Book Review of The Rights of Women in Islam by Asg

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Book Review of: The Rights of Women in Islam by Asghar Ali Engineer

Article · January 1994

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Nimat Hafez )maiden name) Barazangi


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BOOK REVIEW
by
(Dr.) Nimat Hafez Barazangi
Visiting Fellow
Women's Studies Program
391 Uris Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 14853

The Rights of Women in Islam


By Asghar Ali Engineer. London: C. Hurst & Company. 1992, pp. 188.

Engineer's book though not unique in its purpose, the defense of women's rights in Islam,
is different from other books that deal with the same subject in its approach to the
"question of women." By attempting , in this book, "to separate what is contextual from
what is normative" and to "recapture the original spirit of Qur'anic laws with regard to
male-female relationship," the author hoped to equip Muslim feminists with a powerful
weapon in their fight for equal status with men (p. vi). The author is to be commended
for this unprecedented courage to contradicts what has been the customary views on
women's rights in Islam, whether by Muslims or non-Muslims. His documentation from
the Qur'an, Hadith and early Islamic history of issues like sexual equality, marriage,
divorce, and others that have been only presented from the Muqallidun's (those who
follow the foot-steps of ancestors) points of view is a major step by a Muslim male
scholar.
The main argument of the book centers around the misleading interpretation of
Islamic Shariçah (law) as totally divine and immutable (p.6). As Engineer explains,
Shariçah has evolved over centuries and it never remained static, and hence immutable
until the A.D. 12th century. The Qur'anic injunctions are the only divine part of the
Shariçah. The Prophet Muhammad's extrapolations in words and practice of these
injunctions is the second part and should be used as a guidelines for Islamic behavior.
While the prophet's companions' and later jurists' and theologians' interpretations of the
Qur'an and the prophetic tradition, the third part, remain limited to the circumstantial
context of the time. Engineer states that by mistakenly claiming such a divine status of
the whole of shariçah, not only the different theologians' and jurists' interpretations have
become the norm, but these interpretations resulted in transforming some of the Qur'anic
contextual injunctions into normative ones. This is exemplified in the transformation of
the concept of three divorces in one sitting--"denounced by the Hanafites school of
jurisprudence as innovative and sinful form of divorce," but still widely practiced in the
Indian subcontinent where the Sunni Muslims follow this school--into the "Muslim
personal law" that was enacted by the British and was given the "status of immutable
divine law." (p. 7) Another important point of Engineer's argument is the evolution of
the concept of Shariçi ahkam (injunctions) and how it was moved from being moral into
legal bondage. The incorporation of the principle of ijtihad in the Shariçah methodology
which was frozen at some point, rather than keeping ijtihad as the overall principle in
Qur'anic exegitic interpretation is another important point (p. 8). This incorporation not
only caused the evolution of Shariçah to come to a standstill, as Engineer suggests, but it
also raises the question as to why only the Shariçah is studied in its last formative stages,
while all other philosophical and ontological principles of other peoples and religions
have been studied in their historical evolutionary context. Given that Engineer's
argument concerning the Shariçah, and his differentiation between the normative and
contextual aspects of Qur'anic injunctions are the core of his discussion throughout his
book, I will focus my review on Engineer's argument, its implications, and utility in
recapturing the spirit of the Qur'an with reference to women's rights.

The Rights of Women in Islam contains an Introduction and seven other chapters
starting with chapter two, "status of women during Jahiliya" (in reference to pr-Islamic
societies) and ending with chapter eight, "Muslim Personal Law--the Need for Reform."
In the Introduction, the author analyzes the concept of Shariçah, refusing the argument for
its divinity and analyzing the sociological influence in interpreting the divine scripture.
Though the author's argument produces a better understanding of women's status in
Islam, and presents compelling evidence in favor of women's equality, his argument is
limited by overlooking a fundamental Qur'anic principle, the concept of khilafah (human
trusteeship of the earth for each individual male and female), and by the framework in
which he discusses women's rights. The latter is exemplified in two issues. First, the
discussion of the contemporary conscious about women's rights as being a phenomenon
only of modern societies. He goes one generalizing from this assumption that "Human
consciousness in modern society is conditioned by the concept of human rights and
human dignity." (p. 2) This generalization seems to take the idealists view that
consciousness determine reality. By accepting this view, one could easily divert from
recognizing the purpose of the Qur'an as an assertion of human rights and human dignity
in response to the realities of the time.
In this context of human "modern consciousness," Engineer also makes an
unacceptable parallel between the institution of slavery and the subordination of women.
The Qur'an disapproves both, slavery and women's subordination, evidenced by the
principle that no human is superior to other except in Taqwa (i.e., superiority is judged by
individual's deeds and only by Allah). The fact that slavery was not abolished totally
until modern times does not indicate licensing of slavery by the Qur'an, as was
interpreted by some jurists and Western scholars . The same is true with regards to the
practice of women's subordination to men. Although Engineer makes these points
clearly, his treatment of women's subordination or male superiority becomes unsettled
when he attempts to differentiate between the contextual and the normative (.e.g, when
he attempts to explain the meaning of darajah, an edge that a man has "over a woman,"
in 2:228).
Another important difference between the question of slavery and that of women is
that women represent fifty percent of the human society and, thus, their oppression and
inferior status have created and continue to create fundamental misunderstandings of
male-female relationships, family structure, and human-to-human relation in general.
This misunderstanding, in turn, dictates the nature of "master-slave" relationship, and not
vice-versa. There seems to be a confusion here, as is the case among some other
Islamists. The author attempts to interpret the Islamic framework of human equality
within the twentieth century concept of human rights that was introduced to counteract
racial and nationalistic inclinations, ignoring gender and class injustice. For those who
are invoking a relationship in the study of gender, race, class, and nationalism
(particularly the feminists among them), this parallel between women's rights and slavery
could create another confusion regarding the nature of this relationship. Let there be no
dilution and diversion from the main problem of female subordination.
The second issue that imposes some limitations on the author's argument, in the
Introduction of The Rights of Women in Islam, lies in the author's discussion of the "tafsir
bi'al-rai' (i.e., Qura'nic interpretation according to one's own opinion)" vs. understanding
the Qur'an in light of one's own experience and consciousness. Engineer's differentiation
between "personal desire, rai', and true opinion that is the product of a new
consciousness," (p. 4) does not help explain the basic principles and methodology in
Qur'anic exegetic practice as a base for generating public rules that are bound by time
and place vs. the Qur'anic injunctions that are universal in their broader meaning, as
Fazlur Rahman explains in The Major Themes of the Qur'an. Furthermore, the author
confuses the reader when he elaborates on certain examples, departing from the main
point, and leaving somewhat disjointed evidence, such as his comments on the personal
desire of modernists' vs. orthodox' reading of the Qur'an and on the difference between
morality and ethics with reference to purdah and chastity (p. 4-5). The author, in
essence, has overlooked the Qur'anic obligation upon each individual to understand the
Qur'an as a prerequisite to practicing its injunctions, and that this understanding should
be within the parameters of the Qur'anic worldview and not only in the social context of
the time.
Engineer's lay-out of the rest of the book does not differ much from other traditional
books that discuss the rights of Muslim women mainly in relation to family or to males.
Chapters three, four, five, and six deal with the "concept of sexual equality," "other
aspects of equality of women in Islam," "marital rights of women in Islam,' and "women
and divorce in Islam" respectively. Unlike Amina Wadud-Muhsin's (Qur'an and Woman,
1992), treatment of woman's rights as an individual human,The Rights of women in Islam
devotes only one chapter, chapter seven, to "Islam and the individual dignity of women."
Even under this title I remain concerned with the author's treatment of woman having an
individual status while accepting some interpretations without questioning their merit.
For example, he moves from verse 4:32 which states that "for men is the benefit of what
they earn and for women is the benefit of what they earn" to affirming that "it is a clear
enunciation of a woman's individuality, dignity and rights" without explaining the
relationship. He also adds, "Even if there are certain contextual statements in the Qur'an
indicating men having a slight edge over women, in the socioeconomic sense it does not,
in any sense, detract from her individuality."(p 145) Engineer seems to interpret verse
2:228, in the general socioeconomic context instead of limiting it to the context of
divorce as the verse intends. That is, the darajah (degree or edge) that men are told to
have in this context means an obligation toward reconciliation with their pregnant ex-
wives since they (the men) have initiated the divorce. Therefore, the edge has nothing to
do with the socioeconomic benefits that a husband gives a wife as her right, and not as a
favor or as a means to make him superior. In chapter eight, "Muslim Personal Law--the
Need for reform," Engineer concentrates on the Muslim personal law in India and
addresses the views of the major three groups; the reformists, the secularists, and the
conservatives.
In summary, the difference between normative and contextual may have clarified an
important point, dismissing the claim that he entire Shariçah is divine, but it lacked a
follow-up as to how to change the perception about interpretations. As the jurists'
interpretations were also given credence on the same level of Qur'anic injunctions and the
prophetic tradition, the entire Qur'anic pedagogical intention--the continuous
interpretation of its principles in time and space context--is suspended. Both, the theme
and the argument are woven by Engineer through his analysis of issues that have troubled
researchers and practitioners as well, but there is not even a contextual superiority to men
as Engineer argues. (p. vi) This is so because to accept even a contextual superiority is
not only contradictory to the spirit of the basic principle of the Qur'an--that all humans
are equal except in Taqwa--but it also gives indirect license to men and others to abuse
such relationship even with social superiority.

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