Republic v. Science Park of The Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 237714, November 12, 2018

3/1/22, 4:57 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 885

G.R. No. 237714. November 12, 2018.*

REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SCIENCE
PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., herein represented
by its Executive Vice President and General Manager, MR.
RICHARD ALBERT I. OSMOND, respondent.
Civil Law; Land Registration; The applicants for registration

of title must sufficiently establish that: (a) the land or property
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain at the time of the filing of the application for
registration; (b) it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and (c) the possession is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.—In an
application for land registration, it is elementary that the
applicant has the burden of proving, by clear, positive, and
convincing evidence that its alleged possession and occupation
were of the nature and duration required by law. In the instant
case, SPPI essentially asked the MCTC for judicial confirmation
of its imperfect title pursuant to Section 14(1) of PD 1529, which
provides: Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Under the
said provision, the applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish that: (a) the land or property forms part of
the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain at the
time of the filing of the application for registration; (b) it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (c) the
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
_______________
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017f4220508d72e20008000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/17
* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 353

Republic vs. Science Park of the Philippines, Inc.
Same; Same; The applicant has the burden of overcoming the

presumption that the State owns the land applied for, and proving
that the land has already been classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the filing of the application.—Verily,
the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the State owns the land applied for, and proving that the land has
already been classified as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the filing of the application. To prove the alienability
and disposability of the land sought to be registered, an
application for original registration must be accompanied by two
(2) documents, i.e., (1) a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the DENR’s official records; and (2) a
certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of the DENR based on the land classification approved
by the DENR Secretary.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; Words and Phrases;
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them.—Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which
judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
pertinently provides: Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing
necessary.—During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
“As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or
are actually pending before the same judge. However, this rule is
subject to the exception that in the absence of objection and as a
matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all
or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as
read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name
and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently

designated. Thus, for said exception to apply, the party concerned
must be given an opportunity to object before the court could take
judicial notice of any record pertaining to other cases pending
before it.”

354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Civil Law; Land Registration; The applicant needs only to

show that the land had already been declared alienable and
disposable at any time prior to the filing of the application for
registration.—Registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 is
based on possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, without regard to whether the land was susceptible
to private ownership at that time. “The applicant needs only to
show that the land had already been declared alienable and
disposable at any time prior to the filing of the application for
registration,” which SPPI was able to do.
Same; Same; For purposes of land registration under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the land subject of the application.—For purposes of land
registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529, proof of
specific acts of ownership must be presented to
substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of
the application. Actual possession consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property. Possession is: (a) open
when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not
clandestine; (b) continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and
not intermittent or occasional; (c) exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and (d) notorious
when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of
by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
Same; Same; In a number of cases, the Supreme Court (SC)
has repeatedly held that to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in the concept of owner, the
claimant must show the nature and extent of cultivation on the

subject land, or the number of crops planted or the volume of the
produce harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon;
failing in which, the supposed planting and harvesting of crops in
the land being claimed only amounted to mere casual cultivation
which is not the nature of possession and occupation required by
law.—To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession and occupation of

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VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 355

the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, SPPI

presented, among others, the testimony of Nelia Linatoc-Cabalda
(Nelia). Nelia, who was born in 1936, claimed to have known of
Gervacio’s ownership and cultivation of the subject land when she
was about seven (7) years old, or around 1943, as she and other
children her age would frequent the subject land where they
played and gathered fruits. However, such testimony was
insufficient to establish possession in the nature and character
required by law that would give right to ownership. In a number
of cases, the Court has repeatedly held that to prove open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
the concept of owner, the claimant must show the nature and
extent of cultivation on the subject land, or the number of crops
planted or the volume of the produce harvested from the crops
supposedly planted thereon; failing in which, the supposed
planting and harvesting of crops in the land being claimed only
amounted to mere casual cultivation which is not the nature of
possession and occupation required by law. Consequently, SPPI
failed to satisfy the requisite exclusivity and notoriety of its
claimed possession and occupation of the subject land because
exclusive dominion and conspicuous possession thereof were not
established.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Del Mundo, Catipon Law Office for respondent.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1

assailing the Decision2 dated October 12, 2017 and the
Resolution3 dated February 9, 2018 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 15-32.

2 Id., at pp. 38-51. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar
Fernando, with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Ramon Paul L.
Hernando (now a Member of the Court), concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 53-54.

356

C.A.-G.R. CV No. 108099, which affirmed the

Decision4 dated August 10, 2016 of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Malvar-Balete, Batangas (MCTC) in Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. N-129, granting respondent
Science Park of the Philippines, Inc.’s (SPPI) application
for original registration in accordance with Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529,5 otherwise known as the “Property
Registration Decree.”

The Facts

On November 20, 2014, SPPI filed with the MCTC an
Application6 for original registration of a 7,691-square-
meter (sq. m.) parcel of land denominated as Lot 5809, Psc-
47, Malvar Cadastre, located in Barangay Luta Norte,
Malvar, Batangas (subject land).7 SPPI claimed that:
(a) the subject land formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; (b) it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under
a bona fide claim of ownership prior to June 12,
1945;8 (c) the subject land is not mortgaged or encumbered,
nor claimed or possessed by any person other than
itself;9 and (d) it bought the land from Cenen D. Torizo
(Cenen) as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale10 dated
October 17, 2013.
To prove its claim that the subject land formed part of

the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
SPPI
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 56-64. Penned by Presiding Judge Charito M. Macalintal-

Sawali.
5 Entitled “Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration
of Property and for Other Purposes” (June 11, 1978).
6 In Re: Application for Original Registration of Title dated November
18, 2014. Rollo, pp. 69-75.
7 Id., at p. 76.
8 Id., at p. 70.
9 Id., at pp. 70-71.
10 Id., at pp. 80-84.

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VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 357

presented a certification11 dated February 26, 2016 issued

by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)-Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of Batangas City (CENRO) stating that the land is
within the alienable and disposable zone under Project No.
39, Land Classification (LC) Map No. 3601, based on DENR
Administrative Order No. 97-37 (DAO 97-37) issued by
then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos on December 22,
1997,12 as well as certified photocopies13 of LC Map No.
3601 and DAO 97-37.14
On the other hand, to support its claim of possession in
the concept of owner prior to June 12, 1945, it presented
documentary and testimonial evidence that: (a) the subject
land was previously owned by Gervacio Lat
15
(Gervacio), who held a 1955 tax declaration in his
name;16 (b) Gervacio was assisted by his tenant in
cultivating the land and harvesting the crops
thereon;17 (c) Gervacio was succeeded by his daughter,
Ambrocia Lat, who sold the subject land to Spouses
Raymundo Linatoc and Maria Reyes (Sps. Linatoc) through
a “Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa” dated April
25, 1968;18 (d) after Sps. Linatoc’s demise, their heirs
executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Waiver and Renunciation of Rights” on June 4, 1995,

waiving their rights, interests, and participation in the
subject land in favor of Ernesto Linatoc (Ernesto);19 (e)
Ernesto subsequently sold the same land to Cenen on
March 13, 2012 by virtue of a “Kasulatan ng
_______________
11 Not attached to the Rollo.

12 See Rollo, pp. 41-43.
13 Id.
14 Id., at p. 60.
15 Id., at pp. 40, 58.
16 Id., at pp. 43, 60.
17 Id., at pp. 40, 58.
18 Id., at pp. 40-41, 58.
19 Id., at pp. 41, 58-59.

358

Ganap na Bilihan”;20 and (f) the subject land is now owned

by SPPI which purchased the same from Cenen.21

The MCTC’s Decision

22
In a Decision dated August 10, 2016, the MCTC
granted SPPI’s application for original registration, holding
that it was able to establish that: (a) it has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land in the concept of owner even
prior to June 12, 1945, tacked to the possession of its
predecessors-in-interest; and (b) the land is alienable and
disposable per verification by the forester of the DENR
CALABARZON Region, CENRO, Batangas City from the
land classification map issued pursuant to DAO 97-
37.23 While the legal custodian of the DENR’s official
records, Chief of the Records Management and
Documentation Division, Jane G. Bautista (Ms.
Bautista),24 was not presented to identify the certified copy
of DAO 97-37 presented before the court, the MCTC took
judicial notice of the authenticity of DAO 97-37 on the basis
of a stipulation in LRC No. N-12725 (a land registration
case filed by SPPI involving a different parcel of land

previously heard and decided by the same MCTC) between
the same handling Government Prosecutor26 and the same
counsel for the applicant, to dispense with the presentation
of Ms. Bautista.27
Petitioner the Republic of the Philippines, herein
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(petitioner), moved
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 41, 59.

21 Id.
22 Id., at pp. 56-64.
23 Id., at pp. 62-63.
24 Id., at pp. 45, 60.
25 Id., at p. 48.
26 Id., at pp. 199-200.
27 Id., at p. 49.

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VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 359

for reconsideration but was denied in an Order28 dated

October 14, 2016.29 Hence, it appealed30 to the CA, arguing
that the MCTC erred in granting SPPI’s application for
land registration despite the latter’s failure to prove that:
(a) the subject land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since no DENR official
had confirmed that DAO 97-37 was authentic and still in
force at the time;31 and (b) it and its predecessors-in-
interest were in open, continuous, and exclusive possession
of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
prior to June 12, 1945, since the earliest possession was
shown to have started only in 1955, and it failed to identify
its predecessors prior to that time.32

The CA’s Ruling

In a Decision33 dated October 12, 2017, the CA affirmed
the MCTC’s ruling. It declared that the land is alienable
and disposable, and held that the MCTC properly took
judicial notice of DAO 97-37 in view of the acquiescence of
the handling Government Prosecutor after the trial judge

announced that the parties in LRC No. N-127 had already
stipulated on dispensing with the presentation of Ms.
Bautista, and after satisfying himself that the copy of DAO
97-37 presented was certified.34 It also ruled that SPPI
adequately proved through testimonial and documentary
evidence that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the subject land in the concept of owner since
June 12, 1945.35
_______________
28 Not attached to the Rollo.

29 See Rollo, p. 44.
30 See Brief for the Oppositor-Appellant dated May 2, 2017; id., at pp.
90-99.
31 Id., at p. 94.
32 Id., at p. 97.
33 Id., at pp. 38-51.
34 Id., at pp. 48-50.
35 Id., at pp. 50-51.

360

Petitioner sought reconsideration36 but was denied in a

Resolution37 dated February 9, 2018; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA
was correct in upholding the MCTC’s grant of SPPI’s
application for land registration.

The Court’s Ruling

In an application for land registration, it is elementary
that the applicant has the burden of proving, by clear,
positive, and convincing evidence that its alleged
possession and occupation were of the nature and duration
required by law.38
In the instant case, SPPI essentially asked the MCTC

for judicial confirmation of its imperfect title pursuant to
Section 14(1) of PD 1529, which provides:
Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons

may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
_______________
36 See Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated October 12,
2017) dated November 29, 2017; id., at pp. 65-68.
37 Id., at pp. 53-54.
38 See Dumo v. Republic, G.R. No. 218269, June 6, 2018, 865 SCRA
119.

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VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 361

Under the said provision, the applicants for registration

of title must sufficiently establish that: (a) the land or
property forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain at the time of the filing of the application
for registration; (b) it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and (c) the
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.39
Verily, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the State owns the land applied for, and
proving that the land has already been classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the filing
of the application.40 To prove the alienability and
disposability of the land sought to be registered, an
application for original registration must be accompanied
by two (2) documents, i.e., (1) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and

certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
DENR’s official records; and (2) a certificate of
land classification status issued by the CENRO or the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of the DENR based on the land classification
approved by the DENR Secretary.41
In the present case, petitioner maintains that SPPI
failed to prove that the subject land is within the alienable
and disposable portion of the public domain since DAO 97-
37 was never properly identified in court, and the MCTC
should not have taken judicial notice of the record of other
cases even when the said other cases have been heard or
pending in the same court.42
_______________
39 See Espiritu, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 219070, June 21, 2017, 828
SCRA 77, 88; and Republic v. The Estate of Virginia Santos, 802 Phil. 800,
811-812; 813 SCRA 541, 553 (2016).
40 See Dumo v. Republic, supra note 38, citing Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic, 605 Phil. 244, 269; 587 SCRA 172, 232 (2009).
41 See Dumo v. Republic, id., citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,
578 Phil. 441, 452-453; 555 SCRA 477, 489 (2008).

362

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which

judges may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them.43 Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court pertinently provides:
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.—During

the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter
and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

“As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases

may have been tried or are actually pending before the
same judge. However, this rule is subject to the exception
that in the absence of objection and as a matter of
convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or
any part of the original record of the case filed in its
archives as read into the records of a case pending before it,
when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference
is made to it, by name and number or in some other
manner by which it is sufficiently designated. Thus, for
said exception to apply, the party concerned must be given
an opportunity to object before the court could take judicial
notice of any record pertaining to other cases pending
before it.”44
As correctly ruled by the CA, the conditions necessary
for the exception to be applicable were established in this
case. Notably, the handling Government Prosecutor (a) did
not object to the dispensation of the testimony of the DENR
legal custodian of official records, Ms. Bautista, in view of
the similar stipulation between him and the same counsel
of SPPI in
_______________
43 See Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of

Customs, G.R. No. 195876, December 5, 2016, 812 SCRA 1, 50.
44 Id., at p. 52; underscoring supplied.

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VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 363

LRC No. N-127 previously heard and decided by the

MCTC,45 and (b) satisfied himself that the copy of DAO 97-
37 presented was duly certified by Ms. Bautista. Only then
was the photocopy of the certified copy duly marked as
exhibit.46
Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s protestation,47 the
land sought to be registered need not have been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier in
order for the applicant for registration to secure the judicial
confirmation of its title. Such contention had already been
declared as absurd and unreasonable in Republic v.
Naguit.48 Registra-
_______________
45 See Rollo, pp. 49-50.

46 Id.
47 Id., at p. 27.
48 489 Phil. 405, 413-414; 448 SCRA 442, 448-449 (2005). In the said
case, the Court held:
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). “Since June 12, 1945,” as used
in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase “under a bona fide
claim of ownership.” Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict
or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before
June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the

364

tion under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 is based on

possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since June 12,
1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land
was susceptible to private ownership at that time.
“The applicant needs only to show that the land had
already been declared alienable and disposable at any time
prior to the filing of the application for
49
registration,” which SPPI was able to do.
However, notwithstanding the alienability and
disposability of the subject land, the Court finds that SPPI
failed to present convincing evidence that its alleged
possession and occupation were of the nature and duration

required by law.
For purposes of land registration under Section
14(1) of PD 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application.
Actual
_______________
situation would even be aggravated[,] considering that before June

12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application
is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
49 Republic v. Heirs of Spouses Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol, 799
Phil. 514, 529; 808 SCRA 549, 563 (2016).

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VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 365

possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion

over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise
over his own property.50 Possession is: (a) open when it is
patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not clandestine;
(b) continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and not
intermittent or occasional; (c) exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and
an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and (d)
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally
known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.51
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have

been in possession and occupation of the subject land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, SPPI presented, among others,
the testimony of Nelia Linatoc-Cabalda (Nelia). Nelia, who
was born in 1936, claimed to have known of Gervacio’s
ownership and cultivation of the subject land when she was
about seven (7) years old, or around 1943, as she and other
children her age would frequent the subject land where
they played and gathered fruits.52 However, such testimony
was insufficient to establish possession in the nature and
character required by law that would give right to
ownership. In a number of cases, the Court has repeatedly
held that to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in the concept of
owner, the claimant must show the nature53 and extent of
cultivation54 on the subject land, or the number of crops
planted or the volume of the produce harvested from the
_______________
50 Republic v. Remman Enterprises, Inc., 727 Phil. 608, 625; 717 SCRA
171, 190-191 (2014).
51 Republic v. The Estate of Virginia Santos, supra note 39 at p. 814; p.
555.
53 See Republic v. The Estate of Virginia Santos, supra note 39 at p.
816; p. 556.
54 See Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., 525 Phil. 358, 380; 492 SCRA
272, 296 (2006).

366

crops supposedly planted thereon;55 failing in which, the

supposed planting and harvesting of crops in the land
being claimed only amounted to mere casual cultivation
which is not the nature of possession and occupation
required by law. Consequently, SPPI failed to satisfy the
requisite exclusivity and notoriety of its claimed possession
and occupation of the subject land because exclusive
dominion and conspicuous possession thereof were not
established.
Furthermore, SPPI’s evidence were insufficient to prove

that its possession and occupation were for the duration
required by law. The earliest tax declaration in Gervacio’s
name presented by SPPI, i.e., Tax Declaration (TD) No.
6243, dates back to 195556 only, short of the requirement
that possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership should be since June 12, 1945 or earlier. That
TD No. 6243 cancels a prior tax declaration, i.e., TD 1052,
would not help SPPI’s cause in view of the absence of any
evidence (a) identifying Gervacio or any other prior
possessor as the declared owner under TD 1052, and (b)
indicating its effectivity date. Thus, the Court cannot
subscribe to the CA’s conclusion that it can be “reasonably
assumed that before the issuance of [TD] No. 6243, the
subject [land] had already been occupied by [Gervacio] or
other prior claimants.”57 The payment of realty taxes and
declaration of the subject land in the name of Gervacio in
1955 gives rise to the presumption that he claimed
ownership and possession thereof only in that year.58
In sum, the Court finds that SPPI’s unsubstantiated and
self-serving assertions of possession and occupation do not
constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of
possession and occupation of the subject land of the nature
and duration required by Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
Accordingly,
_______________
55 Supra note 50 at p. 626; p. 191.

56 See Rollo, pp. 43, 60.
57 Id., at p. 50.
58 See Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., supra note 41 at pp. 457-458;
p. 494.

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VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 367

the CA erred in affirming the MCTC’s grant of SPPI’s

application for original registration of its imperfect title
over the subject land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. A new
judgment is hereby entered REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the Decision dated October 12, 2017 and the
Resolution dated February 9, 2018 of the Court of Appeals

in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 108099, and accordingly, DENYING
respondent Science Park of the Philippines, Inc.’s (SPPI)
application for original registration of the subject land.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio** (Chairperson), Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr. and J.

Reyes, Jr.,*** JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The land may be declared alienable and

disposable at any time, not necessarily before June 12,
1945. The moment that the land is declared alienable and
disposable, an applicant may then initiate the proceedings
for the judicial confirmation of title. (Republic vs. Go, 834
SCRA 166 [2017])
When an applicant is shown to have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of a land
for the period required by law, he or she has acquired an
imperfect title that may be confirmed by the State.
(Republic vs. Noval, 840 SCRA 11 [2017])

——o0o——
_______________
** Designated Senior Associate Justice per Section 12, Republic Act No.
296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
*** Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2587 dated
August 28, 2018.
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Republic v. Science Park of The Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 237714, November 12, 2018

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Republic v. Science Park of The Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 237714, November 12, 2018

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3/1/22, 4:57 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 885

G.R. No. 237714. November 12, 2018.*

Civil Law; Land Registration; The applicants for registration

VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 353

Same; Same; The applicant has the burden of overcoming the

and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Civil Law; Land Registration; The applicant needs only to

claimant must show the nature and extent of cultivation on the

VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 355

the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, SPPI

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1

1 Rollo, pp. 15-32.

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

C.A.-G.R. CV No. 108099, which affirmed the

To prove its claim that the subject land formed part of

4 Id., at pp. 56-64. Penned by Presiding Judge Charito M. Macalintal-

VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 357

presented a certification11 dated February 26, 2016 issued

Waiver and Renunciation of Rights” on June 4, 1995,

11 Not attached to the Rollo.

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ganap na Bilihan”;20 and (f) the subject land is now owned

case filed by SPPI involving a different parcel of land

20 Id., at pp. 41, 59.

VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 359

for reconsideration but was denied in an Order28 dated

the handling Government Prosecutor after the trial judge

28 Not attached to the Rollo.

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioner sought reconsideration36 but was denied in a

In the instant case, SPPI essentially asked the MCTC

Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons

(1) Those who by themselves or through their

VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 361

Under the said provision, the applicants for registration

classification approved by the DENR Secretary and

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.—During

same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases

43 See Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of

VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 363

LRC No. N-127 previously heard and decided by the

45 See Rollo, pp. 49-50.

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 is based on

possession and occupation were of the nature and duration

situation would even be aggravated[,] considering that before June

VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 365

possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

crops supposedly planted thereon;55 failing in which, the

Furthermore, SPPI’s evidence were insufficient to prove

55 Supra note 50 at p. 626; p. 191.

VOL. 885, NOVEMBER 12, 2018 367

the CA erred in affirming the MCTC’s grant of SPPI’s