SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 104497, January 18, 1995 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALEX
RAMOS ALIAS "BULKO," (AT LARGE), ACCUSED, ANGEL FERNANDEZ,
RODOLFO TULAGAN AND MARCO FERNANDEZ, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

In an Information, dated November 24, 1987, [1] appellants ANGEL FERNANDEZ,

MARCO FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO TULAGAN, together with one ALEX RAMOS,
alias "Bulko," were charged with the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE before the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna (Branch XXXI). The crime was
allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about the evening of October 26, 1987, at Barangay West Poblacion,
Municipality of Rizal, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, while conveniently armed with deadly bladed weapons, taking advantage of
nighttime, with treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and with
intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of
one MRS. AIDA SISON, and once inside, attack, assault and stab Aida Sison and
Avelina Hernandez, with the use of bottles of coca-cola and bladed weapons which
accused were conveniently provided, inflicting upon the offended parties mortal wounds
which caused their instantaneous death, and on the same occasion and by reason thereof,
with intent to gain, ransacked the house of Mrs. Aida Sison and did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away assorted jewelries,
personal belongings and cash money, with a total value of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of the victims and their
surviving heirs in the aforesaid amount. (emphasis ours)

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

Upon arraignment on February 11, 1988, appellants pleaded "NOT GUILTY." [2] Trial

only proceeded against them as their co-accused, Alex Ramos, has remained at large.

There was no eyewitness to the crime. The evidence for the prosecution was given by
Patrolmen DANTE ASEGURADO and GEMINIANO BAGSIK, DR. LEON
RONDILLA, JR., and PEDRO SISON, JR.
From their testimonies, it appears that at about 11:30 P.M., on October 26, 1987, a certain
Jonas Isleta reported to Patrolman Dante Asegurado of the Rizal Police Force in Rizal,
Laguna, a robbery-slaying incident at the residence of Aida Sison, located a few meters
away from the police station. [3] The authorities acted swiftly. A team of six (6)
policemen, led by Station Commander Lt. Alberto E. Pabellon, rushed to the scene and
surrounded Aida's house. [4] After securing the area, they entered the house and found the
bloodied, lifeless bodies of 72 year-old Aida Sison and her maid, Avelina
Hernandez. [5] The house, which has a store at the ground floor, was in complete
disarray. [6]

Patrolmen Geminiano Bagsik and Crispin Reyes searched the Sison compound to verify
earlier reports that the suspects were still within the premises. True enough, they saw
appellants Angel and Marco crawling on the ground some five (5) meters away from the
house of the Sisons. Pat. Bagsik collared Angel who was holding a double bladed weapon
(dagger) stained with blood. [7] Marco, on the other hand, was apprehended by Pat. Reyes.
The two (2) were brought to the police station and were investigated by Pat.
Asegurado. [8]

At about 6:00 A.M. the following day, appellant Rodolfo Tulagan, was also apprehended
at the western part of the poblacion not far from the Sison residence. Apparently, Rodolfo
was with appellants Angel and Marco that fatal evening, but he avoided arrest by hiding
near the fence of a schoolhouse, a few meters away from the scene. [9] A knife (lanseta)
was found in his possession during his arrest. [10] Rodolfo was also brought to the police
station for investigation.

Pedro Sison, Jr., eldest son of Aida Sison, was at work when the incident occurred. Upon
learning of the bad news, he rushed home. He was, however, too late. He found his
mother and her maid lying prostrate on the ground in a pool of blood. His mother's pieces
of jewelry, valued at P150,000.00, were missing. The robbers also took cash in the
amount of P50,000.00. [11] His family spent P33,049.00, for the funeral expenses of the
two (2) victims.

Dr. Leon E. Rondilla, Jr., conducted the postmortem examination of the victims on
October 27, 1987. He stated that Aida Sison died due to "intracranial hemorrhage
secondary to craniocerebral injuries due to trauma." He opined that a hard object was
used to hit Aida's head, causing the fractures on the occipital and parietal regions and
damaging her brain severely. Housemaid Avelina Hernandez suffered more in the hands
of the culprits. She sustained at least three (3) stab wounds on her neck and about twenty-
two (22) incised wounds on different parts of her body. The frontal region of her head
was also fractured. [12] Based on the nature and number of wounds inflicted on Avelina,
the doctor declared that she was assaulted by at least two (2) assailants using different
weapons, particularly sharp edged instruments like the dagger and knife (marked as
Exhibits "H" and "I") confiscated from appellants Angel and Rodolfo, respectively.

The version of the defense is different.

Appellants Angel and Rodolfo are ambulant peddlers of slippers in Mandaluyong. Angel
claimed that in the morning of October 26, 1987, Alex Ramos invited him to buy
lanzones from his 'parents' plantation in Rizal, Laguna. He was initially reluctant to go
with Alex whom he met only for the second time that morning. Angel then consulted
Rodolfo who agreed to accompany him. Angel also asked his cousin, Marco, to go with
him. That morning, the three (3) appellants went to Laguna with Alex.

At about 3:00 P.M., they alighted in front of Aida's store located at West Poblacion,
Rizal, Laguna. Alex knew Aida since he grew up in said locality and worked in a bakery
near her store. [13] The two (2) conversed for a while. After an hour, Alex left the
appellants at the store to meet some friends. He returned at about 7:00 P.M. with two (2)
friends. He then asked Aida to permit them to drink lambanog (a native drink) inside the
store. She acceded. Alex and his friends then engaged in a drinking spree, while
appellants ate biscuits and drank softdrinks. At about 10:00 P.M., Aida advised Alex to
take appellants home so they could rest. He obeyed, leaving his two (2) friends at Aida's
store. [14]

On their way to Alex's house, they took a shortcut via Rizal School. Upon reaching the
school after a ten-minute walk, Alex told appellants that he has to return to the store as he
had something to say to his friends. He left while appellants waited inside the school
compound. Between 10:30 P.M. to 11:00 P.M., appellants heard a woman screaming for
help, saying: "Saklolo, mga kapitbahay, papatayin kami nina Alex Ramos. [15] Initially,
appellants decided to stay in the school compound. When they heard gunshots, appellant
Angel was engulfed with fear. He advised Marco and Rodolfo to leave the premises of
the school as they might be suspected as the culprits. At the school's gate, however,
appellants Angel and Marco were intercepted by policemen. They were mauled and then
brought to the police station. [16]

The policemen continued manhandling Angel and Marco at the police station to force
them to admit their participation in the robbery-slaying incident. During their
interrogation, appellant Angel sustained a gunshot wound on his buttocks. The following
morning, he was brought to San Pablo City Hospital for treatment. He was brought back
to the municipal jail after two (2) days. [17]

Appellant Rodolfo who was arrested the following day also claimed he was maltreated by
the police. Finally, on November 2, 1987, the three (3) appellants signed the sworn
statements prepared by the policemen, without the assistance of counsel. [18] Thereafter,
they returned to the scene and re-enacted the crime. [19]
After trial, appellants were adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
"ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE," under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code on
the basis of the totality of evidence and without considering their uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions. The dispositive portion of the impugned Decision, [20] dated
February 8, 1990, reads:

"WHEREFORE, and from the totality of the evidence on record, the Court finds and
holds the three accused, namely: Angel Fernandez, Marco Fernandez and Rodolfo
Tulagan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide under
Article 294, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, for which the said three accused
are each sentenced with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs, the
highest penalty imposable because of the abolition of the death penalty by the 1987
Constitution.

"As civil liability arising from the offense, all three accused are ordered to indemnify the
respective heirs of the deceased Aida Sison and Avelina Hernandez for their deaths in the
sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for each set of heirs and the further sum of
Thirty Thousand Three Pesos (P33,000.00) for the funeral expenses for both deceased.

"For the loss of future earnings of Avelina Hernandez, who was 42 years old when she
died, at the rate of P6,000.00 annual earnings and for a period of fifteen (15) years, her
heirs are awarded the amount of P90,000.00.

"SO ORDERED."

In this appeal, the critical issue is whether or not the circumstantial evidence adduced by
the prosecution is sufficient to support the judgment of conviction against appellants.
Corollary thereto, whether or not conspiracy was established.

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Evidence is either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is that evidence which proves
a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the
factfinder. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which indirectly proves a fact in
issue. The factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. [21]

Under our Rules of Court, conviction based on circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [22]

It ought to be noted that our rules "make no distinction between direct evidence of a fact
and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No
greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it
is direct, for in either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the accused." [23]

In the case at bench, we are convinced that the totality of the circumstantial evidence
adduced by the People excludes any reasonable doubt that appellants are innocent. The
records indubitably show that appellants had the opportunity to commit the crime at
bench. They arrived together and immediately proceeded to the store of victim Aida
Sison in the afternoon of October 26, 1987. By their own admission, they were at
the locus criminis shortly before the tragic incident. They also had the means to commit
the crime. Soon after the killing, appellants Marco and Angel were nabbed by the
authorities within the compound of the Sison residence. Pat. Crispin Reyes arrested
Marco, while Geminiano Bagsik collared Angel who was still holding the bladed weapon
(Exhibit "H") stained with blood. Rodolfo Tulagan was arrested in the morning, the
following day, near the crime scene, also in possession of a knife. [24] Significantly,
appellants were fleeing when the authorities apprehended them.

The timely apprehension of appellants Marco and Angel inside the compound, Angel's
possession of the dagger stained with blood at the time of his arrest, Rodolfo's act of
concealing himself from the arresting officers and his foiled attempt to leave the locality
the following day, are clear indicia of said appellants’ guilt. [25]

In an attempt at exculpation, appellants point to Alex and his alleged two (2) friends as
the criminals. They insist that they were lured to Laguna by Alex to buy lanzones.

We are not persuaded.

Appellants are in their early twenties, but judging from their replies to the questions
propounded to them during the trial, appellants are not as naive as they claim to be.
Neither do they strike us as mentally dense. We find it unbelievable that they would,
indeed, trust a complete stranger like Alex and hastily go with him without first checking
his character and credibility. Moreover, it would be foolhardy for Alex to involve in the
crime the three (3) appellants whom he hardly knew.

Obviously, appellants are straining to make it appear that their trip to Rizal, Laguna, was
for a legitimate purpose. The facts in field, however, easily blew up this cover. To begin
with, appellants admitted it was their first time to go to Rizal, Laguna. They hardly knew
Alex. They could not give the details of their alleged agreement with Alex. They were
not in the business of buying and selling lanzones. They are ambulant vendors of slippers.
When apprehended, they did not yield any money to be used in buying lanzones. Instead
they yielded deadly knives. Indeed, they did not even bother to discuss how much they
would earn from the transaction or how they would transport the lanzones. [26]
Further, there is no sense in killing Aida Sison and her maid whom appellants met only
that fateful day other than to prevent their identification. When the policemen arrived
shortly after the commission of the crime, the Sison residence was in complete disarray.
The store's cash sales and the pieces of jewelry of Aida were missing. We have ruled that
"(i)n the absence of any other known motive for the crime, it would be, in our judgment,
to reject the universal teaching of experience to draw the inference that the same person
who killed the occupants of the house also committed the robbery." [27] It is crystal clear
that at the time of the robbery and killing, only appellants and Alex Ramos had access to
the money and valuables of victim Aida Sison. No outsiders were able to intrude into the
premises due to the timely arrival of the authorities and apprehension of the appellants.
Although the loot was not recovered from appellants, this can be attributed to the failure
of the policemen to arrest the fourth malefactor, Alex Ramos.

We also count in favor of the prosecution the lack of proof that the police officers,
specifically Pat. Bagsik and Asegurado, harbored any ill-motive to falsely testify against
appellants. This accords with the rule that the testimony of arresting officers, with no
motive or reason to falsely impute a serious charge against the accused, are credible. [28]

Appellants also aver that the policemen were only zealous to resolve the case the soonest
possible time, hence named them as culprits and planted evidence against them. We are
satisfied, however, that the totality of evidence sufficiently inculpates appellants. The
trial court rightly did not dignify the baseless suspicions of the appellants. The well-
settled rule is that findings of trial courts on credibility of witnesses deserve respect,
having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial. [29]

We now proceed to appreciate the aggravating circumstances that attended the

commission of the crime at bench. It is evident that appellants took advantage of the
darkness of the night to facilitate their criminal act. [30] Nighttime is not per
se aggravating, but it is considered as such if it was deliberately and purposely sought to
facilitate the commission of the crime. Although not alleged in the Information, Alex and
appellants also employed craft to gain easy access into Aida's store. They pretended they
were customers and this devious scheme facilitated the commission of the
offense. [31] The circumstance of dwelling was also proved and should be appreciated
against appellants. [32]

The crime was likewise committed with abuse of superior strength. The victims in this
case were women, one of whom was in her seventies, who could hardly put up a fight
against their male attackers. The number and nature of their wounds buttress this
conclusion.

In fine, we rule that the circumstantial evidence against appellants are strong enough to
remove any cloud of doubt on their guilt, sufficiently overturn the presumption of
innocence of the appellants, and exclude every postulate except that of their guilt. [33] We
reiterate the ruling that resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on
direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper
protection to community. [34]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the appealed decision in toto.

However, the civil indemnity awarded in favor of the heirs of the victims, Aida Sison and
Avelina Hernandez, respectively, is increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1]
 See Original Records, p. 14.
[2]
 Certificate of Arraignment, Original Records, p. 27.
[3]
 TSN, June 23, 1988, p. 9; TSN, September 20, 1988, p. 4.
[4]
 TSN, April 13, 1988, pp. 10-13.
[5]
 TSN, September 20, 1988, pp. 5-6; see also Exhibits "A" and "B".
[6]
 Exhibits "F-8" to "F-11."
[7]
 TSN, September 20, 1988, pp. 7-12, 30.
[8]
 TSN, June 23, 1988, pp. 3-4.
[9]
 TSN, September 6, 1989, p. 22.
[10]
 TSN, April 13, 1988, p. 34; TSN, May 31, 1988, p. 7.
[11]
 TSN, November 15, 1988, pp. 4-8.
[12]
 Exhibits "A" and "B"; TSN, June 23, 1988, pp. 32-35 and 38.
[13]
 TSN, December 8, 1988, p. 10.
[14]
 TSN, April 18, 1988, pp. 6-10.
[15]
 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
[16]
 TSN, August 22, 1989, pp. 14-16, 19.
[17]
 TSN, April 18, 1989, pp. 16-22.
[18]
 Exhibits "G" to "G-3."
[19]
 Exhibits "G-3" to "G-7."
[20]
 Penned by Judge Enrique B. Inting.

 Gardner, Criminal Evidence, Principles, Cases and Readings, West Publishing Co.,
[21]

1978 ed., p. 124.

 Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence; People vs. Ilaoa, et al., G.R. No.
[22]

94308, June 16, 1994; People vs. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA
678, 682; People vs. Iran, G.R. No. 88915, December 14, 1992, 216 SCRA 575, 580.
[23]
 Robinson v. State, 18 Md. App. 678, 308 A2d 734 (1973).
[24]
 TSN, September 20, 1988, pp. 6-12.
[25]
 See People vs. Gonzales, 210 SCRA 44.
[26]
 TSN, August 22, 1989, p. 72.
[27]
 United States vs. Merin, No. 1093, March 31, 1903, 2 Phil 88.

 People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 93722, May 28, 1993, Supreme Court Advanced
[28]

Decisions, Vol. 41, p. 883.

[29]
 People vs. Dolar, et al., G.R. No. 100805, March 24, 1994.

 People vs. Empacis, G.R. No. 95756, May 14, 1993, Supreme Court Advanced
[30]

Decisions, Vol. 41, p. 270.

[31]
 Ibid.
[32]
 People vs. Barlis, G.R. No. 101003, March 24, 1994.
[33]
 U.S. vs. Douglas, No. 994, August 31, 1903, 2 Phil 461.
[34]
 People vs. Fuertes, G.R. No. 104067, January 17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289, 299-300.
 EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ABE
VALDEZ Y DELA CRUZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For automatic review is the decision[1]  promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No.
3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended
by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.

In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as follows:

"That on or about September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of
Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was caught in flagrante delicto and
without authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp
weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived,
to the damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.

"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted,
cultivated and cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police
force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September
24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana
plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya.[3]  The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police
Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then
formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The team was composed
of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1
Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same.” [4]
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by
their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown.
After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives
arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his
nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had
his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows,
approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.[5]  PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned
the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. [6]  The
police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms.[7]  The
police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.[8]  Appellant was then
arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. [9]  Inspector Prevy
Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic
examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a
positive indication for marijuana.[10]  She next conducted a chemical examination, the
results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana
plant placed inside a white sack with markings.

xxx

"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave

POSITIVE result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."[11]
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant, on which the growing marijuana
plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland Block B, which formed part of the
Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.[12]  This lot was part of the
public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the
lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.[13]

As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00
o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan
when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go
with the latter to "see something."[14]  This unknown person then brought appellant to the
place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his
nipa hut.[15]  Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the
hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there.
When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him
to admit ownership of the plants.[16]  Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted
owning the marijuana.[17]

The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He
was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where
another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants.
[18]
  The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a
certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the
police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to
participate in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the
marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation."[19]  At the police headquarters,
appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.
[20]

On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around the
vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away.[21]  The latter house
belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace officer who had a
grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were found was located between
his house and Carlito Pascua's.[22]

The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered
to rebut appellant's claim that the marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he was
cultivating.[23]  Tipay presented a sketch he made,[24]  which showed the location of
marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the
closest neighbor. According to Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away
from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of Carlito Pascua. [25] 
Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor accompanied him when he made
the measurements.[26]  He further stated that his basis for claiming that appellant was the
owner or planter of the seized plants was the information given him by the police
informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants.[27]

Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for
cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating
marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. Costs against the
accused.

"SO ORDERED."[28]
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE

SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING
PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF
VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE
INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY

OF DEATH UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THAT THE LAND WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED
IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT
PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA.[29]
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?

(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?

(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?

The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.

Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law
enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the
marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling
of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968), to the effect that the protection against unreasonable government intrusion
protects people, not places.

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show
that there was no search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out
that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew
about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted
by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus,
in plain view of the police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a
warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.

The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the police
team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the
plantation site merely to make a verification. When they found the said plants, it was too
much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the
plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in
the area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants
upon discovery without any search warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot
was not legally occupied by the accused and there was no fence which evinced the
occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect,
hence, no search warrant was required."[30]
The Constitution[31]  lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried
on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed
"unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure
is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded.[32]  Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.[33]

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to
search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where
the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their
possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and
apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search
and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants.[34]  The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights
covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law
enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain

view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; and

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. [35]
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana
plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant.[36]  Hence, there was no valid
warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the
police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the
prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object.[37]  Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area,
they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants.[38] 
Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further
search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or
"open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.

Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were
found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the
Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his
residence, his papers, and other possessions.[39]  The guarantee refers to "the right of
personal security"[40]  of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought
to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. [41]  To
conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead
to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and
seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The
Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the
sanctuary of his bedroom.

We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were
evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which
involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find
that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as
evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was,
therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied
upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana
plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must now address the question of
whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant?

In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police
officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was
asked who planted them. It made the following observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the
marijuana plants was made in the absence of any independent and competent counsel.
But the accused was not, at the time of police verification; under custodial investigation.
His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the constitutional
fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if given without
any counsel."[42]
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question
cannot be used against him for being violative of his right to counsel during the police
investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have relied upon said admission of
ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the police officers was not a
general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana
plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down to him,
competent and independent counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought
information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims
the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his purported
voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his
constitutional right to counsel during investigation.

The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was
not yet under custodial investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the
marijuana plants. His right to competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had not
yet attached. Moreover, appellant’s failure to impute any false motive for the police
officers to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.

The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. [43]  An
investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or
exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. [44]  The
moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from
a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted
by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel. [45]

In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police
appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants
were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly meant to merely
"verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to
appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as a suspect. The
questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.[46]
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator
of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his
constitutional rights because we are just asking him..."[47]  In trying to elicit information
from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point,
he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not
yet been arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way."[48]  As a suspect, two armed policemen interrogated
appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other armed
policemen.[49]  All had been dispatched to arrest him.[50]  From these circumstances, we
may infer that appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a
significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the
police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.

Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its

admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
[51]
  The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also
uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during the investigation,
without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his formal
investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during
criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.[52]  Even if the confession or admission were
"gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of
such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of
coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.[53]

It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a

crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was
committed and that the accused is the author thereof.[54]  The evidence arrayed against the
accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,[55]  it must likewise be credible
and competent.[56]  Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence.[57] 
Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is
bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial."[58]

In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict
appellant of the offense charged. These were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's
purportedly voluntary confession of ownership of said marijuana plants to the police.
Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link appellant with the
offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have
admitted both of these proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to
convict him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The search
and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted without the requisite judicial
warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the police had
sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity
for the warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this
case. To reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt
without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the
inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.

Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly
made to the police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill
of Rights. The purported confession was made without the assistance of competent and
independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to
convict appellant without running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in
a criminal investigation must have the services of competent and independent counsel
during such investigation.

In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary
confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt
failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.

The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved..."[59]  To justify the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its
evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. [60] 
Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal. [61] 
In this case, the seized marijuana plants linking appellant to the crime charged are
miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render these inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."[62]  Nor can the confession obtained during the uncounselled
investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against
him.”[63]  Without these proffered but proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution's
remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to
warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his favor stands.
Perforce, his acquittal is in order.

In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow.
Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the
evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law." [64]
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial
Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death penalty, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant
is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held
for another lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

[1]
  Records, pp. 54-58.
[2]
  Id. at 1.
[3]
  TSN, November 19, 1996, p. 3.
[4]
  Exhibit “1”, Exhibit “C”, Supra Note 1, at 3. See also TSN, November 20, 1996, p. 3.
[5]
  TSN, November 20, 1996, pp. 5-6.
[6]
  TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 3. See also Supra Note 5, at 6.
[7]
  TSN, November 21, 1996, p. 3. See also Exhibit “D”, Supra Note 1, at 4.

  Exhibits “I,” “I-1,” Supra Note 1, at 24-A-24-B. See also TSN, November 28, 1996,
[8]

pp. 10-11.
[9]
  TSN, November 28, 1996, pp. 5-6.
[10]
  Ibid.
[11]
  Exhibit “A,” Supra Note 1 at 16.
[12]
  Exhibits “J,” “J-1” to “J-3,” Supra Note 1, at 41.
[13]
  Supra.
[14]
  TSN, January 15, 1997, pp. 2-3.
[15]
  Id. at 6.
[16]
  Id. at 4.
[17]
  Id. at 5.
[18]
  Supra Note 15.
[19]
  Supra Note 14, at 7.
[20]
  Id.
[21]
  Id. at 10.
[22]
  Id. at 11.
[23]
  TSN, January 28, 1997, p. 2.
[24]
  Exhibit “J” (should be Exhibit “K”), Supra Note 1, at 49.
[25]
  Supra Note 23, at 4.
[26]
  Id. at 8.
[27]
  Ibid.
[28]
  Supra Note 1, at 58.
[29]
  Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[30]
 Supra Note 28.

  Art. III, Sec. 2 states: “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
[31]

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
[32]
  People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293, 314 (1995) citing Nardone v. US, 308 US 388,
60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939).

  Art. III, Sec. 3(2) provides: “Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
[33]

preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”

[34]
  These instances include:

  (a) A search as an incident to a lawful arrest, provided that the search is made
contemporaneous to the arrest and within a permissible area of search. See RULES OF
COURT, Rule 126, Sec. 12.; People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 59 (1992); People v. Catan,
205 SCRA 235 (1992); Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 (1990);
and People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990).
  (b) Searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws.
See Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517 (1996); Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336
(1975). C.f. People v. Ammumudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)
  (c) Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders. See Mustang Lumber v.
Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 450 (1996); People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277
(1995); People v. Lo Hoi Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991); Valmonte v. de Villa, 185
SCRA 665 (1990), 178 SCRA 211 (1989); People v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
101 SCRA 86 (1980), and Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968).
  (d) Inspection of buildings and other premises to enforce fire safety, sanitary, and other
building regulations.
  (e) Where the prohibited articles or contraband are in “plain view” See People v. Musa,
supra; Chia v. Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 735 (1989)

  People v. Bolasa, G.R. No. 125754, December 22, 1999, p. 5, citing People v. Aruta,

[35]

288 SCRA 626, 637-638 (1998).

[36]
  TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 2-3.

  People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597, 611 (1993) citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
[37]

US 443, 29 L. Ed 2d 564 (1971).

[38]
  TSN, November 19, 1996, p. 4.
[39]
  Villanueva v. Querubin, 48 SCRA 345, 349 (1972).

  Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230, 235 (1937); Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas, 64 Phil.

[40]

33, 41 (1937).

  Terry v. Ohio, 20 L. Ed.889, 899 (1968) citing Katz v. United States, 389 US 347,
[41]

351, 19 L. Ed 2d 576, 582, 88 S. Ct 507 (1967).

[42]
  Supra Note 1, at 57.
[43]
  Art. III, Sec. 12 (1).

  Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642, 648 (1988); People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216, 231
[44]

(1989) uses “under investigation for the commission of an offense.”

[45]
  Gamboa v. Cruz, supra, 651.
[46]
  People v. De Jesus, 213 SCRA 345, 351 (1992).
[47]
  TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 5.

  People v. Logronio, 214 SCRA 519, 528 (1992) citing People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA
[48]

2, 9, (1980).
[49]
  Supra Note 46, at 4.
[50]
  Supra Note 4.

  People v. Tan, 286 SCRA 207, 214 (1998); People v. Jerez, 285 SCRA 393, 399
[51]

(1998); People v. Calvo, Jr., 269 SCRA 676, 682 (1997); People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA
199, 211 (1997).

  People v. Cabintoy, 247 SCRA 442, 449 (1995) citing People v. Dacoycoy, 208
[52]

SCRA 583 (1992); People v. Rodriguez, 205 SCRA 791 (1992); and People v. Gonzales,
189 SCRA 343 (1990).

  People v. Cabintoy, supra, 450, citing People v. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546

[53]

(1992); People v. Repe, 175 SCRA 422 (1989).

  People v. Chavez, 278 SCRA 230, 242 (1997) citing People v. Bello, 237 SCRA 347,
[54]

352 (1994).

  People v. Vasquez, 280 SCRA 160, 178 (1997) citing People v. Salcedo, 273 SCRA
[55]

473 (1997).
[56]
  People v. Berroya, 283 SCRA 111, 121 (1997).
[57]
  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th Ed. 1991) 284.
[58]
 Id. at 47.
[59]
  Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).
[60]
  People v. Acuno, G.R. No. 130964, September 3, 1999.

  People v. Elloreg, et al., G.R. No. 126998, September 14, 1999, pp. 30-31,

[61]

citing People v. Fider, 223 SCRA 117 (1993).

[62]
  CONST., Art. III, Sec. 3 (2).
[63]
  CONST., Art. III, Sec. 12 (3).
[64]
  People v. Bolasa and Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 125754, December 22, 1999, p. 7.
 EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 129286, September 14, 1999 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
HERMIE BANTILAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For automatic review by this Court is the Decision of Branch 32, Regional Trial Court,
Surigao City finding accused-appellant Hermie Bantilan y Taganas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the complex crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the supreme penalty of death.

On February 17, 1995, the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Norte, an Information charging Bantilan with the crime
of rape with homicide committed as follows:
That on December 27, 1994 at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, in Bunyasan,
Malimono, Surigao del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with full freedom, intelligence and voluntariness, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, have sexual intercourse or
carnal knowledge with one JITA QUINTO with force and intimidation and the
employment of force caused several injuries on the victim thus resulting in the death of
the victim to the damage and prejudice of the heirs, actual, moral and exemplary damages
in amounts to be proven in court.

ACT CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 335, No. 3, par. 4 of the Revised penal Code. [1]
Upon arraignment on March 29, 1995, accused Bantilan assisted by Atty. Ombra
Benaning from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) pleaded not guilty. Thus, trial ensued.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:

In the early morning of December 27, 1994, Nestor Agapay and Bernabe Humanoy went
to the store of Jita Quinto, at Barangay Bunyasan, Malimono, Surigao del Norte. They
ordered and drank a glass of Tanduay Rhum. They were attended to by Rosie Balabala,
younger sister of Jita Quinto who was then washing clothes. The store is located at the
ground floor of Quinto’s’ residence.

At twelve o’clock noon, the two sisters took their lunch. They invited accused and his
companions who were still drinking to join them. Only accused accepted the offer.

After lunch, Jita went to her room at the second floor to rest. Shortly, thereafter Bernabe
went home leaving behind accused Bantilan and Nestor Agapay who were still drinking
Tanduay Rhum.

At about two o’clock in the afternoon, accused Bantilan ordered another bottle of liquor.
Rosie refused to give him another bottle because he was already drunk. Accused Bantilan
suddenly asked where her sister Jita was. Rosie responded that she was sleeping at her
room upstairs. Accused Bantilan left without being noticed by Rosie and Nestor who
were conversing with each other. Rosie heard some noise upstairs; she just ignored it. A
few minutes later, accused Bantilan appeared and informed Rosie that her sister Jita
wanted her upstairs. Rosie immediately went up. She was followed by accused. As she
entered her sister’s room, she was shocked to see her sister sprawled on the floor
unconscious. The pillows and beddings were in disarray and were strewn around Jita.
Rosie ran towards her sister and shouted for help. Nestor rushed upstairs and carried Jita.
Accused Bantilan, however, did not help them.

Responding neighbors and barangay officials brought Jita to a nearby hospital. Accused
Bantilan, on the other hand, was turned over by the barangay officials to the chief of
police of Malimono, Surigao Del Norte, where he was detained at the municipal jail. The
Police authorities took pictures of the scene of the crime. They found fresh bloodstains
(Exh. “B”) splattered and scattered all over. What caught their attention most was the
victim’s bloodied panty strewn on the floor.

At the police station, accused Bantilan denied any involvement in the killing of the
victim. However, the investigating officer remembered the bloodied panty and thus,
asked accused Bantilan to pull up his shirt. There were bloodstains at the edges of his
shirt and his underwear (brief). He could not explain why and where he got those
bloodstains.

That same afternoon, policemen brought accused Bantilan to the hospital to have the
bloodstains found on his shirt and underwear (brief) examined. When accused Bantilan
was asked to remove his pants, the investigators saw that the lower portion of his sexual
organ contained several specks of fresh bloodstains, the size of a pinhead. What was even
more noticeable were the bloodstains covering most of accused’s brief (front portion)
(exh. “H”). Likewise, he failed to explain why he had bloodstains on his genital organ. [2]

On the other hand, the version of the defense is as follows:

xxx. At the time of the incident, he was in Surigao City buying a meterstick which he
needed as a carpenter. Thereafter, he went home arriving at their house in Bunyaran,
Malimono at around 4 o’clock in the afternoon. The barangay captain, however, fetched
him and brought him to the police station. From there, he was taken to the emergency
hospital and then brought back to the police station and placed in jail (TSN, 10 July 1990,
pp. 4-5).[3]
On February 10, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, Hermie Bantilan, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as a principal of the complex crime of rape with homicide as
defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer the mandatory penalty of DEATH by
lethal injection as provided by law.

The accused is ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim, Jita Quinto, the sum of
P14,000.00 as reimbursement of actual expenses for the burial of the deceased; the sum
of P100,000.00 as indemnity for the rape and death of the said victim; and the costs.

SO ORDERED.[4]

In this appeal, appellant made the following assignment of errors:

I.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE VICTIM JITA QUINTO
WAS RAPED.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[5]
While the appellant concedes to the well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that in rape, it is
sufficient to prove that there is penetration of the man’s penis into the victim’s sexual
organ, no matter how slight, the fact of penetration of appellant’s penis into the victim’s
vagina was not, however, established in the case at bar. The testimony of the examining
doctor did not categorically state that the victim was indeed raped. She testified that the
abrasions in the vaginal canal of the victim and the blood oozing from her vagina may
have been caused by the insertion of some other objects and not necessarily by the
forcible penetration of a man’s penis. Thus, a reasonable doubt exists on the
prosecution’s theory of rape which should be considered in favor of the accused.
Moreover, appellant avers that the trial court erred in convicting him based on
circumstantial evidence which was not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

In convicting the appellant for the crime charged, the trial court gave particular emphasis
on the following unrefuted facts established by the evidence, to wit:
The evidence stands undisputed that at about three o’clock in the afternoon of December
27, 1994, the lifeless or unconscious body of Jita Quinto was found in the bedroom of her
house in barangay Bunyasan, Malimono, Surigao del Norte. At a postmortem
examination conducted later at the Malimono District Hospital by Dr. Adoracion
Mantilla, her death was ascribed to cardiac arrest resulting from asphyxia or suffocation
as stated in her certificate of death (Exhibit E) and the medical findings of Dr. Mantilla
(Exhibit D).

According to Rosie Balabala, the younger sister of the deceased victim, she found Jita
lying on the floor where she had been sleeping. Present with her were the accused,
Hermie Bantilan, and later Nestor Agapay. The sleeping mat, pillows, mosquito net and
blanket of the deceased were in disarray as shown in the photographs (Exhibits A, A-1
and A-2). The victim’s bloodied panties (Exhibit B) were found on top of the mat as
appear in the photographs (Exhibit A-3 and A-1-A).

In her testimony, Dr. Adoracion Mantilla declared that upon making an internal
examination of Jita Quinto, she found fresh abrasions in the latter’s vaginal canal. Blood
oozed from her vagina. The doctor opined that the abrasions were probably caused by a
man having sexual intercourse forcibly with the deceased. For lack of the necessary
laboratory equipment, she was unable to conduct an examination for the presence of
spermatozoa.

The doctor further testified that she found marked bluish discolorations on the body, lips
and fingernails of the deceased indicating a lack of oxygen in her blood. The eyes were
dilated or open and bulging and there were various hematoma found around the victim’s
mouth, above her right nipple, at her extremities and her back, more specifically in the
left and right scapular regions. The aforementioned findings showed that the deceased
had to struggle for breath probably because of some object placed on her face by her
assailant.[6]
The trial court also found that the evidence inevitably and inescapably linked the accused
to the offense charged based on the following facts and circumstances:
(1) The accused, Hermie Bantilan, was in the house of the victim, Jita Quinto, at the time she
was criminally assaulted. Earlier, Bantilan had been drinking liquor with two friends in the
store at the ground floor of the victim’s house;
(2) There was a commotion in the upstairs bedroom where Jita Quinto was resting. About ten
minutes later the accused came out into the store;
   
(3) Bantilan was the one who informed Rosie Balabala that she was needed by her elder sister,
Jita Quinto, thereby admitting that he had just came from the latter;
(4) There was nobody else with Jita Quinto in her bedroom except the accused;
(5) Upon immediately responding, Rosie Balabala found Jita Quinto lying unconscious or dead
on the floor with her beddings in disarray and her bloody panties on top of the mat;
(6) While Balabala and Nestor Agapay frantically tried to revive the victim, Hermie Bantilan
just stood nearby doing nothing to help;
(7) Bantilan was brought by barangay Kagawad Severino Sacro escorted by two tanods in a
jeepney from Bunyasan to the Malimono police station in the afternoon of December 27,
1994;
(8) When Bantilan was physically examined by Chief of Police Eulogio Ferol, he saw
bloodstains in the briefs and tiny specks of blood at the edge of the shirt of the said
 accused;
(9) The foregoing findings of the Chief of police were confirmed and verified by Dr. Ramon
D. Lafuente who found, in addition thereto, numerous specks of newly dried blood on the
sexual organ of Hermie Bantilan; and,
(10) The postmortem examination of Jita Quinto conducted by Dr. Adoracion Mantilla showed
that the deceased sustained fresh abrasions in her vaginal canal and blood oozed from her
vagina. In the doctor’s opinion these were caused by someone having had forcible sexual
intercourse with her.[7]
The testimony of prosecution witness Rosie Balabala established how the crime was
committed. On direct examination, she testified as follows:
Prosecutor:

Q:    Do you recall where were you last December 27, 1994 at around 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon more or less?
A:    Yes, Sir.

Q:    Where were you at that time?

A:    I was at the store, Sir.

Q:    Where is that store located?

A:    At the ground floor of her house where I stayed.

Q:    What barangay is that house located?

A:    At Barangay Buniasan, Malimono, Surigal del Norte.

Q:    By the way, who is the owner of that store?

A:    Jita Quinto.

Q:    Your sister?

A:    Yes, Sir.

Q:    The victim in this case?

A:    Yes, sir.

Q:    At that time, what were you doing at the store of your sister?
A:    I was tending the store.

Q:    While you were tending that store of your sister, at that time, do you remember of
incident that happened at that time?
A:    They were drinking.

Court: (to the witness)

Q:    Who were drinking?
A:    Hermie Bantilan, Nestor Agapay, and Bernabie Humanoy.

Prosecutor:

Q:    While you were tending your store and your customers are Hermie Bantilan, Nestor
Agapay, and Bernabie Humanoy, what happened, if any?
A:    After they finished that drinks they ordered for another drinks, but I did not give
them.

Q     Do you remember who asked for another drinks?

A:    Hermie Bantilan.

Court: (To the witness)

Q:    What did they drink?

A:    Tanduay Rhum.

Prosecutor:

Q:    Now, when you told him that you will not give him drink any more, what did he do?
A:    Then he asked the whereabouts of my ate.

Q:    What did he tell you?

A:    He said, where is your ate and I told him that she was upstairs sleeping?

Q:    What did he do after you told him that she was upstairs sleeping?
A:    I noticed that he move away from me.

Court: (to the witness)

Q:    When you said, Ate, to whom are you referring to?
A:    Jita Quinto.

Prosecutor:

Q     When you said he went away from you, can you remember what did he do by that
time?
A:    After a while there was a commotion upstairs.

Q     When you heard that there was a commotion upstairs what did you do?
A:    After a while he arrived at the store and told me that my ate wanted me to go
upstairs.
Q     Who told you that?
A:    Hermie Bantilan.

Q:    You mean the accused in this case?

A:    Yes, sir.

Court:

Q:    Who told you that your sister wanted you to go upstairs?
A:    Hermie Bantilan, Sir.

Prosecutor:

Q:    From the time that you heard the commotion upstairs to the time that you were told
(sic) by your Ate upstairs, how many minutes have elapsed?
A:    About 10 minutes.

Q:    From the time that you see that the accused went away from you and at the time he
came back and said that you were wanted by your sister, how long did it take that period?
A:    More than 30 minutes.

Q:    When you said that the accused went away from you, do you remember where was
the companion of Hermie Bantilan?
A:    Bernabie Humanoy already went home.

Q:    How about the other companion named, Nestor Agapay?

A:    He was there in the ground floor of the store.

Q:    What was he doing there?

A:    We were conversing each other.

Q:    When the accused told you to go upstairs because your Ate wanted you, what did
you do?
A:    I immediately went upstairs.

Q:    When you went upstairs, where was Hermie Bantilan?

A:    He was at my back following me.

Q:    How about Nestor Agapay?

A:    He remained at the store.

Q:    Did you reach upstairs when the accused told you?
A:    Yes, Sir.

Q:    When you reached upstairs, what happened next?

A:    I saw my sister lying in the floor.

Q:    Which part of the house upstairs that you saw that your sister lying in the floor?
A:    In the bedroom.

Q:    How many bedroom of your house?

A:    Two bedrooms.

Q:    When you saw your sister lying on the floor, what did you notice anything?
A:    I immediately run for her assistance and shouted for help.

Q:    Why did you shout?

A:    To ask for help.

Q:    To whom did you direct your shout?

A:    To our neighbors.

Q:    When you shouted for help, where was the accused, Hermie Bantilan?
A:    He was there at the house.

Q:    What was he doing there in the house?

A:    He was just standing.

Q:    How about Nestor Agapay do?

A:    When I shouted for help, Nestor Agapay ran upstairs.

Q:    What did Nestor Agapay do?

A:    And Nestor Agapay carried the body of my older sister.

Q:    When you saw your sister for the first time in the room, did you notice anything
inside the room?
A:    When I entered the room, the pillows were disarranged, mosquito net was covering
her body, and pillows was at her side and also at the other side.

Q:    When you first saw your sister, what did you notice in her face?
A:    Her face was bluish and eyes wide open (lig-at).

Q:    Did you talk to her at that time?

A:    No more.
Q:    After that, what happened next, after Nestor Agapay carried the body of your elder
sister?
A:    I went down and shouted for help.

Q:    When your sister was carried by Nestor Agapay, where was the accused at that
time?
A:    He just stayed and after awhile he went down.[8]

Another prosecution witness Dr. Ramon D. Lafuente, Medical Officer IV of Malimono

District Hospital testified on the condition of the accused, thus:

Q:    Were you able to examine Hermie Bantilan on that day of December 27, 1994?
A:    I was able to examine Hermie Bantilan when he was brought to the hospital about
5:15 in the afternoon.

Q:    Do you know who brought him there in the hospital if you can remember?
A:    I don’t know it was PNP members.

Q:    Now, in your findings in this medical certificate that you had identified to have
issued, here is in the diagnosis and findings, the patient appeared to be drunk. How did
you conclude that the patient appeared to be drunk at that time?
A:    His facial appearance, his face was red.

Court:

Q:    How about his smell?

A:    I cannot smell, your honor.

Q:    Did you notice if he smell of an alcohol?

A:    I did not notice, your honor.

Q:    How did you conclude that he was drunk?

A:    From his facial appearance his face was red, your honor.

Q:    Is that all?

A:    Yes, your honor.

Court:

That is all, doctor.

Prosecutor:
Q:    The number two findings, it is stated, presence of fresh blood in the brief, anterior
side. Will you elaborate on this findings doctor?
A:    That is in front.

Court:

Q:    Will you indicate in your person the part, you point to your body?

Court Interpreter:

Witness pointing in front portion of his sexual organ.

Prosecutor:

Q:    How big was the fresh blood that you saw in his brief?
A:    Specks of blood pinhead size.

Court:

Q:    How many specks of blood?

A:    So many, your honor.

Court:

Go ahead.

Prosecutor:

Q:    Now, can you tell the Honorable Court the number two finding the size of the blood
on the portion of his brief which contained specks of blood?
A:    Around 2/3 of the front area of his brief.

Q:    Did you ask this Hermie Bantilan when you examined why it happened that he has
fresh blood on his brief?
A:    I failed to ask on that.[9]

x x x.
There is no doubt that Jita Quinto was raped. The physical evidence in the instant case
showing the use of brutal force on her when she was sexually assaulted certainly speaks
louder than words. The failure to find the presence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina
does not in any way weaken the prosecution’s theory of rape for, indeed, there was
enough evidence to prove the existence of rape and that the appellant was the author of
the crime. In fact, the most incriminating pieces of evidence against appellant were his
bloodied shirt and underwear. Reminded by the bloodied panty of the victim strewn on
the floor, the investigating officer told appellant to pull up his shirt. There were
bloodstains at the edges of his shirt and on the front portion of his underwear (brief).
Upon closer examination, there were also tiny specks of fresh bloodstains, many of which
were the size of a pinhead on the lower portion of his sexual organ. Appellant could not
explain how and why he got those bloodstains at the edge of his shirt and in the front
portion of his underwear.

In a strained effort to seek an acquittal, counsel of appellant even argues that the
prosecution failed to prove that these bloodstains were human bloodstains in the light of
the ruling in People v. Alicando.[10] The facts in that case are different and, therefore,
cannot have any material bearing on this case. There, the police investigators found
bloodstains on the pillow and on the t-shirt of the accused found in his house. The Court
discarded the evidence because “there was no testimony that the stains were caused by
either the blood of the appellant or the victim” and, “(i)n addition, there was no testimony
that the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly committed the crime
x x x.” Moreover, a material circumstance peculiar in Alicando, was the accused’s claim
that he was a butcher in a market. In stark contrast, bloodstains in the case at bar were
found not only on the shirt belonging to appellant, but, of all places, on his sexual organ
and on the front portion of his brief. If, for instance, tomato sauce or a red substance
(other than blood) accidentally spilled on him, why did it get into his sex organ and the
front portion of his brief without his trousers being stained, as well, in the process? Yet,
he could not even offer the lamest explanation why and how he got the red substance that
had all the appearances of human blood. One other critical dissimilarity between this case
and Alicando is that, here, the appellant was physically examined right after the brutal
killing was committed; thus, the possibility of a smear getting into appellant’s genitals
and the front portion of his brief with something else other than blood belonging to the
victim is nil. In Alicando, on the other hand, the accused therein was arrested at the meat
section of a supermarket the morning following the commission of the rape; hence, the
posibility was injected that he could have smeared his shirt in some place other than
where the victim was rape and murdered.

It must be noted that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only
matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.[11] Conviction
can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion proving that
the appellant is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others.[12] The law provides
that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[13] We agree with the trial court that all these requirements were
adequately met in the case at bar to sustain the accused-appellant’s conviction.
The prosecution has indubitably established appellant’s culpability through the following
circumstances: (1) Few minutes before the rape-slay of the victim, appellant asked Rosie
(victim’s younger sister) her whereabouts; (2) Appellant left unnoticed; (3) Shortly
thereafter, Rosie heard a commotion upstairs; (4) About ten minutes later, appellant
appeared and informed Rosie that her sister wanted her upstairs. (How else could he have
told Rosie that Jita wanted to see her sister were it not for the fact that he had come from
upstairs?); (5) The victim was seen sprawled dead in her bedroom; (6) Appellant did not
lift a hand to help; (7) Few hours later, appellant was turned over to the police authorities
for investigation, wherein it was discovered that his shirt, underwear and genital organ
were sprinkled and splattered with bloodstains. He could not explain why and where he
got those bloodstains; and (8) The victim, meanwhile, was found to have been brutally
killed and sexually assaulted.[14]

Bantilan denied being at the scene of the crime. He interposed the alibi that he was in
Surigao City buying a meter stick. Defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak and
have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they
can be concocted.[15] On its face, these defenses are worthless considering that Rosie
Balabala positively testified that the accused-appellant was in the house of the deceased
at or about the time of the commission of the crime. No corroboration as to his
whereabouts was ever presented. Neither can we impute bad faith or malice on the part of
Rosie in testifying against Bantilan. Bantilan was a distant relative and a good friend of
the two sisters and oftentimes went to visit them at the store.[16] The trial court found no
motive for Rosie Balabala to wrongfully implicate Bantilan in so serious a charge as in
the case at bar. In the light of the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator
of the crime, the defense of alibi must fail.

Appellant’s evil intention was obvious. After inquiring from Rosie where her sister was,
he slowly and stealthily moved away and disappeared. A good thirty minutes later, Rosie
heard a commotion upstairs and after ten minutes, appellant appeared and informed Rosie
that her sister wanted her upstairs. How did he know then that Jita was upstairs if he had
not been there? Soon after, Jita was discovered sprawled on the floor. Appellant was the
only person who came down from upstairs. No plausible theory was offered, much less
evidence presented, to demonstrate the possibility that somebody else other than the
appellant could have gone upstairs and raped the victim.

The post-mortem examination revealed that the victim’s death was caused by
asphyxiation. When Rosie went upstairs, she discovered the room in disarray, her sister
lifeless on the floor, her face bluish and eyes wide open. The examining doctor opined
that there was an object placed on her face which prevented her from breathing which
consequently, led to her death. The strength of the hands or object that smothered the
victim’s face must have been so great that the victim was not even able to bleat out cries,
shouts, or shrieks of help which could have at least alerted the people downstairs. This is
why Rosie heard only a small commotion from upstairs, which must have come from the
desperate struggle to break away from his stronghold to reach for air. Given such
established facts, this was the only way resorted to by the appellant in order to silence the
victim while he succeeded in satisfying his lust on her. In the absence of a showing that
anyone else, other than the appellant, had the opportunity to be at the scene of the crime
during the very short period between the time appellant went upstairs and the moment
Rosie heard a commotion coming from there, followed by the appellant telling her that
Jita wanted to see her, appellant must necessarily be considered as the author of the rape
and the resulting death of the victim.

The Court is satisfied with moral certainty that the trial court has established the guilt of
the appellant for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of R.A. 7659 provides
that:
x x x.

“when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed , the penalty
shall be death.”
Thus, the Court is constrained to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court. Four
justices of the Court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of Republic Act
7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of
the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In line with the recent jurisprudence, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the victim of
rape with homicide is in the amount of P100,000.00 which is fully justified and properly
commensurate with the seriousness of the said special complex crime. [17]

The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is granted. Moral damages may be

additionally awarded to the heirs of the victim in a criminal proceeding without the need
for pleading or proof of the basis thereof; the fact that they suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages
under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial. [18]

However, one Justice votes to acquit accused-appellant expressing the following:

DISSENTING OPINION
With much trepidation, I regret that I can not agree to the majority’s decision to affirm
the death penalty imposed on the accused.

It is a basic rule in criminal procedure that, ‘the burden of proving that an accused is
guilty of the offense charged lies upon the prosecution, and that the burden must be
discharged on the strength of its own evidence and not upon the weakness of the evidence
submitted by the defense’ (People vs. Adofina, 239 SCRA 67, 81-82 [1994].) ‘The
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense’ (People vs. Ramirez,
266 SCRA 335, 347 [1997], citing People vs. Guamos, 241 SCRA 528, 531 [1995], citing
People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992], People vs. Pizarro, 211 SCRA 325 [1992]
and People vs. De la Cruz, 207 SCRA 449 [1992].) In the case at bar there is misplaced
reliance by the majority on the presence of bloodstains in the undershirt and genital organ
of the accused. This circumstance is inadequate to show that he committed the crime of
rape with homicide.

‘The presumption of innocence is founded upon the basic principles of justice and is a
substantial part of the law. Thus, it cannot be overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture,
i.e., a probability that the accused committed the crime or that he had the opportunity to
do so’ (People vs. Isla, 278 SCRA 47, 52 [1997]; see also People vs. Salem, 280 SCRA
841 [1997].)

We have held that the presence of bloodstains on the garments, without further proof that
the same are necessarily the by-products of the rape committed and that they are the dried
blood of either appellant or the victim, cannot for lack of connecting proof be considered,
even as part of circumstantial evidence in determining appellant’s culpability (People vs.
Ilao, G.R. No. 129529, September 29, 1998.) The conclusion of the trial court that the
bloodstains were indicia of rape is speculative and conjectural because there is no
evidence showing that blood was exuded from appellant or the victim during or after the
sexual intercourse in question. With the failure of the prosecution to show that copulation
necessarily leads to bleeding and that the stains were the victim’s or appellant’s dried
blood, other circumstances and events cannot be excluded as the possible sources
thereof (People vs. Ilao, supra.) This ruling may well be the rationalization in this case.

In the case at bar, the bloodstains were not submitted for examination; there was no
finding that they belonged to the accused or to the victim, hence, as held in the above
cited case, it should not have been considered as part of the circumstantial evidence. It
can not be considered as an indicia that accused raped the victim much more that he
killed the victim.

As emphatically ruled in People vs. Isla (Supra, on p. 570, citing People vs. Jumao-as,
230 SCRA 70), ‘mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required
to establish the guilt of an appellant beyond reasonable doubt.’ The probability that
accused was the one who raped and killed the victim is based on speculation arising from
the bloodstains found in the garments and person of the accused.

In imposing the supreme penalty of death, we must exercise utmost caution. We value
human life no matter how heinous the crime may be attributed to the suspect. In People
vs. Godoy (250 SCRA 676, 732 [1995]), we repeated the age old observation and
experience of mankind on the penological and societal effect of capital punishment: ‘If it
is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.’

I submit that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. I vote to acquit.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision sentencing the
accused-appellant Hermie Bantilan to the supreme penalty of death. Accused-appellant is
directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, in addition to the sums of P100,000 as civil indemnity and P14,000 as actual
expenses awarded by the trial court.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of his pardoning
power.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, p.7.
[2]
 Brief for the Appellee, Rollo, pp. 100-103.
[3]
 Brief for the Appellant, Id., at 67.
[4]
 Id., at 25.
[5]
 Id., at 68, 72.
[6]
 Id., at 21.
[7]
 Id., at 22-23.
[8]
 TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 25-30.
[9]
 TSN, October 13, 1995, pp. 8-11.
[10]
 251 SCRA 293 (1995).
[11]
 People v. Danao, 253 SCRA 146 (1996).

 People v. Parel, 261 SCRA 720 (1996); People v. Tabag, 268 SCRA 115 (1997);
[12]

People v. Villarin, 269 SCRA 630 (1997); and People v. Salvame, 270 SCRA 766
(1997).
[13]
 Section 4, Rule 133, Rules on Evidence.
[14]
 Rollo, p. 154
[15]
 People v. Henson, 270 SCRA 634 (1997); People v. Andal, 279 SCRA 474 (1997).
[16]
 See Decision, Rollo, p. 17.

 People v. Renante Robles y Burgos, Jr., alias “Titing”, G.R. No. 124300, March 25,
[17]

1999.
[18]
 Ibid.
 [G.R. No. 123891. February 28, 2001.]

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, and CARLOS NIETES, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated September 25, 1995 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR Case No. 009101-95. Said
decision affirmed with modification the judgment dated March 16, 1995 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), ordering the herein petitioner
and Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation to pay private respondent jointly and
severally the sum of US$21,000 or its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment
and P34,114.00 as reimbursement for medical expenses plus 10% of the total award as
attorney’s fees in favor of the private Respondent. In its Resolution dated December
29, 1995, the NLRC also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The facts in this case are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On January 23, 1993, private respondent, Carlos Nietes filed a complaint against
Philippine Transmarine Carriers Inc. (PTC) for payment of disability benefit, sickness
wages, refund of medical expenses and attorney’s fees. Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corp. was impleaded as surety of respondent PTC.

Private respondent alleged that he was a licensed Captain and/or Master Mariner. For
the period March 1985 to May 17, 1990, he was employed by PTC. He last boarded M/V
MA. ROSARIO where he served as Master from April 11, 1990 to May 17, 1990. At that
time he was a member of good standing of the Associated Marine Officers and
Seamen’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), an affiliate of the International Transport
Federation (ITF) of London. He paid his union dues, insurance premiums, etc., which
were checked-off from his salaries.

As Master on board, he received US$1,500.00 per month. From May 10, 1990 up to
May 17, 1990, the date he was repatriated, he was hospitalized at the Moji Hospital in
Moji, Japan, at the instance of the vessel’s owners. Upon his arrival in the Philippines,
he was instructed by PTC and AMOSUP to report to the Seamen’s Hospital, a hospital
owned and operated by AMOSUP. On May 19, 1990, Dr. George Matti of the Seamen’s
Hospital issued a medical certification that he was unfit for work and was instructed to
continue treatment/medication.

When he was refused admission at the Seamen’s Hospital, he was forced to secure
medical treatment at the Sto. Niño Medical Specialist and Emergency Clinic as an out-
patient. His attending physician was Dra. Geraldine B. Emperador. Her diagnosis
showed he was unfit to work as Master of the vessel.
On May 25, 1992, he referred his claims to Atty. Oscar Torres who repeatedly informed
PTC of the claim for benefits and refund. Sometime in July 1992, he was informed by
Atty. Torres that his claim was being handled by Atty. Augusto Arreza, Jr., PTC’s legal
consultant and that they had submitted all the required documents to Atty. Arreza,
including the carbon original of the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Matti of the
Seamen’s Hospital which certificate states that he was not fit to work.

From November 1992 up to the filing of this petition, Atty. Torres allegedly had not
talked to Atty. Arreza. Being a member of AMOSUP from 1985 to 1990, until he was
declared unfit to work, petitioner claimed he was entitled to "permanent total disability"
benefit in the amount equivalent to 86% of the US$18,000.00, sickness wage benefit in
the sum of US$6,000.00 as per Section C, Subsection (c) of the POEA Standard Format,
plus ten percent (10%) of the total judgment award and attorney’s fee.

In his supplemental complaint, private respondent further asked for refund of medical
expenses incurred in the amount of P30,411.00 plus professional fee of P4,000.00 or a
total of P34,411.00. Receipts covering these payments were submitted as Annexes "I"
and "II."
cralaw virtua1aw library

On March 16, 1995, the POEA Adjudication Office issued its decision in favor of the
private Respondent. It held that

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering respondents Philippine

Transmarine Carriers Inc. and Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. to pay complainant
jointly and severally the sum of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$21,000.00)
or its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment and P34,114.00 representing
reimbursement of medical expenses plus ten percent (10%) thereof of the total award
by way of and/as attorney’s fees.

All other causes or actions are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner appealed said decision to the NLRC which affirmed it except for the award of
attorney’s fees which is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. NLRC later denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner now contends that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . .AWARDING DISABILITY BENEFIT TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT DESPITE THE ABSENCE

OF PROOF OF HIS PERMANENT DISABILITY AND THE DEGREE THEREOF. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

. . .ARBITRARILY DISREGARDING THE WELL-ESTABLISHED FACT THAT THE ABSENCE

OF A DETERMINATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S PERMANENT DISABILITY AND THE
DEGREE THEREOF WAS DUE SOLELY TO HIS FAULT. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

. . .AWARDING SICK WAGES TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE FULL PERIOD OF 120
DAYS NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION OF HIS UNFITNESS TO
WORK OR A DETERMINATION OF THE DEGREE OF HIS PERMANENT DISABILITY.

. . .GRANTING THE REIMBURSEMENTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL

EXPENSES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LATTER’S TREATMENT WAS DONE BY A
PHYSICIAN NOT DESIGNATED OR ACCREDITED BY PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF THE
POEA STANDARD CONTRACT.

The main issue is whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming with
modification, the judgment of the POEA Adjudication Office.

Petitioner admits that private respondent suffered illness which rendered him unfit for
work. However, it points out that private respondent did not submit proof of the extent
of his disability as required by Section C (4) [b] and [c] of the POEA Standard Contract
for Seamen. 1 Without this proof, petitioner argues that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it affirmed the findings of the POEA.

Petitioner also contends that public respondents erred in awarding sick wages for 120
days in favor of the private respondent without evidence on record establishing the
extent of his disability, which is essential in determining the correct amount of disability
benefit. Further, petitioner avers private respondent’s claim for refund of the medical
expenses should have not been granted by the public respondents on the ground that
the physician who treated private respondent was not accredited in violation of the
POEA Standard Contract for Seamen.

Public respondents held that "in effect, the complainant has substantially complied with
the POEA Standard of Employment Contract for Seamen when he submitted himself to
the Seamen’s Hospital three days after his repatriation from Japan." 2 They also found
that private respondent had in fact substantially complied with the post-employment
requirements under paragraph 4 [b] and [c] of Section c, 3 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Seamen. We note that private respondent submitted himself,
upon the instructions of the petitioner and AMOSUP, to the Seamen’s Hospital, which is
owned and operated by AMOSUP, for medical assistance under the care of Dr. George
Matti, a company accredited physician, three days after his May 17, 1990 repatriation
from Japan.

On record, private respondent was examined and diagnosed at the Seamen’s Hospital
and was found to be suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy, so
that he was declared unfit to work by no less than a company accredited physician in
the person of Dr. George Matti. 4
Petitioner was well aware of the private respondent’s hospitalization at Moji, Japan, as
well as his repatriation on May 17, 1990. It was upon the advice of petitioner that he
was examined and diagnosed at the Seamen’s Hospital. There Dr. George Matti,
petitioner’s own accredited physician, declared him unfit to work. Petitioner could not
now feign ignorance of this information. Two licensed physicians examined and
diagnosed private respondent and both of them had issued similar findings, that private
respondent was afflicted with congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy making him
unfit to work.

Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. In NFD
International Manning Agents, Inc. v. NLRC, 269 SCRA 486, 494 (1997), we said: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Strict rules of evidence, it must be remembered, are not applicable in claims for
compensation and disability benefits. Private respondent having substantially
established the causative circumstances leading to his permanent total disability to
have transpired during his employment, we find the NLRC to have acted in the exercise
of its sound discretion in awarding permanent total disability benefits to
private Respondent. Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of
proof in compensation proceedings.

Consistently the Court has ruled that "disability should not be understood more on its
medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability
means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of
similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work
which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute
helplessness." 5 In disability compensation, we likewise held, it is not the injury which
is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of
one’s earning capacity. 6

Finally, petitioner faults public respondent for allowing the reimbursements of private
respondent’s medical expenses despite the fact that the latter’s treatment was done by
a physician not designated or accredited by the petitioner in violation of the POEA
Standard Contract for Seamen. However, records of the case show that private
respondent had initially sought treatment at Seamen’s Hospital under the care of Dr.
George Matti, a company accredited physician. Only after he was refused admission
thereat was he compelled to seek medical assistance elsewhere. His life and health
being at stake, private respondent did not have the luxury to scout for a company-
accredited physician nor was it fair at this late stage for his employer to deny him such
refund for medical services that previously he was admittedly entitled to. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the
protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board
ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly,
reasonably and liberally in their favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully
carried into effect. 7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of public respondent

National Labor Relations Commission dated September 25, 1995 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner and Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation are ordered to pay jointly and
severally the following amounts to private respondent Carlos Nietes: Twenty One
Thousand US Dollars (US$21,000.00) or its peso equivalent at the time of actual
payment, as disability benefits and P34,114.00 representing reimbursement of medical
expenses, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. 4. The liabilities of the employer when the seaman suffers injury or illness during the
term of his contract are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) . . .

b) . . . the employer should be liable for the full cost of such medical, dental, surgical
and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seaman is declared fit to
work or to be repatriated.

However, if after repatriation the seaman still requires medical attention arising from
said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he
is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company
designated physician.

c) The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he leaves the
vessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel the seaman is entitled to
one hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he is declared fit to work or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company designated
physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) DAYS. For
this purpose, the seaman shall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by the company designated physician within three working days upon his
return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written
notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the
seaman to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

2. Rollo, pp. 35-36.

3. Supra. note 1.

4. Rollo, p. 24.

5. ECC v. Edmund Sanico, 321 SCRA 268, 270-271 (1999); GSIS v. CA, 285 SCRA 430,
436 (1998) GSIS v. CA, 260 SCRA 133, 138 (1996); Bejerano v. ECC, 205 SCRA 598,
602 (1992).

6. Bejerano v. ECC, supra, citing Ulibas v. Republic, 83 SCRA 819 (1978); Roma v.
WCC, 80 SCRA 170 (1977).
7. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 318 SCRA 623, 634 (1999).
 [ G.R. Nos. 105954-55, September 28, 1999 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VS. IRENEO
FAJARDO, SIMPLICIO ATIENZA, DOMINGO HINGGAN, GUILLERMO
PANGANIBAN, JULIAN TERCERO, EUSTACIO ONATE, RUPERTO
FAJARDO, BENIGNO LUMBRES, BONIFACIO DEMAPILIS, TIRSO
MARANAN, QUINTIN FAJARDO, BEN NATIVIDAD AND SEVERAL JOHN
DOES, ACCUSED, IRENEO FAJARDO, RUPERTO FAJARDO, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For review before this Court is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna
in Criminal Case No. 4371-B[1] dated December 20, 1991 convicting herein appellants to
each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants were charged and convicted for
the crimes of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention.

The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto Fajardo,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as co-principals of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom,
defined and penalized in Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, with the
attendant aggravating circumstances of use of motor vehicles without any mitigating
circumstances to offset the same. In view however, of the constitutional provision which
proscribes the death penalty (Sec. 19[1] 1987 Constitution) the Court hereby sentences the
said accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories provided
for by law plus the proportionate costs.

The amount of $3,000,000.00 extorted from the victim or friends of the victim shall be
restored, as it is hereby ordered returned.

For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Simplicio Atienza is hereby declared

acquitted. The bailbond posted by him for his provisional liberty is ordered canceled and
his surety is relieved of the said undertaking.

Both accused having been declared guilty of the crime charged, they are hereby ordered
immediately committed to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.

Biñan, Laguna.”
Accused Ireneo Fajardo, Simplicio Atienza, Domingo Hinggan, Guillermo Panganiban,
Julian Tercero, Eustacio Onate, Ruperto Fajardo, Benigno Lumbres, Bonifacio
Demapilis, Tirso Maranan, Quintin Fajardo, Ben Natividad and several John Does were
charged in an information for “Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention.”[2] Of the aforementioned accused, only Ireneo Fajardo, Simpliciano Atienza
and Ruperto Fajardo were arraigned and tried.[3] All the other accused remained at large.

Accused Bonifacio Dimapilis died during the pendency of the case and the indictment
against him was dismissed. Since the other accused were still at large, the trial court
declared that it had no jurisdiction over them.[4] Accused Simpliciano Atienza was
acquitted by the trial court.[5]

Hence this appeal interposed by Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto Fajardo.

The undisputed facts are:

In the early morning of November 15, 1986 several Japanese executives of Mitsui & Co.
and other Japanese companies left Makati, Metro Manila to enjoy a game of golf at the
Canlubang Golf Club, Canlubang, Laguna. Nobuyuki Wakaoji headed the group of
executives. The group arrived at the Golf Club in a convoy of five cars. The drivers of the
executives parked at the Golf Club car park while the executives played golf. The round
of golf lasted for about four hours, after which the executives had lunch at the Clubhouse.
It was already 3:00 p.m. when the executives left the Golf Club. The convoy of five cars
was led by the car driven by Emiliano Ordona. In it was Nobuyuki Wakaoji. Meanwhile,
the fourth car was driven by prosecution witness Ernesto Escobar. Escobar testified that
five minutes later, the convoy was overtaken by two cars. The two cars, one of them a
blue Toyota Cressida, blocked the lead car. Two men came out of one car and
approached the lead car. A third man, allegedly appellant Ireneo Fajardo, remained
standing near the door of the blue Cressida. The two men forcibly took Wakaoji out of
the car and shoved him in the blue Cressida. The Cressida then sped away in the direction
of the highway.[6]

To support its finding of “detention” the trial court relied on the testimonies of Mario
Palig and Jimmy Lasam. Lasam testified that while looking for a grass cutting job in Aya,
Talisay, Batangas at around 2:00 p.m. of November 25, 1986, he saw Wakaoji being
escorted by three armed men (supposedly accused Maranan, Dimapilis and appellant
Ruperto Fajardo) from the house of accused Lumbres to a waiting white car. He
described Wakaoji as being blindfolded with his hands tied behind his back. [7]

On the other hand, Palig testified that at around 2:00 p.m., on November 25, 1986 he was
at Tarangka, Talisay, Batangas when he saw appellant Ruperto Fajardo in the house of
accused Lumbres. Palig testified that a helicopter boarded by Japanese nationals arrived.
The Japanese nationals alighted, talked to Lumbres and took some pictures. He stated that
Wakaoji was escorted by appellant Ruperto Fajardo, accused Lumbres and Maranan to a
white car, which they boarded. Both witnesses testified that three other unidentified
armed men boarded a passenger jeep and followed the white car.[8]

From these testimonies the trial court concluded that, “…another set of kidnappers
consisting of the group of Ruperto Fajardo moved their victim from Barangay Tarangka,
Talisay, Batangas to Barangay Suplang, Tanauan, Batangas, in a wise move to evade
from the clutches of the law…”[9]

The appellants raise the following assignment of errors:[10]

I.

THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE COMMISSION OF

THE CRIME CHARGED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF TESTIMONIES OF
PROCURRED, PERJURED AND REHEARSED WITNESSES AND STATEMENTS
OF PERSONS WHO WERE NEVER PRESENTED AS WITNESSES FOR THE
STATE.

II.

THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE WRITTEN

STATEMENTS OF PERSONS WHO WERE NEVER PRESENTED AS WITNESSES,
AND DRAWING CONCLUSIONS, SURMISES AND PRESUMPTIONS
EXTENTSIVELY THEREFROM.

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY

BETWEEN THE APPELLANTS, OR WITH OTHERS, ON THE BASIS OF
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.

IV.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING AND RULING THAT THE IDENTITIES
OF THE APPELLANTS WERE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS
MERELY OF THE HIGHLY INCREDIBLE, PERJURED, PROCURED,
MANUFACTURED AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES FOR THE PROSECUTION.

V.

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DISCREDITING ENTIRELY THE TESTIMONIES

OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENSE, PARTICULARLY THE DEFENSE OF
ALIBI.
 VI.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR LEAVE FILED BY
THE APPELLANTS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF MATERIAL AND NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW THAT SOME OTHER PERSONS
CONFESSED TO THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION.

VII.

FINALLY, THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANTS

GUILTY, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
The appeal is without merit.

As its first assignment of error, appellants would have us believe that the prosecution
witnesses, Ernesto Escobar, Mario Palig and Jimmy Lasam were “procured, perjured, and
rehearsed.” Appellants’ bare statements without the presentation of evidence will not
sway us. No proof was presented to substantiate their claim that Escobar, Palig and
Lasam were motivated to falsely testify against appellants. It is a basic rule that mere
allegations are not equivalent to proof.[11] Each party must prove his affirmative
allegations.[12] Appellants failed to do so in this case. Accordingly, there being nothing in
the record to show that witnesses were actuated by any improper motive, their testimony
shall be entitled to full faith and credit.[13]

As to the second and third assignments of error, we note that even assuming that the trial
court erroneously considered statements which were inadmissible in evidence, the
convictions should still be sustained on the basis of other evidence which are admissible.
This evidence consists of the testimonies of Escobar, Palig and Lasam.

We likewise reject appellants’ fourth assignment of error. We find that appellants were
positively identified. It is true that the trial court may have erred in determining Ireneo
Fajardo’s actual participation in the crime, nonetheless, Ireneo Fajardo’s presence during
Wakaoji’s abduction and kidnapping was sufficiently established by prosecution witness
Escobar.

While we agree with appellants that the trial court’s finding that the most “prominent
among” the conspirators was Ireneo Fajardo is without basis,[14] however, the records
show that Ireneo Fajardo stood by the car as two other identified men pull Wakaoji out of
the first car and push him to the back seat of the Toyota Cressida car. Ireneo Fajardo
drove the Toyota Cressida. Ireneo Fajardo stood as a look out.

On direct examination Escobar stated:[15] 

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court what you saw was happening in front?
A: I saw that there were three (3) men carrying arms.
   
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court, what were these three (3) bearing arms doing
when you saw them?
A: Two men were approaching the car driven by Emiliano Ordona and one (1) man was
standing just near the door of the car.
   
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court what did these two (2) armed men who
approached the car of Emiliano Ordona did, if they did anything?
A: What I saw they were just holding the door of the car, sir.
   
Q: And, other than holding the front door of the car, what else did you see if anything?
A: A man was standing near the steering wheel of the Cressida car, sir.
x x x     x x x     x x x
Q: Now, you said you saw one (1) person standing beside the door near the steering wheel of
the Cressida car and there were two (2) armed men who approached the vehicle driven by
Emiliano Ordona, can you tell this Honorable Court if you know these three (3) men you
saw?
A: I only recognized one (1), sir.
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court who was that person you said you can identify?
A: Yes, sir, I can point.

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court who was that person?
A: Ireneo Fajardo, sir.
x x x     x x x     x x x

It must be remembered that a witness who testifies categorically, spontaneously, frankly

and consistently is a credible witness.[16] In this case, we find that Escobar testified in
such a manner.

In disputing the positive identification of Ireneo Fajardo by Escobar, appellants insist that
Escobar “admitted emphatically that he had never met Ireneo Fajardo at anytime in his
life prior to the investigation on January 12, 1987.”[17] We note that the fact that they did
not meet is not a deterrent to affirming the trial court’s finding of positive identification.
There is nothing in the law and jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non,
that in order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon,
he must first know the latter personally.[18]

Appellants also posit that since Escobar was twenty meters away from the Toyota
Cressida car, it is unlikely that he would have been able to identify Ireneo Fajardo. [19] We
are not convinced. In People vs. Castillo,[20] we held that a “distance of forty to forty-five
meters away from the scene of the crime may, by itself,” lead the Court to entertain
doubts on the accuracy of what a witness has observed, “but once a witness has gained
familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a
considerable distance.” In the case at bar, we find that Escobar was able to gain
familiarity with Ireneo Fajardo while they were in the parking lot of the Canlubang Golf
and Country Club, where he observed Ireneo Fajardo surveying the area for a couple of
hours prior to the abduction.[21]

We also find that Palig and Lasam categorically identified Ruperto Fajardo. Both Palig
and Lasam testified that Ruperto Fajardo was one of the armed men who escorted
Wakaoji from the house of Benigno Lubres to the white car.[22] The conditions of
visibility on that day of November 25, 1986 in Tarangka, Talisay, Batangas have not
been open to serious doubt. In People vs. Fabregas,[23] we held that when conditions of
visibility are favorable, and the witness does not appear to be biased, his assertion as to
the identity of the malefactors should normally be accepted.

Neither can the fifth assignment of error be given serious consideration. Since appellants
were positively identified, their defenses of alibi cannot prevail. We have held time and
time again that alibi is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by a prosecution witness.[24] Positive identification, where
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law.[25]

The sixth assignment of error also cannot hold water. We agree with the Solicitor General
that the trial court correctly denied appellants’ motion to re-open the case for the
introduction of “newly discovered evidence” consisting of newspaper reports which
contained “confessions” of different persons as to their participation in the Wakaoji
kidnapping.[26] Such are not newly discovered evidence. Given that the appellants have
been positively identified, the admission of the newspaper accounts will not if introduced
and admitted “change the judgment.”[27] Moreover such newspaper reports are
incompetent and inadmissible for being hearsay.

The seventh assignment of error is also unmeritorious. We find that the appellants’ guilt
has been established beyond reasonable doubt. It is axiomatic that all elements of the
crime charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.[28] The law requires only a moral
certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
[29]
 The crime charged in this case is kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The
elements of serious illegal detention are:[30]
(1) that the offender is a private individual;
(2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances are present:
 (a) that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5 days;
(b) that it is committed simulating public authority;
(c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) that the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.
In the early case of U.S. vs. Cabanag,[31] it was held that it is essential in the crime of
illegal detention that there be actual confinement or restriction of the person of the
offended party. This rule has not changed.

Indeed, for the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim’s liberty,
which is the essential element of the offense, must be duly proved. [32] In a prosecution for
kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter’s liberty needs to
be established by indubitable proof.[33]

In this case, we find that detention was established by the fact that one month after the
abduction, the victim Wakaoji was seen by Palig and Lasam being transferred,
blindfolded, with his hands tied, from Benigno Lumbres’ house to a waiting white car.

While the trial court erroneously relied on the testimony of Ernesto Escobar that “the
Japanese paid the kidnappers $3,000,000.00 ransom money for the release of the victim
which was delivered by Luis Santillan at the designated drop point somewhere in a
cemetery in Angeles City,”[34] the crime is still qualified as “serious illegal detention”
since the transfer of Wakaoji was witnessed a month after the abduction, and there is
testimony that Wakaoji was released only after four months. Here, there is proof that the
kidnapping or detention definitely lasted for more than five days.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna

is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto
Fajardo are found guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code with the attendant aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicles, without any mitigating circumstances to offset the
same, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories
provided for by law. The order to return the amount of $3,000,000.00 to the victim or
friends of the victim is DELETED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

  Trial of Criminal Case No. 4371-B was consolidated with the trial of Criminal Case
[1]

No. 4370-B (Robbery in Band). However, Criminal Case No. 4370-B was dismissed by
the lower court for lack of proof against the accused (Rollo, p. 52).
[2]
 Rollo, p. 5.
[3]
 Rollo, p. 52.
[4]
 Ibid.
[5]
 Rollo, p. 62.
[6]
 TSN, August 25, 1987, pp. 25-43.
[7]
 TSN, March 22, 1988, pp. 46-65.
[8]
 TSN, December 15, 1987, pp. 8-22.
[9]
 Rollo, p. 53.
[10]
 Rollo, pp. 91-92.
[11]
 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 136 (1997).
[12]
 Jimenez vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 84 (1996).
[13]
 People vs. Flores, 252 SCRA 31 (1996).
[14]
 Rollo, p. 55.
[15]
 Ibid.
[16]
 People vs. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82 (1996).
[17]
 Rollo, p. 118.
[18]
 People vs. Bracamonte, 257 SCRA 380 (1996).
[19]
 Rollo, pp.120-121.
[20]
 261 SCRA 493 (1996).
[21]
 TSN, August 25, 1987, p. 29, March 22, 1988, pp. 43-44.
[22]
 TSN, December 15, 1987, p. 15; TSN, March 22, 1988, p. 56.
[23]
 261 SCRA 436 (1996).
[24]
 People vs. Manzano, 248 SCRA 239 (1995).
[25]
 People vs. Dinglasan, 267 SCRA 26 (1997).
[26]
 Rollo, p. 240.
[27]
 Sec. 2 (b), Rule 121, Revised Rules of Court.
[28]
 People vs. Macaraeg, 53 SCRA 285 (1973).
[29]
 People vs. Berroya, 283 SCRA 111, (1997).

 People vs. Paloma, 271 SCRA 352 (1997); People vs. Soberano, 281 SCRA 438
[30]

(1997); People vs. Astorga, 283 SCRA 420 (1997); People vs. Santos, 283 SCRA 443
(1997).
[31]
 8 Phil. 64 (1907).
[32]
 People vs. Bernal, 274 SCRA 197 (1997).
[33]
 People vs. De la Cruz, 277 SCRA 173 (1997).
[34]
 Rollo, p. 53.
 [ G.R. No. L-9181, November 28, 1955 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON.
NICASIO YATCO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
RIZAL, QUEZON CITY BRANCH, AND JUAN CONSUNJI AND ALFONSO
PANGANIBAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955,
Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were
charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case
No. Q-1G37 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the case started on
May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence.
During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning
one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in
connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before
him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso
Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the
ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on
an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce
the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy
between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
conditions, and circumstances. Thereafter, according to the transcript, the following
remarks were made:
"Fiscal Lustre:
May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession
of Consunji as against the accused Consunji himself?
Court:
That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot
prove a confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts,
conditions and circumstances as required by law." Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9
The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but
again the motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before
this Court by the Solicitor General, for the review and annulment of the lower Court's
order completely excluding any evidence on the extra judicial confessions of the accused
Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.
We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the
accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Hules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against
him.
"Sec. 14. Confession.—The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth
of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him."
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may
not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or
to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other
evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the
declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37;
People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is
Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that:
"The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration."
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of
the unlawful enterprises (''during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not
to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end
(U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil, 416; People vs. Badilla,
48 Phil., 718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between
the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions
(both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation
of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less
formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to
adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their
confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of
Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent
Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of
conspiracy.
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made
on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether
different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to
Consunji's confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the
ground that it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this
objection, put up its own objection to the confessions—that it could not be admitted to
prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such
conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely
excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right
to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection
is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no
power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).
We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the
individual extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of
establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of the confessions in essential
details. After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally
offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have
allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made
them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the
prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to
prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case,
the trial Court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and
reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats &
Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:
"In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and
expeditiously administered in the courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof
are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections
to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In
a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of
the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or
not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the
evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the
attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered
that in the heat of the battle over which he presides, a judge of first instance may possibly
fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is
in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the
Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct
the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial,—a step which this Court
is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first
instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can
never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know
the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant
and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is
prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the material before
it necessary to make a correct judgment."
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as
to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence
may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from
which the People can no longer appeal.
Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed
with the trial in accordance with law and this opinion. Costs against respondents Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Monjtemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 163210, August 13, 2008 ]
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS.
MORENO DUMAPIS, ELMO TUNDAGUI AND FRANCIS LIAGAO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the November 7, 2003 Decision[1] and April 15, 2004 Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation (petitioner), a domestic juridical entity

engaged in mining, employed Moreno Dumapis and Elmo Tundagui as lead miners; and
Francis Liagao, as load, haul and dump (LHD) machine operator (respondents). [3] All
three were assigned at the 850 level, underground, Victoria Area in Lepanto, Mankayan,
Benguet. This is a known "highgrade" area where most of the ores mined are considered
of high grade content.[4]

In the afternoon of September 15, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., Dwayne Chambers (Chambers),
one of its foreign consultants who was then acting as Assistant Resident Manager of the
Mine, went underground at the 850 level to conduct a routinary inspection of the
workers and the working conditions therein. When he went to the various stopes of the
said level, he was surprised to see that nobody was there. However, when he went to
the 8k stope, he noticed a group of workers sitting, sorting, and washing ores believed
to be "highgrade." Realizing that "highgrading" [5] was being committed, Chambers
shouted. Upon hearing his angry voice, the workers scampered in different directions of
the stope.[6] Chambers then reported the incident to the security investigation office. [7]

After investigating, Security Investigators Paul Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor (Security
Investigators) executed a Joint Affidavit, which reads as follows:
xxxx

At about 3:40 PM of September 15, 2000, while we were at the Lepanto Security
Investigation office, we received a report that the LMD Asst. Resident Manager, Mr.
Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several unidentified miners at 8K Stope, 850
level committing Highgrading activities therein;

Consequently, all miners assigned to work therein including their supervisor and SG
Ceasarion Damoslog, an element of the Mine Security Patrol posted therein as
stationary guard were called to this office for interrogation regarding this effect;

In the course of the investigation, we eventually learned that the highgrading event
really transpired somewhere at the roadway of 8K Stope, 850 level at about 2:00 o'clock
PM of September 15, 2000. That the involved participants were all miners assigned to
work at 7K Stope, 8K Stope, 240 E, Cross Cut South level drive, all located at 850 mine
level. Likewise, the detailed stationary guard assigned thereat and some mine
supervisors were also directly involved in this activity;

Security Guard Ceasarion Damoslog honestly confessed his direct participation then

claimed that he was allegedly convinced by Mr. Joel Gumatin, one of the miners
assigned at Panel No.1-est-North, 8K Stope, 850 level to cooperate with them to commit
Highgrading. He revealed his companions to be all the miners assigned at 8K stope,
namely, Joel Gumatin, Brent Suyam, Maximo Madao, Elmo Tundagui and Daniel Fegsar.
He also included those who were assigned to work at 240 E, XCS, namely: Thomas
Garcia (immediate supervisor), John Kitoyan, Moreno Dumapis, and Marolito Cativo. He
enumerated also messrs. Benedict Arocod, Samson Damian, and Dionisio Bandoc, 7K
Stope, 850 level assigned miners and shiftboss, respectively;

Mr. Pablo Daguio, the shiftboss of 240 E, XCS, 850 level also positively confirmed the
Highgrading activity. He added that actually he came upon the group and even
dispersed them when he went therein prior to the arrival of Mr. Chambers;

Furthermore, we also learned from the confession of Mr. Maximo Madao that its was
messrs. Joel Gumatin and Brent Suyam who took their issued rock drilling machine then
drilled holes and blasted the same at the 8K Stope roadway with the assistance
of Thomas Garcia, John Kitoyan, Benedict Arocod, Samsom Damian, Daniel Fegsar
and Francisco Liagao. That SG Ceasarion Damoslog was present on the area standing
and watching the group during the incident;

That we are executing this joint affidavit to establish the foregoing facts and to support
any complaint that may be filed against respondents;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and affix our signature this
28th day of September 2000, at Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet.[8](Emphasis supplied)
On October 24, 2000, petitioner issued a resolution finding respondents and their co-
accused guilty of the offense of highgrading and dismissing them from their
employment.[9]

On November 14, 2000, respondents together with the nine other miners, filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA), docketed as NLRC Case No.
11-0607-00 against petitioner.[10] On August 21, 2001, the LA dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit.

On September 22, 2001, the miners appealed the decision of the LA to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On August 30, 2002, the NLRC rendered a Decision,
declaring the dismissal of herein respondents as illegal, but affirming the dismissal of the
nine other complainant miners. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision insofar as
respondents are concerned, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION dated August 21, 2001 is hereby
MODIFIED declaring the dismissal of complainants [herein respondents] Moreno
Dumapis, Elmo Tundagui and Francis Liagao illegal and ordering respondent to pay them
backwages in the total amount of four hundred eighty thousand one hundred eighty
two pesos and 63/100 (P480, 182.63) and separation pay in the total amount of four
hundred seventeen thousand two hundred thirty pesos and 32/100 (P417,230.32) as
computed in the body of the decision.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit by the
NLRC in its Resolution dated on November 22, 2002. [12]

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
CA assailing the aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC. The CA affirmed
the decision of the NLRC[13] and denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, herein petition on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION'S DECISION DATED
AUGUST 30, 2002 WHICH DECLARED AS ILLEGAL THE DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE OF
HEREIN RESPONDENTS.[14]
A. The Court of Appeal's strict application of the hearsay rule under Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the present case is uncalled for.

B. In cases of dismissal for breach of trust and confidence, proof beyond doubt is
not required, it being sufficient that the employer has reasonable ground to
believe that the employees are responsible for the misconduct which renders
them unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by their position. [15]
The petition is devoid of merit.

In finding the dismissal of respondents illegal, the CA upheld the NLRC in considering the
Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators (Joint Affidavit) as hearsay and therefore
inadmissible, to wit:
We subscribed to the conclusion of the NLRC that the Joint Affidavit of Security
Investigators Paul D. Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor is hearsay and thus, inadmissible.
Their narration of factual events was not based on their personal knowledge but on
disclosures made by Chambers and Daguio. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
defined the nature of hearsay:

Witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.[16]
Arguing for the admissibility of the Joint Affidavit, petitioner cites Article 221 of the
Labor Code, as amended, which provides:
Article 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable settlement. In any
proceeding before the Commission or any Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of the Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the petitioner.

Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e.,  by analogy or
in a suppletory character and effect.[17]

In a number of cases,[18] this Court has construed Article 221 of the Labor Code as
permitting the NLRC or the LA to decide a case on the basis of position papers and other
documents submitted without necessarily resorting to technical rules of evidence as
observed in the regular courts of justice. Rules of evidence are not strictly observed in
proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC. [19]

In Bantolino v. Coca-Coca Bottlers Phils., Inc.[20] the Court ruled that although the affiants
had not been presented to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined,
their affidavits may be given evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits were
hearsay was not persuasive. Likewise, in Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission,
[21]
 this Court ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be
cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to
negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated
by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.

Thus, the CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the Joint Affidavit is inadmissible for
being hearsay. The Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators is admissible for what it is,
an investigation report.

However, the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue.[22] Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but
its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by
the rules of evidence.[23] The distinction is clearly laid out in Skippers United Pacific, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission.[24] In finding that the Report of the Chief
Engineer did not constitute substantial evidence to warrant the dismissal of Rosaroso,
this Court ruled:
According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that respondent was
dismissed for just cause. The CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, however, refused to
give credence to the Report. They are one in ruling that the Report cannot be given any
probative value as it is uncorroborated by other evidence and that it is merely
hearsay, having come from a source, the Chief Engineer, who did not have any
personal knowledge of the events reported therein.

xxxx

The CA upheld these findings, succinctly stating as follows:

Verily, the report of Chief Engineer Retardo is utterly bereft of probative value. It is not
verified by an oath and, therefore, lacks any guarantee of trusthworthiness. It is
furthermore, and this is crucial, not sourced from the personal knowledge of Chief
Engineer Retardo. It is rather based on the perception of "ATTENDING SUPT.
ENGINEERS CONSTANTLY OBSERVING ALL PERSONNELS ABILITY AND ATTITUDE WITH
REGARDS TO OUR TECHNICAL CAPABILITY AND BEHAVIOURS WITH EMPHASY [sic] ON
DISCIPLINE" who " NOTICED 3/E ROSAROSO AS BEING SLACK AND NOT CARING OF HIS
JOB AND DUTIES x x x." Accordingly, the report is plain hearsay. It is not backed up by
the affidavit of any of the "Supt." Engineers who purportedly had first-hand
knowledge of private respondents supposed "lack of discipline," "irresponsibility" and
"lack of diligence" which caused him to lose his job. x x x

The Courts finds no reason to reverse the foregoing findings.[25] (Emphasis supplied)

While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound
by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule
should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.
The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have
probative value.[26] Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla.[27] It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[28] Thus, even though technical rules of evidence are
not strictly complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision must be based on
evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial. [29]

Pursuant to the aforementioned doctrines, we now look into the probative weight of
the Joint Affidavit.
An examination of the Joint Affidavit reveals that the facts alleged therein by the
Security Investigators are not of their own personal knowledge. They simply referred to
the facts allegedly relayed to them by Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio, and Madao. Thus,
there is a need to individually scrutinize the statements and testimonies of the four
sources of the Joint Affidavit in order to determine the latter's probative weight.

The Joint Affidavit states that, "Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised
several unidentified miners x x x."[30] Chambers simply narrated to the Security
Investigators what he saw but did not indicate herein respondents.

Also stated in the Joint Affidavit is the alleged confession of Damoslog wherein he
named respondents Tundagui and Dumapis as his companions in the act of highgrading .
[31]

Records show that Damoslog submitted two sworn statements. In his first statement,
[32]
 Damoslog claimed that he was unaware of the act of highrading, and denied any
involvement therein. However, in his second statement, [33] Damoslog claimed to have
personally witnessed the act of highgrading and named the miners involved to wit:
07. Ques - Could you narrate briefly how it transpired then?

Ans - On the first hour of this specific dated and shift at about 0800hrs, while we were at
the 8K stope, 850 level, Mr. Joel Gumatin approached me that he could not
procure some needed amount of money and if possible we will commit highgrading
for that effect to settle his problem. That because I pity him, I just answered that if
they could manage to do it then they could do it.

08. Ques - Who was the companion of Mr. Gumatin when he approached you?

Ans - He was alone.

09. Ques Did Gumatin specifically informed [sic] you his problem?

Ans I did not asked him honestly but he only insisted that he needed an amount of
money badly as I earlier said.

10. Ques So just after telling his purpose did he started [sic] the highgrading activity?

Ans No, the highgrading scheme started at past 1300 Hrs.

11. Ques - How did it started [sic]?

Ans - They started after they all finished their respective drilling assignment. That while I
was near the panel 2-West located at the inner portion of 8K Stope, I observed the
 LHD unit coming from the roadway near the 8K Eating station which was previously
parked thereat proceeded to the roadway of panel 1-West then started cleaning
and scraping said roadway. That after cleaning he parked it at the inner portion of
the roadway. Then afterwhich one among the miner who was not assigned therein
and I failed to identify his name shove two shovels on the roadway recently cleaned
by the LHD then handed it to us with another man whom I don't know his name but
could recognize and identify him if I will meet him again then we washed the same
in the inner area of panel 2-West which is adjacent. That after washing and sorting
the same, we placed it atop of an spread cartoon [sic] sheet. That while we were
busy washing and sorting, Mr. Gumatin also was fixing and spreading the airhose
for rockdrilling machine. That few moments thereafter, I heard the running engine
of the drilling machine but I can not identify the operator as my line of view was
obstructed by the curbed angle of the panel where we are washing the ores. That
afterwhich I heard somebody that they are now going to blast the drilled holes but
we remained in our place continuing washing the stones. That after the blast Mr.
Garcia and one other companion whom I failed to identify due to foggy condition
caused by the explosive blasting then handed us the additional newly unearth ores
for washing. That while were still busy washing, Gumatin approached us then told
us that he will collect what was already washed and sorted and start to process the
same. That Gumatin took the items then started to pound the ores atop of an LHD
unit parked near the entrance of panel 2-East which was not used during the shift.
That after that, I stood up then subsequently proceeded to panel 2-West then
observed messrs. Maximo Madao, Benedict Arocod, Brent Suyam, Daniel Fegsar,
Thomas Garcia, Mariolito Cativo, John Kitoyna and Samson Damian who acted as
the look out at the junction of 240 E, XCS and 8K Stope. The enumerated miners
except Damian were in squatting position in scattered adjacent places busy sorting
ores. Moments later Shift boss Dionisio Bandoc arrived then went to the place of
Gumatin then told us that he will get a portion of the already proceeded ores for
the operator to handcarry so that he will not need to come to 8K Stope, 850 level
then after taking some of the loot he proceeded out simultaneously uttering that
he will check the look out at the outer area of the mainline posted away from the
7K Stope.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Damoslog does not name respondents Dumapis and Tundagui as among the
miners involved in the act of highgrading; neither does he mention respondent Liagao.

The Joint Affidavit also states that Daguio positively confirmed the act of highgrading.
However, in his sworn statement,[35] Daguio claims that he did not recognize nor did he
identify any of the miners, to wit:
11. Ques - In your own honest observation, what could be the estimate [sic] number of this
group of miners doing highgrading activities?

Ans - I don't know but obviously they were several as manifested by their number of cap
lamplights. I also speculated that some of them were hidden at the curved inner
 access of the roadway enroute to the inner area.

12. Ques - Did you recognize nor [sic] identify any of them?

Ans - Honestly, no.[36] (Emphasis supplied)

Lastly, the Joint Affidavit also points to the confession of Madao wherein he particularly
named respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved in the act of highgrading.

Madao submitted two sworn statements. In his first sworn statement [37] dated
September 16, 2000, Madao claimed his innocence. He did not incriminate any of the
respondents. However, in his second sworn statement [38] dated September 20, 2000,
Madao claimed to have knowledge of the act of highgrading and specifically named
respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved, to wit:
09. Ques - Do I understand that Mr. Suyam has companions and had drilled first the flooring of
that roadway before blasting it?

Ans - Yes, that is true I saw Suyam and Gumatin transferred [sic] their assigned drilling
machine at the said roadway and drilled the area with the company of Garcia,
Kitoyan, Arocod, Damian, Fegsar and Liagao.[39] (Emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, the second sworn statement of Madao is not sufficient to find Liagao guilty
of highgrading. In a Joint Affidavit[40] which he executed with respondent Tundagui,
Madao made the following declarations:
When I, MAXIMO MADAO reported for work on September 16, 2000, I am being
required to appear at the security investigation office. After quitting time I went to the
security office and was surprised to learn that my name is among those listed persons
who were seen by Mr. Chambers committing acts of highgrading on September 15,
2000. However, when I quit work on September 20, 2000 I was again called through
telephone to appear at the security office. Investigator Felimon Ringor told me that I will
give another statement and convinced to tell me all the names of the persons assigned
thereat with the promise that I will report for work. With my limited education having
not finished grade 1, I was made to give my statement on questions and answers
which are self-incriminating and knowingly mentioned names of persons who are
innocent. Worst, when I got my copy and the contents were fully explained to me by
our legal counsel I was surprised that it was duly notarized when in fact and in truth
after I gave my statement I did not appear before Atty. Nina Fe Lazaga-Raffols for
swearing. With this circumstances, I hereby RETRACT my statement dated September
20, 2000 for being self incriminatory unassisted by my counsel or union representative
and hereby ADAPTS [sic] and RETAINS my sworn statement dated September 16, 2000.
[41]
(Emphasis supplied)
In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly applied if the
result would be detrimental to the workingman, an affidavit of desistance gains added
importance in the absence of any evidence on record explicitly showing that the
dismissed employee committed the act which caused the dismissal. [42] Accordingly, the
Court cannot turn a blind eye and disregard Madao's recantation, as it serves to cast
doubt as to the guilt of respondent Liagao.

Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Joint Affidavit, being sourced
from Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio and Madao, has no probative value to support
evidence to warrant the dismissal of the respondents. Chambers and Daguio did not
identify the miners involved in the act of highgrading. In addition, Damoslog's first and
second sworn statements did not implicate respondents, and Madao recanted his
statement implicating respondent Liagao. As earlier discussed, the sworn statements
and joint affidavits of the sources do not corroborate but actually cast doubt as to the
veracity of the statements in the Joint Affidavit.

The second ground is not plausible.

While the Court agrees that the job of the respondents, as miners, although generally
described as menial, is nevertheless of such nature as to require a substantial amount of
trust and confidence on the part of petitioner,[43] the rule that proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required to terminate an employee on the charge of loss of confidence, and
that it is sufficient that there be some basis for such loss of confidence, is not absolute.
[44]

The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust
and confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause. [45] In
order that loss of trust and confidence may be considered as a valid ground for an
employee's dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on
clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work. [46]

In the present case, the Court reiterates that the evidence is not substantial to hold
respondents guilty of highgrading so as to warrant the dismissal of respondents.

Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence

presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in
favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and
his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of
agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend
the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail themselves of the benefits
under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and protection to labor.[47]

Lastly, respondents' prayer in their Comment[48] and Memorandum,[49] that the CA

Decision be modified by ordering their reinstatement to their former positions without
loss of seniority rights and with payment of full backwages from their alleged dismissal
up to date of reinstatement, deserves scant consideration. Respondents are estopped
from claiming their right to reinstatement. Records show that respondents along with
their co-accused, filed an appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75457
questioning the decision of the NLRC. The said appeal was denied by the CA. The case
was then elevated to this Court through a petition for review, entitled Thomas Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 162554. However, the same was denied with
finality for having been filed out of time.[50] In effect, it serves to estop the respondents
from praying for their reinstatement in the present case. Under the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as "reclusion of issues" or "collateral
estoppel," issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
[51]
 Applied to the present case, the "former suit" refers to CA-G.R. SP No. 75457 wherein
the CA ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement and G.R. No. 162554 wherein
this Court denied the petition for review filed by respondents together with other
dismissed workers. The "future case" is the present case in which the petitioner is
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company assailing the validity of the CA Decision declaring
the dismissal of respondents to be illegal. Reinstatement was not an issue raised by
herein petitioner. Respondents cannot now be allowed to raise the same in the petition
filed by petitioner, for that would circumvent the finality of judgment as to separation
pay insofar as respondents are concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 7, 2003 and its Resolution dated April 15, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860
are AFFIRMED.

Double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with the concurrence of Justices Andres
B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong; rollo, pp. 9-19.

[2]
 Id. at 20-21.

[3]
 Id. at 10.

[4]
 Rollo, p. 27.

[5]
 Presidential Decree No. 581, Section 1: Any person who shall take gold-bearing ores or
rocks from a mining claim or mining camp or shall remove, collect or gather gold-
bearing ores or rocks in place or shall extract or remove the gold from such ores or
rocks, or shall prepare and treat such ores or rocks to recover or extract the gold
contents thereof, without the consent of the operator of the mining claim, shall be
guilty of "highgrading" or theft of gold x x x.

[6]
 Rollo, p.10.

[7]
 Id. at 27.

[8]
 Rollo, p. 177.

[9]
 Id. at 183-185.

[10]
 Id. at 210-221.

[11]
 Rollo, p. 67.

[12]
 Id. at 70.

[13]
 Id. at 9-19.
[14]
 Id. at 31.

[15]
 Rollo, p. 31.

[16]
 Id. at 52.

[17]
  Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 699,
704.

[18]
  Robusta Agro Marine Products, Inc. v. Gorobalem, G.R. No. 80500, July 5, 1989, 175
SCRA 93; Sevillana v. I.T. Corp., 408 Phil. 570 (2001).

[19]
  Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., supra note 17, at 703.

[20]
  Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., id.

[21] 
G.R. No. 110637, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 523, 534.

[22]
  PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38 (1998).

[23]
  PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22, at 59.

[24]
 G.R. No. 148893, July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 661.

[25]
  Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, id. at 666.

[26] 
Uichico v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 242, 251 (1997).

[27] 
Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110388, September 14, 1995,
248 SCRA 183, 200.

[28]
  Gelmart Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 70544, November 5, 1987,
155 SCRA 403.

[29]
  Ang Tibay v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[30]
  Rollo, p. 177 (emphasis supplied).

[31]
 Id.

[32] 
Id. at 142-143.

[33]
  Rollo, pp. 144-147.

[34]
  Rollo, pp. 144-145.

[35]
 Id. at 140-141.

[36] 
Id. at 141.

[37]
  Rollo, pp. 132-133.

[38] 
Id. at 134.

[39] 
Id.

[40]
 Id. at 136-138.

[41]
 Id. at 137.

[42]
  Oania v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 97162-64, June 1, 1995, 244
SCRA 668.

[43]
 Mina v. National Labor Relations Commission, 316 Phil. 286 (1995).

[44]
 Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 27, at 199.

[45] 
Supra note 27, id.

[46]
 See Pilipinas Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 101372,
November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 750; China City Restaurant Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 97196, January 22, 1993, 217 SCRA 443; Marcelo v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 310 Phil. 891 (1995).
[47]
 Nicario v. National Labor Relations Commission,  356 Phil. 936 (1998).

[48]
 Rollo, p. 291.

[49]
 Id. at 391.

[50]
  Rollo, pp. 309-340, 341-342, 343, 344-345, 346-347.

[51]
 Tan v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 675, 681 (2001).
 FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 126696, January 21, 1999 ]
SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. TRIUMPH
LUMBER AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DAVIDE JR., C.J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the petitioner
asks this Court to reverse the decision[1] of 28 December 1995 and the resolution[2] of 17
September 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33513. The former set aside
the decision[3] of 14 November 1990 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati in Civil
Case No. 16882 and ordered the petitioner to reimburse the private respondent the
value of the alleged forged checks drawn against private respondent’s account, plus
interest and attorney’s fees. The latter denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner and private respondent were the defendant and plaintiff, respectively, in Civil
Case No. 16882.

The factual antecedents of this case were summarized by the trial court in its decision in
Civil Case No. 16882; thus:
Based on plaintiff’s evidence, it appears that plaintiff is a depositor in good standing of
defendant bank’s branch at Sucat, Parañaque, under current checking account no. 210-
0053-60. Plaintiff claims that on March 23 and 24, 1987, three (3) checks all payable to
cash and all drawn against plaintiff’s aforementioned current account were presented
for encashment at defendant’s Sucat Parañaque branch, to wit: Security Bank check nos.
466779  and 466777, both dated March 23, 1987 in the amount of P150,000.00 and
P130,000.00, respectively; and Security Bank Check no. 466780 dated March 24, 1987 in
the amount of P20,000.00. (Exhs. A, A-1 to A-3, B, B-1 to B-3, C, C-1 to C-3) Plaintiff also
claims that due to defendant bank’s gross negligence and inexcusable negligence in
exercising ordinary diligence in verifying from plaintiff the encashment of plaintiff’s
checks whose amount exceed P10,000.00 and in determining the forgery of drawer’s
signatures, the aforesaid three (3) checks were encashed by unauthorized persons to
the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff corporation. (Exhs. D, D-1, D-2) Plaintiff then
requested the  defendant to credit back and restore to its account the value of the
checks which were wrongfully encashed in the amount of P300,000.00 but despite due
demand the defendant failed to pay its liability. (Exhs. F, F-1, F-2) Finally, plaintiff claims
that per findings of the PC Crime Laboratory, the signatures of Co Yok Teng and Yu Chun
Kit, the authorized [signatories] of plaintiff were forged. (Exhs. E, E-1 to E-4, G, G-1, G-2,
H, I, I-1, I-2)

Upon the other hand, the defendant bank claims that on June 19, 1985 the plaintiff
corporation opened savings account no. 3220-0529-79 and current account no. 3210-
0053-60 with defendant bank’s branch in Sucat, Parañaque, Metro Manila. In order to
make the said current and savings account operational, the plaintiff herein provided the
defendant with the requisite specimen signature cards which in efect authorized
defendant bank to honor withdrawals on the basis of any two of three signatures affixed
thereon, specifically those of Mr. Dee Kong, Mr. Co Yok Teng and Mr. Chun Yun Kit, the
president, treasurer and general manager, respectively, of plaintiff corporation. (Exhs. 3,
4) Subsequently, plaintiff executed an automatic transfer agreement authorizing
defendant bank to transfer cleared funds from plaintiff’s savings account to its current
account at any time whenever funds in the current account are insufficient to meet
withdrawals therefrom or are below the stipulated minimum balance. (Exhs. 5, 6, 6-A)
Defendant also claims that the savings account pass book and the check booklets were
kept by the plaintiff in its filing cabinet but on March 23, 1987 the plaintiff herein
discovered that the door of his office was forced open including that of the filing cabinet
where the check booklets and other bank documents were being kept by the plaintiff.
(pp. 32-33, TSN of August 15, 1988) Defendant further claims that the incident was not
reported to the police authorities by the plaintiff nor was there any advise given to
defendant bank and that on the same day of the discovery by plaintiff of the burglary,
said plaintiff nevertheless made three separate deposits in a total amount of
P374,554.10. (Exhs. 1, 1-A, 1-B, 2-A, 2-B) Defendant also claims that immediately after
the said deposit of P374,554.10 has been made by the plaintiff, three checks namely:
check no. 466779 dated March 23, 1987 in the amount of P130,000.00; check no.
466779 dated March 23, 1987 of  P150,000.00 and check no. 466780 dated March 24,
1987 in the amount of P20,000.00 which [were] all payable to cash were successively
presented to defendant bank for encashment which was given due course by the latter
after said checks have passed through the standard bank procedure for verification of 
the check signatures and the regularity of the material particulars of said checks. (pp. 6,
19, 20, 39, TSN of February 1, 1989, p. 21, TSN of August 15, 1988) [4]
On the basis of such factual environment, the trial court found no preponderance of
evidence to support private respondent’s complaint. The private respondent failed to
show that the signatures on the subject checks were forged. It did not even present in
court the originals of the checks. Neither did it bother to explain its failure to do so.
Thus, it could be presumed that the original checks were wilfully suppressed and would
be adverse to private respondent’s case if produced. Moreover, the signatures on the
checks were not compared with the specimen signature appearing on the specimen
signatures cards provided by the private respondent upon opening its current account
with petitioner. Thus, the opinion of the expert witness is not worthy of credit. Besides,
the private respondent failed to present Mr. Co Yok Teng, one of the signatories of the
checks in question, to deny the genuineness of the signatures.

The trial court was convinced that the petitioner bank had exercised due care and
diligence in determining the authenticity of the checks in  question before they were
encashed. It was rather the private respondent that had been negligent in the care and
custody of the corporate checks. After the incident in question occurred, the private
respondent should have reported the matter to the police authorities or to the bank in
order that the latter could “undertake stringent measure to counteract any attempt to
forge  the corporate checks.” But private respondent did not. Hence, private respondent
should be the one to bear the loss.

In view of such findings, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the
petitioner to reimburse the private respondent the sum of P300,000, plus interest at the
rate of 2 ½ % per month from 24 March 1987 until full payment thereof, as well as
attorney’s fees equivalent to 25 % of the principal obligation.

The Court of Appeals held that it was not necessary for the private respondent to prove
that the signatures on the three checks in question were forged because of the
following admissions set forth in petitioner’s answer:
14. Plaintiff was guilty of negligence substantially contributing to the unauthorized
signatures or forgery of the signatures on the checks mentioned in the complaint.
…

15. The alleged forged signatures on the checks were sufficiently adroit as to escape detection
even under the officer’s scrutiny.

20.3 Anna P. Naval and Roberto N. Gabutao verbally admitted that the checks were forged.
 …

21. Anna Naval and Roberto Gabutao are now facing charges for estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents under Criminal Case No. 30004 pending with the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, sitting at Makati, Metro Manila.

According to the Court of Appeals, the expert witness, contrary to the trial court’s
finding, was able to examine the signatures on the original checks and compared them
with the standard signatures of the signatories. The photographic enlargements of the
questioned checks, which she identified in court, were in fact taken from the original
checks. With the bank’s admission in its answer, as well as the unrebutted testimony of
the expert witness and of Chun Yun Kit, there could be no doubt that the signatures on
the questioned checks were forged.

The Court of Appeals likewise held that the petitioner must be the one to bear the
consequences of its failure to detect the forgery. Besides, petitioner was “less than
prudent” in the treatment of private respondent’s account. It did not observe its
arrangement with the private respondent that it would inform the latter whenever a
check of more than P10,000 would be presented for encashment. Neither did it ask the
payee to present an identification card or to bring someone who could attest to identity
of the payee.

After its motion for reconsideration was denied[5] by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
filed this petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
I

…THE SIGNATURES ON THE CHECKS IN QUESTION WERE FORGED

II

…WHETHER THE SIGNATURES WERE FORGED IS NO LONGER AN ISSUE IN THE CASE

CONSIDERING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES SET FORTH IN PETITIONER’S ANSWER

III

… THE PETITIONER ITSELF WAS NEGLIGENT AND THAT THE RESPONDENT EXERCISED
DUE CARE IN THE CUSTODY OF ITS CHECKS AND OTHER RELATED DOCUMENTS
 IV

… RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF P300,000.00 PLUS INTEREST

THEREOF AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.
In the first assigned error, the petitioner alleges that the best evidence of the forgery
were the original checks bearing the alleged forged signatures of private respondent’s
officers. In spite of the timely objection made by the petitioner, the private respondent
introduced in evidence mere photocopies of the questioned checks. The failure to
produce the originals of the checks was a fatal omission inasmuch as there would be no
evidentiary basis for the court to declare that the instruments were forgeries. Likewise
such failure amounted to a willful suppression of evidence, which created a
presumption that its production would be unfavorable to respondent’s case. [6] It could
also be presumed that “the checks in question [were] genuine checks regularly issued by
the respondent in the course of its business, bearing the genuine signatures of the
officers whom it authorized to sign in its behalf.” [7] Also, an unfavorable inference could
be drawn from the unexplained failure of  private respondent to call as its witness Mr.
Co Yok Teng, whose signature was among those allegedly forged.

Petitioner, further contends that the opinion of private respondent’s expert witness,
Crispina V. Tabo, Senior Document Examiner of the PC Crime Laboratory, has no weight
and deserves no consideration. Tabo did not use as basis of her analytical study the
standard signatures of Chun Yun Kit and Co Yok Teng on the specimen signature cards
provided by the respondent upon opening Current Account No. 3210-0523-60 with the
petitioner. It was to be against these standard signatures appearing on the specimen
cards that petitioner was to honor checks drawn against private respondent’s account.
What Tabo utilized for comparisons were signatures that were not even authenticated
by Chun Yun Kit and Co Yok Teng. Neither was it proved that the supposed standard
signatures had been  written “closely proximate” to the date of the questioned checks.
Moreover, the “requested signatures” on the long bond paper written post litem
motam could not be accepted as standards of comparison “because of the ease with
which they[could] be disguised to intentionally differentiate them from those being
challenged.”[8]

As to the second assigned error, petitioner maintains that its Answer contained a
specific denial of private respondent’s allegation of forgery. It could set in its answer
affirmative and negative defenses alternatively even if they were inconsistent with each
other.[9]
With respect to its third assigned error, petitioner asserts that it exercised due care and
diligence in the payment of private respondent’s checks by first verifying in accordance
with standard bank practices and procedures the genuineness of the signatures and
endorsements. Upon the other hand, the private respondent, in the management of its
business affairs, fell short of the diligence and the ordinary prudence required under the
circumstances. It should have advised petitioner of the alleged burglary so that
petitioner could have applied stricter rules in the processing of checks drawn against
private respondent’s account, but it did not bother to do so. Neither did it reconcile its
account, balances with the petitioner in order to forestall the happening of the forgery.

In the last assigned error, the petitioner alleges that in view of the reasons it stated in
the first and third assigned errors the petitioner cannot be obliged to pay the amount of
P300,000 plus interest. On the contrary, petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s
fees because private respondent’s complaint was “insincere, baseless, and intended to
harass, annoy and defame [it].”[10]

Upon the other hand, the respondent claims that petitioner should have filed “a petition
for review by certiorari and not merely a petition for review.” The determination of
negligence by the Court of Appeals is a question of fact that cannot be disturbed on
appeal. Even asuming that the instant case is an exception to the rule limiting the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to reviewing errors of law nonetheless, the
issue of forgery was adequately proved by preponderance of evidence.

This appeal is meritorious.

Well settled is the rule that in the exercise of our power of review the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on this Court. However, there are
recognized exceptions, among which is when the factual findings of the trial court and
the appellate court are conflicting.[11] The disagreement between the trial court and the
Court of Appeals in the factual conclusion, especially with regard to the alleged forgery
of the signatures on the questioned checks and the negligence of the parties, has
constrained us to examine the evidence submitted by the parties.

On the issue of forgery, we are unable to agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the petitioner admitted in its Answer[12] to the complaint the forgery of the
signatures. Far from admitting the forgery, petitioner categorically denied that the
signatures on the questioned checks were forgeries. However, by way of an alternative
affirmative defense, petitioner contended that it had exercised reasonable degree of
diligence in detecting  whether there was forgery. Even assuming that the signatures on
the checks were forged, still petitioner could not be held liable for the value of the
checks because all the checks were complete and regular on their face. The alleged
forged signatures were “sufficiently adroit as to escape detection even under the
officer’s scrutiny.”

The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that forgery was duly established. First,
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was not complied with by private respondent.
The Section explicitly provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall  be admissible other than the original document itself. This
is what is known as the “best evidence” rule. The exceptions are as follows:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and

4.   When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.

In this case, the originals of the alleged forged checks had to be produced, since it was
never shown that any of these exceptions was present. What the private respondent
offered were mere photocopies of the checks in question marked as Exhibits “A,” “B,”
and “C.”[13] It never explained the reason why it could not produce the originals of the
checks. Its expert witness Crispina Tabo admitted though that the original checks were
taken back by the investigating policeman, Glenn Ticson; thus:
ATTY. NARAG:

Q Do you have a copy, Madam Witness of the checks which were submitted to you
under question?
A It was only a xerox copy, because the original was withdrawn by the investigating policeman,
 which is in (sic) the name of Glenn Ticzon, sir.

Q Do you want to impress the court that the originals of these checks were submitted to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you have a copy of the originals of the checks under (sic) standards?

A Xerox copies only, because it was also withdrawn by the investigating policeman, who is Mr.
Glenn Ticzon.[14]

Yet, the said policeman was not presented to produce the original checks.

It is true that the photocopies of the questioned checks were all identified by private
respondent’s witness Yu Chun Kit during his direct testimony [15] without objection on the
part of petitioner’s counsel. The latter even cross-examined Yu Chun Kit, [16] and, at the
formal offer of said exhibits, he objected to their admission solely on the grounds that
they were “irrelevant, immaterial and self-serving.” [17] The photocopies of the checks
may therefore be admitted for failure of petitioner to tender an appropriate
objection[18] to their admission. Nevertheless, their probative value is nil. [19]

Then, too, the proper procedure in the investigation of a disputed handwriting was not
observed. The initial step in such investigation is the introduction of the genuine
handwriting of the party sought to be charged with the disputed writing, which is to
serve as a standard of comparison.[20] The standard or the exemplar must therefore be
proved to be genuine.[21] For the purpose of proving the genuineness of a handwriting
Section 22, Rule  132 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting  of a person may be

proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting  of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge.
In BA Finance v. Court of Appeals,[22] we had the occasion to the rule that the
genuineness of a standard writing may be established by any of the following: (1) by the
admission of the person sought to be charged with the  disputed writing made at or for
the purposes of the trial, or by his testimony; (2) by witnesses who saw the standards
written or to whom or in whose hearing the person sought to be charged acknowledged
the writing thereof; (3) by evidence showing that the reputed writer of the standard has
acquiesced in or recognized the same, or that it has been adopted and acted upon by
him in his business transactions or other concerns.

We find in the records only photocopies, not the originals, of the “long bond papers”
containing the alleged specimen signatures.[23] Nobody was presented to prove that the
specimen signatures were in fact signatures affixed by Yu Chun Kit and Co Yok Teng.
Although the former took the witness stand, he was never called to identify or
authenticate his signatures on the said photocopy. Clearly then, Section 22 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court and the guidelines set forth in BA Finance v. Court of
Appeals[24] were not complied with.

Moreover, the so-called specimen signatures on the bond paper were not directly
turned over to Tabo by those who purportedly wrote them. They, together with the
questioned checks, were first submitted to the Administration Branch of the PC Crime
Laboratory, then endorsed to the Questioned Document Branch. The chief of the latter
branch thereafter referred them to Tabo. Tabo never saw the parties write the
specimen signatures. She just presumed the specimen signatures to be genuine
signatures of the parties concerned. These facts were disclosed by Tabo during her
cross-examination; thus:

Q These question [sic] signatures and the specimen signatures or standard were just
given to you by the police of Parañaque?
It was submitted to the Administrative Branch and the Administrative Branch endorsed that
A to the Question Document Branch and the Chief of the Document branch assigned that case
to me, sir. That is why I received it and examined it.

COURT:

Q How do you know that, that is the genuine signature?

ATTY. REVILLA

Yes, how do you know that, that is the genuine signatures when you were not able to see
 
him personally write his signature?

Because I examined the genuine signatures of Co Yok Teng which was submitted to the office
by the investigator and it is said to be genuine, and I compared the signatures whether it is
genuine or not. And upon comparing, all the specimen signatures were written by one, and
A
also comparing all question [sic] signatures, this one (pointing to the chart) are written by
one so, they were written, the question [sic] and specimen were written by two different
persons.
 You did not ask the person to personally give his signature in order that there will be basis of
Q
comparison between standard signature and the question [sic] signature?

Your Honor, if the specimen signature is not sufficient enough to arrive at a conclusion, we
A will tell the investigator to let the person involved to come to our office to write and sign his
signature, if it is not sufficient to arrive at a conclusion we let him sign.

So, you do not normally demand his income tax for example, the residence certificate or
Q
other documents which contained this  undisputed signature?

We did not ask anymore additional specimen because the submitted document is sufficient
A
enough to arrive at the conclusion.

ATTY. REVILLA:

So, you just relied on what were given to you by the investigator as they informed you that
Q
these were genuine and standard signatures?

A Yes, sir.

Q And who was that person who gave you this document?
It was the Administrative Branch who [sic] endorsed this document to the Documentation
A
Branch. I do not know the person who brought that.

Q You do not know the person who brought this document   to the Administrative branch?

A Yes, sir I do not know.

When you started making comparison and analysis of this question [ SIC] signatures and
Q standard signatures, you did not anymore require the   person, Mr. Co Yok Teng to appear
personally to you?

A I did not, sir.[25]

ATTY. REVILLA

Mrs. Tabo, like the question [sic] signature of Mr. Co Yok Teng, you also did not personally
Q
see or observe how Mr. Co Yok Teng write this standard signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q And this [sic] standard signatures were just submitted to you?

A Yes, it was submitted to the office, sir.

Q And when you made the examination and analysis of these documents the standard and the
question [sic] signature you did not require any other signature from these two personalities
 except those which were delivered to you?

A Yes, sir.

COURT

When this standard signature were submitted to you, you were just told that this is the
Q
genuine signature of the person involved, you were just told?

A Yes, your Honor. As stated in the request it is the genuine signature.

Q So that was your basis in claiming that this is the genuine signature of the persons involved?

A I examined first the specimen, all the specimen whether it was written by….

Q What are those specimen submitted to you?

A The same checks, your Honor, and the written standard.

Q Did you confront Co Yok Teng?

ATTY. REVILLA

A She said no, your Honor.

COURT

Q Did you confront Yu Chun Kit whether those were actually his genuine signature?

  No, your Honor.

So you just relied on the claim of the person who submitted to you that these are the
Q
genuine signatures?

A Yes, your Honor.

And on the basis of that you compare the characteristic handwriting between the alleged
Q
genuine and question [sic] signature?

A Yes, your Honor.[26] (underscoring ours for emphasis).

Our review of the testimony of private respondent’s expert witness, Crispina V. Tabo,
fails to convince us that she was a credible document examiner, despite petitioner’s
admission that she was. She was candid  enough to admit to the court that although she
had testified more or less  three hundred times as an expert, her findings were
sustained by the courts in more or less ten cases only. Thus:
Court:
Q How many times have you testified in Court?
A More or less three hundred (300) times, your Honor.

Q How many were sustained by the Court?

A More or less ten (10), sir.

Q Out of 300?

A Yes, your Honor.[27]

Besides, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, Tabo could by no yardstick be
considered to have adequate knowledge of the genuine signatures of the parties whose
signatures on the questioned checks were claimed to be forged. That knowledge could
be obtained either by (a) seeing the person write some other documents or signatures
(ex visu scriptionis); (b) seeing documents otherwise known to him to have been written
by the person in question (ex scriptis olim visis); or (c) examining, in or out of  court, for
the express purpose of obtaining such knowledge, the documents said to have been
written by the person in question (ex comparatione scriptorum).[28] Tabo could not be a
witness under the first and the second. She tried  to be under the third. But under the
third, it is essential that (a) certain specimens of handwriting were seen and considered
by her and (b) they were genuinely written by the person in question. [29] Now, as stated 
above, Tabo had no adequate basis for concluding that the alleged specimen signatures
in the long bond paper were indeed the signatures of the parties whose signatures in
the checks were claimed to have been forged. Moreover, we do not think that the
alleged specimens before were sufficient in number. [30]

Given the fact that Mrs. Tabo’s testimony cannot inspire a conclusion that she was an
expert, it was error to rely on her representation. It is settled that the relative weight of
the opinions of experts by and  large depends on the value of assistance and guidance
they furnish the court in  the determination of the issue involved.[31]
On the issue of negligence, the Court of Appeals held:

[T]here is overwhelming evidence to show that appellee (petitioner herein) was less
than prudent in the treatment of appellant’s (private respondents’) account.

According to Chun Yun Kit, they had an agreement with Appellee’s Assistant branch
manager, Felicidad Dimaano, that appellant should be informed  whenever a check for
than P10,000.00 is presented for encashment. Dimaano did not controvert Chun Kit’s
testimony on this point. Such an arrangement was not observed by appellee with
respect to the payment of the checks in question. (Emphasis supplied).
We do not agree. During the hearing on 1 February 1989, Felicidad Dimaano denied
having such agreement with the private respondent. Rather, the agreement was that
“all encashments over the counter of  P10,000.00 and above should be accompanied by
one of the signatories” of private respondent. But this agreement was made only on 31
March 1987, or a few days after the encashment of the checks in question. [32]

At any rate, since the questioned checks, which were payable to “cash,” appeared
regular on their face and the bank found nothing unusual in the transaction, as the
respondent usually issued checks in big amounts[33] made payable to cash or to a
particular person or to a company,[34] the petitioner cannot be faulted in paying the
value of the disputed checks.

Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the private  respondent is the one which
stands to be blamed for its predicament. Chun Yun Kit testified that in the morning of 23
March 1987, he and some employees found the doors of their office and the filing
cabinets containing  the company’s check booklet to have been forcibly opened. They
also found the documents in disarray. Under these circumstances, a prudent and
reasonable man would simply have to go over the check booklet to find out whether a
check was missing. But, apparently, private respondent’s officers and employees did not
bother to do so. If they did examine the booklet  they could have readily discovered
whether a check was taken. The following testimony of Chun Yun Kit is apropos:

Q You said also during the last hearing that on the morning of March 23, 1987 you found
out in the morning that the doors of the office were forced opened?
A Yes, sir.

And you also testified during the last hearing that the locked [sic] of the filing cabinet were
Q
also forced opened?

A Yes, sir.

And you found out on that same time and date on March 23, 1987 that the documents in the
Q
filing cabinet were not in their proper position?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you do when you found out this [sic] circumstances on March  23, 1987?

A We did not do anything because nothing was lost.

 Did it not occur to you Mr. Witness, that considering that burglary was committed in your
office, the doors of your office were forced opened, the locks of the filing cabinet were
Q forced opened, the documents placed in the filing cabinet were not in their proper position,
it did not occur to you to check the checks of the company as being placed in the filing
cabinet?

A When we examined the check booklet, we did not discover anything lost.

You did not at all bother Mr. Witness or your treasurer to check something might have lost in
Q
the check [sic], considering that the burglery [sic] and the filing cabinet were forced opened?

A No, sir.

Q Did you notice anything lost?

A No, sir.[35]

Neither did any of private respondent’s officers or employees report the incident to the
police authorities,[36] nor did anyone advise the petitioner  of such incident so that the
latter could adopt necessary measures to prevent  unauthorized encashments of private
respondent’s checks. Hence, as correctly held by the trial court, it is the private
respondent, not the petitioner, which must bear the loss.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED the challenged decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33513 is hereby REVERSED, and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 16882 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Kapunan, Martinez, and Pardo JJ., concur.

[1]
  Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, 54-62. Per Jacinto, G., J., with Montoya, S. and Agcaoili,
O., JJ.,concurring.

[2]
  Annex “B” of Petition; Id., 64-65.

[3]
  Original Record (OR), Civil Case No. 16882, 219-222. Per Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles.

[4]
  OR, 220-221.
[5]
  Rollo, CA-G.R. CV No. 33513, 96-110.

[6]
  Per Section 3[e], Rule 131, Rules of Court.

[7]
  Citing  Section 5b and 5q, Rule 131, Rules of Court, [Now Section 3 (b and q)].

[8]
  Rollo, 36.

[9]
  Citing Section 2, Rule 8, Rules of Court.

[10]
  Citing  Heirs of Justiva v. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 72 [1963]; Tanjangco v. Jovellanos,
108 Phil. 713 [1960]; Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 339.

[11]
  Borillo v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 130, 140 [1992]; Salvador v. Court of Appeals,
243 SCRA 239, 253 [1995].

[12]
  OR, 25-32.

[13]
  OR, 140.

[14]
  TSN, 4 November 1988, 8-9.

[15]
  TSN, 10 August 1988, 8, 11-12; 14-15.

[16]
  TSN, 15 August 1988, 24-35; TSN, 9 September 1988, 3-19.

[17]
  TSN, 1 February 1989, 2-3.

[18]
  See RICARDO J. FRANCISCO, EVIDENCE 60-61 (1993).

[19]
  See Borje v. Sandiganbayan, 125 SCRA 763, 780 [1983], citing  U.S. v. Gregorio, 17
Phil. 522 [1910]; People v. Sto. Tomas, 138 SCRA 206, 218-219 [1985]; Claverias v.
Quingco, 207 SCRA 66, 76-77 [1992]; People v. Dismuke, 234 SCRA 51, 60 [1994];
Gobonseng v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 472, 495 [1995]; Republic v. Court of Appeals,
258 SCRA 223, 242 [1996].
[20]
  7 VICENTE J, FRANCISCO, EVIDENCE Part I, 604 (1973).

[21]
  2 H.C. UNDERHILL, UNDERHILL'S  CRIMINAL EVIDENCE Sec. 318, at 806 (5th ed.
1956). See also J. NEWTON BAKER, LAW OF DISPUTED AND FORGED DOCUMENTS Sec.
52, at 77-78 (1955).

[22]
  161 SCRA 608, 618 [1998].

[23]
  Exhibits “J” and “H”; OR, 144 and 146.

[24]
  Supra note 22.

[25]
  TSN, 7 December 1988, 28-34.

[26]
  TSN, 8 December 1988, 10-14.

[27]
  TSN, 6 December 1988, 14.

[28]
  3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE Sec. 693, at 21 (3rd ed. 1940).

[29]
  Ibid.

[30]
  3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE Sec.  709, at 41.

[31]
  Geromo v. Comelec, 118 SCRA 165, 175 [1982] ; People v. Aldana, 175 SCRA 635, 650
[1989] ; Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 362, 371 [1995] ; Eduarte v. Court of
Appeals, 253 SCRA 391, 399 [1996].

[32]
  TSN, 1 February 1989, 33-34; Exhibit “6,” OR, 160.

[33]
  TSN, 1 February 1989, 41.

[34]
34 TSN, 1 February 1989, 55.

[35]
  TSN, 9 September 1989, 11-13.

[36]
  TSN, 15 August 1989, 4.
 THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE, VS.
VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The mantle of protection upon one’s person and one’s effects through Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to
avail themselves of their right to privacy.  The alleged compromise with the battle against
dangerous drugs is more apparent than real.  Often, the compromise is there because law
enforcers neglect to perform what could have been done to uphold the Constitution as
they pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.

Squarely raised in this appeal[1] is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a
warrantless arrest.  The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that
were not based on their personal knowledge.  The information as to the accused’s
whereabouts was sent through a text message.  The accused who never acted suspicious
was identified by a driver.  The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was required
to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been fully
apprised of his rights.

This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution.  There was no
reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate “stop and frisk” action.  The alleged
waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without
improper pressure or coercion.

The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with
Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.  There being no possible admissible
evidence, the accused should be acquitted.

According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior
Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,
La Union, “received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer”[2] that one
Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) “[would] be transporting marijuana”[3] from
Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. [4]
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order “to intercept the suspect.”[5]  PSI Bayan
ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel
Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound
for San Fernando City.[6]

A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. [7] 
The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana.[8]  SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male
passengers who were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa
Dayao.[9]  Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow
bag.[10]

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. [11]  Cogaed
and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the
bags as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin.[12]  After this exchange, Cogaed
opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. [13]  Cogaed
then muttered, “nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoy met gayam ti nagyanna,” which
translates to “Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag.” [14]  “SPO1 Taracatac
arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station.” [15]  Cogaed and
Dayao “were still carrying their respective bags”[16] inside the station.[17]

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit
(PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.[18]  Inside Cogaed’s sack
was “four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,”[19] and inside Dayao’s
yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.[20]

PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.[21] PSI Bayan
personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. [22]  Forensic
Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and
found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana.[23]  The marijuana collected from
Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams.[24]  The marijuana from Cogaed’s
sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.[25]  The marijuana collected from Dayao’s bag weighed
5,092 grams.[26]  A total of 17,429.6 grams were collected from Cogaed’s and Dayao’s
bags.[27]

According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, “waiting

for a jeepney to take him”[28] to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.
[29]
  He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s friend.[30]  Upon
arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney. [31] 
Dayao allegedly “asked for [Cogaed’s] help in carrying his things, which included a
travelling bag and a sack.”[32]  Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market.
[33]
  This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked
Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know. [34]  SPO1
Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation. [35] 
Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police
station.[36]  These facts were corroborated by an eyewitness, Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was
standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended. [37]

At the police station, Cogaed said that “SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head.” [38]  The
bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside. [39]

It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. [40]  The
information against them states:

That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel,
Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA
(who acted with discernment) and JOHN DOE, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly,
without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody and possession dried
marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand, four hundred
twenty-nine and six-tenths (17, 429.6) grams.

CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic

Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”).
[41]

The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union.
[42]
 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.[43]  The case was dismissed against Dayao
because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability
under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344. [44]  Trial
against Cogaed ensued.  In a decision[45] dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court
found Cogaed guilty.  The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”) and sentences
him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php
1,000,000.00).[46]

The trial court judge initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that “Cogaed at
that time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that he
was about to do so or that had just done so.  He just alighted from the passenger jeepney
and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.”[47]  Since the arrest was
illegal, the warrantless search should also be considered illegal. [48]  However, the trial
court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed “waived his right to
object to such irregularity”  [49] when “he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after
identifying himself, asked him to open his bag.”[50]

Cogaed appealed[51] the trial court’s decision.  However, the Court of Appeals denied his
appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.[52]  The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed
waived his right against warrantless searches when “[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1
Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag.”[53]  Hence, this appeal was filed.

The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED

DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND SEIZURE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE
THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS.[54]

For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and
seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through
the search should be admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the
conviction of the accused.

In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the
requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.[55]

We find for the accused.

 II

The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. 

It has many dimensions.  One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches
and seizures are “reasonable.”  As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that
meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable.  This warrant requires the
existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.[56]  The existence of
probable cause must be established by the judge after asking searching questions and
answers.[57]  Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be
committed.  Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers.  There must
be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched. [58]

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. [59]  In
the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a
separate warrant.[60]  This court has taken into account the “uniqueness of circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.”[61]  The known jurisprudential
instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest . . . ;

2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” . . . ;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the

vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;
 6. Stop and frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[62] (Citations omitted)

III

One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is “stop and frisk”.  “Stop and
frisk” searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the
Rules of Court.[63]  Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be
committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and within
reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to
preserve the evidence.[64]

On the other hand, “stop and frisk” searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a
crime.  For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals[65] was similar “to a ‘stop
and frisk’ situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious
individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to
obtain more information.”[66]  This court stated that the “stop and frisk” search should be
used “[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the
city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant.” [67]

The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not
comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches[68]) are necessary for
law enforcement.  That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses.  However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the
police officer finds himself or herself in.  This may be undoubtedly based on the
experience of the police officer.  Experienced police officers have personal experience
dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.  Hence, they should have the ability to
discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting
in a suspicious manner.  Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with
his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit
act.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,[69] the police officers were initially informed about a

place frequented by people abusing drugs.[70]  When they arrived, one of the police
officers saw a man with “reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner.” [71] 
The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police officers.[72]  These observations
led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on drugs.[73]  These were
sufficient facts observed by the police officers “to stop [the] petitioner [and]
investigate.”[74]

In People v. Solayao,[75] police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.[76]  This man
was also “wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.”[77]  Upon seeing the police, the
man fled.[78]  His flight added to the suspicion.[79]  After stopping him, the police officers
found an unlicensed “homemade firearm”[80] in his possession.[81]  This court ruled that
“[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a
search warrant first.”[82]  This was also a valid search.

In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the
suspicion.  Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on
their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs.  A drunk
civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.

The case of Cogaed was different.  He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and
traveling aboard a jeepney.  There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about
riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.  The assessment of suspicion was not made by the
police officer but by the jeepney driver.  It was the driver who signalled to the police that
Cogaed was “suspicious.”

This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:

COURT:
Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the
passenger jeep?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor.[83]

SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:

COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to
believe that the accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor.[84]

The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed.  He would not have been identified by the
police officers otherwise.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person.  The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by
another person.  This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched.[85]  Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s
basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

IV

Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer
with a judge to determine probable cause.  In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,[86] one of the
earliest cases adopting the “stop and frisk” doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this
court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause:

The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in
the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
[87]
 (Emphasis supplied)

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as “a reasonable ground of

suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.”[88]

Malacat v. Court of Appeals[89] clarifies the requirement further.  It does not have to be

probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion.[90] It has to be a “genuine
reason”[91] to serve the purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception:[92]

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
“stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
“stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.[93] (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)

In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,[94] Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers

must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.[95]  There should be “presence of more
than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted
a reasonable inference of criminal activity.”[96]  The Constitution prohibits “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”[97]  Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or
none at all will not result in a reasonable search.[98]

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest.  The person
searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant.  The informant gave the
name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed.  Even if it was true
that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this
still remained only as one circumstance.  This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless
there is compliance with the “genuine reason” requirement and that the search serves the
purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:

[A] “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
[99]
 (Emphasis supplied)

The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.[100]  As in Manalili,[101] jurisprudence also allows “stop and
frisk” for cases involving dangerous drugs.

The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta.[102]  In that case, an
informant told the police that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be bringing in drugs from
Baguio City by bus.[103]  At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. [104] 
The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street[105] and identified her as “Aling
Rosa.”[106]  The police apprehended “Aling Rosa,” and they alleged that she allowed them
to look inside her bag.[107]  The bag contained marijuana leaves.[108]

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. [109]  There
were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search
and seizure.[110]  It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.[111] 
The evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search. [112] 
Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.[113]

Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the
police’s informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was “suspicious.”

The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.[114]  Here, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as
somebody possessing drugs.[115]  The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted
Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat.[116]  Like in the case at bar, the NBI
inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what turned out to be marijuana leaves.
   The court declared that the search and seizure was illegal. [118]  Aminnudin was
[117]

acquitted.[119]

People v. Chua[120] also presents almost the same circumstances.  In this case, the police
had been receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in “different
karaoke bars in Angeles City.”[121]  One night, the police received information that this
drug dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a
stakeout.[122]  A car “arrived and parked”[123] at the hotel.[124]  The informant told the police
that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs.[125]  The man alighted from his car.[126] 
He was carrying a juice box.[127]  The police immediately apprehended him and
discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding.
[128]

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s
situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that “[t]here was no valid ‘stop-and-
frisk’.”[129]

VI

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.  The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful
arrest.  For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a
lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest.  None of the
instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the
arrest was made.

At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was
about to commit a crime.  As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante
delicto to be affected, “two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.”[130]  Both elements were missing when Cogaed was
arrested.[131]  There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified
for the last allowable warrantless arrest.

VII

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he
did not object when the police asked him to open his bags.  As this court previously
stated:

Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.[132] (Citations omitted)

Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive

environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private
space.  The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion.  In
all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned
again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:

ATTY. BINWAG:
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their
bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, ma’am.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?
A None, ma’am.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents of
the bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, ma’am.
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the
bags, is it not?
A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised.[133] (Emphasis
supplied)

The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s responses to
Judge Florendo’s questions:

COURT:
....
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was
somewhat frightened. He was a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping
down and he put down the bag I asked him, “what’s that,” and he answered, “I don’t
know because Marvin only asked me to carry.”[134]

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that
the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.  The
police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her
part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not
amount to a reasonable search.  The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a
language known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. 
There must be an assurance given to the police officer that the accused fully understands
his or her rights.  The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy
requires no less.

VIII

The Constitution provides:

Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[135]

Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this
constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.[136]  This rule prohibits the
issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. 
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it
is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”[137]  It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s
person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of
his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence
left to convict Cogaed.

Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society.  In the fight to eradicate this
menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their
duties better.  However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental
values enshrined in our Constitution.  Otherwise, we will be seen as slowly dismantling
the very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando
City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for
some other legal grounds.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr.,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

O R D E R  O F  R E L E A S E

TO: The Director

        Bureau of Corrections
        1770 Muntinlupa City

G R E E T I N G S:

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court on July 30, 2014 promulgated a Decision in the above-
entitled case, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando
City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is held for some
other legal ground.  No costs.

SO ORDERED."

NOW THEREFORE, You are hereby ordered to immediately release VICTOR

COAGAED Y ROMANA unless there are other causes for which he should be further
detained, and to return this Order with the certificate of your proceedings within five (5)
days from notice hereof.

GIVEN by the Honorable PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., Chairperson of the Third

Division of the Supreme Court of the Philippines this 30th day of July 2014.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

September 4, 2014

N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on ___July 30, 2014___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on September 4, 2014 at 2:15 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

 Designated as Acting Member in view of the vacancy in the Third Division per Special
*

Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014.

[1]
 CA rollo, pp. 39–58.
[2]
 Id. at 60.
[3]
 Id.
[4]
 Rollo, p. 5; CA rollo, p. 10.
[5]
 Id.
[6]
 Id.
[7]
 Id.
[8]
 Id.
[9]
 Id.
[10]
 Id.
[11]
 Rollo, p. 5; CA rollo, p. 13.
[12]
 Rollo, pp. 5–6, 13.
[13]
 Id. at 6, 13.
[14]
 Id. at 6.
[15]
 Id.
[16]
 Id.
[17]
 Id.
[18]
 Id.
[19]
 Id.
[20]
 Id.
[21]
 Id.
[22]
 Id.
[23]
 Rollo, p. 7; CA rollo, p. 12.
[24]
 Rollo, p. 7.
[25]
 Id.
[26]
 Id.
[27]
 Id.
[28]
 Id.
[29]
 Id.
[30]
 Id.
[31]
 Id.
[32]
 Id. at 7–8.
[33]
 Id. at 8.
[34]
 Id. at 5.
[35]
 Id. at 8.
[36]
 Id.
[37]
 Id.
[38]
 Id.
[39]
 Id.
[40]
 Rollo, pp. 8 and 3–4.
[41]
 Id. at 3–4.
[42]
 Id. at 2–3.
[43]
 Id. at 4.
[44]
 Id.
[45]
 CA rollo, pp. 9–15.
[46]
 Id. at 15.
[47]
 Id. at 14.
[48]
 Id.
[49]
 Id.
[50]
 Id.
[51]
 Id. at 39–58.

 Rollo, pp. 2–22. Ninth Division, decision penned by Associate Justice Ramon R.

[52]

Garcia, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Samuel H. Gaerlan

concurring.
[53]
 Id. at 12.
[54]
 CA rollo, pp. 41–42.
[55]
 Rep. Act No. 10640 (2014) amending sec. 21 of Rep. Act No. 9165.
[56]
 CONST., art. III, sec. 2.
[57]
 CONST., art. III, sec. 2.
[58]
 CONST., art. III, sec. 2.

 See Valmonte v. De Villa, 258 Phil. 838, 843 (1989) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc]: “Not all
[59]

searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden.”

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person
[60]

lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without search warrant.

 Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 370, 383 [Per J.
[61]

Carpio- Morales, Third Division], citing People v. Nuevas, 545 Phil. 356, 370–371

(2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
[62]
 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879–880 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].

 Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 370, 393–394 [Per
[63]

J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division] (Bersamin dissenting), citing Malacat v. Court of

Appeals, 347 Phil. 462, 479–480 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

 See also Nolasco v. Judge Paño, 223 Phil. 363, 377–378 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-
[64]

Herrera, En Banc].
[65]
 G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA 288 [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].
[66]
 Id. at 294, citing the Solicitor General’s arguments.

 Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 632, 636 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
[67]

Division].

 The term was derived from the American case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
[68]

This case served as basis for allowing “stop and frisk” searches in this jurisdiction.
[69]
 345 Phil. 632 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[70]
 Id. at 638.
[71]
 Id.
[72]
 Id.
[73]
 Id. at 647.
[74]
 Id.
[75]
 330 Phil. 811 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
[76]
 Id. at 815.
[77]
 Id.
[78]
 Id.
[79]
 Id. at 818–819.
[80]
 Id. at 815.
[81]
 Id.
[82]
 Id. at 819.
[83]
 TSN, May 23, 2006, p. 6.
[84]
 TSN, June 1, 2006, pp. 21–22.

 Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 462, 473–474 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En
[85]

Banc].
[86]
 G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA 288 [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].
[87]
 Id. at 293.

 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division] (Emphasis
[88]

supplied).
[89]
 347 Phil. 462 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
[90]
 Id. at 481.
[91]
 Id.
[92]
 Id.
[93]
 Id.

 Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 370 [Per J. Carpio
[94]

Morales, Third Division].

[95]
 Id. See dissenting opinion of J. Bersamin, p. 397.
[96]
 Id.
[97]
 CONST., art. III, sec. 2.

 See dissenting opinion of J. Bersamin in Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August

[98]

25, 2010, 629 SCRA 370, 397 [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
[99]
 Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 462, 481-482 (1997) [Per J. Davide, En Banc].

 In J. Bersamin’s dissent in Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010,
[100]

629 SCRA 370, 396, he opined:

[A] Terry protective search is strictly limited to what is necessary for the discovery of
weapons that may be used to harm the officer of the law or others nearby. There must
then be a genuine reason to believe that the accused is armed and presently dangerous.
Being an exception to the rule requiring a search warrant, a Terry protective search is
strictly construed; hence, it cannot go beyond what is necessary to determine if the
suspect is armed. Anything beyond is no longer valid and the fruits of the search will be
suppressed.
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
[101]
 345 Phil. 632 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[102]
 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
[103]
 Id. at 883.
[104]
 Id.
[105]
 Id. at 884–885.
[106]
 Id. at 883.
[107]
 Id.
[108]
 Id.
[109]
 Id. at 888.
[110]
 Id. at 885.
[111]
 Id.
[112]
 Id. at 894.
[113]
 Id. at 895.
[114]
 246 Phil. 424 (1988) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[115]
 Id. at 427.
[116]
 Id.
[117]
 Id.
[118]
 Id. at 434.
[119]
 Id. at 435.
[120]
 444 Phil. 757 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
[121]
 Id. at 763.
[122]
 Id.
[123]
 Id.
[124]
 Id.
[125]
 Id.
[126]
 Id.
[127]
 Id.
[128]
 Id. at 763–764.
[129]
 Id. at 774.
[130]
 Id. at 770.

 See also People v. Molina, 404 Phil. 797, 812 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En

[131]

Banc] and People v. Aminnudin, 246 Phil. 424, 433–434 (1988) [Per J. Cruz, First
Division].

However, the application of these rules to crimes of illegal possession has been subject of
debate. In People v. Maspil, Jr. (G.R. No. 85177, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA 751 [Per
J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division]), we ruled that the accused were in flagrante
delicto when the police searched their cargo at a checkpoint, and the accused were found
to be transporting prohibited drugs. {761-762} The court delineated this
from Aminnudin because in Aminnudin, the police had an opportunity to secure a
warrant. {433} Maspil also relied on the doctrine in People v. Tangliben (263 Phil. 106
(1990) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division]) wherein the search was considered
incidental to an in flagrante delicto arrest because of the “urgency” of the situation.
{115}

Despite these doctrinal deviations, it is better if we follow the two-tiered test to determine
if an individual is in flagrante delicto, which calls for his or her warrantless arrests. The
general rule should be that there must be an overt act and that such act is in plain view of
the law enforcer.
[132]
 People v. Encinada, 345 Phil. 301, 322 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[133]
 TSN, June 1, 2006, pp. 18–19.
[134]
 Id. at 21.
[135]
 CONSTI., art. III, sec. 3 (b).
[136]
 126 Phil. 738 (1967) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc].
[137]
 Id. at 750.
 THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 110397, August 14, 1997 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARMANDO
BINAMIRA Y ALAYON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In acquitting the accused, this Court stresses two doctrines: (1) a violation of the
accused’s right to retain a counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation
renders his extrajudicial confession inadmissible even where such confession was
extracted on October 3, 1985, i.e., before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, and
(2) to sustain a conviction anchored on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must
convincingly prove an unbroken chain of events from which only one fair and
reasonable conclusion can be inferred -- that of the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Where such circumstances can be the subject of two possibilities,
one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, then such evidence
has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and the constitutional presumption of
innocence must thus be upheld.

Statement of the Case

Appellant Armando Binamira y Alayon[1] appeals the May 5, 1989 Decision[2] of the

Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 164,[3] in Criminal Case No. 19504
convicting him of the crime of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Jessie Flores y Cledar,
[4]
 P30,000.00 as indemnity and P25,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.

On October 7, 1985, an Information,[5] dated October 4, 1985, was filed by Second

Assistant Fiscal Dennis M. Villa Ignacio accusing appellant of robbery with homicide
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of October, 1985, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, while armed with a fan knife, with intent to gain and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
and divest from one Jessie Flores y Cledera her 14K Gold Necklace worth P1,000.00 and
One (1) Lady’s Citizen wrist watch worth P1,000.00 all belonging to Jessie Flores y
Cledera in the total amount of P2,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the aforementioned amount of P2,000.00; that on the occasion of said robbery, the
accused stabbed the said Jessie Flores y Cledera on her neck, as a result thereof, the
said victim suffered mortal wound which directly caused her death.

Contrary to law.”
Arraigned on October 25, 1985, the accused, assisted by Counsel de Oficio Elpidio R.
Calis, pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6] Trial ensued in due course.

Based on circumstantial evidence and on Appellant Binamira’s extrajudicial confession,

the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and hereby sentences him to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of
P30,000.00 for the death of Jessie Flores and P25,000.00 as actual or compensatory
without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.”[7]
Aggrieved, appellant interposed this appeal.

The Facts According to the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four witnesses; namely, NBI Medico-Legal Officer Nieto
Salvador, who testified on the autopsy results; Nicasio Rosales, a security guard who
testified on the arrest and turnover to the police authorities of Appellant Binamira;
Makati Police Officer Wilfredo Cruz, who testified on the custodial investigation and
extrajudicial confession of appellant; and Narciso Flores, the husband of the deceased,
Jessie Flores y Cledera. In the appellee’s brief, the Solicitor General summarized the
facts as presented by the prosecution, thus:

On 02 October 1985, at about 6:50 P.M., in Magallanes Village, Makati, Metro Manila,
Security Guard Nicasio Rosales of the RAPSA Security Agency assigned thereat together
with his co-guards were alerted by a report regarding the death of a woman by the
name of Jessie Flores y Cledera at No. 68 Margarita St., Magallanes Village, Makati. They
hurried to the scene of the crime where they saw the lifeless body of a woman lying on
the ground (pp. 4-6, tsn, February 14, 1986).

They immediately conducted a search of the immediate surroundings hoping to find the
person responsible for the killing and they saw a man wearing short pants, walking very
fast. When the guards approached him, the man who turned out to be herein appellant,
casually pretended to be urinating. Suspicious, they searched him and found a pair of
pants and undershirt inside his bag soaked with blood (pp. 6-7, id).

Thereupon, the guard brought appellant to the Galleria de Magallanes Hall where he, as
well as the bloodied clothings, were turned over to Police Investigator Wilfredo Cruz
whom they had called to respond to said incident. On the same day, appellant was
brought to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the Makati Police Station for
further investigation (pp. 7-8. id).

On the following day, 03 October 1985, Cruz conducted an investigation of appellant’s

complicity in the Magallanes robbery-killing incident. Before the investigation
proceeded, Pfc. Cruz first apprised appellant of his constitutional rights while under
custodial investigation by explaining to him his right to counsel, his right to remain silent
and, that any statement that he would give during the investigation may be used for or
against him in any court of law, and that in case he did not have a lawyer, the State
would provide him with one who will assist him in the investigation. At this juncture, the
services of Atty. Romeo P. Parcon of the Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) of
Makati was offered to which appellant agreed (pp.5-7, tsn, 1986; pp.4-6, tsn, May 14,
1986; pp.84, Record).

While being investigated with the assistance and presence of Atty. Parcon, appellant
readily cooperated to give his statements. He admitted that he stabbed the victim in the
neck with a fan knife after divesting her of one (1) wristwatch and a gold necklace.
Appellant revealed that he killed the victim when she began screaming for help despite
his instructions to keep silent. Midway during the investigation, Pfc. Cruz showed to
appellant a gold necklace and asked him the connection thereof to the investigation to
which appellant, despite being told that he was at liberty not to proceed with the
investigation, admitted that the necklace was the same one he took from the victim.
After the investigation, the extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to by
appellant (Exh. ‘C’ to ‘C-2’) before the office of the then Fiscal of Makati (pp.84-84,
Records; p.10, tsn, March 21, 1986; p.7, tsn, May 14, 1986).
Dr. Nieto Salvador, the NBI Medico-legal Officer, who conducted an autopsy
examination on the body of the victim on October 3, 1985, found as per autopsy report
no. N-85-2078 (Exh. ‘F’ to ‘F-3’) dated December 2, 1985, the following:
'Lips and nailbeds, pale. Abrasions, reddish brown, 1.5 x 0.5. cm. right infraclavicular
region.

'Wound stab, 2.0 cm. in size, lower extremity rounded, running downward and medially,
edges clean cut; located at the left side of the suprasternal, 1.0 cm. to the left anterior
median line directed backward, downward and laterally, involving skin, underlying soft
tissues, cutting carotid artery and vein, approximate depth artery and vein, approximate
depth, 7.0 cm.

‘Other visceral organs pale.

‘Stomach is filled up to 2/3 with partially digested food particles.’

Dr. Salvador testified that the victim’s cause of death was due to acute hemorrhage on
account of a frontal stab wound she sustained at the base of her neck just above the
subtraclavicular notch. He further opines that the instrument used in the stabbing is a
sharp pointed object. Appellant’s clothings soaked with the victim’s blood were also
submitted to Dr. Salvador for examination (pp. 6-9, tsn, April 25, 1986).” [8]

According to the Defense

Appellant, as lone defense witness, admitted his presence at Magallanes Village that
fateful night but unequivocally denied participation in the crime. The following counter-
statement of facts is narrated in Appellant’s Brief:

The evidence for the defense eloquently shows that accused-appellant was formerly
connected with the National Food Authority (NFA) as messenger from 1983 to 1985. On
October 2, 1985, coming from his work at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila, at around
7:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, he went to Magallanes Village at the back of
Bulwagang Pilipino for the purpose of taking a merienda which he usually did after office
hours. While walking all alone at the vicinity of Magallanes Village, accused-appellant
did not notice any unusual incident nor seen (sic) anybody until the security guards who,
without legal and justifiable grounds searched and apprehended him. Accused-appellant
was brought by the security guards at their headquarters where they beat, mauled,
maltreated and tied him to the post. They forced him to admit that he was the one who
killed the woman whose body was lying at their guardhouse. But the accused-appellant
maintained his innocence. After the lapse of several minutes, the security guards untied
the accused-appellant from the post and they brought them back to their headquarters.
The security guards then pointed to accused-appellant a person lying at their
guardhouse. They forced accused-appellant to carry the dead body to be placed inside
the funeral car. Helpless, accused-appellant followed their order. After he has placed
the body at the funeral car, the security guards ordered him to take off the clothes he
was wearing. Accused-appellant consented. Afterwards, the security guards brought
him once more to their headquarters where accused-appellant saw Pfc. Willy Cruz. From
their headquarters, they brought him to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Makati
Police Station for interrogation.

At the Makati Police Station, the police investigators assigned that time investigated the
accused-appellant relative to the death of a woman at the Magallanes Village, Makati,
Metro-Manila. When the investigation was being conducted by the police investigator,
accused-appellant did not see one of his relatives at the police station nor was he
provided a lawyer of his choice. Subsequently, the police investigators blindfolded him.
He was thereafter mauled by the police investigators, forcing him to admit the
commission of the crime which happened in Magallanes Village. After maltreating the
accused-appellant, they detained him and was made to sign a statement the following
day.

When his wife visited him at the detention cell, accused-appellant told her what the
security guards and police officers did to him during the apprehension and investigation.
The wife, due to fear, did not report the maltreatment committed on the accused-
appellant to the higher authorities.

Accused-appellant denied having divested Jessie Flores of one gold necklace worth
P1,000.00 and Ladys’s (sic) Citizen wrist watch also worth P1,000.00 or a total of
P2,000.00 and having stabbed Jessie Flores on her neck which resulted to her untimely
death. On August 2, 1986, accused-appellant `wrote his lawyer on record reiterating
thereto the mishandling committed by the security guards and police investigator when
he denied the killing of a woman whose body was found in Magallanes Village, Metro-
Manila. (Exh. ‘1’). (TSN, September 11, 1987, pp. 3-11)”[9]

The Issues
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

“I

The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to thhe [sic] testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses despite of [sic] its improbabilities.

II

The trial court gravely erred in holding that the extrajudicial confession of accused-
appellant Armando Binamira is admissible in evidence.

(III)

The trial court gravely erred in totally disregarding the defense interposed by the
accused-appellant.

IV

The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.” [10]

In the ultimate, the foregoing boil down to whether the evidence on record establishes
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Appellant Binamira. Two points will be addressed:
first, the admissibility of appellant’s extrajudicial confession; and second, the sufficiency
of the circumstantial evidence to sustain appellant’s guilt.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Extrajudicial Confession Inadmissible

Appellant Armando Binamira contends that his extrajudicial confession marked as

Exhibit “C” is inadmissible in evidence because it was improperly taken during the
custodial investigation.[11] He contends that he “was not informed of his right to counsel
of his own choice nor assisted by counsel of his own choice” [12] and that this was evident
from the Pahiwatig of his extrajudicial confession, which reads: [13]
PAHIWATIG:            Ikaw ARMANDO BINAMIRA ay nahaharap sa isang pagsisiyasat
tungkol sa isang pangyayari na kung saan ang isang babaing biktima ay namatay dahil sa
isang saksak sa kanyang leeg.

Bilang isang malayang mamamayan ng ating bansa, ikaw ay may ilang mga karapatan sa
ilalim ng ating bagong umiiral na Saligang Batas gaya ng mga sumusunod;

Na, karapatan mo ang manahimik o ang hindi pagbibigay ng pahayag tungkol sa

pagsisiyasat na ito.

Na, karapatan mo ang kumuha ng isang abogado o manananggol na siyang

mamamatnubay sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito at kung ikaw ay walang abogado ay
bibigyan ka namin ng isang manananggol o abogado.

Na, karapatan mo rin ang hindi pagsagot sa mga ipagtatanong ko sa iyo na inaakala mo
na makasasama sa iyo.

Nais ko rin ipaalam sa iyo na ano mang sasabihin mo sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maari ring
naming gamitin laban sa iyo sa alin mang hukuman dito sa ating bansa.

TANONG: Matapos kong maipaliwanag sa iyo ang ilan sa iyong mga karapatan, ikaw ba
ay magbibigay ng isang malayang salaysay sa pagsisiyasat na ito?

SAGOT:    Opo. A.B.[14]

T.     Dahilan sa ikaw ay walang manananggol o abogado sa pagsisiyasat na ito, ikaw ay

bibgyan namin ng isang abogado sa katauhan ni Atty. ROMEO P. PARCON ng Makati
CLAO office na siyang mamamatnubay sa iyo ngayon. Pumapayag ka ba na itong si ATTY.
ROMEO P. PARCON ang siyang mamantnubay sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito?
S.    Opo. A.B. [handwritten]

T.     Ikaw ba ay magbibigay ng isang malayang salaysay sa harap ni Atty. Romeo P.

Parcon?” (Underscoring supplied.)
Significant in assessing this contention of the appellant is the Solicitor General’s candid
admission that “Exhibit ‘C’ (the extrajudicial confession) does not show that appellant
was informed of his right to have a counsel preferably of his own choice as required
under the present Constitution.”[15]
The prosecution however justified such failure to inform appellant of his right to counsel
of choice and to give him the opportunity to retain one by arguing that the questioned
extrajudicial confession was obtained on October 3, 1985, whereas the 1987
Constitution, which expressly provided for such rights, [16] took effect only on February 2,
1987[17] and could not be given retroactive effect pursuant to Magtoto vs. Manguera.
[18]
 Thus, the Solicitor General postulates, “(a)t the time said confession was made,
appellant was not yet entitled to be informed of the right he is now invoking simply
because there was none at the time. The right to counsel preferably of one’s own choice
during investigation for the commission of an offense is a new provision.” [19]

We do not agree. Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution mandated that “x x x
(a)ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. x x x Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.” Parenthetically,
this constitutional provision was an “acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by
the United States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona.” [20]

Significantly, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile[21] promulgated on April 26, 1983, the Philippine
Supreme Court, applying said provision of the 1973 Constitution, laid down for the first
time the guidelines to be observed strictly by law enforcers during custodial
investigation,[22] and there had occasion to state that “x x x No custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of
the detainee himself or anyone on his behalf. x x x” [23] (Italics supplied.) This doctrinal
pronouncement was reiterated in People vs. Galit, [24] promulgated on March 20, 1985,
and other cases. In People vs. Jimenez[25] promulgated on December 10, 1991 and which
dealt with an extrajudicial confession given during a custodial investigation on
September 16, 1985, this Court through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice,
Andres R. Narvasa held that “a person being investigated by the police as a suspect in an
offense has the right, among others, ‘to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice’ and if he ‘cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one;’ and that said right ‘cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.’ x x x In one case, the confession of an accused was rejected there
being no showing that the lawyer of the Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) called
by the National Bureau of Investigation to assist the accused was his counsel of
choice.”[26]
In its evolution, the right to engage a counsel of choice and its companion rights had
been initially a “judge-made”[27] law, the definitive ruling having been first laid down by
this Court in Morales, reiterated in Galit and subsequent cases and eventually
incorporated in the 1987 Constitution. Ineludibly, these rights may not be given
retroactive effect pursuant to Article 4 in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code and, by
parity of reasoning, Magtoto. Consequently, they do not cover extrajudicial confessions
made prior to April 26, 1983, the promulgation date of Morales. [28] Since Appellant
Binamira executed his extrajudicial confession on October 3, 1985, or after April 26,
1983, he was correct in invoking the right to be informed of his right to engage a
counsel of his own choice and to be afforded the reasonable opportunity to retain one.
On this basis, the prosecution’s argument, pointing to our ruling in Magtoto, is flawed.
For, clearly, the facts obtaining in the present case do not justify the application of the
doctrine on non-retroactivity or prospectivity of laws, including this Court’s
interpretation of the same as enunciated in Magtoto.

In addition, the factual antecedents of Magtoto are not on all fours with that of the
present case. The former case contemplated a right previously absent under the 1935
Constitution and which was granted for the first time only by the 1973 Constitution. The
instant case involved a right which, although not then expressly worded in the 1973
Constitution, already existed as a “judge-made” law when the incident happened and its
application was claimed by the appellant.

Father Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, writes that
“the brief sentence in the 1973 version was expanded (in the 1987 Constitution) in
order to clarify the scope of the right.”[29] Indeed, the present Constitution did not create
a new right; it merely affirmed its scope as already explained in existing jurisprudence.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion.
Felicitas S. Aquino, another member of the Constitutional Commission, proclaimed that
“[l]ikewise, the amendment of incorporating ‘PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE’
reasserts that the freedom to choose and the freedom to refuse belong first to the
detainee.”[30] This Court had occasion to explain the rationale of this right as follows:
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all
organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of
1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice,
under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the
accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed
judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.

Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer
were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent
and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this
Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.'

Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if
the latter could not afford one) `should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the
latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon
proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition.
Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity
and supposed independence, are generally suspect; as in many areas, the relationship
between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic." [31]
Clearly, the right to counsel preferably of one’s own choice and the right to be informed
thereof were extant when Appellant Binamira was investigated by the Makati Police on
October 3, 1985, or more than two years after the promulgation of the “judge-made
law” in Morales.

In the present case, Appellant Binamira was not adequately informed of his
constitutional right to engage a counsel of his own choice, much less afforded an
opportunity to exercise such right. This much, we repeat, is admitted by the Solicitor
General.

Moreover, the extrajudicial confession itself shows that, in the course of the custodial
investigation, Appellant Binamira was not fully apprised of his constitutional rights.
While he was perfunctorily informed of his right to be represented by counsel, it was
not explained to him that he may choose that counsel. More important, he was not
given the chance to actually retain such counsel of his choice. Furthermore, he was
supposedly “informed” of these rights through two kilometric sentences punctuated by
similarly two terse answers of “Opo” initialed by him.[32] It was not demonstrated that
appellant understood his constitutional rights; and the Pahiwatig itself, which is
obviously of martial law vintage, shows that the investigating officers did not exert
sufficient effort to explain such rights. Verily, the right of a person under custodial
investigation to be informed of his rights contemplates “an effective communication
that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of
the right, as it cannot truly be said that the accused has been ‘informed’ of his right.” [33]

Finally, the CLAO lawyer appointed by the police to assist appellant did not provide
effective or adequate legal assistance to the latter. He did not display any measure of
zeal commensurate to the magnitude of his responsibility. Said counsel even failed to
object to the apparent illegal arrest and unlawful search on appellant who was simply
walking when “arrested” by Nicasio Rosales, a security guard, on the sole ground that he
looked “suspicious.” Unquestionably, Rosales did not witness the robbery or the killing
and did not see appellant commit, or about to commit, the crime charged. [34]

The evidence shows that said counsel was present only during the signing of the
extrajudicial confession. The record is bereft of any indication that said counsel
explained anything to or advised the appellant of the consequences of his confession.
Although it is clear that appellant had been “investigated” by the police as early as
October 2, 1985, the counsel’s presence was established by the prosecution only during
the actual signing on October 3, and not during the investigation itself. Prosecution
Witness Rosales testified that the Magallanes Village security guards turned over the
appellant -- as a suspect in and not as a witness to the killing -- to the Makati Police on
the night of October 2. Pfc.[35] Wilfredo Cruz also testified that he investigated appellant
on October 2. Appellant himself confirmed that the “investigation” started as soon as he
arrived at the police station. The extrajudicial confession, however, was signed only on
the following day. In spite of appellant’s allegations of irregularities committed in the
course of the investigation, i.e., before and during the actual signing of the confession,
the prosecution miserably failed to present rebuttal evidence. To clarify all these, Atty.
Romeo P. Parcon should have been presented on the stand. Such failure or lapse
denigrates the prosecution’s cause.

As this Court held in People vs. Deniega, “[I]f the lawyer’s role is reduced to being that
of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating therein
compliance with the accused’s constitutional rights, the constitutional standard x x x is
not met.”[36] Under the circumstances of this case, appellant’s extrajudicial confession
does not merit our imprimatur.
The prosecution also hammers on the fact that neither Appellant Binamira nor his wife
or other relatives ever reported to the authorities the physical abuse appellant suffered
in the hands of the security guards and the police investigating him. However, such
failure does not prove the voluntariness of Binamira’s confession. It is not very difficult
to understand the apprehension, even the refusal, of appellant and his wife -- poor folks
not highly educated, if at all -- to report these violations of appellant’s rights, for
Binamira suffered these wrongs from the very same persons who were supposed to
protect him. The fact that he was able to divulge these abuses only to his wife and Atty.
Calis cannot by itself destroy the credibility of his claim. Indeed, the Constitution also
proscribes the admissibility of any confession or admission from a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense if such admission was obtained through
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free
will.[37] However, the Court will not take up appellant’s allegations that he was tortured
and maltreated by the investigating police and the security guards, because such
consideration is no longer necessary in view of our holding on the violation of his right
to counsel of choice. Where a confession is extracted contrary to the accused’s Miranda
rights, it is ipso facto inadmissible in evidence. Hence, there is no more need for the
appellant to prove duress or intimidation to attain the same objective of outlawing the
confession.

Circumstantial Evidence Insufficient

In view of the inadmissibility of appellant’s extrajudicial confession, the prosecution’s

case rests purely on circumstantial evidence. Under Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court, “[c]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.” The well-entrenched doctrine is that:
 “ x x x a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if
the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person, that is, the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.” [38]
In the case at bar, we find that the totality of circumstantial evidence does not support
the conviction of the accused. The only circumstances proven in this case were: (1) the
mortal stabbing of the victim, Jessie Flores; (2) the presence of Appellant Armando
Binamira in Magallanes Village where the crime occurred; 3) his arrest by the three
RAPSA security guards, on the ground that he was walking suspiciously fast; and (4) the
alleged recovery of bloodied clothes from appellant’s bag.

The prosecution also pointed out that a necklace belonging to the victim was recovered
from the appellant. This is highly dubious. According to the testimony of Police Officer
Cruz, the appellant allegedly surrendered the necklace to a CID personnel at the police
station after the investigation had already started.[39] This is incredible, for no such
necklace or any other piece of stolen jewelry was found in appellant’s possession when
he was apprehended and searched by the security guards. Additionally, this Court
wonders why appellant, who would not even hold on to his loot of jewelry, would lug
around in his bag bloodied clothes which inexplicably were not presented in evidence
during the trial.

All in all, these circumstances do not form an unbroken chain adequate to justify the
inference beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime.
These circumstances can be the subject of two possibilities: one consistent with the guilt
of the accused and the other consistent with his innocence. The hornbook principle is
that “ x x x when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other or others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence, in view of the constitutional
presumption of innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus
insufficient to support a conviction.”[40]

Sufficiency and Weight of Evidence

In view of appellant’s admission that he was at the locus criminis when the offense was
committed, his defense of denial is admittedly weak. However, it should not be
automatically disregarded either. It may turn out to be true specially in this case where
the appellant’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence and the remaining
pieces of circumstantial evidence are sorely insufficient to convict him. In any event, the
burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless such burden is discharged properly,
the appellant has no duty to prove his innocence.

In closing, we must stress that mere suspicions and speculations can never be the bases
of a conviction in a criminal case. Our Constitution and our laws dearly value individual
life and liberty and require no less than moral certainty or proof beyond reasonable
doubt to offset the presumption of innocence. Courts -- both trial and appellate -- are
not called upon to speculate on who committed the crime. The task of courts, rather, is
to determine whether the prosecution has submitted sufficient legally admissible
evidence showing beyond reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed, and that
the accused committed it. In this case, the prosecution has failed to present adequate
proof demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt that Appellant Armando Binamira y
Alayon was the culprit who robbed and killed Jessie Flores y Cledera.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Armando Binamira y Alayon
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. His immediate RELEASE from confinement
is ORDERED unless he is detained for some other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ.,  concur.

[1]
 Married, 19 years old, employee of the National Food Authority and resident of ATO
Compound, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila, on the date of the crime. Records, p.
87.

[2]
 Rollo, pp. 19-23.

[3]
 Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles presiding.

[4]
 Married, 30 years old, a beautician and resident of Blk. 9, Lot 12, Camella Homes,
Alabang I, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on the date of the crime.

[5]
 Records, p. 1.

[6]
 Ibid., p. 4. Before this Court, however, appellant is represented by the Public
Attorney’s Office.

[7]
 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, p. 5; Rollo, p. 23.

[8]
 Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-7; Rollo, pp. 88-92.

[9]
 Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6-8; Rollo, pp.41-43.
[10]
 Ibid., pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 43-44.

[11]
 Appellant’s Brief, p. 15; Rollo, p. 50.

[12]
 Ibid., p. 16; Rollo, p. 51.

[13]
 Exhibit “C,” Records, p. 84.

[14]
 “Opo. A.B.” was handwritten. “A.B.” allegedly meant “Armando Binamira.”

[15]
 Appellee’s Brief, p. 21; Rollo, p. 106.

[16]
 Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

“Sec. 12.            (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx        xxx        xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.

xxx        xxx        xxx.”

[17]
 Section 27, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution.

[18]
 63 SCRA 4, March 3, 1975.

[19]
 Appellant’s Brief, p. 21; Rollo, p. 106.

[20]
 People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA565, 585, March 22, 1995, per Davide, Jr., J.; citing 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
[21]
 121 SCRA 538, per Concepcion, Jr., J.

[22]
 See,. Filoteo, Jr vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79543, p. 43, October 16, 1996.

[23]
 People vs. Morales, supra, p. 554. See also People vs. Maqueda, supra, p. 587.

[24]
 135 SCRA 465, 472.

[25]
 204 SCRA 719.

[26]
 Ibid; citing People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, September 30, 1987.

[27]
 People vs. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36, 49-50, July 3, 1992.

[28]
 See Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, pp. 41-44.

[29]
 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 409.

[30]
 Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 734.

[31]
 People vs. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626, 637-638, December 29, 1995, per Kapunan, J.

[32]
 Records, p. 84.

[33]
 People vs. Newman, 163 SCRA 496, July 26, 1988.

[34]
 TSN, pp. 3-4, February 28, 1987.

[35]
 Patrolman First Class.

[36]
 Supra, p. 638.

[37]
 Art. III, Sec. 12, pars. 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution.

[38]
 People vs. Adofina, 239 SCRA 67, 76-77, December 8, 1994, per Regalado, J.
[39]
 TSN, p. 10, March 21, 1986.

[40]
 People vs. Agustin, 246 SCRA 673, 681, July 18, 1995, per Regalado, J.