CDJ 2021 BHC 1255

Court : High Court of Judicature at Bombay

Case No : Public Interest Litigation No. 28 of 2021

Judges: THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. DIPANKAR DATTA & THE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.S. KARNIK

Parties : Vanashakti & Another Versus Union of India & Others

Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioners: Venkatesh Dhond, Senior Advocate with Akash
Rebello, Zaman Ali i/by Zaman Ali, Advocates. For the Respondents: R1, Parag A. Vyas i/by
A.A. Ansari, R2, Milind More, Addl. Govt. Pleader, R3, Sharmila Deshmukh, Advocates.

Date of Judgment : 08-10-2021

Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 -

Dipankar Datta, CJ.

1. The first petitioner is a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The
second petitioner is a Director of the first petitioner.

2. By instituting this writ petition dated March 25, 2021 - in the Public Interest Litigation
jurisdiction of this Court - the petitioners have mounted a challenge to a notification bearing no.
G.S.R 37 (E) dated January 18, 2019 (hereafter “the impugned notification”) issued by the
Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (hereafter “the Ministry”) in exercise of
powers conferred by sub-section (1) and clause (v) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (hereafter “the Environment Act”). Such notification
purports to supersede the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification 2011 (hereafter “the 2011
Notification”) bearing no. S.O. 19(E) dated January 6, 2011.

3. Recitals in the impugned notification would reveal that the Ministry had received
representations from various coastal States and Union Territories, besides other stakeholders,
regarding certain provisions in the 2011 Notification related to management and conservation
of marine and coastal ecosystems, development in coastal areas, eco-tourism, livelihood
options and sustainable development of coastal communities, etc., together with requests to
20. We need not burden this order with any discussion on what delegated legislation is. Suffice
to say, the petitioners are laboring under a misconception that the impugned notification is a
law brought into force by the Central Government in exercise of the power of delegated
legislation conferred by the Environment Act. Far from it, we see the impugned notification as
one which is a statutory order of the Central Government made in pursuance of what is called
in Administrative Law as ‘administrative delegation’. A legislature may confer upon an
administrative authority not only the power to make rules and regulations to carry out the
purposes of a statute but also the power to apply the law to particular cases by making orders
in exercise of the statutory power. So far as the validity of such orders themselves are
concerned, they are subject to the doctrine of ultra vires and must, therefore, be within the
limits set by the statute. Sections 6 and 25 specifically empower the Central Government to
make rules in respect of all or any of the matters referred to in section 3 and for carrying out the
purposes of the Environment Act, respectively. Pertinently, the Environment (Protection) Rules,
1986 have been framed by the Central Government in exercise of power conferred by sections
6 and 25 of the Environment Act. These rules, being delegated legislation, are distinct and
different from the statutory order made under section 3. The impugned notification not having
been issued in exercise of the rule making power of the Central Government, cannot be seen
as a product of delegation legislation in the sense it is understood in Administrative Law. This
being our conclusion as to the nature of power that was exercised to bring into existence the
impugned notification, all the cited decisions have no application.

21. The real concern of the petitioners is that the measures brought about by the impugned
notification are insufficient to prevent unscientific and unsustainable development, and
ecological destruction, and it is claimed that they are not intended to protect life. The phrase
“substantial question relating to environment” appearing in sub-section (1) of section 14 has
been defined in clause (m) of sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Environment Act. It reads as
follows:

(m) ‘substantial question relating to environment’ shall include an instance where, -

(i) there is a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental obligation by a person by

(A) the community at large other than an individual or group of individuals is affected or likely to
be affected by the environmental consequences; or

(B) the gravity of damage to the environment or property is substantial; or

While considering section 33, it was held as follows:

“47. Section 33 of the Act provides an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act over
anything inconsistent contained in any other law or in any instrument having effect by virtue of
law other than this Act. This gives the Tribunal overriding powers over anything inconsistent
contained in the KIAD Act, the Planning Act, the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976
(the KMC Act); and the Revised Master Plan of Bengaluru, 2015 (RMP). A Central legislation
enacted under Entry 13 of Schedule VII List I of the Constitution of India will have the
overriding effect over State legislations. The corollary is that the Tribunal while providing for
restoration of environment in an area, can specify buffer zones around specific lakes and
waterbodies in contradiction with zoning regulations under these statutes or RMP.”

26. In view of the pronouncement that the NGT Act would override State legislations, any
planning law has to yield to the former. Equally, section 24 of the Environment Act provides
that the provisions thereof and the rules or orders made therein shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than the said
Act. The MRTP Act, if it contains any provision inconsistent with the Environment Act, must
yield to the latter. Even otherwise, if there is direct violation of a specific statutory
environmental obligation by a person affecting the community at large or likely to affect such
community, the Tribunal may step in and pass such order as is warranted for settling the
dispute.

27. We now propose to assign our own reasons as to why the contention under consideration
does not appeal to us to be acceptable.

28. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to deal with environmental issues is so wide and expansive that
literally speaking, ‘everything under the sun’ raising substantial question relating to
environment can be dealt with by it. It would matter little that in its pursuit to further the objects
for which the Tribunal has been brought into existence as well as to ensure protection of
environment and conservation of forests and other natural resources including enforcement of
any legal right relating to environment, any other enactment is required to be considered. So
long as the basic question remains the same, i.e, the Tribunal is either approached or is duty
bound to secure proper implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I of the NGT
Act and a substantial question in relation thereto arises, and the decision of the Tribunal on
such question would beneficially impact the environment, merely because in the process of
decision making the Tribunal may be required to consider provisions of any other enactment
would not denude it of its fundamental and predominant task of taking decisions that would
advance the object of the Schedule I enactments as also to secure the ends of justice in any
particular case. We may refer in this connection to rule 24 of the National Green Tribunal
(Practice and Procedure) Rules, 2011 framed by the Central Government.

29. There is one final reason for which we are not persuaded to accept the contention of Mr.
Dhond. There could be a situation that the impugned notification is also under challenge before
the Tribunal on the first two contentions raised by the petitioners, as noted above, in an
application under section 14 of the NGT Act. If this writ petition were entertained, which raises
the fourth contention also, as noted above, the Court would be tasked to decide the first two
and the fourth contentions on its own merits. The Tribunal also being in seisin of the first two
contentions, there would always be a possibility of conflicting opinions being rendered by this
Court and the NGT in respect of the same subject matter of challenge which, in our opinion,
would be absolutely undesirable.

30. Regard being had to the wide contours of the Tribunal’s powers to address all concerns
pertaining to environment, it would not be appropriate for us to entertain this writ petition on the
specious ground that issues relating to the MRTP Act may also incidentally arise for
consideration of the Tribunal. If such issue arises, the Tribunal has to decide the same bearing
in mind that it being a creature of the NGT Act, environmental interest is of paramount
consideration and it has to decide accordingly.

31. We are also minded to observe that no Court ought to interfere in respect of matters over
which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, or else the very purpose for enactment of the NGT Act
would stand defeated. The Tribunal, having regard to its constitution, would be better equipped
to deal with all points of law and facts, which could be intricate, with the expert assistance that
is available at its level.

32. The discussion must end by quoting paragraph 40 of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan vs. Union of India, reported in (2012) 8 SCC
326, reading as follows:

“40. Keeping in view the provisions and scheme of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (for
short “the NGT Act”) particularly Sections 14, 29, 30 and 38(5), it can safely be concluded that
the environmental issues and matters covered under the NGT Act, Schedule I should be
instituted and litigated before the National Green Tribunal (for short “NGT”). Such approach