09 - Kinnari Bhuta - TYLLB
09 - Kinnari Bhuta - TYLLB
09 - Kinnari Bhuta - TYLLB
ROLL NO – 09
CLASS- TY.LLB
SEM -5
SUBJECT- INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Assignment is like a bridge between theoretical and practical working. I Thank the Almighty
for always supporting and believing my efforts and I am highly oblige in taking this
opportunity to record our sincere thanks to the faculty members of MKES College Of Law
Malad (w),The Whole Department of Law & the concerned authorities for all their valuable
guidance ,support ,encouragement ,motivation & efforts for the completion of the
assignment.
THANKYOU !
KINNARI BHUTA
CLASS – (TY.LLB)
INDEX
Sr PAGE
PARTICULARS
No NO.
1) INTRODUCTION TO INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 4
SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATION
3) DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTERPRETAION & CONSTRUCTION 6
5) CONCLUSION 16
6) WEBLIOGRAPHY 18
INTRODUCTION TO INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
1)The legislature makes laws with a specific intent in mind. The responsibility of deciphering
that intent lies with the judiciary. This process of getting to know the intent behind the law is
known as statute interpretation. Enacted laws, especially the modern acts and rules, are
drafted by legal experts and it could be expected that the language used will leave little room
for interpretation or construction. But the experience of all those who have to bear and share
the task of application of the law has been different.
2) The term has been derived from the Latin term ‘interpretari’, which means to explain,
expound, understand, or to translate. Interpretation is the process of explaining, expounding
and translating any text or anything in written form.
3) The most significant goal accomplished by the interpretation of statutes would be to make
sure that the judiciary acts in compliance with the legislature’s purpose. The various
possibilities and variations that can occur throughout the actual application of the law as well
as to account for every one of these in context excluded from certain inconsistencies are not
beyond the ability of people to anticipate.
4)Interpretation of statutes is the correct understanding of the law. Interpretation is the
process of explaining, expounding and translating any text or anything in written form. This
basically involves an act of discovering the true meaning of the language which has been
used in the statute. Various sources used are only limited to explore the written text and
clarify what exactly has been indicated by the words used in the written text or the statutes.
5)This process is commonly adopted by the courts for determining the exact intention of the
legislature. Because the objective of the court is not only merely to read the law but is also to
apply it in a meaningful manner to suit from case to case. It is also used for ascertaining the
actual connotation of any Act or document with the actual intention of the legislature. Statute
are the starting point in interpretation. Once the statute is enacted, the legislature can be said
to become functus officio so far as the statute is concerned.
6) A Statute is an edict of the Legislature and it must be construed “to the intent of them who
make it” and “duty of the judicature is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature- the
mens or sententia legis.”
7) Interpretation is a familiar process of considerable significance in relation to statute law,
interpretation is of importance because of the inherent nature of legislation as a source of law.
DEFINITION OF INTERPRETATION
Salmond -According to Salmond interpretation or construction is the process by which the
courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative
forms in which it is expressed.”. It has been said that there is a distinction between the two
expressions.
Cooley According to Cooley - Interpretation differs from construction in the sense that the
former is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; i.e. the sense that their
author intended to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions,
respecting the subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text.
Crawford – Statute law defined as the will of the state expressed by the legislature or by the
people through its initiative and expounded by the courts. Thus “statute law” includes statutes
as also case-laws.
Maxwell – Statute is defined as “the will of the legislature”.
Interpretation differs from construction in the sense that the former is the art of finding out
the true sense of any form of words; i.e. the sense that their author intended to convey.
Construction on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting the subjects that lie
beyond the direct expression of the text. In general, interpretation recognizes or discovers the
linguistic meaning of an authoritative legal text. Contract interpretation yields the linguistic
meaning of the contract. Patent interpretation yields the semantic content of the patent claims.
Statutory interpretation yields the linguistic meaning of statutory texts. Interpretation finds
out the ways through which any statute can be analyzed. Construction tries to conclude it.
MEANING OF INTERPRETATION - The term interpretation has been derived from the
Latin word ‘interpretari’ which means to understand, expound, explain and translate.
Interpretation is the procedure of explaining or translating a text. In simple terms,
interpretation of a statute means understanding the law. The aim of a court is to not just read
law but to apply it in a manner which suits case to case. Therefore, it is a process used by
courts to find out the actual implication of an act or document and also its intention.
Interpretation bridges the gap between the enactment of a law and its translation.
The basis of interpretation is to clarify the meaning of the words used in in-laws and statutes
which might be ambiguous. There might be irregularities in in-laws which need to be
corrected and they can be done by applying various theories of interpretations to see which
might go against the literal meanings of those laws.
Interpretation differs from construction in the sense that the former is the art of finding out
the true sense of any form of words; i.e. the sense that their author intended to convey.
Construction on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting the subjects that lie
beyond the direct expression of the text.
PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION & CONSTRUCTION
The fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that the words of a statute be read in
their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the
scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of the legislature.
Some Important points to be taken care of in the context of interpreting Statutes:
1)Intention of the legislature 2) Statute must be read as a whole in its Context 3)Statute
should be Construed so as to make it Effective and Workable – if statutory provision is
ambiguous and capable of various constructions, then that construction must be adopted
which will give meaning and effect to the other provisions of the enactment rather than that
which will give none.
4) If meaning is plain, effect must be given to it irrespective of consequences.
5) The process of construction combines both the literal and purposive approaches. The
purposive construction rule highlights that you should shift from literal construction when it
leads to absurdity.
MEANING OF CONSTRUCTION
Construction is the process of drawing conclusions of the subjects which are beyond the
direct expression of the text. The courts draw findings after analyzing the meaning of the
words used in the text or the statutes. This process is known as legal exposition. There are a
certain set of facts pending before the court and construction is the application of the
conclusion of these facts. The objective is to assist the judicial body in determining the real
intention of the legislature. Its aim is also to ascertain the legal effect of the legal text.
CONCEPT OF CONSTRUCTION
Conceptually, construction gives legal effect to the semantic content of a legal text.
Construction can occur in a variety of contexts, and there are different modes of construction.
One important distinction can be marked by differentiating the contexts in which construction
can occur. For example, we can distinguish judicial construction from political construction
and private construction. Courts engage in judicial construction when they translate the
linguistic meaning of a legal text into doctrine: examples of judicial construction of the First
Amendment were discussed above. Judicial construction also occurs when the effect to be
given to semantic content of a legal text is constrained or modified by higher-order legal
rules. For example, when a will violates the rule against perpetuities, a court may give the
will a saving construction --- this construction gives the will a legal effect that varies from the
semantic content of the text.Yet another example of judicial construction occurs when a court
simply translates the semantic content of the text into corresponding legal content, and then
applies that content to a particular case—in such cases, the act of construction may go
unnoticed since it does no work in determining legal content.
We need to examine two related distinctions. The first of these is the distinction between
vagueness and ambiguity; the second distinction is between semantic content and legal
content.
A second response to the interpretation-construction distinction might claim that the semantic
meaning of legal texts, in general (and the Constitution, in particular), simply is the legal
meaning of the associated doctrines. In other words, it might be argued that linguistic
meaning (semantic content) can be reduced to legal effect (legal content). Although one can
imagine heroic efforts to redeem this claim, it is surely implausible on its face. For example,
we can talk about a divergence between the rules of constitutional law and the linguistic
meaning of the constitutional text, but such talk would be mistaken and even absurd if it were
a conceptual truth that the legal content simply is the semantic content. Similarly, we can
investigate the linguistic meaning of a legal text that is no longer in force, or that was never
enacted, but if the claim that semantic and legal content are identical were true, such
investigations would be senseless - the equivalent of an attempt to investigate the nature of
phlogiston.
This point is an important one, and it can be illustrated clearly by a familiar example. Take
the case of a will that may violate the rule against perpetuities. When a lawyer or judge is
analyzing the will, the first step is interpretation: what is the linguistic meaning of the text? If
the will does (as a matter of linguistic fact) contain a provision that would create perpetuity,
the next step requires construction—determining the legal effect of the will. In some cases,
the will may be given a saving construction (or reformation).The second step is construction:
what legal effect shall be given to the will? In answer to this question, the court can substitute
a provision that matches the semantic content of the will as closely as possible without
violating the rule against perpetuities.
The Court can consider resources outside the Act, called the extrinsic aids, in interpreting and
finding out the purposes of the Act. Where the words of an Act are clear and unambiguous,
no resource to extrinsic matter, even if it consists of the sources of the codification, is
permissible. But where it is not so, the Court can consider, apart from the intrinsic aids, such
as preamble and the purview of the Act, both with the prior events leading up to the
introduction of the Bill, out of the which the Act has emerged, and subsequent events from
the time of its introduction until its final enactment like the legislation, history of the Bill,
Select Committee reports.
1) HISTORICAL SETTING/ PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY
The Supreme Court, enunciated the rule of exclusion of Parliamentary history in the way it is
enunciated by English Courts, but on many occasions, the Court used this aid in resolving
questions of construction. The Court has now veered to the view that legislative history
within circumspect limits may be consulted by Courts in resolving ambiguities. It has already
been noticed that the Court is entitled to take into account “such external or historical facts as
may be necessary to understand the subject-matter of the statute”, or to have regard to “the
surrounding circumstances” which existed at the time of passing of the statute. Like any other
external aid, the inferences from historical facts and surrounding circumstances must give
way to the clear language employed in the enactment itself.
CASE LAW -Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India
In this case it was observed that the Parliament history may be considered for the purpose of
the interpretation in case where the meaning of a provision is not clear.
It contains the following things- 1) Reports 2) Parliamentary Debates 3) Bills
CASE LAW - G. Sekar v. Geetha
JUDGEMENT - In this case the court observed that the reports such as of Law Commission
of India can be considered for interpretation if a provision in ambiguous.
CASE LAW - S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab and Ors.
JUDGEMENT - In this case the debates of the Constituent Assembly were taken into
consideration for the determination of provisions. It was stated that through it the intention of
the legislature can be ascertained.
They are generally not considered as useful tool to interpretation. Courts refrain from using
the reports for interpretation. However in some cases where ambiguity arises in a provision
then court can refer these reports which are formed by committees which advices the
legislature at the passing of an act. They can help in determining the intention of the
legislature.
CASE LAW - S.R. Chaudhuri v State of Punjab and others, (2001) 7 SCC 126
JUDGEMENT -The Supreme Court has stated that it is a settled position that debates in the
Constituent Assembly may be relied upon as an aid to interpret a Constitutional provision
because it is the function of the Court to find out the intention of the framers of the
Constitution.
2) CONSOLIDATING STATUTES & PREVIOUS LAW / REFERENCE TO OTHER
STATUTES
It has already been stated that a statute must be read as a whole as words are to be understood
in their context. Extension of this rule of context, permits reference to other statutes in pari
materia, i.e. statutes dealing with the same subject matter or forming part of the same system.
The meaning of the phrase ‘pari materia’ has been explained in an American case in the
following words: “Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or thing, or to
the same class of persons or things. The word par must not be confounded with the words
simlis. It is used in opposition to it intimating not likeness merely, but identity. It is a phrase
applicable to public statutes or general laws made at different times and in reference to the
same subject. When the two pieces of legislation are of differing scopes, it cannot be said
that they are in pari materia.s
It is a well accepted legislative practice to incorporate by reference, if the legislature so
chooses, the provisions of some other Act in so far as they are relevant for the purposes of
and in furtherance of the scheme and subjects of the Act.
Words in a later enactment cannot ordinarily be construed with reference to the meaning
given to those or similar words in an earlier statute. But the later law is entitled to weight
when it comes to the problem of construction.
Generally speaking, a subsequent Act of a legislature affords no useful guide to the meaning
of another Act which comes into existence before the later one was ever framed. Under
special circumstances the law does, however, admit of a subsequent Act to be resorted to for
this purpose but the conditions, under which the later Act may be resorted to for the
interpretation of the earlier Act are strict. Both must be laws on the same subject and the part
of the earlier Act which is sought to be construed must be ambiguous and capable of
different meanings.
Although a repealed statute has to be considered, as if it had never existed, this does not
prevent the Court from looking at the repealed Act in pari materia on a question of
construction. The regulations themselves cannot alter or vary the meaning of the words of a
statute, but they may be looked at as being an interpretation placed by the appropriate
Government department on the words of the statute. Though the regulations cannot control
construction of the Act, yet they may be looked at, to assist in the interpretation of the
Act and may be referred to as working out in detail the provisions of the Act consistently
with their terms.
5) DICTIONARY - When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to
dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common
parlance. However, in selecting one out of the various meanings of the word, regard must
always be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that “the meaning of words and
expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear”.
Therefore, when the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes
unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word
is capable of, according to lexicographers”. As stated by Krishna Aiyar, J. “Dictionaries are
not dictators of statutory construction where the benignant mood of a law, and more
emphatically the definition clause furnish a different denotation”. Further, words and
expressions at times have a ‘technical’ or a ‘legal meaning’ and in that case, they are
understood in that sense. Again, judicial decisions expounding the meaning of words in
construing statutes in pari materia will have more weight than the meaning furnished by
dictionaries.
CASE LAW - Alamghir v. State of Bihar
JUDGEMENT - In this case the interpretation of Article 498 of Indian Penal Code was
done. The word “detain” was under consideration. It was accompanied by other words such
as takes or entices or conceals. Now in ordinary sense the word detain would mean without
consent of the person detained. But the court observed that Section 498 protect the interests
of husband. So, detain would include the case of taking away the wife from her husband even
with her consent.
6) TEXTBOOKS
Sometimes courts while determining a law takes help from the textbooks. But this view has
been criticized because textbook contains the personal views of the author and different
textbooks have different opinions. Personal views of the author cannot tell us about the
intention of the legislature. Thus is not a reliable source of interpretation.
7) SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND SCIENTIFIC
INVENTIONS
A Statute must be interpreted to include circumstances or situations which were unknown or
did not exist at the time of enactment of the statute. Any relevant changes in the social
conditions and technology should be given due weightage. Courts should take into account all
these developments while construing statutory provisions.
CASE LAW - In S.P. Gupta v Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149.
JUDGEMENT -“The interpretation of every statutory provision must keep pace with
changing concepts and values and it must, to the extent to which its language permits or
rather does not prohibit, suffer adjustments through judicial interpretation so as to accord
with the requirement of the fast changing society which is undergoing rapid social and
economic transformation. It is elementary that law does not operate in a vacuum. It is,
therefore, intended to serve a social purpose and it cannot be interpreted without taking into
account the social, economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. It is here
that the Judge is called upon to perform a creative function. He has to inject flesh and blood
in the dry skeleton provided by the legislature and by a process of dynamic interpretation,
invest it with a meaning which will harmonize the law with the prevailing concepts and
values and make it an effective instrument for delivery of justice.” Therefore, court has to
take into account social, political and economic developments and scientific inventions which
take place after enactment of a statute for proper construction of its provision.
8) OTHER MATERIALS
Similarly, Supreme Court used information available on internet for the purpose of
interpretation of statutory provision in Ramlal v State of Rajasthan, (2001) 1 SCC 175.
Courts also refer passages and materials from text books and articles and papers published in
the journals. These external aids are very useful tools not only for the proper and correct
interpretation or construction of statutory provision, but also for understanding the object of
the statute, the mischief sought to be remedied by it, circumstances in which it was enacted
and many other relevant matters. In the absence of the admissibility of these external aids,
sometimes court may not be in a position to do justice in a case.
The External aids are very useful tools for the interpretation or construction of statutory
provisions. As opposed to internal aids to construction there are certain aids which are
external to the statute. Such aids will include parliamentary history of the legislation,
historical facts and surrounding circumstances in which the statute came to be enacted,
reference to other statutes, use of dictionaries, use of foreign decisions, etc.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to the legal exposition of the statute, act or any agreement, interpretation
precedes construction. While the interpretation of the statute, is all about exploring the
written text, whereas construction is used in the broader sense, i.e. it not only helps in
determining the sense and explanation of the provisions of the act but also elucidates its legal
effect.
But once we have the interpretation-construction distinction at hand, it turns out that some of
the apparent disagreement between Originalism and Living Constitutionalism dissolves, and
that the remainder is reconfigured. The core of Originalism is a theory of constitutional
interpretation: Originalists claim that the linguistic meaning of the constitution is fixed by
linguistic facts at the time that each constitutional provision is framed and ratified. Most
Originalists also affirm a partial theory of constitutional construction: they claim that the
legal content of constitutional doctrine should be constrained by the linguistic content of the
text. To simplify for purposes of exposition, Originalists believe that the legal content of
constitutional doctrine must be consistent with the semantic content of the constitutional text
— 41. This discussion adapts remarks in Semantic Originalism. Living constitutionalism, on
the other hand, is primarily a theory of constitutional construction. Living constitutionalists
believe that the legal content of constitutional doctrine must change with changing
circumstances and values. Although there may be Living Constitutionalists who believe that
that the commitment to change in constitutional doctrine requires them to deny that the
linguistic content of the Constitution is fixed, that belief is obviously false. Even if the
linguistic meaning of the Constitution is fixed (as originalists recognize), the content of
constitutional doctrine can grow and change over time (as it obviously does). One reason for
this phenomenon is the fact of constitutional under determinacy: many constitutional
provisions are general, abstract, and vague. “Legislative power” and “freedom of speech” are
examples. When a legal provision is vague, then semantic content underdetermines legal
content. Thus, a variety of specific rules regarding prior restraints could be consistent with
the linguistic meaning of the First Amendment, and these specific rules could change over
time. Once the interpretation-construction distinction is recognized, it becomes apparent that
some (and perhaps even many) aspects of the debate between Originalists and Living
Constitutionalists are the product of conceptual confusion. In fact, some forms of living
constitutionalism may actually be compatible with some forms of originalism. If Living
Constitutionalists are willing to live within what we can call “the construction zone” the zone
of indeterminacy created by the general, abstract, and vague provisions of the Constitution—
they can embrace the notion that the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text was fixed at
the time of framing and ratification. If Originalists are willing to accept that constitutional
doctrine should and must change over time within the limits imposed by the original meaning
of the text, then they can accept a constrained version of Living Constitutionalism.
Every nation has its own judicial system, the purpose of which to grant justice to all. The
court aims to interpret the law in such a manner that every citizen is ensured justice to all. To
ensure justice to all the concept of canons of interpretation was expounded. These are the
rules which are evolved for determining the real intention of the legislature.
It is not necessary that the words used in a statute are always clear, explicit and unambiguous
and thus, in such cases it is very essential for courts to determine a clear and explicit meaning
of the words or phrases used by the legislature and at the same time remove all the doubts if
any. Hence, all the rules mentioned in the article are important for providing justice.
WEBLIOGRAPHY
1) https://keydifferences.com/difference-between-interpretation-and-
construction.html
2) https://www.lawordo.com/external-aids-to-interpretation/
3) https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-2713-interpretation-of-statutes-a-
complete-study-to-an-aids-to-interpretation.html