One of the most pronounced narratives in the nationalist discourse of

partition continues to be: “Hindustan for the Hindus, Pakistan for the
Musalmans.” Is this a fair assessment of the political dreams of the
people of the regions that became a part of ‘Pakistan’?

Hadi Ameer
23020110

Pakistan Studies SS-102

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 1947 was marked by the biggest migration in the history of humankind. Hindustan, which

had existed as such for a few millennia, was carved apart in the process of creating a state for the

Musalmans of the subcontinent: Pakistan. The League narrative had been one of deeply

embedded divides between Hindus and Muslims, yet there is sufficient reason to believe that

these views were not entirely emblematic of social circumstances. As the infallible slogan of

‘Pakistan for the Musalmans, Hindustan for the Hindus’ emerged, it was to have grave

consequences, not only on the creation of the state but also who lived in it. Our text thus posits

that the Two-Nation theory was not a just assessment of the political dreams of Pakistanis. What

we lay greater emphasis on however, is how these narratives assumed greater popularity and

became part of the common narrative. A number of state practices and methods contributed to

this, and it is this critique of state mechanisms through which we intend to illustrate this

unfairness.

Our reasons for discussing Pakistan’s master narrative are grounded in its wide

permeation in different levels and circles of the general populace. Originally created through the

reformation and modification of history textbooks, the contemporary otherization of the Hindu is

reinforced through media narratives. The popularity of the narrative however, should not be

mistaken with its prevalence in all parts of Pakistan. It is the Punjab that was most impacted by

partition, and thus Punjab that holds the greatest grievances against India. It is through this

otherization and the creation of a security state that the Punjab-centered military establishment

controls and perpetuates Pakistan’s political economy of defense. Numerous critics in Sindh and

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have spoken out against this, asserting that the constant talk of Indian

threat is an unnecessary distraction , but one purposefully orchestrated by the military

establishment to retain its stranglehold on the state machinery. It thus seems that the idea of

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‘Pakistan for the Musalmans, Hindustan for the Hindus’ is far more prevalent in Punjab than the

other provinces. Historically, Baluchistan and KP have been involved in their own struggles,

ranging from nationalist struggles to discontentment with the federal administration for its lack

of attention to these regions. Punjab’s proximity to the border and the vested interests of its elite

civilians however, mean that it continues to function as a ‘zone of statehood’ for the civil-

military nexus of the government. Coming back to the master narrative however, we can see how

a greater recognition of the supposed Hindu Muslim divide has permeated among the general

population. Speaking to my uncle’s driver who lives in a village not far from the LOC in Sialkot

district confirms this hypothesis.

“The Indian forces with their tanks were too strong for us. Instead, our young soldiers

tied bombs to their chests, chanting slogans of Allahu Akbar (God is great). We are

indebted to our armed forces for their sacrifices and the preservation of our country.”

His views are emblematic of the wider Pakistani population that relies primarily on the news

media for information. The three wars and numerous skirmishes between now and 1947 have

only served to strengthen this essentialist reasoning. On the other hand, when state curriculums

villainize India and place the Two-Nation theory at the centre of nationalist discourse, an entire

generation is raised that considers India as the archenemy, and Hindus as the complete antithesis

of Muslims, reinforcing their irreconcilably conflicted dynamic.

Any reading of the Hindu-Muslim divide is incomplete without an understanding of

partition and the bloodshed that transpired. There is ample reason to believe that violence was an

organized and systemic process. Ethnic communities acted in ways that would ensure the

complete eradication of the other in their regions. The Rawalpindi massacres exemplify this

wave of religious nationalism, where the stepping down of the Unionist Party culminated in

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anarchy and led to mass killings of Hindus. Similarly in Lahore, Muslim mobs raided and set

ablaze Hindu homes and markets such as the Shah Alam one. Trains leaving for India were

attacked and their passengers were looted, raped and mutilated. Events of a similar nature

transpired on the other side of the border. Muslim army companies such as the Baluch regiment

joined in the communal massacres taking place. While it can certainly be said that official party

narratives helped exacerbate the tensions, the general divide between predominantly rural India

and Delhi meant that there must have been more personal factors at play. Whether by killing or

making them flee, the goal in West Punjab was to ensure that only a fraction of the Hindu

community remained. If nothing else, this serves to show that some semblance of violent

Pakistaniyat did exist among the Muslims of the Punjab. Their notions of Hindu animosity were

only strengthened by similar acts of violence on the other side of the border.

Our analysis indicates how the situation is not as simple as it seems. It would be unfair to

suggest that the Two-Nation theory was a fair assessment of the political dreams of the people of

Pakistan, given how they had peacefully co-existed for centuries. We do however posit that the

divides occurring at partition have since been strengthened. Punjab, as a borderland for the state

to exercise its control, has taken the lead in exacerbating such tensions, while other provinces

continue to be relatively more critical and skeptical of this Hindu otherization narrative. But the

encompassing nature of dissemination; through national curriculums and media news, is such

that it continues to pervade the circles of the commoner. Between 1947 and now, there is

certainly a greater percentage of people who believe that Hindus and Muslims are irrevocably

opposed to each other, and thus cannot live peacefully in the same territory and community. To

sum it up, there exist two key reasons why the assessment in the question statement is not fair;

firstly the pre-partition harmony of Hindus and Muslims and secondly, the state narrative of

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Hindu-Muslim animosity which was thrust upon the people through the coercive apparatus of the

state. The use of oral history techniques also offers a greater insight into the political views and

aspirations of the general populace.