Complex Systems Design & Management: Gauthier Fanmuy Eric Goubault Daniel Krob François Stephan
Complex Systems Design & Management: Gauthier Fanmuy Eric Goubault Daniel Krob François Stephan
Complex Systems Design & Management: Gauthier Fanmuy Eric Goubault Daniel Krob François Stephan
Complex
Systems
Design
& Management
Proceedings
of the Seventh International Conference
on Complex Systems Design
& Management,
csd&m Paris 2016
123
Complex Systems Design & Management
Gauthier Fanmuy ⋅ Eric Goubault
Daniel Krob ⋅ François Stephan
Editors
123
Editors
Gauthier Fanmuy Daniel Krob
Dassault Systèmes CESAMES
Vélizy-Villacoublay Paris
France France
Introduction
v
vi Preface
To make the CSD&M conference this convergence point of the academic and
industrial communities in complex industrial systems, we based our organization on
a principle of complete parity between academics and industrialists (see the con-
ference organization sections in the next pages). This principle was first imple-
mented as follows:
• the program committee is composed of 50 % academics and 50 % industrialists,
• the invited speakers came in a balanced way from numerous professional
environments.
The set of activities of the conference followed the same principle. They indeed
consist of a mixture of research seminars and experience sharing, academic articles
and industrial presentations, software and training offers presentations, etc. The
conference topics cover in the same way the most recent trends in the emerging
field of complex systems sciences and practices from an industrial and academic
perspective, including the main industrial domains (aeronautic & aerospace,
transportation & systems, defense & security, electronics & robotics, energy &
environment, healthcare & welfare services, media & communications, software &
e-services), scientific and technical topics (systems fundamentals, systems archi-
tecture & engineering, systems metrics & quality, systemic tools) and system types
(transportation systems, embedded systems, software & information systems, sys-
tems of systems, artificial ecosystems).
Preface vii
The CSD&M Paris 2016 edition received 46 submitted papers, out of which the
program committee selected 16 regular papers to be published in the conference
proceedings. A 29 % acceptance ratio was reached which guarantees the high
quality of the presentations. The program committee also selected 17 papers for a
collective presentation during the poster workshop of the conference.
Each submission was assigned to at least two program committee members, who
carefully reviewed the papers, in many cases with the help of external referees.
These reviews were discussed by the program committee during an online meeting
by the May 30, 2016 and via the EasyChair conference management system.
We also chose nine outstanding speakers with various industrial and scientific
expertise who gave a series of invited talks covering all the spectrum of the con-
ference during the two days of CSD&M Paris 2016. The conference was organized
around a common topic: Challenges & Opportunities of Systems Engineering in a
Changing World. Each day proposed mix invited keynote speakers presentations
and a “la carte” program comprising accepted papers presentations and conference
partners’ workshops.
Furthermore, we had a poster workshop, for encouraging presentation and dis-
cussion on interesting but “not-yet-polished” ideas. CSD&M Paris 2016 also
offered booths and presentations to provide each participant a good vision of the
latest engineering and technological news.
Conference Chairs
General Chair
Daniel Krob, Incose Fellow, CESAMES and Ecole Polytechnique, France
Program Committee
Academic Members
Co-Chair
Eric Goubault, Ecole Polytechnique, France
Members
Aleida Aleti, Monash University, Australia
Eric Bonjour, ENSGSI, France
Thao Dang, Verimag, France
Mike Hinchey, University of Limerick, Ireland
Daisuke Ishii, Fukui University, Japan
ix
x Conference Organization
Industrial Members
Co-Chair
Gauthier Fanmuy, Dassault Systemes, France
Members
Sylvain Chabroux, LGM, France
Alain Dauron, Renault, France
Jeremy Dick, SyntheSys, UK
Jean-Paul Fardel, Airbus, France
Ali Koudri, IRT SystemX, France
Pascal Lamothe, PSA, France
Nicolas Gueit, Snecma, France
Garry Roedler, LMCO, France
Sven-Olaf Schulze, Unity AG, Germany
Lucio Tirone, Aster S.p.A., Italy
Organizing Committee
Chair
François Stephan, IRT SystemX, France
Members
Emmanuel Arbaretier, Airbus, France
Philippe Bourguignon, Engie, France
Alain Carof, DCNS, France
Etienne De Pommery, IRT SystemX, France
Johan D’Hose, Systematic Paris Region, France
Eric Duceau, Airbus, France
Brigitte Dueme, INRIA, France
Didier Dumur, Centralesupelec, France
Pascal Foix, Thales, France
Bruno Foyer, IRT SystemX, France
Vincent Gauthier, Telecom ParisTech, France
Conference Organization xi
Invited Speakers
We would like to thank all members of the program and organizing Committees for
their time, effort, and contributions to make CSD&M Paris 2016 a top-quality
conference. Special thanks addressed to the CESAMES non-profit organization
team which managed permanently with huge efficiency all the administration,
logistics and communication of the CSD&M Paris 2016 conference (see http://
www.cesames.net/).
The organizers of the conference are also greatly grateful to the following
sponsors and partners without whom the CSD&M Paris 2016 event would not exist:
• Founding Partners
– CESAMES—Center of Excellence on Systems Architecture, Management,
Economy and Strategy,
– Ecole Polytechnique—ENSTA ParisTech—Télécom ParisTech—Dassault
Aviation—DCNS—DGA—Thales “Engineering of Complex Systems”
Chair.
• Academic Sponsors
– Ecole Polytechnique,
– CentraleSupélec,
– ENSTA ParisTech,
– Télécom ParisTech.
• Industrial and Institutional Sponsors
– Airbus Apsys,
– Dassault Aviation,
– DCNS,
– Digiteo labs,
– Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA),
– Institut de Recherche Technologique IRT SystemX,
– MEGA International,
xiii
xiv Acknowledgements
– PPI,
– Thales.
• Supporting Partners
– Association Française d’Ingénierie Système (AFIS),
– International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE).
• Participating Partners
– Anylogic,
– CCES—MIT,
– IBM Analytics,
– No Magic Europe,
– Obeo,
– PragmaDev,
– The CoSMo Company.
Contents
xv
xvi Contents
Part II Posters
System Engineering Education for Confirmed Engineers:
The FAIS Case Study—A 6 Years Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Omar Hammami
1 Introduction
Railway signalling systems have been developed for more than 150 years to ensure
the safe movement of trains [1, 2], offering the following basic functionalities:
(a) Provide a safe running path for each train in the railway network, avoiding
collisions between different trains.
(b) Ensure that the train speed does not exceed a specific speed limit and espe-
cially that a train comes to stop in front of a signal at danger. This functionality
avoids derailments due to excessive speed as well as collisions due to signals
passed at danger.
In the past, separate systems have been developed for these basic functions: For
providing a safe running path the so-called “interlocking” was invented. In the last
150 years the realizing technology has evolved from mechanical via electrical to
software based systems, but the basic signalling and interlocking principles have
remained the same.
Systems that control the correct movement of a train are called train control
systems. Accidents, where trains wrongly passed a signal showing a danger aspect,
have led to country dependent control systems that warn the train driver or auto-
matically stop the train in such a situation. A unique European solution, the
European Train Control System ETCS [3] has been developed over the last
20 years.
This historical evolution leads to a complex legacy environment for any new
railway signalling application. New applications and systems have to be compatible
with the installed base of signalling systems. Typical examples are:
• New computer based interlocking systems have to provide interfaces to a
neighbouring railway station equipped with a mechanical interlocking built in
1900.
• New ETCS systems need to be combined with existing relay interlocking sys-
tems built in the 1950s.
Beside these legacy problems a manufacturer is confronted with two other
issues: On the one hand all legacy or new interfaces differ from country to country.
Even if they are generally standardized (e.g. ETCS) the required functionality is
different for each country. So systems need to be adapted for every railway
infrastructure company. On the other hand, systems grow more and more together.
In the past interlocking train control systems were operated by different staff and
have been loosely coupled. To save expenses by reducing the number of staff,
systems get more and more coupled to automate and integrate operation.
Challenges for MBSE and PLE … 5
Confronted with the diversity in the landscape of legacy systems described above,
Thales selected in the past classical system engineering to manage the complexity of
the systems. This chapter describes these approaches and the resulting consequences.
Fig. 1 Refinement of
requirements
detailed and interpreted before they can be processed further. Concerning the
legacy systems to be interfaced both variants exists: Some customers describe
them in detail, while others may only provide a single requirement that a
specific legacy system needs to be adapted.
(b) The refinement process is not only a requirements management process but
also becomes an architectural process. Requirements are allocated to subsys-
tems as functions and interfaces between the subsystems are defined, which
are typically architectural tasks and not requirements management tasks
(shown in orange in Fig. 1).
(c) Because the system requirements form the interface towards the customer,
every detail that needs to be discussed with the customer is contained in the
system requirements specification. This leads to an explosion of the number of
requirements objects. The following list shows some examples:
• North-South Railway Saudi-Arabia: 2,730 valid requirements
• Danish re-signalling Programme: 5,600 valid requirements
It is obvious that this number can only be handled by persons that are deeply
involved in a project. For newcomers these documents are nearly unreadable.
(d) Every system requirements specification is customer specific. A product line
management approach was not applied, because each project organisation
used to run requirement engineering to issue their perception of what the
system of interest should do in support of the expected operational capabilities
of the single customer. This approach hinders reuse: the same requirements
could be interpreted differently, the same property can be described by dif-
ferent requirements sets. Functionality existing in different variants is not easy
transferable, because already the system requirements specifications differ in
form and content. This is a major problem concerning the legacy environment:
A legacy interface realized for specific customer could not be easily trans-
ferred to a different customer, not to mention the case that this interface needs
to be adapted.
Several approaches have been implemented to overcome this situation. One
promising approach was to use Use-Cases in a textual form instead of classical
Challenges for MBSE and PLE … 7
(b) UML and SysML are languages for modelling, they provide many different
views, but they do not provide a methodology that helps system architects to
know what to model in a diagram. This led even more so than in the area of
requirements management to the problem that models and diagrams differ
from project to project.
(c) The project-centric view results often in the case that legacy systems, even if
they contribute largely to the system functionality, have been modelled only as
external actors. This results in the problem that the next project, which needs
this functionality (e.g. in a new implementation) could not reuse the model.
Classical System Engineering helped Thales to develop and deliver new railway
signalling systems also in large and complex legacy environments. But it demon-
strates also the limits of this methodology:
Handling of requirements specifications and system models becomes complex
and heterogeneous. Legacy systems could be integrated, but the whole approach
shows no concept for reusability.
4 Future Work
In order to identify errors in the manual Fault Tree analysis a fault tree is also
automatically derived from the model and the result with the minimal cut sets can
be used for the verification of the manual creation of the Fault Tree. On the basis of
the derived fault tree structure and the specified failure rates in the model hazard
rates can be calculated automatically.
For that purpose relevant parts of the Capella model are transformed into a
formal framework, which is manually supplemented to a complete formal model by
specifying the comprehensive internal behaviour of components in a formal
language.
This formal model can then be also used for formal verification of safety
requirements by model checking. Different model checking techniques shall be
combined so that the most effective technique for the respective model structure can
be chosen. In this way the correctness of the system definition in relation to the
safety requirements can be shown.
As a consequence it is ensured that the safety case has the same basis as the
system definition used in system engineering.