Notes - Estafa 315 1b
Notes - Estafa 315 1b
Notes - Estafa 315 1b
WILMA T. BARRAMEDA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and LOLITA WATANABE, respondents.
Accused-petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa through misappropriation or conversion as
defined in and penalized under paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code 8. The elements of the said
crime are: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission of for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or
to return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender 9.
On this point, we find no error in the conclusion of the trial court that accused-petitioner indeed received
the amount of US$1,400.00 and 400,000 yen from the private complainant for delivery to the latter's
mother, Papiniana Paguinto. In arriving at this conclusion, the trial court took into account the testimony of
private complainant herself who positively declared that the amount was actually given to and received by
accused-petitioner.
In sum, the prosecution has conclusively shown that accused-petitioner received money equivalent to
P50,000.00 from private complainant Lolita Paguinto Watanabe, in trust and under the obligation to
deliver the same to her mother, Papiniana Paguinto. The accused denied having received the said
amount, which denial has been proven to be false. The denial made by accused-petitioner was to the
prejudice of the private-complainant and her mother. Finally, demand was made for the return of the
money from accused-petitioner which she failed to do.
Under these circumstances, accused-petitioner is clearly guilty of the crime of estafa through
misappropriation or conversion as penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(B) of the Revised Penal
Code which states as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
The
It is to be emphasized that in accordance with the receipt for the jewelry, the authenticity of which is
not questioned, the accused received the jewelry to sell on commission or to return on demand to
Hodges. Further, we should emphasize that notwithstanding the plain meaning of this document,
Panes repeatedly failed to return the jewelry on demand, and apparently construing the document
for his own purposes, after the passage of a long interval of time, sold the jewelry to another on
credit. It would seem that, soon after the first demand for the return of the jewelry was made and no
attention was paid to the same, the accused must be held to have converted the property to his own
use, and consequently was liable before the law. To appropriate to one's own use includes not only
conversion to one's personal advantage but every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without right. (See 9 R. C. L., pp. 1275, 1276.) The fact that, on threat of criminal prosecution, Panes
actually did make restitution to Hodges and the latter proclaimed himself satisfied, only affects the
penal aspect of the case as to the right of the offended party to indemnification.