Unit 1 Seventeenth Century European Crisis': 1.0 Objectives
Unit 1 Seventeenth Century European Crisis': 1.0 Objectives
‘EUROPEAN CRISIS’*
Structure
1.0 Objectives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Historical Debate on the Nature of Crisis
1.3 Origins of the Crisis
1.4 Extent of the Crisis
1.4.1 Demographic Crisis
1.4.2 Agrarian Crisis
1.4.3 Monetary Crisis
1.4.4 Climatic Factors
1.4.5 Economic Crisis
1.5 The Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) and the Crisis
1.6 Mediterranean Countries and the Seventeenth Century Crisis
1.6.1 Decline of Spain
1.6.2 Decline of the Italian States
1.7 Impact of the Seventeenth Century Crisis
1.8 Let Us Sum up
1.9 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises
1.0 OBJECTIVES
Seventeenth century marks a watershed in the history of Europe. It led to the end
of feudal age in Western Europe while in the Central and Eastern Europe; it
resulted in the strengthening of feudalism. It also completed the shift of the
commercial and economic activities from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic
Coast on Western Europe. It meant the decline of the Mediterranean states and
the rise of England, Holland and northern France.
In this Unit, you will study why the Seventeenth century crisis is considered
the ‘General Crisis’ and how it affected the economy, polity, social life and
geographical contours of the European map,
you will get familiar with the debate that has taken place among historians
on the nature and dimension of the crisis,
you will be able to explain the importance of ‘The Thirty Years War’ and
how it contributed to the crisis in central Europe, and
you will be able to trace the impact of the general crisis on political, economic
and social life of Europe.
However, this vast expansion of economy came to an end between 1600 and
1620 in many parts of the continent. What led to the decline, what was the nature
of the crisis and how it affected Europe have been explained differently by
historians and scholars. This has become a prolonged historical debate. In the
subsequent sections, we are going to study these aspects in detail.
The intense debate on the subject of general crisis can be seen in the three broad
approaches: The first view argues that the crisis was economic in origin. We may
divide the economic interpretation into; a) those arguments based on theoretical
classical Marxist interpretation, b) arguments based on economic data — issues
like money and prices, c) those arguments which focus on demographic factors.
The Marxist writings (on the general crises) present this period as a critical phase
in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The debate was initiated by Eric
Hobsbawm in 1954 and was followed by Boris Porchnev. The crisis was seen as
a class conflict that took place at two levels. In the eastern region of Europe, the
8
struggle was between the peasants and feudal nobility in which the latter won. In Seventeenth Century
‘European Crisis’
the Western Europe, the struggle to control the state was between bourgeoisie
and feudal nobility and was decided in favour of the bourgeoisie. Eric Hobsbawm,
a leading Marxist historian, considered it as a major crisis of European economy.
In his initial essay, Hobsbawm observed that the seventeenth century was not
only an era of economic crisis but also a period of social revolt. Later, Hobsawm
integrated the seventeenth century crisis as a part of much wider transition from
feudalism to capitalism. Ruggiero Romano provided massive data from various
sources to pinpoint the precise moment of the crises. According to him, the exact
time of the crisis was 1619-1622, when the economic growth of the sixteenth
century ended and marked the beginning of stagnation or decline. He also presents
it as an economic and political crisis. But his thesis provided factual basis to
Hobsbawm’s interpretation. Thus, the Marxist writers saw the seventeenth century
crisis a crisis of production and the major force behind at least some of the
revolutions was the force of the producing bourgeoisie, restricted in their economic
activities by the obsolete, restrictive and wasteful productive system of feudal
society. The crisis of production was general in Europe, but it was only in England
where the feudal monarchical absolutism was overthrown by the rising landed
gentry and urban bourgeoisie (1642-1660) paving the way for the triumph of
capitalism. The second approach concentrates on political issues, particularly
the mid-century revolts and rebellions. H.R. Trevor-Roper was one of the earliest
writers to suggest the thesis of ‘The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century.
He picked up the theme that it was not the crisis of the European economy but a
crisis in relations between society and the state, a result of the expansion of
Renaissance Monarchies and whose financial burden the society could not bear.
He sees the major events of this period as political revolution. R.B. Merriman
(in his Six Contemporaneous Revolutions) sees them as a social and political
manifestation of the crisis that had been affecting the entire Europe. In his work,
he compares various mid-century revolts which took place in England, France,
Catalonia, Naples and Holland.
The third major interpretation of the crisis takes a sceptical view towards the
very concept of general crisis. There are historians who oppose the theory of
general crisis of the seventeenth century. J.H. Elliott had doubts whether the
instability caused by widespread revolts was in any way exceptional. For him,
similar clusters of revolts could be seen between 1560s and 1590s. He tried to
draw attention of the historians to a series of tensions within early modern political
structures that caused frequent revolts and rebellions. Elliott was rather sceptic
of Trevor-Roper’s focus and explanation of the mid-seventeenth century revolts.
In 1975, Theodore K. Rabb published his famous work on this subject titled The
Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe. It synthesized the discussion on
the crisis debate of the last twenty five years and sought to rescue the idea of
crisis with a more precise definition of the term. At the same time, he broadened
the scope of the European history between 1500 and 1700 piecing together new
information from political, economic, social and cultural history into the crisis
debate. Rabb made historians to employ the word ‘crisis’ with greater precision
and brought cultural dimension of change into the discussion on general crisis.
The 1960s and 70s witnessed coming together of many historians to support or
reject the idea of the ‘general crisis’. An interesting explanation was provided by
J.V. Polisensky, who tried to establish connection between the Thirty Years’ War
(1618-1648) and the seventeenth century crisis and saw them both as the conflict
of opposite political and cultural societies — one Protestant that was liberal, and
the other Catholic that was absolutist in character.
In recent years, the thesis of the seventeenth century crisis is generally accepted
by the scholars of early modern Europe but its scope has been broadened.
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There were more revolts in the Mediterranean region at the same time. These Seventeenth Century
‘European Crisis’
included the revolts of Catalonia, Naples and Portugal which created crisis in
the Spanish empire. The peasant revolt in 1640s spread across Barcelona in Spain,
driving out the Castilians and killing the Viceroy. The revolt in Naples in Italy
(in July, 1647) was the direct outcome of food shortage, heavy taxation and
administrative inefficiency. For a brief period, Naples had become a republic
under the leadership of Masaniello and enjoying French protection. However,
the Spanish ruler re-conquered it. Some other parts of Europe too faced scattered
uprisings like Swiss peasant uprising (1653), Ukranian revolts (1648-54), Russian
revolts (1672), Kuruez movements in Hungary, Irish Revolts (1641 and 1689)
and the Palace revolution in the United Provinces of the Netherlands. A cluster
of these revolutionary upheavals, political and social protests make several writers
believe that there was some widespread crisis in Europe that had different time
of their origins but they also reflect some commonness.
The population of southern Europe declined quite sharply during the seventeenth
century. In 1700, it was less than that of 1600. On the other hand, situation was
different in some other parts of Europe where the population increased swiftly in
northern Europe including the Low Countries and England. Even here, the rate
of growth slowed down during the second half of the seventeenth century.
12
The index of grain prices in France declined from 100 in 1625 -50 to 1681-90 , Seventeenth Century
‘European Crisis’
while in Poland, the grain prices declined from 100 index points in 1580 to about
87 in 1650 [Peter Kriede] . The Swedish- Polish War resulted in further destruction
of agriculture. In Germany and Austria, declining trend in agriculture was visible.
The declining ground rents brought down the prices of property and there was
no incentive to invest in agricultural property. On the other hand, the prices
continued to rise from 1601-10 level in England (1147), Belgium (150) and Austria
(118) per cent. The cereal price in western and central Europe remained high till
the middle of the seventeenth century, but in western and northern parts of Europe,
the boom continued but in Germany, agriculture collapsed due to the thirty years’
war. In certain areas like Brabant, Flanders, Zealand etc, grain prices fell and
grain was replaced by crops like flax, hops and rape seed. The seventeenth century
crisis widened the gap between the eastern and western and northern and southern
zones of Europe. While eastern and central-eastern Europe witnessed an extension
and tightening of serfdom, England and the Netherlands saw the breakdown of
capitalism and agriculture began to move in the capitalism direction. Forage
crops like cloves and Turnip were popularized. Crop rotation was introduced on
a large scale and alternative crops were grown to increase soil fertility. Thus, we
find partial dislocation of the old types of communed holdings in the north-
western regions of Europe.
While discussing the nature of the crisis, Jan de Vries does not subscribe to the
view that the European economy grew or fell along the flow of precious metals
13
Rise of the Modern West-II from the ‘New World’. Yet, he concedes that the monetary instability played a
definite role in short-term cycles, particularly the one in 1619-22. There are several
other writers who reject Hamilton’s arguments. They provide counter argument
that the American silver did not stay in Europe and was re-exported via Levant
to India and China. So the silver import to Europe had virtually no role in the
creation of crisis.
A study of dendrochronological evidence (study of tree rings inside the tree trunk)
was corroborated with the records of vineyards, particularly in France. It found
that the tree lines were deeper and thick during these years- phenomena associated
with wet weather conditions in summer an acute winters. Another significant
change was about the lowering of snow line that resulted in the decrease of
cultivable area. This also had bearing on the decreasing volume of river water
and the ripening of food grains. All these factors played a cumulative role in the
making of general crisis.
14
There are scholars who suggest that the economic setbacks were not of uniform Seventeenth Century
‘European Crisis’
pattern. During the crisis, a few industrial centres witnessed fundamental
transformation. While some centres lost their earlier dominance like Venice,
Florence, Antwerp, some others rapidly progressed towards capitalist
organization. Most of the regions in Germany, Mediterranean state and southern
France experienced sharp decline. Within each region, a few alternative centres
of production emerged-decline of Florence in Italy was followed by the rise of
textile industry in Prato and Sienna. In the north-western Europe, decline of
Antwerp was followed by the rise of Amsterdam. Cloth manufacturing in Europe
underwent significant changes, Textile industry functioned within the artisan
form of production. Most historians agree that the Italian cloth virtually
disappeared from the world of international trade. The Flemish wool industry
went into long-term contraction. Many textile centres of France such as Rouen,
Amiens also declined or stagnated. However, the textile sector in England and
Holland experienced distinct growth in the sixteenth century and continued even
in the seventeenth century. Leiden emerged as one of the leading centres of
industry where the population grew from about 12,00 in 1582 to almost 70,000
by mid-seventeenth century. The rise of new draperies led to the English
domination of the markets of Iberian Peninsula and the Mediterranean. The other
regions could not compete with the English products because of price advantage.
The destruction of the traditional textile centres caused socio-economic dislocation
and unemployment of artisans. It is estimated that the number of weavers in
woolen textiles had come down by 1700 to hardly 10 per cent of what was a
century back. The Spanish shipbuilding industry had started declining from the
last decade of the sixteenth century. During this period, the Dutch (Holland)
shipping industry developed very fast and became the carrier of international
cargo. The emergence of the colonial empire encouraged the growth of the
commercial fleet, which increased thrice between 1629 and 1686. Holland also
became the hub of commercial activities including banking, insurance and stock
exchange. Romano points out that the sixteenth century industrial and commercial
expansion in Europe was supported by agricultural prosperity. The setback in
the seventeenth century was largely linked to the agricultural crisis. Two important
trading zones of pre-sixteenth century were the Mediterranean and the Levant.
During the seventeenth century, the former no longer supplied bulk manufactured
items while the Levant trade suffered with the opening of new routes to Asia.
During the sixteenth century, European economy tried to break the medieval
traditional structure to reach the capitalist mode of production. In most parts of
Europe, the feudal social framework resisted that change. The seventeenth century
crisis is seen by the Marxist historians, including Hobsbawm as the manifestation
of the feudal crisis existing in the mode of production spreading across the
European economy. The old structure did not allow sustained growth beyond a
point. According to Hobsbawm, the crisis demonstrated Europe’s failure to
overcome the obstacles created by the feudal structure to reach the stage of
capitalism. The crisis was resolved in different ways by different societies. The
solution to the crisis could be found only in the English bourgeois revolution of
1640s. It was only in England where the forces of capitalism could triumph and
the old structure was destroyed and a new economic order was created.
15
Rise of the Modern West-II Check Your Progress 2
1) How do the population figures suggest the magnitude of crisis?
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2) What was the significance of agrarian trouble in creating the crisis of the
seventeenth century?
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3) What was the extent of economic crisis?
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Causes: Historians initially viewed it as the last religious war between the
Catholics and the Protestants originating in Germany. Now it is accepted that the
trouble started in the German Kingdom of Bohemia which was a part of the Holy
Roman Empire. It held an important place in the Empire as it contributed heavy
material and manpower. It had a large number of textile and glassware industries
besides iron, silver and copper mines. Bohemia was one of the centres of Religious
conflicts even before Martin Luther. The religious conflict assumed political
colour when outside states fought for the cause of the Catholics and the Protestant
states supported the Protestants. This turned into a dynastic and religious war led
by Spain and France and Netherlands. This shows that it was not a war between
the catholics (both Spain and France were Catholic powers fighting against each
other) and the Protestants.
16
An alternative explanation sees the war as a war between the two major empires Seventeenth Century
‘European Crisis’
(Spain and France) to control Europe. Many historians see the war as a struggle
between two powerful dynasties of Europe-the Habsburg of spain and the Valois
of France for the hegemony of Europe.
A few historians like C.V. Wedgewood provide a German approach. For them,
the war was sparked off by a number of revolts against the Habsbueg rule of the
Holy Roman Empire in various parts of Europe. Over half a century of religious
and constitutional disputes led to the formation of two rival groups in Germany.
The Thirty Years War ended with the Treaty of Westphalia which formed an
extremely important document. It altered the political map of central Europe.
This was the most destructive war that shifted its terrain at short intervals. The
war marked a new form of territorial wars- a transition from men-based offensive
to dependence on firepower including artillery and volley strikes. Thus, the
subsequent wars became more offensive in nature.
The war led to a long-term peace between the Catholics and the Protestants. The
latter were given back church properties that were seized and the supporters of
Calvin were given religious toleration. The Protestant leadership in Germany
passed from the hands of Saxony to Prussia-Brandenburg.
The most important result of the war was the disintegration of the Holy Roman
Empire. The weakening of the Empire implied the consolidation of the larger
German states like Palatine, Bavaria, Saxony and Brandenburg. It led to the rise
of northern Germany as a major military power to counter-balance the traditional
power of Austria in the southern Germany.
Historians have divided opinion about the socio-economic impact of the war.
One set of historians (called the ‘Disastrous war school) argue that the war had
disastrous consequences and marked the decline of Germany, while the set of
writers (called the Revisionist School) suggest that the impact has been highly
exaggerated and the decline og Germany was not caused by war alone and had
started much earlier.
A group of seventeenth century writers in Spain called Arbitristas were the first
to present a picture of Spanish decline. They were warning the Spanish rulers of
the impeding troubles and suggested a drastic change of state policies. Historians
of the twentieth century more or less agree on the Spanish decline during the
seventeenth century but there is no unanimity on various questions regarding the
actual reasons of decline.
Another question that has been raised by scholars is whether the decline was of
entire Spain or was it confined to some specific regions like that of Castile.
Many historians suggest that the decline was of only a few states of Spain. For J.
I. Israel, in the state of Valencia, there were distinct signs of growth and expansion
in the sixteenth century followed by stagnation and decline as was the case of
Castile, the biggest state of Spain. Henry Kamen points out that Catalonia
witnessed distinct developments during the same period. For Kamen, it was the
decline of Castile and not of entire Spain.
Reasons for the decline have been explained differently by the historians on the
subject. Among the earliest explanations on the Spanish Crisis during the
seventeenth century was provided by Earl J. Hamilton. He argued that the major
role in the crisis was silver import from the New World. So long as the silver
supply to Spain was increasing, the Spanish economy was well-off but from
1620s, the supply witnessed a downward graph and the decline set in. According
to Hamilton, huge quantity of gold and silver from Central America created an
illusion of prosperity in Spain. It provided fund for waging foreign wars, massive
army, lavish spending by the court, elaborate bureaucracy, wasteful expenditure
and an attitude of aversion to manual work in the society. All this led to all-
pervasive crisis in Spain when the silver supply decreased. Another historian,
Dennis O. Flynn argues that mining profits rather than the volume of silver trade
financed the Spanish empire. However, the cost of running the mines continued
18
to increase leading to a recession in mining by 1620s. Over-dependence of the Seventeenth Century
‘European Crisis’
Spanish state and society on influx of American treasure created a crisis situation
but the role of silver was only one factor among many.
Some scholars hold the Spanish society responsible for the decline of Spain. It is
suggested that the Spanish society lacked a strong middle class despite a vast
colonial empire. The huge influx of precious metals could have led to vast
economic expansion of Spain but the opportunity was squandered. Neither the
bullion was utilised for industrial development nor was there a rise of powerful
class of merchants and businessmen. Unlike the English gentry which showed
keen interest in higher agrarian productivity and participated in market operations,
the Spanish society revealed contempt for trade and industry.
Most historians suggest that the Spanish decline was mainly caused by economic
factors and hastened by politico-social factors. The decline becomes apparent in
demographic figures. Though this was not confined to Spain alone and can be
found in many parts, particularly in southern and east-central parts of the continent.
Equally significant contributory factor in the Spanish decline was the state policy
towards agriculture. Several scholars have blamed the state policies for the neglect
of agriculture. Fernand Braudel and some other historians point out the
shortcomings in the Spanish policy towards agriculture. The state policy favoured
sheep farmers by giving them subsidies and monopolies instead of promoting
land cultivation which created shortage of corn. The Spanish rulers neither
pursued consistent policy towards agriculture nor did they offer anything to the
rural farmers.
Historians have divergent views on the industrial condition in Spain. Spain often
experienced labour shortages but it is not certain whether it caused industrial
decline or de-industrialization. The Spanish woollen industry had grown due to
the state policy towards sheep farmers. After 1580, the woollen industry showed
declining trend at several manufacturing centres like Segovia, Toledo. In Segovia,
cloth manufacturing declined from about 13,000 pieces annually during the last
quarter of the sixteenth century to about 3,000 pieces by mid-seventeenth century.
The Spanish wool was used for the coarser variety but was gradually manufactured
by the Dutch and the English. Ship-building industry of Spain at Basque had
grown during the sixteenth century mainly due to the Latin American demand
but the Spanish ships could not meet the growing American demand. The
destruction of the Spanish armada in 1588 caused rapid decline including the
one at Basque. Even the iron manufacturing faced stiff challenge from Sweden.
However, those industries such as paper, leather ware experienced modest
prosperity. The huge volume of bullion from America failed to revive the Spanish
industries. The economy fell into debt trap that became worse with unrealistic
expansion of the bureaucratic structure and heavy army expenditure.
Reasons for the decline have been explained differently by the historians on the
subject. Among the earliest explanations on the Spanish Crisis during the
seventeenth century was provided by Earl J. Hamilton. He argued that the major
role in the crisis was silver import from the New World. So long as the silver
supply to Spain was increasing, the Spanish economy was well-off but from
1620s, the supply witnessed a downward graph, the decline set in. Dennis O.Flynn
argues that mining profits rather than the volume of silver trade financed the
Spanish empire. However, the cost of running the mines continued to increase
leading to a recession in mining by 1620s. Over-dependence of the Spanish state 19
Rise of the Modern West-II and society on influx of American treasure created a crisis situation but the role
of silver was only one factor among many.
The decline of the Italian region is evident from the demographic trends. The
population began to shrink till the late seventeenth century. This trend was not
the same in every region but the overall picture was of demographic fall. On the
other hand, states like Sardinia and Genoa experienced population growth in the
first half of the seventeenth century. Many factors were responsible for the
demographic decline such as famines, plague and epidemics and wars across the
region. These had disastrous effect on the urban centres. Higher density of
population in the urban regions made them susceptible to epidemics. Although
these were short-term factors, they affected economic sphere of the Italian states
by restricting markets, production and trade and had serious bearing on the
neighbouring states. It led to a major crisis of urban economy and pushed Italian
states towards feudalism. Merchant bankers started shifting their capital to safer
places outside Italy.
The case of Italian decline is more complicated than that of Spain for a number
of reasons. Spain was a vast political empire ruled by an Emperor with a distinct
boundary but was economically not so strong as Italy despite possessing rich
colonies. Italy was not a single state, rather a geographical region with several
independent states with their own rulers (like Florence, Venetia, Piedmont, Milan,
Naples, Sicily Papal states, etc). Some of the city-states of northern Italy such as
Venice and Florence were prosperous economies and had flourishing network of
trade, large fleet of ships and shipyards, countless manufacturing units and
concentration of population associated with trading and manufacturing activities.
Trade and industry was organized on a pre-capitalist structure when most of
Europe had sunk into feudal mode. Italian states had reached an advanced level
of economic structure and they had been handing exchange and production
through commercial instruments – trading companies like commendas, societas,
which were in the nature of partnerships, banks and commercial instruments like
promissory notes, bills of exchange and insurance. In the sixteenth century, Italian
states constituted an urban region with heavy concentration of population in
towns and cities, unlike Spain which had a large rural population with a few
scattered towns and cities.
Venice was a major mercantile power for most part of the sixteenth century and
controlled the trade of Mediterranean Sea. When the neighbouring states were
experiencing industrial decline, the Venetian silk and woollen industries showed
expansion. The spread of plague of 1575-77 hit the industries sharply. It is
estimated that nearly one-third of the population perished. Milan’s population
was reduced by almost half due to plague of 1630-31. But it would be wrong to
put the entire blame of decline only on natural calamities. The economic decline
had set in from the sixteenth century itself when the Italian city-states were losing
their control on international markets. Italy lacked rich natural resources and the
20 prosperity of the states was dependent on manufacturing industries and foreign
trade. The recovery after each natural calamity or war could not be complete and Seventeenth Century
‘European Crisis’
the loss of exports affected the Italian fortunes. The Italian textiles were
undermined by the English, the Dutch and to a lesser extent, by the French, who
offered their textiles at much lower rates. According to Braudel, the most dramatic
problem between 1590 and 1630 Italian industry faced was competition from
the low-priced industrial goods from the northern countries.
In the absence of political and geographical unity and varied geographical features,
it is difficult to present a uniform picture of the Italian agriculture. The urban
centres of the north were generally importers of food grains due to limited arable
land, low yields in the absence of technology and heavy density of population
who were putting heavy pressure on agriculture. The northern were states usually
heavy importers of food grain while the southern states produced agrarian
products, the surplus of which was exported to the neighbouring states. There
were mountainous region too that received scanty rainfall. There was hardly any
improvement of technology in such regions. The main centres of intensive
agriculture in northern plains included Venetia, Lombardy, Piedmont, etc. during
the sixteenth century were known for producing foodstuff, raw silk, dyestuff and
fruits. Agriculture in this region prospered on high urban demand. Natural
calamities like the spread of plague, famine, wars and population losses affected
industries which in turn reduced demand for agrarian products. The southern
states experienced a similar trend and the deterioration of agriculture was apparent
by the seventeenth century. Thus, Italy was on the path of decline that lasted
more than three centuries.
From the demographic point of view, the crisis resulted in heavy mortality in
some parts of the continent. Military conflicts were one of the chief factors in
population decline. Constant wars were accompanied by natural disasters like
plague, epidemics and famines which disrupted social life in many regions. The
most catastrophic demographical reversal could be seen in Central Europe as
most of the battles of Thirty Years War were fought there. These losses varied
from 25 to 40%. Poland suffered the same fate. Even Denmark lost about 20% of
the total population in the Danish-Sweden War (1658-1669). Italian urban
population was lost for various reasons. Demographic losses were more in the
urban centres and caused widespread dislocation of trade and industry. It took
almost half a century to overcome these losses.
The rise of rural cottage industry had already started in England and the
Netherlands. This displacement of urban manufacturing, also called proto-
industrialization, gained popularity in western and some parts of central Europe.
This marked the first phase of industrialization. The merchants and entrepreneurs
dealt with the crisis in a variety of ways. The falling prices and the rising labour
costs under the guild system in urban manufacturing centres turned them to
cheaper rural labour by larger turnovers. This resulted in the manufacturing of
inexpensive draperies in place of expensive cloth. Another method of increasing
profits by the merchants and entrepreneurs was to increase the volume of trade
with the newly created colonies through the chartered companies to compensate
for the reducing colonial demand. By the end of the seventeenth century, woollen,
linen, cotton and blended cloth was being produced in the rural regions of England,
Low Countries, France, and Switzerland and even in Germany. As a result, the
urban manufacturing units and guilds were losing out to rural cottage industry.
While studying the origins of the crisis, we have noticed that during the same
chronological time span, widespread conflicts, political revolts, demographic
catastrophe, economic and monetary difficulties were felt to make this century a
period a general crisis.
The extent of the crisis provide a wide range of fields like demography, monetary,
agrarian, economic and climatic factors which shaped the historical passage of
Europe in opposite directions. We have also tried to show how the Thirty Years’
War contributed to the crisis situation, though its geographical terrain was confined
to central and Eastern Europe. The progress and historical progress of the
Mediterranean zone had received a jolt. The crisis ended the commercial and
mercantile domination of Spain and Italy. This trend already prevailed in the
sixteenth century but by the seventeenth century, the Atlantic countries like
Holland and England and western coast of France became the core commercial
zone.
The last segment of the Unit brings out the impact of the crisis. The same crisis
resulted in the triumph of capitalism in north-western region but in Eastern Europe
the feudal structure defeated the capitalist forces. It led to re-feudalization of the
social relations of production in central and Eastern Europe. The crisis widened
the economic contrast between the western and eastern as well as north and
south Europe.
23
Rise of the Modern West-II
1.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS
EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1
1) See Section 1.2
2) See Section 1.3
Check Your Progress 2
1) See Sub-section 1.4.1
2) See Sub-section 1.4.2
3) See Sub-section 1.4.5
Check Your Progress 3
1) See Sub-section 1.6.1
2) See Section 1.7
24