Paper no. 1223 17. 01.

2005

INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES 2005: A Perspective Analysis

by Dr. Subhash Kapila 

Introductory Observations:

India’s foreign policies, fortunately, have enjoyed bipartisan political support

domestically, markedly from the 1990s onwards. The year 2004 witnessed a change of
political complexion of the Government in India raising uncertainties in international
quarters that under a Congress-led Government foreign policies may revert back to the
Nehruvian mould. Initial pronouncements by the new Government and especially its new
foreign minister created some confusion. However, international realities and global
security environment soon forced the new Government to prudently stick to the earlier
general direction. 

 India’s foreign policies first significant change in direction, attendant with change in
India’s economic policies took place under the stewardship of a Congress Prime Minister
from South India and not belonging to the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, namely Prime Minister
Narasimha Rao, who recently passed away. He was the initiator of India’s ‘New Look’
foreign policies. 

Foreign policies of any nation do not function in a vacuum. They are a product of the
prevailing international environment and the country’s indices in terms of its geo-strategic
location, economic health, military strength and domestic stability. Hence PM Narasimha
Rao’s ‘New Look’ foreign policies arose from the prevailing international environment at
the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and its global
countervailing power and the need for India to detach its foreign policies from domestic
minority vote bank considerations and also to focus on neglected regions. Hence the thrust
for a strategic partnership with Israel in West Asia and the ‘Look East” foreign policy. So
also was the quest for a substantive relationship with the United States. This was not to the
liking of many of the Congress Party hierarchy.

The latter half of the 1990s till 2004 witnessed a BJP Government in power. Its tenure
coincided with the post-Cold War era, the major rise of United States unilateralism and the
new American policies of pre-emption and military intervention in global affairs without
restraint. The Vajpayee Government of the BJP continued with the overall general
direction of foreign policies of the Narasimha Rao Government.  However greater
intensity was accorded to the build-up of US-India strategic cooperation, normalising and
enlarging cooperation with China, besides Vajapayee’s personal commitment to bring a
military adventurist and terrorism proxy-war nation like Pakistan to the dialogue table. 

India’s Foreign Policies-Imperatives for a Change of Direction/Nuances:

Constancy of operational factors/considerations are not the hallmark of the international

situation. It is a rapidly changing world, where increasingly the global security
environment undergoes changes rapidly and new equations are struck and new doctrines
postulated by United States unilateralism, at times in immoral contradiction of its
established and declaratory policies e.g. Compromising on counter-terrorism against
Islamic Jehad and condoning Pakistan's WMD proliferation. 

While the turn of the millennium augured well for the general direction of Indian foreign
policies under two separate political dispensations with an over-emphasis on a US-India
strategic partnership, the last few years of the 21st Century indicated otherwise. 

The last few  years of the 21st Century in terms of international/political developments
impacting on India’s foreign policies presents the following broad picture:

 United States with its tactical obsession with Pakistan has placed the
emerging USA-India strategic partnership on the back-burner. India is no
longer a priority for USA.
 Russia at long last has realized that it is no longer a “natural ally of the
West”. The post-Cold War knee-jerk reaction of forging a strategic alliance
with China has not brought the desired fruits. Russia may look for
resurgence on its own strengths.
 China despite a phenomenal rise in trade with India and a flurry of visits by
senior Chinese leaders to India has yet to give up its strategic nexus with
Pakistan. China continues with the military build-up of Pakistan and
establishing the infrastructure of a Chinese military presence in Pakistan.
 The Indian sub-continent or so called South Asia , presents a dismal
security environment. Pakistan strategically buoyed by American political,
economic and military aid continues with its illusions of strategic parity
with India and has not displayed any indicators of political maturity or
conflict resolution. Turmoil and conflict continues in Nepal and Sri Lanka.
Bangladesh under the present political dispensation is anti-Indian and
emerging as an alternative base for Pakistan’s proxy war against India.

The indicators above present significant challenges for India’s foreign policies in 2005 as
they generate imperatives calling for a change in direction/nuances of India’s existing
foreign policies thrusts. The thrust of this paper is to present a perspective analysis of
India’s foreign policy challenges for 2005. 

United States-India Relations Under Challenge of Continued Engagement: 

The turn of the millennium effervescence in United States-India relations has evaporated
and so also the prospects of a meaningful strategic partnership emerging in the future. This
is the stark reality in 2005 notwithstanding the rhetoric emerging in Washington and New
Delhi. 

This situation is not of India’s making. This situation has been generated by United States
and an avoidable one at that strategically. The United States had a choice to make and that
was whether the emerging United States-India strategic partnership could be jettisoned in
favour of enlisting the dubious services of Pakistan to further American strategic
expediency with relation to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. The United States chose the
latter. To add insult to injury, the United States has moved further ahead with weapon-
systems and military equipment aid in an effort to placate Pakistan’s military rulers call
for conventional parity with India. Pakistan was also surreptiously designated as a Major
Non-NATO ally without taking India into confidence.

In Indian perceptions the above has seriously eroded United States credibility  in terms of
its declared policies, intentions and deviations from the two foregoing. It is galling for
Indians to see the American President extolling the Pakistani military dictator as a valiant
fighter against terrorism and a steadfast ally. Indians have not forgotten General
Musharraf’s role as the architect of the Kargil War (1999), the proxy war by the Pakistani
Army in Jammu and Kashmir and the American condonation of Musharraf’s WMD
proliferation. 

American policy makers are likely to dismiss the above as Indian whining. They forget
that all of the above has:

 Endangered and ruled out a United States-India strategic partnership.

 Will force India to look for alternatives to preserve its national security
interests.
 Likely to make India resist US pressures against development of her ICBM
and SLBM arsenal.

India’s major foreign policy challenge in 2005 would be how to walk the tight-rope in
keeping alive India’s engagement with the United States and not let them go on the glide-
path towards estrangement. The responsibility on India is heavy as the United States is not
likely to make India’s task any easier with their narcissistic obsession with Pakistan. On
the contrary, the United States may exert avoidable pressure on India on the Kashmir issue
to placate the Pakistani military dictator. India would need strong political will to ward off
such pressures.

For more on this, readers may refer to this author's paper: “United States-India Relations
on Glide Path Towards Estrangement?” (SAAG Paper No.1183 dated 10-12-2004). 

Russia-India Relations Present Hope of Re-kindling of Strategic Partnership:

Russia no longer presents the strategically dismal picture as it did in 1991 or in 1996. It
may be economically down, but not down and out. The Russian Federation has reasonably
weathered its national crises one after the other. Its strategic assets are intact and it cannot
be ignored in any global strategic calculus. Within Russia, the Atlanticists with their
slogan of “Russia as the natural ally of the West” have lost the debate and Russian foreign
policy is veering towards its traditional focus. 

In terms of India’s foreign policy formulations, Russia presents the following

perspectives:

 Russia has had a history of strategic relationship with India.

 India’s armed forces have a 60-75% dependence on Russian military
inventories.
 Russia seems to intend to re-kindle a strategic partnership with India as
evident from President Putin's recent visit to India.
  Russia could emerge as a major source of energy security for India.

If the above factors were not enough the recent American policies of being insensitive to
India’s national security interests (Pakistan-specific) is likely to prompt India too in re-
kindling its strategic partnership with Russia. 

This issue stands elaborated in this author's paper entitled: “Russia Re-kindles Strategic
Partnership With India” (SAAG Paper No.1180 dated 07-12-2004). 

The challenge of re-kindling Russia-India strategic partnership should be pursued

forcefully by Indian foreign policy planners in 2005. 

India’s Challenge in Relations With China-Enlargement With Vigilance:

China’s policies towards India changed significantly after India’s nuclear weapons tests in
1998. China after its initial hysterical reactions on India’s nuclear weaponisation settled
down to accept the new strategic reality on its Southern frontiers. 

China’s new approaches towards India manifested itself in the following ways:

 China ensuring peace and tranquility on the Sino-Indian frontiers.

 China-India economic cooperation and two way trade registering a
phenomenal growth which is likely to tough  US $10 billion.
 Increased China-India military-to-military contacts.

All of the above augurs well for Sino-Indian relations, but at the same time Indian cannot
ignore the following Chinese moves:

 China’s slow movement on the boundary dispute dialogue.

 China’s continued military build-up of Pakistan.
 China’s strategic military cooperation in South Asia with Pakistan and
Bangladesh, both adversarial with India.
 China’s development of naval infrastructure on India’s flanks-Gwadur
(Pakistan) and Chittagong (Bangladesh).

China therefore prevents a significant foreign policy challenge to India in 2005. India’s
foreign policy planners need to aim at:

 Enlargement of Sino-Indian relations.

 Attempt dilution of Sino-Pakistan strategic nexus by imaginative
diplomatic maneuvers.
 Emphasising the strategic realties on China of the choices of cooperating
with a rising major power like India as opposed to building up a regional
spoiler state in the form of a pygmy  state like Pakistan.

Concurrent with India’s attempts to enlarge and enhance its relationship with China, India
needs its utmost to exercise vigilance and detailed scrutiny of China’s  strategic moves in
South Asia, till such time China shows definite signals of change of priorities in its South
Asian policies. 

India and the European Community and the Potential for Multi-polarity:

The European Community with specific reference to France and Germany offers the
potential for working towards a more multi-polar world. The European Community with
the rising value of the “Euro” and its attraction as an alternative to the US dollar in terms
of global nesting of financial reserves and trading leads to the prospects of the emergence
of an alternative “Euro Trading Area” to the Dollar. 

The rising economic strength of the Euro coupled with the political independence of
countries like France and Germany offers an attractive foreign policy challenge to India.
India also enjoys the luxury of being a lucrative market for European defence equipment
sales. A selective use of this option by India could help Indian foreign policy planners to
elicit favourable political responses for India’s national security and economic interests. 

India and West Asia-Strategic Interests Should Outweigh Political Platitudes:

India’s new Congress government under the influence of its constituent partners of the
coalition like the Communists and the Muslim League besides the Nehruvians in the
Cabinet have tried to veer India’s foreign policy in West Asia towards platitudinous
approaches on the Palestine issue and opposed to Israel. This has caused concern within
the Israeli government. 

India’s national security interests are best served by its intensifying the strategic
cooperation with Israel followed by the Narasimha Rao Government and the Vajpayee
Government. 

The challenge in 2005 for India’s foreign policy on West Asia are going to be:

 Re-assure Israel that India values its existing strategic cooperation with it
and would like to it to be made more substantive.
 India would politically support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
Israel.
 Emphasise to Israel that it must invest in a continued Israel-India strategic
partnership.
 Emphasise to Israel that the above should  not become a hostage to the
tenor of US-India relations.

For greater elaboration of this subject, see this author’s paper: “Israel-India Strategic
Cooperation And Prime Minister Sharon’s Visit: The Added Dimensions “(SAAG Paper
No. 777 dt 02-09-03)”.

 India’s foreign policy planners for West Asia have a bigger challenge in keeping alive its
good relations with Iran in the face of stiff opposition from the United States. The United
States till such time it militarily intervenes in Iran (prevented by its military overstretch)
has embarked on international isolation of Iran. India should not be a part of any such
effort. 

Both India and Iran must continue to pursue vigorously the thrust enshrined in the Teheran
Declaration and the Delhi Declaration. 

For different reasons, Israel and Iran assist India’s natural security interests and these two
should be the focus of India’s foreign policy in 2005. 

South East Asia- The Need for Two-Tier Diplomatic Engagement: India’s “Look
East” policy devised by late Narshimha Rao has borne fruit in the last decade and a half.
India today enjoys good relations with all the countries in the region. India has good
interface with ASEAN in various capacities as well as setting up regional economic and
development groupings like BIMSTECH and Mekong Ganga Project.

While these over arching efforts need to be reinforced and pursued vigorously,
relationships with all the countries cannot be pursued with the same intensity. 

India’s foreign policy challenge in 2005 would be to fashion a two-tier diplomatic

engagement with the region. Tier 1 countries should be those with which India has more
substantive political, economic and military links. These include Vietnam, Thailand and
Singapore. Tier II countries should incorporate the remainder of the region. Vietnam has
strategic convergences with India and has extended strategic cooperation all along. India
needs to build further  and enlarge on this base its ties with Vietnam.

East Asia and South Pacific Challenges

The challenge here is that the major countries located in this region i.e. Japan, South
Korea and Australia are strong United States allies linked to USA with substantive
defence ties. Hence their attitudes towards India will be determined by existing USA
attitudes towards India. 

However of late it seems that Japan while attaching value to the Japan-US security
linkages is embarking on a more independent political course. Under the Vajpayee Govt.
high-level exchanges have taken place from both sides. India and Japan have also agreed
to work together for demanding a UN Security Council Permanent Membership with full
veto powers. 

Japan has revived interest in significant investments in India’s infrastructure and enough
convergences exist in the strategic area also. 

India’s foreign policy challenge in 2005 should be to vigorously pursue Japan towards a
strategic partnership with India.

South Asia Foreign Policies Should Ignore Pakistan and Dwell on the Rest of the
SAARC Countries:

In the last five years, India’s foreign policies in South Asia, under American prodding or
pressure has led to the following:

        Legitimising Pakistan’s military dictatorship by inviting Musharraf  for the

Agra summit.

        Equating Pakistan with India by engaging in unconditional talks with a

terrorist and proxy war state and an implacable foe of India.

        Seeking peace with a country whose very existence which has been framed
by the Pakistan Army and its Generals as a “Warrior State” not amenable to
peace in South Asia.

        Misreading Pakistani masses yearning for peace with India as the political
aspiration of the Pakistani military dictatorship.  

India should long ago have dispensed with its Pakistan-centric South Asian foreign
policies. It is high time that India’s foreign policy planners ignore Pakistan totally from
their strategic calculus for South Asia. India should concentrate in a focused manner to
improve and enhance its relationships with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the
Maldives. The political stability of these countries is more critical for a South Asian stable
security environment than pandering to an inflated egoist state like the militarized
Pakistan. 

India if it has to exercise political magnanimity in South Asia, it should be towards these
countries and not Pakistan as American interlocutors suggest. 

Pakistan even under a combination of a rabid Mullah-cum-Pakistan Army dictatorship

cannot pose more military threats to India than it has done so far. 

Pakistan should be left in the American lap, a situation relished by both. Let USA take
care of Pakistan’s stability and India should concentrate on the rest of South Asia. 

Concluding Observations:

The old adage in foreign affairs stipulates that a nation does not have permanent friends or
foes; only its national interests are permanent. India’s foreign policy challenges for 2005
arise squarely from this precept. 

In terms of the above, the prevailing global security environment, the existing global
power structure and the United States redefinition of its South Asian priorities suggest:

 India’s proximate relations with the United States,  and particularly the
strategic partnership which it so assiduously pursued in the last decade, no
longer serve India’s national security interests.
 Russia and India which veered off their quarter of a century old strategic
partnership (USA as a causative factor due to political and economic
inducements to both separately) have enough convergence of interests to
re-kindle their strategic partnership.
  China, for whatever reasons has invested heavily in an enlarged economic
relationship with India. It needs to further invest in an enhanced political
relationship with India by divesting its South Asian policies of its Pakistan
strategic nexus policy priorities. Pakistan is squarely in America’s lap as a
major non-NATO ally. One of the underlying aims of NATO is the
containment of China. China needs to take notice of Pakistan's new anti-
China status.

India’s foreign policy challenges in 2005 therefore lie in going in for course-corrections of
the overall foreign policy directions followed by the Narshimha Rao Govt and the
Vajpayee Government. 

India’s quest for strategic partnerships lie elsewhere than the United States and it is this
challenge which India’s foreign policy planners must face in 2005 and craft policies which
while keeping USA engaged politically, look elsewhere for countervailing power, counter-
pressure points and multi-polarity.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic
Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila @yahoo.com)

 
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