Is Feminism Bad For Multiculturalism

Singapore Management University
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Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
4-2001
Is feminism bad for multiculturalism?

Chandran KUKATHAS
Singapore Management University, [email protected]
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Citation
KUKATHAS, Chandran.(2001). Is feminism bad for multiculturalism?. Public Affairs Quarterly, 15(2),
83-98.
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Published in Public Affairs Quarterly,
Volume 15, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages
83-98
North American Philosophical Publications
Distinguished Lecture in Public Affairs: Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?

Author(s): Chandran Kukathas
Source: Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 83-98
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Public Affairs Quarterly
Volume 15, Number 2, April 2001
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS*
IS FEMINISM BAD FOR MULTICULTURALISM?
Chandran Kukathas
ABSTRACT: Multiculturalism and feminism are in tension to the

extent that multiculturalism is a doctrine that condones the tolera-
tion of cultural communities which might not respect or value
women's concerns or interests. This has led some feminist think-
ers, notably Susan Okin, to ask whether multiculturalism is bad
for women. This paper agrees with Okin that there is a tension
between feminism and multiculturalism - some of her critics to
the contrary notwithstanding - but argues that multiculturalism
should take precedence.
But stories were already gaining ground that the white man had not only
brought a religion but also a government. It was said that they had built a
place of judgement at Umuofia to protect the followers of their religion.
It was even said that they had hanged one man who killed a missionary
- Chinua Achebe1
most important social movement of the twentieth century is ar-

guably the movement for the liberation of women. Without doubt
there have been other political movements of great significance, includ-
ing those to build, and then to destroy communism; and others to liberate
societies from colonial rule or to create new national states. But as so-
cial movements go, the women's movement is hard to match, not only
♦Delivered at the State University of New York at Albany on 17 November 2000.

The financial support of the Earhart Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
83
84 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
for the transformation of society it has effected and

ment, but also for the challenge it has presented to the m
social and political institutions - from the family to the
the most profound changes have been pursued, and to som
in the societies of the developed West, the women's m
unknown in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
Feminism is the body of thought that gives theoretical expression to
this movement. Though it must be said at once of this set of ideas, first,
that it has a history which predates the women's movement of the twen-
tieth century, and second, that it is not a single doctrine or ideology but
a body of ideas which embraces a wide range of doctrines or theories,
some of them greatly at variance with, and indeed highly critical of,
others. Nonetheless, while there are many feminisms, it is possible to
speak of feminism. Following Susan Okin, I take it to mean "the belief
that women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that they should
be recognized as having human dignity equal to that of men, and that
they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely cho-
sen lives as men can."2 Because it addresses the condition of women in
general, feminism is a universal doctrine. Indeed, it is one which poses
a profound challenge to other ethical and political theories which, it
claims, have universalist pretensions that are implausible because they
fail to include one half of humanity.
There is, however, another political development of the late twenti-
eth century which has come to dominate political theory as well as
political practice and political action: the demand for cultural recogni-
tion. In Western societies such as the United States, Canada, Britain,
Australia, France, and Germany, either or both of two particular devel-
opments have brought this about. First, the culmination of decades of
immigration of peoples from a diversity of cultural backgrounds has
changed the ethnic and cultural composition of the society sufficiently
that the status of migrant communities and their traditions has became a
political issue. Second, the emergence of indigenous peoples who found
the resources and will to question their own social conditions and po-
litical status within their societies gave concerns about cultural
protection a prominence they had hitherto lacked. In Canada and the
United States, moreover, the rise of Québec nationalism and of the civil
rights movement lent further impetus to the development of a politics in
which cultural diversity and its implications became a major political
issue - at many levels of debate and action.
Arguments about what kinds of political institutions and social poli-
cies are needed to deal with diversity have become arguments about the
virtues, and shortcomings, of 'multiculturalism' - a term which has its ori-
gins in Canadian public policy, but which now has a place in philosophical
IS FEMINISM BAD FOR MULTICULTURALISM? 85
debate as well as public policy all over the world. What

culturalism amounts to, however, is not so clear, since p
that name vary, and principled defenses of multicultura
ways defend the same thing. But in broad terms, mul
advocates dealing with diversity not by assimilating, or
tural minorities but by accommodating them. The signi
development is considerable. Among Western nations suc
Canada, and the United States, the dominant view of po
well as of the general public was that most minorities shou
lated. In Australia it was once thought that indigenous
be allowed to die out (or be bred out), and migrants ass
the case of nonwhites, excluded). Now, however, public
nizes that people do not always desire assimilation (even
wish to be excluded from membership of political societ
find ways of accommodating diverse cultural traditions wi
ing those who live by them to abandon their particular wa
Glazer put it, "we are all multiculturalists now."3 The polit
multiculturalism tries to explain why - and addresses t
how - diverse cultural traditions should be accommodated.
These two social movements which have produced feminism and
multiculturalism are in important ways the manifestation of a more gen-
eral development of ideas over the past three centuries. Of central
importance here is the idea of freedom. Feminist thinkers, from Mary
Wollestonecraft and Harriet Taylor onwards, have been preoccupied with
the emancipation of women. And in the history of debate about the reso-
lution of cultural differences, those who have defended the idea of
accommodating dissent have also been advocates of freedom - and in
particular of religious freedom. Feminism and multiculturalism stem
from common concerns about human freedom. To the extent that they
are also concerned about the equal freedom of men and women, and of
people of different cultures or religious traditions, feminism and multi-
culturalism are also theories of equality.
If these two sets of ideas reflect some common concerns it is be-
cause they share a common theoretical inheritance. Both have their roots
in certain Enlightenment ideas about the value of individual freedom,
the importance of human dignity, and the need for toleration rather than
the suppression of difference or disagreement. They have their roots in
ideas that might broadly be described as liberal. This is not to suggest
that all feminists or multiculturalists are liberals. That would be far from
the truth, since many explicitly reject liberalism as incapable of doing
justice to their moral concerns. Nonetheless, if there are many who try
to advance the cause of feminism or of multiculturalism by criticizing
liberal ideas, this is as much as anything a reflection o

place liberal ideas have in these two traditions of thoug
But while these two traditions of thought share a com
ance, they are also in serious conflict. While they may bot
the importance of freedom and equality - of human eman
different particular concerns put them at odds. Their p
in tension. This has been argued most vigorously by Susan
who poses the question: "Is multiculturalism bad for w
swers "yes." But the question could as easily be turned
asks: "Is feminism bad for multiculturalism?" - which
produce an answer which is much the same. That woul
larger question: if feminism and multiculturalism are in t
to be done? Which way should we go if we have to ch
them? Susan Okin's suggestion is that, to the extent th
incompatible, so much the worse for multiculturalism
cerns should take priority. Some of her critics have tried
the tension is not as deep as she suggests, and that som
this difference is possible. My contention, however, is tha
sis of the tension is fundamentally right; but the ques
resolved in favor of multiculturalism. Of course, the i
cated, and qualifications may have to be made, and a m
understanding of both these ideas may give us a more
unambiguous conclusion. But while all that is true, it i
state clearly what is the bottom line.
Yet before the bottom line can be defended, more needs to be said
about the nature of the tension between feminism and multiculturalism,
and also about the reasons for resolving the difference in favor of femi-
nism. Only then can we turn to the defense of multiculturalism. But it
ought also to be made clear now that such a defense will involve an
argument for a particular understanding of multiculturalism - one which
rejects the idea of group rights, and of many of the protections (or privi-
leges) multiculturalists often claim for cultural minorities. If this
argument runs the risk of giving offense, it is a risk of offending doubly.
I. The Tension between Feminism and Multiculturalism
Katha Polliti puts the matter very clearly when she says that, wh
feminism and multiculturalism may find themselves allied in acade
politics, as political visions they are very far apart. "In its demand
equality for women, feminism sets itself in opposition to virtually
ery culture on earth. . . . Multiculturalism demands respect for all cultu
traditions, while feminism interrogates and challenges all cultural
ditions."4 In this she is agreeing with Susan Okin, who points out t
"most cultures are patriarchal . . . and many (though not a

tural minorities that claim group rights are more patri
surrounding cultures."5 Indeed, some cultures not only hav
aim to control women and render them servile to men's desires and in-
terests, but have traditions that are so much concerned with the control
of women that they virtually define the culture in question.
Feminism and multiculturalism are in tension because feminism's
overriding concern is the emancipation of women from such circ
stances, while the advocates of multiculturalism are concerned about
how cultural minorities can retain their customs or their cultural heri-
tage in societies which do not share their values. This means that, fo
feminism, cultures that do not accord women equal dignity, and do no
consider that women should have the opportunity to live fulfilling an
as freely chosen lives as men, should not be given succor. Equally, fo
the defenders of multiculturalism, minority cultures should be able t
resist the encroachment upon their traditions, including those that con-
fine women, by the dominant culture seeking to impose its allegedly
universal values upon all groups.
The extent of this conflict between two different worldviews is evi-
dent not only in the philosophical literature on multiculturalism, which
addresses practical issues dealing disproportionately with cultural dif-
ferences over claims involving gender, but also in the cultural cases
that come before the courts. When the cultural defense is invoked by
those facing criminal prosecution, it is often to try to justify the mal-
treatment of women. In many cultural communities women are denied
the same access to education as men, are subject to forcible genital
mutilation in girlhood, or are given no say in the choice of marriage
partner or in the question of whether to marry at all. Moreover, in many
traditions, the recognized power of husband over wife leaves married
women without relief from abuse within the home.
Feminism is in tension with multiculturalism insofar as it asserts that
cultures such as these should not be condoned. Indeed, thinkers like
Okin ask why a cultural group should be entitled to try to live by its
ways if these ways violate the individual rights of their members. "Why
shouldn't the liberal state, instead, make it clear to members of such
groups, preferably by education but where necessary by punishment,
that such practices are not to be tolerated?"6 In the end, Okin suggests
that it is a serious mistake to think that, from a feminist point of view,
minority group rights are a part of the solution to the problem of human
development. On the contrary, they merely exacerbate the problem.
In the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in the context of a less

patriarchal majority culture, no argument can be made on the basis of
self-respect or freedom that the female members of the culture have a
8 8 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
clear interest in its preservation. Indeed, they might be much

the culture into which they were born were either to become
that its members would become integrated into the less sexist
ing culture) or, preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as
the equality of women - at least to the degree to which this v
held in the majority culture.7
Okin is quite right to identify this tension or conflict b

nism and multiculturalism. Some of her critics have tried
her view is not sensitive enough to the subtleties of the v
and religious traditions she criticizes, since some of th
have historically been concerned about ameliorating t
women. And others have painted her as blind to the w
well as to the imperial pretensions - of the liberal feminis
which her arguments spring.8 But these criticisms do
contention that there is a conflict. Even if many of th
cultures Okin criticizes are in fact less harmful to women t
or indeed even if some of them are entirely benign, femi
ticulturalism remain in tension to the extent that there a
which neglect the interests of women, and which seek
within the polity. Their claims cannot be defended from a
of view, for these groups, ex hypothesi, reject or fail to h
feminism upholds.
There is no question that there is a conflict between
multiculturalism. The issue is, which should prevail wh
arises; which should govern, or inform the character of a
damental political institutions?
II. The Case for Feminism
To the extent that feminism and multiculturalism are inconsistent,

why should feminism prevail? Okin's arguments on this score are want-
ing inasmuch as she devotes little space to explaining why feminism's
claims should trump those of multiculturalism. It is one thing to show
that multiculturalism is bad for women but another to show that this is
sufficient reason to reject - or even weaken - multiculturalism. None-
theless, this does not mean that Okin has no case, only that more needs
to be said to draw it out so that it might be better appreciated.
Before doing this, one point that needs to be disposed of is the charge
that, in putting her arguments, Okin is guilty of cultural imperialism.
This kind of charge is not uncommonly made against those who criti-
cize cultures or traditions other than their own - particularly if they
criticize the customs or practices of colonial peoples, or of cultural mi-
norities. This is a common fate met by outsiders who dare to criticize.
Yet the fact is that many of the claims made by feminists

also made by non-Western feminists (or women generall
their own cultural traditions oppressive and offensive, or b
ing in particular religious communities who are advocat
for reform. Moreover, it is the explicit concern of Okin
question of whether culture can provide a compelling de
might otherwise be regarded as morally questionable co
examined the evidence and tried to argue that it cannot. U
shown that the very undertaking of such an exercise is wr
to see how cultural imperialism can be at work here. If it i
Western women are cultural irredentists; and there is n
reason for Western feminists not to take their side.
The more serious problem, however, is that Okin does not fully ex-
plain why feminism's values should triumph in the contest with multi-
culturalism. Feminist values are taken as self-evidently true. According
to Bhikhu Parekh, Okin simply takes certain liberal ideas to be self-
evidently true, without appreciating that they have only a limited place
in a morally diverse world.9 Nevertheless, some of Okin's arguments
allow us to draw out her reasons for thinking feminist values should
prevail. (These reasons are also quite consistent with arguments she has
advanced elsewhere in her writings, notably in her book Justice, Gen-
der and the Family.10) First and foremost, to the extent that patriarchal
values prevail over feminist ones, women's interests are seriously
harmed, and if the harm is to be tolerated, some justification has to be
forthcoming. But not any justification is going to be acceptable. Cer-
tainly no justification which leaves the interests of women out of con-
sideration altogether is going to be acceptable; the equal consideration
of the interests of men and women is fundamental. But more than this,
it is not going to be acceptable to consider the interests of women as so
fundamentally different from those of men that they do not desire lib-
erty, or require self-respect. Societies or communities or traditions that
inculcate or force women into particular social roles may not only stifle
women's capacity to make choices about how to live their lives but also
hamper the development of self-respect and self-esteem. In a patriar-
chal society "the healthy development of girls is endangered."11
The feminist objection to many cultures is that they perpetuate pat-
terns of unequal treatment and control of women. Such women, even if
they are not the victims of violence or cruelty, are left with little free-
dom to make choices, or to freely pursue life as they see fit. They lack
personal freedom in the present, and have no power to make choices for
their lives in the future.
What is implicit in these arguments is that freedom and the capacity
to make choices are of fundamental value, and that multiculturalism does
not honor or recognize them. Feminism should be pre

does. In this regard, Okin takes issue with Will Kymlicka
of Multicultural Citizenship, which grants group-diffe
to minority cultures, including those that practice overt
tion. Although Kymlicka is sympathetic to feminist co
he would only grant group-differentiated rights to th
which are internally liberal to some degree, Okin argu
far fewer groups that would meet this test than Kymlic
are many cultures that, though they may not impose
practices on others, and though they may appear to r
civil and political liberties of women and girls, do not in
cially in the private sphere, treat them with anythi
concern and respect as men and boys, or allow them t
freedoms."12 Indeed for Okin, as for feminism more gen
ordination of women is often far less formal and public t
and private" - so much so that virtually no culture in
pass any 'no sex discrimination' test.
Okin's argument is that there cannot be a case for pub
liberal state for practices which are illiberal. This m
funding of religious education for ultra-Orthodox Jews,
indefensible to the extent that young boys are given an
prepares them no other life than one of religious stud
education is defended by Margalit and Halbertal,13 but fo
no grounds for this at all, since it is not an educatio
cerned with the well-being of the individual within a
must, she insists, include the right to exit from the gro
Orthodox society that Margalit and Halbertal are defe
she argues, the problem is even greater for girls, since t
oriented towards facilitating the religious life of boys. If
asks, what kind of personal identity can the girls dev
adjunct female status within the culture that controls
this is to be justified, it cannot be on liberal grounds.
Okin's argument in the end suggests that the reason fe
take priority over multiculturalism is that feminism i
values. Liberalism's most important moral commitments,
liberty or autonomy, and equality. Thus, while she w
multiculturalism that effectively treats all persons as eac
equals,"14 what that would require is a multicultural soci
cultures met more exacting (liberal feminist) standar
tonomy and gender equality.
The implications of this view should be emphasized, for
tant. Cultural communities or traditions which are inconsistent with the
standards of liberal feminism should not be encouraged, or subsidized
IS FEMINISM BAD FOR MULTICULTURALISM? 9 1
with public funds. The liberal state ought, in fact, to take act
educate such groups so that the scope for coercion of wom
within the family is reduced. Furthermore, where necessa
should punish those whose practices harm women, to mak
such things will not be tolerated.
HI. The Case for Multiculturalism
While the feminist case, particularly as presented by Okin, is a

erful one, I think it should be resisted. But before going on t
why, something needs to be made clear. Many of Okin's crit
tried to argue against her case by suggesting that multicultura
feminism need not be in conflict, and that a slightly different (o
subtle or sophisticated) theory would allow space for both po
stances. Such writers as Kymlicka, Nussbaum, and Parekh acc
importance of Okin's concerns, but think that some resolution
conflict she identifies is possible. Kymlicka wants to see femin
multiculturalism as allies working to revise earlier, "complacen
sions of liberalism; Nussbaum thinks that a Rawlsian "political
ism" offers a suitable compromise which is sensitive to feminist c
as well as to cultural sensibilities; and Parekh thinks that a theory
requires liberalism to engage in open discourse with other cultu
ditions will allow us to select appropriately which liberal value
hold along with those cherished by other cultures. Yet none o
writers, to my mind, has recognized Okin's fundamental poin
the interests of women (as feminists construe them) come into co
with the claims of culture, only one can prevail. According to the
ries of multiculturalism she criticizes, the claims of culture shoul
vail - with the active support of the state. She thinks that feminis
liberalism - require that the interests of women trump the claims
ture. There is no theoretical halfway house. In the realm of practi
have to recognize that there are halfway houses, since practi
ways a compromise (and one in the process of evolution) rather th
exemplification of some pure, static, theory. But theory has to bi
lets. Okin's theory does this by suggesting that, when multicultur
and feminism come into conflict, feminism should always prevail
of her critics have not been so clear.
I would like to argue that when feminism and multiculturalism come
into conflict it is the latter than should take precedence. Before the ar-
gument is presented, it will be important to say something about the
theory of multiculturalism I want to defend, for it is very different from
the view advanced by writers like Kymlicka, or Margalit and Halbertal -
though it is also a theory Okin criticizes and rejects.
The conception of multiculturalism I wish to put forw

sis in certain liberal ideas, most important among them
eration. In a world of cultural diversity and, hence, fund
disagreement, a good society is one in which differenc
dated and tolerated rather than resolved by force in favo
ful. In such a society the state would not exercise pow
dissenting views to majority belief, or to expel dissentin
or beyond its borders. Indeed, it would not have the p
the same time, however, it is also true to say that societ
of fixed or unchanging, neatly defined and divided grou
trary, it is composed of numerous overlapping communi
zations, and religious, linguistic, and cultural tradition
all entirely stable. And these groups wax and wane in
social and political circumstances, and also in accordan
alty of their members. In a world of such diversity and
accommodation of difference requires not only a tolerati
ment but also a structure which does not privilege par
traditions. A multicultural society, in short, is one that
diversity of groups but does not accord any group a r
sustenance or preservation.
To put it slightly differently, in this view of multicul
are no cultural rights. Groups, or religious or cultural tr
end, have to survive by their own resources. They ma
individuals, who are free to associate, accept the authorit
or tradition, and sustain it by remaining members an
energy and resources to keep it going. But if these comm
retain this loyalty they will wither. In the end, groups d
themselves. They only matter because they are importan
being of individuals.
On this view, groups which act illiberally are not entit
cial protections so that they might continue to live by
But neither is the wider society or the state entitled to
societies to ensure that they become more liberal or m
jority of people in society in their practices and belief
to be entrenched, any more than they are to be elimin
authorities in such groups are given no explicit recog
power they might exert over their members depends for
on the acquiescence of those members, who have alw
exit from the community of their fellows.15
For many multiculturalists, this view is unacceptable
not give cultural groups much recognition, and certain
external protection.16 It does not grant groups subsidi
to preserve their languages if they are dying out, or fun
them to support their arts or other cultural practices. So sm

groups are less likely to survive as their members assim
wider community. Indeed, on this view culture does not
tification for anything. One cannot claim exemptions fr
cultural grounds; culture does not provide a justificati
which are regarded as criminal or breach a contract or
(Equally, one cannot borrow from Shylock and then cla
tian prohibitions against usury entitle one to repudiate the
For many liberals, and liberal feminists in particular, ho
is disconcerting about this view is that it leaves illiberal
deal with their own members, tolerating their practices
wider society finds them abhorrent. For as long as mem
in the ways of their communities or traditions, the view o
alism I advance suggests that they be tolerated.
Before attempting to explain how such a stance can be ju
ever, I would like to expound the most serious feminist
such a view. Once again, the most powerful arguments c
san Okin. First, if cultural groups are not homogeneous bu
of elites and masses, and if it is important not to entrench
elites by privileging them with special support or recognit
not mean that we should be wary of just leaving grou
that simply allows elites to remain in power. In this con
might be men, and the powerless masses, women.17
Second, acquiescence may not be much of a foundatio
gitimacy of cultural practices "if the 'acquiescence' by so
practices stems from lack of power, or socialization into
resulting in lack of self-esteem or a sense of entitlemen
members of some cultures imbibe their sense of inferiorit
their acquiescence says little about the legitimacy of th
great deal about its power over its weaker subjects. The
ticulturalism being defended here simply looks insensitive
of power.
Third, the theory pays far too little attention "to the enormous scope
for coercion that exists within the private sphere of family life."19 Here
Okin refers to a particular example I offered to account for the limits of
tolerance of illiberal practices. In the case of forced marriages within
immigrant cultures, I argued that such marriages could be, and in places
like Britain were, rightly annulled on appeal because they were entered
into under duress. The immigrant community, though entitled to try to
live by its ways, has no right to expect the wider society to enforce those
norms against the individual. But for Okin this sends a message that
parents may coerce their daughters into marriage if they can get away
with it. In fact, families can make it extremely difficult for a daughter
to invoke her individual rights against the family's ins

ing by their own customs. It is in this context that Ok
the liberal state should not make it clear to members of s
education or punishment, that such practices will not b
These three objections are important because they go
the matter: the problem of social power. Feminists h
that women were subordinated not only by being deprive
but by the structure of fundamental social institutions, s
and the family, which socialized them into beings who
of freedom, and incapable of exercising power. And such
exercise is of questionable value if it is bought by the f
tion of character.20 The question now, however, is: d
multiculturalism advanced here tolerate the differenti
which Okin refers?
The answer is, I think, inescapably yes. Elites in groups will usually
dominate the masses. Many who acquiesce will do so because they have
been socialized or manipulated into compliance, and many families will
all too frequently bully their daughters into marrying unsuitable boys.
(For every Elizabeth Bennett who chooses a Mr. Darcy, there is a Lata
who forsakes a Khabir.) I do not think the reality of such power, or its
destructive capacity, can rightly be denied.
The problem, however, is what is to be done about it. This is where I
part company with Okin, and where I think this version of multicultur-
alism as toleration puts itself at odds with feminism. The view advanced
here suggests that the problem of differential social power should be
addressed by denying any greater authority, such as the state, the power
to support or entrench existing power. Feminists such as Okin, on the
other hand, believe that a greater authority, such as the state, should
have the power to redress, if not overturn altogether, the existing bal-
ance of social power. But in my view this is not a good way to deal with
the problem of social power.
The problem with addressing the imbalance of social power by cre-
ating or authorizing a greater power to correct it is that there is little
reason to believe that the greater power will redress rather than exacer-
bate the imbalance. If elites can capture power in their own groups and
communities, they are also better placed than the weaker group mem-
bers to capture power at higher institutional levels. Even if the wielders
of power at the center are members of different elites, however, it is all
too often the case that elites have more in common with each other than
with the masses, and will pursue their own interests first. Simply to
assume that central power will be benign seems unduly optimistic, if
not naïve; on the other hand, to assert that it must be so would be point-
less, since one might then do as well to assert that groups must be benign.
As to the problem of determining the meaning of acqui

quite true that acquiescing may be the product of sociali
than a reflection of any sort of independence. But the diffi
to ignore the preferences of individuals by imputing to t
cient autonomy is also to deny them autonomy, or any sort
women are disempowered by the fact that their acquiesce
cial institutions which govern them is conditioned, they c
powered by treating their preferences as inauthentic. There
dilemma here. The suggestion being made, however, is n
escence be taken to mean full voluntary consent or enthusia
thing. It is only enough to suggest that a practice or traditi
a certain minimal legitimacy because it is not rejected by
It means that one should be wary of threatening it, since to
be to threaten something which is valued by or has meaning
bers. But it does not mean that the practice or tradition is b
ous criticism or undeserving of reform. The fact that pe
in a practice or tradition simply means that one should b
cautious about the exercise of power to override or overturn
This goes in particular for institutions like the family. Fe
quite right to emphasize how greatly human beings, and wom
ticular, are shaped and controlled by the exercise of info
But it is precisely because it is so subtle that it is difficult t
and still avoid doing great violence to people's lives. It is
to annul a marriage in which young brides are coerced into
bands before they are ready to make any choice. But it b
difficult when the bride complies with her parents wishes o
and a deep conviction that this is her duty to marry, even t
no desire to do so. Such a woman is in an even more invid
than the coerced bride who can run away, for it looks as if
a genuine choice. It is hard to see what the state can do to p
things from happening, or what punishments it can met
people's thinking.
One general reason for arguing that the claims of femi
not override those of multiculturalism, then, is not that th
women is less important, or that feminism is wrong to think
lives in many cultures and traditions are highly constrained
It is rather that the solution to the problem does not lie in
the power of the state to effect reform.
Nor may it be a very promising idea to have the state try
cultural communities or traditions in the interest of women. For one
thing, there is always the problem that the state will regulate in its own
interests rather than in the interest of those it purports to serve. And its
primary interest is in preserving its legitimacy and perpetuating its rule.
But even if we leave this aside, regulation is dangerous

to reproduce the subjects whose behavior it seeks to sh
One thing Michel Foucault has shown convincingly is
and medical regulation of human behaviour tends to p
who 'recognize' themselves in these regulative discours
litical institutions like the state are given the power to re
definition of women and their interests it is likely to p
who will conform to its constructions. But there is no reason to think
that these will necessarily bear any relation to the interests of women.
Yet none of this is to deny that multiculturalism may not also be to
the disadvantage of women, for reasons already canvassed in this paper.
So something also needs to be said about why multiculturalism, at lea
in the version advanced here, should be upheld. One important reaso
is that, for all its failings, it is a form of decentralizing political an
social power. To consider what this might mean, imagine what mono
culturalism might mean. In a society characterized by cultural diver
sity, and marked by religious, linguistic, and ethical differences, th
idea of allowing one particular cultural tradition to dominate should
troubling. Multiculturalism is a theory which suggests that no tradition
be allowed to rule unchecked, for society sustains a variety of cultur
traditions, each of which has its place. The trouble with this is that som
lamentable traditions will also be capable of flourishing under such
regime. The trouble with the alternative is that there is a risk of one of
those traditions acquiring hegemony.
The danger here may be no less serious under a liberal regime tha
under any other, if this is a liberalism which thinks it a part of its task
engage in the cultural reconstruction of society. This became evident in
the Australian Aboriginal experience over the past half century. During
this time, a series of mostly well-intentioned governments and thei
administrators thought that it would best serve the interests of Austra-
lian Aboriginals if children of mixed descent were taken from their
families and raised in white foster homes. This, it was thought, wou
at once remove them from communities where mixed descent might be
stigmatized, and at the same time give these children the benefit of an
education they might not otherwise receive. After all, it was argued, th
race was dying out, and perhaps, it was also implied, its extinction would
not be a bad thing. What the policy failed to anticipate, and which th
report on the Stolen Generations that appeared in 1999 made abundantly
clear, was the trauma visited not only upon Aboriginal children but o
Aboriginal parents whose offspring were forcibly taken. These effor
at cultural reconstruction began to cease only in the 1970s.
In the end, the case for multiculturalism is a mixed one. It is filled wit
dangers and difficulties, many of which cannot readily be overcome
There is a down side to multiculturalism, as feminists h

clear. But at the same time, in societies which are in fa
verse, it does provide an important check on other dan
cies - most significantly the tendency for power to concen
In the modern world more generally, however, it may a
sary because it performs another important function: t
on the process of social transformation, thereby allow
space, and time, to adjust. From the perspective of Wes
it appears that cultural diversity is a Johnny-come-lately,
ing about an unexpected reshaping of modern Western soc
the perspective of those whose traditions lie outside the W
ticularly for those in former colonial societies, the ch
taken place in the twentieth century are dramatic and uns
religion settled upon the world, and with it came governm
places of judgment. Even if this will prove in the end to b
the traumatic nature of this development - for those who
from their homelands, as well as for those whose home
new rulers - should not be underestimated.
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere

The ceremony of innocence is drowned
Feminism, like liberalism, is a reforming tendency. And in the end

the changes it seeks may be necessary and important. Multiculturalism,
at least as it is described here, on the other hand, has a conservative
aspect to it. But the case for multiculturalism is a qualified one. It is not
an argument for upholding traditions and cultures which must be kept
immune from criticism and resistant to change. It is only an argument
for resisting the tendency of dominant ideas and political powers to ac-
quire greater control than is desirable. Feminism may be bad for
multiculturalism, but it is not bad in itself. And multiculturalism is not
an unqualified good.
Australian Defence Force Academy
NOTES
1. Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart (New York: Anchor Books, 1994),
2. Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" in Is Multiculturalism
Women? ed. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum (Pr
Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 9-24, at p. 10. The same definition is
by Okin in her essay "Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions," E
(July 1998), pp. 661-84, at p. 661.
3. Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge MA: Ha

Press, 1997).
4. Pollitt, 'Whose Culture?' in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Wo

Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum, pp. 27-30, a
5. Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" p. 17.
6. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 676.
7. Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" pp. 22-3.
8. See, for example, the essays by Bonnie Honig, Azizah Y. al-
Gilman, Bhikhu Parekh, and Homi Babha, in Is Multiculturalism
ed. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum.
9. Parekh, "A Varied Moral World," in Is Multiculturalism Bad

Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum, pp. 6
10. Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1
11. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680.

12. Ibid., p. 678.
13. Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, "Liberalism and the R
Social Research 61 (1994), pp. 491-510.
14. Okin, "Reply," in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? ed.
Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum, pp. 117-31, at p. 13
15. I have tried to defend this theory elsewhere. See in particul
papers: "Are There Any Cultural Rights?' Political Theory 20
"Cultural Toleration" in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. W
Shapiro, Nomos 39 (New York: NYU Press, 1997), pp. 69-104.
16. The term is from Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A L
Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 35 ff.
17. "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 675.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 676.

20. This is what Mary Wollestonecraft had in mind when she wrote: "Women,
deluded by these sentiments, sometimes boast of their weakness, cunningly
obtaining power by playing on the weakness of men; and they may well glory in their
illicit sway, for, like Turkish bashaws, they have more real power than their masters;
but virtue is sacrificed to temporary gratifications, and the respectability of life to the
triumph of an hour." See A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, edited with an
introduction by Miriam Brody (London: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 126.
21. This point is made by Moira Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and
Corporeality (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 78.

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Singapore Management University

Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University

Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences

Is feminism bad for multiculturalism?

Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research

North American Philosophical Publications

Distinguished Lecture in Public Affairs: Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?

University of Illinois Press, North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating

DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS*

IS FEMINISM BAD FOR MULTICULTURALISM?

ABSTRACT: Multiculturalism and feminism are in tension to the

most important social movement of the twentieth century is ar-

♦Delivered at the State University of New York at Albany on 17 November 2000.

for the transformation of society it has effected and

debate as well as public policy all over the world. What

liberal ideas, this is as much as anything a reflection o

I. The Tension between Feminism and Multiculturalism

"most cultures are patriarchal . . . and many (though not a

In the case of a more patriarchal minority culture in the context of a less

clear interest in its preservation. Indeed, they might be much

Okin is quite right to identify this tension or conflict b

II. The Case for Feminism

To the extent that feminism and multiculturalism are inconsistent,

Yet the fact is that many of the claims made by feminists

not honor or recognize them. Feminism should be pre

HI. The Case for Multiculturalism

While the feminist case, particularly as presented by Okin, is a

The conception of multiculturalism I wish to put forw

them to support their arts or other cultural practices. So sm

to invoke her individual rights against the family's ins

As to the problem of determining the meaning of acqui

But even if we leave this aside, regulation is dangerous

There is a down side to multiculturalism, as feminists h

The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere

Feminism, like liberalism, is a reforming tendency. And in the end

Australian Defence Force Academy

3. Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge MA: Ha

4. Pollitt, 'Whose Culture?' in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Wo

9. Parekh, "A Varied Moral World," in Is Multiculturalism Bad

11. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680.

19. Ibid., p. 676.

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