Rule 114

WILSON ANDRES
vs.
JUDGE ORLANDO D. BELTRAN,
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1597. August 20, 2001.

Facts:

Wilson Andres was charged with the crime of murder. The trial court
presided by Judge Abraham Principe, granted bail upon motion of the
accused and ordered his release from detention. After presentation of
evidence for the prosecution, Accused Wilson Andres filed a "motion to
dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence." Respondent Judge Orlando
Beltran, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge denied the motion in his
Order of November 25, 1999. The court issued a subpoena to accused
Andres informing him that the criminal case is set for initial hearing for
reception of evidence for the accused on January 31, 2000. Accused
appeared at the scheduled hearing but his counsel was not present.
Respondent Judge then issued an order cancelling the bail bond of accused
Andres and ordered his detention. In the absence of his counsel and
considering the fact that the presentation of defense evidence in this case had
been delayed for almost one year from the time that the prosecution rested
its case, the bailbond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused
Wilson Andres is hereby cancelled and is ordered detained,

Accused Andres was detained from January 31, 2000 until February 9, 2000
1 when an order for his release was issued after the trial court found that no
subpoena or notice of hearing was sent to counsel of accused. Hence, the
instant administrative case for conduct unbecoming of a judge, serious
misconduct, inefficiency, and gross ignorance of the law.

Issue:

Whether or not the judge acted in abuse of authority upon the cancellation of
the bail bond
Ruling:

Yes, as the Accused was granted bail by then Presiding Judge Principe and
with such grant we assume that the trial judge made a judicial determination
that the evidence of guilt is not strong and would render him the opportunity
to bail.
Nonetheless, respondent Judge, in effect, is of the view that since the
prosecution has rested its case and prosecution evidence had been adduced,
he can make his own determination of whether or not the evidence adduced
strongly suggest the guilt of the accused and if so, he can cancel the bail
previously granted to the accused.

Section 20 of Rule 114 provides that after the accused shall have been
admitted to bail, the court may, "upon good cause shown," either increase or
decrease the amount of the same. Needless to state, this would entail a
hearing for the purpose of showing "good cause" and hence, would require
not only the presence of the accused but also of the latter’s counsel. Neither
can the bail of the accused be forfeited pursuant to Section 21, Rule 114
since it is not disputed that accused did not violate the conditions of the bail
as he was present at the scheduled hearing. es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The failure of counsel for the accused to appear at the scheduled hearing is
not a valid ground for cancellation of bail. The alleged delay in the
presentation of evidence by the defense is likewise not substantiated. In the
case at bar, respondent Judge motu proprio cancelled the bail bond in view
of the absence of counsel for the accused during the hearing initially
scheduled for the presentation of evidence for the defense. Accused should
not be punished for the absence of his counsel by the cancellation of his bail
and his immediate detention.

The duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to conduct
himself in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. He has
the avowed duty of promoting confidence in the judicial system. Admittedly,
judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous order or decision rendered
in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited. We note that
respondent Judge ordered the release of the accused but only after finding
that counsel for the accused was not served a copy of the notice of hearing.
 ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR 
vs. 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175482; July 06, 2011

Facts:

Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino

Apelado were found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with Apelado,
ordered the release of then criminally charged and detained mayor Francisco
Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the
governor’s residence.

Issues:

Whether or not the transfer of the detainee by the governor was a violation
in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019

Ruling:

Yes, In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and
evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner
Ambil, Jr.’s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s contention
that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his
power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.
 
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR.
VS
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA
G.R. No. 143591, November 23, 2007

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s

compensation against Urban Bank and the petitioners, for when he allegedly entered
into an agreement with the petitioners wherein Peña undertook to perform acts
necessary to prevent any intruders or squatters from unlawfully occupying Urban
Bank’s property. Petitioners presented documents to show that the respondent Peña was
appointed as agent by ISCI (former owner of the banks property) and not by Urban
Bank or by the petitioners.

Peña claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not
actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers
and employees of ISCI. The City Prosecutor rules in favor of Peña and concluded that
the petitioners were guilty of crime of introducing falsified documents, subsequently,
information were filed with the MTCC of Bago City, Negros, Occidental. The Judge
subsequently issued warrants for the arrest of the petitioners. Petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and insisted that they were denied due
process because they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavits. And
avers that since they were not afforded to submit their counter -
affidavit, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of
the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners
further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners are entitled to submit counter-affidavit before a warrant of
arrest shall be issued against them.

RULING:
No. The prosecutor may take the appropriate action based on the affidavits and other
supporting documents submitted by the complainant. It means that the prosecutor may
either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason to proceed with the case
or file the information if he finds probable cause.
Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits, without
infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
Although the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses he shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis
thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause;
 ANITA ESTEBAN
vs. 
HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA
G.R. NO. 135012 : September 7, 2004

FACTS:

Gerardo Esteban is the accused in four criminal cases. In each case, his
sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, posted cash bail of P20,000.00 in each case for
his temporary liberty. However, while out on bail and during the pendency
of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was once again charged with another
crime for which he was arrested and detained.
Esteban then refused to post another bail and instead, she filed with the trial
court an application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the
four criminal cases and alleged that she will terminate the cash bail by
surrendering the accused who is now in jail as certified to by the City Jail
Warden as she was fed up with her brother’s antics. The Judge denied her
application, as well as the motion for reconsideration, hence she filed this
petition for certiorari. She contends that by surrendering the accused who is
now in jail, her application for cancellation of bail in the four criminal cases
is allowed under Section 19, now Section 22, Rule 114.

ISSUE:

Whether she may avail of the right to cancel bail

HELD:
No, petitioner’s submission is misplaced. Section 22, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides that Sec.
22. Cancellation of bail. “Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice
to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or
proof of his death. . . .”
In the case at bar, Anita did not pay in bons or surety but by cash making it
not possible to cancel the bail. At this time the accused was arrested and
detained because he was charged in a subsequent criminal case. A cash bond
may be posted either by the accused or by any person in his behalf.
However, as far as the State is concerned, the money deposited is regarded
as the money of the accused.
 JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 189122               March 17, 2010

Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste  was charged with the crime of murder of Rafael
de las Alas but was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide.
He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he filed an application for
admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend
bail during appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for
bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under
the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than
20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent,
bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
application for bail of Leviste.
Ruling:
No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion Perpetua, or life
imprisonment. Furthermore, petitioner failed to establish that the Court of
Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his
claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the
absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
 RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR.
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986
Facts:
Manotoc is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc., and Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house.
Petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with
his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the appointment of a management committee, not only for
Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion
entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and
after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. "The court sees no
urgency."
Petitioner wrote to the Commissioner a letter requesting the recall of the
RTC but was also denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the CA for denying his leave to travel abroad. CA
dismisses it for lack of merit. Petitioner contends that having been admitted
to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the
Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue:
Whether or not a person who was criminally accused and provisionally
released on bail is restricted to travel.
Held:
No, the court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines. In this case, this is a necessary consequence of the
nature and function of a bail bond. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to
leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts and will not be able to pay his dues.
 GAUDENCIO B. PANTILO III
vs.
JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262               February 9, 2011
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Facts:

Pantillo, brother of the homicide victim in a pending criminal case under

Judge Canoy. When Pantillo attended the criminal case’s inquest
proceedings, he was informed that  the accused,  Ronald  Perocho  was
released from detention. Pantillo proceeded to the City Police station and
was informed that Perocho posted  bail and was released based on a verbal
order of Judge  Canoy. Pantillo then went to the Office of the Clerk of Court
to request  for  the  copy of  the  information which served as basis for the
approval of bail  but was informed that no information has yet been filed in
court. Hence, Pantillo filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator against Judge Canoy for gross ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of authority and appearance of impropriety.

Judge Canoy invoked the constitutional right of the accused to bail and
Section which does not require that a person be charged in court before he or
she may apply for bail. To his mind, there was already a constructive bail
given that only the papers were needed to formalize it and is the reason why
there was no information to be given to Pantillo. It would be unreasonable
and unjustifiable to further delay the release of the accused.

Issue:

Whether or not a judge may verbally grant constructive bail to the accused
who is not yet charged and did not file an application for such.

Ruling:

As regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered as

"constructive bail," there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite
the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at
random to the prejudice of the rights of another.
On October 18, 2010, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez issued his
evaluation and recommendation on the case. In his evaluation, the Court
Administrator found that respondent judge failed to comply with the
documents required by the rules to discharge an accused on bail.

In the case at bar, any person acting in his behalf did not deposit the amount
of bail recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the nearest collector of
internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer. Then the
respondent judge did not require Melgazo to sign a written undertaking
containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied
with by Melgazo. Judge Canoy ordered the police escorts to release Melgazo
without any written order of release. Hence rendering him guilty of violation
of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ESCOBAR
G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017
LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
Manuel Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of
Mary Grace Cheng-Rosagas, daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman
Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2) other victims. Robert was the owner
of Uratex Foam, Philippines, a manufacturing company of foams and
mattresses. Robert paid the ransom of PhP15M. Mary Grace and the other
two victims were released more than 12 hours since they were abducted.
Cubillas, the driver of the group of kidnappers, became a state witness. He
executed an extrajudicial confession and implicated respondent Escobar as
an adviser for Villaver. Escobar filed a petition for bail which was denied by
the Regional Trial Court and CA. A subsequent development in the
accused's case compelled himt o file a second petition for bail. On April 26,
2012, the Regional Trial Court denied this on the ground of res judicata.

ISSUE:
Whether or not res judicata is applicable to bail.

RULING:
No, res judicata is not applicable to bail.

Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right
to bail if the offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment before conviction by the Regional Trial Court.
 
However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is
death or regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution and when
evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is
subject to the discretion of the trial court. Escobar's bail is, a matter of
judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 
vs.
NG YIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG, CHANG CHAUN SHI, CHUA
SHILOU HWAN, KAN SHUN MIN, AND RAYMOND S. TAN, 

G.R. No. 180452               January 10, 2011

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Facts:

On August 24, 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force
Aduana received information from an operative that there was an ongoing
shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province.
The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort
from around 50 meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags
containing a white substance into a white van. Having been noticed, Capt.
Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan
(Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it was shabu
and pointed, when probed further, to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the
leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated.
Bundles of noodles (bihon) were also found on the premises although
laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on
samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed the white substance to be
shabu. They were then convicted and found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not the search and seizer was valid

Ruling:

Yes, accused-appellants claim that no valid in flagrante delicto arrest was

made prior to the seizure and that the police officers placed accused-
appellants under arrest even when there was no evidence that an offense was
being committed. Since there was no warrant of arrest, they argue that the
search sans a search warrant subsequently made on them was illegal. They
contend that a seizure of any evidence because of an illegal search is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. The petition is then
dismissed and the court rendered the appellants guilty and the evidence
found admissible as the arrest is valid in flagrante delicto.
 FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 141529            June 6, 2001

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner was convicted of estafa by the RTC. He filed a notice of appeal

and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had
filed earlier in the proceedings, but the motion was denied by the trial court.
When the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail, invoking the last
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked
to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General lectured that petitioner
may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required
to secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his
residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so
until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be
with prior notice to the court and private complainant.

Yap however contended that the P5,500,000 proposed bail was violative of
his right against excessive bail. The CA upheld the recommendation of the
Solicitor General and maintained the conditions and the P5,500,000 bail. His
motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed this present petition.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that no grave abuse of
discretion could be ascribed to the Court of Appeals for fixing the amount of
bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the severity of the penalty imposed, the
weight of the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity of the offense of
which petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the
P5,500,000.00 not only corresponded to civil liability but also to the amount
of fraud asserted to petitioner. The Solicitor General further pointed out the
probability of flight in case petitioner is released on bail, it is having been
established that petitioner was in possession of a valid passport and visa and
had in fact left the country several times during the proceedings in the lower
court.
Issue:

Whether or not the P5.5M bail is violative of his right against excessive bail.

Ruling:

Yes, the amount is too excessive pursuant to Rule 114 provides the factors to
be considered when fixing the amount of bail. Although it there is a
possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the
setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no
legal nor factual basis. The court then grants the petition partially, having the
petitioner have a hold-departure order against him and releasing him on bail.