Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia.

A comparative study of the

Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz regions
Adegehe, A.K.

Citation
Adegehe, A. K. (2009, June 11). Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. A comparative
study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz regions. Retrieved from
https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13839

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 8 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region

8.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined intra-regional conflicts within the

Benishangul-Gumuz region. This and the next chapter (chapter 9) deal
with inter-regional conflicts between the study regions and their
neighbours. The federal restructuring carried out by dismantling the old
unitary structure of the country led to territorial and boundary disputes.
Unlike the older federations created by the union of independent units,
which among other things have stable boundaries, creating a federation
through federal restructuring leads to controversies and in some cases to
violent conflicts. In the Ethiopian case, violent conflicts accompany the
process of intra-federal boundary making.
Inter-regional boundaries that divide the Somali region from its
neighbours (Oromia and Afar) are ill defined and there are violent
conflicts along these borders. In some cases, resource conflicts involving
Somali, Afar and Oromo clans transformed into more protracted
boundary and territorial conflicts. As will be discussed in this chapter,
inter-regional boundary making also led to the re-examination of ethnic
identity.
This chapter examines two cases on the impact of ethnic
regionalisation on inter-regional conflicts between the Somali region and
its Oromo and Afar neighbours. First, it examines how the process of
boundary making led to a territorial contest among three Afaan-Oromo1
speaking clans in the border town of Moyale, Southern Ethiopia. Second,
it considers how the ethnic regionalisation process affected the age-old
Afar2-Issa conflict in northeast Ethiopia. Although the conflicts in both
cases are not new, the federal restructuring process has transformed
them into inter-regional boundary conflicts.

180
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 181

8.2 Background to Somali Relations with the Oromo and

the Afar

The Somali, the Oromo and the Afar belong to the eastern Cushitic
linguistic group of the Horn of Africa. They relate to each other in terms
of language and culture. Sociologically, they are all organised in
patriarchal clan structures. Both the Afar and the Somali practice Islam
almost exclusively and are predominantly engaged in nomadic
pastoralism. In contrast, the Oromo practice Islam, Christianity and
traditional religion. Nevertheless, those Oromo clans who reside
coterminous with the Afar and the Somali largely follow the Islamic faith
and are predominantly engaged in pastoralism.3 While Islam could serve
as an instrument of integration, pastoralism, which depends on the
mobility of livestock, brings them into frequent resource conflicts.
There are both similarities and differences among the three groups
and in their relationship with the Ethiopian State. The Somali and the
Afar remained at both the geographic and political periphery for much
of the 20th century. The Oromo, in contrast, played a key role in
Ethiopian politics at least since the beginning of the 20th century
(Clapham 1988: 217).
Under the new regional administrative structure, the Somali and the
Oromia regions share a long boundary that stretches for more than 1000
kilometres from the Jijiga highlands in the northeast to the Ethio-
Kenyan borderlands in the southeast. As neighbouring ethnic
communities, the Somali and the Oromo have longstanding
relationships. Both were key players in the 16th century major population
movements in the Horn of Africa, which greatly contributed to the
present distribution of ethnic groups (Baxter 1978: 284; Lewis 1966: 27).
According to Herbert Lewis, interactions between the easternmost
Oromo and the westernmost Somali began during the 1500s and 1600s
as the Oromo were expanding to the north, northeast, and southeast
(1966: 35). This means the two groups were competing for about 400
years in their borderlands for water, grazing and agricultural land (Lewis
1966; Turton 1975).
Because of their centuries old interactions, the Somali and the
Oromo have several commonly shared socio-cultural values. For
instance, some Oromo and Somali groups have been either Somalised or
Oromised.4 In this respect, the ethnic identities of Garre and the Gabbra
that today compete with the Borana for control of the Moyale town
 182 Chapter 8

were influenced by years of Oromo-Somali interactions in southern

Ethiopia and northern Kenya.5
The relationship between the Oromo and the Somali largely
remained in the realm of culture and local alliance formation, until it
began to change and became politicised because of the partition of the
Horn of Africa at the beginning of the 20th century by different powers;
state nationalism and ethnic politics
Since 1992, Ethiopia’s policy of ethnic regionalisation also led to the
emergence of inter-regional boundary conflicts between the Somali and
the Oromo. The gravity of inter-regional boundary disputes between the
two regions is such that both instituted regional bureaus responsible for
border affairs. One important outcome of this process is the weakening
of an overarching solidarity between the Oromo and the Somali through
the Islamic faith against the political centre in Addis Ababa. This was
quite a reversal from the situation during the 1970s. Indeed, the alliance
between the two groups seemed so strong during the 1970s that I.M.
Lewis came up with the idea of providing an ideological foundation for
this partnership by promoting the cult of Sheik Hussein of Bale, which
both the Somali and Muslim Oromo revere (1980: 412).
Even if menacing for the local communities, inter-regional boundary
disputes that have plagued relationships between the Oromo and the
Somali regions do not present a credible security threat to the federal
government in Addis Ababa. Unwittingly or not, these conflicts
contributed to forestall the development of a wider Oromo-Somali
alliance against the political centre.
The Somali also share a long frontier with the Afar. It is the Issa clan
of the Somali that predominantly interacts with the Afar. The Afar live in
an ethnically and geographically well-defined region known as the Afar
Triangle. Like their Somali neighbours, they are divided into clans and
lineages (Kloos 1982: 22).6 The Issa clan whom the Afar border with
belong to the Dir7 clan family of the Somali and live in Ethiopia,
Djibouti and Somalia (Lewis 2002b: 56). In Ethiopia, the Issa constitute
the second largest Somali clan next to the Ogaden. In Djibouti, where
the Afar comprises the second largest ethnic group, the Issa are
dominant in terms of population size and politics (Ambroso 1994: 27).
Like their Afar neighbours, the Issa are predominantly engaged in
nomadic pastoralism. They are also involved in transport and cross
border businesses (Markakis 2003a: 447).
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 183

Historically, relationships between the Afar and the Issa were mainly
characterised by conflicts.8 There are few exceptions to this general trend.
One of this instances happened during the 16th century Ahmed Gragn
war against the Ethiopian (Abyssinian) Kingdom in which both the Afar
and the Somali allied with the forces of Ahmed Gragn (Pastner 1979:
101). Like any neighbouring pastoralist groups whose livelihood depends
on mobility of livestock, the two groups frequently clash over scarce and
vital resources (Ali 1997; Flintan and Imeru 2002; Getachew 2001b).
There are also cultural ethoses that encourage inter-clan violence between
the two groups (Thesiger 1935: 4-5).
Since the end of the 19th century, interventions by external players
increased the complexity and intractability of the conflict between the
Afar and the Issa. Indeed, the conflict between the two groups cannot be
considered as mere localised conflicts between neighbouring pastoral
groups over water and pasture. There is deep involvement of external
actors ranging from national governments in the region to cross border
traders. With this background, the next sections discuss the impact of
federal restructuring on the relationship between the Somali and their
Oromo and Afar neighbours.

8.3 Somali-Oromia Boundary Conflicts: Case of Moyale

Moyale, a border town between Ethiopia and Kenya, has strategic

significance as a gateway to Kenya from southern Ethiopia. An asphalt
road connects it to Addis Ababa. Before the reorganisation of local and
regional governments in 1992, it was under the Borana administrative
region and served as the capital of the Moyale awraja.
Like other towns in southern Ethiopia, the development of the
Moyale town was associated with the expansion of the Ethiopian State at
the end of the 19th century and the formation of administrative and
military centres in newly conquered territories. Thus, the majority of the
residents were in the service of the government and largely extracted
from the northern and central parts of the country.
Since 1992, both the Oromia and the Somali regions claim the town
and its surrounding areas. The conflicting claim over Moyale town
between the two regions stems from the division that occurred among
the three Afaan-Oromo speaking clans over their ethnic identity that is,
the Borana, the Garre and the Gabbra.
 184 Chapter 8

8.3.1 Nature and evolution of the conflict

The Borana, Garre and Gabbra over the years developed complex
relationships in the Borana9 region. All of the clans speak Afaan-Oromo.
The Borana and the Gabbra clans also use the gada10 institution.
Moreover, all of the clans are predominantly engaged in pastoralism.
There are, however, differences in terms of ethnic identification. The
Borana belong to the Oromo ethnic group, while the ethnic identity of
the Garre and Gabbra remains controversial. Getachew Kassa, for
instance, characterises the Garre as ‘partly Somali and partly Oromo’
(2003: 1). Similarly, E.R. Turton discusses the fluidity of the identity of
the Garre between the Oromo and the Somali as many of them were
bilingual and culturally mixed (1975: 536).
Likewise, the ethnic identity of the Gabbra remains uncertain.
Günther Schlee (1989: 5), for example, questions the practice of
assigning the Gabbra as sub-units of the Borana-Oromo and suggests
that these ‘so-called Oromo are more Somali than anything else.’ At the
same time, he underlines that even if one accepts the Somaliod11 origin
of the Gabbra, it is their Borana-ness, that is, ‘their political association
with the Boran and their use of the Boran language [Afaan-Oromo], that
sets them apart from [other groups]…and establishes their separate
identity…’ (1989: 137). In spite of this, both the Garre and the Gabbra
use their Islamic religion as an important aspect of their ethnic marker
and a vital factor that unites them with other Somali clans (Schlee 1998:
143).
The main cause of conflicts among the three clans in the past was
competition over access to land resources such as water and pasture
(Bassi 1997: 271). The three clans also developed such institutions as
negga-Borana (peace of Borana) and Tiriso,12 which provide stability for
inter-clan relations and help manage resource conflicts (Obba 1996: 118-
22). However, inter-clan relationships changed after the division of the
region among the Ethiopians, the British and Italians at the beginning of
the 20th century. Hence, the establishment of artificial boundaries and the
divide and rule policies of each of these three powers adversely
influenced relationships among the three groups (Bassi 1997: 26; Yacob
1997: 20).
The territorial dispute that emerged between Ethiopia and Somalia
since the 1960s because of the latter’s aspiration of uniting all Somali
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 185

speaking territories under its jurisdiction adversely affected inter-clan

relations. In other words, the inter-state conflict became an inter-clan
conflict in the region whereby the Garre and the Borana respectively
supported Somalia and Ethiopia.
Moreover, when Somalia established the SALF in 1976 the Garre,
the Gabbra and other Islamic Oromo clans joined the new movement,
while the Borana remained aligned with the Ethiopian government
(Gebru 1996: 210). Similarly, the three clans suffered divisions during the
1977-78 Ethio-Somalia war. The Garre and the Gabbra stood by the
Somalia government, while the Borana who feared that any military
success to Somalia would change the local balance of power in favour of
their traditional foes firmly rallied behind Ethiopian defence lines (Yacob
1997: 20-1). Since 1992, the reconstitution of the country into an ethnic
federation brought conflicting claims and counter-claims among the
three groups. In this respect, all of the three Afaan-Oromo speaking
clans have conflicting claims over Moyale town. Initially, when the
regions formed in 1992, Moyale was put under the newly established
Oromia region and served as the capital of the Oromia Moyale woreda.
Even after the EPRDF government decided in 1994 to transfer some
territories earlier controlled by the Borana (Oromo) to the Somali region
in the name of boundary making, Moyale’s status under the jurisdiction
of the Oromia region was affirmed and later acknowledged in a letter
issued by former Prime Minister Tamrat Layne, to effect the
aforementioned territorial changes (1994). However, the Garre whose
political class sought to join the Somali region challenged this decision.
Because of the territorial dispute between the two regions, there is
now a dual Oromo and Somali administration in Moyale town. The town
also serves as the capital of two competing woreda – Oromia-Moyale and
Somali-Moyale. Due to the presence of two competing woreda and
municipal administrations within one town, there are dual authorities for
almost all government activities at the district level. For instance, there
are Oromia and Somali police stations, courts, public prosecutor,
finance, education and other offices with overlapping and competing
jurisdictions. More importantly, the town is divided into (ethnic) quarters
– the eastern part of the town for the Garre (Somali) and the western
part for the Borana (Oromo). The asphalt road that dissects the town
serves as unofficial boundary. The continued standoff between the two
regions led to the worsening of relationships among the three clans. As a
result, there are frequent conflicts within the town.13 Indeed, as one
informant sarcastically noted, ‘there are three dysfunctional governments
 186 Chapter 8

in Moyale town that include the federal and the Somali and Oromia
regional governments resulting in much confusion and uncertainty.’14

Map 8.1 Location of three clans and Moyale

Source (Belete 1999)

Because of the lack of resolution to the Moyale dispute and the

presence of competing administrative structures within one town, there
are problems in maintaining law and order. As noted by both groups, the
duality in administrative structure and the unofficial division within the
town enable individuals who commit crime to evade prosecution by
fleeing from one sector to the other.15 Additionally, as a result of the
continued standoff, there is a low level of municipal services and
construction activities in the town ceased for the last 12 years.
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 187

8.3.2 Federal restructuring and the Moyale dispute

The federal restructuring of the country has brought political significance

to the question of whether a clan is Oromo or Somali (Schlee and
Shongolo 1995: 8). More importantly, as the new ethnic regions have the
rights of regional autonomy and secession, stakes are high in the process
of marking inter-regional boundaries. Thus, the new line of division
between the Oromia and the Somalia regions was considered
enormously important for both the local actors in the zone of conflict
and the new regional authorities as a way of consolidating the territorial
and political identity of their ethnic regions. In other words, the conflict
now has regional and ethnic dimension between the Oromia and the
Somali regions. This is evident, for instance, in the following statements
taken from a document by the Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFedA
2003a:3).

In both regions – Oromia and Somali – regional officials at all levels

neither behave as part of the federal system nor take responsibility to
protect the welfare of all Ethiopians particularly the lives and properties of
peoples of the neighbouring regions. They rather consider themselves as
“good” ethnic/ clan leaders and “defenders” of their ethnic territories.

The territorial dispute in Moyale led to the re-examination of the

ethnic identity of some of the clans like the Garre and the Gabbra. The
issue of marking the boundary of the two regions around Moyale became
contentious because not only there were longstanding resource and
territorial conflicts among the three clans but also due to the difficulty of
dividing the three clans into clear-cut ethnic categories/regions. Indeed,
all of the clans in the area had ambivalence about the way they relate to
such wider ethnic categories as Oromo and Somali. Even the Borana,
who not only speak Afaan-Oromo but also have a central symbolic place
in the Oromo clan structure, began only recently to identify themselves
as members of the wider Oromo ethnicity. The Garre and the Gabbra
have always been ambivalent about their ethnic identity as they are
Oromo ‘…by one set of criteria (language…) and Somali by another set
of criteria […religious affiliation] (Schlee and Shongolo 1995: 8). The
heavy emphasis placed on ethnicity as a way of representation,
citizenship and formation of local and regional administrative structures
 188 Chapter 8

in federal Ethiopia may be explained by re-examining the three groups’

ethnic identity (Schlee 1998: 143).
The formation of the ethnic regions thus required these groups to
take on either their Oromo or Somali identity. This means applying
principles of ethnic self-determination, which constitutes the key ethos
of Ethiopian ethnic federation, brought a huge challenge to ethnic
communities with dual Oromo and Somali identities. In this situation,
the question of which group belongs to such wider ethnic categories as
Oromo or Somali is not only a question of scholarly enquiry but also an
instrument of inclusion and exclusion (Schlee and Shongolo 1995: 8).
The response of the Garre and the Gabbra to the new demand,
choosing their ethnicity as either Oromo or Somali, was varied. While
the Garre ethnic entrepreneurs decided to take on a Somali identity, the
Gabbra remained divided. The former seemed to realise that they had to
negotiate which ethnic identity to take on after the collapse of Somalia
and the change of the military regime in Ethiopia at the beginning of the
1990s. At the beginning of the transitional period, when the OLF was
the second most important political force in the country next to the
TPLF/EPRDF, the Garre and their associates reinvented their political
front from SALF to Oromo Abbo Liberation Front (OALF). The
Borana were suspicious of this move as they saw more of a similarity
between the two in terms of ethnic symbols and clan constituency (Bassi
1997: 36; Ibrahim 2005: 49).
In addition to the re-branding of the SALF into an Oromo
organisation at the early days of the TGE, the traditional leader of the
Garre, Haji Mohammed Hassen Gebaba, sought to take the office of the
OLF representative of the Moyale woreda. OLF officials then based in
Addis Ababa seemed to accept the wish of the Garre leader to represent
them, as they were then promoting wider Oromo nationalism on the
basis of Afaan-Oromo. The Borana elders saw this as a skilful
machination of the Garre, intended to bolster their territorial claim
against them by taking advantage of the power vacuum created after the
downfall of the Derg (Ibid 11).
However, Garre overtures to Oromo ethnicity ended when the
politics of post-1991 Ethiopia began to take shape and after the
formation of the ethnic regions, which included a separate region for the
Somali. More importantly, the withdrawal of the OLF from the
transitional government and its resumption of armed insurgency caused
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 189

a dramatic shift in the relationship of the three clans with the Ethiopian
State. The Borana, traditionally considered allies of the Ethiopian
government became a suspect in the eyes of the EPRDF. In contrast, the
Garre and other Somali clans became allies of Addis Ababa in its anti-
insurgency activities against the OLF. This dramatic change of policy
bewildered and alienated the Borana while at the same time tilted the
balance of power in favour of the Garre.16
The other key factor that seemed to give an additional incentive for
the Garre to demand their inclusion into the Somali region was the large
influx of Garre and other Somali clansmen to the Moyale town and its
surroundings as ‘returnees’ through controversial refugee repatriation
programmes during the 1990s (Bassi 1997). With these important
changes, there appeared to be little incentive for the Garre to emphasise
their Oromo identity. Thus, their ethnic entrepreneurs chose to join the
Somali region. This decision transformed inter-clan conflicts between the
Borana and the Garre into a boundary conflict between the newly
created Oromia and Somali regions. Soon after their decision to join the
Somali region, the Garre laid claim over territories either jointly used by
them and the Borana or considered traditional turf of the latter. These
included two of the nine famous Borana permanent water wells, the El
Leh and El Gof and the border town of Moyale. When the EPRDF
government decided on the boundary between the Somali and the
Oromia regions in the former Borana administrative region in 1994, it
assigned Gof and Leh to the Garre (Tamrat 1994).
In contrast, the question of either joining the Somali or he Oromo
regions has been internally divisive for the Gabbra and brought them
more conflicts with the Borana. The position of the Gabbra vacillates
between the two regions. The Gabbra within Borana dominated areas
like Yabello, Arero and Supra identify with the Borana. They
nevertheless quietly demand the establishment of a Gabbra special-
woreda17 within the Borana zone of the Oromia region. However, this
demand is distasteful to the Borana, who fear that if the Gabbra have a
special-woreda, they would claim Somali identity like the Garre and cause
further territorial loss.18
The Gabbra who identify themselves with the Somali demand the
assignment of Moyale and its surroundings to the Somali region. They
also attach much importance to those points such as religion (Islam),
styles of dress, way of constructing houses and others that make their
clan distinct from the Borana, but bring them closer to the Garre and
other Somali clans.19
 190 Chapter 8

In 1992, a major conflict between the Gabbra and the Borana

occurred after the former rallied behind the OALF. This conflict cost
hundreds of lives and displaced thousands of Gabbra. Some of the
Gabbra displaced by this conflict fled to the north and found refuge with
the Guji, an Oromo clan that has a history of conflict with the Borana.
They were settled at a place called Finchwa. Nevertheless, a conflict
arose between them and their Guji hosts in 2005 that led to their
displacement yet again. The cause for this violence appears to have been
suspicion among the Guji that if the Gabbra remain on their territory,
they would demand their own administrative structures. Hundreds of
Gabbra displaced from Finchwa are now in Surpa, between
Ageremariam and Yabello on the main asphalt road that connects Addis
Ababa and Moyale. The displaced Gabbra live in plastic makeshift
houses. As there is still potential for violence, the government deployed
the Federal Police in Surpa and its surroundings as observed in March
2007.
Since 1991, internal divisions and vacillation between Oromia and
Somali mark Gabbra’s response to the need to negotiate its ethnic
identity within Ethiopia’s federal structure. For instance, after the 1992
violence, the Gabbra with the help of the Oromia region reinstituted a
gada institution, weakened over the years by Gabbra adherence to
Islam.20 Hassan Kella, one of the prominent leaders of the Gabbra, was
elected Abba Gada (head of the gada) and later became a member of the
Oromia regional council (Ibrahim 2005: 49).
After the reinstitution of the gada, when the idea of joining the
Somali region apparently got the upper hand among some of their ethnic
entrepreneurs, the Gabbra in the Moyale area reinstituted a traditional
administrative institution called Teliya. This institution emphasises Islam
and resembles Somali traditional clan administration. In a surprising
move, Hassan Kella, installed earlier as the Abba Gada of the Gabbra,
became head of the Teliya. 21
Hassan’s position change accompanied his change of allegiance from
Oromo to Somali ethnicity. He presently advocates Gabbra identification
with the Somali and the assignment of Moyale town to the Somali
region. When asked why he changed his allegiance, Hassan stated that
‘he was involved in the restoration of the gada and became member of
the Oromia regional council in order to provide security for his people.’
He alleged that these actions had not brought security to the Gabbra.
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 191

Consequently, he switched allegiance from the Oromo to the Somali

region. He furthermore defended his position by saying:22

All the Gabbra in terms of ancestry (genealogy) are Somali. The way we
build houses is more similar with the Somali than the Borana. We keep
camels like our Somali brothers, while the Borana were traditionally
engaged in the husbandry of cattle. We worship one God (Allah) like the
Somali, while the Borana do not worship in one God. We share more
similarities with the Somali clans than the Borana. As a result, the Gabbra
are no Oromo but Somali.

Another high profile Gabbra politician, Shenu Godana, also switched

his loyalty from the Oromia to the Somali region. Shenu served as
member of the federal parliament representing the OPDO and the
Moyale woreda for ten years (1995-2005) in Addis Ababa. After his tenure
at the federal parliament, he became head of the Borana zone’s Bureau of
Popular Organisation and Mobilisation. Nevertheless, when the Oromia
region sacked him from his position, he switched his allegiance to the
Somali. Consequently, the Somali region gave him a position within the
Somali Moyale woreda administration. He now promotes the idea that the
Gabbra are all Somali and should be under the administration of the
Somali region. He defends his switching of identity as follows.23

Initially, when the EPRDF controlled the country (1991-2), the Gabbra, the
Garre and the Borana rallied behind different Oromo ethnic movements.
When ethnic and clan division occurred, the Garre joined the Somali; some
Gabbra also joined the Somali. I and some other Gabbra leaders, however,
joined the Oromo. The reason for our decision to join the Oromia region
was to safeguard the interest of our people who live in the midst of the
Borana in such areas as Yabello, Arero, Negele and others. We were afraid
that if all of the Gabbra leaders join the Somali, the Borana would attack
our clan. My decision to leave the OPDO (Oromia) and join the SPDP
(Somali) was because of my realisation that I could not provide security to
the Gabbra who live in the midst of the Borana. I felt that the officials of
the Borana zone were directly and indirectly involved in Borana violence
against the Gabbra. When I voiced my opposition about the handling of
the conflict between the Borana and the Gabbra to the zonal authorities, I
was removed from my position. I then went to the Somali region and was
given a position within the Moyale Somali woreda.
 192 Chapter 8

In addition to these high profile cases, allegiance switching by

Gabbra local and regional officials appears to be a recurrent
phenomenon in the Moyale woreda. For instance, in March 2007, the top
local news in the Moyle town was the defection of two members of the
Moyale Oromia woreda cabinet to the Somali region.
The unresolved dispute over the status of Moyale town could explain
why the Somali region provides positions to the Gabbra. Indeed, if the
dispute is going to be resolved through a local referendum, prominent
Gabbra appointed by the Somali region could mobilise their clansmen in
favour of the Somali region. One Oromo official of the Borana zone
complains that ‘Whenever Gabbra officials in the Oromia region are
sacked from their positions either because of lack of competence or of
alleged criminal activities, they flee to the Somali region and the Somali
region gives them political appointments.’24 Individuals who are involved
in such activities despite their claim of ‘providing security to their people’
appear largely motivated by personal gain. Indeed, the salaries and other
benefits that accompany political offices at local and regional levels are
valuable economic resources, which entice the Gabbra ethnic
entrepreneurs to switch their allegiance from the Oromo to the Somali.
The reorganisation of the country into an ethnic federation also
affected Garre and Borana relations. It brought them different challenges
and opportunities. For the former, the formation of the Somali region
gave them the opportunity to identify themselves as Somali and join that
region with whatever territory they managed to seize from the latter. It
also gave them new allies from the Somali region. The newly established
Oromia region on its part emerged as the major player in the territorial
dispute among the three clans representing the Borana Oromo.
Indeed, the Moyale dispute has major political significance for
Oromo nationalism. As the Borana maintain some of the key pristine
elements of Oromo identity such as the gada and its associated rituals,
they are considered the eldest son of all the Oromo clans and receive
seniority in Oromo rituals (Mohammed 1990: 6). Therefore, the Moyale
dispute is an important issue for the Oromia region. The Oromia
regional officials could not afford to see the assignment of Moyale town
to the Somali, as this could undermine the confidence of the typically
suspicious Oromo public about their steadfastness in protecting ‘Oromo
interest.’ In fact, in spite of the widely held view among the Borana that
the OPDO is powerless regarding the territorial conflict between
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 193

themselves and the Garre (Ibrahim 2005: 46-7), Oromia regional officials
are still reluctant to see any decision that would transfer the Moyale town
to the Somali region. Accordingly, Junedin Saddo ex-president of the
Oromia region and presently federal cabinet minister underscored that
the issue of Moyale is a ‘make or break’ for the Oromia region and its
‘vanguard’ party, the OPDO. Hence, he cannot compromise on it
(Muhdin 2004: 3).
The dispute between the Borana (Oromo) and the Garre (Somali)
over Moyale town has been festering for close to 16 years now. The
federal government attempted to resolve the conflict through both
political and legal instruments without success. The most frequently used
instruments in this regard include the organisation of the ‘peace,
development and democracy conference,’25 interposition of the army
between rival groups and joint peace committees (JPC).26 Despite the
contribution of these efforts to de-escalate conflicts, they have not led to
significant results.
The main impediment regarding the resolution of the Moyale dispute
relates to the immense polarity that prevails among the parties to the
conflict. The federal constitution provides that when regions fail to
resolve territorial disputes through negotiation, the federal government
should organise a referendum to enable people at the local/kebele level to
decide democratically, which region they would like to join. While the
Somali region seems to accept the principle of holding a referendum, the
Borana oppose it vigorously. They argue that holding a referendum
would only endorse the unjust expansion of the Garre and other Somali
clans on Borana territory.27
The HoF, which is responsible for resolving inter-regional conflicts,
instructed the NEBE in 2004 to hold a referendum in 463 kebele along
the contested borders of the Oromia and the Somali regions including
Moyale. The referendum could not, however, take place in Moyale.
According the NEBE, this was because of disagreements between the
two regions on a number of issues such as election of public observers,
registration of displaced people and mutual suspicion (2004: 6). Local
Oromo and Somali officials, however, blamed each other for the
cancellation of the referendum. One Oromia official alleges that the
referendum was ‘cancelled because of the fact that the Garre brought
thousands of people from other areas including Kenya and Somalia so
that they could prevail over the Borana and secure the ownership of the
town.’28
 194 Chapter 8

In contrast, officials of the Moyale Somali woreda allege that the

pressure from Oromo officials at the regional level, who feared holding
the referendum as planned, meant Oromia would lose Moyale, botched
the referendum.29 After the failure of the referendum, the federal
government once again let the problem fester. Still, it deployed federal
police to deter violence. As the situation remains tense, a minor incident
could trigger violence.

8.4 Somali-Afar Boundary Conflict: Case of the Afar-Issa

Conflict

The inter-regional boundary between the Somali and the Afar regions
remains poorly defined and extremely tense. A single minor incident
involving clansmen from the Somali or the Afar could trigger major
violence. The security situation is so fragile that paramilitary units of
the federal police and the army patrol in those areas where there are
frequent clashes between the two rival groups.
The Afar-Issa conflict was initially a resource conflict between
two neighbouring pastoral clans over water and pasture. However, the
conflict intertwines with other broader regional conflicts since the
division of the region at the beginning of the 20th century by external
powers that include the French, British, Italians and Ethiopians. The
intervention of foreign powers irreversibly changed the relationships
between the two groups. In this respect, the external powers sought
to use a divide and rule strategy by magnifying historical animosities
that prevailed between the Afar and the Issa to further their interests.
The Awash valley on which the two rival groups clash over for
water and pasture also attracted new resource users, irrigated
commercial farms and sugar plantations since the 1960s. The
introduction of new users is believed to exacerbate the conflict among
the traditional users by reducing the amount of available resources
(Ali 1997).
The top-down federal restructuring of Ethiopia, which resulted in
the formation of the Afar and the Somali regions in 1992,
transformed the Afar-Issa conflict in several respects. It most
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 195

importantly changed the conflict into a boundary conflict in which

the two ethnic regions directly and indirectly participate.

8.4.1 Nature and evolution of the conflict

The Afar and the Issa, like many other neighbouring ethnic groups
locked in territorial conflicts, have conflicting narratives about the
nature of their relationships and territorial ownership. In this respect,
the Afar bitterly recall that they were progressively displaced by Issa
expansion in such areas as Meisso, Afdem, Erer and even Dire Dawa,
over the past six decades (Seyoum et al. 1999). In contrast, the views
of the Issa on territorial expansion differ. While some Issa reject Afar
claims of continued Issa expansion (Ibid), others acknowledge the
continuous westward expansion of the Issa into Afar territories,
which pushed the latter to the other side of the Awash River
(Michaelson 2000: 12).
The two groups also have conflicting views about the causes of
the conflict. In this respect, the Issa and Somali regional officials
emphasise the resource aspects of the conflict. For instance, a study
paper on the Afar and Issa conflict by the Somali region states that
‘because of the nature of nomadic pastoralism on which the
livelihoods of both groups depends, Afar and Somali pastoralists
cross each other’s territories in search of water and pasture. The
competition to have access to these vital resources, therefore, leads to
conflicts’ (SNRS 2004b: 3). Putting resource competition at the heart
of the Afar-Issa conflict is not limited to the Issa-Somali narrative.
Some scholars and government officials consider the conflict from a
perspective of resource conflict between two pastoral communities.
In this respect, John Markakis not only disapproves of the labelling of
the conflict as ethnic, but also concludes that the Afar-Issa conflict is
a localised resource conflict (2003a).
Afar officials and opinion-makers, however, have an opposite
view of the conflict. For them, the problem is neither a localised
conflict nor a conflict over water and pasture. It is rather part of
explicit or implicit attempt territorial expansion by the Somali
dominated neighbouring countries of Ethiopia – Somalia and
Djibouti. An Afar expert who works in the regional Bureau of Border
Affairs says:30
 196 Chapter 8

In our view, the conflict is not a localised conflict between Afar and
Issa. It is rather an element of a broader territorial conflict between
Ethiopia and Somalia. The Somali in order to cover their real intention
characterise the conflict as a “resource conflict”. The main objective of
the Issa is, however, to control the Awash River from its upper to lower
courses and Ethiopia’s strategic link to the sea that traverses the Afar
country.

The Afar-Issa conflict passed through several phases since the

beginning of the 20th century. The division of the Horn of Africa by
colonial powers and Ethiopia’s expansion at the turn of the century
not only brought new actors, but also affected inter-clan relationships
of the Afar and the Issa in several ways.
The construction of the railway that connected the former French
colony of Djibouti with Addis Ababa (1897-1917) contributed to the
changing of Afar and Issa clan boundaries. Thus, many Issa employed
by the construction company settled permanently in several of the
small towns that emerged along the rail tracks in Afar country
(Markakis 2003a: 447).
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 197

Map 8.2 Afar-Issa conflict zone

Source: Adopted from Ali (2008)

The 1935 Italian invasion and subsequent occupation of the

country (1935-1941) adversely influenced Afar-Issa relations. The
Italians not only recruited Somali native soldiers and supported the
Issa by providing arms and training, but also severely punished the
Afar because of their alliance with the Ethiopians More importantly,
the Issa who sided with the Italians began to have access to the
Allighedi plains31 with Italian support (Ibid).
In the immediate post-war period, the Issa successfully expanded
into traditional Afar territories. In 1947 as a result of a violent conflict
between the two groups, the Afar were evicted from Erer, Aydora,
Asbuli and Butiji localities in the former Adal, Issa and Gurgura
 198 Chapter 8

awraja. During this period, the Afar also had to vacate the eastern side
of the railway. Following this, the Haile Selassie government in 1948
decreed that the Erer River should serve as a geographic divide
between the Afar and the Issa. To maintain this boundary, the
government deployed hundreds of troops until 1963. The troop
pullout in 1963 precipitated the outbreak of violence anew, leading to
further Issa expansion into Afar territories (Seyoum et al. 1999: 15-
16).
The 1970s saw such radical changes in Ethiopia as the overthrow
of the Haile Selassie government and the emergence of a Marxist
military regime, the Derg. Unprecedented levels of intra and inter-
state conflict in the Horn of Africa characterised the post-1974 era,
with Ethiopia at the epicentre.32 The conflict situation of the Horn of
Africa led to the entanglement of the Afar-Issa conflict with broader
international and regional conflicts.33 In this regard, the 1977-8 Ethio-
Somalia war was of particular importance.
According to John Markakis, one of the divisions of the Somalia-
backed WSLF was mainly composed of the Issa and was initially
prepared to annex Djibouti. After Mogadishu dropped that plan, this
division served in the Ethio-Somalia war in the Awash valley (1987:
446-7). After the war, the Issa managed to penetrate deep into the
Awash valley and establish new Issa settlements on the highway that
links Addis Ababa to the Assab/Djibouti ports. The most notable
settlement in this regard was Gedamaitu, established in 1982.
In addition to territorial conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia,
the geopolitical significance of northeast Ethiopia contributed
immensely to the intractability of the conflict between the two
groups. Indeed, Ethiopia’s desire to ensure safe access to the sea
influenced its policy towards the conflict. Thus, ever since the
emergence of the Issa as the ruling ethnic group of Djibouti, Addis
Ababa sought to foster good relationships and at times kept a blind
eye on the expansion of the Issa into Afar territories (Gilkes 1999: 20-
1).
In other instances, Ethiopian regimes employed draconian
measures against the Issa due to geopolitical and security calculations.
For instance, the Derg in 1987 intervened in order to check Issa
expansion because of the fear that the Afar-Issa conflict would
jeopardise the strategic highway. Accordingly, the government
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 199

decided to use the highway as a point of reference regarding the

ethnic frontier between the two rival groups. The Issa who were then
located to the east of the highway were told not to come nearer than
40 kilometres to the highway. However, they were allowed to graze
their livestock on the first 10 kilometres of the restricted zone
without carrying firearms. The Afar, on the other hand, could graze
their livestock at a distance of 10 kilometres to the east crossing the
highway also without carrying firearms. The remaining 20 kilometres
were supposed to be a buffer zone and both the Afar and the Issa
were not allowed to cross. The military regime also dismantled the
Gedamaitu town that emerged as an important transit point for
contraband trade.34 After EPRDF’s takeover in 1991, the government
ceased to enforce the above measures. Consequently, the 40 km
restricted zone disintegrated, the Issa reconstituted the Gedamaitu
town and further encroached into Afar territories.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the geopolitical aspect of the
Afar-Issa conflict intensified because of Eritrea’s independence and
the antagonism that emerged in the relationship between Ethiopia
and Eritrea after their 1998-2000 brutal war. The beginning of the
1990s also saw the emergence of two Afar insurgent movements both
in Djibouti and Ethiopia. In the case of Djibouti, the Afar
disenchanted by their marginalisation established the Front for
Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) in 1991 (Agyeman-
Duah 1997: 7; Schraeder 1993: 211). Whereas in Ethiopia, the Afar
displeased by the further international division of their territory after
Eritrea’s independence established the Afar Revolutionary
Democratic Union Front (ARDUF), popularly known as Ugougoumou
(revolution). This movement sought the formation of a ‘pan-Afar’
independent country through armed struggle (Tronvoll 1999: 1050).
The reactions of Ethiopia and Eritrea to these movements were
initially almost unanimous. They provided support to the beleaguered
Djiboutian government against FRUD (Gilkes 1999) and coordinated
their anti-insurgency activities against the ARDUF (Ruth 2000: 665).
Their security cooperation abruptly ended when the two countries
began their destructive border war in 1998.35
The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea that made former almost
completely dependent on Djibouti for port services further
complicated the Afar-Issa conflict. As a result, the main interest of
Addis Ababa today regarding the Afar-Issa conflict is the maintenance
of security on the strategic highway that links the country with
 200 Chapter 8

Djibouti. The government at the same time does not wish to upset
the Issa political class, which controls Djibouti and thereby almost
follows a policy of neglect to the simmering conflict between the two
rival groups.

8.4.2 Federal restructuring and the Afar and Issa conflict

The Afar-Issa conflict is a protracted territorial conflict that has been

going on for many decades before the country adopted a federal
structure. However, ethnic regionalisation has transformed the conflict
into intra-federal boundary conflict by bringing in new actors. At the
beginning of the transitional period, there was a feeling among the Afar
elite that previous Ethiopian governments deliberately inflamed their
conflict with the Issa to undermine local resistance. And Afar and
Somali politicians within the new government could amicably resolve
the conflict.36 This enthusiasm did not last long and the conflict
continued after the formation of the regions with increased intensity
and geographic expanse (Getachew 2001b: 30).
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Issa not only reconstituted
Gedamaitu, which was earlier dismantled by the Derg, but also crossed
the Awash River for the first time and established new towns such as
Adaitu, Undofo and Ambule on the Djibouti-Addis Ababa highway.
This highway has emerged as a de facto boundary between the Afar and
the Somali regions (see map 8.2). The eastern side of the highway is
now increasingly inaccessible to the Afar.
The continued Afar-Issa conflict has almost made the drawing of
inter-regional boundaries between the two regions impossible. In fact,
in a situation where there is an active territorial expansion between
neighbouring ethnic groups, creating ethno-regional boundaries
acceptable to both parties, is difficult, if not impossible. With or
without a boundary, the emergence of the Afar and the Somali regions
has transformed the Afar-Issa conflict into inter-regional conflict. This
means the two regions now participate in this otherwise old and
protracted conflict as both parties to the conflict and agents of conflict
management.
In spite of the fact that the ethnic regions have been given central
importance by the federal constitution regarding the resolution of
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 201

boundary conflicts, the two regions have so far failed to produce an

arrangement that would help amicably resolve their territorial conflicts.
On the contrary, there is a widely held view in the federal government
that such conflicts have been exacerbated by what federal officials like
to call ‘rent seeking’ and ‘narrow-nationalist’ attitudes of regional and
local officials. For instance, the federal government accuses regional
officials of partaking directly and indirectly in violent boundary
conflicts (MoFedA 2002a, 2003a).
In the case of the Afar-Issa conflict, the federal government
accused regional and local officials of lacking the good will to resolve
the problem amicably and appearing as good defenders of ethnic
interests instead of trying to find a long lasting solution that caters for
the needs of both ethnic groups (Ibid). Indeed, the new ethnic regions
either directly or indirectly participate in the conflict. For instance, the
Afar region provided logistical support to Afar fighters in one of their
violent encounters with the Issa (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003b: 19).
Similarly, Afar officials accuse their Somali counterparts of providing
support to the Issa. They particularly note that the support the SNRS
provides to the Issa grew tremendously after some prominent Issa
politicians began to play important roles in the politics of the Somali
region.37
Additionally, both the federal and the regional governments
underscore that local and regional officials get involved in the conflict
(SNRS 2004a: 11). Hence, in a joint document prepared by the two
regions under the supervision of the MoFedA, Somali and Afar officials
conceded that the conflict has been exacerbated by mutual suspicion,
the tendency to resolve conflicts through violence and regional officials
providing shelter to criminals in the name of clan/ethnic solidarity
(SNRS and ANRS 2003: 5).
Because of all these, the animosity between the two groups has
been aggravated. For example, they do not live together in the small
towns that emerged on the contested highway. Consequently, the
contested towns, Adaitu, Undofo and Gedamaitu are off limits to the
Afar. Similarly, the Issa cannot venture into nearby Afar towns such as
Gewane, Awash and others. This is a new trend, according to a report
by the Somali region on the Afar-Issa conflict that emerged after the
formation of the regions in 1992 (SNRS 2004b: 10).
The other important aspect of the Afar-Issa territorial conflict is the
desire to control the Addis Ababa-Djibouti highway that serves as a
trading route for the thriving contraband trade. The dramatic expansion
 202 Chapter 8

of contraband trade during the 1990s was precipitated by the weakening

of the boundaries of the countries of the Horn of Africa and the
emergence of Somalia after its collapse as a haven for cross border
smugglers (Markakis 2003a: 448). In this context, Gedamaitu, one of
the contested towns between the Afar and the Issa, emerged as an
inland enter port for the transit and distribution of smuggled
contraband goods to the Ethiopian hinterland.
The Afar oppose Issa’s control of the trading routes. They feel that
the flourishing of business in these otherwise pocket territories within
their region is just a precursor to Issa expansion (Flintan and Imeru
2002: 278). Hence, they seek to ensure the highway that traverses the
region remains within their geographic jurisdiction. To this end, one of
the tactics used to forestall the further expansion of the Issa is the
establishment of new Afar towns and settlements along the contested
highway. This tactic is meant to leave no doubt regarding Afar
ownership of these territories. However, the Issa fiercely oppose such
moves. In fact, the Somali region blames the decision by the Afar
region to establish new settlements on the highway as one of the key
factors exacerbating conflict between the two groups (SNRS 2004b: 8).
For example, the decision of the Afar region to move the capital of the
Bure-Mudaytu woreda to the highway at Gelalau in March 2002 caused a
fierce skirmish between the two groups in which several lives were lost
(Markakis 2003a; SNRS 2004b).
In tandem with their narrative about the source of the conflict,
the Afar and the Issa provide opposing views about the way to
resolve their territorial disputes. The former’s argument hinges on the
history of settlements in the Awash valley. They argue that as the
latter continue to dislodge them from their ancestral lands and
establish new settlements in which they constitute local majorities,
holding a referendum to decide on the fate of the contested territories
would be an injustice. Accordingly, an official within the Afar region
notes that ‘deciding the boundary problem through a referendum,
which is based on size of voters, is not only unjust but also legitimises
violent acquisition of land.’38 Furthermore, the Afar argue that the
Issa pocket settlements recently created on the Djibouti-Addis Ababa
highway should either be removed or brought under their jurisdiction.
In contrast, the Somali argue that boundaries between the Afar
and the Somali region are not international and the people at the
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 203

kebele level should have the opportunity to decide to which region

they wish to join. In this respect, the SNRS has reported:

Afar claim of ownership of some of the territories in which the Issa are
presently found such as Adaitu, Gedamaitu, Undofo and others is based
on the claim that the Afar used to inhabit these territories in the past.
Nevertheless, the issue of territory should not be considered by looking
at history, what should be considered rather is the status quo. The present
settlement patterns and also the fact that both the Afar and the Issa are
peoples of one country that inter-regional boundaries should not be a
barrier for the two communities from using the scarce natural resource
that are found in their localities (SNRS 2004b: 7).

The EPRDF government, which literally allowed the problem to

fester, only began to be seriously engaged in the Afar-Issa conflict after
the breakout of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998. Even then, its
main motive was to secure the country’s strategic link to the sea. As the
war made Ethiopia completely dependent on the port services of
Djibouti, where the Issa are dominant, the government was extremely
careful not to antagonise the Issa. Hence, the federal government shied
away from tackling the core problem of the conflict, territorial dispute
between the two groups.
Thus it initiated a dual approach consisting of the use of traditional
and governmental institutions of conflict management in 1998
(Michaelson 2000: 4). With respect to the use of traditional conflict
management instruments, the elders of the Afar and the Issa, at the
urging of the government agreed to adopt payment of blood money, 53
head of cattle for each inter-clan killing (Ibid).
The other aspect of conflict management constituted the
establishment of several ad-hoc governmental institutions (Ibid; SNRS
2004b: 11). First, the establishment of a purportedly neutral police force
excluding members of the two rival clans. This force, among other things
had a mandate to supervise the border areas where inter-clan conflicts are
recurrent. Second, a special court was established. The court was
responsible to try individuals for inter-ethnic (Afar-Issa) crimes such as
killings, livestock looting and raiding. Third, the government organised a
Joint Peace Committee (JPC) composed of officials of the two regions
both at local and regional levels (Michaelson 2000: 5; SNRS 2004b: 11).
The JPCs were composed of Afar and Somali officials and
 204 Chapter 8

representatives of the federal government, usually commanders of troops

deployed in the conflict zone.
This arrangement was somehow successful in freezing outbreaks of
inter-ethnic violence at least during the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000).
Through the arrangement, both the Afar and the Issa returned looted
animals and handed over individuals who were engaged in inter-ethnic
violence to the authorities. More importantly, members of the Afar and
the Issa clans began cultivating good relations.39 However, this brief
détente came to an abrupt end in 2002 with the killing of a prominent
Afar politician, Ninia Tahiro allegedly by Issa clansmen. After the killing,
many lives were lost because of inter-ethnic violence in Gewane,
Gedamaitu and Undofo. A few months later, another bloody conflict
occurred on the highway at Galgalu between the two groups when the
Afar region was constructing the capital of the Bure-Mudaytu woreda.
Thus, the conflict management mechanism instituted by the federal
government in a top-down fashion disintegrated after bringing stability
for only a few years. With the signing of a cease-fire between Ethiopia
and Eritrea in December 2000, the federal government also seemed less
enthusiastic about conflict management between the two rival groups.
The major limitation of the 1998 conflict management initiative by the
federal government was its heavy emphasis on temporary solutions and
the decision to place the issue of territory, which is at the heart of
problem on the back burner (Michaelson 2000: 11).
The federal government again showed interest in finding resolution
to boundary conflicts between the regions after it established MoFedA in
2001. In 2003, the MoFedA brought together the two regions and
persuaded them to sign the following commitments. First, to undertake
detailed studies on the disputed areas and present their recommendations
of how best the conflict between the two regions could be resolved.
Second, both parties reportedly agreed to resolve their territorial claims
through implementation of constitutional principles (referendum), if they
fail to resolve the conflicts through negotiation.40 The federal
government also instructed the two regions to make their detailed studies
free from ‘rent-seeking attitudes’ and to keep the results confidential
(SNRS and ANRS 2003: 19).
In response, both regions submitted their reports to MoFedA.
According to officials of the Afar region, since submitting their report in
November 2004, they have not received any reply from MoFedA. The
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 205

Afar report is still confidential and thus inaccessible to both researchers

and the public. However, I was fortunate to receive a briefing on the
report from Afar officials in Semera. According to the briefing, the
report documented the history of Issa expansion with maps and archives,
explaining how the Issa expansion linked with foreign interests, the
‘Greater Somalia’ agenda and alleged Djiboutian hidden aspiration for
territorial expansion.41 The Afar report reiterates the dominant Afar
narrative about their loss of territory due to Issa expansion. It also
underscores the impracticability of using a referendum to provide a just
and lasting solution. In contrast, the Somali region’s report, I gained
access, emphasises the need to resolve territorial questions based on facts
on the ground (that is, settlements on the contested territories) in order
to provide stability and the opportunity for those in the contested border
areas to decide freely and democratically which region they wish to join
(SNRS 2004b: 17).
Currently, there are no efforts by either the federal or the concerned
regional governments to provide a lasting solution to the problem. The
main interest of the federal government is still maintaining stability in this
strategically important part of the country. Thus, there is a strong
presence of federal police troops on the highway and in and around the
contested towns. However, there is no effective regional/federal
administration in the contested towns. Despite the two groups’ inability
to find resolution to the conflict, major skirmishes are avoided because
of the presence of federal security forces in the zone of conflict. There is,
however, tension and a minor incident involving Issa and Afar clansmen,
may trigger major violence.
The federal government seems faced with a critical dilemma about
the boundary conflict between the Afar and the Somali regions. The
immense polarity that exists, not only between the narratives of the two
groups about the root causes of the conflict, but also about the means to
resolve the conflict provides little room for the federal government to
manoeuvre a compromise. More importantly, the federal government
appears tied by the federal constitution and its own policy
pronouncements, which heavily emphasise the rights of people in the
contested territories to choose freely to which region they would like to
join through a plebiscite, if neighbouring regions fail to resolve territorial
disputes through negotiation (MoFedA 2003a: 4).
The principle that territorial disputes between ethnic regions should
be resolved based on existing population settlement patterns and the will
of the concerned communities, as expressed through a referendum is
 206 Chapter 8

important to stop recurrent historical claims and counter-claims on a

given territory. However, these principles have limitations where there is
active territorial expansion by one of the conflict parties. Holding a
referendum to decide the fate of contested territories in such a situation
could unwittingly benefit the ethnic group engaged in territorial
expansion. This explains the dilemma the federal government faces. If it
sanctions holding a referendum in such contested territories as Adaitu,
Undofo and Gedamaitu, the Afar would certainly consider the decision
biased and pro Issa/Somali. Similarly, if the federal government decides
to assign the contested territories based on the historical argument, the
Somali would certainly view such a decision as pro-Afar.
The attitudes of the two regions regarding the role of the federal
government also complicate the task of finding a solution to the conflict.
The dominant theme in the Afar discourse on the role of the Ethiopian
State in the Afar-Issa conflict, at least since the 1940s, is about its
impartiality and neglect. This means the Afar do not view the federal
government as a fair mediator as one Afar informant commented.

This government (EPRDF) like its predecessors is mainly motivated by

geopolitical calculations. It does not want to disappoint the Issa in Djibouti
who today control Ethiopia’s access to the sea. That is why it has decided
to follow a blind eye policy regarding the armed expansion of the Issa
within Ethiopia.42

Exasperated Afar officials seem to have lost hope of regaining their

lost territories and are now quietly demanding the delineation of
whatever boundary by the federal government and its protection in order
to forestall further Issa expansion.43 One of the experts within the Afar
Border Affairs Bureau says, ‘whatever the outcome we need a boundary
now. As We cannot live intermixed with the Issa and their expansion is
continuing. We need the federal government to draw a boundary and to
defend the integrity of our region.’44
In contrast, the Somali region advocates for the resolution of the
boundary conflict through a referendum and emphasises the need to
work out an arrangement that enables both the Afar and the Issa to use
the available scarce resources jointly – notably the Awash River (SNRS
2004b: 16).
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 207

8.5 Conclusion

The political, economic and security impacts of African state boundaries

have been examined by several scholars. However, there is little attention
paid to the impacts of intra-national political boundaries on inter-ethnic
relations and conflicts. This stems partly from the belief that intra-state
boundaries are just lines of geographic jurisdictions of administrative
units within a single country and hence do not have political significance
(Stewart 1990: 101). Such an approach, as demonstrated in this chapter,
does not grasp the situation where federal restructuring leads to an
ethnic federation (Ethiopia). In ethnic federations created through
devolution, unlike the older federations (e.g. Switzerland and the United
States) where the constituent members predate the federal union with
defined borders, making boundaries of the new sub-units is prone to
violent conflicts.
The federal restructuring of Ethiopia, as has been discussed in this
chapter, intertwined ethnicity, territory and boundary. There is a rigorous
ethnicisation of territory explained by the heavy emphasis put on
matching politico-administrative boundaries with ethnic boundaries. The
constitution and other legislations recognise this principle. However, the
process has been problematic and violent. As demonstrated in this
chapter, matching ethnic and intra-federal boundaries foment sub-state
nationalism (Mbembe 2000: 267). In fact, as noted by Alexander
Murphy, when ethnic regionalisation tends to make territories ‘spatial
surrogates of large-scale, potentially self-conscious cultural communities,
most territorial conflicts become community conflicts as well’ (1995: 93).
Murphy’s observation has some validity for Ethiopian ethnic federalism
where territorial/resource conflicts between neighbouring communities
become inter-ethnic and inter-regional conflicts. This has adverse
implications on the management of territorial conflicts.
The heavy emphasis on ethnicity as the key instrument for the
territorial organisation of the federation not only reinforces territorial
claims and counter-claims by rival/competing ethnic groups, but also
fails to appreciate the difficulty of putting all people/s of the country
into predefined ethnic categories. The culture of shifting ethnic identity
of the Gabbra and the Garre between the Oromo and the Somali is a
case in point. The new demand placed on these ethnic communities to
be either Oromo or Somali not only tears apart their communalities, but
also makes conflicts between them and their neighbours protracted.
 208 Chapter 8

The emergence of the ethnic regions with incipient nationalism has

so far complicated the task of finding an amicable solution to the
conflict. On the one hand, the process of creating intra-federal borders
gave opportunities for those groups who do have a history of territorial
expansion (e.g. Issa) to legitimise whatever territory they seized from
their neighbours. On the other hand, those ethnic communities who lost
(or are still losing) territory because of their neighbours armed expansion
seek boundary making to ensure the restoration of their lost territories.
This polarity in the expectations of the different actors makes the task of
boundary making not only contentious but conflict provoking.
The forthcoming chapter discusses how inter-regional boundary making
affects inter-ethnic relationships between the Benishangul-Gumuz region
and its Amhara and Oromo neighbours.

Notes
1 Afaan-Oromo means Oromo language.
2 The Afar are also known as ‘Adal’ and ‘Danakil.’ They, however, call

themselves Afar and their country Cafar-barrow, literally the Afar land.
(Getachew 2001a: 33).
3 The only major exception in this regard could be the Borana Oromo who

practice traditional religion.

4 This refers to the assimilation of some Somali and Oromo clans by their

neighbours through a long period of interaction. Because of the assimilation,

some of the concerned clans could adopt a new Oromo or Somali identity – or
maintain a dual identity of both the Somali and the Oromo. For instance, the
Garre clan in the Borana region uses the Oromo language, but due to its
Islamic religion and genealogy identifies itself with the Somali (Farah 1996:
124).
5 The Borana and Gabbra are in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. The

majority of them are found within Ethiopia. The Garre, on the other hand, are
found within Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. In terms of language, all of the
clans predominantly speak Afaan Oromo, while the Garre of central Somalia
speak a Garre dialect known as Garre Koffar (Belete 1999: 30).
6 The Afar, according to Wilfred Thesiger, are divided into two major groups,

the ‘Asaeimara and the Adaeimara and these in turn are divided into about six
great tribes, which again are indefinitely subdivided. Both sections are hostile to
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 209

each other, but sometimes temporarily united against their hereditary foes the
Itu and Kareyu [Oromo], the Issa Somali’ (1935: 2).
7 According to I.M. Lewis, ‘the Dir family, generally recognised as the oldest

Somali stock, have been greatly dispersed and so reduced that only three main
tribes survive. These are the Esa, Gadabursi and Bimal’ (1994: 25).
8 François Piguet for instance characterises the Issa as ‘…the real enemies of

the Afar. They challenge them more than any other surrounding ethnic group.
The Issa are well armed and rarely hide their intention of eventually gaining
access not only to the rangelands but also to the Awash riverbank and other
tributary rivers crossing the rangelands. Since the Issa are known for their illicit
trade (gun running and contraband merchandise) they consider the Addis
Ababa highway as vital to their strategic interest’ (2001: 9).
9 In this chapter, the Borana region refers to the area, which the Borana in the

past maintained their dominance extending ‘…roughly from the Chew Bahir in
the west to Dolo in the east and from Ageremariam in the north to Moyale in
the south (Belete 1999: 1).
10 The Borana are the only Oromo clan who maintained the traditional Oromo

administration system known as Gada. The Gada could be described as

egalitarian socio-political organisation based on age-groups (see Asmarom
1973).
11 Günther Schlee who studied the history of ethnic interaction in the Borana

region suggested that present day southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya
(Borana region) was, before the expansion and establishment of Borana
hegemony in the 16th century, populated by clans who had ‘Proto-Somali and
Rendille (PRS) identity.’ Though this identity changed due to the dominance of
the Borana, it was retained in camel-centred symbolic and ritual forms. (1989:
32-3)
12 Negga–Borana refers to the maintenance of peace within Borana and in Borana

relations with other clans through the observance of a communal moral order,
which is based on Borana adda seera (law and custom) (Obba 1996: 118-19). On
the other hand, Tiriso, which means ‘adoption,’ refers to the central instrument
that the Borana used to maintain patron-client relationships with subordinate
clans (Belete 1999; Getachew 1996; Schlee 1989). Even if tiriso relationship is an
outcome of the dominance of the Borana, it provided a framework for peace
and stability in the region (Schlee and Shongolo 1995: 14).
13 Personal Interview: Ex-police officer and presently an Oromia Kebele

Official, 15 March 2007.

14 Personal Interview: Long-time resident of Moyale and a trader from the Burji

ethnic group, 26 March 2007.

 210 Chapter 8

15 Personal Interview: Official of Moyale Oromia woreda council, 25 March

2007.
16 Simply stated, the EPRDF seemed to have cooperated well with such clans as

the Gabbra and the Garre at the same time alienating the Borana (Lister 2004:
24).
17 Special woreda refers to a district established to provide autonomy to minority

ethnic groups – who because of their small population size cannot have their
own woreda council.
18 Personal Interview: Official Moyale woreda (Oromia) official, Educational

Bureau, 22 March 2007.

19 Focus Group Discussion: Elders of the Gabbra Clan, Harro Beke Kebele,

Moyale woreda, 20 March 2007.

20 Personal Interview: Official, Borana Zone, Border’s Affair Bureau, Yabello,

20 March 2007.
21 Focus Group Discussion: Moyale (Somali) woreda cabinet members, 23 March

2007.
22 Focus Group Discussion: Gabbra elders, Moyale, 24 March 2007.

23 Personal Interview: Gabbra official, former member of the federal

parliament, Moyale, 27 March 2007.

24 Personal Interview: Acting Administrator, Borana zone, Yabello, 20 March

2007.
25 ‘Peace, Democracy and Development Conferences’ are usually organized by

agencies of the federal government such as the former Office for Regional
Affairs (ORA) at the Prime Minister’s Office and presently the Ministry of
Federal Affairs. Such conferences, though not formally constituted and used to
make decisions on controversial issues (For more discussion see chapter 10).
26 Joint Peace Committees are usually composed of officials of conflicting

administrative organs (usually at the woreda level) and representatives of the

army deployed in the affected areas.
27 Focus Group Discussion: Borana elders, Moyale, 24 March 2007.

28 Personal Interview: Official in Oromia Moyale woreda, 22 March 2007.

29 Focus Group Discussion: Moyale (Somali) woreda cabinet members, 23 March

2007.
30 Personal Interview: Expert, Afar region, Borders’ Affairs Bureau, Semera, 29

June 2007.
 Inter-regional Conflicts: Somali Region 211

31 The Allighedi plain is a key wet season grazing plain and is ‘…used by all
clans with less marked boundary. Although Allighedi plain is the most common
destination because of its rich resources, it has always been an area of
contention among the Afar, Issa (Somali), and Ittu Oromos.’ (Ame 2004: 13)
32 These conflicts include the 1977-78 Ethio-Somalia war (inter-state) and

several intra-state conflicts within Ethiopia between the central government

and rebel forces ranging from the Eritrean war of secession to the insurgency
of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).
33 According to one Afar informant, ‘Since the independence of Somalia in

1960 and its declaration of the Greater Somalia Outlook, the Afar-Issa conflict
became part and parcel of Ethio-Somalia territorial conflict. Ethiopian
governments, however, for a long time consider the conflict as a tribal conflict
over water and pasture.’ Personal Interview: Expert, Afar region, Borders’
Affairs Bureau, Semera, 29 June 2007.
34 Personal Interview, Former Afar government official, Semera, 30 June 2007.

35 Ethio-Eritrea security coordination and united position against ARDUF

severed abruptly due to their 1998-2000 full-scale war. When the two countries
began to implement a proxy warfare strategy using each other’s rebel
movements, the Ethiopian government provided support to ARDUF, albeit
briefly (Abbink 2003: 415). Presently the activity of ARDUF is limited as the
majority of its leaders including Mohammuda Ga’as agreed to deal with the
Ethiopian government, which led to their appointment at regional and federal
levels. In contrast, the Eritrean government is presently supporting one faction
of ARDUF. This faction made it to the headlines of international news in 2007
when it abducted western diplomats and their Ethiopian aides in the Afar
country near the Eritrean border. Eventually, all of the hostages were freed.
These geopolitical maneuvers in several ways bolstered the position of the Issa
in their conflict with the Afar.
36 Personal Interview: Deputy president of the Afar region, Semera, 29 June

2007.
37 The Issa are the second largest Somali clan within the Somali region. During

the period 2003-2005, Issa clansmen Abdi Jibril and Mohamoud Drir
respectively served as president of the Somali region and head of the EPRDF
affiliated Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP).
38 Personal Interview: High Afar regional official, Semera, 29 June 2007.

39 Focus Group Discussion: Afar elders, Gewane Town, 30 June 2007.

40 However, it is doubtful that the Afar regional officials would agree to hold a

referendum, as they would certainly lose the contested localities because of the
extreme Issa majority and Afar minority.
 212 Chapter 8

41 Personal Interview: High Afar regional official, Semera, 29 June 2007.

42 Personal Interview: Former Afar official, Semera, 30 June 2007.
43 Personal Interview: Expert, Afar region, Borders’ Affairs Bureau, Semera, 29

June 2007.
44 Personal Interview: High Afar regional official, Afar region, Semera, 26 June

2007.