The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child

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Internalization: Process or Fantasy?

Roy Schafer

To cite this article: Roy Schafer (1972) Internalization: Process or Fantasy?, The Psychoanalytic
Study of the Child, 27:1, 411-436, DOI: 10.1080/00797308.1972.11822723

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 Internalization:
Process or Fantasy?
ROY SCHAFER, PH.D.

WHEN, SPEAKING AS PSYCHOANALYSTS, WE USE THE TERM "INCORPORA-

tion," we refer to a fantasy (ordinarily an unconscious fantasy) of
taking part or all of a person, creature, or other substance into
one's own body. When we use the term internalization) we refer
not to a fantasy but to a psychological process, and we are saying
that a shift of event, action, or situation in an inward direction or
to an inner locale has occurred. For example, a child imposes on
himself prohibitions hitherto imposed on him by his parents: we
think then of internality or inside-ness as having more or less re-
placed externality or outside-ness.
If, however, we ask, "Inside what?" we can provide no satisfac-
tory answer. We do not mean inside the body or organism. Nor do
University Health Services, Yale University. This work has been supported by the
Old Dominion Fund and the Foundation for Research in Psychoanalysis.

(41 I)
(412) ROY SCHAFER

we mean inside the brain, though we know the brain to be the

necessary organ for all mental processes. Many of us would say we
mean inside the mind or mental apparatus, or, more narrowly, in-
side the ego; in this usage, we are regarding mind, mental ap-
paratus, and ego as places or locales. And yet this is not how we
think of these terms when we define them formally. In our formal
definitions we recognize them to be not places at all but concepts
devised for descriptive and theoretical purposes; they refer to
classes of events. (I shall return to this point.) At the same time,
however, many analysts would be loath to agree that when they
speak of internalization they intend merely to include an event
within a class; they would feel that something essential in the way
of empirical reference had been lost. And so they might then turn
to the empirical-sounding "inside the self" as a way out of this
difficulty. But "the self" refers only to mental content; in Freudian
theory, at any rate, it is a descriptive or phenomenological concept
and as such it cannot encompass the regulatory structures, func-
tions, and relationships that are prime referents of the concept of
internalization (Hartmann, 1939; Loewald, 1960, 1962; Schafer,
1968b). "Inside the self" proves to be no more than a bloodless
statement of an incorporation fantasy!
It does not help matters to claim, finally, that the idea of the
inside is a metaphor, and then to go on to claim that, since science
or at least the science of psychoanalysis is necessarily metaphoric,
the metaphor of the inside is legitimate and useful. Not only is this
set of claims mostly false or in any case not demonstrably true;
it also neglects to show that the metaphor of the inside is needed,
is the best one for the purpose, and is being used in a proper and
consistent fashion. For instance, as 1 have just indicated, this meta-
phor cannot be satisfacror ily completed; we cannot specify in a
systematically useful way what anything mental is inside of. That
Freud used spatial analogies to help formulate his theoretical
propositions carries no weight at all in this connection, for prepara-
tory phases of thought and visual aids to explanation are not theory
proper.
1 Kohut (1971) has failed to provide a theoretical basis for his mixed structural.
functional and phenomenological usc of self concepts, and so has not helped resolve
the difficulty with which we aloe here concerned (Schafer, 1973) .
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (413)

As the notion of internality thus occupies an important but

puzzling position in psychoanalytic inquiry, I shall devote this es-
say to an examination of the salient features of the language of in-
ternalization. First, I shall survey the internalization words we
use." In this connection I shall also have something to say about
structure words, for these presuppose the legitimacy of internaliza-
tion words and so both imply them and seem to contribute to their
legitimacy. To round off this part of the argument I shall propose
alternative conceptualizations of the ideas in question. Second, I
shall discuss two topics-introjects and affects-with respect to
which both psychoanalytic observation and conceptualization have
followed common usage on internalization and in doing so have
suffered significantly. Third, I shall discuss a number of reasons
for the prevalence of internalization concepts in our everyday lan-
guage and, through that language, in our psychological theory.
Fourth and last, I shall offer some suggestions concerning the fram-
ing of interpretations; these suggestions follow from my conceptual
analysis, and in my view they should serve to increase the clarity
of analytic interventions and thereby to facilitate the orderly and
effective development of the traditional psychoanalytic process.

Internalization Words
Setting aside incorporation, which we know we use to refer to fan-
tasy only, the chief internalization words are internalization, in-
ternal, inner world, intrapsychic, introjection, introject, and less
clearly, identification (both the process and the end result of that
process) .3 I shall begin by concentrating on internalization itself.
I said before that by internalization we do not mean inside the
body or organism. On this point I might be charged with neglect-
ing Hartmann's (1939) discussion of the topic in which he empha-
sized the progressive interiorization of reaction and regulation as
2 As it is a necessary extension of my argument to survey externalization words, but
as I also wish not to add to the complexity of my exposition, I shall merely mention
in footnotes some parallel considerations concerning externalization. I see no great
problems in transposing this conceptual analysis of internalization to the conceptual
analysis of externalization.
3 The chief externalization words are externalisation, external, external world
or external reality, projection, reprojection, and interpersonal.
(414) ROY SCHAFER

the phylogenetic scale (and, by implication, the ontogenetic scale)

is ascended. He said:

In phylogenesis, evolution leads to an increased independence

of the organism from its environment, so that reactions which
originally occurred in relation to the external world are in-
creasingly displaced into the interior of the organism. The
development of thinking, of the superego, of the mastery of
internal danger before it becomes external, and so forth, are
examples of this process of internalization [po 40].
[He also said:] In the course of evolution, described here as
a process of progressive "internalization," there arises a central
regulating factor, usually called "the inner world" which is in-
terpolated between the receptors and the effectors [po 57].
[And he said this, in a discussion of thinking:] It appears
that in higher organisms, trial activity is increasingly displaced
into the interior of the organism, and no longer appears in the
form of motor action directed toward the external world
[po 59£.].

So far as the term internalization is concerned, Hartmann en-

gaged in a certain amount of begging the question in these (and
other such) formulations. He spoke of what is "central," "inner,"
and "between" as if these words were factual referents of and justi-
fications for a concept like internalization. And yet "central" makes
sense only as conceptually central and strategically central; "in-
ner" makes sense only as a synonym for mental or psychological;
and "between" refers to the increasing size and complexity of the
central nervous system-the system which, though it does lie ana-
tomically between receptors and effectors, has no bearing on the
question of a spatial location for mental processes. The terms of
brain theory cannot be the terms of psychological theory. Only by
contaminating the location of the brain with the location of ideas
can one create this misunderstanding. The contamination of the
two ideas is evident in the notion that thinking is trial activity
which has been displaced spatially into the "interior of the or-
ganism." The correct way to put it is that thinking is activity of a
different kind rather than in a different place.
Thus, even as a biological, evolutionary conception, internaliza-
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (415)

tion is faulty. It expresses an illogical leap. The leap is from greater

organismic complexity, especially of the central nervous system,
and increasing organismic independence from environmental stim-
ulation to some vague attribution of location to thought and sub-
jective experience in general.
Conceptual difficulties are even greater when we turn from phy-
logenesis to ontogenesis. In this regard there is not even a funda-
mental change in physical makeup to point to, however errone-
ously, as the spatial referent of internalization. The unreflective
subject may ascribe internality to his own thinking on the basis
of all kinds of "physical" fantasies about mental processes. (Freud
noted this factor particularly in his paper on negation [1925],
where he described the subjective link between early thinking
and oral activity.) The subject may also ascribe internality to the
thinking of others, not only for this reason but also because he is
likely to infer illogically and concretistically that anything he can-
not perceive must be within, behind, or beneath something else.
On his part, the psychological observer must not repeat these mis-
takes; he has no warrant to locate thinking anywhere. Moreover,
it is of the utmost importance that he not confuse his viewpoint
with that of the unreflective subject; he must maintain his own
criteria for applying or rejecting notions concerning the designa-
tions inside and outside. With respect to mental processes, then,
we are left with no answer at all to the question "Inside what?"
Actually, the evolutionary and especially the developmental
propositions concerning internalization may be formulated in non-
spatial ways that entail fewer assumptions and achieve more exact-
ness than the spatial or pseudospatial. For example, with regard
to phylogenesis, we may speak of increasing delay, selectivity, and
modifiability of response; decreasing automaticity and stereotypy
of behavior; less fixed dependence on specific environmental stim-
uli in the initiation or release, guidance, and stability of action; in-
creasing self-stimulation; and so forth. Although Hartmann, like
Freud before him, spoke in these very terms or terms like them,
he thought it a scientific step forward to subsume these descrip-
tions under some notion of increased interiorization; his theoriz-
ing was in this regard, as in so many others, predominantly biologi-
cal rather than psychological (Schafer, 1968a, 1968b, 1971) . I have
 (416) ROY SCHAFER

already indicated that even considered as a purely biological propo-

sition) this view of internalization is unsatisfactory.
Let us pursue the matter further. As I mentioned, Hartmann
emphasized the evolution of thinking among the signs of increased
interiorization. Although thinking is undoubtedly an advance in
self-regulation and adaptational flexibility and accomplishment,
what exactly is thinking inside of? Where is a thought? We can lo-
cate neural structures, glands, muscles, and chemicals in space, but
where is a dream, a self-reproach, an introject? If one answers, "In
the mind," he can be making a meaningful statement in only one
sense of mind, namely, mind as an abstraction that includes think-
ing among its referents. In this sense, there is no question of spatial
localization. To argue otherwise about "in the mind" is to be
guilty of reification, that is, to be mistaking abstractions for things.
For mind itself is not anywhere; logically, it is like liberty, truth,
justice, and beauty in having no extension or habitation, requiring
none and tolerating none. It is pure abstraction. The boundaries
of mind are those of a concept, not of a place. Only certain refer-
ents of these abstractions may have place and substance.
Suppose that we have dispensed with the idea of the inside.
Then, in describing human psychological development, we could,
for example, say with greater parsimony and exactness that as one
becomes an adult, he stops saying everything aloud; he thinks more
often, more verbally, and with greater complexity and consistency
of conceptualization than he did as a child; he uses words instead
of motility far more often; more frequently than before he antici-
pates (e.g., danger) and engages in mental experimentation con-
cerning possible physical and verbal action; his fantasies can be
more detailed and organized; and so on and so forth. In all these
ways he becomes both more private and more elaborately mental.
The observer, on his part, has increasingly to depend en the devel-
oping subject's reports in words to know what his situation is, and
often these reports are of words or about words, the words that
make up unexpressed thoughts.
Additionally, dispensing with the idea of the inside enables us
to recognize that a person is not keeping ideas or feelings within
himself when he keeps them to himself, that is, remains silent
about them. In the same way we recognize that a person does not
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (417)

have an inner world just because he has a private world. "Private"

is a key concept here. It refers to what is not communicated, per-
haps not yet formulated or even not directly or exactly communi-
cable; it includes what is unconscious as well as what is consciously
kept secret or passed over. "Private" is not just another word for
"inner": it expresses an entirely different way of thinking about
mental processes.
It follows from these considerations that introjection can only
be a synonym of incorporation, which is to say that it must refer
to the fantasy of taking something into one's body. In this light, it
is redundant without appearing to be so, and if kept in use can
on ly be confusing. Introject now becomes the thing that is fanta-
sied as having been taken into one's body and as retaining in the
fantasy some identity or some characteristic form of activity; it
means the same as "the incorporated object," which is a more exact
designation of the phenomenon in question. Intrapsychic now re-
fers to what is private; in many instances, it pertains to the person's
private and to a large extent unconscious regulation of his own de-
sires, thoughts, feelings, etc.
Identification) finally, is a bit more difficult to reconceptualize
inasmuch as in psychoanalytic usage it has not been used to imply
internality directly. Traditionally, however, psychoanalysts have
assumed that identification goes on "in the inner world," gets es-
tablished there, and may transform its "internal" setting (e.g., in
the case of superego identification). Once we dispense with the
theoretical vocabulary of internality, however, we are able to speak
about identification as a change in the way one conceives of him-
self and perhaps a corresponding change in the way he behaves
publicly; as before, the change would be modeled on personal ver-
sions of significant figures in his real life or imaginative life (e.g.,
fictional or historical characters) . I have discussed the full sense of
identification at length elsewhere (Schafer, 1968b, esp. Ch. 6).4
4 Projection can now be regarded as being simply synonymous with fantasied

expulsion from the body; the "projected" content expelled and then localized within
the boundaries of someone else is often a concretized (fecal, fetal, etc.) version of a
trait, feeling, wish, or demand that one does not wish to recognize as one's own.
Reprojection should refer to a second expulsion after an intermediate phase of re-
incorporation; usage is unsatisfactory in this instance, however, in that reprojection
is often used to mean simply the expulsion of something that has been incorporated,
(418) ROY SCHAFER

Having mentioned identification, I can pass right on to structure

words or structural concepts since they are so closely intertwined
with identification in psychoanalytic theory. Though it may not be
apparent at first, the idea of psychic structure relies implicitly on a
spatial metaphor-specifically, the metaphor of mind as a place, an
entity c~!aracterizedby extension. Thus, Freud positioned the super-
ego (" Uberich") in some unspecified upper space-either directly
Citber" as "over") or indirectly Cither" as "higher," as in "higher
ideals") . And we all think of "levels" and "layers"; we all resort to
"underlying" factors or causes; we all speak of "hierarchic" ar-
rangements, "surfaces," and "depths." Indeed, who would object
to the idea that psychoanalysis is a "depth" psychology or the idea
that for Freudians, at any rate, interpretation must work from "the
surface"? But, again, within what space?
Despite this spatialization of mind, when pressed for a strict defi-
nition of psychic structure) we do not resort to spatial metaphors.
We refer instead to stability of modes of function, slow rates of
change, resistiveness to regressive transformations, and the like. In
another respect, we refer to certain similarities--of aims, of amen-
ability to delay, of relative degree of desomatization, and so forth.

in which genital anesthesia and incapacity for erections provide a similar analogue
external is quite unsatisfactory, too, in that in the psychological literature it has
been used to mean three things-one biological, one psychological-observational, and
one psychological-subjective. The biological meaning of external is outside the
physical boundaries of the organism; for this purpose the word environmental is
clearer than the word external. The psychological-observational meaning of external
is all the mental functioning that can be perceived by an independent observer; here,
external refers to what is public rather than private. The psychological-subjective
meaning of external is everything the subject does not include in his idea of him-
self; in this respect even his entire body may be external to one subject, while pos-
sessions, love objects, home and nation may be internal to another subject. The
psychological-subjective meaning of external is the one that corresponds to the re-
stricted usage of internal being established in this paper; for other purposes, en-
vironmental and public should be the preferred words. Interpersonal, finally, refers
to what the objective observer sees, that is to say, two or more people interacting. In-
sofar as the subject is realistic, he will be the objective observer of his interpersonal
situation. We know, however, how often it is the case that when the subject is
ostensibly dealing with another real person, he is found on analytic examination to
be dealing more or less with a fantasied version of that person; and that version is
likely to include details of significant figures from the subject's childhood. We en-
counter the limits of the "externality" of the interpersonal most clearly in the
analysis of the transference.
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (419)

This is how we speak of id, ego, and superego--as functions

grouped together by the observer or theoretician on the basis of
such criteria as I have just listed. They are classes of events, and
to include an event "within" a class, rather than being inherently
and inescapably a spatial designation, is merely to say, "I consider
this event a member of that class." Hartmann, Kris, and Loewen-
stein (1946) (see also Hartmann, 1964) and Rapaport (1959,
1967) stand out among those who have established this mode of
conceptualization of structure as the right one for traditional psy-
choanalytic theory.
What does it mean, then, that identification is assigned so im-
portant a role in the development of psychic structure by Freud
(see, e.g., 1923) and others after him? It means that modeling
change of ideas about oneself and change of one's behavior on as-
pects of important real or imaginary people plays a decisive part
in the progressive stabilization and integration of one's specifically
human activity. It means that to develop as a specific person one
must have models; one cannot and does not have to create his idea
of being fully human by himself. We know that the process of
modeling oneself after another person is typically fantasied as an
incorporation of that person and may even be undertaken for that
very purpose (e.g., to preserve a sense of the presence of that per-
son or of one of his qualities) . But we realize too that when we say
"incorporation," we are speaking of imagination or fantasy; we are
not conceptualizing psychological processes for systematic pur-
poses.
It comes then to this: identification is or may be "structure-
building" in the sense that it may make possible a high degree of
consistency in certain modes of subjective experience and behav-
ior; on the basis of identification, specific modes of desiring, feel-
ing, thinking, and doing things, along with specific ideas and feel-
ings associated with these modes, may be in evidence much more
regularly and readily than they would be otherwise. But we speak
of structure in this instance because, thinking metaphorically, we
are picturing mind as a matter of places, currents, quantities, inter-
actions-in short, as a spatial entity containing other localizable
entities and processes. This entire notion, once made explicit, can
be seen to be the archaic invention it is.
(420) ROY SCHAFER

Not only invention, but convention: the spatial notion is so well

established in common usage, it has so many variations and so
wide a range of application, that it seems the very stuff of thought.
This usage is so powerful that if I were to say "John's internal
standards," who, under ordinary circumstances, would think I was
referring not to a fact but to a problematic metaphoric rendition
of an observation? The observation itself, I suggest, would be
stated more exactly in "John's standards" or "John's private stand-
ards," or perhaps "the standards John abides by unconsciously."
And, if it was structure that was to be emphasized in this regard,
the observation would not be rendered directly or exactly in
"John's structuralized internal standards" but in "John is pretty
consistent, even when under stress, in abiding by his unconscious
standards" or "John may be counted on to abide by certain stand-
ards he maintains privately even when in intense conflict." It
should be evident by now that the spatial metaphor comes between
us and the potential fact. With which observation I shall go on to
consider two sets of phenomena-usually subsumed under the
headings introjects and affects-the observation and conceptualiza-
tion of which have been seriously hampered by pseudospatial refer-
ences to the inside and outside in mental functioning. But first I
should clarify some of the context and implications of the general
trend of my argument.

A Methodological Interlude
This conceptual critique and reformulation is strong stuff. It un-
dermines our confidence in the utility of words like internaliza-
tion, structure-and drive and energy, too. Moreover, in the next
two sections, I shall discuss "introjects" and "affects" in some novel
ways. The question, "What will be left to work with in psycho-
analytic theory?" becomes inescapable. It will be well to pause,
therefore, to reflect on where we have come from, where we are,
and where we seem to be heading.
Freud used the conceptual tools he had at hand. He relied (as
we have, in following him) on a mixture of two languages---one
suitable for stating facts about neural organizations and chemical
processes, and one suitable for the utterly unsystematic discourse
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (421)

of everyday life. But Freud had no warrant to expect the language

of the laboratory or the home to be suitable for defining or express-
ing his data. He seems never to have considered that before it
could be a system with a real claim to dignity and elegance, his
psychoanalysis would have to have a language peculiarly its own.
At least, it would need a set of rules about the usage of common
words which could help achieve a consistent rendering and order-
ing of the observations specific to his method.
In this paper, as well as elsewhere, I have been re-examining
psychoanalytic terms in the interest of eliminating from our theory
confusing, unnecessary, and meaningless metaphors and the as-
sumptions they both express and generate. Additionally, although
I am not proposing a new theory, at least not in any traditional
sense of the word theory, I am, one might say, attempting to de-
velop a sublanguage within the English language that will make it
possible to specify mental facts in an unambiguous, parsimonious,
consistent, and meaningful fashion; I refer especially to facts of in-
terest to psychoanalysts and analysands. Thus, according to this
sublanguage and its rules, internalization refers to a fantasy, not
a process; the fantasy is that of incorporation. Additionally, as
mental processes do not occur in space, they neither have insides
and outsides nor move from place to place-s-except in fantasy!
Clearly, the trend of my argument is that well-established habits
of thought will have to be changed. But it is difficult to change such
habits of thought. Change of that nature requires continuous con-
scious alertness and effort. In turn, that alertness and effort dis-
rupt the ease and smoothness of thought and speech that we have
laboriously achieved during our personal and professional develop-
ments-with an accompanying sense of loss and of being at a loss,
especially for words. Inevitably, we fear, resent, and resist the de-
mand for change; this is as true for psychoanalytic conceptualizing
as it is for neurotic fantasizing.
Viewed most broadly, the habit of thought or the type of lan-
guage I am calling into question is the one that relies on concretis-
tic, substantial references to abstract or at least nonsubstantial
ideas. The fact is that habitually we speak of thoughts, feelings,
motives, and entire personalities as though they had the properties
of things, such as extension, location, and momentum. This per-
(422) ROY SCHAFER

vasive reliance on what ultimately are infantile or primary process

modes of thought undoubtedly adds vividness, charm, and drama
to our discourse in everyday life and to psychoanalytic work and
theorizing. It is gratifying as well as reassuringly familiar. But in
the end, we discover ourselves to be engaged in anthropomorphic
thinking (Grossman and Simon, 1969; Schafer, 1973), which, in
sound Freudian theorizing, at any rate, cannot be acceptable.
In this paper, which is part of a larger effort to resolve chronic
problems in psychoanalytic conceptualization, I am limiting my-
self to dealing mainly with confusing, unproductive, and dispens-
able notions of location, especially of inside and outside, in the
case of mental processes. Other aspects of the substantialization
and personification of abstract terms pertaining to mental processes
include references to their mass, energy, momentum, and inten-
tionality; I shall, however, merely indicate these as I go along (see
also Schafer, 1968b, 1971, esp. 1973) .5

Introjects
There is no topic to which the preceding considerations may be
applied with more emphasis than traditional discussions of intro-
jects. First of all, the custom is to speak of introjects as if they were
angels and demons with minds and powers of their own. One
speaks of them not as an analysand's description of experience but
as unqualified facts. This is the case, for example, when, without
qualification, introjects are said to persecute, scold, comfort, etc.,
the person under consideration. In these instances we forget that
an introject can only be a fantasy, that is, a special kind of day-
dream which, in a more or less dearly hallucinatory experience,
the subject takes for a real-life event. We forget then that the intro-
ject can have no powers or motives of its own, and no perceptual
and judgmental functions, except as, like a dream figure, it has
these properties archaically ascribed to it by the imagining sub-
ject. The subject is, as it were, dreaming ~vhile ostensibly fully
and consistently awake. His introject has the "reality" of a dream
figure, and is a "hallucination" in the same sense as a dream is.
;; I am aware of how many conceptualizations will have to be reworked. and on
how many levels of theoretical formulation, once one embarks on this course. And
I am equally aware of how much remains to be done and how cumbersome revised
formulations will be or seem for a long time to come.
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (423)

In the second place, we have designated as introjects many

dreamlike experiences of the nearness and influence of other per-
sons or parts of persons when, according to the spontaneous reports
of the analysand, he has either not localized them in subjective
space at all or has indicated that they are "outside" himself (e.g.,
behind him) . Why then "introject"? Is it not the result of reason-
ing that goes something like this: since the presence, as I call it, is
objectively not outside the subject, and since thinking somehow
goes on "in the head" because the mind is somehow "in the head,"
the presence must be inside the head, too, and so must be an intro-
ject? It is all quite crude, but there it is!
Thus, owing to the tenacity with which we hold on to our ideas
about mind in space and mind as space, we do not always listen
carefully to our analysands when they report these vivid imaginary
experiences. We do not sort out the subject's experiential lan-
guage and the observer's conceptual language. Consequently, the
theory of introjects has always had the same spooky quality as the
subjective experience it refers to; it has remained more a repeti-
tion or continuation of the problem than a clarification or ex-
planation of it.
Obviously, this conceptual analysis may be applied to the related
concept "internal objects" and all the pseudospatial words asso-
ciated with it. And since, as I indicated earlier, incorporation is to
be preferred to introjection, I think we would achieve the greatest
clarity in our discussions of these matters by speaking of some pres-
ences as "incorporated objects" while remembering that not all
presences have been incorporated; some presences remain unlocal-
ized in subjective space and perhaps, owing to the elusiveness of
many of these phenomena, are altogether unlocalizable. I have
discussed the "power" and the "locale" of introjects and other
"presences" in greater detail elsewhere (1968b, esp. Ch. 5) .

Affects
Rather than take up affects in general, which course would require
me to consider issues that extend far beyond the scope of this pa-
per, I shall single out anger as an example of an affect the observa-
tion and conceptualization of which have been seriously hampered
by our adhering to the notions of the inside and outside. In order
 (424) ROY SCHAFER

to develop the implications and consequences of my critique, I

shall go into some detail about spatial and nonspatial ways of talk-
ing about anger.
People speak of anger as being held in or suppressed, dammed
up or pent up, exploding or erupting, consuming one or simmer-
ing. Similarly, they say that they express anger or let it out, that it
spills out or spreads, and so on. It is as if anger were some kind of hot
lava in a volcanic cone. In psychoanalytic parlance, we also speak
of displacing anger, discharging it, and turning it around upon the
self. All these words presuppose that anger has the properties not
only of substance and quantity, but extension, place or locale as
well (these properties go together, necessarily) . The vocabulary of
anger thus depends on the legitimacy of assuming or referring to
an inside and an outside-but, I ask again, inside or outside of
what? Where? Is anger anywhere? And where does anger go when
it is discharged or expressed? And what is left in the place occupied
by anger before its purgation? A vacuum? A clean inside?
The questions are unanswerable, of course, because they cannot
be asked in a logical inquiry. Anger is not the kind of word about
which such questions may be asked, and we shall soon see what
kind of word it is. Meanwhile, it follows from what I have said
that with respect to psychological theory the spatial metaphor and
the spatial (and substance-quantity) implications of our affect
words are to be treated as unreal or not serious. I t should be noted
that affect theory and psychic energy theory are not independent
in this respect, in that, according to the latter theory, affects are
quantities, and, being quantities, they must therefore (we sup-
pose) be somewhere or be going somewhere, even if only within
an ill-considered spatial metaphor."
Much of the problem issues from the archaic notion, familiar to
us from our studies of primary process thinking or unconscious
fantasy, of affect as substance (see, e.g., Brierley, 1937; Schafer,
1964) . Thus, when we speak of anger, we have the illusion that
we are referring to something that may be designated by a concrete
6 In his final major formulation of the matter (as translated by Strachey) , Freud

said that the ego was the "seat" of anxiety, and, by implication, of the affects in
general (1926, p. 93) . Freud's word was "Angststatte" which more literally would be
translated "place (or locus) of anxiety." Being engrossed in establishing his im-
plicitly spatial "structural theory," Freud understandably relied on the notion that
affects have locales.
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (425)

noun, that is, to a unit that can be pointed to, like a claw or a fang
or a fecal mass. But that is not what anger is. The anger of com-
mon usage is really an abstract noun; it is a rubric for a set of refer-
ents, and it is the referents rather than anger that can be pointed
to, at least in some instances. These referents include physiologi-
cal arousal reactions and ideas of having been wronged and of
doing something more or less violent about that. These ideas or
fantasies may be repressed altogether or replaced by "tamed" ideas
or fantasies of some sort of retaliation against someone or other.
I need not spell out all the variations in this regard.
There is, of course, a quantitative or quantifiable aspect of
physiological arousal or activity. Ordinarily, this quantity will cor-
respond to the total situation as the subject defines it, especially
unconsciously. But by itself this arousal is not "anger."
That anger is an abstract noun rather than an irreducible sub-
jective experience, a pure feeling, is evident from the fact that it
makes perfect sense to ask a person who says he is angry, "How do
you know you are?" It makes sense because that person can then
attempt to answer by surveying the referents of the term anger as
he uses it, which is to say by pointing to the signs from which he
draws the conclusion that he is angry. He might, of course, protest
that the question as to how he knows he is angry makes no sense
since this knowledge is given to him directly as experience; that
is, he might claim to be experiencing what has been called "pure
anger" as such. But this objection will not stand up to such further
questions as "How can you tell that you are angry rather than anx-
ious?" "How can you tell that you are angry rather than irked?"
and "How did you ever learn that the term anger was the one to
apply to that 'pure feeling' you are feeling now?" For even if he
were to say in response merely that each emotion is a distinctive
and immediately recognizable experience, he would be obliging
himself to specify its distinguishing features-in which case he
would have granted the legitimacy of the question to which he had
initially objected. Additionally, the distinguishing features cited
would prove to be equally applicable to others as well as himself;
it would become clear then that there is no privileged access to
anger.
For these reasons we can (and we do) on occasion say sensibly
(and usefully) in the course of our analytic work that an analysand
(426) ROY SCHAFER

who claims to be angry is not angry, that he is only saying SO, that
he is in fact trying to obscure his feeling nothing or his feeling
excited. Similarly, we can (and we do) on occasion say sensibly
that an analysand is only pretending to be angry, that despite his
sounding irate and belligerent he is only trying to convince him-
self or us that he is angry when he is not. On his part, the analysand
whose anger we have called into question can ask us sensibly,
"How do you know?" for we, too, base our judgments in this re-
gard on criteria; that is to say, our labeling someone angry or not
angry is stating a conclusion rather than a direct perception of a
pure something which is anger and which someone "has" or
"doesn't have." That we need not be conscious of our process of
appraisal and that it may take place quickly, both contribute to the
incorrect impression that anger is directly experienced or per-
ceived as a "pure feeling."
Being an abstract noun, anger is, of course, undischargeable.
Moreover, the force of the word anger is not nominative but ad-
verbial; it refers to a way of acting, though perhaps only to an in-
hibited, fantasied or oblique way of acting-namely, angrily. In
clinical work, when we analyze "angry" fantasy and behavior, this
is how we understand them-as thinking and behaving angrily.
We may obscure this fact by using spatial metaphors ourselves;
we use them because we think (invalidly) that these metaphors
(a) describe something tangible, and (b) help us to understand the
angry fantasy and behavior. In fact, however, by using the spatial
metaphor we introduce primary process modes of thought into
systematic thinking, and so, as we do in the spooky thtory of intro-
jects, we contaminate the explanation with what is to be explained.
In this light we can see that "catharsis" expresses an anal-expul-
sive fantasy! The anger that is pent up, simmers, explodes, or spills
over expresses a volcanic anal fantasy; it is psychological content
to be explained, not psychological explanation. "Catharsis," thus,
is peculiarly well suited for expressing in an aseptic fashion archaic
ideas about anger as a spatially localizable, destructive substance
or quantity; it cannot be a useful theoretical term.
If we give up the illusion that anger is a concrete noun, and
think instead that angrily denotes a way of acting, we may proceed
quite logically. We will state our propositions somewhat as follows.
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (427)

People act angrily. A number of ways of acting may be subsumed

under angrily. Adjectival forms are easily transposed into adverb-
ial ("an angry man" refers to a man acting angrily) . A person may
or may not be conscious that he is acting angrily. He may imagine
himself to be filled with some sort of quantity of anger. He may
try to avoid acting angrily or to avoid being aware that he is
so acting, and he may succeed entirely or intermittently. He
may act more angrily in certain situations than others. He may act
angrily in different ways at different times. He may put on a show
of behaving angrily.
Further, he is not likely to go on acting angrily if he has done
something that signifies to him adequate revenge or retaliation, or
adequate communication and effectiveness of action wih regard to
his grievance, for then he will see his situation as having changed
for the better, and he will no longer be provoked to think or be-
have angrily. Concurrently, his physiological arousal for vigorous
action will subside, and he may begin to think of other, perhaps
more pleasant matters. He will then be said to be "feeling better."
This, in nonspatial, nonquantitative, nonsubstantial-and so, non-
purgative-terms is "anger" and diminution of "anger," possibly
cessation of "anger" as well. Nothing has gotten into or out of
anyone's system except in fantasy. Objectively, there has been no
anal event.
To anticipate a possible objection to my argument at this point,
I want to point out that I am not advocating or slipping into a
psychology of consciousness. The entire process I have described
may-and often does-take place unconsciously. It is quite pos-
sible, as Freud demonstrated, to say "think," "believe," "con-
clude," "put on a show," and so forth, without implying "con-
sciously" or "superficially." There is no opening here for the facile
charge of superficiality-a charge which has too often hampered
exploratory psychoanalytic discussion.
, This, then, is the kind of word that anger is. Whenever we fail
to realize or remember that this is so, we make the mistake of
thinking of anger as an entity to which notions of substance, quan-
tity, and place (inside and outside) are applicable. This is the
mistake involved in using notions of discharging or abreacting an-
ger. Also in error on this account is the assumption that some pure
(428) ROY SCHAFER

feeling of anger exists apart from all its observable or communi-

cable characteristics; in other words, that the subject has privi-
leged access to this pure feeling of anger.
A few remarks regarding the so-called unconscious affects are
in order here. According to the viewpoint I am developing, these
"unconscious affects" must be understood always to be fully real-
ized properties of action, that is, as unqualified adverbial charac-
terizations; this is so provided that it is also understood that the
subject is successfully resisting being aware that some or all of his
actions have these properties. Thus, it is quite common for the
analyst to point out to an analysand that he is speaking angrily (or
tearfully, etc.) while remaining defensively oblivious of the fact.
That this emotional property is likely to become more vivid fol-
lowing the analysand's becoming consciously aware of it, or follow-
ing his restraining overt action with this emotional property de-
spite continued (subjective) provocation, does not show that a
potential affect has been actualized (which is one main sense of
unconscious affect) ; nor does it show that a dammed-up and un-
acknowledged affect has been released (the other main sense of
unconscious affect): it does show that the analysand's attitude
toward action with this emotional property has changed sufficiently
for him to be able to tolerate being consciously aware of it or to be
no longer willing to abstain from action of this sort, and, this be-
ing so, that he has defined a new situation for himself in which it
is subjectively appropriate and possible for him to behave in a
more emphatic or demonstrative fashion and with more varied
ideas of grievance and retaliation available to him. "Discharge"
and "abreaction" are now seen to be emotional actions appropriate
to changed situations rather than movement of quantities of psy-
chic energy.
It might be surmised-correctly!-that I am dispensing with
the hypothesis of an instinctual drive of aggression whose psychic
energy (also called "aggression") is accumulated and discharged
in anger (among other responses) . I, along with many others (e.g.,
Holt, 1967; Applegarth, 1971), have advanced at some length rea-
sons for discarding "psychic energy" as a fundamental hypothesis
in psychoanalytic theory (1968b, esp. Ch. 3); I shall not repeat
these arguments here.
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (429)

Although I could extend this discussion to other affect words,

such as joy, sadness, anxiety, and guilt, I shall not do so at this
time. My reason is that I planned only to make a methodological
point in taking up anger (as well as introjects) . The point is to
expose a serious problem and suggest a possible solution. The
problem is the confusion of observation and theory that results
from our unwittingly employing the archaic notion of internality
to mental processes. The solution is the elimination of words of
the "inside" and "outside" variety from theoretical discourse. This
change in our thinking will be one part of a general strategy for
avoiding the concretistic error of ascribing substance (quantity,
extension, momentum, etc.) to mental processes.

The Prevalence of the Idea of the Inside

] udging by its prevalence in our everyday language, the idea of
the inside appears to have profound significance in human experi-
ence. So much is this so that without our realizing it we have used
the idea extensively in fashioning psychoanalytic theory. From
among the factors contributing to the pervasiveness of the idea of
the inside, I single out the following as being especially important.'
1. Earliest subjective experience seems to get organized around
bodily sensations with their varying pleasure-pain properties. This
early subjective experience is the "body ego" that, according to
Freud (1923), is the first ego. Thus, from its very beginnings, the
organization of experience implies physical referents such as are
later subjectively defined as being inside and outside (Schafer,
1968b, esp. Ch. 4) .
2. Throughout subsequent experience, the notion of the inte-
riority of one's own being is supported by the often prominent
physiological changes that are part aspects of the emotional side of
significant activities, such as the sexual, the angry, and the fright-
ened. With regard to the makeup and boundaries of the physical
body, these physiological changes are indeed mostly "beneath the
surface" or "inside," and in some instances "deep."
• I am indebted to Dr. Ernst Prelinger for helping me to develop a number of the
main propositions I shall set forth in this section-and also for his helpful sugges-
tions regarding this paper as a whole.
(430) ROY SCHAFER

3. Adding further to the idea of mental processes as occupying

space and as moving in space are the crucial anatomical foci of
psychosexual development-mouth, anus, genitalia-with their
openings and closings, and the passage of substances in and out
of them, all of which is associated with highly sensuous and emo-
tional actions and events. So much of mental life concerns these
places, spaces, substances, feelings, and sensations, that inevitably,
when we begin to think about mind at all, we model it after the
"body ego" and assume that it is somehow a substantial and sensi-
tive entity with spatial characteristics.
4. Early notions of self are strongly influenced by these archaic,
concretistic factors. Self, too, is then thought of as being a place as
well as being in places, e.g., within the physical boundaries of the
body, though not necessarily filling it. As a place, self is thought
to be like a body in having boundaries which contain processes or
contents that "belong" to it. Sometimes the boundaries of self are
thought to include possessions and other people we love, hate, or
fear. And sometimes, as when we engage in projecting, these
boundaries exclude features of our own being that we have re-
pudiated. Other ways in which we spatialize self are by thinking
of it as having parts, splits, layers, and levels. These pseudospatial
metaphors are repeatedly emphasized in social discourse, a matter
about which I shall say more under point 7.
5. Our perceptions of others being, as we learn from experience,
limited, fragmentary, and insufficient for predictive purposes, we
think from early on that the "more" that eludes us must be "be-
hind" or "within" what we do perceive.
6. Earlier in this paper, I mentioned how we have contaminated
the idea of the brain, which mediates mental processes and is in-
side the head, with the idea of mental processes. The result of this
conceptual contamination is that these processes, too, are thought
to be somehow or other characterized by inside-ness.
7. Finally, there is the factor of well-learned metaphysical as-
sumptions. These assumptions are conveyed and perpetuated in
the basic language of "experience." The child learns them from
people in his environment, and he relies on them as he learns to
speak and to think in words. Moreover, and as one would expect
from points 1-5 above, he finds these assumptions congenial. That
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (431)

is to say, they match his own physical, sensuous, psychosexual

matrix for comprehending and organizing ideas. I do not mean
that children or even most adults realize that they entertain meta-
physical assumptions, but, from the study of young children,
dreams, and neurotic and psychotic symptoms, we know all too
well the extent to which physical reference constitutes the core
of understanding."

Implications for the Language of Interpretation

In many instances analysts unwittingly encourage their analysands
to use archaic (though also everyday) internalization language.
They do so whenever they themselves use spatial metaphors to
render mental processes and do so not in the service of empathi-
cally verbalizing how a process seems or "feels" to an analysand
but in the service of objectively describing how mental events take
place in fact. For example, the analyst might say "your internal
standards," "your inner image," "your innermost conviction," "on
another level," "the deepest meaning," and so on and so forth along
the lines I laid down earlier. Of greater significance often is the
analyst's use of internalization language in dealing with so-called
introjects or internal objects and other presences, and also in deal-
ing with affects and their disposition." Every time the analyst
speaks of "the mother inside you," "the values you took in," "the
structure you set up," "the boundaries between you and others,"
"the feelings you let out," etc., he confirms the analysand's uncon-
scious fantasy that being is a spatial, ultimately incorporative and
expulsive affair rather than actions of various kinds by various
people. Rendering these actions exclusively in the form of spatial
8 Further consideration of this factor would require formulating fundamental
doubts concerning the logical necessity and legitimacy of using motivation words to
explain behavior. This is so because the term "motive," for example. refers to a
mover of action that is prior to it in time and "interior" to it as an inner or behind-
the-scenes entity that is person like in its comprehension and activity. I cannot do
justice to this problem in this paper. I refer the interested reader to Ryle's (1949)
and Hampshire's (1958, 1962) discussions of mind, action, and dispositions. These
discussions are an important part of the intellectual background of this paper.
9 Externalization words are used by the analyst in the same way; for example,
"your outer manner," "the outward manifestation," "an external danger," "you
projected your feeling into him," etc.
 (432) ROY SCHAFER

metaphor can be done only at great expense to understanding.

Objectively, "the mother inside you" is better said "the mother
you think of whenever you thus and so," or "the mother you
imagine inside you in order that you thus and so." I am here sug-
gesting a nonspatiallanguage as an alternative to our familiar one;
actually, this alternative is one we all use at times, perhaps often
or even regularly. And yet we do not altogether believe in it or
appreciate it for we lapse so readily into unacknowledged and un-
qualified spatial metaphor.
Certainly, there are many analytic contexts where it seems right
for the analyst to use language that has the same archaic (though
also everyday) implications as the analysand's language. Particu-
larly is this so when the analysand is beginning to say new, signifi-
cant, and difficult things in the analysis. But the analysand must
have some steadily available sense, though not necessarily a steady
conscious awareness, that at least the analyst is being metaphoric
in his effort to help find the best words for hitherto unverbalized
fantasies. In other words, the analysand should increasingly appre-
ciate that words are being used "as if" mind or being or ego were
space and structure with objects moving into, out of, and through
it all.
I want at least to mention here a matter I have discussed at
greater length elsewhere (Schafer, 1973). By joining in saying
that things come to mind, or slip the mind, or are brought to mind,
the analyst tends to confirm the idea of mind as place rather than
as an abstract rubric which has expanse only in the sense of con-
ceptual inclusiveness. These locutions also confirm the archaic,
anthropomorphic belief that ideas are like animate beings that
can "come," "slip away," and "bring" more like them.
The ideal language for interpretation that is aimed at objecti-
fying mental processes would, according to my argument, never
refer to inside or outside, structure and its variants (barriers, lim-
its, boundaries, etc.), introjection and introject, and affects as
moving or movable quantities that are implicitly objectlike. Ref-
erences to inside and outside would be made, of course, in the
many appropriate comments by the analyst that express empathy,
recognition, and articulation of archaic and obscure experiences.
In the main, the analyst would be working in that manner. But
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (433)

when speaking strictly objectively, the analyst would avoid treating

abstractions as spatial and personal entities.
Here are a series of translations of the sort I mean. (Elsewhere
in this paper I have indicated other translations-e.g., regarding
introjects, affects, and mind.)
lao It was an old anger you fi- I b. You allowed yourself to act
nally got out. angrily after all this time.
2a. You broke through the in- 2b. You finally did not stop
ternal barriers against your yourself from acting lov-
feelings of love. ingly.
3a. Your chronic deep sense of 3b. You regularly imagine your
worthlessness comes from mother's voice condemning
the condemning inner voice you, and, agreeing with it,
of your mother. regard yourself as being es-
sentially worthless.
4a. Your underlying reason for 4b. There IS an unacknowl-
being superficial is avoiding edged but crucial reason
the shame about your past why you dwell on obvious
that haunts you. or trivial matters: if you
did not do so, you would
be shaming yourself about
your past over and over
again; your contrived obvi-
ousness and triviality help
you avoid that.
5a. You are afraid of your im- 5b. You are afraid you might
pulse to throw caution to act extremely recklessly.
the winds.
I offer these illustrative translations with the full realization
that, like translations of the King James Bible into modern Eng-
lish, they seem to take the "body" and "soul" out of the language.
But that is the point! A soulful language cannot help us under-
stand all we wish to understand about "soul," "soulfulness," and,
in Schreber's phrase, "soul-murder" (Freud, 1911). And a lan-
guage that is not "disembodied" cannot help us understand all we
wish to understand about the fantastic concreteness and "embodi-
ment" of unconscious or primary process thinking (Freud, 1915,
 (434) ROY SCHAFER

1925). I mentioned earlier the actual disruption of habitual

thought and speech and the sense of loss that accompany change
in well-established modes of thought, and I argued then that these
difficulties should not deter us from thinking through-and work-
ing through---ehronic and crucial problems in psychoanalytic con-
ceptualization. I must also mention again that the type of non-
anthropomorphic, nonspatial locutions I am emphasizing are
widely used anyway; my argument is to establish their value for
systematic thinking in theory and practice.

Conclusion
The gist of my argument is that internalization is a spatial-actu-
ally, pseudospatial-metaphor that is so grossly incomplete and
unworkable that we would do best to avoid it in psychoanalytic
conceptualization." Incorporation (and incorporated object or
person) is the only term that has a real referent, namely, archaic
fantasies of taking objects into the body. Logically, internalization
cannot mean anything more than that: it refers to a fantasy, not
to a process.
The unsatisfactoriness of "internalization" tor systematic pur-
poses is all the more apparent when, upon further reflection, we
realize that a clear need for this metaphor has never been estab-
lished in psychoanalytic theory. We realize, that is, that invalidly
we have assumed a condition of conceptual need or impotence in
this connection. After all, why do we have to add anything about
localization once we have said that a child now reminds himself
to do things when before it was his mother who did so; or that he
imagines his father's commanding visage in his father's absence;
or that he thinks of himself as looking after himself? Typically we
have hastened to invoke internalization words to describe these
phenomena. But why this haste or urgency? How were we in a
primitive, obstructed, or incomplete conceptual condition in the
10 It is not so strange as it might seem at first that this sentence has been written
by the author of a book on psychoanalytic theory entitled Aspects o] Internalization
(1968b) . The reader of that hook will find that to a great extent I was already re-
defining the central concepts in nonspatial terms. But, while writing that book, I did
not yet realize the extent to which "internalization" itself was part of a major prob-
lem in psychoanalytic theorizing.
 Internalization: Process or Fantasy? (435)

simple (though not naive) descriptions? In no way at all. If we

say that the child "internalized" his mother's reminders or his re-
minding mother, that he "introjected" his father's authority or
his authoritarian father, etc., have we understood or conveyed any-
thing more? If anything, we are working with less. I maintain this
for these reasons: we have complicated our thinking unnecessarily;
we are using a pseudospatial metaphor from which it is all too easy
to slip into concreteness of thought; once embarked on metaphor,
we tend to develop a sense of obligation to be metaphorically con-
sistent, and involve ourselves in extravagant niceties of formula-
tion; and perhaps we even introduce still another assumption into
theory where none is needed. The history of the pseudoquantita-
tive energy metaphor in Freudian metapsycho: ogy demonstrates
what I mean.
I have also indicated how our observations, understanding, and
conceptualization of introjects, affects, and what we call psychic
structure may be improved by our dispensing with notions of the
inside and the outside in our theorizing. The terms organism and
environment suffice for biological discussion; the terms inside and
outside (and their variations) are suitable for verbalizing fantasies
about mental processes, self, and human relations. But mental
processes themselves-the referents of our theoretical propositions
-are not localizable in any kind of space for they are classes of
nonsubstantial and therefore nonspatial psychological events.
They do not exist anywhere and they do not move anywhere; we
only-and fatefully!-think they do.

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