that point,
of course, the two agents were dead. In light of this performance, it is probable that Williams' and Coler's
interrogation of Draper, Anderson and Charles the evening before had led the FBI to the condusion that
only eight potential combatants would be encountered in the AIM camp on June 26, and that these could
be quickly overwhelmed by the more than 15 to 1 odds which had been deployed. In the event, the
interrogation itself alerted the Indians that something was up, a matter causing as many as 25 local men
to assemble, "just in case." Hence, when the firefight began, Williams and Coler confronted perhaps 30
rather than the anticipated eight fighters. By all appearances, when they discovered the odds to be
"only" 5 to 1 in their favor, Adams and his colleagues simply turned tail and ran for cover, refusing to
move in for several hours. It was perhaps a personal sense of guilt over his own conduct on the morning
Williams and Coler died which motivated Adams to behave with brutality during his subsequent
interrogations of the AIM teenagers mentioned above, as well as Norman Brown, another 16-year-old.
142. The arrival of Janklow's vigilantes on the scene is yet another evidence that the firefight was
preplanned. By his own account, Janklow had received a phone call that fighting was occurring at Oglala
"around noon" on June 26. At the time, he was at his office in Pierre, South Dakota, virtually dead-center
in the state. He notified his assistant, William Delaney, and the pair went to their respective homes to
arm themselves. They then went to the local airport where an aircraft and pilot just happened to be ready
and waiting, and were flown to the town of Hot Springs, in the far southwestern portion of the state. At
Hot Springs, they rounded up "about 20" well-armed men whom they later described as "deputies"
(none were law enforcement personnel), and then drove the sixty-odd miles to Oglala. After all this, they
still arrived in time to participate in the FBI's massive "assault" on the Jumping Bull Compound. Such
a sequence of events is dearly improbable, unless Janklow had advance warning and had placed
Delaney, the pilot, and the Hot Springs crew on standby prior to the event. An AIM participant's
recounting of the arrival of the Janklow group may be found in a letter from Bob Robideau to attorney
Jack Schwartz, dated June 11,1976.
143. Although it was reasonably obvious that the defenders had departed prior to the assault, the
Bureau and its associates — undoubtedly enraged by the deaths of Williams and Coler —utilized the
opportunity to devastate the structures in the Jumping Bull Compound with rifle and automatic
weapons fire, render them uninhabitable with large amounts of teargas, and then engage in the
apparently deliberate shooting-up of personal items such as family photos. A good survey of this
gratuitous property damage may be found in the film Annie Mae: A Brave-Hearted Woman, produced and
directed by Lan Brookes Ritz (Brown Bird Productions, Los Angeles, 1979). An official account may be
found in a report by U.S. Civil Rights Commission investigator William Muldrow to Regional Director
Shirley Hill Witt, titled Monitoring of Events Related to the Shooting of Two FBI Agentson the Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation (Rocky Mountain Regional Office, Denver, July 9, 1975).
144.According to the 302 Report of SA Gerard Waring for June 26, 1975, Joe Stuntz Killsright was
killed by a single long-range shot to the forehead fired by BIA policeman Gerald Hill, with whom
Waring had taken up a position. Hill, however, was unequipped with a scoped weapon capable of
delivering an aimed shot at the range in question (approximately 800 meters, or one-half mile). Waring,
on the other hand, was carrying a 30-06 rifle with a sniper-scope. Hence, it is widely believed that if there
is any truth at all that Killsright was hit — fatally or otherwise —by a long-range shot, Waring fired it. There
are serious questions about how Killsright died. In a June 28, 1975 press statement, South Dakota
Assistant Attorney General William Delaney, who was on the scene, noted that the body appeared to
him to have been struck by a "burst across the back" (implying automatic weapons fire at dose range).
NPR reporter Kevin McKiernan, whom the FBI unintentionally allowed onto the scene as well,
corroborated Delaney's observation of torso wounds — "blood was leaking from the jacket sleeve" — and
added that the corpse was wearing an FBI field jacket (suggesting the possibility that agents had covered
up their handy work by adding the jacket after the fact). McKiernan also stated repeatedly (including
in direct conversations with author Churchill) that he observed no blood indicating a head wound; this
is corroborated by side-view and full-face photos of Killsright after death, in the possession of former
WKLDOC attorney Bruce Ellison, which reveal no wound to the forehead. It would be almost
impossible to resolve the controversy insofar as the body was immediately delivered by the FBI to its
ubiquitous Nebraska contract coroner, W.O. Brown; Brown's autopsy, as always, "confirmed" the
already officially reported cause of death. See Crewdson, John, "Two FBI Men Die, Indian Slain ," New
York Times, June 27,1975.
145.The UPI wire report on June 27,1975 is typical of what was reported as a result of the first Coll-
orchestrated press conference: "Two FBI agents were ambushed and killed with repeated blasts of
gunfire Thursday in an outbreak of bloodshed appearing to stem from the 1973 occupation of Wounded
Knee...the agents, on the Oglala Sioux Reservation to serve a warrant, were sucked into an ambush,
dragged from their cars, and shot up to 15 to 20 times with automatic weapons...An agent said: 'This is
a regular coup de gras [sic) by the Indians.' The agents were taken from their cars, stripped to their waists,
then shot repeatedly in their heads." In actuality, as Coll well knew, the agents had been dispatched to
the Jumping Bull property rather than having been lured," there were — as has been noted — no
"bunkers" or other defensive emplacements, the evidence indicated both agents had left their cars of
their own accord rather than being "dragged," neither agent had been hit more than three times, neither
agent had been "stripped," and there was no evidence of automatic weapons having been employed by
the Indians. For analysis of Coll's systematic disinformation, see Weisman, op. cit. The U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights (Muldrow, op. cit.) described his releases, in toto, as being "either false, unsubstantiated,
or directly misleading." For further information, see Qavir, Judy Gumbo, and Stew Albert, "Open Fire!
or the FBI's History Lesson," Crawdaddy, November 1976.
146.The "RESMURS Story" received saturation coverage in the national media for the initial week
after the firefight. During this period, only the Minneapolis Tribune —for which Kevin McKiernan served
as a correspondent — appears to have seriously questioned the FBI's fabricated version of events. The
Tribune was also the only major paper to mention in its headlines the fact that an Indian, as well as two
agents, had been killed during the firefight.
147.The letter, announcing this "success" to Richard G. Held, was sent by FBIHQ on July 3,1975.
It reads in part: "Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee (SSC), dated 6-23-75, addressed
to [Attorney General] Edward S. Levi. The letter announces SSC's intent to conduct interviews relating
to Douglass Durham, a Bureau informant The request obviously relates to our investigation at
'Wounded Knee' and our investigation of the American Indian Movement. This request was received
6-27-75, by Legal Division...On 6-27-75 [the day of Coll's press extravaganza], Patrick Shae, staff member
of the SSC, requested we hold in abeyance any action on the request in view of the Agents at Pine Ridge
Reservation, South Dakota."
148. Kelley opted to offer his disclosure that virtually all the information heretofore provided by
the Bureau on the subject of the agents' deaths was "inaccurate" during a press conference conducted
at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles on July 1,1975. He was in LA to attend the funerals of Williams
and Coler, both of whom were buried there, and could thus rest assured that the implications of his
"corrections" would be appropriately lost amidst a wave of national sympathy for the two men's
families. It is noteworthy that Kelley took care that Richard G. Held was on hand during the press
conference to back him up. For further information, see Bates, Tom, "The Government's Secret War on
the Indian," Oregon Times February-March 1976.
149.Zigrossi, who had been well down in the ranks of Bureau hopefuls prior to accompanying Held
to Pine Ridge, was amply rewarded for the nature of his services in directly supervising what the FBI
did on the reservation in 1975 and '76. By 1979, he had been promoted to serve as SAC, San Diego, cutting
nearly a decade off the time normally required for even the most promising agent to assume so exalted
a position. For further information, see Johansen, Bruce, "The Reservation Offensive," The Nation,
February 25, 1978.
150.See Worster, Terry, "FBI combing Pine Ridge," Rapid City Journal, June 28, 1975.
151.See Muldrow, op. cit., for official confirmation of equipment and tactics. Author Churchill also
witnessed portions of what is described, first-hand.
152.The air assault on Selo Black Crow's property was led by SA David Price. The agents possessed
no warrant and didn't so much attempt to search Black Crow's home and outbuildings "for fugitives"
allegedly sought in the RESMURS investigation, as destroy the structures while he and his wife were
held at gunpoint. Black Crow appears to have earned Price's personal animus a few months earlier when
he refused to talk with the agent, or allow Price on his land without a proper warrant (see "Wanblee man
charges FBI with searching without a warrant," Rapid City Journal, July 5, 1975). Price was also involved
in the 100 agent assault on Crow Dog's Paradise — supposedly provoked by reports of two teenagers
having had a fist fight there — during which the Brele spiritual leader was deliberately humiliated by
being separated from the male captives and forced to squat naked among a throng of women and
children who were also being detained. Crow Dog's life was also apparently threatened by an agent —
allegedly J. Gary Adams —during the ensuing transport of the arrestee to Pierre, South Dakota (see Crow
Dog's interview in Ritz, op. cit.).
153.On the death of James Brings Yellow, see Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 211.
154.The petition was initially reported in the New York Times, June 30,1975. Also see "Injunction
to be filed for FBI removal," Rapid City Journal, July 9, 1975. Concerning the tribal council endorsement,
see "Lakota council approves resolution asking FBI removal," Rapid City Journal, July 14, 1975.
155.Letter from Arthur J. Flemming, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to U.S. Attorney
Edward S. Levi dated July 22,1975.
156.The first such grand jury was convened on July 14,1975. Held had been able to rely upon the
services of AUSA Bill Clayton — who had earlier assisted the Bureau by ordering the nocturnal removal
of Pedro Bissonette's body from the Pine Ridge morgue — in facilitating jury formation. Seeking the jury
had been one of Held's first acts upon arriving in South Dakota (see Kroese, Ron, 'Material witnesses
to testify on killings," Rapid City Journal, July 2,1975). A second jury was impaneled in late August, and
ultimately — in November — returned the RESMURS four indictments requested by the FBI.
157.A "hard case" was Joanna LeDeaux, a WKLDOC legal assistant who refused to testify. U.S.
District Judge Andrew Bogue, who informed her that the "keys to your cell are in your mouth," sent her
to the federal women's facility at San Pedro, California for eight months as a result. Pregnant at the time
of her incarceration, she was forced to deliver her baby behind bars. A "weak link" was Angie Long
Visitor, a young (and apolitical) Oglala mother of three, whose main offense seems to have been that she
was married to one of the Jumping Bull sons, and lived in the compound on the family property. All
evidence indicates that she, her husband, and their children ran for safety — away from the firefight — the
moment the shooting started on June 26, 1975. They were hardly in a position to witness much of
anything. Long Visitor did testify and appears to have told prosecutors what little she knew. She did not,
however, tell them what the FBI wanted to hear. Hence, she was jailed for three months for "withholding
information." Upon release, she was immediately served with another five subpoenas, and the
performance was repeated. The tactic, pursued by both Norman Zigrossi and Bill Clayton, seems to have
been to cause such pain for both the mother and her children that some other member of the Jumping
Bull clan might offer more substantial testimony in exchange for her freedom. Ultimately, the bewil-
dered young woman was forced to take the stand against Leonard Peltier during his 1977 Fargo trial,
where she could ultimately offer no testimony useful to the prosecution. Instead, she spent most of her
time weeping uncontrollably. Thus shattered, she was finally released after nearly two years of
unrelenting federal pressure. See, among other items, "Affidavit for Detention of Angie Long Visitor as
a Material Witness in the Matter of United States v. Leonard Peltier, CR-75-5106-1 (signed by ASAC, Rapid
City, Norman Zigrossi and submitted by AUSA William Clayton to U.S. District Judge Andrew Bogue
on January 17, 1977), and "Motion to Review Conditions of Release and Petition for Extraordinary
Remedies in the Matter of Angie Long Visitor, Material Witness," (No. 77-1080, submitted to the United
States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals by Quick, Tilsen and Quick, Attorneys for the Plaintiff, January
27, 1977).
158. A review of the entire 12,000 pages of RESMURS investigative documents released under
provision of the FOIA to Peltier defense attorney Bruce Filison in 1981 reveals that although given agents
developed what they felt to be the beginnings of strong cases against several area residents, these were
consistently abandoned — under SAC Held's handling — in favor of "developing" the suspects for
deployment in court against the Northwest AIM leadership. On balance, it is abundantly clear from the
record that Held and his immediate assistants had a predetermined outcome in mind, and shaped the
RESMURS effort accordingly.
159.Eagle was wanted with regard to the May 17,1975 assault on an Oglala named James Catches
at the point he turned himself in. He was immediately charged with theft in the "Cowboy Boot Caper"
— other, more serious, charges supposedly levied against him in this matter having by this point
mysteriously evaporated— and held on $25,000 bond. On July 28, he was charged with murdering
Williams and Coler, ostensibly on the basis of a jailhouse "confession" he made to an FBI informant
named Gregory Dewey Clifford, which just happened to dovetail perfectly with a later discarded
Bureau contention that a .45 caliber Thompson submachinegun had been used by Northwest AIM
during the firelight. His bail was immediately raised to $250,000. On October 12, he was convicted of
the assault upon Catches and sentenced to six years the was paroled in mid-1977). As has been noted,
he was acquitted in the cowboy boot matter. The RESMURS charges were simply dropped for reasons
which will be discussed below.
160. According to Butler, he was taken from Crow Dog's to the federal building in Pierre, South
Dakota, where he was interrogated for six solid hours by SAs Olen Victor Harvey and Charles Kempf.
The agents offered him money and a "new identity" if he would turn on the other members of his group.
The alternative, they explained, was that the accused would be murdered by the FBI if he didn't spend
the rest of his life in prison. One agent, thought to have been Harvey, promised to "personally blow
[Butler's] fucking head off" (see Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 233). Butler ultimately served a two-year prison
term for having been a "felon in possession of a weapon" at the time of his apprehension at Crow Dog's.
161.Robideau was heading a group composed of Kamook Banks (aka Darlene Nichols, an Oglala),
her baby, and her sister, Bernardine Nichols, Keith DeMaris, and Jean Bordeaux (all Oglalas), as well
as Mike Anderson and Norman Charles (both Navajo) which was attempting to evade the FBI net on
Pine Ridge and Rosebud. Near Wichita, on the Kansas Turnpike, a defective muffler set their 1964
Mercury station wagon ablaze, ultimately detonating a store of ammunition they were carrying in the
back. Robideau, who had crawled beneath the car to attempt to extinguish the blaze, was partially
blinded by the explosion, a matter which led to the group's immediate capture. Nichols and Bordeaux
were not charged, essentially on the basis that they were "uninvolved minors." Anderson was charged,
but not prosecuted, for reasons which have never been explained. Norman Charles, Keith DeMaris and
Kamook Banks were all convicted of weapons violations and received probation. On the same charges,
Robideau was convicted and sentenced to ten years in Leavenworth, allegedly due to his having had
prior felony convictions as a youth (Bob Robideau, various interviews with the authors).
162.The FBI contended that Peltier had traveled to Oregon in a motor home belonging to Marlon
Brando, the actor, and driven by Dennis Banks, by then a fugitive from a July 26, 1975 conviction
stemming from his participation in the 1973 Custer County Courthouse confrontation. Banks had gone
underground rather than submit to the custody of South Dakota Attorney General William Janklow,
who had campaigned with a promise to "put the AIM leadership either in jail or under it," and who had
publicly stated that "the way to deal with AIM leaders is with a bullet between the eyes." On the night
of February 14,1976, Oregon state troopers —acting on a tip provided by the Portland FBI office —stopped
the motor home and a lead car near the small town of Ontario, along the Oregon-Idaho border. They took
into custody Kenny Loudhawk and Russ Redner, AIM security members who had been in the lead car.
From the motor home, they arrested Kamook Banks and Anna Mae Aquash. According to the police,
who produced no evidence to substantiate their story other than Banks' thumbprint from a pickle jar
inside the motor home, Peltier and Dennis Banks escaped across an open field, firing as they went. Also
according to police — although no evidence of this was ever produced either — a quantity of dynamite
was found in the motor home. Redner and Loudhawk were promptly charged with carrying concealed
weapons — Buck knives, common in most rural areas — and held on $50,000 bond apiece. Kamook Banks,
eight months pregnant, was held on $100,000 bond until authorities could revoke her probation on the
earlier Kansas conviction (see note 198, above); she was eventually released when it was established that
the government was engaging in vindictive prosecution against her, but not before her baby—christened
"Iron Door Woman" in acknowledgement of her surroundings — was born. Anna Mae Aquash was
whisked back to South Dakota, where she was shortly murdered (see below) by the FBI. Dennis Banks
turned up in San Francisco, where he was successfully able to petition — on the basis of Janklow's death
threats — California Governor Jerry Brown not to honor South Dakota's attempts to extradite him (this
situation continued until Brown left office, at which time Banks successfully relocated to the tiny
Onandaga Reservation in upstate New York, placing himself under protection of the traditional chiefs;
he finally negotiated a deal with South Dakota in 1984 which allowed him to serve fourteen months in
prison under a guarantee of physical safety and finally retire the Custer matter). Meanwhile, charges
stemming from the motor home incident were dropped against Peltier. U.S. District Judge Frank Belloni,
citing a complete lack of evidence, also dismissed all charges in the matter against the Bankses,
Loudhawk and Redner on May 12,1976. However, AUSA Sidney Lezak appealed Belloni's decision and
was able to get charges reinstated against the four in March 1980. The case came before U.S. District
Judge James Redden in May 1983, and was again dismissed, this time on the sixth amendment grounds
that the defendants had been denied the due process of a speedy trial. AUSA Charles Turner, who had
replaced Lezak, again appealed, and was turned down by the Ninth Circuit Court in mid-1984. Turner
then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and was rewarded, on January 21, 1986, with an opinion
declaring that since the defendants had bothered to enter a defense, they had thereby waived their sixth
amendment rights. Under this strange interpretation of the constitution, the case was ordered back to
trial in 1988, making it the longest-running criminal action in U.S. history. It was finally "resolved" by
an offer extended by prosecutor Turner that if Banks would enter a guilty plea on reduced charges, he
would be given probation and all charges would be dropped against his wife, Redner and Loudhawk.
Having long since retired from political activism, the former AIM leader opted to cut his losses and
accept the deal. For further information, see Churchill, Ward, "Due Process Be Damned: The Case of the
Portland Four," Zeta, January 1988. Also see Johansen, Bruce, "Peltier and the Posse," The Nation,
October 1, 1977.
163.According to the reports of Sergeant Mitchell and Corporal Parlane, submitted on February
7, 1976, they were sent to Smallbors camp on the basis of an "informant's tip" provided to Canadian
authorities by "US. police officials" (the FBI). Parlance notes that at the time Peltier was arrested, he was
in possession of two loaded revolvers, an M-1 rifle and a .30-30 caliber carbine, but offered no resistance.
With Peltier at the time were Ronald Blackman (aka: Ron Janvier), a Mitis AIM member from Canada,
and Frank Black Horse. Black Horse was supposedly a prime suspect in the RESMURS investigation at
the time, and was also arrested. Unlike Peltier, however, U.S. authorities made no subsequent effort to
extradite Black Horse, who remained in Canada and has subsequently dropped from sight.
164. Richard G. Held was 71 at the time of his retirement in 1980. Hence, he had reached
"mandatory" retirement age by 1976, the time of his promotion to associate director. The entire period
of his stint as second in command of the Bureau was spent on a special "waiver" status similar to that
held earlier by J. Edgar Hoover himself. During 1985 and '86, he refused repeated attempts by author
Churchill to interview him either by phone or at his suburban Chicago residence.
165.Bureau personnel held several press conferences — at which it was announced, among other
things, that federal snipers would be posted on the courthouse roof throughout the trial, as a "security
measure" — and private meetings with local law enforcement personnel in Cedar Rapids during May
1976 to stress such points. This was reinforced, on May 11, by the U.S. Attorney's Office sending
marshals to visit with every employee in the federal building to prep them on what actions to take in
the event of a "terrorist incident." On May 24, ASAC Norman Zigrossi tipped Pennington County
Sheriff Mel Larson, in Rapid City, that AIM had a "huge arms cache" in a vacant lot in that city, which
was intended for "use in the near future." Accordingly, Larson undertook a spectacular "emergency
excavation" of the lot, attempting to thwart "AIM terrorism" in the full glare of national publicity. The
fact that Sheriff Larson recovered only three spent shotgun shells for his efforts was largely outweighed
in the media by the sensational nature of why his men were digging in the first place.
166. In the Butler-Robideau trial transcript (Appendix A, p. 3), Kelley responded to Kunstler's
question of whether the Bureau had "one shred of evidence" to back up the accusations of AIM terrorism
it was spreading, Kelley replied, I know of none. I cannot tell you." Under oath, the director also stated
that, despite the teletypes and AIM's then-current listing in the FBI's Domestic Terrorist Digest, "It is my
very definite knowledge that the American Indian Movement is a movement which has fine goals, has
many fine people, and has as its general consideration of what needs to be done, something that is
worthwhile; and it is not tabbed by us as an un-American, subversive, or other wise objectionable organi-
zation." Meanwhile, in Rapid City, Sheriff Mel Larson — apparently not chagrined over the fiasco of his
search for an "AIM arms cache" (see note 202, above) — issued a widely publicized announcement,
openly based on the FBI's teletypes, that he was canceling all leaves for his men and placing law
enforcement in Pennington County on "full alert and mobilization" in anticipation of an outbreak of
AIM terrorism in western South Dakota over the 4th of July holiday. The whole absurd scenario was thus
kept before the public until the virtual moment of the Cedar Rapids verdict. South Dakota Senator James
Abourezk, whose son Charlie had been named as a Dog Soldier participant for no apparent reason other
than FBI retaliation for the senator's outspoken criticism of the Bureau's operations in his state, went on
record describing the matter as a "smear campaign" which "smacks of a total setup that these
unfounded, unverified reports are given such widespread distribution" (quoted in Matthiessen, op. cit.,
pp. 288-9).
167.The attempted jailbreak charges stemmed from an April 19, 1976 incident at the Pennington
County Jail in Rapid City, where Bob Robideau and Dino Butler were being held pending their
RESMURS trial, when Sheriff Mel Larson "invited" SAs J. Gary Adams, William Wood, Dean Hughes,
Fred Coward and David Price to participate in a search of the facility. Supposedly, they found a set of
hacksaw blades in one of the two cells, housing sixteen men, which were examined. Although the blades,
assuming their existence and that they were not planted, could have belonged to any of the prisoners,
Robideau was immediately tabbed as the "owner." Shortly, agents Coward and Hughes advanced the
charge that Robideau and Butler had conspired with two other AIM members being held in the jail,
Kenny Kane and Alonzo Bush (both Oglalas), to break out, and contended that WKLDOC attorney
Bruce Ellison had been the party who smuggled the blades in. Substantiation of these charges seems to
have rested entirely upon the willingness of another prisoner, Marvin Bragg (aka: Ricky Lee Waters),
a black man accused of ten brutal rapes of elderly women, to testify. Coward and Hughes appear to have
offered Bragg assistance in beating the approximate eighty year sentence he was facing in exchange for
his aid in this matter. Although much was made of the escape conspiracy claim during the Cedar Rapids
trial, all charges against Butler and Robideau in this regard were dropped almost as soon as they were
acquitted in the RESMURS case. As Robideau sums it up, "The whole thing was just a ploy to sway the
jury against us at Cedar Rapids." As concerns Ellison, it turned out he had been meeting in St. Louis,
Missouri, with U.S. Attorney Evan Hultman at the very moment his alleged offense occurred in Rapid
City, a matter known to the FBI.
168.James Harper was at the time being held in jail at Cedar Rapids on a fugitive warrant from
Texas and awaiting the outcome on extradition hearings concerning a desire by the State of Wisconsin
to prosecute him for theft by fraud. Under cnoss-examination by defense attorney Kunstler, he readily
admitted that he was used to "lying to law enforcement officials," and had lied "numerous times in [his]
life" to get what he wanted. In this case, he appears to have wanted protection from prosecution in Texas
and Wisconsin, a matter evidenced by the fact that he entered a suit against the U.S. Attorney's Office
for breach of contract when he was later extradited despite the lies he'd extended under oath against
Butler and Robideau. See Anonymous, "Who Are the Real Terrorists?" Akwesasne Notes, Late Fa111976.
169.Any comparison of the testimony entered by Adams and several other agents against Butler
and Robideau in Cedar Rapids with the testimony they entered concerning the same events against
Leonard Peltier at Fargo raises the dear probability of perjury on their part in one or the other trial, or
possibly in both. It was undoubtedly for this reason that Peltier trial judge Paul Benson ruled from the
outset — in a very illuminating interpretation of the rules of evidence, not to mention conceptions of
justice — that defense attorneys would not be allowed to use transcripts of the Cedar Rapids testimony
to impeach testimony entered by the agents against Peltier.
170.Among these witnesses was sixteen-year-old Wish Draper, who had been "strapped to a chair"
in the police station at Window Rock, Arizona (on the Navajo Reservation) while being "interrogated"
by SAs Charles Stapleton and James Doyle. Unsurprisingly, he then agreed to "cooperate," albeit he
admitted under oath that his testimony consisted of lies and that prosecutors had told him precisely
what "facts" he was to recount (Peltier Trial Transcript, pp. 1087-98). Then there was seventeen-year-
old Norman Brown, who, during an interrogation conducted by SAs J. Gary Adams and Olen Victor
Harvey on September 22, 1975, was told that unless he "cooperated," he would "never see [his] family
again" and would "never walk the earth again." On the stand, Brown admitted that he had become "ex-
ceptionally frightened" by these death threats, and agreed to allow the FBI and prosecutors to script his
testimony (Peltier Trial Transcript, pp. 4799-4804, 4842-3). Another such witness was fifteen-year-old
Mike Anderson, who was arrested along with Bob Robideau after their car exploded on the Kansas
Turnpike on September I 0, 1975. That night, Anderson was "interrogated" in his cell by SAs Adams and
Harvey, who offered both the carrot of assistance with pending criminal charges and the stick of
"beating the living shit out of" him to obtain "cooperation." A second interview, conducted by agents
Adams and Doyle on the Navajo Reservation on February 1,1977, gained the desired result (Peltier Trial
Transcript, pp. 840-42). Anderson, however, attempted to go on the stand in Peltier's behalf near the end
of the Fargo trial, and — perhaps as a consequence — was killed in a mysterious automobile accident on
the Navajo Reservation in 1979 (see Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 439).
171.Most of Church's examples were drawn from the record of COINTELPRO-BPP. The senator
made it dear that the Bureau deliberately released false information in order not only to discredit
targeted individuals and organizations, but also to see violence perpetrated against them in many
instances. There is some indication in the record that Church considered what had been done to AIM
to amount to a de facto COINTELPRO, regardless of what the FBI chose to call such things by 1976. For
further information, see Churchill, Ward, and Jim Vander Wall, "The FBI Takes AIM: The FBI's Secret
War Against the American Indian Movement," The Other Side, Vol. 23, No. 5, June 1987.
172.Muldrow testified that, "A great deal of tension and fear exist on the Reservation. Residents
feel that life is cheap, that no one really cares about what happens to them...Acts of violence...are
commonplace. Numerous complaints were lodged in my office about FBI activities" (quoted in
Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 318).
173.To his great credit, McManus read the jury the full text of the law governing self-defense as
part of his instruction before sending them into deliberations. As jury foreman Robert Bolin put it after
the trial, "The jury agreed with the defense contention that an atmosphere of fear and violence exists on
the reservation, and that the defendants arguably could have been acting in self-defense. While it was
shown that the defendants were firing guns in the direction of the agents, it was held that this was not
excessive in the heat of passion." Bolin also made it clear that the jury would have reached the same
conclusion had it been shown — which it was not— that Robideau and Butler had actually fired the rounds
which killed Williams and Coler. Finally, the jury foreman noted that, in certain segments of the
prosecution case, the jury "didn't believe a word" uttered by the government's witnesses. (quoted in
thid.)
174.In 1982, Peltier's attorneys, arguing that this series of secret meetings constituted collaboration
between the judge, prosecution and FBI, moved that Benson recuse himself from further involvement
in the case. Benson refused, countering that — despite a total absence of evidence of AIM terrorism, in
court or elsewhere — the meetings had been necessitated by the "likelihood" that Peltier's supporters
would violently disrupt the trial and possibly attempt to free the defendant. No answer was provided
as to why, if this was really the basis of the meetings, defense counsel — whom, one must assume, would
have a bona fide concern with any real threat of terrorist acts in the courtroom — were deliberately
excluded. See "Motion to Vacate Judgement and for a New Trial in the Matter of the United States v.
Leonard Peltier, C77-303," U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota, April 20, 1982; Benson's
response, conveyed earlier by memorandum, is summarized in United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, United States v. Leonard Peltier, 731 F. 2d 550, 555 (8th Cir. 1984).
175. As WKLDOC attorney Karen Northcott later summarized the matter: "Defense evidence
which had convinced the jury of the innocence of Butler and Robideaux [sic] was ruled inadmissible at
Peltier's trial. He was not allowed to present a case of self-defense." See Northcott's pamphlet, The FBI
in Indian Communities, American Friends Service Committee, Minneapolis, 1979.
176.Motel receipts and other items show that Price and Wood held Poor Bear in motel rooms from
early February through the night of February 23, 1976. On February 24, they appear to have turned her
over to SA Edward Skelly, who then continued to hold her in a motel room in Belle Fourche, South
Dakota. See Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 454.
177.The first two affidavits were signed on February 19 and 23, respectively. The third affidavit,
which was utilized in obtaining Peltier's extradition, was signed on March 23, 1976.
178.Martin Montileaux was fatally wounded in the restroom of the Longhorn Bar — located in the
hamlet of Scenic, South Dakota, just north of the Pine Ridge boundary — on the night of March 1, 1976.
Pennington County sheriff's deputies shortly arrested Marshall and Ruggell Means, who'd been in the
bar earlier in the evening on charges they'd participated in the shooting. Prior to his death from
complications resulting from his wounds on March 15, Montileaux repeatedly and emphatically denied
that either Montileaux or Means had been among his assailants. State Attorney General William Janklow
nonetheless opted to charge both men with murder. Marshall was convicted on April 6,1976, largely on
the basis of the "first-hand" testimony of Myrtle Poor Bear, who had been provided as a surprise witness
by agents Price and Wood. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Means, in a separate trial in which
Poor Bear did not appear, was acquitted on June 17, 1976. Marshall maintained his innocence, and
became one of the three U.S. prisoners for whom Amnesty International demanded retrial on the basis
of FBI counterintelligence activities directed against them (the other two were Geronimo Pratt and
Leonard Peltier; see Proposal for a commission of inquiry into the effect of domestic intelligence activities on
criminal trials in the United States of America, op. cit.). There was, of course, no official response to the
Amnesty International position. In 1984, with all due process remedies foreclosed, Marshall accepted
a deal with Janklow — by now governor of South Dakota, and eyeing a seat in the U.S. senate, but
suffering certain national image problems as a result of his threats against Dennis Banks and other anti-
AIM conduct — to get out of prison. The quid pro quo appears to have been that Marshall would "admit"
having shot Montileaux, thus finally validating one of the governor's anti-AIM assertions, and Janklow
would engineer an immediate parole. Marshall was correspondingly released from the South Dakota
State Prison at Sioux Falls on December 20, 1984. In August of 1989, he was returned to Sioux Falls to
resume his life sentence as a result of alleged drug transactions on the Pine Ridge Reservation. William
Janklow, meanwhile, lost in his bid to become a senator and is finally out of public office.
179. Peltier defense attorneys used the Poor Bear affidavits to take up the matter of extradition
treaty fraud (under the Extradition Act, R.S.0 1970, Chap. E-21) in the Canadian courts, beginning in
late 1977. Presented with the evidence, Canadian Minister of External Affairs Allen MacEachen called
for an "urgent investigation" of FBI and Justice Department behavior in the matter. Upon review in 1978,
Canadian Supreme Court Justice R.P. Anderson concluded that, "It seems clear that the conduct of the
U.S. government involved misconduct from inception." Canadian Justice W.A. Schultz, whose name
had been brought up as having possibly cooperated with U.S. authorities despite knowledge of the
nature of the Poor Bear material, sued and won a retraction, on the basis of having been unaware of "any
such fraud." By 1986, Canadian Member of Parliament Jim Fulton had formally stated on the floor of the
House of Commons that, "(The nature of Peltier's extradition] constitutes treaty fraud between our
nations." He and more thansixty other Canadian MPs have consequently demanded Peltier's return to
Canada, and have explored the possibility of abrogating the Canada-U.S. extradition treaty unless the
federal government complies. See "External Affairs: Canada-US. Extradition Treaty — Case of Leonard
Peltier, Statement of Mr. James Fulton," in House of Commons Debate, Canada, Vol. 128, No. 129, 1st
Session, 33rd Parliament, Official Report, Thursday, April 17, 1986.
180. Poor Bear's recantation regarding her Peltier "evidence" occurred on the stand during his
Fargo trial, is contained in the trial transcript, and is a matter of appeal record. She also recanted, and
was corroborated by her father in doing so, during Marshall's appeals process (quoted in Win Magazine,
December 1,1980). In 1977, she was called as a witness by the Minnesota Citizens Commission to Review
the FBI (a federally-sponsored entity, convened in the same fashion as that charged with examining
official conduct in Chicago in the wake of the 1969 Hampton-Clark assassinations); a videotape of this
testimony was made by WKLDOC attorney Karen Northcott and is filed at the law offices of Kenneth
Tilsen in Minneapolis. Poor Bear also told her story in a popular forum through People Magazine, April
20, 1981.
181. Poor Bear has repeatedly testified and otherwise asserted that this occurred. When queried
under oath by the Minnesota Citizens Review Commission as to whether he'd used such photos to
intimidate his captive, SA Price responded, "I don't recall" (transcript quoted in Matthiessen, op. cit., p.
455).0n Aquash's assertions that her life had been threatened by the FBI, and SA Price in particular, see
McKiernan, Kevin, "Indian woman's death raises many troubling questions," Minneapolis Tribune, May
30,1976. Also see Oppenheimer, Jerry/Ile Strange Killing of a Wounded Knee Indian," (The Washing-
ton Star, May 24,1976), and "Questions raised about FBI's handing of Aquash Case," (Rapid City Journal,
May 25, 1976). Former WKLDOC researcher Candy Hamilton and AIM member Nilak Butler, both of
whom were personal friends of Aquash, each recount having been told by the victim that SA Price had
threatened her life unless she "cooperated."
182.The matter is well covered in First Session on FBI Authorization, (1981), op. cit., esp. pp. 267-76.
Aquash's body, although somewhat decomposed, was quite recognizable; author Churchill, without
having been informed as to the identity of the body at Issue, and having never been personally
acquainted with the victim, was able to identify Aquash from morgue photos shown him years later.
183. In the film Annie Mae: A Brave Hearted Woman, (op. cit.) AIM leader John Trudell points out
(correctly) that in order for the FBI to have made a fingerprint identification of Aquash from the severed
hands, someone with the Bureau's Rapid City office had to have sent along the suggestion that the hands
were probably hers; the role of the crime lab in such cases being merely to confirm or disprove such
speculations from the field Trudell also points out that the usual manner in which such confirmations
of identification are performed is through dental x-rays, but that coroner Brown failed to perform any
x-rays of the body's skull. Trudell therefore condudes that the severing of Aquash's hands was an
unnecessary mutilation of "enemy dead" by the FBI, and a by-product of Brown's attempted cover up
of the real cause of death. The mutilation scenario is strongly reinforced in Trudell's recounting of how,
when Aquash's hands were finally returned to be buried with the rest of her remains, SA William Wood
smilingly "pitched the box" containing the body parts to WKLDOC attorney Bruce Ellison. For further
information, see Brant, op. cit.
184. Ellison attempted to file his motion for exhumation with U.S. District Judge Andrew Bogue
in Rapid City on March 8,1976. Apparently having gotten wind of WKLDOC's intentions, and realizing
that Bogue would have little option but to approve such a motion entered in behalf of the victim's family,
SA William Wood appeared a short while before Ellison asking for exhumation on behalf of the Bureau.
Bogue granted Wood's request.
185. According to Shirley Hill Witt, director of the Rocky Mountain Regional Office of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, and her assistant, William Muldrow, " On March 11 [1976) the body was
exhumed in the presence of FBI agents and Dr. Garry Peterson, a pathologist from Minneapolis,
Minnesota, who had been brought in by Aquash's family to examine the body. X-rays revealed a bullet
of approximately .32 caliber in her head. Peterson's examination revealed a bullet wound in the back of
the head surrounded by a 5x5 an. area of subgaleal reddish discoloration" (see Events Surrounding
Recent Murders on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, op. cit., p. 3). In his own account, even before the x-
rays, Peterson "noticed a bulge in the dead woman's left temple and dry blood in her hair" and that "the
back of the head had been washed and powdered...a .32 caliber bullet accounting for the bulge in the
temple. There were powder burns around the wound in the neck" (see Brand, op. cit., p.131). As Hill Witt
and Muldrow further point out on p. 3, hospital personnel who had attended the initial autopsy
professed not to be surprised by Peterson's findings insofar as they had observed blood leaking from
the corpse's head during Brown's examination and had therefore all along doubted the finding that
death had been caused by exposure.
186.The FBI, apparently proceeding on the belief that the bad-jacketing efforts undertaken against
Aquash by certain of the Bureau's provocateurs (notably Douglass Durham and Darryl "Blue Legs"
Stewart) may have caused her death, has consistently — and without success — attempted to build a case
that AIM members executed her as a "suspected informer." As late as the summer of 1987, agents were
interviewing former AIM members on Pine Ridge and in the Denver area in this vein. Meanwhile, there
is no indication that the FBI has so much as deposed either Price or Wood — whose bizarre behavior in
connection with the victim is very much on record — during this lengthy "homicide investigation." See
Churchill, Ward, "Who Killed Anna Mae?" Zeta, December 1988, pp. 96.8.
187. Peltier trial transcript, quoted in Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 350.
188.There was no primary evidence in the RESMURS case. No slugs were recovered from either
Williams' or Coler's bodies, and only fragments of .22 caliber series projectiles — which could have been
fired from any of a number of different types of small bore weapon — were recovered from the ground
beneath the two agents. The Bureau crime lab could not even determine whether these fragments were
from slugs fired on the day of the firelight. The FBI retained two different coroners— Robert Bloemendaal
and Thomas Noguchi — in an attempt to corroborate its theories. Bloemendaal ascertained that Coler's
first wound (rather than only the last, as the prosecution maintained at trial) had been mortal, and that
it was caused by a very large bore .44 magnum slug, fired at long rather than short range, which had
passed through the door of his car, splaying, before strikinghis left arm and nearly severing it (see Peltier
trial transcript at 591-3, 626, and 633-5). Bloemendaal also found that Williams had received a
"potentially fatal" wound by a round — also .44 caliber and fired from some distance — which passed
through his left arm and entered his body at the belt line (see a heavily deleted teletype from Zigrossi
to Kelley, dated February 12,1976, and captioned RESMURS INVESTIGATION; also see Peltier trial
transcript at 587-8, 623-4, 589 and 593). Bloemendaal also found that both agents had been struck by
different calibers of slugs, fired at various ranges. Such conclusions had been sufficient for the "group
murder" case presented at Cedar Rapids, but contradicted the lone gunman" case the prosecution
intended to present against Peltier. Hence, Noguchi was retained to try again. He proceeded to engage
in a rather interesting fishing expedition, firing assorted weapons (spanning the range from .22 to .45
caliber) at various ranges into "animal parts," then attempting to match the results to the wounds
suffered by the dead agents. He obtained inconclusive results at best, finding that each man had been
struck at least once by "a small, high-powered rifle fired at close range" (Peltier trial transcript at 589 and
593). Like the projectile fragments, this description could be applied to any of a number of weapons,
including those of 22 magnum, 222 caliber, 223 caliber and possibly 30 caliber series. Certainly, the
coroners found nothing demonstrating the "murder weapon" had been an AR-15. In the end, the most
useful material for prosecutors accruing from the evidence provided by pathologists was not the result
of autopsies, etc., but an array of gory color photos of Williams and Coler shortly after their deaths. While
Judge McManus had restricted prosecutorial use of such emotional but largely irrelevant material at
Cedar Rapids, so as not to unnecessarily taint the jury's view of the defendants, Judge Benson allowed
dozens of the pictures to be introduced against Peltier (Peltier trial transcript at 544-6).
189.Coler's car had been gone over with a fine tooth comb by investigators working on site in the
immediate aftermath of the firefight. No AR-15 "ammunition component" was found in Coler's open
trunk. To the contrary, the Bureau's operant theory for more than a month after RESMURS began — an
idea agents attempted to "confirm" when contriving Jimmy Eagle's supposed jailhouse confession, and
in the initial statements prepared for Norman Brown, Wish Draper and Mike Anderson — was that the
agents had been killed with a .45 caliber Thompson submachinegun. Concerning the AR-15 cartridge
casing itself — described by the prosecution as "the most important piece of evidence" in the Peltier case
— the Bureau could never quite seem to determine who found it, when, or what happened to it after it
was found. The discovery was originally attributed to the chief of the FBI's Firearms and Toohnarks
Division, Courtland Cunningham. At least that's what is maintained in a July 1,1976 affidavit prepared
at FBI headquarters and sent to Rapid City for Cunningham's signature (see Peltier trial transcript at
2113-4). On the stand during Peltier's trial, however, Cunningham denied having found the cartridge
casing, and stipulated the affidavit he'd signed was "incorrect" (Peltier trial transcript at 2114-26).
Instead, Cunningham contended that the casing had been found by a fingerprint specialist named
Winthrop Lodge. Lodge then testified that he had discovered the item during an examination of Coler's
car on June 29, 1975, and had then turned it over to Cunningham (Peltier trial transcript at 3012-3, and
3079-80). On cross examination, Lodge began to contradict himself, first claiming that he had not
removed evidentiary material from Coler's car, then stating that "some" material had been removed,
and then asserting that "all evidence had been inventoried and removed from the vehicle" (Peltier trial
transcript at 3112-20). When pressed on what had happened to this material, including the cartridge
casing he'd allegedly found, Lodge first insisted that he'd turned it all over to Cunningham, but had
unaccountably failed to get the receipt required by Bureau evidentiary procedures designed to prevent
false evidence from being gratuitously introduced somewhere along the line. He then switched stories,
stating that "not all the evidence" gathered from Coler's car had been turned over to Cunningham.
Some, he contended, "were carried back to Pine Ridge and turned over to the agent personally in charge
of the evidence." Lodge couldn't say who this agent was, exactly what had been "carried back" to him,
or why the unorthodox decision had been taken to turn certain unreceipted evidentiary items over to
Cunningham and some to another agent (Peltier trial transcript at 3137-8 and 3162-3). In other words,
there was never anything resembling a dear record of where the FBI's "most important piece of
evidence" came from, when it was "found," where it was found, by whom it was found, or what
happened to it between the time it was allegedly found and the time it was catalogued at the FBI crime
lab in Washington, D.C. Such "contamination" of the evidentiary chain — allowing as it does for the
introduction of false evidence — is typically sufficient to cause the material to be disallowed from
introduction into any trial, never mind a capital case such as RESMURS.
190.On September 11,1986, a three judge panel of the Eighth Circuit Court found, upon review of
documents released and hearings held subsequent to Peltier's conviction, that the "one AR-15" theory
advanced by the prosecution in Fargo had been false, and that the FBI had known it was false. Indeed,
the evidence indicated "several" AR-15s had been used by Indians during the Oglala firefight. See U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, "Appeal from the United States District Court for the District
of North Dakota, United States v. Leonard Peltier," No. 95-5193, St. Louis, Missouri, September 11,1986.
191. At trial, Hodge testified that a firing pin test conducted with the Wichita AR-15 for purposes
of making a comparison with the cartridge casing supposedly found in Coler's trunk was "inconclusive"
because of "a lack of marks on the bolt face in the condition I received" the rifle (Peltier trial transcript
at 3235 and 3247). Hodge's October 2,1975 teletype shows this to have been untrue; the test conclusively
proved the cartridge casing had not been fired through the AR-15 in question. Hodge then performed
a much less (even by his own definition; see Peltier trial transcript at 3248) definitive extractor test and
used this to advance a "link" between the weapon and the cartridge casing (Peltier trial transcript at
3247). Hodge also claimed on the stand not to have examined the crucial casing until "December or
January" of 1975 or '76 (Peltier trial transcript at 3233-4 and 3388), a line of testimony designed to explain
the slow evolution of the Bureau's "evidence" against Peltier. In actuality, as a raft of documents
subsequently released under the FOIA reveal, the casing had been being "handled" in the lab since at
least as early as the first week of August 1975. Under the circumstances, a much more likely explanation
for the pace of the AR-15 investigation is that it simply did not fit in with the RESMURS script the Bureau
was trying to follow during the early days; only later, as the scenario developed, did it become
important. The evidence was then tailored accordingly.
192.Coward's testimony on this is to be found in the Peltier trial transcript at 1305. The defense then
requested that Judge Benson and/or the jury attempt to duplicate such an identification. Benson refused
either to do so himself, or to allow jury participation in such a "stunt" (Peltier trial transcript at 1797).
As an alternative, the defense retained James R. Hall, the owner of a local sporting goods store and an
individual well-versed in the use of rifle scopes, to conduct an appropriate test. Using a comparable 2x7
scope at the same distance Coward had specified, but under cool, dear atmospheric conditions (far
superior to those the agent would have necessarily encountered at Oglala on June 26, 1975, a hot day
following a heavy rain) Hall was consistently unable to identify a dose friend standing still and facing
the viewer. Benson allowed Hall a well respected man in Fargo — to testify on the results of his tests,
but only with the jury absent (see Peltier trial transcript at 3786-90). There is some indication that the FBI
performed its own tests, with equally poor results. In sum, the "eyewitness" sighting sworn to by SA
Coward was a virtual physical impossibility. Relatedly, BIA Police Officer /GOON Marvin Stoldt, who
was partnered with Coward on June 26, and who shared his rifle scope from the same range, "positively
identified" Jimmy Eagle as being among the Indians present on the Jumping Bull property. This is
reflected in Coward's 302 Report for June 26. The problem here was that Eagle, by the government's own
admission, had been nowhere near the firefight. Benson ruled that the 302 Report containing this
misidentification — which would surely have cast appropriate doubt upon Coward's own supposed
sighting of Peltier — would not be allowed as evidence (Peltier transcript at 1351).
193. Peltier trial transcript at 5011.
194, U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth District, "Motion to Vacate Judgement and for a New
Trial in the Matter of the United States a. Leonard Peltier, Criminal No. C77-3003," transcript at 7327-
28 (April 12, 1978).
195. U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth District, "Finding of the United States Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Matter of the United States v. Leonard Peltier, C77-3003, Motion to Vacate
Judgement and for a New Trial," St. Louis, Missouri, September 14,1978.
1%. It should be noted that Webster is known to hold strange views, not only on the nature of
justice, but on race and gender relations as well. For instance, he is was a member of a "social club" called
the 'Mysterious Order of the Veiled Prophets," explicitly barring membership to blacks or women,
during his tenure as an appeals court judge in St. Louis.
197.United States a. Peltier, 858 F.2d 314, 335 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979).
198.Peltier v. Department of Justice, CA. No. 79-2722 (D.D.C.).
199, See "Motion to Vacate Judgement and for a New Trial, Pettier a. United States, Crim. No. 077-
3003" (D.N.D. filed April 20, 1982) and "Motion for Disqualification of Hon. Paul Benson, Peltier v. United
States, Crim. No. C77-3003," (D.N.D. filed December 15, 1982).
200. United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, United States a. Leonard Peltier, 731
F.2d., 550, 555 (8th Cir. 1984). At p. 4, the judges noted: "The importance of [the ballistics evidence] to
the government's case against Peltier cannot be ignored. During the argument to the jury at the close of
the trial, counsel for the government stated/One shell casing is ejected into the trunk of the agent's car
which was open, one shell casing, perhaps the single most important piece of evidence in this case
[emphasis added]."
201.The October 2 teletype, Hodge asserted, referred to comparison of the AR-15 to other car-
tridges found at the scene of the firelight, not to the .223 cartridge from SA Colees trunk. When
questioned as to why he had not tested that cartridge against the Wichita AR-15 immediately, Hodge
claimed he was not aware of the urgent need to do so. This proved to be, as the Eighth Circuit Court was
later to put it, "inconsistent with...several teletypes from FBI officials, agents requesting [Hodge] to
compare submitted AR-15 rifle with .223 casing found at the scene, and [Hodge's] response to these
teletypes."
202.In trying to salvage something of the integrity of the Bureau's evidentiary chain regarding the
key cartridge casing, Hodge swore that he — and he alone — had handled the item once it arrived at the
ballistics lab. Kunstier then pointed out that a second person's handwriting appeared on the lab notes
pertaining to the casing. After a bit of perplexity, Hodge altered his testimony that both he and a lab
assistant named Joseph Twardowski had been involved with the item. Kunstler then queried Hodge
whether he was absolutely certain he and Twardowski were the only individuals with access to the
crucial evidence. Hodge replied emphatically in the affirmative. Kunstier then produced yet another lab
report on the matter, with still another person's handwriting on it, demanding that an independent
handwriting analyst be retained by the court "to determine the identity of the unknown party who is
at issue here." Court was then recessed for the day. An hour later, counsel were called back to court by
Judge Benson, who stated that "Mr. Hedge has something he wishes to say to you." Hodge then took
the stand and explained that he had "mis-spoken" when he insisted for the record that he, and then he
and Twardowski, had been the only individuals with access to the cartridge casing. When Kunstler
asked how many people might actually have had such access, Hodge replied, "I really can't say." In
other words, as Kunstier put it at a press conference shortly thereafter, "For all their pious assurances
to the contrary, made repeatedly and under oath, the FBI cannot really say for certain that this is the same
cartridge casing found in the trunk of agent Coler's car, if indeed any such casing was ever found. And
the fact of the matter is that to the extent that given FBI agents have been saying otherwise is the extent
to which they have been lying through their teeth."
203.Peltier v. United States, Transcript of Oral Arguments before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth District, October 14,1985, p.18. For further information, see Kunstler, William, "The Ordeal of
Leonard Peltier," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 24, Summer 1985.
204.Ibid., p. 19. Crooks' attempt to change the charge on which Peltier had been convicted from
murder to aiding and abetting murder provoked the following exchange with a bewildered Judge
Gerald Heaney: Heaney: Aiding and abetting Butler and Robideau [who had been acquitted]? Crooks:
Aiding and abetting whoever did the final shooting. Perhaps aiding and abetting himself. And
hopefully the jury would believe that in effect he did it all. But aiding and abetting, nevertheless."
205.United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth District, "Appeal from the United States
Court for the District of North Dakota in the Matter of United States v. Leonard Peltier, Crim. No. 85-5192,"
St. Louis, Missouri, October 11,1986, p. 16.
206.'Tetition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc for Appellant Leonard Peltier,
United Skate v. Leonard Peltier, Crim. No. C77-3003," United States Circuit Court of Appeal for the Eighth
District (1986).
207.See "Petition for Reconsideration of the Denial of the Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion
for Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Leonard Peltier," No. 85-5192, United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth District (1986).
208.The appeal to the Supreme Court was based in a need for the high court to clarify whether in
its decision in the case United States v. Bagley (US. 105 S. Ct. 3375 [1985]) it had meant the new evidence
must be sufficient to have "possibly" changed the outcome of original jury deliberations — or whether
it is required that new evidence would "probably" have resulted in this outcome — for a retrial to be
mandated. The Eighth Circuit opted for the latter interpretation in its Peltier decision, while the Ninth
Circuit had already utilized the more lenient standard in another case. In refusing to hear the Peltier
appeal, the Supreme Court chose to leave this important due process issue clouded; see "Court refuses
to hear Peltier appeal," Rapid City Journal, October 6,1987. Also see Churchill, Ward, "Leonard Peltier:
The Ordeal Continues," Zeta, March 1988.
209.Heaney, U.S. Circuit Judge Gerald, interview on the CBS television program West 57th Street,
aired on September 14, 1989.
210.Banks, Dennis, conversation with Ward Churchill, Boulder, CO, March 14,1987 (notes on file).
211.Means, Russell, conversation with Ward Churchill, Boulder, CO, September 12,1989 (notes on
file).
212.For analysis on this point, see Berman, Jerry J., "FBI Charter Legislation: The Case for
Prohibiting Domestic Intelligence Investigations," University of Detroit Journal of Urban Law, No. 55,1978,
pp. 1041-77. Also see Beichman, Arnold, "Can Counterintelligence Come in from the Cold?" Policy
Review, No. 15, Winter 1981, pp. 93-101. Of further interest, see Ungar, Sanford J., "An Agenda for
Rebuilding the FBI," Washington Post, August 21, 1977.
213. Cohen, Felix S., "The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53: A CasP Study in Bureaucracy," Yale
Law Journal, Vol. 62,1953, p. 390.
214. Kelley, FBI Director Clarence, statement at press conference, Los Angeles, CA, July 5, 1975
(notes on file).
Chapter 8: Conclusion
1. The data concerning COINTELPRO actions accrues from Hearings on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, op. cit., p. 601; that concerning taps, bugs and mail openings comes from Final Report of the
Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book III:
Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, op. cit., pp. 301, 632.
2. See Martinez, Elizabeth, "The Perils of Pilar: What Happened to the Chicano Movement?," Zeta,
April 1989.
3. It will be recalled that at the time of the Church Committee hearings in 1975, Chicago SAC
Richard G. Held was still swearing in court that the FBI had no documents relevant to the Hampton-
Clark matter, and was actively denying that a Bureau infiltration was involved.
4. At the time the "official record" of COINTELPRO was compiled, the FBI was still denying — as
it had at trial — the existence of ELSURS logs which could have exonerated Geronimo Pratt. The Bureau
also denied —on appeal — that Pratt was a specific COINTELPRO target, a contention which was revealed
to be absolutely untrue by a massive release of documents pursuant to the victim's successful 1981 FOIA
suit.
5. On March 17, 1989, writing for the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Justice Peter
McQuillan concluded that FOIA documents obtained by Richard Dhoruba Moore's attorneys in 1985-
86 demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that COINTELPRO collusion between the FBI and
NYPD concerning the manipulation of witnesses "might well have" led to a verdict of "not guilty," had
the jury during Moore's 1972 "trial" been aware of it. McQuillan further noted that, had these
COINTELPRO activities been known at the time Moore's direct appeal was decided in 1976 ( it had been
argued at the same time the Church Committee hearings were occurring), the situation would have
"compelled reversal" of Moore's conviction. But the FBI withheld all such information from both the
courts and congress. In what may be the ultimate testimonial to the real quality of American justice, the
New York high court decided, in the face of all this, to allow Moore's conviction to stand. The
rationalization upon which this decision was based is simply that once direct appeals have been
exhausted, New York law does not require reversal of a conviction, no matter what evidence is
subsequently introduced. Hence, Dhoruba Moore continued to serve a life sentence concerning
"crimes" for which even the courts admit he was never fairly convicted, for more than a year after
McQuillan's opinion was rendered. Finally, on March 22, 1990, after his attorneys introduced the fact
that an earlier New York high court decision made reversal of convictions mandatory in cases where it
could be proven that exculpatory evidence had been withheld by the government, he was grudgingly
released.For further information, see Debo, Dan, "COINTELPRO Lives On: The Unending Ordeal of
Dhoruba Moore," New Studies on the Left, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 1989, pp. 136-7.
6.These are, of course, the descriptive phrases which had been used to define COINTELPRO. It will
be noted that, in the teletype, Kelley claims 'Presidential authority" as a cover for the ELSURS activities;
Chapter 8 Notes: Conclusion 409
obviously, if such authority were being extended as a means of regulating Bureau behavior rather than
as a blanket beneath which agents could do essentially whatever to whomever, whenever they wanted,
the FBI director would not have had to ask who was doing what to whom (and for what purpose) at that
time. Further, researchers such as Louis Wolf have determined COINTELPRO is being more formally
continued "under two new FBI cryptonyms: COMTEL and TOPLEV, presumably for Communications
Intelligence [or Communist Intelligence; the authors] and Top Level." See Wolf, Louis, "COINTELPRO
Gets a New Name," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 31, Winter 1989, p. 57.
7. The document is drawn from those generated by the NEWKILL investigation, integral to the
aforementioned case of Richard Dhoruba Moore.
8.For a complete list, see Press Release, "GROUPS INCLUDED IN THE CISPES FILES OBTAINED
FROM FBI HEADQUARTERS," Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, January 27, 1988.
9. A classic example is that of Frank Varelli, a Salvadoran infiltrated by the FBI into the Dallas
CISPES chapter in 1982, and who persistently both reported inaccurate information on chapter activities
(which provided a rationale for continuing the Bureau's "investigation") and sought to persuade
chapter members to engage in actual illegal activities. See King, Wayne, 'F.B.I.'s Papers Portray Inquiry
Fed by Informer," New York Times, February 13, 1988.
10.One need go no further than the application of the term "terrorist" to CISPES and other targeted
organizations, even as a "suspidon," to apprehend disinformation being employed in a most forthright
manner. Both former FBI Director William Webster and the present director, William Sessions, made
such claims repeatedly in the media. See, for example, Sherron, Philip, "F.B.I.'s Chief Says Surveillance
Was Justified," New York Times, February 3,1988, and "Reagan Backs F.B.I. Surveillance Accepts Bureau
Report That There Was Solid Basis for Effort Aimed at Critics," New York Times, February 4,1988. For
valuable insights into how this works, see Donner, Frank, "The Terrorist as Scapegoat," The Nation, No.
226, May 20,1978, pp. 590.4.
11.More than 200 incidents of burglaries of the homes and offices of Central America activists — in
which political materials such as documents and computer disks were taken while valuables were left
untouched — are chronicled as having occurred from the beginning of 1984 through the beginning of
1988. The list is undoubtedly incomplete. See Harassment Update: Chronological List of FBI and Other
Harassment Incidents, Movement Support Network and Anti-Repression Project for the Center for
Constitutional Rights, New York, January 1987; also see Harassment Update, Center for Constitutional
Rights, New York, January 27, 1988.
12.Ibid. For example, "On July 29,1986, a Center for Constitutional Rights staff person reported that
when her travel agent telephoned, although she was home and her answering machine on, no message
came over. Instead, a man answered who said: 'I'm her boyfriend and a policeman, I'll take the
message.'"
13.Ibid. Also see Hirschorn, Michael W., "Newly Released Documents Provide Rare Look at How
FBI Monitors Students and Professors," Chronicle of Higher Education, February 10,1988.
14.See "Once a G-Man, Now a Pacifist: A costly conversion," Newsweek, November 23, 1987.
15.The FBI advanced the interesting concept during the Plowshares cases that any action which
curtailed, or was intended to curtail, the state's ability to project violence — disabling a nuclear missile,
for instance — should be considered "terrorism." It follows that planning or even discussing such an act
would amount to "terrorist conspiracy."
16.Assata Shakur was supposedly sought for involvement in the "execution style murders" of
New York police officers Joseph Piagenti and Waverly Jones on May 21,1971, and Gregory Foster and
Rocco Laurie on January 28,1972. A good survey of the sensationalist, Bureau-provoked coverage of the
charges may be found in Shakur, Assata, Assata: An Autobiography, Lawrence Hill and Company,
Westport, Conn., 1987. For a police-eye view, see Steedman, Albert A., Chief I, Avon Books, New York,
1975.
17.After her arrest, Shakur penned an open letter to the black community apologizing for the
"sloppiness" and lax security" which led her and her colleagues to travel the turnpike despite
knowledge that "racist police continually hassle black people" seen driving thereon. For further
information, see Jaimes, M. Annette, "Self-Portrait of a Black Liberationist," New Studies on the Left, Vol.
XIV, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring 1989.
18.Shakur was charged with robbing the Bankers Trust Branch in Queens of $7,697 on August 23,
1971 and the Manufacturers Hanover Trust in the Bronx of $3,700 on September 29,1972. The killing of
the heroin dealers occurred in Brooklyn on January 3,1973. As was revealed at trial, the government had
essentially no case in any of these matters.
19.The saga of Shakur's trials, and the nature of the conditions for her incarceration are brought
out in a series of articles published in the New Brunswick Home News during the period 1975-77.
20.Prior to Clinton, Assata Shakur was housed briefly at the New Jersey State Youth Reception and
Correction center at Yardville, and at the Alderson (West Virginia) Federal Prison for Women.
Thecombat unit was a "mixed group," composed o BLA members, and former members of the Weather
Underground Organization.
21 It is worth noting that even had Shakur participated in the Jersey Turnpike firelight in the
manner claimed by prosecutors — a matter which seems highly dubious, given medical evidence — she
would demonstrably have been engaged in armed self-defense rather than "terrorism." The state's
definition of "terrorism" is in this instance more than somewhat suspect.
22.It seems doubtful that the FBI was ever particularly concerned with the activities of Omega 7,
a CIA-created organization of Batistite Cubans used as a hemispheric anti-communist terrorist appara-
tus specializing in assassinations during the 1960s and '70s. It wasn't until Omega 7 was shown to have
been involved in the car bomb assassination of former Allende government official Orlando Letelier and
researcher Ronni Moffit in Washington, D.C., on September 21,1976 that the public became in any way
concerned with the Cubans' activities. The Bureau was thus able to (cynically) list the government-
supported operations of Omega 7 as a reason for increasing its emphasis on domestic "counter-
terrorism" (see Dinges, John, and Saul Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row, Pantheon Publishers, New
York, 1980). As to the Serbo-Croatian group, aside from claiming credit for a single flash-powder
explosion at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport in 1979, they seem to have accomplished
so little as to have been virtually non-existent. It should be considered an active proposition that the
whole thing was a police/FBI ruse designed to whip up public support for the emerging campaign of
"anti-terrorism." In any event, it should be clear that the real weight of what was going on was all along
placed upon the left in counterintelligence circles.
23.A development roughly corresponding with the emergence of the JITF was the establishment
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through Jimmy Carter's E.O. 12148, in 1977.
This was an extension from the Federal Emergency Preparedness Agency (FEPA), created in 1976, under
Gerald Ford's E.O. 11921. In 1980, with the advent of the Reagan administration, FEMA was used as the
vehicle for creation of a quasi-secret, centralized "national emergency" entity, headed by a federal
"emergency czar." Appointed into the latter position was Louis 0. Giuffrida, the former national guard
general and counterinsurgency enthusiast who had built up the California Specialized Training
Institute (CSTI) and contributed heavily to the Garden Plot and Cable Splicer plans of the late 1960s and
early '70s, before going on to serve as a government consultant during the repression of AIM and during
the 1979 "counterterrorism conference" held in Puerto Rico, among other things (see Chapters 4 and 7).
While FEMA's charter called for planning and training activities concerning "natural disasters, nuclear
war, the possibility of enemy attack on U.S. territory, and incidents involving domestic civil unrest,"
Giuffrida focused his agency's energy and resources entirely upon the last category. By January 1982,
this emphasis had led to the preparation of a joint FEMA-Pentagon position paper, entitled "The Civil/
Military Alliance in Emergency Management," which effectively voided provisions of the 1877 Posse
Comitatus Act (prohibiting military intervention in domestic disturbances). The plan was considerably
reinforced by Reagan's top secret National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 26) during the spring of
1982, a pronouncement which appears to have formally interlocked FEMA, not only with the military
but with the National Security Council (NSC). By 1984, Giuffrida had installed his old friend General
Frank S. Salcedo, another counterinsurgency expert, as head of the agency's "Civil Security Division"
(CSD) and had established a "Civil Defense Training Center" — based on the CSTI model — near
Ernrnitsvffie, Maryland. Here, more than 1,000 civilian police from around the country received what
FEMA euphemistically referred to as "military police methods" for quelling domestic political unrest.
Meanwhile, in cooperation with the Pentagon and various federal and local police agencies, CSD
engaged in a series of national training exercises — "Proud Saber/Rex-82, "Pre-Nest," and "Rex-84/
Night Train," etc. — in preparation for a suspension of the constitution in case of massive domestic
political turmoil. The exercises envisioned "at least 100,000" U.S. citizens, identified as "national
security threats" being rounded up and thrown into concentration camps for unspecified periods.
Simultaneously, FEMA was opening files on the U.S. activists who would comprise those interned
whenever the exercise plans were put into "real world" practice. This last placed FEMA in direct conflict
with the FBI, precipitating a power struggle in which Bureau Director William Sessions ultimately
prevailed, compelling Giuffrida to turn over the more than 12,000 political dossiers his agency had
already assembled. The contest had also brought Attorney General William French Smith into the fray,
a matter which led the Justice Department to conclude that FEMA's activities were openly unconstitu-
tional and "seek to establish new Federal Government management structures or otherwise task
Cabinet departments and other federal agencies." The structural outcome of this dispute is undear.
However, the issue seems to have been resolved in immediate sense by the FBI — well aware of the
personal venality often associated with those who make a fetish of enforcing political orthodoxy —
opening an investigation into the possibility that Giuffrida had misappropriated government funds.
The Bureau was quiddy able to determine that the FEMA boss had engaged in "de facto nepotism" by
placing only his cronies in key positions within his agency, and had mis-spent taxpayer monies by,
among other things, lavishing $170,000 in furnishings upon an opulent bachelor pad f or himself. In 1985,
Giuffrida quietly resigned, taking most of his "crew" with him when he went. Since then, FEMA has
been more-or-less back-burnered, its core political activities incorporated under the mantle of the FBI-
dominated TITF. For further information, see Reynolds, Diana, "FEMA and the NSC: The Rise of the
National Security State," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 33, Winter 1990.
24. The state Addiction Services Agency had stopped funding Lincoln Detox five years earlier, in
1973, positing as its rationale the fact that heroin withdrawal at the center cost $261 per client (with a very
low recidivism rate), as compared to $57 per client in methadone-based programs (showing nearly 100%
recidivism). The activists sustained the Lincoln Detox effort even with funding thus constricted. More
than 50 members of the NYPD were finally used to oust them after Mayor Ed Koch suspended all further
funding in 1978.
25. According to the JTTF, the RATF was responsible for a $13,800 robbery from a Citibank branch
in Manhattan on October 10, 1977; a $8,300 robbery from a Chase Manhattan branch on May 27, 1978;
a $200,000 robbery of a Coin Deposit Corporation armored truck in Livingston, New Jersey on December
19,1978; a $105,000 robbery of a Coin Deposit Corporation armored truck at the Garden State Plaza Mall
(New Jersey) on September 11,1979; the attempted robbery of an IBI armored truck in Greenberg, New
York during December of 1979; the $529,000 robbery of a Purolator armored truck in Inwood, Long
Island on April 22,1980; the unsuccessful robbery of a Purolator armored truck in Danbury, Connecticut
on March 23,1981; a $292,000 robbery of a Brinks truck in the Bronx on June 2,1981 in which one guard
was killed and another wounded; and two unsuccessful attempts to rob a Brinks truck in Nanuet, New
York in October, 1981. In addition, the group is credited with breaking Assata Shakur out of her New
Jersey prison on November 2, 1979.
26. Captured were Kathy Boudin, David Gilbert and Judy Clark, all former members of the
Weather Underground Organization, and Sam Brown, a black man only recently brought into the RATF.
27. Those who allegedly escaped from West Nyack, in addition to Mutulu Shakur, were Mtyari
Sundiata (s/n: Samuel Lee Smith), Kuwasi Balagoon, Chui Ferguson, Edward Joseph, and Nehanda
Obafemi (s/n: Cheryl Lavern Dalton), all former members of the BPP, BLA or RNA. Marilyn Buck and
Susan Rosenberg, white members of RATF, were also accused of involvement; Buck was allegedly
wounded in the leg at Nyack.
28. RATF members captured withinsix months of the West Nyack incident include Sekou Odinga,
Anthony LaBorde, Kuwasi Balagoon, Chui Ferguson, and Edward Joseph, all former Panther 21
defendants. Also arrested in the same connection were James York, Silvia Baraldini, Bilal Sunni-Ali and
'liana Robinson.
29. Kuwasi Balagoon, Judy Clark and David Gilbert were found guilty of robbery and murder on
September 15, 1985. Balagoon died in prison in 1987. Clark and Gilbert are serving 75-year-to-life
sentences (in 1985, Clark was also convicted of "conspiring to escape" and received an unprecedented
sentence of two years in solitary confinement). Kathy Boudin pleaded guilty to the same charges and
is serving a 44 year sentence. Sekou Odinga and Silvia Baraldini were convicted of RICO charges on
September 3, 1983 and sentenced to 40 and 43 years respectively (Odinga was also convicted of
attempted murder and sentenced to 25-years-to-life, this sentence to run consecutive with the others).
Edward Joseph and Chui Ferguson were convicted of being accessories to RICO conspiracy in the same
trial as Odinga and Baraldini; they were sentenced totwenty years apiece. Bilal Sunni-Ali and 'liana
Robinson were acquitted on the RICO charges. Marilyn Buck was not captured until May 11, 1985;
Mutulu Shakur more than a year later. They were tried together on RICO charges in 1987, convicted, and
sentenced to fifty years each (Buck's sentence does not begin until she finishes serving a twenty year
weapons and escape sentence, already in progress).
30. See "Defendants Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Governmental Misconduct," U.S. v.
Laura Whitehorn, et al., CR. No 88-145-05 (HHG), United States Court for the District of Columbia,
January 3, 1989, p. 56:
The political nature of these grossly disproportionate sentences is evidenced by comparing

punishments imposed on Ku Klux Klan members, abortion clinic bombers and other right-
wing defendants whose offenses cause death and serious injuries, and are motivated by racist
violence, greed and hatred. Ku Klux Klan organizer Don Black was convicted of possession
of massive quantifies of explosives and weapons in 1984, yet served only 24 months in prison
and was released and permitted to engage in Klan recruitment. Edward Heffernan, a right-
wing "survivalist" convicted of possession of 1,000 pounds of dynamite and 18 fully
constructed pipe bombs was sentenced to six mon ths to two years and served six months...Victor
Vander and other members of the Jewish Defense League pled guilty to firebombing and
other acts of bombings, arsons, extortions and fraud, and received only 10 year sentences or
less.
At p. 55, the motion also notes that,
The 58-year sentences given to Blunk and Rosenberg exceeded the single largest sentences
imposed in 1982 for violations of [the same laws under which they were convicted] by 33
years. They were 38 years longer than the longest sentence imposed on any defendant in 1982
or 1983 for violation of any section of the federal explosives act...The Blunk and Rosenberg
sentences were two and one-half times the 1985 average of Kidnapping, three times the
average for Second Degree Murder, four times the average for Bank Robbery, nine times the
1985 average for Felony Distribution of Narcotics, ten times the 1985 average for assault, and
sixteen times the 1985 average for possession of firearms. Their sentence was longer than
every person convicted in 1982 and 1983 of racketeering, conspiracy, fraud, theft, larceny,
burglary, assault, escape, riot, sedition, perjury, bribery, and graft, and all but one of the 901
defendants sentenced for possession and distribution of heroin.
31. Statement by attorney Susan Tippograph, October 13, 1982.

32. Those jailed were Eve Rosahn, Fulani Sunni-Ali, Jerry Gaines, Yaasmyn Fula, Larry Mack,
Richard Delaney, Asha Sundiata (s/n: Debra Buckman), Dr. Alan Berkman, Illana Robinson, Shaheem
Abdul Jabbar (s/n: John Crenshaw), Silvia Baraldini, and Bernardine Dohrn.
33. See Calhoun, Patricia, "Grand Slam," Westward, December 14,1983.
34. The six imprisoned JBAKC activists were Christine Rico, Sandra Roland, Steven Burke, Bob
Lederer, Terry Bisson and Julie Nalibor. They were held up to eight months.
35. The points are extracted from the aforementioned "Motion to Dismiss" in Whitehorn, et al, at
pp. 37-8. The motion relies upon written responses to interrogations entered by Webster on February
4, 1982, and the director's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on
February 11. At pp. 32-3, the motion points out that "within a week of the Brinks incident, [New York
SAC Kenneth] Walton and other FBI officials were claiming that the FBI had found links among the
Weather Underground, the Black Liberation Army and the Black Panther Party, and that they were
investigating possible connections with the [PALM. FBI suggestions of possible Cuban Intelligence
(DGI) involvement immediately arose as well, and on October 25, 1981, FBI chief spokesman Roger
Young asserted that the Cuban Intelligence service 'has been supportive in the past of the Weather
Underground.' The FBI claimed that the Brinks incident might be linked to domestic and foreign
political groups was given wide play in the media." But as soon as public exposure on the matter had
been accomplished, the Bureau promptly dropped the whole baseless assertion, never bringing it up
during the several RATF trials which ensued.
36. The charges were filed by FBI agent David B. Mitchell, a member of the JTTF. The "Son of
Brinks" label seems to have been dreamed up by New York ASAC (and JTTF commander) Lee F. Laster.
37.Those convicted on the ID and weapons charges were Coltrane Chimarenga, Omawale Clay,
Ruth Carter, Yvette Kelly, Roger Wareham and Robert Taylor.
38.The jury views are quoted in Castellucci, op. cit., pp. 293-4.
39. As with the Rosenberg and Blunk sentences, Berkman's is virtually unprecedented in its
severity. The average federal sentence for a comparable "offense" is two years, making his punishment
six times the norm. This harsh judgment was rendered despite his having been diagnosed as afflicted
with a potentially fatal cancer, making it possible he'd not live out his sentence. Further, having been
convicted of no violent act, or otherwise meeting any criteria for such placement, he was immediately
sent to the federal "super-maximum" prison at Marion, where 23 1/2 hour per day "lock down"
conditions prevail on a permanent basis.
40.See "Defendants' Reply to Government's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Prose-
cutorial Misconduct," U.S. v. Whitehorn, et al., CR. No. 88-0145 (HI-IG), United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, February 10,1988, p. 8.
41. For an excellent example of this sort of sanctimonious self-indulgence, see Frankfort, Ellen,
Kathy Boudin and the Dance of Death, Stein and Day Publishers, New York, 1983.
42.The Order or Bruder Schweigen (Silent Brotherhood) was an organization founded by Robert Jay
Mathews, a former member of the John Birch Society and Minutemen, in 1982. An associate of Richard
Butler's "Aryan Nations" Church of Jesus Christ Christian in Idaho, Mathews — who was himself an
Odinist — carefully recruited members who subscribed to the visions of genocide and racial purity
propounded in The Turner Diaries (National Vanguard Books, Arlington, VA, 1978), a novel by William
Pierce, a former aide to American Nazi Party leader George Lincoln Rockwell. In short order, he'd
gathered together a cadre of Gary Lee Yarbrough, David Tate, Bruce Carrol Pierce, Denver Parmenter,
Ken Loff, Randy Duey, James Dye and Robert and Sharon Merki. The group received "inspiration" from
Robert Miles, pastor of an identity christian church in Michigan, and a leading figure in the U.S. racist
movement. It then recruited armorer/trainers — Randall Rader, Richard Satan and Andrew Barnhill —
from another batch of right-wing religious fanatics, The Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA),
in Arkansas. Thus rostered and equipped with automatic weapons, the group set out on a process of
sparking the race war outlined in The Turner Diaries. To finance their plan, they first tried counterfeiting
(with mixed results) and then turned to banks and armored trucks. On December 17,1983, they robbed
the Citibank branch in Innis Arden, Washington of $25,952. On January 30, they robbed the Mutual
Savings Bank in Spokane of $3,600. On March 16, they robbed a Continental armored truck of $43,345
in Seattle. On April 23, they took $531,713 from a Continental armored truck in Seattle; $301,334 was in
checks, which they discarded, making their cash haul $230,379. On May 23, they "executed" Walter
West, a fringe member of their group, with a hammer and a gunshot to the head; Mathews had become
concerned West was compromising security by his loose talk in bars. On the evening of June 18, 1983,
they undertook their first act of sparking the "race war" by machinegunning KOA radio talk show host
Alan Berg, a Jew, in his Denver driveway; Berg was hit at least twelve times with .45 caliber bullets from
a MAC-10 machine pistol fired at close range, dying instantly. On July 19, they robbed a Brinks armored
truck of $3.8 million near Ukiah, California. After that, the FBI moved in, using an informant named Tom
Martinez, "turned" after being apprehended in Philadelphia passing some of the gang's counterfeit
money. Mathews himself was killed on December 8,1983 on Whidbey Island (near Seattle), after an all-
night siege of a house in which he was holed up. The other members of The Order were picked up at
various points around the country over the next few months. One of them, David Tate, killed a Missouri
state trooper with a MAC-10 machine pistol before giving himself up. Ultimately all the men directly
involved in the organization went to prison, several on very long sentences. And it is true that the
government applied the same RICO statutes in their case used against the RATF and other left-wing
defendants. But conspicuously absent from the FBI's handling of the matter was the sort of movement-
wide investigation of organizations on the right which marked the CISPES probe, the broad use of grand
juries to neutralize key right-wing activists who had some loose association with The Order, or the
public branding of anyone and everything sharing even remote ideological affiliation with Mathews
group as being "terrorist." The sorts of "law enforcement" practices engaged in by the Bureau vis a vis
the left are thus of an emphatically different sort than those pursued when some element of the radical
right gets out of control. For further information, see Flynn, Kevin and Gary Gerhardt, The Silent
Brotherhood: Inside America's Racist Underground, The Free Press, New York, 1989. Also see Coates, Jim,
Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right, The Noonday Press, New York, 1987.
43. The sentences of Buck, Rosenberg, Blunk and Berkman have already been outlined. Linda
Evans is serving a total of 45 years as a result of a conviction for having "harbored" RATF fugitive
Marilyn Buck (they were arrested outside a Dobbs Ferry, New York diner on May 11,1985), as well as
being "a felon in possession of firearms," having rendered false statements to obtain four firearms, and
having "caused false statements to appear in Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms records." As
with other RATF defendants, the severity of the sentence imposed in Evans' case shatters all conceivable
standards of "equal justice before the law." The norm in harboring cases is five years. In felon /firearms
cases not involving related convictions for use of the weapons, the usual sentence is 3-5 years. Typically,
all sentences would run concurrently, rather than the consecutive sentencing Evans received. Even had
the harboring sentence been set to run consecutive to a duster of weapons sentences, the defendant's
punishment would have added up to 8-10 years. The difference between that and 45 years speaks for
itself.
44. This makes Whitehom far and away the longest-held U.S. citizen under such circumstances in
the country's history, with Puertorriquerlo activist Fffiber to Ojeda Rios running a dose second. Joe
Doherty, a member of the Irish Republican Army accused by the British of "terrorist activity" in 1980
- but who escaped from jail before his 1981 trial - holds the record for such incarceration in a U.S. jail.
Doherty was arrested in New York on June 18, 1983 as an "illegal alien." On December 12,1984, Judge
John E. Spizzo, ruled that Doherty could not be extradited to Northern Ireland insofar as his case falls
under the "political exemption clause" of the U.S./Britain extradition treaty. The federal government
has continuously appealed and otherwise maneuvered to get around the law ever since (meanwhile
refusing to simply deport the prisoner to Ireland, out of British jurisdiction). Doherty remains in jail as
of this writing.
45. See "Court Permits Prosecution of 3 in Bombings," New York Times, November 5, 1989.
46. "Motion to Dismiss," op. cit., p. 74.
47. Ibid.
48.Ibid., pp. 75-6. The RFG and RGR are organizations with which some of the defendants were
associated, in addition to the ARU.
49. Quoted in Day, Susie, 'Political Prisoners: Guilty Until Proven Innocent," Sojourner: The
Women's Forum, February 1989, p. 18.
50. Quoted in UM. For further information, see Day, Susie, "Resistance Conspiracy Trial," Zeta,
September 1989.
51.Quoted in Whitehorn, Laura, "Counterinsurgency in the Courtroom: The 'Resistance Conspir-
acy Case," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 31, Winter 1989, p. 47.
52. Quoted in Day, op. cit.
53.Pell, op. cit., pp. 193-4. Charges were dismissed against Kearney after he adopted the "Nurem-
burg Defense," claiming he was "only following orders." Gray, on the other hand, was allowed to walk
because - incredibly - he was held to have been "too highly placed" to have been responsible for what
went on in the field.
54. "Motion to Dismiss," op. cit., p. 30.
55.kid.
56.Jonathan Jackson is covered in Chapter 5. Sam Melville was a white activist convicted of leading
an anti-corporate bombing campaign in New York during the late '60s and killed during the bloody
repression of the prisoner revolt at Attica Prison in 1971. See Melville, Samuel, Letters from Attica,
William Morrow and Company, New York, 1972.
57.See Levasseur, Ray Luc, "Opening Statement to the Jury," published by the Sedition Commit-
tee, Boston, 1985. The Sharpeville Massacre occurred on April 21, 1960. The second Union Carbide
bombing is attributed to the Red Guerrilla Resistance.
58.Smith, Maggie, and Valerie West, "BOS-LUC, Western Sweep and the Ohio Seven: A Case Study
in Counterinsurgency," unpublished manuscript provided to the authors by Ray Luc Levasseur.
59. The UFF was known to have provided support and security to Toure during his organizing
efforts concerning the busing of school children in Boston during 1980 and '81. The initial JTTF approach
seems to have been to try and crack the UFF through relatively visible activists such as Toure, and
hopefully neutralize the latter in the process. Taken to trial in 1985 on charges stemming from the 1982
Attleboro firefight (he'd been held without bail during the interim), Toure was acquitted of assault with
intent to murder, but convicted of state and federal firearms violations. He is presently serving a six year
sentence in the federal prison at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania; upon release, he is to begin serving a five year
sentence in a state prison for exactly the same "offenses," but under Massachusetts rather than federal
law. Obviously, normal standards of double jeopardy do not apply to targets for political repression in
the U.S. See Kahn, Ric, 'Fed Excesses: Going too far to get the Ohio 7," The Boston Phoenix, July 8, 1988.
60.Tom Manning acknowledges having killed Lamonaco, but maintains it was a matter of self-
defense, the trooper having started shooting first. Interestingly, the state contends Manning did not
shoot Lamonaco, arguing that Richard Williams was in Manning's car, and that he fired the fatal shots.
Williams rebuts that he was not there, and Manning confirms his story. In their 1987 trial in the matter,
Manning was convicted of "felony murder" (that is, of being in commission of a completely different
felony — flight to avoid prosecution — which led up to the killing, but not of pulling the trigger) and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. Ironically, having simultaneously put Manning in prison for life while
deciding he was not Lamonaco's killer, the jury then failed to convict Williams of anything at all. We thus
have a man serving time for a death the jury determined he did not cause, and for which no killer has
been identified. Williams is scheduled for retrial in 1990. See Bailey, Dennis, "Underground," The Boston
Globe Magazine, March 26, 1989.
61.Smith and West, op. cit.
62.Ibid.
63. Ibid. In retrospect, it is widely believed by those victimized that the FBI itself arranged the
campaign of telephone threats against individual western Massachusetts feminists and women's
facilities in order to put itself in the position of offering "protection" in exchange for "cooperation" in
breaking the Ohio 7 case. Whether or not Bureau personnel actually made or arranged for the calls, the
idea of agents attempting to broker the fundamental services for which they are paid speaks for itself.
If agents did orchestrate the threats, which seems entirely possible, it should be remarked that the whole
ploy was also blatantly sexist, presuming as it does that "the weaker sex" would be inordinately
susceptible to such terror tactics. That the whole thing sounds like a classic COINTELPRO-style
operation goes without saying.
64.The sequence of events began when the owner of a storage facility in Binghamton, New York
was clearing out a locker on which rent had not been paid in nearly two years. In the process, he
discovered the pieces of a disassembled shotgun and, for some reason, decided to contact the FBI about
it. The locker had been rented to "Salvadore Bella," an alias attributed to Tom Manning, so the Bureau
dispatched a team of investigators. Among the locker's other contents, they found a mail order catalogue
addressed to "Jack Homing," of Danbury, Connecticut. In Danbury, agents located a babysitter who had
worked for lack and Paula Horning," and who recounted having been in the car when the latter was
involved in a minor traffic accident some years previously. Going through old accident reports, the
agents discovered that "Mrs. Horning" had produced a driver's licence in the name of "Judy Hymes,"
and that the car involved had been registered to "John Boulette," an alias attributed to Ray Luc
Levasseur. Using the Grumman computer, the FBI then ascertained that "Mrs. Hymes" held a current
post office box in Columbus, Ohio. They staked it out, identified the box holder as Pat Gros Levasseur
when she showed up to collect her mail, and then followed her home to Deerfield. The Ohio 7 arrests
began the following morning. See Bailey, op. cit.
65. Ibid.
66.Agents had followed Williams from the Levasseur residence the day before. On June 20,1988,
U.S. District Judge William G. Young determined that the SWAT operation in Cleveland which led to
the arrests of Williams and the Laamans had been illegal, a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights
of the latter couple. See Kahn, op. cit.
67.Utilizing the Grumman computer, agents were able to trace the gun to a dealer in Norfolk,
Virginia. The buyer listed a local mail drop as an address, and after a month-long stakeout, the FBI was
able to effect its capture of the Mannings. See Bailey, op. cit.
68.During the aforementioned June 20,1988 pretrial hearing, Judge Young stipulated that, "if a law
enforcement officer tried to bribe the child, that shocks my conscience and...no system of individual
liberty worthy of the name should permit that of a minor child." The other two Levasseur children are
Simone (then aged six) and Rosa (aged four).
69.The massive FBI SWAT raid which resulted in the capture of the Laamans and Richard Williams
occurred in the midst of a birthday party for Ricky Laaman, the youngest child at age four. The
Levasseurs were captured en route to the party.
70.Cameron Bishop was a member of the SDS chapter at Colorado State University (Ft. Collins)
accused of dynamiting power lines near Denver in 1967. He subsequently spent eight years under-
ground, most of it as one of the FBI's ten "most wanted" fugitives, before being captured in 1975 in East
Greenwich, Rhode Island. At the time of his arrest, Bishop was accompanied by Ray Luc Levasseur. The
experience seems to have been one of the factors which prompted Levasseur to go underground himself,
only a few months later. Bishop was convicted of sabotage and sentenced to serve twenty years; the
conviction was, however, overturned on appeal.
71.The Manning children were interrogated by FBI agents from five to ten times each, and may
have suffered severe psychological trauma as a result. Jeremy, the eldest, refuses to discuss his ordeal
and breaks down in tears at the mere mention of his experience at the hands of the Bureau. When
questioned on the matter by the press, FBI media coordinator James Waldrop offered "no comment" on
agent participation in the grilling of the children. A bit more candidly, Norfolk Deputy City Attorney
Dan Hagemeister challenged whether the youngsters were even entitled to legal counsel during their
repeated interrogations: "Do we really need a bunch of lawyers saying 'Don't answer that' to an 11-year-
old?" he asked reporters. See Bisson, Terry, and Sally O'Brien, "Young Hostages," The Nation, August
5,1985.
72.Manning and Levasseur went underground in 1975 after the murder of a local Portland activist
named Stevie Poullen. Poullen, it turned out, had been targeted for elimination by a police "death
squad" formed by a cop named Bertrand Surphes. Surphes was sentenced to prison for his organizing
activities but, when it was disclosed that their names were on the police death list, the two future Ohio
7 members dropped out of sight. See Levasseur, Ray Luc, "My Name Is Ray Luc Levasseur: Statement
to the Court, January 10, 1989," New Studies on the Left, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 1989, p. 104.
73.For example, Aceto testified that Ray Luc Levasseur had told him the SMJJ planned to bomb
the Suffolk County (Massachusetts) Courthouse prior to the April 1976 event. After the bombing,
according to the version given by Aceto on the witness stand, Levasseur explained to him that the group
had used "twelve sticks of dynamite" in accomplishing the job. Aceto later recanted these assertions —
which were the only means by which the government could "link" any of the Ohio 7 to an offensive
action in which people were injured — admitting that the first of the alleged conversations never took
place, and that the "twelve sticks of dynamite" statement had been gleaned not from Levasseur, but
from rumors circulated on the "movement grapevine." Tellingly, police explosives experts in Massa-
chusetts determined only six sticks of dynamite had been used at Suffolk. See Kahn, op. cit.
74.Smith and West, op. cit.
75.Aceto had originally gone to prison on a breaking and entering conviction. While serving that
sentence, he stabbed another inmate to death, pled guilty to the charge, and received a life sentence.
Arguably, once he agreed to the FBI's deal to testify in exchange for a release from prison, he became
utterly dependent upon the Bureau to keep him out, "snitches" having virtually zero life expectancy
behind bars. He was, by all accounts, an extremely "cooperative" prosecution witness as a result. See
Kahn, op. cit.
76.See Baily, op. cit. Ray Luc Levasseur was sent directly to the federal "super-max" prison at
Marion, Illinois. Tom Manning was lodged in the super-max control unit at Trenton State Prison in New
Jersey
77.How this move "simplified" anything is a bit of a mystery insofar as the case against all seven
defendants was the same. A better explanation is perhaps that the government sought to appear
"moderate" by virtue of dropping charges against the two men it calculated had already been
neutralized for life. The dismissal of charges occurred on August 30,1989. See "Ohio 7 Minus 2: On Trial
for Seditious Conspiracy," The Insurgent, September 1989, p. 3.
78.The Justice Department initially contended it would try Curzi-Laaman separately. With the
recent acquittal of her former codefendants on both counts, however, this seems quite unlikely.
79. Carol Manning's acceptance of the deal should not necessarily be construed as an actual
admission of guilt. After the Aceto travesty, etc., she had little reason to extend much faith to the "due
process" of the U.S. judicial system. She faced up to sixty years additional imprisonment if convicted of
seditious conspiracy and RICO violations. The deal offered was for a sentence to run concurrently with
her existing fifteen year incarceration. Her decision seems mostly predicated on an assessment of which
route would lead to her earliest release from prison.
80.See "Three Cleared of Seditious Conspiracy," New York Times, November 28, 1989. Additional
analyses of the case may be found in Hoeffle, Paul, and Phil Garber, "Seduced and Abandoned," Zeta,
February 1989; and Ogden, Don, "Ohio Seven: The Whole Truth Goes Untold," The Guardian, September
15, 1989. It should be noted that the acquittals occurred despite court rulings that many defense
witnesses — such as the acclaimed historian Howard Zinn — would not be allowed to testify.
81. Ojeda Rios was accused of shooting an agent in the face on August 30, 1985 when the FBI
attempted to kick in the door of his San Juan home. The defendant did not deny firing the shot which
struck the agent, but contended that given the agent's behavior, the history of the Bureau's anti-
independentista COINTELPRO, and the fact that his family were in the apartment, he was justified in
shooting. The jury agreed. Prior to his acquittal, Ojeda Rios had been held without bond — despite having
suffered a heart attack while in captivity — for four and a half years. See "Filiberto is Free!," La Patna
Radical, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 1989.
82.See Churchill, Ward, "The Third Word at Home: Political Prisoners in the United States," Zeta,
June 1990.
83.See Churchill, Ward, "Wages of COINTELPRO: The Case of Mumia Abu-Jamal," New Studies
on the Left, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 1989, pp. 96-9.
84. The figures are derived from Murphy, Jim, A Question of Race, Center for Justice Education,
Albany, NY, 1988, Chart I.
85.Ibid., p. 3.
86. For further information, see Austin, James, and Aaron McVey, The NCCD Prison Population
Forecast: The Growing Imprisonment of America, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, San
Frandsco, 1988. Also see Nagel, William C., "On Behalf of a Moratorium on Prison Construction," Crime
and Delinquency, Fall 1977, pp. 154-72.
87. A classic example of this is the FBI's recent assessment that the El Rukn organization is a
"primary" instrument of drug commerce in Chicago's south side. Bureau reports conveniently neglect
to mention that El Rukn is the current name of what was once known as the Black P. Stone Nation, the
entity FBI COINTELPRO specialists used as a counter against the strongly anti-drug Black Panther
chapter in that city. Once the Chicago Panthers were destroyed, the P. Stones cum Rukns predictably
filled the vacuum thus created. For all its present posturing about "combatting drug traffic," the Bureau
clearly decided drugs were preferable to social change in Chicago in 1969. The same general dynamic
pertains to the notorious Crips and Bloods organizations in Los Angeles. For the latest Bureau
propaganda line on the subject, see King, Patricia, "A Snitch's Tale: The Killer Gang (An informer tells
about life as an 'El Rulcn')," Newsweek, November 6, 1989, p. 45.
88. Concerning the CIA's role in establishing modern drug distribution in the United States, see
McCoy, Alfred W., with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast
Asia, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1972. Also see videotapes of various lectures presented by attorney
Daniel Sheehan, circa 1984-87, available through the Christie Institute, Washington, D.C. CIA involve-
ment in the more recent cocaine trafficking is also relatively well known; see Scott, Peter Dale, and
Jonathon Marshall, The Politics of Cocaine: Drugs, Contras, and the C.I.A., Black Rose Books, Montreal,
Canada, 1989.
89.No evidence has ever been disclosed linking the Black Guerrilla Family to any facet of the drug
trade. Nonetheless, see Held's assertions to the contrary in the San Francisco Examiner, August 25,1989.
This is but one example.
90.Newton's killer shot him in the forehead at pointblank range, then bent over to shoot him twice
more in the temple, a very calm and professional execution. The day after the murder, the Oakland police
announced it had "no dues" as to the killer's identity, but "suspected" (for unexplained reasons) that
the matter was "drug related." On August 24, two days after the murder, the San Francisco Examiner ran
a story stating that the police had arrested three men fleeing the scene immediately after the event.
Oakland police lieutenant Mike Simms quickly convened a press conference to deny the whole thing
but, when it turned out that the arrest had been videotaped and the tapes were aired by local TV stations,
Simms was forced to admit the department had had "suspects" in custody all along. There were, Simms
insisted — contrary to the visual evidence appearing on television — only two men apprehended. On the
morning of August 25, the police suddenly announced that one of them, 25-year-old Tyrone Robinson
was a member of the Black Guerrilla Family and that therefore it was almost certainly a drug-related
killing. Then, curiously, the police offered the information that Robinson "appeared" to have acted in
self-defense after Newton "pulled a gun" during an argument concerning a cocaine debt. The story is
currently being dung to — by police and accused alike — despite the facts that no witnesses overheard
an argument (about cocaine or anything else) prior to the shooting, no weapon attributable to Newton
was recovered from the scene, and, even if there had been, this would not explain the two shots fired
as a coup de grace. Further, no one has yet identified the third man taken into custody by police just after
Newton's murder. All told, the death of Huey P. Newton bears every sign of having been a political
assassination. For further information, see Saxifrage Group, "Huey P. Newton: Tribute to a Fallen
Warrior," New Studies on the Left, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 1989, pp. 129-35.
91. Concerning Stammheim and the horrors that occur therein, see Ryan, Mike, "The Stammheim
Model: Judicial Counterinsurgency," New Studies on the Left, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1-2, Spring-Summer 1989,
pp. 45-69.
92. Letter from U.S. Bureau of Prisons Director J. Michael Quinlan to Congressman Robert W.
Kastenmeier (D., Wis.), September 20, 1987.
93.For more on the Lexington HSU, see O'Melveny, Mary, "U.S. Political Prison: Lexington Prison
High Security Unit," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 31, Winter 1989. It should be mentioned that
O'Melveny observes that one BoP official, Southeast Regional Director Gary R. McCune, has acknowl-
edged having attended a special course given by the FBI on how to deal with "terrorists" in prison.
McCune is responsible for the Lexington facility. Also see Reuben, William A., and Carlos Norman,
"Brainwashing in America? The Women of Lexington Prison," The Nation, June 27,1987, pp. 8814; and
Halsey, Peggy, "Undue Process," Christianity in Crisis, Vol. 48, No. 4, March 21, 1989, pp. 81-4.
94. Report on the U.S. Penitentiary at Marion, John Howard Association Report, October 1987, p. 1.
95.Quoted in National Committee to Support the Marion Brothers, Breaking Men's Minds, Chicago,
1987.
96. Korn, Dr. Richard, Effects of Confinement in HSU, study prepared for the ACLU Foundation
National Prison Project, 1987; attached to major ACLU report (see note 97, below).
97.Presentation by attorney Jan Susler, University of Colorado at Boulder, March 13,1988. Also see
Rosenberg, Susan, "Reflections on Being Buried Alive," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No.31, Winter
1989; and Silverstrim, Elaine, "The Ordeal of Alejandrina," The Witness, Vol. 71, No. 2, February, 1988.
98.See Amnesty International, The High Security Unit, Lexington Federal Prison, Kentucky, (AI Index:
AMR 51/34/88), New York, 1988. For the ACLU position, see Report on the High Security Unit for Women,
Federal Correctional Institution, Lexington, Kentucky, National Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation,
New York, August 25, 1987.
99. See Baker, Scott, "Activists attack new women's control unit," The Guardian, March 23, 1988.
100.See Lyden, Jacki, and Paula Schiller, "The Prison That Defies Reform," Student Lawyer, May
1987, pp. 9-17.
101.Conversation with Raphael Cancel Miranda, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, January 10, 1990.
102.Lyden and Schiller, op. cit. It is worth noting that the plan to turn Marion into an experimental
"dosed" facility was known to prisoners well before the fact. This was apparently a major contributing
factor in the "riot" upon which the lock-down was supposedly predicated. Also see Dunne, Bill, "The
U.S. Penitentiary at Marion Illinois: An Instrument of Oppression," New Studies on the Left, Vol. XIV, Nos.
1-2, Winter-Spring 1989, pp. 9-19.
103.Lyden, Jacki, "Marion Prison: Inside the Lockdown," All Things Considered broadcast, October
28,1986, produced by Paula Schiller, National Public Radio. Transcript published by Committee to End
the Marion Lockdown, Chicago, 1987. Also see Cunningham, Dennis, and Jan Susler (eds.), Transcript
of the People's Tribunal to Expose the Crimes of the Marion and Lexington Control Units, Committee to End
the Marion Lockdown, Chicago, October 24,1987.
104.See Amnesty International, Allegations of Inmate Treatment in Marion Prison, Illinois, USA, (AI
Index: AMR 51/26187), New York, May 1987. Also see Cunningham, Dennis, and Jan Susler, A Public
Report About a Violent Mass Assault Against Prisoners and Continuing Illegal Punishment and Torture of the
Prison Population at the U.S. Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, Marion Prisoners Rights Project, Chicago,
1984. Relatedly, see Benjamin, Thomas B., and Kenneth Lux, "Solitary Confinement as Psychological
Torture," California Western Law Review, 13(265), 1978, pp. 295-6.
105.Judge Parker's decision was rendered in Baraldini v. Thornburgh, C.A. 88-5275,1988: "It is one
thing to place persons under greater security because they have escape histories and pose special risks
to our correctional institutions. But consigning anyone to a high security unit for past political
associations they will never shed unless forced to renounce them is a dangerous mission for this
country's prison system to continue."

106.Rosenberg, Susan, "Growing repression of political prisoners," Gay Community News, Novem-
ber 5, 1989, p. 5.
107.Concerning the inception phase of this development program, see Cooper, Lyn, Elliot Curie,
Jon Frappier, Tony Platt, Betty Ryan, Richard Schauffler, Joy Scruggs and Larry Trujillo, The Iron Fist in
the Velvet Glove: An Analysis of U.S. Police, Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Berkeley, CA, 1975,
pp. 38-48.
108.For a survey of the sorts of weapons and other technologies in common use by SWAT units,
see Dewar, Michael, Weapons and Equipment of Counter-Terrorism, Arms and Armor Press, London, 1988.
Also see, Churchill, Ward, "To 'Serve and Protect'?" New Studies on the Left, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1-2, Spring-
Summer, 1989, pp. 205-9.
109.This should by no means be construed as an argument in favor of drugs and/or drug gangs.
It is, however, very much an argument in favor of the sort of anti-drug activity undertaken by the OAAU
and Black Panther Party in which partidpants endeavor to take "the streets" — for the first time—not only
from the drug dealers but, more importantly, from the state as well. This is posed as a viable alternative
to the Bush administration's present war on the black and Latino communities.
110. Gross, Bertram, Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America, South End Press, Boston,
1982.
111.See Dutschke, Ruth, "On Anti-authoritarianism," in Carl Oglesby (ed.), The New Left Reader,
Grove Press, New York, 1969, pp. 243-53.
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Ababa, Addis (s/n: Dennis Shillingford), 355 Allen Robert, 149d.

Abernathy, Rev. Ralph, 104 Allende, Chilean President Salvador, 249
Abdul Jabber, Shasheem (s/n: John Crenshaw), Alsop, Joseph, 352
412 American Bar Association, 255-6, 390
Ablard, Deputy Attorney General Charles D., American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 65,191,
251d. 228, 322
Ables, Michael, 375 American Federation of State, County and
Abourezk, Charlie, 279d., 401 Municipal Employees (AFSCME), 224, 344
Abourezk, U.S. Senator James, 279d., 384, 401 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC),
Abu-Jamal, Mumia, 320 100d., 101d.
Abzug, Bella, 167 American Indian Movement (AIM), x, xii, xiv, 2-
Accfon Patriotica Revolucionaria (APR), 67 9, 19, 86, 233-302, 246d., 250-1d., 257d., 2644.,
Action Patriotica Unitaria (APU), 69d., 73d., 77d. 275-6d., 2784., 280d., 300-2d., 332, 348, 391-2,
Aceto, Joseph (aka Joseph Balino), 318, 416 399, 401;
ACLU; see American Civil Liberties Union "AIM Camp 13," 391;
Acoli, Sundiata (s/n: Clark Squire), 308, 361 Colorado AIM, 236d.;
Adams, Hank, 234 Des Moines AIM, 392;
Adams, FBI Deputy Associate Director James "Dog Soldiers," 276, 278-9d., 401;
B., 254d., 2704., 273-44., 281d., 305d. founding of, 233
Adams, SA J. Gary, 265, 269, 270d., 276, 396, 398, Northwest AIM, 263, 271, 294, 399
401-2 American Nazi Party, 413
Adams, Reverend John, 385 American Police State, The , 21
Adams, Wallace, 55d. American Teachers Forum, 203d.
Adelphi University, 371 American Workers Party, 341
AFSC; see American Friends Service Committee Americans Before Columbus, 233
AFSCME; see American Federation of State, Amiotte, Roger, 291
County and Municipal Employees Amite County (MS), 367
Afraid of Bear, Sam, 394 Amnesty International, 145, 306, 321-2, 324, 334,
Africa, 128 391, 403
African Communities World, 13 Ana, Heldma, 355
Afro-American Student Society, 202d. Anderson, Blair, 140, 358
Agents of Repression, x, xii, xiv, 1, 8,10-1, 20, 327; Anderson, U.S. District Judge George, 35
Washington Post review of, 2-3, 6, 8-9; Anderson, Mike "Baby AIM," 265, 395-6, 399,
official sources cited in, 5-6 402, 405
Ahern, New Haven Police Chief James F., 147 Anderson, Randy, 221
Ahmad, Eqbal, 375 Anderson, Canadian Supreme Court Justice R
AIM; see American Indian Movement P., 403
Aird, George, 7, 391 Andrades, Alfonso, 84
Albania, 371 Ann Arbor, MI, 192-3d.
Alameda County (CA), 129 Anniston, AL, 166
Albertini, Ann, 307 APR; see Accidn Patriotica Revoluciemaria
Albertini, Jim, 307 Aptheker, Bettina, 370
Albizu Campos, Pedro, 64-7, 77-8, 345 APU; see Accidn Patriotica Unitaria
Albuquerque, NM, 246d. Aptheker, Herbert, 172, 370
Alcatraz Island, 233 Aquash, Anna Mae, 291, 293d., 393, 399-400, 404;
Alderson (WV) Federal Prison for Women, 410 FBI post mutton identification of, 293d.
Alexander, S.L.; see de Mau Mau, Spade Arbuckle, John "Two Birds," 383
Algeria, 129, 148, 150-2, 361 Archerd, Army, 212, 214d.
Algiers (Algeria), 149d. Arellano, Johnny, 235, 383
Allen, Louis, 367 Arizona State University, 51-2, 55-6d.
439
Armed Resistance Unit (ARU), 313 Bates, FBI Supervisor R.F., 352
"Aryan Nations," 413 Battisti, US. District Judge Frank, 378
Ashley, Karen, 377 Baumgardner, FBI Assistant Director Fred J., 42-
Ashwood, Carlos (aka Carl Wood), 147, 361 3d., 45, 351-3
"Asiatic Beetle," the, 201d. Bay Area Radical Union (BAYRU), 381
Askardi, Churnaimari, (s/n: Charles Stalling), Bay of Pigs Invasion, 386
355 Bayh, U.S. Senator Birch, xiv
Atlanta Constitution, 352 BAYRU; see Bay Area Radical Union
Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, 94 Bear Runner, Edgar, 395
Attack on Terror, 170 Bear Runner, Oscar, 272d.
Attleboro, MA, 316, 414 Bel Air, MD, 112
Attica (NY) State Prison, 414 Bell, Harold, 140
Augusta (GA) Chronicle, 351-2 Bell, Herman, 157
Aurora, CO, 236d. Bell, Sylvester, 133d., 135
Austin, Toni Rene; see Quddus, Njeri Belle Fourche, SD, 402
Austria, 320 Bellecourt, Clyde, 233
Avakian, Bob, 357, 381 Belloni, U.S. District Judge Frank, 400
Ayers, Bill, 377, 379 Belmont, FBI Headquarters Supervisor Alan H.,
16d., 33, 40d., 352, 368
BAAANA; see Black Acupuncture Advisory Bennett, Fred, 148, 150, 151-52d., 153, 362
Association of North America Bennette, Fred C., 100d.
Bad Heart Bull, Julius, 393 Benson, U.S. District Judge Paul, 280, 293, 295,
Bad Heart Bull, Sarah, 239, 384 401-2, 406-7
Bad Heart Bull, Wesley, 238, 241d. Berg, Alan, 312, 413
Badlands National Monument, 384 Bergman, Dr. Walter, 166
Baez, Joan, 183 Berkeley, CA, 217, 220
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 349 Berkman, Dr. Alan, 311-2, 314, 412-4
Balagoon, Kuwasi (s/n: Donald Weems), 311, Berman, Cook County (IL) Chief Toxicologist
361, 411 Eleanor, 358
Baldwin, James, 167, 342 Bernstein, Leonard, 159, 162d.
Balino, Joseph; see Aceto, Joseph Berrigan, Phillip and Daniel, 189, 375
"Baltimore Four," the, 375 13errfos Martinez, Ruben, 87, 349
Banks, Dennis James, 233-4, 238, 251d., 255, 299, Berry, Thomas; see Mshina
399-400, 403; Betances, Ramon Emeterio, 64
and Douglass Durham, 255, 391; Bettelyoun, George, 262
founds AIM, 233; BIA; see U. S. Government; Bureau of Indian
"Wounded Knee Leadership Trial" of, 7, 255- Affairs
6, 389 Biberman, Dana, 315
Banks, Kamook (Darlene Nichols), 399-400; Biddle, Francis, 337, 341
has baby, "Iron Door Woman," in prison, 400 Billings, Richard "Mohawk," 7, 391
Banks-Means Trial, 255, 259, 280, 389-90 Binetti, Nicholas, 157
Banoff, Barbara, 332 Bingham, Stephen J., 364
BAPBOMB (Baptist Bombing) Investigation, 369 Binghamton, NY, 415
Baraka, Amiri, (s/n: LeRoy Jones), 135 Binias, Floyd S., 393
Baraldini, Silvia, 310, 411-2 Binias, Olivia, 394
Barcei6 Romero, Puerto Rico Governor Carlos, Bird, Joan, 36
87 Birmingham, AL, 166, 167, 169;
Bardacke, Frank, 371 Police, 367, 369;
Barker, Bernard, 376 16th Street Baptist Church, 369
Barnhill, Andrew, 413 Birmingham (AL) News, 351
Barry, Lee, 361 Bishop, Cameron David, 318, 416
Barton, Jack, 36 Bishop, FBI Assistant Director Thomas E., 100-
BASA; see Black Allied Student Association ld., 118d., 127d., 149d., 183d.
Basford, Canadian Justice Ron, 291 Bismarck, ND, 288-9d., 297
Bates, San Francisco SAC Charles, 143-6,145d. Bisson, Terry, 412
Index 441
Bissonette, Gladys, 261, 393 1334.,143, 1454., 148, 149d., 163; Commu-
Bissonette, Jeanette, 393 nity Education Program, 123; Health Care
Bissonette, Pedro, 259, 261-2, 392-3, 398 Program, xv-xvi, 123, 143, 146, 159; Ten
BLA; see Black Liberation Army Point Program, xv, 124, 356;
Black, Don, 412 SNCC merger with, 126-8; split with, 127d.;
Black Acupuncture Advisory Association of "war" with United Slaves (US), 130-5, 130-3d.,
North America (BAAANA), 309 358
Black Allied Student Association (BASA), 202- "Black Power," 105, 107, 353
3d. "Black Scare," 94
Black Bear, Janice, 394 Black Star Line Steamship Corporation, 12d.
Black Crow, Sylvester "Selo," 268, 398 Black United Front (BUF), 192-3d.
Black Elk, Philip, 393 The Blackboard, 115, 116d.,117
"Black Extremists," 151d. Blackhorse, Alice, 236d.
Black Guerrilla Family, 320, 417, 418 Blackman, Ronald (aka Ron Janvier), 400
Black Horse, Frank (aka Frank DeLuca), 263, Blackstone Rangers (Black P. Stone Nation, El
272d., 396, 400 Rukn), 135-6, 138d., 417
Black Liberation Army (BLA), 157, 164, 306, 308, Blackwell, Randolph T., 367
364, 410, 412 BLACPRO (Black Program), 110, 354
Black Liberators, 113-5d. Blair House, 67
"Black Nationalist - Hate Groups" (FBI Bloemendahl, FBI Contract Coroner Dr. Robert,
classification), 92-3d., 100d., 102d., 107-11d., 404-5
1134., 115d., 118d., 120-1d., 124-54, 1274., Bloeser, SA Richard H., 153
1304., 132d., 134-5d., 1384, 1444., 1494., 1544., Bloods (street gang), 419
162d., 210-Id., 214d., 216d., 218-9d. Blount, Brenda; see Salim, Aisha
"Black Nationalists," 91 Blue Bird, Howard, 394
The Black Panther, xvi, 1374043-4d., 148, 159, Munk, Tim, 309, 314, 412-4
161-2d.,163, 213d., 357, 365; Boardman, FBI Intelligence Division Supervisor
COINTELPRO against, 159, 161, 163, 226, 365 L.V., 33, 40d.
Black Panther Party (BPP), x, xv-xvi, 123-64, 124- Bogue, U.S. District Judge Andrew, 373-4, 388-9
5d., 127d., 144-5d., 1544, 162-3d., 178, 183-4, Bohemia Libre Puertorriquefia, 72
188,193d., 201, 210, 214-5d., 218-94., 233, 256- Bohmer, Peter G., 201, 224
7, 3(13, 320, 356-65, 370, 412, 417, 419; BoI; see Bureau of Investigation
and the Jewish Defense League (JDL), 135, Boldt, U.S. District Judge George, 188, 375
136-7d., 1634.; Bolin, Robert, 402
conflict withBlacicstone Rangers, 135-9, 138d.; Bolshevism, 124.;
founding of, 123; Bolshevik Party, 391;
local chapters of; Chicago, 103, 135, 139-42, Bolshevik Russia, 34
141d., 210-1d., 356, 358, 360; Des Moines, Bomani Sababu, Kojo, 322
360;Denver, 144, 2124., 356, 360; Detroit, Bond, U.S. Senator Julian, 104
212, 360; Indianapolis, 144, 360; Jersey City, Bonds, Howard, 310
2134.; Los Angeles, 132d., 133, 141-2, 148, Bonus Army, the, 36, 337
153-7, 154-54., 215, 216-7d., 2584., 356, 359, Booth, John Wilkes, 311
362-63; New Haven, 146-7, 360; New York, BoP; see U. S. Government; Bureau of Prisons
135, 147-8, 150, 157-9, 1584., 161-2d., 356-7, Bordeaux, Jean, 399
361;Newark, 134d., 135; Oakland, 124d., Bork, Acting Attorney General Robert, 383
132d., 145d.; Omaha, 143, 356; Peoria, 141; Borne, Robert, 86
Philadelphia, 143; Sacramento, 142-3,159, Borup, Donna, 312
163; Salt Lake City, 142, 360; San Diego, BOSLUC (Boston, Ray Luc Levasseur) Investi-
133d., 135, 142, I44d., 159, 360; San gation, 316-7
Francisco, 142-4, 146, 150, 215, 356; Seattle, Bosman, Deputy Sheriff David, 382
143,145; Washington, D.C., 360; Boston, MA, 316, 344, 414;
Newton-Cleaver split within, 148-54, 149-52d., Arlington Street Church, 372
157, 159, 160-1d., 362; "Boston Five," the, 175
programs of; Anti-Drug Program, xvi, 123, Boston Tea Party, 319
419; Breakfast for Children Program, 123, Boston University, 371
Bottom, Anthony 157 Bundy, Presidential Adviser McGeorge, 345

Boudin, Kathy, 379, 411 Burden, William A.M., 372
Boudin, Leonard, 62 Bureau of Investigation (13o1), 93
Boutelle, Paul, 343 Burke, Steven, 412
Bowers, Sam, Jr., 168-9, 368 Burnett, Alfred, 223
Bowling Green, KY, 281d. Burnette, Rosebud Sioux Tribal President
Box Canyon (CA), 391 Robert, 383, 388
Boy Scouts of America, 51 Burns, Nathaniel; see Odinga, Sekou
BPP; see Black Panther Party Burton, Joe, 224
Bradlee, Benjamin, 97 Bush, Alonzo, 401
Bragg, Marvin (aka Ricky Lee Waters), 401 Butler, Darryl "Dino," 263, 271, 283d., 319, 395,
Braithwaite, South Dakota Judge Richard, 334 399, 407;
Brandeis University, 371-2 RESMURS trial of, 7, 273-4, 276-7, 401-2
Brando, Marlon, 399 Butler, Julius C "Julio," 7, 155, 363
Brennan, FBI Assistant Director Charles D., 92d., Butler, Nilak, 391-2, 395, 403
96, 160d., 176, 177d., 180d., 183-4d., 333 Butler, Richard, 413
Brewer, BIA Police Officer/GOON Duane, 242, Butler-Robideau Trial, 283-6d., 319, 400
384 Butte, MT, 34
Brewer, Verlina, 140, 358 Byrd, U.S. Senator Robert C, 189
Brewster, Kingman, 360 Byrne, U.S. District Judge Matthew, 190
Bridges, Harry, 36, 337
Bridges, William, 350 Cabellero, Juan, 82-3
Briggs, Cyril V., 350 "Cable Splicer," 244, 385, 410
Bringing Down America, 224 Cabrera, Miguel, 84
Brings Yellow, James, 268, 394, 398 Cabot Lodge, Senator Henry, 345
"Brinks Case," the, 309-10 Cagle, Charles Arnie, 369
Britt, Travis, 367 Cairo, IL, 114d., 117
Broderick, CPD Officer Raymond, 358 CALC; see Clerty and Laity Concerned About
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Union, 94 the War in Vietnam
Broussard, Holly, 391 Caldas de Blanco, Gloria Teresa, 348
Brown, Elaine, 358, 362 California;
Brown H(ubert) "Rap," 93d., 105, 111d., 112, 126, Adult Authority, 129;
135, 357 State Appellate Court, 129;
Brown, California Governor Jerry, 400 State Assembly, 356;
Brown, Norman, 283d., 395-6, 402, 405 State Police; Criminal Intelligence and
Brown, Ray, 129, 256-7, 361, 363 Investigation Unit (CID, 359, 364;
Brown, Sam, 411 Specialized Training Institute (CSTI), 410
Brown University, 371 California State College, 201
Brown, Federal Contract Coroner Dr. W.O.; Callahan, FBI Associate Director Nicholas P.,
autopsy on Pedro Bisonnette, 262, 393; 267d., 2704., 2734, 269d., 305d.
autopsy on Joe Stuntz ICillsright, 397; Callahan, CCS Detective Ray, 142, 359, 364
autopsy on Anna Mae Aquash, 291, 404 Cambodia, 221
Brownell, Attorney General Herbert, 353 "Camden Twenty-Eight," the, 223
"Bruder Schweigen" (Silent Brotherhood), 312 Camp, Carter, 256, 383, 386, 390
Buchanan, Patrick J., 351 Campbell, Dougherty County (GA) Sheriff Cull,
Buck, Marilyn, 311-2, 314, 411, 414 367
Buckley, William F., Jr., 146 Canada, 7;
Buckman, Debra; see Sundiata, Asha House of Commons, 403
Budapest, Hungary, 46d. Cancel Miranda, Raphael, 322, 346, 375
BUF; see Black United Front Cannon, James, 341
Buffalo, NY, 376 Cannon, Terry, 371
Buffalo Gap, SD, 238 Cardoza, Peter, 126, 357
Build, Project; see Project Build Carlin, Newark Mayor Leo, 342
Bunche, Ralph, 98d. Carlucci, White House Aide (later NSC
Bundeskriminalamt, 86 Director) Frank, 383
Index 443
Carmichael, Stokely (Kwame lure), 163d., 355, Chicago Rainbow Coalition, 210
370; Chicano-Indio Unity Conference, 238
as BPP Prime Minister, 126; Childs, Jack and Morris, 351
as chair of SNCC, 105, 173; Chimarenga, Coltrane (s/n: Randolph Simms),
bad-jacketing of, 126.8,128d., 357; 311, 413
FBI surveillance of, 112, 171; "Chinese Communists," 109d.
FBI targeting of, 93d.,109, 110d, 111 Chomsky, Noam, 52, 91, 372
Carmody, CPD Officer Edward, 358 Christianson, SA Steve, 203
Carr, Jimmy, 150, 362 Christmas, William, 364
Carter, Alprentice 'Bunchy," 131d., 133, 359 Church Committee, 9, 148, 164, 229
Carter, Frances, 360 Church, U.S. Senator Frank, idv, 277, 402
Carter, President Jimmy, 333, 346, 410 Church of Jesus Christ Christian, 413
Carter, Ruth, 413 Churchill, Ward, x, 226, 227d., 276, 380, 400, 404
Carver, Ron, 371 CIA; see Central Intelligence Agency
Casa Puerto Rico, 78 CII; see California; State Police; Criminal
Casades, Leroy, 383 Intelligence and Investigation Unit
Casper,FBI Supervisor J.J., 160d. Cincinatti, OH, 223
Casson, John J.; see Hassan, All Bey CIO; see Congress of Industrial Organizations
Castro, Fidel, 50, 68d. 71d., 75d., 76, 77d., 78, 89 CISPES; see Committee in Solidarity with the
Catches, James, 399 People of El Salvador
Catholic University (Washington, DC), 60 Ciszewsld, John, 358
Catholic War Veterans (CWV), 186d. Citizens Committee to Investigate the FBI, xi;
Catonsville, MD, 375 City Collegy of New York (CCNY), 372
CBS; see Columbia Broadcasting System Civil Disorder Management School, 244
CCNY; see City College of New York Civil Rights Act of 1866, 367;
CCS; see Los Angeles; Police Department; Civil Rights Act of 1968, 106, 354;
Criminal Conspiracy Section anti-riot amendment ("Rap Brown Act"), 188,
Cedar Rapids, IA, 273, 282, 394, 319, 390, 400-1 354
Cedar Rapids (IA) Gazette, 286d. Civil Rights Congress, 167
Celay, Phillip, 382 Civil War, 91
Center for Constitutional Rights, 409 Claridad, 72-4
Center for the Study of Human Behavior, 86 Clark, Judy, 315, 379, 411
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), x, 82,126, Clark, Atlantic City SAC Leo, 369
128d., 166, 174, 176, 178, 281-2d., 301-2d., 303, Clark, Mark, 103, 140, 141d., 348, 358, 403
320, 347, 355, 363, 366, 371-2, 386; Clark, Attorney General Ramsey, 106, 175, 179,
Director of Central Intelligence, 344 183, 271
Cerro Maravilla, Puerto Rico, 84, 3.48 Clark, Attorney General Tom, 338-9
Cetewayo (s/n: Michael Tabor), 361 Clay, Omawale, 413
Chambers, jay David Whittaker, 14-5d. Clayton, AUSA Bill, 261, 398-9
Chamblis, Robert E. "Dynamite Bob," 369 Clearwater, Frank, 247, 387-8, 393
Chaney, James, 168-70, 367-8 Qearwater, Morning Star, 387
CHAOS, Operation; see Operation CHAOS Cleary, SA Brendan, 153
Charles, Norman, 265, 395-6, 399 Cleaver, Mdridge, 126, 128-9, 148, 149d., 150,
Charles Mix (SD) County Court House, 278d. 151d., 152-3, 157, 159, 160d., 163d., 357, 361-2
Chavez, Los Angeles Municipal Judge Antonio, Cleaver, Kathleen, 151-2d., 363
359 Clergy and Laity Concerned About the War in
Chavez, Cesar, 183 Vietnam (CALC; now Clergy and Laity
Cherry Hill, NJ, 309 Concerned), 178, 306
Chesimard, Joanne; see Shakur, Assata Cleveland, MS, 149d.
"Chicago Eight," the, 146, 188, 360 Cleveland, OH, 192d., 317, 377, 379, 415;
Chicago Interreligious Task Force, 306 West 22nd Street, 317
Chicago, IL; Clifford, Secretary of Defense Clark, 374
Golden Torch Restaurant, 139; Clifford, Gregory Dewey, 360, 399
Police (CPD), 139-41, 186, 225-6, 356, 358, 360- Clifford, BIA Police Officer/GOON Joe, 261-2,
1, 377, 379 392
Clinton (NJ) Women's Prison, 308 Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), 35-6, 48,
Cluchette, John, 363-4 52d., 58d., 61-2, 69-714., 94-6, 103-4, 111d., 165,
Clutterbuck, General (UK) Richard, 86 167, 173, 175, 185-6d., 201, 230, 336, 337, 340-1,
Coalition for a New South, xiv 347, 351, 370-71;
Cochran, John A., 55d. FBI targeting of, 19, 38, 40-4, 40d., 42d, 47-8,
Coffin, William Sloane, 175, 187, 372 47d., 340-1;
COFO; see Council of Federated Organizations FBI wiretapping of, 338-9;
Cohen, Felix, 300-1 founding of, 33-4, 336;
Cohendet, William, 146 Operation Hoodwink and, 43d., 44-5d, 45-6;
COINTELPRO Papers, The, xi-xvi Palmer Raids and, 34-5;
Colbum, Chief U.S. Marshal Wayne, 243-4, 248, W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of, 44d., 173, 185d., 370-1
2524., 385 Communist Workers Party (CWP), 230
Coleman, Bruce, 371 Compton, CA, 105
Coler, SA Jack R., 265-6, 271, 273, 277, 283-7d., COMTEL (Communist Intelligence), 409
2874., 297d., 395-7, 399, 402, 404-7; also see Congressional Joint Resolution 1042, 382
RESMURS Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 341
Coll, FBI Public Information Specialist Tom, 266, Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 93d., 106,
397 112, 168-9, 171, 367
Collazo, Oscar, 67, 346 Congress pro Independentista (CPI), 66
Collier, Robert, 361 Connor, Birmingham (AL) Police Clef Eugene
Collins, Addie Mae, 369 "Bull," 166
Colon Berrios, Puerto Rico Intelligence Agent Cook, Birmingham Police Sgt. Thomas H., 167,
William, 348 366
Colorado State University, 416 Cook, Tom, 386-7
Colson, White House Counsel Charles, 190, 376 Coolidge, President Calvin, 350
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), 368 Corbett, CPD Officer William, 358
Columbia University, 60, 165, 171-2, 174-6, 181d., Cordier, Dean Andrew, 372
186d., 201, 217, 225, 372-3; CORE; see Congress of Racial Equality
Hamilton Hall, 372; Corretjer, Juan Antonio, 65, 70d., 346
Low Library, 372; Cosa Nostra, La, 42-64., 45, 103, 104d.
School of International Affairs, 372 Coston, Anthony; see Shakur, Lumumba
Columbus, OH, 317, 415 Coston, James; see Shakur, Zayd Malik
Copland& Armados de biteracion (CAL), 74 Council of Federated Organizations (COFO),
COMINFIL (Communist Infiltration), 39, 95, 367-8
340, 351-2, 354 Counterintelligence; A Documentary Look at
Comintern, the, 341 America's Secret Police, xi
Committee Against Foreign Domination of the Cottier, Stacy, 393
Fight for Independence, 88, 349 court cases;
Committee for the Expansion of Socialist Albizou v. United States, 346;
Thought in America, 42 Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 345;
Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Baraldini v. Thornburgh, 419;
Salvador (CISPES), x, xii-"dv, 10, 17-9d., 18, Boynton v. Virginia, 366;
306, 310, 331, 409, 413; Clark v. United States, 315;
Dallas chapter, 15; Cole v. Young, 340;
FBI infiltration of, 15 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Committee to Aid the Monroe Defendants Control Board, 340;
(CAMD), 51, 52d., 57 DeLima v. Bidwell, 345;
Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP), Downes v. Bidwell, 345;
383 Dunne v. United States, 341;
Committee United for All Political Prisoners In Re Attorney General, 344;
(CUPP), 214d. In Re United States, 344;
Communist Control Act of 1954, 95 Jencks v. Unites States, 340;
Communist Labor Party, 35, 336 Morgan v. Virginia, 366;
Communist League, 341 New York Times v. United States, 375;
Communist Manifesto, 49 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 340;
Index 445
Peters v. Hobby, 340; Custer, Lt. Col. ("General") George Armstrong,

Service v. Dulles, 340; 276d.
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 344; Custer, SD, 238, 240, 241d., 246d., 264d., 280d.,
Socialist Workers Party v. United States, 344; 383
Spence v. Washington, 191; Custer County (SD) Court House, 238, 246d., 399
Stern v. Richardson, 343; Custer Died fur Your Sins, 233
United States v. Calandra, 228; Cut Grass, Lydia, 394
United States v. Dennis, et al., 339; Cutler, Robert, 39
United States v. Nardone, 338; Cutt, Jackson Washington, 393
United States v. United States District Court, CWP; see Communist Workers Party
302d.; CWV; sec Catholic War Veterans
United States v. Whitehorn, et al., 312, 412-3; Cyszewski, CPD Officer John, 358
Watkins v. United States, 340;
Yates v. United States, 340 Dallas, TX, 192
Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA), Dallas Notes, 192-3
413 Dalton, Cheryl LaVern; see Obafemi, Nehanda
Coward, SA Fred, 294, 401; Daly, FBI Inspector P.V„ 158d.
telescopic identification of Leonard Peltier, Danang, Republic of Vietnam, 172
406 Danbury, CT, 415
"Cowboy Boot Caper," the, 395, 399 Darcy, Sam, 36
Cox, Don "D.C," 134d., 150, 151d., 153 Dario Rosada, Arnaldo, 84
Cox, U.S. District Judge Harold, 169 Darst, David, 375
CPI; see Congress() pro Independentista Davis, Angela Y., 159, 201, 364
CP, USA; see Communist Party, USA Davis, Benjamin J., 95
CREEP; see Committee to Re-Elect the President Davis, CPD Officer Phillip Joseph ("Gloves"),
Crenshaw, John; see Abdul Jabber, Shasheem 358
CRIPs (street gang), 417 Davis, Rennie, 188
Cronin, Father John, 37 Davis, Sammy, Jr., 183, 256, 257-8d.
Cronkite, Walter, 168, 368 Day, Secretary of State William, 345
Crooks, Lynn, 294, 298 Daylight, Mary, 236d.
Cross, Clarence, 393 "Days of Rage," the, 222, 379
Cross, Lonnie, 95 DeBerry, Clifton, 343
Crossfire (television program), 351 DeBruler, Atlanta SAC Wilburn K, 252-3d.
Crow Dog, Leonard, 234, 256, 386-7, 390-1, 398; de Diego, Jose, 67
Crow Dog's Paradise, 234, 268, 288-9d., 398 de Garcia, Concepcion, 66
Crowder, Richard, 342 DeGaulle, Charles, 373
Crusade for Justice, 274, 383 DeLoach, FBI Assistant Director Cartha "Deke,"
"Crusader Briggs," 13d. 42-3d., 97, 98d., 100-1d., 107-8d., 124d., 127d.,
CSA; see Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord 14911., 169, 171, 177d., 183d., 351-2, 369
CSTI; see California; Specialized Training DeLuca, Frank; see Black Horse, Frank
Institute DeLuse, Virginia "Blue Dove," 391
Cuba, 50, 63, 68d., 71d., 72, 78, 88, 129, 275d., 308, DeMaris, Keith, 399
342, 386; "De Mau Mau," 117
Intelligence Service (DGI), 412 De Mau Mau, Spade (s/n: S.L. Alexander), 355
Cubbage, FBI Departmental Attorney Roger, DeSersa, Aaron, 394
287d. DeSersa, Betty, 394
Cueto, Maria, 310 DeSersa, Byron, 262, 394
Cunningham, FBI Toolmarks and Firearms De Simone, Ralph, 344
Expert Courtland, 405 de Vaughn, Cynthia J., 383
Cunningham, Dennis, 141 De Voto, Bernard, 329
CUPP; see Committee United for Political Deacons for Defense of Justice, 93d., 112
Prisoners Dean, Presidential Council John, 383
Curran, Father Frank, 159 Decker, John P., 55d.
Curry, Thomas, 157 Dee, Henry H., 368
Curzi-Laaman, Barbara, 316-8, 415-6 Deerfield, OH, 317, 415
Delaney, Richard, 412 DSOC; see Democratic Socialists of America

Delaney, South Dakota Assistant Attorney DuBois, W.EB, 94, 350
General William, 396-7 W.E.B. DuBois Clubs; see Communist Party,
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 301d. USA
Dellinger, David, 179, 180d., 188 DuBray, Betty Jo, 394
Deloria, Vine Jr., 233, 389 Dudley, Betsey, 387
Democratic Revolutionary Front, 313 Duey, Randy, 413
Democratic Socialists of America (DSOC), 344 Duke, Elizabeth Ann ("Bettty"), 312
"DEMNOV" (COINTELPRO New Left), 209d. Dull Knife, Guy, 262
Democratic Party, 38, 43, 50, 91,171; Dumke, Chancellor George, 201-2
1964 Atlantic City Convention, 168, 170; Dunne, Bill, 322
1968 Chicago Convention, 59, 146, 180-1, 185, Durant, Paul "Skyhorse," 7, 391
191, 217-8 Durham, Douglass, 8, 245, 255-6, 332, 386, 390-2,
1972 Miami Convention, 190 397, 404
Dennis, Delmar, 169 Dutschke, Ruck 326
Dennis, Eugene, 36, 337, 339 Dye, Thomas, 413
Denver, CO, 34, 51, 52-3d.,142, 356, 360, 404; "Dynamite Bob"; see Chamblis, Robert E.
school board election, 51, 53d.;
East Colfax St., 236d. Eagle, James Theodore ("Jimmy"), 265, 273, 380,
Denver Post, 52-3d. 395-6, 405-6;
Des Moines, IA, 360; RESMURS charges dropped against, 287-90d
Police, 386 Eagle, Leon, 396
Detroit, MI, 34-5, 52, 56, 105, 117, 212, 223, 34-4, Eagle, Richard, 393
353, 355, 360, 379 Eagle Dear, Jancita, 392, 394
Detroit Coalition Committee, 191, 192-3d. Eagle Hawk, Edith, 393
DGI; see Cuba; Intelligence Service Eaglestaff, Marcella "Makes Noise"; see
Dhoruba, Analye; see Moore, Richard Dhoruba McNoise, Marcella
DIA; see Defense Intelligence Agency Earth First!, xiv
Dies, U.S. Representative Martin, 26 Easchief, Jeremiah, 236d.
Dies Committee; see U. S. Government; House of East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives, 375
Representatives; Committee on UnAmerican East Greenwich, RI, 416
Activities East Orange, NJ, 51
Divale, William Tulio, 222, 365 East St. Louis, IL, 91, 114d., 116d., 117
Dobbs, Farrell, 341 Eastman, BIA Police Commander/GOON
Dobbs Ferry, NY, 414 Leader Delmar, 235, 242, 259, 261-2, 384, 392-3
"Dog Soldier Teletypes," 8, 274-5 Eaton, William 0., 170, 369
Doherty, Joe, 414 Eberhart, David, 375
Dohrn, Bernardine, 377, 379, 412 Ebner, Jerry, 307
Dohrn, Jennifer, 276d. Ecoffey, BIA Police Officer Robert, 265
Domingo, WA., 350 Edwards, Cleveland, 363
DOMS; see United States Government; Depart- Edwards, U.S. Representative Don, x
ment of Defense; Directorate of Military Edwards, George, 360
Support Edwardville, IL, 116d.
Donaldson, 171 Effland, Robert W., 55d.
Donghi, Diane, 379 Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 39, 40, 341
Donner, Frank, 191 El Hajj El Shabazz; see Malcolm X
Doolittle Committee, 49 El Imparcial, 72, 347
Douglass, Boyd, 189, 375 El Mundo, 72, 75d.
Dow Chemical Corporation, 174, 371-2 El Rukn Organization; see Blackstone Rangers
Dowd, Jeffrey, 375 El Viet', 72, 347
Dowdell, Rick, 221 El Yunque rainforest, 82-3
Doyle, SA James, 401-2 Elliot, Walter, 51
Draper, Wilfred "Wish," 265, 283-4d., 395-6; Ellison, Bruce, 292, 397, 399, 401, 404
FBI interrogation of, 401, 405 Ellsberg, Daniel, 4,189-90, 332, 372, 375-6
Drumgo, Fleeta, 363-4 Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD, 244-5, 389
Index 447
ELSURS (Electronic Surveillance), 96, 155, 166, subdivisions of; Counterintelligence Division,
304, 351, 408; 33; Crime Lab, 291; Crime Records
legal basis for, 338-9 Division, 97, 100d., 127d.; Division Five
EM; see "Extremist Matters" (COINTELPRO), 355; Domestic Intelligence
Emerson, Thomas I., 1 Division, 178d.; General Crimes Section,
Emmitsvffie, MD, 410 277d., 283d., 287d.; General Intelligence
Engels, Frederick, 50 Division, 37, 283d.; Headquarters (FBIHQ),
Enloe, Minneapolis ASAC, Philip, 389 252-3d., 271; Identification Division, 291,
Epps, Lonnie, 361 293d.; Internal Security Section, 33, 277d.,
Epton, Bill, 371 352; Fireams and Toolmarks Unit, 294;
Erikson, Justice Department/FBI Liason Ralph, Foreign Liaison Desk, 237d.; National
251d., 385 Bomb Data Center, 313; Squad 47 (NYC
Erlich, Ralph, 371 COINTELPRO Section), 315; Training
Erlichman, White House Domestic Advisor Facility (Qunatico, VA), 266, 296d., 395;
John, 190, 251d., 376 Special Investigations Division, 167;
Espionage Act of 1917, 49, 189 Subversive Control Section, 68-9d., 734., 75-
”Espionage-R," (FBI classification), 16d. 6d., 79-81d.;
Evans, FBI Section Head Courtney A., 167, 351 Field Offices and Resident Agencies; Albany,
Evans, Linda Sue, 312, 314, 379, 414 206d., 307d., 256; Aquadilla, Puerto Rico
Evanston, II, 226 (Resident Agency), 65; Atlanta, 95-6, 350-2,
Evelegh, Robin, 385 368; Baltimore, 120d., 130; Birmingham,
"Evidence and Intimidation of Fascist Crimes by 365-6; Boston, 244., 117, 1944., 362; Chicago,
U.S.A." (newspaper artide), 143 68d., 102d., 103, 104d., 1384., 141d., 201d.,
Executive Orders; 273d., 283d., 286d.; Dallas, 17-8d.; Denver,
E.O. 9835, 339; 51, 53d., 235, 283d.; Detroit, 120-1d., 150d.,
E.O. 10450, 52d.; 191, 192d., 212d.; Fajardo, PR (Resident
E.O. 11921, 410; Agency), 65; Honolulu, 260d.; Jackson, MS
E.O. 12036, 333; (Resident Agency), 1224., 168-9, 368; Los
E.O. 12148, 410; Angeles, 130-1, 1324., 154d., 156d., 184, 201,
E.O. 12333, 333, 335 2094., 2144., 216d., 218-94., 256, 2574., 259d.,
"Extremist Matters" (EM; FBI classification), 270d., 362; Las Vegas, 257d.; Louisville, KY
235, 236-7d., 246d., 257d., 259d., 307d., 362 (Resident Agency), 281d.; Media, PA
(Resident Agency), 4; Miami, 119d.; Mil-
FALN; see Fuerzas Armadas de Lilleracicfn Nacional waukee, 197d.; Minneapolis, 257d., 2614.,
Fanon, Franz, 354 273d., 291, 292-3d., 395; New Orleans, 18-
Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN), 313 9d., 104d., 168; New York, 24d., 42-7d., 52d.,
Fargo, ND, 282, 294, 401, 406 57, 58d., 60, 68-71d., 73d., 75-6d., 126, 1364.,
Farmer, James, 98d., 171, 352 158d., 161-3d., 165, 182d., 191, 194d., 1964.,
Fast Horse, Allison, 393 202d., 204d., 351-2, 354, 362, 365; Newark,
Faulkner, William, 167 51, 133-5, 134d., 179, 180-24., 199-2004.,
Featherstone, Ralph, 112, 357 213d., 358; Oklahoma Qty, 261d.; Omaha,
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), 238, 239d., 261d.; Philadelphia, 44-7d., 1094.,
FD-302 reports, 285d., 406; 184, 185-64., 187, 204, 205d., 2074., 355;
intelligence/counterintelligence classifica- Phoenix, 51, 55d., 353; Ponce, Puerto Rico
tions of; Administrative Index, 260d.; (Resident Agency), 65; Portland, 264d., 400;
Agitator Index, 355; Black Nationalist Rapid City, SD (Resident Agency), 238, 240,
Photo Album (Black Extremist Photo 248-9, 253, 272-3d., 292-3d., 296d., 388, 395,
Album), 117, 153,156d., 355; Key Agitators 404; St. Louis, 112, 113-6d.,117; San
Index, 175; Key Extremist List, 206d.; Public Antonio, TX (Resident Agency), 18d.; San
Security Index (PSI), 72; Rabble Rouser Diego, 131, 133, 135, 358, 365; San Fran-
Index, 113, 355; Racial Calendar, 355; cisco, 24d., 126, 143, 144-5d., 150-1d., 161d.,
Reserve Index, 184., 96, 351; Security Index, 1634., 209d., 2164., 2184., 2604., 357, 360,
76d., 96, 112,154d., 355; 362, 365; San Juan, 64, 68-71d., 72, 73d., 75-
publications of; Domestic Terrorist Digest, 217, 6d., 79-81d., 83d., 85d.; Seattle, 257d.;
275-6d., 401; Springfield, IL (Resident Agency), 113d.,
114d., 116d.; Washington, D.C., 12d., 24d., bl exemptions, 17d., 237d.;

68d., 109d., 193d.; b2 exemptions, 18-9d.;
U.S. Legation, Ottawa (Canada), 237d., 238 b7c exemptions, 17-9d., 239d., 246d., 264d.,
FBI and CISPES, The, xiii 270d.;
FederaciOn de Universarios pro Independencia b7d exemptions, 236d.;
(FUPI), 57, 69, 71d., 72, 74, 75d., 77d., 80d., 83d. c exemptions, 17d.;
Federation Estudantil pro Independencia (Fag), 67, s exemptions, 24-5d.
80d. Freedom Rides/Riders, 166-7, 170, 366
Federal Communcations Act of 1934, 338 Freudenberg, Nick, 373
Federal Emergency Management Agency Frey, Oakland Police Officer John, 356
(FEMA), 398, 410-1 Friends of SNCC, 166, 170-1
Federal Emergency Preparedness Agency Friends of the Panthers, 159
(FEPA), 410 Frizzell, U.S. Solicitor General Kent, 248, 388
Federal Tort Claims Act, 62 Froehlke, Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert,
Felt, FBI Associate Director W. Mark, 177d., 178
183d., 315, 367 Froines, John, 188
FEMA; see Federal Emergency Management Act Fuerst, John, 379
FEPA; see Federal Emergency Preparedness Act Fumas Armadas de Liloemcion Nacional (FALN),
FEPI; see Federacion Estudiantil pro Independencia 86, 275d., 310, 326, 412
Ferber, Michael, 175, 372 Fula, Yarsmyn, 412
Ferguson, Chui, 411 Fulton, Canadian M.P. Jim, 4(13
Fernandez, Ronald, 65 FUPI; see Federation de Universarios pro Indepen-
Fielding, Dr. Louis, 190, 376 dencia
Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, 174 Gain, SA Charles, 146, 360
First World War, 91-2, 106 Gaines, Jerry, 412
Fitzpatrick, SA Thomas, 245, 386 "Gainesville Eight," the, 190
Fleigelman, Ronald, 379 Gamber, Edward F., 14d.
Flemming, U.S. Civil Rights Commission Gammage, BATF Agent Mike, 296d.
Chairman Arthur J., 269 GAO; see U. S. Government; General Account-
Flores, Irwin, 346 ing Office
Foerster, New Jersey State Trooper Werner, 308 "Garden Plot," 244, 385, 410
FOIA; see Freedom of Information Act Gardiner, SA Theodore M., 313
Fonda, Jane, 159, 212, 214-5d. Garment, White House Aide Leonard, 251d., 383
Foraker, U.S. Senator Thomas B., 63 Garry, Charles, 129, 143, 146
Foraker Act, 63-4, 345 Garvey, Marcus, x, 11-13, 12-13d., 91, 94, 349-50
Ford, President Gerald R, 410 Garveyism, 349
Ford, Joudon, 361 Gary, Romaine, 215-6, 216d.
Gaston, A.G., 369
Ford, Assistant Attorney General Payton, 338
Gaston, Billy, 367
Foreign Agents Registration Act, 341
Gastonia, NC, 36, 337
Forman, James, 126, 135, 171, 357, 366
Gates, Hobart, 238
Fort, Jeff, 135-6, 138d.
General Intelligence Division (FBI predecessor),
Fort Carson, CO, 385 34, 36
Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, 244, 387-9 Genet, Jean, 364
Fort Randall Dam (SD), 278d. Georgetown University Law School, 34
Fort Sam Houston, TX, 179 German-American Bund ("German Bund"), 339
Fort Totten Reservation, 245 Germany, 37
Foster, New York Police Officer Gregory, 409 Ghetto Informant Program, 110, 354, 355
Fraina, Louis, 33 Gibson, U.S. Eighth Circuit Court Judge Jim, 298
France, 129 Gibson, Robert S., Jr., 14d.
Franklin, H Bruce, 381 Gibbs, Phillip, 221
Franklin, John Clarence, 343 Gilbert David, 411
Free Speech Movement, 171 Gitlin, Todd, xv
Freed, Donald, 159 Gitlow, Benjamin, 336
Freedom of Information Act, xi, xii, 9, 235-6, 295, Giuffrida, FEMA Director Louis O., 348, 385,
306, 333; 410-1
Index 449
Gladstone, Lyn, 238 Hai& General Alexander, 243

Glick, Brian, 327-8 Haile, Bartee, 378
Godfrey, Howard Berry, 194, 203, 222, 224-5 Haldeman,WhiteHouseCbief of Staff H.R.,383
Gold, Ted, 174, 371-2 Haley, Marin County (CA) Judge Harold J., 364
Goldsmith, John A., 149d. Hall, Gus, 48, 79
Goldstein, Robert Justin, 41, 187 Hall, James R., 406
Gonzales, Rudolfo "Corky," 274 Hall, John Wesley, 369
Gonzales Molave, Alejandro, 84, 86, 348 Halstead, Fred, 57, 59d.
Gonzalez Perez, Puerto Rico Intelligence Hamden, CT, 344
Sergeant Nelson, 348 Hamer, Fannie Lou, 171
Good Buffalo, Hilda R., 393 Hamilton, Candy, 388, 392, 403
Goodman, Andrew, 168-70, 367-8 Hamilton, Steve, 371
Goodman, Mitchell, 175 Hammond, Samuel, 220
Gordon, NE, 234, 282, 382, 388; Hampton, Carl, 221, 378
Hacienda Motel, 388 Hampton, Fred, 103, 135, 13841, 271, 358-9, 403
Gorman, CPD Officer Joseph, 358 Handelsman, Leonard, 379
Grady, U.S. District Court Judge John F., 141 Hanrahan, Illinois State's Attorney Edward V.,
Grathwohl, Larry G., 223, 379 140
Gray, FBI Director L Patrick, 256-7, 306, 315, 414 Hard Times Conference, 276d.
Gray, U.S. Attorney William B., 287d. Hardy, John, 367
Green, Berta, 52d., 342 Hardy, Robert W., 223
Green, James Earl, 221 Hare, Leslie, 234
Greenwood, MN, 367 Hare, Melvin, 234
Greenwood, Tony R., 279d. Hare, Nathan, 363
Gregory, Richard Claxton ("Dick"), 103, 104d. Haring, J. Howard, 14d.
Greisa, U.S. District Court Judge Thomas P., 62, Harlan County, KY, 36
343-4 Harlem Mau Mau, 117
Grenada Invasion, 312 Harper, New Jersey State Trooper James, 309
Grey, Whitney, 383 Harper, James, 276, 401
Grimes, Wille Earnest, 220 Harris, Brenda, 140
Grimm, Charles, 223 Harris, Lou, 352
Grimm, U.S. Marshal Lloyd, 247, 286 Harris, CPD Officer Lynwood, 358
Gross, Rosemary, 363 Harris, Richard, 361
Grossner, Morris, 373 Harrison, Hubert, 350
Groth, CPD Sgt. Daniel, 139, 358 Harrison, James A., 354
Grove Press, Inc., 178 Hartford, CT, 348
Grumman Corporation, 317 Harvard University, 175, 371-2
Grupo pro-Uso Voto Del MPI, 88, 89d., 349 Harvey, SA Olen Victor, 276, 399, 402
Guam, 345 Hassan, Al! Bey (s/n: John J. Casson), 361
The Guardian, 1954., 211d. Havana, Cuba, 78
"Guardians of the Oglala Nation" (GOONs), Hawaii, 64
242-9, 259, 262-3, 265-6, 268, 277, 284-5, 388, Hayden, Tom, 128, 165, 172, 179, 180d., 182d.,
394; 188
start-up funding for, 247; Hayes, Roland, 361
wound Marshall Grimm, 247 He Crow, Donald, 393
Guatemala, CIA operations in, 386 Heanes, Oakland Police Officer Herbert, 356
Guaynabo, PR, 83d. Heaney, U.S. Eighth Circuit Court Judge Gerald,
Guerra, Steven, 310 298
Guild Theatre; see San Diego Hefferman, Edward, 412
Gump, Joe, 307 Heisler, Edward, 344
Held, Chicago SAC Richard G., 142, 400;
Haas, Jeff, 141 and Hampton-Clark assassination cover-up;
Haber, Al, 165 140;
Haber, Joyce, 215, 219d. and COINTELPRO-AIM, 245, 248, 252d., 266
Hagemeister, Norfolk (VA) City Attorney Dan, 267-8d., 2704., 273-44., 287d., 300, 391, 395,
416 397, 398
Held, SA (later San Francisco SAC) Richard 169, 172-3, 177d., 181d., 192d., 199d., 205d.,
Wallace; 335-6,351-3, 355-6, 358-61, 368, 375, 380, 400;
and COINTELPRO-AIM, 9, 256-7, 259, 266, and the Black Liberation Movement; authori-
268, 2684., 2691, 274d.; zation of COINTELPRO against, 91, 92d.,
and COINTELPRO-BPP, 9,142; 99, 102, 352; authorization of national disin-
and Geronimo Pratt, 153; formation campaign against, 118-94.;
and Jane Fonda, 212, 214-5d.; expansion of COINTELPRO against, 108d.,
and Jean Seberg, 214-6, 216-7d., 2194.; 112; targets Dick Gregory, 103, 104d.;
and the "War on Drugs," 320, 417 targets Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., 96, 99,
Helgeson, SA Hunter E., 168, 170 102, 352; targets Rev. Charles Koen, 1154.,
Henry, Aaron, 368 117;
Henry, Richard; see Obadele, liar! Abubalcari and the Black Panther Party; authorizes
Herbers, John, 352 Newton/Cleaver split COINTELPRO, 150,
Hershey, Selective Service Director General 362; authorizes US/BPP operation,130d.,
Lewis, 372 133, 134d., 135; denounciation of, 123;
Hewitt, Raymond "Masai," 215 orders escalation of COINTELPRO-BPP in
Hill, Dave, 238, 396 San Francisco, 144-5d., 146; provocation of
Hill, BIA Police Officer Gerald, 266 the Blackstone Rangers against Chicago
Hill, Kevin, 394 BPP, 136, 138-94.; targets Breakfast
Hill Witt, Rocky Mt. Regional Civil Rights program, 145;targets Chicago Rainbow
Commision Director Shirley, 396-7, 404 Coalition, 210d.;
Hilliard, David, 131d., 148, 1504., 212, 361-3 and COINTELPRO; creation of, 33; orders
Hilliard, June, 363 termination of, 332;
Hills, Argentina, 72 and COINTELPRO-CP, USA, 33-48;
Hinds County (MS), 122d. authorizes Operation Hoodwink, 43d.;
Hinton, Alberta, 271 targets Marcus Garvey, 11, 12d., 91;
Hiss, Alger, x, 13-6, 14-5d. and media manipulation, 34, 117;
Woodstock typewriter of, 14-5 and the New Left; authorizes COINTELPRO
Hithe, Rory, 360 against, 191; denounciation of, 175; targets
Hitler, Adolph, 163d. Tom Hayden and Dave Dellinger, 179,
Hobart College, 222 1894.; targets Liberation News Service,
Hodge, FBI Ballistic Lab Chief Evan, 294, 297, 194d., 196d.; targets Mobe and SWP, 179,
406-7 209d.; targets SDS, 165-6, 184, 2004., 2044.,
Hoffa, Jimmy, 341-2 207d., 212;
Hoffman, Abbie, 170, 179, 188, 230, 374, 376, 380- authorizes COINTELPRO-SWP, 50;
1 authorizes COINTELPRO-Puerto Rican
Hoffman, U.S. District Judge Julius, 188 Independence Movement, 57-70, 68d., 72;
Hogan, N.Y. County District Attorney Frank, and wiretapping, 99, 103, 165-6, 352, 366, 388-
147, 157 9
Hogan, John, 375 Horowitz, Gus, 59d.
Holder, SA George, 122 Horse, Hobart, 394
Holder, Stan, 256, 383, 386, 390 Hot Springs, SD, 391, 396
Holiday, Wilfred, 362 House Resolution 66, 339
Hollywood Daily Variety, 212, 214d. Houston, Melvin Lee, 396
Holy Elk Face, Debbie, 236d. Houston, TX, 91, 221, 349
Holy Elk Face, Joanna, 236d. Howard, CPD Officer Fred, 358
Holy Elk Face, John, 236d. Howard University, 371
Homochita National Forest, 368 Howell, Renee, 276, 278d.
Hoodwink, Operation; see Hoxie, Milwaukee SAC Herbert E., 252d.
Operation Hoodwink Hruska, U.S. Senator Roman L., 189
Hoover, George A., 203 HUAC; see U.S. Government; House of Repre-
Hoover, FBI Director J(ohn) Edgar, xii, 444., 63, sentatives; Committee on UnAmerican
69d., 73d., 76d., 79-81d., 85d., 94, 102d., 106, Activities
108, 113d., 1204., 122, 1324033, 136d., 1414., Hubert, Claude, 133
145, 148, 149d., 150, 151d., 154d., 159, 162d., Hudgins, Margaret, 360
Index 451
Huggins, Ericka, 133, 147, 360 IS; see 'Internal Security"

Huggins, Jon, 131d., 133, 147 Iselin, Jay, 97
Huggins, Mai, 133 Israel, 135
Hughes, SA Dean, 396, 401
Hultman, AUSA Evan, 280, 287d., 401 J&R Dude Ranch, 389
Humphrey, Hubert, 50, 204d. Jack-In-The-Box Corp., 159
Hungary, 45-6d. Jackson, George, 159, 363, 364
Hunt, Howard, 190 Jackson, Larry; see Njabafundi, Hakim
Hunter, Randy, 394 Jackson, MS, 121,122, 122d., 195, 355
Hurd, AUSA RD., 255-6, 389-91 Jackson, Attorney General (later Supreme Court
Hurst, Eugene H., 367 Justice) Robert H., 49, 50, 338
Huston, Tom, 48 Jackson State College, 220, 221
Hutton, "L'il" Bobby, 128-9 Jackson, Col. Vic, 244
Hyland, Rick, 357 Jacobs, John "J.J.", 377, 379
Jaffe, Naomi, 379
IAT; see Indians of All Tribes Jalovec, Illinois Deputy State's Attorney
IBM; see International Business Machines Richard, 139, 140
IDA; see Institute for Defense Analysis Jamaica, 350
"Identity Christians," 413 Jamal (s/n: Eddie Joseph), 361, 362, 411
Imperial Valley (CA), 36 Jamal, Hakim (s/n: Allen Donaldson), 117, 355
Independent Oglala Nation (ION), 244, 387-8 James, Wayne Maurice; see Quddud, Offoga
Indianapolis, IN, 142, 360 Janis, Dale, 394
Indians of All Tribes (IAT), 233, 382 Janklow, S.D. Attorney General (later Governor)
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), 35 William 'Wild Bill," 266, 392, 396, 399, 403
Ingram, SA James 0.1 170 Janvier, Ron; see Blackman, Ronald
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), 176, 372-3 Jayuya, P.R. 67
Institute for Policy Studies, 175 Jefferson, Thomas, 342, 356
Insular Cases, the, 64, 345 Jenkins, Birmingham SAC Thomas, 366
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, xii, Jerome, Fred, 371
333 Jewish Defense League (JDL, JEDEL), 135, 136-
71, 162, 163d., 412
Interamerican Press Association, 72 Jim Crow, 166, 168, 171
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), x, 41, 97,161, Jobs or Income Now (JOIN); see Students for a
207, 352 Democratic Sodety
"Internal Security" (IS; FBI dassification), 404., Johansen, Bruce, 249
42-7d., 52-3d., 55d., 58d., 83d., 854., 92-3d., John Birch Society, 199d., 392, 413
108d., 180-1d., 185d., 197d., 199-200d., 202d., John Brown Anti-Klan Committee, 310, 412
212d., 214d., 351-3 "John Doe" warrants, 86
Internal Security Act of 1950 (McCarran Act), 38, John F. Kennedy International Airport; see New
404., 50,179, 339 York City
internal Security Emergency," 50 John Howard Association, 321
International Business Machines (IBM), Johnson, Deborah, 140
bombing of, 316 Johnson, Lee Otis, 376
International Editors and Publishers Confer- Johnson, President Lyndon B., xiv, 41, 103, 106,
ence, 341 168-9, 171, 174-5, 197, 255-6, 368, 370, 374
International Consultative Meeting of Commu- Johnson, Chicago SAC Marlin, 103, 135, 140, 209,
nist and Workers Parties, 46d. 358
International Indian Treaty Conference (1975), Johnson, Mississippi Governor Paul, 168
278d. Johnson, Robert, 98d.
International Left Opposition, 341 Johnson, Walter; see Odinga, Baba
Interstate Route 80, 316 Johnson, Baker County (GA) Sheriff Warren
Interstate Route 95, 316 "Gator," 367
ION; see Independent Oglala Nation JOIN; see Students for a Democratic Society
Irish Republican Army (IRA), 345, 414 Joint Terrorist Task Force (ITTF), 309-11, 316,
Iron Door Woman, 400 361, 411-2, 414
IRS; see Internal Revenue Service Jones Act, 64, 345
Jones, CPD Officer George, 358 King, CB., 367

Jones, James Wormley, 13d. King, Christopher; see Tour& Karl
Jones, Jeff, 379 King, Marion, 367
Jones, LeRoi; see Baraka, Amiri King, Rev. Martin Luther, Jr., 55d., 102, 104-5,
Jones, New York Police Officer Waverly, 157, 112-3, 138;
409 FBI attempt to force suicide of, xi, 97, 99d.,
Jordan, Sam, 343 352;
Joseph, Edward "Eddie"; see Jamal FBI and assassination of, 100-1, 352;
Josephy, Alvin Jr., 234 FBI defamation of, 10, 97-101, 352;
Juan Soto, Pedro, 84 FBI surveillance of, 95-7, 171, 351-2;
Juarbe y Jaurbe, Juan, 78, 347 placed in Reserve Index, 96;
Jumping Bull, Cecilia, 263 targeted for neutralization, 98d., 109, 110-Id.
Jumping Bull Compound, 395-6 King, May, 368
Jumping Bull, Harry, 363, 290d. King, Slater, 367
Jumping Bull Hall, 388-90d. Kinshasa, Kwando (s/n• William King), 361
Justesen, Michael, 375 Kirk, Columbia University President Grayson,
Joseph, Edward "Eddie"; see Jamal 176, 372-3
Kabat, Father Carl, 307 Kirkpatrick, Jean, 88
Kahane, Rabbi Meir, 135, 136-7d. Kissenger, Secretary of State Henry, 189
Kaleidoscope, 197d. Kitchens, T.W., 351
Kane, Kenny, 401 Kitson, Frank, 385
Kansas Turnpike, 294, 399, 402 KKK; see ku klux klan
Kaplan, Sherwin, 368 Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General Richard,
Kaptchuk, Ted, 174 165, 228, 251d., 333
Karenga, Ron, 130, 131d., 135 IGimkowski, Major Adam, 376
Kash, U.S. Marshal Reese, 243, 385 Klonsky, Mike, 226
Katara, 202-3d. Koch, New York Mayor Ed, 410
Katara, Abayama, (s/n: Alex McKeiver), 361 Koen, Rev. Charles, 113-7, 113-64.
Katz, Dr. Aaron, 86 Komisaruk, Katya, 307
Katzenbach, Attorney General Nicholas deB., Korea, North, 77d.
103,165-6, 353, 366, 368 Korn, Dr. Richard, 322
Kearney, FBI Supervisor John, 315, 414 Kraslow, David, 352
Kefauver, Estes, 50 Krause, Allison, 221
Kelley, FBI Director Clarence M., 8, 23, 266, Kudzu, 195-7
267d., 271, 276, 280, 281d., 2874., 291, 294, 304, ku klux klan (KKK), xv, 51, 117, 122, 144d., 166-
397-8, 400-1, 408 70, 335, 347, 366, 368-9, 412
Kelly, FBI Supervisor J.G., 95 Kunstler, William, 188, 276, 297, 400-1, 407
Kelly, James, 353
Kelly, Joe, 375 LaComte, Dennis, 393
Kelly, CPD Officer William, 358 LaCourse, Richard, 235
Kelly, Yvette, 413 La Fortaleza, 67
Kempf, SA Charles, 399 La Pointe, Frank, 394
Kennedy, Jacqueline, 167 La Vista, NB, 279d.
Kennedy, President John F., 41, 50,167, 340-1, Laaman, Jaen, 316-8, 416
345, 355, 367, 383 Laaman, Ricky, 415
Kennedy, Attorney General Robert, 41, 96, 171, Labor-Management Relations Act; see Taft-
351, 367, 374 Hartley Act
Kent State University, 221, 224, 378; Lacon, IL, 380
Police, 224; Ladd, FBI Assistant Director D. Milton, 164., 37,
Kenyatta, Charles 37X, 117, 139 63, 65-6
Kerr, Clark, 171 Lake Andes (SD), 278d.
"Key Activists" (FBI classification), 177-84., Lamonaco, New Jersey State Trooper Philip,
180d., 186d. 316, 318-9, 415
Killsright, Joe Stuntz, 266, 394, 396-7 Lamont, Buddy, 348, 388
Kimbro, Warren, 146, 360 Lane, Mark, 261, 393
Index 453
Lares Board, 73d. Little Crow, Philip, 393

Large, Jess, 236d. Little Ghost, Leroy, 245, 386
Large, Jim, 236d. Liuzzo, Violo, 170, 369
Larson, Pennington County (SD) Sheriff Mel, Lloyd, George, 362
400-1 Lockhart, Ann; see Sana, Tamu
Laster, New York ASAC Lee F., 412 Locust, Joe, 233, 236d.
Laurel, MS, 167 Lodge, FBI Fingerprint Specialist Winthrop, 405
Laurie, New York Police Officer Rocco, 409 Loff, Ken, 413
"Law Enforcement on the Pine Ridge Indian Lone Hill, Yvette Lorraine, 393
Reservation" (FBI report), 263 Long, U.S. Senator Edward V., 99, 102
LCN; see La Cosa Nostra Long, Gerry, 377
Le Deaux, Joanna, 398 Longdale, MS;
Leaventhal, Larry, 389 Mt. Zion Baptist Church bombing, 168-9
Leavenworth (KS) Federal Prison, 399 Long Island Star Journal, 351
Lebrun, Lolita, 346 Long Soldier, Aloysius, 393
Lederer, Bob, 412 Long Visitor, Angie, 398
Lee, Herbert, 367 Lopez, Alfredo, 82
Legion of Justice, 225 Lopez-Rivera, Oscar, 322
Lemmer, William W., 190, 224 Los Angeles, CA, 105, 141, 148, 215, 224, 259d.,
Lenin, V.I., 50 337, 344, 356, 383;
Lester, Julius, 171 Centry Plaza Hotel, 397
Letellier, Orlando, 410 Police Department (LAPD), 133, 142, 225, 359,
Levasseur, Carmen, 318 363; Criminal Conspiracy Section (CCS),
Levasseur, Patricia Gros (aka Paula Horning, 142, 159, 359, 361, 363
Judy Hymes), 316-9, 415-6 Watts District of, 105
Levasseur, Ray Luc (aka Jack Horning, John Los Angeles County (CA);
Boulette), 316-9, 322, 415-6 Jail, 142;
Levasseur, Rosa, 415 Sheriffs Department, 363
Levasseur, Simone, 415 Los Angeles State College, 372
Levi, Attorney General Edward H., 350, 397 Los Angeles Times, 215, 229, 352
Levison, Stanley D., 95, 351 Los Macheteros, 86, 326, 348
Lewis, Thomas, 375 Loud Hawk, Kenny, 396, 399-300
Lewisburg (PA) Federal Prison, 391, 415 Loud Hawk, Sam, 396
Lexington (KY) Federal Prison for Women, 321- Louisana State University, 371
3; Lowndes County (AL), 369
High Security Unit (HSU), 321-3 Lowry, Robert, 342
Lezak, AUSA Sid, 400 Luce, Phillip Abbot, 222, 366
Liberation News Service (LNS), 191-2, 194-6d. Luckes, Loretta, 360
Liberia, 13d. "Iumpen," the, 126
Liddy, G. Gordon, 190, 376 Lynd, Staughton, 172, 377
Light, Bill, 368
Ligua Sochtlista Puertorriquefla, 74 McAlister, Sister Elizabeth, 375
Linberg, Jackson SAC Elmer, 122 McCarran, U.S. Senator Pat, 50
Lincoln Detox Center, 309, 311, 410 McCarran Act; see Internal Security Act of 1950
Lincoln, NB, 239d. McCarthy, U.S. Senator Eugene, 374
Lipmans, Carol, 59d. McCarthy, U.S. Senator Joseph, 187, 340;
Lippman, Roger, 375 McCarthyism, 13, 38, 325
Little, Bruce "Beau," 396 McClain, James, 364
Little, Jim, 394 McCloskey, William, 390
Little, Kenneth, 394 McComb, MS, 170
Little, Malcolm; see Malcolm X McCord, James, 190
Little, Richard, 396 Camp McCoy (WI), 380
Little, Wallace Jr. ("June"), 279d., 396 McDaniels, Clarence, 247d.
Little Big Horn River (MT), 276d. McGee, James, 378
Little Bird, BIA Police Officer Qen, 265 McGee, Ruchell, 364
McGhee, Willie, 167 Marisuch, CPD Officer John, 358

McHugh, Ray, 332 Markle, Arnold, 360
McIntyre, RCMP Inspector Ronald, 86 Marquette University, 2
McKeiver, Alex; see Katara, Abayama Marriot, Sacramento Mayor Richard, 143
McKiernan, Kevin Barry, 387 Marshall, Chip, 375
McLaughlin, Rev. Niel, 375 Marshall, Richard, 7, 291, 403
McLucas, Lonnie, 147, 360 Martin, AUSA John S., 310
McManus, U.S. District Edward ("Speedie Martin, SD, 394
Eddie"), 276, 280, 290, 402, 405 Martinez, Eugenio, 376
McManus, Matthew, 378 Martorell, Antonio, 349
McNair, Denise, 369 Maryknoll Sisters, 306
McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert, 174 Marx, Karl, 50
McNoise, Marcella ("Makes Noise Eaglestaff"), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MID,
391 372
McQuillan, New York Supreme Court Justice Matchinger, Howie, 377, 379
Peter, 408 Mateo Espada, Puerto Rico Intelligence Sergeant
Nazario, 348
MacDonald, Dwight, 372 Mathews, Robert Jay, 413
MacDonald, Herbert, 358 Matter, FBI Audio Technician John, 97
MacEachen, Canadian Minister of External Matthews, Connie, 153
Affairs Allen, 403 Mau Mau (political organization), 110d., 358
Mack, Larry, 361, 412 Mau Maus (Chicago gang), 139
Madame Binh Graphics Collective, 312 May 2 Movement (M2M), 173, 366, 371
Madrid, Rocky, 386, 387 May 19th Communist Organization, 310-2
Mafia; see La Cosa Nostra Mayday Demonstration, 228, 229, 380
Maestas, Roberto, 249 Mayfair Markets, 159
Mahoney, CCS Detective Daniel, 364 Mayflower II, 234
Major, Harvey, 392 Maynor, New Orleans SAC Harry, 168
Malcolm X (s/n: Malcolm Little), 57, 102d., 103, MDFP; see Mississippi Freedom Democratic
105, 110d., 117, 328, 353, 362 Party
Mallin, Jay, 86 Means, Betty, 394
Mallory, Mae, 51, 53, 342 Means, Bill, 383
Malvesi, Dennis, 310 Means, Date "Dace," 383
Manchester, William, 187 Means, Edward Jr., 393
Mancuso FBI (television program), xiii Means, Russell, 234-5, 238, 243, 239-40d., 251d.,
Mandel, Bob, 371 279-80d., 382-3, 384, 394;
Manderson, SD, 394 joins AIM, 233;
Manning, Carol, 316, 318, 415, 416 Wounded Knee charges against, 6-7, 387;
Manning, Jeremy, 318, 416 "Wounded Knee Leadership Trial" of, 7, 255-
Manning, Jonathan, 318 6, 389-90;
Manning, Mary, 318 murder trial of, 403;
Manning, Tamara, 318 imprisonment of, 334;
Manning, Tom(aka Salvadore Bella), 316-8, 414, denounces COINTELPRO, 299
415-6 Means, Ted, 243, 383
Maoists, 371 Media (PA) FBI Resident Agency, break-in at, xi,
Marable, Maiming, 102 332, 347; also see FBI; Field Offices and
Marcantonio, Vito, 346 Resident Agencies
Mari Bras, Juan, 67, 70d., 74, 77d., 78, 78d., 79, 81- Meese, Attorney General Edwin, 86, 349
2, 83d., 87d., 88, 89d., 348 Meet the Press (television program), 349
Marianna (FL) Federal Prison for Women, 321-3 Mellen, Jim, 377
Marin County (CA) Civic Center, 364 Melrose Park, IL, 337
Marine Corps, 359; Melville, Mary, 375
Camp Pendleton, SC, 359 Melville, Sam, 414
Marion (IL) Federal Prison, 319, 322-3, 413, 416, Melville, Thomas, 375
418, 419 Memphis, TN, 100
Index 455
Meneses, Dona Laura, 78 Molino, David, 383

Mengel, James, 375 Monroe, NC, 342
Merhige, U.S. District Judge Robert, 390-1 "Monroe (NC) Defendants," the, 51
Meridian, MS, 168 Montague, MA, 159d., 196d.
Merld, Robert, 413 Monterey, CA, 389
Merki, Sharon, 413 Montgomery, Ed, 146
MERRIMAC, Project; see Project MERRIMAC Montileaux, Martin, 403
Merritt College, 123 Moore, Charlie Eddie, 368
Mesa, Steve, 383 Moore, FBI Associate Director George C, 100,
Message Information Center, 224 100d, 106, 107d., 111d, 118d., 119d., 123, 124d.,
Meyer, FBI Section Chief for Indian Matters and 126, 127d., 148, 149d., 157, 158d., 260d., 270d.,
Government Affairs Allan, 382 274d., 354
Miami, FL, 97, 117,118d.; Moore, Richard Dhoruba (s/n: Richard Moore;
Police Special Investigation Unit, 376 aka Analye Dhoruba), 157, 303, 361-2, 363,
MIBURN (Mississipi Burning) Investigation, 408, 409
169 Moore, Jackson SAC Roy K., 169-70
Michigan Daily, 193d. Moran, Kevin, 220
Michigan, Project; see Project Michigan Morehouse College, 96
Michigan State University, 371 Moreno, Puerto Rico Intelligence Agent Rafael,
Middleton, Delano, 220 348
Morgan, Craig, 222
Miles, Robert, 413
Morgan, Michael, 382
The Militant, 40d., 61, 341
Moritorium Demonstration, 380
Miller, Alvin lug," 364
Morlan, Larry, 322
Miller, FBI Assistant Director Edward S., 315 Morris, Barry, 378
Miller, Jeffrey, 221 Moses, Bob, 168, 367, 368
Miller, John V., 363
Mosher, Thomas E., 362
Miller, Kelly, 350 Moton, Robert Russa, 350
Miller, Richard, 307
Mt. Rushmore National Monument (SD), 279d.
Milwaukee, WI, 344 Mt. Zion Baptist Church; see Longdale, MS
Mims, Lloyd Lamar, 150
Mousseau, Jerry, 396
MINARET, Project; see Project MINARET
Mousseau, Robert 384
Minneapolis, MN, 49, 292, 341, 404 Moves Camp, Ellen, 385
Minnesota Citizens' Commission to Review the Moves Camp, Louis, 7, 255-6, 389
FBI, 5, 403 Moves Camp, Sam, 279d.
Minniks, Joanna, 59d. Movimiento de Liberacicht Nacional (MLN), 310
Minutemen, 226, 2274., 335, 413 Movimiento de LtheraciOn Nacional, Mexico
Mische, George, 375 (MINM), 86
Mississippi Burning (film), xiii Movimiento Pro Independencia de Puerto Rico
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), (MPIPR), 67, 69, 714., 72, 74, 77, 78, 78d., 79d.,
168,170 83d., 85d.
Mississippi Freedom Summer Project, 168, 367, Movimiento 27 de Marro, 67
368 Moylan, Mary, 375
MIT; see Massachusetts Institute of Technology MPIPR; see Movmiento pro Independencia de
Mitchell County (GA) Jail, 367 Puerto Rico
Mitchell, SA David B., 412 Mshina (s/n: Thomas Berry), 361
Mitchell, RCMP Inspector Edward W.J., 271, 400 Muhammad, Elijah (s/n: Elijah Poole), 93d.,
Mitchell, George, 233 1024.,103, 109,110d., 111d., 353
Mitchell, Attorney General John, 221, 228, 378 Muldrow, U.S. Civil Rights Commission
Mitchell, SA Roy, 139, 140, 359 Investigator William, 277, 395-6, 402, 404
MLN; see Movmiento de Llberacidn Nacional Mulveny, Connecticut Judge Harold M., 147
MOBE; see National Mobilization to End the Mundt, U.S. Congressman Karl, 50
War in Vietnam Mulloz Marin, Puerto Rico Governor Luis, 66,
Moffit, Ronni, 410 88, 346;
Mohr, FBI Assistant Director J.P., 98d., 160d. attempted assassination of, 67
Mohr, Reinhold, 224 Murphy, David, 56d.
Murphy, SA Robert A., 35d. National War College, 312

Murray, George, 201 Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, 77d., 346
Muslim Mosque, Inc., 103 NBC; see National Broadcasting System
Mutual Non-Agression Pact (nazi-Soviet), 36 NCAI; see National Congress of American
"Mysterious Order of the Veiled Prophets," 406 Indians
M2M; see May 2 Movement NCUP; see Students for a Democratic Society
Neal, Kathleen; see Cleaver, Kathleen
NAACP; see National Association for the Nebosha County (MS), 168, 368
Advancement of Colored People Sheriff's Office, 368
Nalibor, Julie, 412 Negro World, 12d.
Napier, Samuel, 148, 362 Nelson, Dusty (aka John Star Yellow Wood), 395
NASA; see National Aeronautics and Space Netherlands, 320
Administration Neufield, Russ, 379
Nashville, TN, 355 New Bedford, MA, 36
Nation of Islam (NoI), 93d., 102d., 103, 109d., New Haven, CT, 146-7, 360
111d., 149d., 353; New Jersey, 39, 51;
"Black Muslims," 355 State Police, 317;
National Aeronautical and Space Administra- State Youth Reception and Correction Center
tion (NASA), 384 at Yardville, 410;
National Anti-War Conference, 142d. Turnpike, 308, 410
National Association for the Advancement of New Left Notes, 195d., 211d.
Colored People (NAACP), 51, 52d., 94-5, 183, New Mobilization Committee to End the War in
342, 350-1, 368 Vietnam (New Mobe), 56d., 57, 57d., 58d., 59d.,
National Broadcasting Corp. (NBC), 60, 171, 333 60d.,192-3d., 209, 209d.
National Commission on the Causes and "New Negro," The, 92, 350
Prevention of Violence ("Walker Commis- New Orleans Times-Picayune, 351
sion"), 218-9, 374 New York City, 12d., 45d., 46d., 51d., 52d., 56d.,
National Conference for a People's July 4th, 60, 62, 70-1d., 74, 94, 96, 117, 126, 135, 147, 157,
276d. 174, 247d., 275d., 276d., 310, 313, 343-4, 347,
National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), 357, 361, 363-4, 371;
233 boroughs of; Bronx, 308; Brooklyn, 308, 371;
National Convention for a New Politics, 135 Manhattan, 126; Queens, 308;
National Council of Churches, 391 Grand Central Station of, 217;
National Guard, 106; Harlem section of, 95,103, 148;
Puerto Rico, 66 hotels in; Diplomat, 371; Hilton, 174;
National Indian Youth Council (NIYC), 233, 382 John F. Kennedy International Airport
National Labor Relations Board, 348 bombing, 410;
National Lawyers Guild (NLG), x, xv; Morningside Heights/Park, 372-3;
Anti-Repression Task Force, xv; Police, 158d., 217, 220, 361, 409-10, 417; Toe
Committee on Civil Liberties, x; Unit, 373;
founding of WKLDOC, 254 Special Services Department, 361, 363;
National Mobilization to End the War in "Tombs" jail of, 94;
Vietnam (MOBE), 60, 174, 179, 188, 209 Washington Square, 217
National Negro Congress, 167 New York Philharmonic Orchestra, 159
National Public Radio (NPR), 397 New York State Addiction Services Agency, 410
National Security Agency (NSA), 178 New York Times, 4, 60, 123, 158d., 189, 223, 342,
National Security Council (NSC), 38, 383, 410 352
National Security Decision Directive 26 (NSDD New York University, 202, 203d., 204d., 374
26), 410 Gould Student Center of, 203d.
National States Rights Party, 166 "New York 3," the, 157-9
National Tribal Chairmen's Association "New York 21;" see Panther 21
(NTCA), 383 Newark, NJ, 106, 135, 212, 342-4
National Union Construction Relations Board, Newark Community Union Project (NCUP); see
348 Students for a Democratic Society
National Uranium Research Evaluations NEWKILL (New York Killings) Investigaton,
(NURE), 384 158d.
Index 457
Newsday, 97 Obafemi, Nehanda (s/n: Cheryl LaVern Dalton),

Newsweek, 97, 220 411
Newton, Huey P., 123, 125-6, 128, 131d., 148, 150, Oberlin University, 371
150d., 151d., 157, 159, 1604., 161d., 321, 356-7, O'Clock, Rapid City ASAC George, 249, 253,
362-3, 381; 266, 395
assassination of, 328, 417-8 O'Connell, FBI Supervisor J.E., 249, 266
Nichol, U.S. District Judge Fred, 6-7, 255, 280, O'Dell, Jack, 96
389, 390 Odinga, Baba (s/n: Walter Johnson), 361
Nichols, Bernardine, 399 Odinga, Sekou (s/n: Nathaniel Burns), 311, 361,
Nichols, Darlene; see Banks, Kamook 411
Nichols, SA R. Robert, 351 O'Donnell, Kenneth, 351
Nixon, President Richard M., xvi, 4, 48, 50, 60, "Oglala Four," the, 281d.
158d.,186-7, 204d., 214d., 2154., 220, 228, 243, Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Organization
280, 343, 351, 361, 364, 374, 380, 382-3 (OSCRO), 259, 262
NIYC; see National Indian Youth Council Oglala Sioux Housing, 384
Njabafundi, Hakim (s/n: Larry Jackson), 355 Oglala Sioux Landowners Association, 235
Nkruma, Tawwab, 355 Oglala Sioux Tribe, 2504.;
NLG; see National Lawyers Guild Tribal Council, 385;
Nobel Peace Prize (Nobel Prize), 97,167 Tribal Court, 235
Noguchi, Thomas, 404-5 Oglala, SD, 263, 265, 268, 288-904., 395-7
NoI; see Nation of Islam Oglesby, Carl, 370
Nolen, W.L., 363 Ohio National Guard, 221-2
Non-Partisan League, 35 Ohio State Highway Patrol, 222
Norfolk, VA, 415 Ohio State University, 221, 222
Norman, OK, 372 "Ohio 7," the, 315-9, 326, 414, 417
North Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical Ojeda Rios, Hitherto, 86, 319, 326, 349, 414, 417
College, 220 Olsen, Caroline, 362-3
Northcott, Karen, 387, 403 Olsen, Kenneth, 362
Northern Ireland, 414 Om, Shaba, (s/n: Lee Roper), 361
"Northwest Territory," 278d. Omaha, NB, 143, 279d., 356
Northwestern University, 225 Omega 7, 308, 410
"Notes from the Sand Castle," 60 O'Melveny, Mary, 314
Nova Scotia, 292 O'Neal, William, 139-41, 358
NPPR; see Puerto Rican Nationalist Party Onondaga Reservation, 400
NPR; see National Public Radio Ontario, OR, 399
NSA; see National Security Agency Operating Engineers Union, 353
NSC; see National Security Coundl Operation CHAOS, 176, 178, 373
NTCA; see National Tribal Chairman's Associa- Operation Hoodwink, 424., 43d., 44d., 45-6, 45d.,
tion 464., 103, 105, 130, 335
NURE; see National Uranium Research Operation Sail, 275d.
Evaluations Order, The, 312, 413; also see Bruder Schweigen
"Nuremburg Defence," 414 Oregon State Police, 276d., 399
Nuremburg Tribunal, 49 O'Reilly, Kenneth, xvi, 166
NYU; see New York University Organic Acts, the, 63
Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU),
OAAU; see Organization of Afro-American 57,103, 419
Unity Orwell, George, 324
Oakland, CA, 123, 1244 125-6, 128-9, 132d., Ossining ("Sing Sing") State Prison, NY, 324
145d., 146, 155, 174, 356, 313, 364, 381; Ostensen, George, 307
Highland Hospital, 129; Owen, Chandler, 350
Police, 371, 471; Panther Squad of, 356, 361,
363 Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E), 233
"Oakland Seven," the, 371 Packer, Horace L, 222
Oaks, Richard, 233, 382 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 313
Obadele, Imari Abubakari (s/n: Richard Henry), Palmer, Attorney General A. Mitchell, 34
117-8,120-2d., 122-3 Palmer Raids, the, 34-5, 325
Panama Canal, 12d. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General Henry, 333

'Panther Pinheads," 127d. PFOC; see Prairie Fire Organizing Committee
Panther 21 (aka "New York 21"), the, 147-8, 157, PG&E; see Pacific Gas and Electric
159, 1614., 361-2 Philadelphia, MS, 168
Parenti, Michael, 199-200, 377 Philadelphia, PA, 44d., 454., 46d., 1094., 143, 172-
Parker, U.S. District Judge Barrington, 324, 333, 3, 186d., 275-64., 320, 353
419 Philadelphia Free Press, 193
Parlane, RCMP Corporal Dale, 271, 400 Philippine Islands, 345
Parmenter, Denver, 413 Phillips, NYC Assistant District Attorney Joseph
Parsons, U.S. District Judge James Benton, 98d., A., 147-8
102d. Phillips, FBI Internal Security Supervisor
Partido Independentista Puerterriquelo (PIP), 66, Seymore F., 97
74, 87 Phoenix, AZ, 380
Partido Popular Democratico (PPD), 66 Piagentini, NYC Police Officer Joseph, 157, 409
Partido Socialists Puertorriqunio (P), 67, 74 Pickstown, SD, 278d.
Pasadena City College, 366 Pierce, Bruce Carrol, 413
Passaic, NJ, 36 Pierce, James, 378
Paton, Lori, 51, 342 Pierce, William, 413
Patterson, U.S. Justice Department Negotiator Pierre, SD, 278d., 396, 399
Bradley, 251d. Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation, 9, 242, 249, 250d.,
Patterson, Eugene, 352 2514., 269d., 2704., 274d., 2904., 384, 397, 403;
Patton, Gerri, 360 Calico Hall, 2514.;
Payne, Cite, 112, 357 FBI and 1974 tribal election on, 6;
Pax Today, 245 Head Start Program on, 384;
Peace and Freedom Party, 128, 132d., 159, 357 hospital morgue, 261, 291, 393, 398;
Pearl, Ed, 159 Red Cloud Cemetary, 291;
Peck, James, 166 "Reign of Terror" on, 6;
Peltier, Leonard, 263, 28xd., 293, 2964., 395, 399; Sheep Mountain Gunnery Range of, 243, 384
appeals of, 298, 405-7; Pine Ridge, SD, 235, 249, 262, 279d.
capture of, 271, 400; PIP; see Partido Independentista Puertorriquena'
FBI targeting of, 271, 272d., 280, 287d.; Piper, SA Robert, 140
fraudulent extradition of, 7, 291, 400; Plenty Arrows, Carl Sr., 394
imprisonment of, 298, 319; PLP; see Progressive Labor Party
police targeting of, 235; "Plumbers," the, 190
Poor Bear affidavits about, 288-91d.; Poindexter, Ed, 143, 146
RESMURS trial of, 282, 294-5, 298, 398, 401-2 Political Rights Defense Fund, 51, 62, 344
Pennsylvania State University, 193, 372 Ponce, Puerto Rico, 65
Pennington County, SD, 401; Poole, Elija; see Muhamad, Elija
Jail, 401 Poor Bear, Myrtle, 282, 291, 293, 402-3;
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 320 affidavits of, 282, 288-91d., 295, 403
Pensamiento Critico, 349 Poor People's Campaign, 100d., 101, 101d.
Pentagon, the, 243, 411; Poppin, Samuel, 380
anti-war demonstration at, 371 Porcupine, SD, 279d.
"Pentagon Papers," the, 4, 189, 190, 375, 380 Portage County (OH) Grand jury, 378
People's Law Office (PLO), 141 Portland, ME, 318
People's Park (Berkeley, CA), 220 Portland, OR, 34
Posse Comitahis Act, 243, 410
Peoria, 14 140, 1414., 226, 376, 380 Potter, Col. Jack, 243, 252d., 385
Pepin, Scottsbluff County Sheriff Ernie, 241-2d. Potter, Paul, 172, 370
Perez, Ramon, 241d. Pottinger, FBI Supervisor J. Stanley, 350
Perez Casilla, Puerto Rico Police Intelligence Poullen, Stevie, 416
Commander Angel, 348 Powell, Curtis, 361
Perkins, Ronald, 363 Powless, Herb, 233
Perkins, William, 378 PPD; see Partido Popular Democratico
Perry, U.S. District Judge J. Sam, 141 Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC),
Peterson, Dr. Gary, 292, 404 275d., 276d., 314, 381
Index 459
Pratt, Geronimo (s/n: Elmer Gerard Pratt; aka Radio stations;

"G"; "Geronimo Ji Jaga"), 303, 362; KIXI (Seattle, WA), 247d.;
appeals of, 363; KOA (Denver, CO), 413;
attempted murder of, 142; WJRS (San German, Puerto Rico), 72;
COINTELPRO against, 6-7, 142, 151-2d., 153, WKFE (Yauco, Puerto Rico), 72;
154d., 1564.; WLEO (Ponce, Puerto Rico), 72
imprisonment of, 6, 319, 363; "Racial Intelligence" (RI; FBI dassification), 100,
murder trial of, 155, 157, 363 108
Pratt Institute, 371 "Racial Matters" (RM; FBI dassification), 44d.,
Pratt, Sandra Lane "Red," 148, 150, 362 69d., 83d., 85d., 100d., 1024., 107d., 1084., 1184.,
"Predication for Investigation of Members and 120d., 121d., 124d., 1254., 127d., 130d., 132d.,
Supporters of AIM" (FBI Report), 300 1344., 1354., 138d., 144d., 149d., 1514., 1594.,
"Pre-Nest" Operation (FEMA), 411 162d., 167,192d., 202d., 210d., 214d., 216d.,
Presley, Brenda, 363 217d., 219d.
Pretty Flips, Julia, 394 Racial Matters: The FBI's Secret File on Black
Price, Nebosha County (MS) Deputy Sheriff America, 1960-1977, xvi
Cedl, 168-9 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
Price, SA David, 293, 391, 395, 401; tions (RICO) Act, 309, 319, 326, 411-2, 413, 416
Anna Mae Aquash and, 292; Raddey, Alex, 146-7, 360, 362
Louis Moves Camp affair and, 255, 389; Rader, Randall, 413
Myrtle Poor Bear and, 282, 291, 402-3 Radical Education Project (REP), 212, 212d.
Price, FBI Stenographer Linda, 395 "Radio Bandera," 72
Princeton University Conservative Club, 199d., Radical Organizing Committee, 207d.
200d. RAF; see Red Army Fraction
Privacy Act, the, 9 RAM; see Revolutionary Action Movement
Proctor, SA John, 168 Ramparts, 128, 367
"Profile in Terrorism" (FBI Report), 310 Rampton, FBI Supervisor RJ., 351
Progressive Labor Movement, 371 Rand Corporation, 189, 372
Progressive Labor Party (PLP), 78, 173, 1844., Randall, Allen, 84, 348
230, 366, 370-1, 377, 380 Randolph, A. Philip, 94, 98d., 350,
Progressive Party, 96 Rap Brown Act; see Civil Rights Act of 1968
Project Build, 106, 353 Rapid City, SD, 238, 242d., 2464., 261, 264d., 270,
Project MERRIMAC (CIA), 176, 373 270d., 272d., 276, 278d., 280, 280d., 292, 390-1,
Project Michigan (CIA), 372 400-1;
Project MINARET (CIA), 178 North Street, 278d
Project RESISTANCE (CIA), 176, 373 Rapid City Journal, 238
Project Themis (CIA), 372 Raskin, Marcus, 175
'Proud Saber/Rex-82" Exercise (FEMA), 411 RATF; see Revolutionary Armed Task Force
Provost, Wilburt 'Willie", 279d. Ravena, OH, 378
PSP; see Partido Socialists Puertorriqueno RCMP; see Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Public Law 280 (PL 280), 232-3, 300 RCP; see Revolutionary Communist Party
Puerto Rican Independence Movement Reade, Harold, 342
(Independentistas), 19, 63-90, 68-70d., 71d. Reagan, California Governor (later President)
"Pumpkin Papers," the, 16d. Ronald, 220, 315, 333, 351, 357, 383
Real, Mark, 379
Quainton, Director of the State Department Reconstruction Era, 91
Office on Combatting Terrorism Anthony, 86 Rector, James, 220
Quddus, Njeri (s/n: Rene Austin), 355 Red Army Fraction (RAF), 86
Quddus, Offoga (s/n: ayn Maurice James), 355 Red Guerrilla Resistance (RGR), 313, 414
Quebec Liberation Movement, 86 Red Paint, Lorinda, 393
Querrolo, Uruguayan General Manuelo, 86 "Red Scare," the, 13, 34-5, 94
Quiles, Puerto Rico Intelligence Lieutenant "Red Star Cadre," 224
Jaime, 348 Red Star Collective 224, 245
Quiroz, Aida, 383 "Red Summer," 93
Quiroz, Andrea, 383 Reddest, Cleveland, 394
Redlands, CA, 383 RM; see "Racial Matters"

Redner, Russ, 299-400 RNA; see Republic of New Afrika
Redshirt, Marvin, 7, 391 "RNA 11," the, 122-3, 355
Reed, John, 336 Roark, Roxine, 393
Reid, U.S. Plenipotentiary Whitelaw, 63 Robbins, Terry, 377, 379
Reissner, Will, 343 Roberts, NYC Police Detective Eugene, 147, 361
Republic of New Afrika (RNA), 86, 117-8, 1204., Robertson, Carole, 369
121-3 121-2d. Robideau, Robert Eugene ("Bob"), 263, 271,
Republican Party, 39, 41; 283d., 395, 399, 407;
1972 Convention of, 190
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), 174, RESMURS trial of, 7, 273-4, 276-7, 401-2
221-2 Robideau, Jim, 263
RESIST, 372 Robinson, ffiana, 411
Resistance Conspiracy Case, the, 312, 315, 319, Robinson, Tyrone, 418
326 Rochester, NY, 222
RESISTANCE, Project; see Project RESISTANCE Rockwell, George Lincoln, 413
Resistance, the, 375 Rocky Mountain News, 53d.
RESMURS (Reservation Murders) Investigation, Rodriguez, Richard, 150
264d., 266, 267d., 268d., 269d., 270d., 271, 272d, Rogers, Attorney General William, 39
274d., 281d., 282, 283d., 2874., 296d., 297d., 395, Roland, Sandra, 412
399-401, 404-6. Romero, Ricardo, 310
Reveron Martinez, Puerto Rico Special Arrests Romano, Lin, 307
Agent Luis, 348 Romitti, Chicago Judge Phillip, 140
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), 93d., Roosevelt, President Franklin Delano, 36-7, 337-
109d., 111d., 112, 123, 235, 355, 361 8, 341
Revolutionary Armed Task Force (RATF), 309- Roosevelt Roads Naval Base, Puerto Rico, 86
12, 326, 411-4 Roosevelt, Col. (later President) Theodore
Revolutionary Communist Party, USA (RCP), "Teddy", 345
230, 381 Roper, Lee; see Om, Shaba
Revolutionary Youth Movement II (RYM II), Rosado, Andres, 310
381; also see Weatherman Rosado, Julio, 310
"Rex-84/Night Train" Exercise (FEMA), 411 Rosahn, Eve, 412
RGR; see Red Guerilla Resistance Rosebud Sioux Reservation, 234, 2794., 288-90d.,
RI; see "Racial Intelligence" 383, 392
Rialto, CA, 383 Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 383, 392
Rice, David, 143,146 Rosen, FBI Assistant Director Alex, 169, 368
Rice, Harry, 221 Rosen, Milton, 371
Rice, Dr. Ross P., 54d. Rosenberg Espionage Case, the, 24, 27
Richards, Chuck ("Charlie Manson"), 262, 394
Richards, Cliff, 259 Rosenberg, Ethel, 24d., 25d.
Richardson, Attorney General Elliot, 378 Rosenberg, Julius, 24d., 25d.
Richardson, Fred, 361 Rosenberg, Susan, 312-5, 322, 412-4
Richardson, US. Congressman James D., 64, 345 Ross, U.S. Eighth Circuit Court Judge Donald,
RICO Act; see Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 295, 298
Organizations Act ROTC; see Reserve Officer Training Corps
Rico, Christine, 412 Rowe, Gary Thomas, 167, 170, 366, 368-9
Ridenour, Ron, 386 Rowen, Carl, 98d.
Riesel, Victor, 352 Roxbury, MA, 117, 120
Riggs, Puerto Rico Police Colonel Frank, 65 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 86,
Ring , Barry, 59d. 355
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico, 65, 75d. Royko, Mike, 352
Rios Polanco, Puerto Rico Special Arrests Agent Rubin, Jerry, 179, 188, 374, 380
Jose, 348 Rudd, Mark, 371, 373, 377, 379
River Falls, WI, 255, 389 Rupprecht, West German Bundeskriminalamt
Rivera Burgos, Ludmilla, 348 Director Reinhard, 86
Rizzo, Philadelphia Police Chief (later Mayor) Rusk, Secretary of State Dean, 41
Frank, 143-4 Russo, Anthony, 189, 375
Index 461
Rustin, Bayard, 352 Scenic, SD;

Rutgers University, 371 Longhorn Bar, 403
Ruthenburg, Charles E., 33, 336 Scheer, Mortimer, 371
Ryan, SA John, 307 Schein, Dr. Edgar, 321
RYM II; see Revolutionary Youth Movement H Scheuer, Sandra, 221
Schmahl, Horace W., 13-5, 14d.
Sacramento, CA, 142,143 Schmitz, Darld, 238
SACB; see Subversive Activities Control Board Schroeder, William, 221
Safeway Stores, Inc., 159 Schwelb, Frank, 368
Sail, Operation; see Operation Sail Schwerner, Michael "Micky," 168-70, 367-9
Schwerner, Rita, 168, 368
Sailors Council, 34 SCLC; see Southern Christian Leadership
St. Francis, SD, 288d. Conference
St. Louis American, 116d. Scoblick, Anthony, 375
St. Louis Globe Democrat, 351 Scott, Emmett, 350
St. Louis, MO, 112, 114d., 115d., 116d., 117, 349, Scott, Ruben, 157
379, 401, 406 Scottsbluff, NB, 238, 239d., 240d., 241d., 246d.,
Salem Village, 329 262, 280d., 383, 393;
Salim, Aisha (s/n: Brenda Blount), 355 county jail in, 239d., 264d.;
Salsedo, General Frank S., 410 Park Motel, 239d
Salt Lake City, UT, 142, 360 SDS; see Students for a Democratic Society
Salt River Reservation, 383 Seale, Bobby, 123, 125-6, 128, 131d., 137d., 145d.,
Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson Brigade (SMJJ), 146-8, 159, 188, 356-7, 359-63
315, 317-8, 416; also see United Freedom Front Seale, John, 363
Sams, George, 360 Seattle, WA, 34-5, 43, 222, 247d., 413;
San Diego, CA, 133d., 135, 142, 149d., 159, 163, Police, 223
360; "Seattle Eight," the, 188, 222, 375
Guild Theater bombing, 224 Seattle Liberation Front, 188
San Diego State University, 201 Seberg, Jean, 214-6, 216d., 217d., 218d., 219d.
San Diego Street Journal, 143, 194 Second World War, 37, 49
San Fernando Valley College, 372 Secret Army Organization (SAO), 194-5, 203,
San Francisco, CA, 34, 123, 142, 150, 174, 212d., 224-5, 266
320, 371, 379; Segal, Jeff, 371
Haight-Ashbury District of, 146 Sellers, Cleveland, 112, 171
San Francisco Examiner, 146, 417 Selma, AL, 170
San Francisco State University, 201, 371 "Serbo-Croatian Liberation Front," 308, 410
San Jose State College, 372, 389 Sessions, FBI Director William, xii, xiii, 15, 409,
San Juan, Puerto Rico, 10, 67, 75d., 86, 346-9 411
San Juan Star, 72, 347, 349 Sewell, University of Wisconsin Chancellor
San Pedro (CA) Federal Prison for Women, 398 William, 174
San Quentin State Prison (CA), 6, 129, 157, 159, Shabazz Bey, Hanif, 322
324, 357, 364 Shae, Senate Select Committee Staff Member
"San Quentin Six," the, 364 Kevin, 397
Santa Barbara, CA, 378 Shafer, Harry E. III ("Gi"), 224, 245, 386
Santa Monica, CA, 155 Shafer, Jill, 224, 245, 386
Sana, Tamu, (s/n: Ann Lockhart), 355 Shafer, Lawrence, 378
Sanford, Maxwell "Max", 93d., 111d. Shakur, Afeni (s/n: Alice Williams), 361
Santaliz, Coqui, 349 Shakur, Assata (s/n: Joanne Chesimard), 308,
SAO; see Secret Army Organization 409-11
Satan, Richard, 413 Shakur, Lumumba (s/n: Anthony Costan), 361
Satchell, Ronald "Doc," 140, 358 Shakur, Mutulu (s/n: Jeral Wayne Williams),
Savage, John, 135 309, 411-2
Savio, Mario, 171 Shakur, Zayd Malik (s/n: James Costan), 308
Saypol, U.S. Attorney Irving H., 16d. Shannon County (SD) News, 394
SCAR; see Statewide Correctional Alliance for Sheehan, Neil, 189
Reform Sheet Metal Workers Union, 353
Shenandoah, Leroy, 382 SOG; see United States Marshals Service;

Sherwin, California Superior Court Judge Special Operations Group
Raymond J., 129 Soland County, CA, 129
Shillingford, Dennis; see Ababa, Addis Soldier of Fortune, 86
Shultz, Canadian Justice WA, 291 Soldiers Council, 34
Shuttlesworth, Rev. Fred, 369 Soledad Brothers Case, 363-4
"Siberian Beetle," 206d., 207 Soledad Brothers Defence Committee, 201, 364
Silo Plowshares (Plowshares), 307, 324, 409 Soledad (CA) State Prison, 357, 363
Simms, Oakland Police Lt. Mike, 417 "Son of Brinks" Case, 310, 326, 412-3
Simms, Randolph; see Chimarenga, Coltrane Sostre, Martin, 376
Simon, Kenneth, 15d. Soto Arrivi, Carlos, 84
Sindair, John, 191 Sou/ on Ice, 128
Sing Sing; see Ossining State Prison Soulbook, 77
Sioux Falls (SD) State Prison, 334, 403 South Africa, 173, 320;
Sitting Up, Ben, 394 Sharpeville Massacre, 316, 414
Sizoo, FBI Administrative Assistant Joseph A., South African Airways, 310, 315
97, 98d. South Carolina Division of Criminal Investiga-
Skelly, SA Edward, 396, 402 tion, 225
Skenadore, Rod, 236d. South Carolina State College, 354
Skinner, William, 123 South Carolina State University at Orangeburg,
Sky, David, 396 220;
Skyhorse/Mohawk Case, 256, 391-2 Orangeburg Massacre at, 220d., 355
Slow Bear, Lena R., 394 South Dakota Division of Criminal Investiga-
Smallboy, Robert, 271, 400 tion, 238
SMC; see Student Mobilization Committee South End Press, x
Smith Act of 1950, 38-9, 41, 43, 49, 337, 339, 341-2 Southern Christian Leadership Conference
Smith, Henry, 220 (SCLC), 93d., 95-6, 99, 100d., 102-5, 111d., 112,
Smith, Leon, 378 351-4, 368
Smith, Melvin "Cotton," 141, 359 Southern Illinois University, 116d.
Smith, Mike, 371 Southern University, 221
Smith, Roberta, 379 Southwest African Peoples Organization
Smith, Rose, 360 (SWAPO), 310
Smith, Samuel Lee; see Sundiata, Mtyari "Southwest Territories," 345
Smith, Attorney General William French, 411 Spahn Movie Ranch, 391
Smokey the Bear, 376 Spain, 63, 64
SNCC; see Student Nonviolent Coordinating Spain, Johnny, 364
Committee Spanish-American War, 63
Sneed, Deputy Attorney General Joseph T., Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams, 86,
251d. 133, 142, 265, 268, 317, 325, 326, 395-6, 415
Snyder, U.S. Attorney Cecil, 346 Spencer, SA Thomas, 14d.
Socialist Party of America (SPA), 33, 35, Spider, Melvin, 393
Socialist Party of Puerto Rico (PIP), 275d., 346, Spiegel, Mike, 379
349; Spielman, Jane, 379
offices bombed, 348 Spiro, 376
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), 40d., 61, 69, 78, Spizzo, U.S. District Judge John E., 414
95,173, 230, 341, 350; Spock, Dr. Benjamin, 175, 187, 372
and the CAMD, 51, 342; Spotted Eagle, Leah, 394
FBI targeting of, 19, 51- 3, 52d., 53d., 54d., 55d., Spring Mobilization Against the War, 173
56d., 58d., 59d., 209, 209d., 342-4; Squire, Clark; see Acoli, Sundiata
founding of, 49, 341; Stafford, Will, 362
Malcolm X and, 57,103; Stalin, Josef, 341
Teamsters Union and, 341-2; Stallings, Charles; see Chumaimari, Askardi
Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) of, 51, 56d, Stammheim Prison (West Germany), 418;
57d., 58d., 59d., 60-1, 78,173, 184d., 209d., "Stammheim Model," 321
341, 344, 370 Standing Soldier, Edward, 393
Index 463
Stanford University, 381 9, 41, 339

Stapleton, SA Charles, 401 Suffolk County (MA) Courthouse, bombing of,
Stark, Janis, 279d. 316, 416
Starsky, Morris, 52, 55d., 56d., 343 Sullivan, FBI Inspector Joseph, 169
State University of New York (SUNY); Sullivan, FBI Assistant Director William C., 33,
Buffalo campus, 221; 335, 337;
Stony Brook campus, 371 and COINTELPRO-CP,USA, 36-7, 42d., 43d.,
Statewide Correctional Alliance for Reform 48, 340;
(SCAR), 318 and COINTELPRO-Black Liberation, 100-1d.,
Statue of Liberty, 361 106, 107d., 108d., 111d., 112, 118d., 119d.,
Stephan, Carl, 60 354, 367;
Stephans, U.S. Attorney Jay, 314 and COINTELPRO-BPP, 123, 124d., 125,
Stern, Carl, 333 125d., 126, 127 d., 146, 148, 149d., 160d., 357;
Stern, Susan, 375 and COINTELPRO-New Left, 165, 169, 175,
Stewart, Andrew Paul, 394 176, 177d., 178d., 184d., 189d., 340;
Stewart, Darryl "Blue Legs," 404 and COINTELPRO-Puerto Rican Independ-
Stewart, Larry, 343 ence, 347;
Stiner, George, 133 and Martin Luther King, Jr., 96-7, 98d., 99-100,
Stiller, Joseph, 133 351, 352;
Stoldt, BIA Police Officer/GOON Marvin, 406 and Operation Hoodwink, 45;
Stone, I.F., 167 and termination of COINTELPRO, 333
Stop the Draft Week, 174 Sundiata, Asha (s/n: Debra Buckman), 412
Stringer, SA William, 123 Sundiata, Mtyari (s/n: Samuel Lee Smith), 309,
Student Afro-American Society (SAS), 372S 411
Student Mobilization Committee (MOB), 58d., Sunni-Ali, Bilal, 411
60, 207d. Sunni-All, Fulani, 412
Student Nonviolent (later National) Coordinat- SUNY; see State University of New York
ing Committee (SNCC), 113, 114-5d., 135, 165, Supreme Court of the State of New York, 408
170, 173, 355, 367, 376; Surphes, Portland (ME) Police Officer Bertrand,
"Black Power" and, 105; 416
FBI surveillance of, 103, 106; SWAPO; see Southwest African Peoples
FBI targeting of, 93d., 111d., 112, 127-8d., 357; Organization
MDFP and, 171; SWAT; see Special Weapons and Tactics
merger with BPP, 126, 128, 370; Swearingen, SA M. Wesley, 215, 334
"Mississippi Freedom Summer" and, 168, Swift Bird, Leon, 393
367-8 SWP; see Socialist Workers Party
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), xv, 19,
128, 188, 197d., 226, 378, 380; Tabor, Michael; see Cetewayo
anti-war efforts of, 172-5, 370-4; Tackwood, Louis, 225, 359
attempted coalition with BPP, 139, 209-10, Taft-Hartley Act (Labor-Management Relations
210d., 211d., 212, 213, 357; Act), 337
Columbia uprising of, 176, 372-3; Tail, Jesse, 241d.
ERAP effort of, 171, 370; Tait, Mike, idv
FBI surveillance of, 165-6, 366; Tallulah, MS, 368
FBI targeting of, 176, 178-9, 183, 183-4d., 184, Tampa, FL, 224
185-6d., 187d., 197d., 199d., 200d., 202d., Taplin, Allen, 53d., 54d.
203d., 201d., 207d., 380; Taplin, Barbara, 51, 53d., 54d.
founding of, 165, 365; Tappis, Steve, 377
JOIN project of, 370; Tate, David, 413
Midwest National Conference of, 377; Taubert, SA Robert, 255
NCUP effort of, 370; Taylor, Flint, 141
Weatherman faction of, 222, 223, 225, 228, 314, Taylor, Robert, 413
377, 379, 381; also see Weatherman Te Deum, 67
Sturgis, SD, 242d., 282 Teamsters Union, 44d., 45d., 46d., 47d., 341-2
Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB), 38- Tempe, AZ, 55
Temple University, 186d., 187, 205, 206, 207 Turner, AUSA Charles, 400
Temple University News, 185d., 186d. Turner Diaries, The, 413
"Tennis Court Murder," the, 155 Twardowsld, FBI Lab Assistant Joseph, 407
Terronez, Justice Department Public Relations Two Bulls, BIA Police Officer/GOON Fred, 265
Representative John, 241d., 243, 385 Two Elk, Aaron, 392
Texaco Oil Co., 83d. Two Elk, Richard, 236d.
Texas State Alcoholic Beverage Control Two Hawk, Webster, 383
Commission, 43 Two Two, Marvin, 394
Tharp, Paula, 203 Tylertown, MS, 367
Themis, Project; see Project Themis
Theoharis, Athan, 2-11, 332, 347 UCLA; see University of California at Los
Thomas, Eugene, 170, 369 Angeles
Thomas, Marin County (CA) Assistant District Ulman, Seattle Mayor Wes, 143
Attorney Gary, 364 Ukiah, CA, 413
Thomas, Myron C., 383 Unemployed Movement, 36
Thomas, Wilbert, 147, 361 UNIA; see Universal Negro Improvement
Thomas, Ohio Judge William K., 378 Association
Thompson-El, Richard, 322 Union Carbide Corp., 159;
Thunder Hawk, Herman, 396 bombing of, 316, 414
Tilsen, Ken, 254, 390-1, 403 Union of Russian Workers (URW), 34
Title 18 US Code 2388 (Rebellion or Insurrec- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 12d.,
tion), 246d., 264d. 13, 34, 37, 40d., 48, 68d., 77d., 79
Title 18 US Code 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy), Unitarian Society of Cleveland, 42-3
246d., 264d. United Airlines, 364
Tobacco, Michelle, 394 United Electrical Workers Union, 224
Tobin, Dan, 341 United Farm Workers, 183
Toledo, OH, 34 United Freedom Front (UFF), 313, 315, 317, 318,
Tongyai, Thomas ("Tommy the Traveler"), 222 414
TOPLEV (Top Level) FBI Program, 110, 354, 409 United Nations (U.N.), 78, 85d., 87d., 88;
Torres Marrero, Puerto Rico Intelligence Agent Committee on Decolonization of, 79, 88, 349;
Rafael, 348 General Assembly of, 88;
Torresola, Grisilio, 67 Secretariat of, 349;
Tour& Kazi (s/n: Christopher King), 316, 414-5 U.S. Mission to, 349
Trail of Broken Treaties, the, 234-5; United Press International (UPI), 247d., 397
"Twenty Points" of, 234 United Slaves (US), 130, 130d., 131, 1314., 1324.,
Travis, Jimy, 367 133, 133d., 134d., 135, 149d.
Trimbach, Minneapolis SAC Joseph, 240, 267d., U.S. Army;
395; Army Air Corps, 384;
and Wounded Knee seige, 243-5, 251d., 385, Chief of Staff, 252d.;
386, 387; Military Intelligence Service, 3014.;
Intelligence Corps, 178-9, 225, 373; 113th
Banks-Means Trial and, 255-6, 390-1 Military Intelligence Detachment, 82;
Trinidad, 355 Military Intelligence Group, 226; 771st
Trotsky, Leon, 51, 341; also see Socialist Workers Secretary of the Army, 344;
Party; Special Forces, 382;
Trotskyism, 341-2; 1st Air Cavalry Division, 370;
Troskyites, 50, 60 4th Army, 226;
Trotter, William Monroe, 350 82nd Airborne Division, 359;
Trudell, John, ix, 233, 404 101st Airborne Division, 370
Truelock, Louis, 140 U.S. Bicentennial Celebration, 275d., 276d.
Truman, President Harry S., 37, 38, 50,189, 338- U.S.-British Extradition Treaty, 414
9, 341; U.S.-Canadian Extradition Treaty, 403
attempted assassination of, 67, 346 U.S. Capitol Building, bombing of, 312
Tucson, AZ, 379 U.S. Catholic Conference, 306
Tulane University, 371 U.S. Government;
Tupamaros Guerrillas, 86 Attorney General, 250d., 253d., 254d., 305d.;
Index 465
Attorney General's Order No. 3343, 338; Committee"), 3-5, 299, 397; Subcommittee
Assistant Attorney General, 277d.; on Internal Security, 5, 8, 38, 256; Subcom-
Deputy Attorney General, 250d., 253d., mittee on Security and Terrorism, 412;
254d. State Department, 82, 172; Office on Combat-
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ting Terrorism, 86 Secretary of State, 344;
(BATF), 240, 242d., 258d., 259d., 296d., 414; Supreme Court, 49, 50, 95,167, 229, 295, 298,
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), 231-2, 234, 300d., 302d., 337-9, 342, 350, 366, 375, 400;
242, 250d., 253d., 281d., 288d., 302d.; BIA War Department, 384
Police, 251d., 288-90d., 385, 388; U.S. News and World Report, 173
Bureau of Prisons (BoP), 6, 295, 321-3, 327, Universal Negro Improvement Association
382; (UNIA), 12, 12d., 13d., 94
Circuit Courts of Appeal; Eighth, 141, 295, University of Alabama at Tuscaoosa, 223
298, 334, 405-6, 407-8; Ninth, 188, 400, 407; University of Arizona, 371
Civil Service Commission, 56, 58, 339, 344; University of Arkansas, 377
Circular No. 222, 339; University of California;
Commission on Civil Rights, 5-6, 262-3, 269, at Berkeley, 171-3, 201, 220, 357, 371-2, 378;
277, 396, 397; Rocky Mountain Regional at Los Angeles (UCLA), 133, 201, 366, 372,
Office, 395, 404; 387; Campbell Hall, 133
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturali- University of California, Regents of, 357
zation Service (INS), 344; University of Chicago, 322
Department of Defense (DoD), 344; Director- University of Colorado at Boulder, 371
ate of Military Support (DOMS), 252d.; University of Connecticut, 372
Secretary of Defence, 344; University of Illinois, 371-2
Department of Interior, 251d., 253d., 277d., University of Indiana, 371-2
313, 382, 383; University of Iowa, 371-2, 391
Department of Justice, 168, 172, 175, 179, 187, University of Kansas, 221
189, 191, 241d., 251d., 252d., 281d., 333, 403, University of Kentucky, 371
411; subparts of: Civil Rights Division, 167, University of Michigan, 193d., 372
333; Community Relations Service, 240, University of Minnesota, 372
251d., 385; Interdivisional Information University of Oklahoma, 372
Unit, 183; Internal Security Division, 63, University of Pennsylvania, 371-2
167, 228; "Panther Unit", 144; Task Force University of Puerto Rico, 65
on Indian Matters, 5; University of Texas, 225
Department of Labor, 353; University of Vermont, 199
General Accounting Office (GAO), 384; University of Washington, 222
House of Representatives, 339; Committee on University of Wisconsin;
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitu- at Madison, 174, 197d., 372;
tional Rights, 382; UnAmerican Activities at Milwaukee, 221
Committee (aka HUAC, "Dies Commit- UPI; see United Press International
tee"), 36, 38, 43, 50, 64,179, 338, 366, 373,
376; "Urban Guerrilla Warfare," 307d.
Intelligence Board, 33; Urban Guerrilla Warfare, 361
Marshals Service, 243-9, 250-4d., 265, 271, 385- Urban League, 183;
6, 387, 388; Special Operations Group Washington, D.C. chapter, 373
(SOG) of, 243, 385; Urbom, U.S. District Judge Warren K., 388
National Park Service, 243, 384; US; see United Slaves
Naval Intelligence Service, 82; "Use of Special Agents in Paramilitary Opera-
Postmaster General, 344; tions in Indian Country" (FBI Report), 249
Secret Service, 82, 172, 277d., 281d., 301d., 344,
369; Vacaville (CA) State Prison, 129
Secretary of the Treasury, 344; Vander, Victor, 412
Selective Service Administration, 354, 375; Vander Wall, Jim, x, xi
Senate, subparts of: Committee on Intelli- Vanderbilt University, 355, 372
gence, xiii, 39, 150, 179, 301d., 332; Commit- Varelli, Frank, xiii, xiv, 409
tee on the Judiciary, 313; Select Committee Venceremos organization, 381
to Study Government Operations ("Church Ventura County, CA, 391
Vietnam, 4, 59, 172, 174, 176, 371, 382; WEATHERFUGS (Weatherman Fugitives)
North Vietnam, 172 Investigation, 314-5, 379
Vietnam Day Committee 173, 374, 381 Weatherman (aka Weather Underground
Vietnam Summer, 174 Organization, WUO), 222-3, 225, 228, 230,
Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), 275d., 276d., 314, 377, 379-80, 381, 410-11
190, 224 Weaver, Robert, 148, 362
Vietnam War, xi, 170-4, 177d., 181, 189, 359, 375, Webster, FBI Director (now CIA Director)
385, 387; William, xii, 17d., 18d., 263, 295, 313, 394, 406,
Tet Offensive, 374 409
Vincent, Clara, 134d. Weems, Donald; see Balagoon, Kuwasi
"Virgin Islands 5," the, 322 Weil, Robert, 368
Virginia Education Association, 306 Weinberg, Jack, 171, 370
Visani, LA Deputy District Atorney Diane, 363 Weiner, Lee, 188
Voorhis Anti-Propaganda Act, 338 Weinglass, Leonard, 188
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 106 Weiss, Larry, 379
VVAW; see Vietnam Veterans Against the War Weissman, George, 342
Wells Fargo Corp., 86, 349
Wagenknecht, Alfred, 336 Wenderoth, Rev. Joseph, 375
Wagner, SD, 278d. Wesley, Cynthia, 369
Waldrop, FBI Media Coordinator James, 416 West Germany, 321
"Walker Conunission";see National Commission West Hartford, CT, 86
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence West Indies, 12d.
Walker, Wyatt Tee, 96, 351 West Nyak, NY, 310, 411
Wall, Philadelphia (MS) SAC Roy, 169 West, Walter, 413
Wallace, George, 203d. Westerman, Cris, 396
Wallace, Howard, 51, 53-4d. "Western Sweep" (FBI Operation), 316-7
Wallace, Walter, 131d. Westmoreland, General William, 174, 371, 373
Wanblee, SD, 262, 291, 292d., 293d. Weyler, Rex, 243
Wannall, FBI Assistant Director W. Raymond, Wheeler, Robert, 371
157, 158d. Whidbey Island (WA), 413
Walton, New York SAC Kenneth, 412 White, Judy, 57
War at Home, x, xi, >di, xiv, 327 White, NYC Police Detective Ralph (aka "Sudan
"War on Drugs," the, 320 Yedaw"), 147, 361
War Resisters League, 173 White Clay, NB, 259
Ward, Larry Eugene, 223 White House, the, 251d., 253d., 340, 348, 383, 387
Ware, Charley, 367 White Panther Party, 191, 193d.
Wareham, Roger, 413 White Plume, Priscilla, 393
Waring, SA Gerard, 397 Whitehead, Don, 170
Warner, Col. Volney S., 243, 251-2d., 254, 385 Whitehorn, Laura, 312
Warrior, Clyde, 233, 382 Whitson, SA Lish, 97, 352
Washington, Albert "Nuh", 157 "Wichita AR-15," ballistics examination of, 294,
Washington City Presbytery, 98d. 296d., 297-8, 297d., 405-6, 407
Washington, D.C., 34, 60, 66, 67, 96, 101d., 109d., Wichita, KS, 284d.
179, 189, 193d., 252d., 275d., 299, 313, 321, 360, Wicker, Tom, 355
374, 380, 387, 410; Wilkerson, Cathy, xv, 379
Police, 228, 383 Wilkins, Collie Leroy, 170, 369
Washington, John William ("Long John"), 153 Wilkins, Roy, 351
Washington Post, 313; Williams, Alice; see Shakur, Afeni
exposure of COINTELPRO, 4; Williams, SA Bill, 380
review of Agents of Repression, 2-11 Williams, Jeral Wayne; see Shakur, Mutulu
Washington Star, 281d. Williams, Seattle Police Intelligence Director
Washington University, 371 John, 223
"Watergate Scandal," the, 4, 58,190, 343, 383 Williams, Landon, 360, 364
Waters, Ricky Lee; see Bragg, Marvin Williams, SA Ray, 256
We Talk, You Listen, 233 Williams, Richard, 316-9, 415-6
Index 467
Williams, Robert, 51, 342 248, 246d., 247d., 250d., 251d., 252d., 257d.,
Williams, SA Ronald A., 255, 256, 265-6, 270d., 258d., 260d., 280d., 385-8, 390, 393,394
271, 273, 277, 283-6d., 287d., 389, 391, 395-7, "Wounded Knee Leadership Trials," 255, 386
399, 402, 404-6; also see RESMURS; Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense
Louis Moves Camp affair and, 255, 389 Committee (WKLDOC), 254, 260-1, 292, 388,
Wilson, Billy, 262, 394 390-2, 401-4
Wilson, Fairley, 116d. Wright, U.S. Congressman Jim, xiv
Wilson, George, 384
Wilson, Richard "Dick," 235, 244, 248-9, 262, Yale University, 172, 175, 360, 371
263, 385, 387, 388, 394;
accused of embezzlement, 242, 384; Yankton Sioux Reservation, 278d.
becomes Tribal President, 242, 384; Yankton, SD, 254d.
forms GOONs, 242, 384; Yarbrough, Gary Lee, 413
impeachment trial of, 243, 385; YAWF; see Workers World Party
nepotism of, 242, 384 Yellow Thunder, Raymond, 234, 382
Wilson, Richard Jr. ("Manny"), 384 Yellow Wood, John Star; see Nelson, Dusty
Wilson, Secretary of Labor William B., 35 Yippiel; see Youth International Party
Wilson, President Woodrow, 64 York, James, 411
Winchell, Walter, 37 Young, George, 359
Window Rock, AZ, 401 Young Bear, Severt, 384
Winship, Puerto Rico Governor Blanton, 66, 346 Young Lords (Young Lords Party), 139, 210,
Winters, Charles David, 394 210d.
Wise, David, 21 Young Patriots, 139, 210, 210d.
Wofsy, Isadore, 96, 351 Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), see Socialist
Wolf, Louis, 409 Workers Party
Women's Strike for Peace, 178, 373 Youth Against War and Fascism; see Workers
Wood, Carl; see Ashwood, Carlos World Party
Wood, SA William, 401; Youth International Party (lippie!), 179, 188,
Anna Mae Aquash and, 291-3, 404; 204, 205d., 217, 230, 376, 380
Myrtle Poor Bear and, 282, 291, 293, 403-4
Woods, John Q., 367 zephier, Gregory Francis Sr. ("Greg"), 279d.
Woodson, Helen, 307 Zigrossi, Rapid City (SD) ASAC Norman, 231,
The Worker, 96 266, 280, 292, 381, 395, 398-9, 400, 405
Workers Council, 34 Zionists/Zionism, 135
Workers Party, 341 Zinn, Howard, 49
Workers World Party, 78; Zoller, Ralph, 378
Youth Against War and Fascism (YAWF) of, Zuckoff, Murray, 343
78 "Zulu 1200," 116d
World Council of Churches, 391 Zuni Indians, 345
Wounded Foot, Sandra, 394
Wounded Knee, SD, federal seige of, 6, 243-6, 4-H Clubs, 376
About South End Press
South End Press is a nonprofit, collectively run book publisher
with over 150 titles in print. Since our founding in 1977, we have tried
to meet the needs of readers who are exploring, or are already commit-
ted to, the politics of radical social change.
Our goal is to publish books that encourage critical thinking and
constructive action on the key political, cultural, social, economic, and
ecological issues shaping life in the United States and in the world. In
this way, we hope to give expression to a wide diversity of democratic
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information about our membership program—which offers two free
books and a 40% discount on all titles—please write us at South End
Press, 116 Saint Botolph Street, Boston, MA 02115.
Other titles of interest from South End Press:

Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against the Black
Panther Party and the American Indian Movement
Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall
War at Home: Covert Action Against U.S. Activists and What

We Can Do About It
Brian Glick
Freedom Under Fire: U.S. Civil Liberties in Times of War

Michael Linfield
Toward an American Revolution: Exposing the Constitution

and Other Illusions
Jerry Fresia
Marxism and Native Americans

edited by Ward Churchill
The Trial of Leonard Peltier

Jim Messerschmidt
/
306
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Rt,Pi9rrut, iS, IY3 / 5g "'- 71, 71, „ Fl o, 7C, ql -3 , qq, roz

109 1110-41 ) 1(q 11,8-iivivtroir) ) /Z5 1 7-7(.41-E014) / 13 z_ 3.
'3.1 I j ) 1461 k I I 44/67/4) 1 (r000*-4,44"100,
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What is the book about?

What is the book about?

What groups are discussed in the book?

What groups are discussed in the book?

The COINTELPRO Papers

Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars

Foreword by John Trudell

South End Press Boston, MA

Edited by the South End Press collective.

South End Press/ 116 Saint Botolph St./Boston, MA 02115

Foreword by John Trudell ix

Preface by Brian Glick x

Guide to the Documents by Chip Berlet and Brian Glick xvii

1. Understanding Deletions in FBI Documents 23

2. COINTELPRO - CP, USA 33

4. COINTELPRO - Puerto Rican Independence Movement 63

5. COINTELPRO - Black Liberation Movement 91

6. COINTELPRO - New Left 165

7. COINTELPRO - AIM 231

8. Conclusion: COINTELPRO Lives On 303

Organizational Contacts 328

We would like to thank the following individuals without whose various

Brian Glick is an activist/attorney who has long been involved in the

John Trudell (Santee Dakota) was national chairman of the American

The Face of COINTELPRO

embarrassing counterintelligence actions were not committed to writing, and ex-

r- That committee-known initially as the "Church Committee," after its founding

• the coordinator of the National Lawyers Guild's anti-repression task force,

Understanding Deletions in FBI Documents

COINTELPRO — CP, USA

COINTELPRO — Puerto Rican Independence Movement

73 Document: Split and disrupt group seeking Puerto Rican independence

COINTELPRO Black Liberation Movement

COINTELPRO New Left

177-8 Memo: Disruption of new left formalized as new program.

180 Target anti-war leaders Dellinger and Hayden.

A Glimpse Into the Files of America's

Of Myths and Documentation

justice Department officials...The FBI files released on AIM do not document a

"The AIM Files"

session on FBI authorizations, several legal depositions, Bureau of Prison records,

Merely being on the receiving end of a disingenuous review, while never

Rican independence movement in San Juan in 1985, Theoharis would have us

The COINTELPRO Papers

October 11, 1919.

I am transmitting herewith a communication which 1,18 come

The following is a brief statement of Marcus Garvey and

1919 letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, proposing

used infiltrators against Garvey's non-criminal,United Negro Improvement Asso-

A report from James Wormley

OiC43., hot 21214101

Page 2 - Mr. Thomas Spencer

sufficient time to assemble a countering argument that no such modifications to a

- Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES

PA^IMROUNP EX - 75 --ED k- —41W%

You will recall that Alger Rise...Way fliOvh.a:mainlY

T 0 C IRECT 03 ROOT 19E

SAN A•ior10 (1990- 53) ROCTIPE

ATTACy, ADA C1SPES AAA) SPECIFICALLY, AOAIrST IMDIVIDLTALS ,