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G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005 Benjamin Lee vs. Court of Appeals & People of The Philippines Austria-Martinez, J. Facts

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G.R. No.

145498, January 17, 2005


Benjamin Lee vs. Court of Appeals & People of the Philippines
Austria-Martinez, J.

FACTS:

The herein accused issued in the amount of 980,000 pesos in favor to


Rogelio G. Bergado, however, the same bounced. Bautista was already
detained for a pending case in Calapan, Mindoro at the time. The regional trial
court found Dr. Lee guilty of violating B.P. 22, and rejected his defense that
only Bautista owned the closed account with UCPB.

The RTC found the accused guilty and imposed a penalty of


imprisonment of one (1) year of prision correccional, and to pay the offended
party ₱980,000.00 and to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and non-payment of the fine by the
accused. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and added another one
year to his sentence of imprisonment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalties imposed for B.P. 22 were correct

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled to grant the petition, and modified the
decision, on the ground that that in view of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001,
establishing a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided
for in B.P. Blg. 22; and the recommendation of the Solicitor General in its
Comment that the policy laid down in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals , and Lim vs.
People,of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, be considered in
favor of petitioner who is not shown to be a habitual delinquent or a
recidivist,we find that the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals should be
modified by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only a fine of
₱200,000.00.
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
Casupanan vs. Laroya

FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Laroya and the other
owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan, figured in an accident. Two cases were filed, with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Capas , Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against
Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the
other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-
delict.
When civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency
of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismiss the civil case.
Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a motion for reconsideration. They
insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the RTC and still it was denied for lack of merit. They f iled a
Motion for Reconsideration but RTC denied the same.

ISSUES:

Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless


imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant
in the criminal case;

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that
an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. Clearly, the
Capas RTC’s order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the
proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous. The essence of forum-
shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively. It is present when in the
two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and
relief sought. There is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
and the rules expressly allow the filing of separate civil action which can
proceed independently.
Under Section 1 of the Rule 111, what is “deemed instituted” with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime
or ex-delito. All other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the
Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted and may be filed separately and
independently even without reservation.
In no case, however, may the “offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of
Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not the accused.
G.R. No. 200444 August 15, 2018
SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER, INC. AND FELIX Q. RUZ v. ANTONIO
SAN ANDRES
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioners Supreme Transportation Liner Inc (Supreme) and Felix Ruz


(Ruz) assail the decision of the CA affirming the judgment of RTC which
dismissed their counterclaim on the ground that it would be tantamount to
double recovery of damages. Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger bus,
Mabel Tours Bus owned by Antonio San Andres (San Andres) along Maharlika
Highway, Brgy. Malabanban Norte, Candelaria, Quezon. While traversing the
highway, the Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo and immediately
swerved to the left but in the process, hit head-on the bus owned by petitioner
Supreme which was driven by Ruz.
San Andres filed a complaint for damages against herein petitioners
alleging actual damage to Mabel Tour Bus and unrealized profits.
Subsequently, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim, they alleged
that San Andres has no cause of action against them since the vehicular
accident was caused by the driver of San Andres operating the Mabel Tours
Bus. By way of counterclaim, Supreme alleged that it suffered damages.
In the course of trial, Jessi Alvarez filed a criminal complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property against Ernesto Belchez. Belchez
was convicted.
RTC dismissed San Andres’ complaint as well as petitioners’ counterclaim for
not reserving the right to institute a separate civil action. Petitioners appealed,
however, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners’ countercliam was correctly denied by the RTC.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners' counterclaim is allowed
and should not have been dismissed by the RTC and the CA despite their
failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action in the criminal case
they had brought against respondent's driver. However, whether or not they
could recover damages upon their counterclaim presents a different story, as
they should first show that they will not recover damages twice for the same
incident.
The error committed by the CA emanated from its failure to take into
consideration that the omission of the driver in violation of Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code could give rise not only to the obligation ex delicto, but
also to the obligation based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Under the factual antecedents herein, both obligations rested on the
common element of negligence. Article 2177 of the Civil Code and Section 3,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court allow the injured party to prosecute both
criminal and civil actions simultaneously. As clarified in Casupanan v. Laroya:
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the
crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not
a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on
these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions
based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing
of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the
Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action "deemed
instituted" in the criminal action.
G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001;
George Manantan Vs. The Court of Appeals, Spouses Marcelino Nicolas &
Maria Nicolas,
Quisumbing, J.

FACTS
The car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on the
wrong lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle when
they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused immediately
tried to swerve the car to the right but the two vehicles collided with each
other at the center of the road. Thereafter, a collision happened and the car
turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the highway
immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic. Fiscal
Ambrocio lost consciousness. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were
brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night while Ambrocio
suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.

Petitioner Manantan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in


homicide. The RTC acquitted him. Private respondents filed their notice of
appeal on the civil aspect and prayed that the appellee be ordered to pay
indemnity and damages. The Court of Appeals ruled for the respondent.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the appellate court committed a reversible error

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled to grant the petition, on the ground that the
Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals doctrine was in
applicable in this case. Where the civil action is impliedly instituted together
with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the offended parties,
as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees
are to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information.
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's allegations that the filing fees were
not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no
jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004
Vicky C. Ty vs. People of the Philippines
Tinga, J.

FACTS:

The mother of the accused, Chua Lao So Un, and her sister Judy Chua
were both confined at the Manila Doctor’s Hospital. Their bill amounted to
1,075,592.95 pesos, so the accused executed a promissory note to pay in
installments. She issued 7 post-dated checks at 30,000 pesos each, but all of
them bounced. The hospital wrote demand letters but there was no response.
Thus, she was charged and later convicted by the trial court of 7 counts of
violation of B.P. 22. The Court of Appeals deleted her penalty consisting of
imprisonment but it affirmed her conviction. Instead, the CA only imposed a
fine with no imprisonment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty to
pay a fine instead of a prison term

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that it agrees with the Court of Appeals in
deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner was
not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith. Administrative
Circular 12-2000,50 adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Lim v.
People, authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P.
22 cases subject to certain conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify
the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-200153 which clarified
Administrative 12-2000.
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty was ordered to pay a fine equivalent to double the
amount of each dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with article 39 of
the revised penal code. She is also ordered to pay private complainant, manila
doctors’ hospital, the amount of two hundred ten thousand pesos
(₱210,000.00) representing the total amount of the dishonored checks. Costs
against the petitioner.
G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines,
Panganiban, J.

Facts

The accused Napoleon Roman was petitioner’s employee. He was found


guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty consisting of imprisonment and to pay
damages. The court further ruled that petitioner, in the event of the insolvency
of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the
judgment against accused had become final and executory.

However, the accused jumped bail. Thus, herein petitioner employer filed an
appeal from the judgment. The trial court denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense


of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled to deny the petition and affirmed the decision
of the lower court, on the grount that, that the cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact
should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may
assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the
present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but
can only defend the accused. Therefore, the petitioner could not file an appeal
independently of the accused.
G.R. No. 108017, [April 3, 1995]
DULAY V. COURT OF APPEALS
Bidin, J.
FACTS:
There was an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay in which the latter was shot and killed by the former, a security guard
on duty at the "Big Bang sa Alabang" carnival in Alabang Village, Muntinlupa.
On February 8, 1989, petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased
Napoleon Dulay, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and
private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.
("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela, for negligence in failing to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of defendant Torzuela.
The RTC found that the complaint lacked the facts necessary or sufficient to
establish a quasi-delict because it did not mention Torzuela's negligence in
shooting Napoleon Dulay or that it was done in the course of his duties
(dismissed), resulting in the petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether Superguard and Safeguard committed an actionable breach and can
be civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for
homicide.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that It is sufficient that the complaint alleges
that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay, killing him; that the shooting
occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD or
SAFEGUARD employed Torzuela and was responsible for his actions.
Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that, “Sec. 1. Institution
of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action”.
G.R. No. 80194. March 21, 1989
EDGAR JARANTILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING
REGALADO, J

FACTS:
The herein petitioner was charged serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. As the complaining witness in the case, Kuan Sing did
not reserve his right to file a separate civil action and instead intervened in
the criminal case through a private prosecutor. In that criminal case, the
petitioner was found not guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt." Hence, the
acquittal.
Kuan Sing filed a complaint against the Jarantilla in the former Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case No. 9976, on October 30,
1974, which civil action involved the same subject matter and act as the
criminal case. The Jarantlla alleged as special and affirmative defenses in his
answer that the Kuan Sing had no cause of action and that the latter's cause of
action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207
insofar as the civil liability was deemed instituted when said criminal case
was instituted because plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively
participated in the criminal case.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Kuan Sing is barred from filing a separate civil case
for damages due to his failure to reserve his right to do so and his intervention
in the criminal case.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in this landmark case that since this action is
based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file
a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him
from filing such separate civil action for damages. This court reiterated that a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to
recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c)
of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. . . ."
G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011
PAULINO S. ASILO, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PEREZ, J.

FACTS:
This case involves the acts of the late Mayor Comendador who
authorized the demolition of the stores of Spouses Bombasi without a judicial
order. The said demolition was supervised by Asilo and Angeles. The acts of
the three mentioned petitioner prompted the Spouses Bombasi to file a civil
action for damages before the RTC and a separate criminal complaint before
the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Upon
arraignment the three accused all pleaded not guilty. However during the
pendency of the case, Mayor Comendador died. Notwithstanding the
Manifestation of Mayor Comendador’s counsel informing the court of the
Mayor’s death, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding Comendador
and Asilo guilty for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and also held them
civilly liable to Spouses Bombasi. The counsel for the late Mayor filed a Motion
for reconsideration alleging that the death of Mayor Comendador
extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted
the motion as to the extinction of the criminal liability but upheld Mayor
Comendador’s civil liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of
the case also extinguished his civil liability.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, on the groudn that the death
of Mayor Comendador did not extinguish his civil liability pursuant to Section
3 Rule 111 of the Rules of Court because his civil liability is not predicted upon
the violation of R.A. 3019 a quasi-delict, but upon his violation as provided
under Art. 32(6) of the Civil Code. The Mayor, by authorizing the demolition of
the stores of Spouses Bombasi without a judicial order is tantamount to
depriving the Spouses Bombasi of their property without due process. Hence,
his civil liability stands.
G.R. No. 200055 September 10, 2014
STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. vs. ARNOLD CUARESMA and JERRY B.
CUARESMA
PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
There were two vehicles that were involved in an accident on North
Avenue in Quezon City, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured by
petitioner Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and the other owned by respondent
Arnold Cuaresma and driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma. The damage to
Cham's vehicle was repaired, with the cost borne by the petitioner's insurance
company.
Cham was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Property Damage
in an information filed with the MeTC of Quezon City. During the pendency of
the case, the insurance company filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against
the respondents with the MeTC of Manila, demanding payment for the cost of
repairs on Cham's vehicle.
The Cuaresmas allege that the insurance company, in failing to disclose the
pendency of the criminal suit against its assured Cham, is guilty of forum
shopping.

ISSUE:
Whether the insurance company, in filing a separate civil action, is
guilty of forum shopping.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that in the negative, on the ground that, the
insurance company, who is subrogated to the rights of Cham, the accused in
the criminal case instituted by the Cuaresmas, cannot be guilty of forum
shopping for its separate civil action is expressly allowed to proceed
independently of the criminal action involved herein.
Under Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal procedure, the
offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for
quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly
states that the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended
party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action.

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