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 Constitutional Law
 Remedial Law
July 23, 2020

CASE DIGEST: PIMENTEL VS. LEB G.R. NO. 230642 & 242954.
SEPTEMBER 10, 2019
FACTS: 

Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal
Education Reform Act of 1993 which creates the Legal Education Board.
Petitioners particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional the creation of LEB
itself, LEB issuances and memorandums establishing law practice internship
as a requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting a
system of continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA
7662, and establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude
test known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhilSAT
pursuant to LEB’s power to “prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission” under Sec. 7 (e) of RA 7662. Petitioners principally grounded the
petitions on LEB’s alleged encroachment upon the rulemaking power of the
Court concerning the practice of law, violation of institutional academic
freedom, and violation of law school aspirant’s right to education under the
Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the

Court.
2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination
embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is
unconstitutional.
3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in
LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is
unconstitutional.
4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum
pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

RULING: 

1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and
consistently exercised by the political departments. The historical
development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the consistent
exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all
levels and areas of education, including legal education. Legal education is but
a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique
because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is no reason
in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and
supervisory powers of the political branches. 

Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the
regulation and supervision of legal education:

First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and
regulate legal education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate
admission to the practice of law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly
contrary to the history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid
of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must
not, arrogate upon itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest
the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to
void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and
place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to
demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism. 

As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution
covers the practice of law and not the study of law. The present rules
embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not support the argument that the
Court directly and actually regulates legal education, it merely provides
academic competency requirements for those who would like to take the Bar.
Furthermore, it is the State in the exercise of its police power that has the
authority to regulate and supervise the education of its citizens and this
includes legal education.

2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions
thereto. The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to
take the bar examinations belongs to the Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power of
the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education but
now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct
encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority to promulgate rules
concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as
unconstitutional.

3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly
give the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of those who are
already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such
duration as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s
power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the
education of Lawyer-professors as the teaching of law is considered the
practice of law.

4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its
charter to prescribe minimum standards for law admission. The PhilSAT,
when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the
applicant’s aptness for legal education along with such other admissions policy
that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard. However, the
PhilSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude
for law school. The PhilSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools
who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the
PhilSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as
its present design mandates, the PhilSAT goes beyond mere supervision and
regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable
and therefore, unconstitutional.

AGUIRRE VS RANA

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 5, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution)

Facts: 

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. One day before the
scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees, Aguirre filed against Rana a
Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar charging him with unauthorized practice of law
among others. Aguirre alleges that Rana, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
(MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Aguirre further alleges that Rana filed with the MBEC a
pleading wherein Rana represented himself as counsel.

Rana was allowed to take oath but not to sign the roll of attorneys until he is cleared of the
charges against him. The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its
findings disclosed that the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in
the pleading as counsel for the candidate.

Issue:

Whether or not Rana should be admission to the bar

Held:

No. The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan before he took the
lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent
signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading
respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC
and similar bodies.

Respondent himself also wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his
appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA
LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition
filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent
engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed
by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel
knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to
be a member of the Philippine Bar.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has
passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers
oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the
bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar. (Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000)

FATHER RANHILIO AQUINO et al V

ATTY EDWIN PASCUA A.C. No. 5095,
November 28, 2007
FACTS:

Father Ranhilio Aquino, as the Academic head of the Philippine Judiciary Academy, together
with other complainants filed a letter-complaint against Attorney Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public
for violation of the Notarial Practice Law. In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that
Atty. Pascua falsified two notarized documents in which he filed with the Civil Service
Commission. Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents, but they were not
entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary. The case was referred
to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation. The Office of
the Bar Confidant found that Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in
maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-
complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of
the Bar.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Pascua is guilty of Misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register
in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints.

HELD:

Yes. After a close review of the records of this case, the court resolved to adopt the findings of
facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. They found that Atty. Pascua
guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial
Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo. Misconduct
generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose. Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but
due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His
failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a
dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff. Under
the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature
of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing,
swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument. Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or
entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a
ground for revocation of his commission. In the present case, considering that this is Atty.
Pascua’s first offense, court believed that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the
practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of
notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is
ordered REVOKED.

IN RE: JUDGE QUITAIN JBC No. 013,

August 22, 2007
FACTS:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 10, Davao City. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against
Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and as a result of which he was dismissed from the service. The Deputy of Court
Administrator (DCA) required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and
deception he committed before the JBC.

Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. Respondent
explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc
Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from the government service,
he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable
resignation from NAPOLCOM; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the
honest belief that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that
his resignation amounted to an automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that
the issues raised therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he would be
dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew
he would never be appointed.

The court contends that Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was
dismissed from the government service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data
Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the subject administrative
case, as well as Administrative Order No. 183 dismissing him from the government service.

ISSUES:

1. WON the resignation of the judge renders the administrative proceedings against him moot
and academic.

2. WON the judge be excused of his omission in the PDS.

HELD:

1. No. Respondents contentions utterly lack merit. As a member of the Bar, he should know that
his resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any administrative liability he may
have incurred, much less, would it result to the automatic dismissal of the administrative case
filed against him. The acceptance of his resignation is definitely without prejudice to the
continuation of the administrative case filed against him. If such would be the case, anyone
charged administratively could easily escape from administrative sanctions by the simple
expedient of resigning from the service.

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does
not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court
had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent acceptance without prejudice by this
Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority
to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him.

2. No. Respondent is guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or defraud;
unworthiness; lack of integrity. The court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and
integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary. They have often stressed
that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of
court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. The court
condemns, and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability
and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave
misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned
during the pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It
appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges, if any, the
Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits which
Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement
and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations.