Credit Risk Management 3 PDF Free
Credit Risk Management 3 PDF Free
PROJECT REPORT
ON
CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT OF BANKS
Submitted by:
ManasKaushik
Roll no.04316608909
MBA(B&I)
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CERTIFICATE
supervision.
The work has not been submitted elsewhere for award of any degree/diploma.
Faculty Guide:
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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Preface
Decision making is a fundamental part of the research process. Decisions regarding that what
you want to do, how you want to do, what tools and techniques must be used for the
maker that makes project fruitful for those who concern to the area of study.
Basically when we are playing with computer in every part of life, I used it in my project not
for the ease of my but for the ease of result explanation to those who will read this project.
The project presents that how risk is managed in the banks,specialy the credit risk and what
I had toiled to achieve the goals desired. Being a neophyte in this highly competitive
world of business, I had come across several difficulties to make the objectives a reality. I
am presenting this hand carved efforts in black and white. If anywhere something is
found not in tandem to the theme then you are welcome with your valuable suggestions.
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INDEX
1. Introduction
3. Banks Covered
ICICI
HDFC
Standard Chartered
Union bank
4. Basel 2 norms
6. Research Methodology
8. Conclusion
9. Refrence
10. Questionnaire
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INTRODUCTION
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Credit Risk
Credit risk is most simply defined as the potential that a bank
borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in
accordance with agreed terms.
The goal of credit risk management is to maximise a bank’s risk-
adjusted rate of return by maintaining credit risk exposure within
acceptable parameters.
Banks need to manage the credit risk inherent in the entire portfolio
as well as the risk in individual credits or transactions. Banks should
also consider the relationships between credit risk and other risks. The
effective management of credit risk is a critical component of a
comprehensive approach to risk management and essential to the
long-term success of any banking organisation.
For most banks, loans are the largest and most obvious source of
credit risk; however, other sources of credit risk exist throughout the
activities of a bank, including in the banking book and in the trading
book, and both on and off the balance sheet.
Since exposure to credit risk continues to be the leading source of
problems in banksworld-wide, banks and their supervisors should be
able to draw useful lessons from past experiences. Banks should now
have a keen awareness of the need to identify, measure, monitor and
control credit risk as well as to determine that they hold adequate
capital against these risks and that they are adequately compensated
for risks incurred.
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A comprehensive credit risk management program should address
these four areas. These practices should also be applied in conjunction
with sound practices related to the assessment of asset quality, the
adequacy of provisions and reserves and the disclosure of credit risk.
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PRINCIPLES OF CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT
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B. Operating under a sound credit granting process
Principle 4:
Banks must operate under sound, well-defined credit-granting
criteria.These criteria should include a thorough understanding of the
borrower or counterparty, as well as the purpose and structure of the
credit, and its source of repayment.
Principle 5:
Banks should establish overall credit limits at the level of individual
borrowers and counterparties, and groups of connected counterparties
that aggregate in a comparable and meaningful manner different types
of exposures, both in the banking and trading book and on and off the
balance sheet
Principle 6:
Banks should have a clearly-established process in place for
approving new credits as well as the extension of existing credits.
Principle 7:
All extensions of credit must be made on an arm’s-length basis. In
particular, credits to related companies and individuals must be
monitored with particular care and other appropriate steps taken to
control or mitigate the risks of connected lending.
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C. Maintaining an appropriate credit administration, measurement and
monitoring process.
Principle 8:
Banks should have in place a system for the ongoing administration of
their various credit risk-bearing portfolios.
Principle 9:
Banks must have in place a system for monitoring the condition of
individual credits, including determining the adequacy of provisions
and reserves.
Principle 10: Banks should develop and utilise internal risk rating
systems in managing credit risk. The rating system should be
consistent with the nature, size and complexity of a bank’s activities.
Principle 11:
Banks must have information systems and analytical techniques that
enable management to measure the credit risk inherent in all on- and
off-balance sheet activities. The management information system
should provide adequate information on the composition of the credit
portfolio, including identification of any concentrations of risk.
Principle 12:
Banks must have in place a system for monitoring the overall
composition and quality of the credit portfolio.
Principle 13:
Banks should take into consideration potential future changes in
economic conditions when assessing individual credits and their
credit portfolios, and should assess their credit risk exposures under
stressful conditions.
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D. Ensuring adequate controls over credit risk
Principle 14:
Banks should establish a system of independent, ongoing credit
review and the results of such reviews should be communicated
directly to the board of directors and senior management.
Principle 15:
Banks must ensure that the credit-granting function is being properly
managed and that credit exposures are within levels consistent with
prudential standards and internal limits. Banks should establish and
enforce internal controls and other practices to ensure that exceptions
to policies, procedures and limits are reported in a timely manner to
the appropriate level of management.
Principle 16:
Banks must have a system in place for managing problem credits and
various other workout situations.
E. The role of supervisors
Principle 17:
Supervisors should require that banks have an effective system in
place to identify, measure, monitor and control credit risk as part of
an overall approach to risk management.Supervisors should conduct
an independent evaluation of a bank’s strategies, policies, practices
and procedures related to the granting of credit and the ongoing
management of the portfolio. Supervisors should consider setting
prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to single borrowers or
groups of connected counterparties.
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ICICI Bank
ICICI Bank has a central Risk, Compliance and Audit Group with a
mandate to identify, assess, monitor and manage all of ICICI Bank’s
principal risks in accordance with well-defined policies and
procedures. The Head of the Risk, Compliance and Audit Group
reports to the Executive Director responsible for the Corporate
Center, which does not include any business groups, and is thus
independent from ICICI Bank’s business units. The Risk, Compliance
and Audit Group coordinate with representatives of the business units
to implement ICICI Bank’s risk methodologies.
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The Asset Liability Management Committee of ICICI Bank’s board
of directors is responsible for managing the balance sheet and
reviewing the asset-liability position to manage ICICI Bank’s market
risk exposure. The Agriculture & Small Enterprises Business
Committee of ICICI Bank’s board of directors, which was constituted
in June 2003 but has not held any meetings to date, will, in addition to
reviewing ICICI Bank’s strategy for small enterprises and agri-
business, also review the quality of the agricultural lending and small
enterprises finance credit portfolio.
As shown in the following chart, the Risk, Compliance and Audit
Group is organized into six subgroups:
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RISK MANAGEMENT GROUPS AND SUBGROUPS OF ICICI BANK
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Risk Management and SME lending of ICICI Bank
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Managing Risk with the GIS system (For the purpose of Insurance)
This helped the company get a clearer picture of the levels of risks
associated not just with financial information, but also with natural
risk-prone geographies. It allowed the company to understand its
customers better and make strategies according to the more accurate
levels of perception offered by the solution.
The RMS helps to zoom into spatial level risk data representing real-
world entities including both geo-referenced and quantitative
attributes attached to it at a national scale. This application helps to
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manage risks in a better way, and operate more efficiently by
geographically assessing and analysing information about
underwriting, risk management, and customer service.
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HDFC BANK
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Risk Management through ALM technique
There are three different but related ways of managing financial risks.
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Asset-liability analysis is a flexible methodology that allows the bank
to test interrelationships between a wide variety of risk factors
including market risks, liquidity risks, actuarial risks, management
decisions, uncertain product cycles, etc. However, it has the
shortcoming of being highly subjective. It is up to the bank to decide
what mix would be suitable to it in a given scenario. Therefore,
successful implementation of the risk management process in banks
would require strong commitment on the part of the senior
management to integrate basic operations and strategic decision
making with risk management.
The scope of ALM function can be described as follows:
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Standard Chartered Bank
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Why Qualys?
Accuracy
Scalability
The stakes are very high indeed. With our many large and complex
interconnections to the outside world, it's vital to carry out effective
patch management. Our aim is to achieve the right level of security
through implementing an appropriate risk-based strategy. This cannot
be achieved without a clear and accurate understanding of what needs
patching and ensuring that it remains reliably patched. We use
QualysGuard as a dynamic tool to underpin this process
The aim is to achieve the right level of security on our global
networks. This means a clear and accurate understanding of what
needs patching and ensuring that it remains reliably patched. We rely
upon QualysGuard to underpin this process.
Being able to report on remediation and response plans has also
helped us meet strict financial compliance requirements. QualysGuard
reports give me and my security team an instant overview of the
overall level of health of security in my organisation.
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Standard Chartered's Need for Vulnerability Management
Security monitoring in an environment like Standard Chartered's
requires the capability to cover diverse IT platforms - including both
Windows and Linux - and many applications and services. Its goal
was to consolidate these ad-hoc efforts into one cohesive, global
process with clear visibility, follow through and accountability.
Before the introduction of enterprise vulnerability management,
Standard Chartered's network topology and system configurations
were unknown. Local operating teams performed only occasional
scanning with various tools. Spot audits were made through
penetration- testing and there was no rigorous methodology to assess
exposure and take corrective action.
The bank evaluated four alternatives including tools from Foundscan,
ISS, Vigilante and X-Force but eventually, it selected QualysGuard
on six clear criteria:
Scanning accuracy, deployability, scalability, ease-of-use, integration
capabilities and overall cost effectiveness.
"It was the only solution which met our demands without
compromise, giving the bank a reliable, centralised method for
protecting our critical assets worldwide. Their experience of rolling
out QualysGuard has been remarkably painless. Working with our
integration team in both London and Singapore, the service has been
consistently high.
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The role of Vulnerability Management at Standard Chartered
By introducing vulnerability management, Standard Chartered gained
a clear picture of the exposure with common standards worldwide.
The company has been able to quickly prioritise remediation; get
security and operating teams to work together smoothly and
effectively and empowered outsourcing vendors to meet specific
security service level agreements.
Many major viruses have the ability to recur and creep insidiously
back into the network causing considerable problems; another reason
why on-going scanning is important.
Although Standard Chartered Bank was not hit the first time round by
SQL Slammer, it did manage to infect the network a number of
months later due to difficulties in restoring patched server builds after
operational problems. Our IDS engines and QualysGuard enabled the
Bank to pinpoint rapidly the source of the problem and close it down,
avoiding major infection.
Reports Help to Improve Risk Management and to Address
Regulatory Requirements
QualysGuard's easily accessible reports provide a clear audit trail for
fixing vulnerabilities. Delivered on a monthly basis to the bank's
operational risk committee, they have enabled Standard Chartered to
improve its risk management methodology and address regulatory
requirements that impact financial institutions.
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These reports help the security group support the front-line production
operations team more effectively to patch and maintain the security of
the whole network. They allow centralised management by checking
the patch management performance, tracking patching actions to
completion and distributing tasks to the relevant geographic support
group.
Regulatory pressures and increased exposure are driving more
complex requirements for managing security risk. The vulnerability
management strategy gained the bank ability to view and act upon
security risk as it pertains to our organisation's assets.
The reports also enable management to justify the investments we
need and further define the security strategy. Today, the bank really
can deploy our security manpower much more effectively in both
preparing and responding to security incidents.
Standard Chartered Bank, an international bank that provides interest
rate derivatives products for corporate customers globally, is
expanding its Sun Microsystems technology infrastructure in four
offices worldwide as it implements a more sophisticated, object-
oriented global derivatives trading system.
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State Bank of India
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The Risk Management unit is a separate division within the
organization headed by the Chief Risk Officer (CRO). A Risk
Management Committee, comprising the MD, Deputy CEO, CRO,
COO, CIO and the CMO meets on a regular basis to manage risk
within the organization.
The CRO is responsible for risk management over all the functions
within the organization including Investments, Marketing, Operations,
etc. Currently, the CRO is an experienced investment professional and
is assisted by a two-member team, one being an investment
Professional with an MBA in Finance and the other being an
investment professional deputed from SGAM.
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Union Bank
Loan Policy
Recovery Policy
Treasury Policy
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The Policies and procedures for Market Risks are articulated in the
ALM Policy and Treasury Policy.
Outsourcing Policy
Disclosure Policy
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Credit Risk
The Credit rating system of the Bank has eight borrower grades
for standard accounts and three grades for defaulted borrowers.
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Basel-ll
The New Basel Capital Accord, also known as Basel II, is one of the
banking industry's top priorities. Basel II is the basis for the minimum
capital requirements for banks and was created in response to the
tremendous growth in international financial markets that has
occurred over the past few years.
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In redefining how banks worldwide calculate regulatory capital and
report compliance to regulators and the public, the Basel ll Accord is
intended to enhance safety and soundness in the financial system by
placing greater emphasis on banks’ own internal control and risk
management processes and models, the supervisory review process,
and market discipline.
Basel ll’s risk focus provides banks and financial practitioners with
new impetus to concentrate on comprehensive risk management.
While the 1988 Capital Accord addressed market and credit risks,
Basel ll substantially changes the treatment of credit risk and also
requires that banks have adequate capital to cover operational risks. It
calls for ongoing improvements in risk assessment and mitigation.
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It is widely accepted that the new Accord’s risk management
requirements are likely to prompt significant changes in the core
business of an individual bank as well as in its organisational
structure. Under Basel ll, the ‘outputs’ of better management of credit
and operational risk will result from the ‘inputs’ of a macroeconomic
capital model by which banks can allocate capital to various functions
and transactions depending on risk.
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The supervisory organizations have agreed that Basel I, with its
broad-brush system for setting the risk weights on various classes of
bank assets, is increasingly inadequate for measuring risk and the
appropriate level of capital for such firms.
The U.S. banking agencies have proposed the adoption of the Basel II
accord because it links the risk-taking of large banking organizations
to their regulatory capital in a more meaningful way than does Basel I
and encourages further progress in risk management. It does this by
building on the risk-measurement and risk-management practices of
the most sophisticated banking organizations and providing incentives
for further improvements.
The pillar 1 treatment of credit risk also reflects more accurately the
risk-reducing effects of guarantees, credit derivatives, and
securitization, thus improving regulatory capital incentives for banks
to hedge credit risks. The incorporation of operational risk in pillar 1
is based on the recognition that, indeed, operational failures are a
potentially important risk that banks should seek to minimize.
These include liquidity risk, interest rate risk, and concentration risk,
none of which are reflected in pillar 1. Currently, U.S. banking
regulators assess a bank's overall capital adequacy as a normal part of
the examination process. But the overall quality of assessments of
capital adequacy, both by supervisor and by each bank, should
improve greatly under Basel II because of the expanded information
that will be available from pillar 1, from supervisory reviews under
pillar 2, and from the bank's own analyses.
Under pillar 3, banks will be required to disclose to the public the new
risk-based capital ratios and more-extensive information about the
credit quality of their portfolios and their practices in measuring and
managing risk. Such disclosures should make banks more transparent
to financial markets and thereby improve market discipline.
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Taken together, these three pillars provide a broad and coherent
framework for linking regulatory capital to risk, for improving
internal risk measurement and management, and for enhancing
supervisory and market discipline at large, complex, internationally
active banks. The three pillars build on the risk-management
approaches of well-managed banks and better align regulatory and
supervisory practices with the way the best-run banks are actually
managed.
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Pillar 1: Calculation of minimum capital requirements
Transitional arrangements
For banks using the IRB approach for credit risk or the Advanced
Measurement Approaches (AMA) for operational risk, there will be a
capital floor following implementation of this framework. If the floor
amount is larger, banks are required to add 12.5 times the difference
to risk-weighted assets.
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The capital floor is based on application of the 1988 Accord. It is
derived by applying an adjustment factor to the following amount:
i. 8% of the risk-weighted assets
ii. plus Tier 1 and Tier 2 deductions.
iii. less the amount of general provisions that may be
recognised in Tier 2.
The adjustment factor for banks using the foundation IRB approach
for the year beginning year-end 2006 is 95%. The adjustment factor
for banks using
(i) either the foundation and/or advanced IRB approaches, and/or
(ii) the AMA for the year beginning year-end 2007 is 90%, and for
the year beginning year-end 2008 is 80%. The following table
illustrates the application of the adjustment factors.
In the years in which the floor applies, banks must also calculate
Plus other Tier 1 and Tier 2 deductions. Where a bank uses the
standardized approach to credit risk for any portion of its
exposures, it also needs to exclude general provisions that may
be recognised in Tier 2 for that portion from the amount
calculated according to the first sentence of this paragraph.
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Should problems emerge during this period, the Committee will seek
to take appropriate measures to address them, and, in particular, will
be prepared to keep the floors in place beyond 2009 if necessary. The
Committee believes it is appropriate for supervisors to apply
prudential floors to banks that adopt the IRB approach for credit risk
and/or the AMA for operational risk following year-end 2008.
For banks that do not complete the transition to these approaches in
the years specified in paragraph 46, the Committee believes it is
appropriate for supervisors to continue to apply prudential floors –
similar to those of paragraph 46 – to provide time to ensure that
individual bank implementations of the advanced approaches are
sound.
However, the Committee recognises that floors based on the 1988
Accord will become increasingly impractical to implement over time
and therefore believes that supervisors should have the flexibility to
develop appropriate bank-by-bank floors that are consistent with the
principles outlined in this paragraph, subject to full disclosure of the
nature of the floors adopted. Such floors may be based on the
approach the bank was using before adoption of the IRB approach
and/or AMA.
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The Second Pillar – Supervisory Review Process
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Accordingly, supervisors may wish to adopt an approach to focus
more intensely on those banks with risk profiles or operational
experience that warrants such attention. The Committee recognises
the relationship that exists between the amount of capital held by the
bank against its risks and the strength and effectiveness of the bank’s
risk management and internal control processes. However, increased
capital should not be viewed as the only option for addressing
increased risks confronting the bank.
Other means for addressing risk, such as strengthening risk
management, applying internal limits, strengthening the level of
provisions and reserves, and improving internal controls, must also be
considered. Furthermore, capital should not be regarded as a
substitute for addressing fundamentally inadequate control or risk
management processes. There are three main areas that might be
particularly suited to treatment under
Pillar 2: risks considered under Pillar 1 that are not fully captured by
the Pillar 1 process (e.g. credit concentration risk); those factors not
taken into account by the Pillar 1 process (e.g. interest rate risk in the
banking book, business and strategic risk); and factors external to the
bank (e.g. business cycle effects). A further important aspect of Pillar
2 is the assessment of compliance with the minimum standards and
disclosure requirements of the more advanced methods in Pillar 1, in
particular the IRB framework for credit risk and the Advanced
Measurement Approaches for operational risk. Supervisors must
ensure that these requirements are being met, both as qualifying
criteria and on a continuing basis.
Four key principles of supervisory review
The Committee has identified four key principles of supervisory
review, which complement those outlined in the extensive supervisory
guidance that has been developed by the Committee, the keystone of
which is the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and
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the Core Principles Methodology.A list of the specific guidance
relating to the management of banking risks is provided at the end of
this Part of the Framework.
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1.Board and senior management oversight
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2. Sound capital assessment
Fundamental elements of sound capital assessment include:
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and measurement of risk from all credit exposures, and should be
integrated into an institution’s overall analysis of credit risk and
capital adequacy. The ratings system should provide detailed ratings
for all assets, not only for criticised or problem assets. Loan loss
reserves should be included in the credit risk assessment for capital
adequacy.
The analysis of credit risk should adequately identify any weaknesses
at the portfolio level, including any concentrations of risk. It should
also adequately take into consideration the risks involved in managing
credit concentrations and other portfolio issues through such
mechanisms as securitisation programmes and complex credit
derivatives. Further, the analysis of counterparty credit risk should
include consideration of public evaluation of the supervisor’s
compliance with the Core Principles for Effective Banking
Operational risk: The Committee believes that similar rigour should
be applied to the management of operational risk, as is done for the
management of other significant banking risks. The failure to properly
manage operational risk can result in a misstatement of an
institution’s risk/return profile and expose the institution to significant
losses.
A bank should develop a framework for managing operational risk
and evaluate the adequacy of capital given this framework. The
framework should cover the bank’s appetite and tolerance for
operational risk, as specified through the policies for managing this
risk, including the extent and manner in which operational risk is
transferred outside the bank. It should also include policies outlining
the bank’s approach to identifying, assessing, monitoring and
controlling/mitigating the risk.
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Market risk: This assessment is based largely on the bank’s own
measure of valueat- risk or the standardised approach for market
risk.112 Emphasis should also be placed on the institution performing
stress testing in evaluating the adequacy of capital to support the
trading function.
Interest rate risk in the banking book: The measurement process
should include all material interest rate positions of the bank and
consider all relevant repricing and maturity data. Such information
will generally include current balance and contractual rate of interest
associated with the instruments and portfolios, principal payments,
interest reset dates, maturities, the rate index used for repricing, and
contractual interest rate ceilings or floors for adjustable-rate items.
The system should also have well-documented assumptions and
techniques.
Regardless of the type and level of complexity of the measurement
system used, bank management should ensure the adequacy and
completeness of the system. Because the quality and reliability of the
measurement system is largely dependent on the quality of the data
and various assumptions used in the model, management should give
particular attention to these items.
Liquidity risk: Liquidity is crucial to the ongoing viability of any
banking
organisation. Banks’ capital positions can have an effect on their
ability to obtain liquidity, especially in a crisis. Each bank must have
adequate systems for measuring, monitoring and controlling liquidity
risk. Banks should evaluate the adequacy of capital given their own
liquidity profile and the liquidity of the markets in which they
operate.
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Other risks: Although the Committee recognises that ‘other’ risks,
such as reputational and strategic risk, are not easily measurable, it
expects industry to further develop techniques for managing all
aspects of these risks.
4. Monitoring and reporting
The bank should establish an adequate system for monitoring and
reporting risk exposures and assessing how the bank’s changing risk
profile affects the need for capital. The bank’s senior management or
board of directors should, on a regular basis, receive reports on the
bank’s risk profile and capital needs. These reports should allow
senior management to:
Evaluate the level and trend of material risks and their effect on
capital levels;
Evaluate the sensitivity and reasonableness of key assumptions
used in the capital assessment measurement system;
Determine that the bank holds sufficient capital against the
various risks and is in
compliance with established capital adequacy goals; and
Assess its future capital requirements based on the bank’s
reported risk profile and
Make necessary adjustments to the bank’s strategic plan
accordingly.
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5. Internal control review
The bank’s internal control structure is essential to the capital
assessment process. Effective control of the capital assessment
process includes an independent review and, where appropriate, the
involvement of internal or external audits. The bank’s board of
directors has a responsibility to ensure that management establishes a
system for assessing the various risks, develops a system to relate risk
to the bank’s capital level, and establishes a method for monitoring
compliance with internal policies. The board should regularly verify
whether its system of internal controls is adequate to ensure well-
ordered and prudent conduct of business.
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process to assess capital adequacy. The emphasis of the review should
be on the quality of the bank’s risk management and controls and
should not result in supervisors functioning as bank management. The
periodic review can involve some combination of:
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2. Assessment of capital adequacy
Supervisors should review the bank’s processes to determine that:
Supervisors should also consider the extent to which the bank has
provided for unexpected events in setting its capital levels. This
analysis should cover a wide range of external conditions and
scenarios, and the sophistication of techniques and stress tests
usedshouldbe commensurate with the bank’s activities.
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4.Supervisory review of compliance with minimum standards
In order for certain internal methodologies, credit risk mitigation
techniques and asset securitisations to be recognised for regulatory
capital purposes, banks will need to meet a number of requirements,
including risk management standards and disclosures. In particular,
banks will be required to disclose features of their internal
methodologies used in calculating minimum capital requirements. As
part of the supervisory review process, supervisors must ensure that
these conditions are being met on an ongoing basis.
The Committee regards this review of minimum standards and
qualifying criteria as an integral part of the supervisory review
process under Principle. In setting the minimum criteria the
Committee has considered current industry practice and so anticipates
that these minimum standards will provide supervisors with a useful
set of benchmarks that are aligned with bank management
expectations for effective risk management and capital allocation.
There is also an important role for supervisory review of compliance
with certain conditions and requirements set for standardised
approaches.
In this context, there will be a particular need to ensure that use of
various instruments that can reduce Pillar 1 capital requirements are
utilised and understood as part of a sound, tested, and properly
documented risk management process.
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5. Supervisory response
Having carried out the review process described above, supervisors
should take appropriate action if they are not satisfied with the results
of the bank’s own risk assessment and capital allocation. Supervisors
should consider a range of actions, such as those set out under
Principles 3 and 4 below.
Principle 3: Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the
minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to
require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum.
Pillar 1 capital requirements will include a buffer for uncertainties
surrounding the Pillar 1 regime that affect the banking population as a
whole. Bank-specific uncertainties will be treated under Pillar 2. It is
anticipated that such buffers under Pillar 1 will be set to provide
reasonable assurance that a bank with good internal systems and
controls, a well-diversified risk profile and a business profile well
covered by the Pillar 1 regime, and which operates with capital equal
to Pillar 1 requirements, will meet the minimum goals for soundness
embodied in Pillar 1. However, supervisors will need to consider
whether the particular features of the markets for which they are
responsible are adequately covered. Supervisors will typically require
(or encourage) banks to operate with a buffer, over and above the
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Pillar 1 standard. Banks should maintain this buffer for a combination
of the following:
(a) Pillar 1 minimums are anticipated to be set to achieve a level of
bank creditworthiness in markets that is below the level of
creditworthiness sought by many banks for their own reasons. For
example, most international banks appear to prefer to be highly rated
by internationally recognised rating agencies. Thus, banks are likely
to choose to operate above Pillar 1 minimums for competitive
reasons.
(b) In the normal course of business, the type and volume of activities
will change, as will the different risk exposures, causing fluctuations
in the overall capital ratio.
(c) It may be costly for banks to raise additional capital, especially if
this needs to be done quickly or at a time when market conditions are
unfavourable.
(d) For banks to fall below minimum regulatory capital requirements
is a serious matter. It may place banks in breach of the relevant law
and/or prompt non-discretionary corrective action on the part of
supervisors.
(e) There may be risks, either specific to individual banks, or more
generally to an economy at large, that are not taken into account in
Pillar 1.
There are several means available to supervisors for ensuring that
individual banks are operating with adequate levels of capital. Among
other methods, the supervisor may set trigger and target capital ratios
or define categories above minimum ratios (e.g. well capitalised and
adequately capitalised) for identifying the capitalisation level of the
bank.
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Principle 4: Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to
prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels required to
support the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should require
rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored.
Supervisors should consider a range of options if they become
concerned that a bank is not meeting the requirements embodied in
the supervisory principles outlined above. These actions may include
intensifying the monitoring of the bank, restricting the payment of
dividends, requiring the bank to prepare and implement a satisfactory
capital adequacy restoration plan, and requiring the bank to raise
additional capital immediately. Supervisors should have the discretion
to use the tools best suited to the circumstances of the bank and its
operating environment.
The permanent solution to banks’ difficulties is not always increased
capital.
However, some of the required measures (such as improving systems
and controls) may take a period of time to implement. Therefore,
increased capital might be used as an interim measure while
permanent measures to improve the bank’s position are being put in
place. Once these permanent measures have been put in place and
have been seen by supervisors to be effective, the interim increase in
capital requirements can be removed.
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The Third Pillar – Market Discipline
A.Disclosure requirements
The Committee believes that the rationale for Pillar 3 is sufficiently
strong to warrant the introduction of disclosure requirements for
banks using the Framework. Supervisors have an array of measures
that they can use to require banks to make such disclosures. Some of
these disclosures will be qualifying criteria for the use of particular
methodologies or the recognition of particular instruments and
transactions.
B. Guiding principles
The purpose of Pillar 3 ─ market discipline is to complement the
minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review
process (Pillar 2). The Committee aims to encourage market
discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements which will
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allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the
scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment
processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution. The
Committee believes that such disclosures have particular relevance
under the
Framework, where reliance on internal methodologies gives banks
more discretion in assessing capital requirements.
In principle, banks’ disclosures should be consistent with how senior
management and the board of directors access and manage the risks of
the bank. Under Pillar 1, banks use specified
approaches/methodologies for measuring the various risks they face
and the resulting capital requirements. The Committee believes that
providing disclosures that are based on this common framework is an
effective means of informing the market about a bank’s exposure to
those risks and provides a consistent and understandable disclosure
framework that enhances comparability.
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Preparing for Basel 3
Limitations of Basel 2
Leverage Ratio
Importance of Leverage,
Leverage and Impact on Bonuses,
Concealed Leverage,
Basel 3 approach
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Types of Capital
Marking to market
Initial, Maintenance and Variation Margin
Market Credit and Operational Risks associated with Complex
Products
Accounting for OTC v Exchange Traded products
Impact of Moving to Central Clearing House
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International Financial Reporting Standards
Development of Market
Marking to market products
Hedge vs. Trade Accounting
Use of the OCI/STRGL accounts
Criticisms of Basel 3
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
63
DRAWBACKS:
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ANALYSIS
There are seven forces of continuity and seven forces of change that effect the
banking industry and hence effect their risk management process. The degree to
which they affect each bank and each operative line of the bank is different. They are
listed as follows:
1. Globalization
2. New Opportunities
3. Competition
4. Customer Needs
5. Technologies
7. Government Policies
1. Customer Base
2. Infrastructure
3. Technologies
4. Core Competencies
6. Culture
7. Performance
The effect of these forces on the risk management of each of these five banks will be
analyzed with the through expert opinion of bank managers which will be obtained
with the help of a questionnaire.
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The first continuity factor, namely, the customer base of a bank has components
inherent such as current market share of key offerings, revenue growth rate,
customer retention rate, etc. All other factors of continuity and change have various
factors inherent in them which have been discussed individually with bank
managers.
An Expert Opinion Survey was conducted in various banks across various branches
of Delhi. The subjective opinion of managers with their consent and advice was
converted to numbers to create the change and continuity grid.
The cumulative average of the questionnaires was taken out to give two scores, i.e.,
one each of the Factors of Change and the other of the Factors of Continuity. These
scores are listed as under:
ICICI 83 102
HDFC 61 78
STANDARD 79 88
CHARTERED
UNION BANK 30 58
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FINDINGS
In addition to finding out and studying the risk management techniques of various
banks another objective was to create the Change and Continuity Grid for which the
questionnaire was conducted. This grid has been constructed as under with the help
of some simple calculations.
The scores in the above table are to be converted to Change Scores and
Continuity Scores respectively. The former can be obtained by dividing the above
scores by 21 and the latter by 29
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CONCLUSION
The evolution of risk management as a discipline has thus been driven by
market forces on the one hand and developments in banking supervision on the
other, each side operating with the other in complementary and mutually
reinforcing ways. Banks and other market participants have made many of the
key innovations in risk measurement and risk management, but supervisors
have often helped to adapt and disseminate best practices to a broader array of
financial institutions. And at times, supervisors have taken the lead, for
example, by identifying emerging issues through examinations and comparisons
of peer institutions or by establishing guidelines that codify evolving practices.
The interaction between the private and public sectors in the development of
risk-management techniques has been particularly extensive in the field of bank
capital regulation, especially for the banking organizations that are the largest,
most complex, and most internationally active.
The current system of bank capital standards is the so-called Basel I framework,
which was established internationally in 1988. Basel I was an important
advance that resulted in higher capital levels, a more equitable international
marketplace and--most relevant to my theme this evening--closer links between
banks' capital holdings and the risks they take.
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REFERENCES
www.channeltimes.com
www.techtree.com
http://www.hdfc.com/cg_risk_mgmt.asp
http://www.hdfcbank.com/aboutus/careers/default.htm
http://www.neuralt.com/article34.html
http://www.equitymaster.com/DETAIL.ASP?story=5&date=11/30/2001
http://myiris.com/shares/company/reportShow.php?url=AMServer%2F2000%2F10%
2FSTABANIA_20001030.htm
http://www.indiainfoline.com/company/innernews.asp?storyId=51863&lmn=4
69
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
a Customer Base
b Infrastructure
b.1 Fixed assets & other facilities of organisation Negligible Highly Capital
Intensive
b.2 Number of company owned service outlets None Higher than average
c Technology
d Core Competence
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e.5 Inventory costs in % revenues None >20% of revenues
f Culture
g Performance
a Globalization
b New opportunities
c Competition
c.3 Vertical integration potential of your industry Nil Almost all players
players have VI
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c.4 Entry barriers for global players Domestic industry Nil
totally protected
d Customer needs
e Industry technology
f.2 Mergers and acquisitions in your Almost none Affecting more than
industry(domestic) 50%of the industry
f.3 Mergers and acquisitions in your Almost none Affecting more than
industry(global) 50%of the industry
g.4 Govt support for your promotion of your Nil Significant govt
industry support
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