Republic vs Maddela Issa Gayas violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or

sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an

G.R. No. L-21664 March 28, 1969 incident only of the adjudication of the right of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE the parties to a controversy, the court may pass
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioners, vs. upon, and make a pronouncement relative to,
HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement
of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, and is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no
MIGUELA TAN SUAT, respondents action or proceeding may be instituted for a
declaration to the effect that plaintiff or
G.R. No. L-21665 March 28, 1969 petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE child, although a finding thereon may be made
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioners, as a necessary premise to justify a given relief
vs. HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the available only to one enjoying said status. At
Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II and times, the law permits the acquisition of a given
CHAN PO LAN, respondents. status, such as naturalization by judicial decree.
But there is no similar legislation authorizing the
Nature:Two (2) separate petitions for certiorari and institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that
prohibition with preliminary injunction but are decided a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan v.
jointly because the issues presented proceed from the Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960).
same factual background.
Burca vs Republic Anne C. Dela Peña
Facts: Mo Ya Lim Yao Jamie Bentinganan
On April 29, 1963 the Court of First Instance of Oh Hek How Nadine Abenoja
Quezon (Branch 11), Hon. Manolo L. Maddela presiding,
rendered a decision in its Special Proceeding No. Board of Commissioner Jamic Villar Arbolado
4012.On the same day the same court rendered another
similarly worded, decision in its special Proceeding No.
4013, this time in favor of Chan Po Lan. Facts:

The two cases involve the same petition to have On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian,
petitioners declared Filipino citizens. Both petitioners grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by
were legally married to Filipino citizens and during the the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino
trial it has been established to the satisfaction of the citizen following the citizenship of natural mother
Court that both petitioners have all the qualifications Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then
and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong
citizen. The Fiscal representing the Solicitor General if he together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They
has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal had with them certificate of registration and identity
answered that he has no opposition, neither has he any issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on
evidence to warrant opposition. a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of
foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission
Both Po Lan and Tan Suat were declared Filipino as Filipino citizens.
citizens by marriage and the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Immigration was ordered to cancel the On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry
necessary alien certificate of registration and immigrant admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued
certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue the an identification certificate to William. The boarf of
corresponding identification card. commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice
The Solicitor General filed the instant petitions to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the
and on August 10, 1963 the SC issued in each case a ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution and included the case of William. As a result of the decision
enforcement of the judgment. of the board of special inquiry which recommended for
the reversal of the decision of the Board of
Issue: Whether petitioners should be declared Filipino Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order
citizens affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

Held: No. On August 15, 1990, the Commission on

Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of
Jurisprudence had already set the question at rest: no William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash
person claiming to be a citizen may get a judicial bond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed a
declaration of citizenship. petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of
Under our laws, there can be no action or Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.
proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice Issue: Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be
exist for the settlement of justiciable declared as a Filipino citizen
controversies, which imply a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission Held: Yes.
 status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other
ID.; CONFLICT OF LAWS; FOREIGN LAW PRESUMED THE means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."
SAME WITH PHILIPPINE LAW ABSENCE OF PROOF TO (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code).
THE CONTRARY. — In Miciano v. Brimo (50 Phil. 867
[1924]; Lim and Lim v. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 20. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. —
472; Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 Having declared the assailed marriages as valid,
[1915]),this Court held that in the absence of evidence respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of
to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being
the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the
relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine
is the same as that of Philippine law. citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration
in an order dated July 12, 1960. Finally, respondent
18. ID.; MARRIAGE; DOCTRINE OF "PROCESSUAL William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino
PRESUMPTION" APPLIED IN PHILIPPINE LAW. — citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, Constitution, which provides: "Section 1. The following
adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where are citizens of the Philippines:" (1) Those who are
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 this Constitution. . . ." This forecloses any further
of the Family Code) provides that" (a)ll marriages question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent
performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with William Gatchalian.
the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in Nuval Julie Ann Bedrio
this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the
matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the GREGORIO NUVAL, petitioner-appellant,
validity of such marriage may be extended to the vs. NORBERTO GURAY, ET AL., respondents.
consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220
of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all NORBERTO GURAY, appelllee.
presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or facts leans toward the Nature of the Case: Appeal from the judgment of CFI of
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage La Union, upholding the defense of res judicata and
bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of dismissing the quo warranto proceedings against
property during marriage, the authority of parents over Norbeto Guray
their children, and the validity of defense for any
member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." FACTS:
(Italics supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual
presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he On May 11, 1928, Nuval filed (in his dual capacity as a
who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law voter duly qualified and registered in the election list of
bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law. the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered
candidate) a petition against Guray asking for the
19. ID.; PROOF OF FILIATION; STATEMENTS OR exclusion of his name from the election list, not being a
DECLARATORY REGARDING FAMILY REPUTATION OR qualified voter of said municipality sine he had not
TRADITION IN MATTERS OF PEDIGREE; ADMITTED IN resided therein for six months as required by section
CASE AT BAR. — The lack of proof of Chinese law on the 431 of the said Administrative Code.
matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much
more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a CFI Decision: Norberto Guray was a bona fide resident
twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, of the municipality of Luna from Janury 1, 1927. As that
Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship order was not appealable, Guray's name remained in the
Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating election list. In the election on June 5, 1928, Guray was
to marriage, having been content with the testimony of elected as municipal presidentby a plurality of votes,
Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or Nuval obtaining second place.
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
Neither was Francisco Gatchalian‟s testimony subjected On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present
to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. action of quo warranto asking that Guray be declared
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian ineligible had a legal residence of one year previuos to
and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular the election as required by the Admin Code.
and immigration authorities regarding their marriages,
birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the judgment rendered in the
but are admissible in evidence as statements or CFI is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now
matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furthermore, before us.
this salutary rule of evidence finds support in
substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code HELD: 1. No. The petition for exclusion was presented
provides: "Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, by Nuval in his capacity as qualified voter and as a duly
authentic document, final judgment or possession of registered candidate, against Guray as a registered
voter. The present proceedings of quo warranto was dated January 15, 1928, in which it is presented that he
intreposed by Nuval as a registered candidate voted for resided in the barrio of Victoria, Luna, La Union. On
the office of municipal president of Luna, against Guray, February 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and
as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, obtained the cancellation of his name in the election list
there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928, he
not enough that there be an identity of persons, but applied for registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that
there must be an identity of capacities in which said he had been residing in said municipality for thirty years.
persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. For this purpose he made of the cedula certificate
Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, antedated.
par. 1165.) 3. Whether or that to the date when he once more
established his residence in the municipality of Luna.
In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons
of the litigation was the conclusion of Guray as a voter his residence in a state and acquires one in another
from the election list, while in the present quo warranto state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former
proceeding, the object of the litigation is his exclusion or residence until he has qualified by a new period of
expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28). "The term
Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object 'residence' as so used is synonymous with
of the litigation, or the litigious matter. 'domicile,' which imports not only intention to
In the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence
thatGuray had no six months' legal residence in the in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S.,
while in proceedings of quo warranto, the cause is that 145.)
Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence Luna
the eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. and acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be
Neither does there exist, therefore, identity of causes of a candidate in Luna, he needed to reacquire residence
action. infor the length of time prescribed by the law, and for
For res judicata may exist the ff are necessary: (a) such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so,
Identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c) but his personal presence in said municipality.
identity of issues. There is no identity either of parties, A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate
or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of abandonment of the former (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71) and
action, there is no res judicata. one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
2. Whether or not Guray at the time of his election, was Guray abandoned his legal residencce in the municipality
ineligible for the office of the residence in said of Luna, transferring it to the municipality of Balaoan by
municipality. - He transferred his residence from the reason and an account of the requirements of the rules
municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan. of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose
Up to June 27, 1922, Guray had resided in the jurisdiction is said municipality, exercising his right of
municipality of Luna, his birthplace, where he had suffrage in the latter.
married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the
He was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Municipality of Balaoan, and began to acquire another in
Union. The rules of the provincial treasurer require that the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when
municipality treasurers live continuously in the he filed his resignation from the office of municipal
municipality where they perform they official duties. In treasurer of Balaoan which he had been holding, and
order to qualify, he asked for the cancellation of his which resignation was accepted; and on being elected
name in the election lists of Luna, alleging as a ground municipal president of Luna in the general elections of
therefore the following: "On the ground of transfer of June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal residence
any residence which took place on the 28th day of June, necessary to be validly elected to said office.
1922. My correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan, SC Decision: Election of Guray as municipal president of
La Union". In his cedula certificates for1923 to 1928, he Luna is hereby held to be unlawful and quashed and he
made it appear that his residence was Balaoan. In 1926, has no right to take possession of said office, petitioner
his wife and children went back to live in the town of Gregorio Nuval being the one legally elected to said
Luna in the house of his wife's parents, due to the high office with a right to take possession thereof, having
cost of living in that municipality. Guray used to go secured second place in the election.
home to Luna and his children studied in the public
school of Luna. In January, 1927, he commenced the RULING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
construction of a house of which has not yet been
completed, and neither be nor his family has lived in it. February 1, 1929
On February 1, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and
obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the Sec 408 of the Election Law, providing the remedy in
16th of the same month he filed his resignation by case a person not eligible should be elected to a
telegraph, which was accepted on the same day, also by provincial or municipal office, does not authorize that it
telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was already be declared who has been legally elected, thus differing
provided with a cedula by himself as municipal treasurer from section 479 of the law, which contains such an
of Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring him resident authorization, and for the reason, furthermore, that
of said town, he obtained another cedula from the section 477 of the said law provides that only those who
municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was have obtained a plurality of votes, and have presented
their certificates of candidacy may be certified as elected - He has no record of conviction and it is his intention to
to municipal offices. Elective offices are by nature renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A.
different from the appointive offices. The occupation of
the first depends on the will of the elector, while that of Court a quo: Denied the petition on the ground that
the second depends on the will of the authority petitioner did not have the residence required by law six
providing for it. months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of
In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by Philippine citizenship.
election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the
candidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedings Issue: Whether petitioner should be allowed to
referring to offices filled by appointment, what is reacquire Philippine citizenship
determined is the legality of the appointment. In the
first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court Held: No.
cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second
place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since The SC agreed with the lower court‟s decision.
the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor
of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides:
has presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second
case, the court determines who has been legally One of the qualifications for
appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled reacquiring Philippine citizenship
to occupy the office. is that the applicant shall have
Judgment is amended, eliminating from the dispositive resided in the Philippines at
part thereof, the holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one least six months before he
who has been legally elected, so as to read as follows: applies for naturalization.
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee
Norberto Guray to the office of Municipal president of The term "residence" has already been
Luna, is hereby declared unlawful and quashed and, interpreted to mean the actual or constructive
consequently, that he has no right to take possession of permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or
said office, with costs against said respondent. domicile (WilfredoUytengsu v. Republic of the Philippines,
95 Phil., 890; 50 Off. Gaz., 4781). A place in a country
Vellilla Soltan Michael Alisan or state where he lives and stays permanently, and to
which he intends to return after a temporary absence,
2nd set no matter how long, is his domicile.
Ujano – Issa
In other words, domicile is characterized by
[G.R. No.L-22041. May 19, 1966.] animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted
MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. into this country as a temporary visitor, either for
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Oppositor- business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though
Appellee. actually present in this country cannot be said to have
established his domicile here because the period of his
Nature: Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when
citizenship in a petition filed before the Court of First the purpose of his coming is accomplished.
Instance of Ilocos Sur.
In the present case, Petitioner, who is presently
Facts: a citizen of the United States of America, was admitted
- Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has
Magsingal, Ilocos Sur. maintained at the time of the filing of the present
petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and
- He is married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has which continues up to the present. Such being the case,
one son, Prospero, who is now of legal age. he has not complied with the specific requirement of law
regarding six months residence before filing his present
- 1927- Went to the United States of America in where petition.
after a residence of more than 20 years he acquired
American citizenship by naturalization. The word "residence" used therein imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
- November 10, 1960- Returned to the Philippines on to personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of
which he was admitted merely for a temporary stay. such intention (Yen v. Republic, L-18885, January 31,
1964; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil., 645).
- He owns an agricultural land and a residential house
situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less than Indeed, that term cannot refer to the presence
P5,000.00. in this country of a person who has been admitted only
on the strength of a permit for temporary residence.
- He receives a monthly pension of $115.00 from the
Social Security Administration of the United States of The only way by which petitioner can reacquire
America. his lost Philippine citizenship is by securing a quota for
permanent residence so that he may come within the
purview of the residence requirement of Commonwealth -Recto filed motion to establish and enforce his charging
Act No. 63. lien.

Caasi - Anne -defense: The contract of services of recto is invalid: to

Marcos - Jamie secure a divorce decree in violation of our laws
Jimenez - Nadine
Recto – Jamic CA remanded to the court of origin in order to determine
the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto
Recto vs Harden in his motion dated February 20, 1952.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered
the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce a decision dated April 30, 1953, adopting substantially
between the American husband and his American wife said report of the commissioner, but increasing the
as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that contingent fee ofAppellee herein from P369,410.04, the
their status and capacity are governed by their National sum recommended in the report, to P384,110.97. Hence,
law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of this appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a
divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married Objections of Mr. AndMrs Harden
to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities
would be involved. The first question for determination therein is the
validity of the above-quoted contract of services, which
RECTO V. HARDEN (1959) the Appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground:

Short summary: (1) that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without her husband‟s consent;
Recto was hired by American wife to represent her in RP
case for protection of her interest in the conjugal (2) that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
property, vs. American husband, in conjunction with the in effect prohibits contingent fees;
divorce proceeding she's going to file in US. They won in
Trial Court, but on appeal, American H & W agreed to (3) that the contract in question has for its
settle. Recto now wants to collect fees for services, but purpose to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in
as defense, Harden spouses argues that the contract's violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the
object was unlawful (Divorce not allowed in RP) so it is Civil Code of the Philippines;
invalid, thus, Recto cannot enforce it against them.
Court ruled for Recto (4) that the terms of said contract are harsh,
inequitable and oppressive.
Facts:
SC Decision:
Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services of Claro M.
Recto, for suit The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the
…to secure an increase in the amount of support she contract in dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal
was receiving partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden
…to preserve her rights in the properties of the conjugal merely bound herself — or assumed the personal
partnership obligation — to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of
…in contemplation of a divorce suit she's going to file in her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives,
the US. nor purports to give, to the Appellee any right
whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid
Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of her share of share.
conjugal partnership after liquidation
The amount thereof is simply a basis for the
“The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled computation of said fees.
under paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit JJJ or 20, is
20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97. The second objection is, likewise, untenable.
Moreover, it has already been held that contingent fees
Trial Court: Ruled for Mrs. Harden are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly
sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional
CA: Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45
Upon appeal to CA, Harden Sps. mutually released and Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in the United
forever discharged each other from all actions, debts, States
duties, and claims to the conjugal partnershipin
consideration of the sum of $1. It was further asserted, The third objection is not borne out, either by the
in Recto’s “manifestation”, that the purpose of the said language of the contract between them, or by the intent
instruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was to of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a
defeat the claim of the former for attorney‟s fees, divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a
divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs.
Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Court of
of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. Appeals modifying that of the Regional Trial Court,
What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City declaring
admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and respondent Alicia F. Llorente, as co-owners of whatever
the dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente may
Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that
the Philippines at the time of the execution of the they lived together as husband and wife.
contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines — by the laws of the United States, which Facts:
sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services, The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an
between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is not enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or 1927 to 1957
public policy.
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorentewere
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak
but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must come of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United
with clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. DyBuncio& Co., 93 States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua,
Phil., 195; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary30 C.J.S. 475), Camarines Sur
and Appellants have not done so, for the circumstances
surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that their In 1943,Lorenzo was admitted to United States
aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816
settlement of the differences between husband and wife, was issued in his favor by the United States District
were made for the purpose of circumventing or Court, Southern District of New York.
defeating the rights of herein Appellee, under his above-
quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Upon the liberation of the Philippines in 1945,
Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy,
Summary to visit his wife. He discovered that his wife Paula was
pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous
Issue: WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT relationship with his brother, CeferinoLlorente.
of services ?
In 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in
Held :Yes the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
“CrisologoLlorente,” with the certificate stating that the
Their marital and personal status, and the child was not legitimate and the line for the father‟s
dissolution of their marriage are governed by the name was left blank
laws of the United States which sanction divorce.
This is in pursuant to Art. 15 of the Civil Code In 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to
the effect that:
The CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT CONTRARY (1) all the family allowances allotted by
TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC the United States Navy as part of
ORDER, OR PUBLIC POLICY Lorenzo‟s salary and all other
The contract has a lawful object: it is to protect obligations for Paula‟s daily
the interests of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal maintenance and support would be
partnership during the pendency of a divorce suit suspended;
-NOT (2) they would dissolve their marital
…to secure divorce union in accordance with judicial
…to facilitate or promote procurement of divorce proceedings;
(3) they would make a separate
Divorce can be granted to the Sps Harden, they being agreement regarding their conjugal
nationals of country whose laws allow divorce (following property acquired during their marital
the nationality principle in determining the status and life; and
dissolution of the marriage) (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula
for her adulterous act since she
voluntarily admitted her fault and
Barnuevo - Julie agreed to separate from Lorenzo
Quita - Soltan peacefully.

Llorente - Issa
G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000 November 16, 1951- Lorenzo filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California.
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and
APPEALS and ALICIA F. actively participated in the proceedings. The divorce was
LLORENTE, respondents. granted on December 1952.
When Lorenzo returned to the Philippines, he married
Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Alicia had no knowledge of Alicia filed a motion for reconsideration which was
the first marriage even if they resided in the same town denied by the Trial Court and her appeal with the CA
as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or was also denied. However, the CA modified the TC‟s
cohabitation. decision declaring that Alicia is co-owner of whatever
properties she and the deceased may have acquired
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
husband and wife and had three children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. Hence, this petition.

Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he Issue: (As identified by the SC) Who are entitled to
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
children.
(Pertinent to our lesson) Is the foreign divorce
Lorenzo also filed for the probate and allowance of his granted to Lorenzo Llorente valid?
last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his Held: The SC did not agree with the decision of the
estate.The Trial Court, finding that the will was duly Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial
executed, admitted the will to probate. However, denied court.
the motion for appointment of Alicia for the reason that
the testator Lorenzo was still alive. Applicable Law

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became
terminated, Lorenzo died. an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1)
his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3)
Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established,
administration over Lorenzo‟s estate in her favor. She admitted and undisputed.
contended:
(1) that she was Lorenzo‟s surviving spouse, Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents
(2) that the various property were acquired are necessarily governed by foreign law.
during their marriage,
(3) that Lorenzo‟s will disposed of all his The Civil Code clearly provides:
property in favor of Alicia and her children, Art. 15. Laws relating to family
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share rights and duties, or to the status,
in the conjugal property. condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon
Alicia also filed in the testate proceeding a citizens of the Philippines,
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. even though living abroad.
Without terminating the testate proceedings, the
trial court gave due course to Paula‟s petition and Art. 16. Real property as well as
such order was published in the newspaper “Bicol personal property is subject to
Star”. the law of the country where it is
situated.
Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals However, intestate and
ruling: testamentary succession, both
with respect to the order of
The divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente succession and to the amount of
is void and inapplicable in the Philippines therefore the successional rights and to the
marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunatois likewise intrinsic validity of testamentary
void. The petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of provisions,shall be regulated
letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not by the national law of the
entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the person whose succession is
will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo under consideration, whatever
having gained the status of paramour. may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the
On the other hand, the petition of Paula Titular Llorente country wherein said property
is meritorious. The court declared her entitled as may be found.
conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded,
Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The
estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
children with Alicia. the renvoi doctrine, where the case was “referred back”
to the law of the decedent‟s domicile, in this case,
Paula Llorentewas also appointed legal administrator of Philippine law.
the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente.
 The SC noted that while the trial court stated that officials of the Republic of the
the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the Philippines in a foreign
same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally country, the solemnities
unproven statement that “American law follows the established by Philippine laws
„domiciliary theory‟ hence, Philippine law applies when shall be observed in their
determining the validity of Lorenzo‟s will. execution.” (underscoring
ours)
First, there is no such thing as one American
law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property
Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown
law. Each State of the union has its own law applicable in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his
to its citizens and in force only within the State. wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our
laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and
Second, there is no showing that the application legal capacity.”
of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New
York State law. As a guide, the trial court should note that
The trial court and the Court of Appeals held that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court‟s extend the same to the succession of foreign
opinion was a mere paramour. nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of
successional rights to the decedent's national law.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the
complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine
law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and
legal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

The SC cited various cases (Van Dorn v. Romillo,

Jr.,Quita v. Court of Appeals,Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera)wherein it was held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality. Aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of

the Court of Appeals must be reversed.The divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula
was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter
of comity.

However, the effects of this divorce (as to the

succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 17. The forms and
solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public
instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the
country in which they are
executed.

When the acts referred to are

executed before the
diplomatic or consular