No. L-18148.  February 28, 1963.

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the
deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely:
ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS
OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO
REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.

Descent and distribution; Estate proceedings; Determina­tion by

probate court of question as to title to property; General rule and
exceptions.—While as a general rule question of title to property cannot be
passed upon on testate or intestate pro­ceedings, except where one of the
parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the
question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate ction
(Garcia v. Garcia, 87 Phil. 353; Guingguing v. Abu-ton, 48 Phil. 144),
however, when the parties are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional on
them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and
when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon
(Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Mañalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661).
Same; Same; Same; Probate courts vented with jurisdiction to try
controversies between heirs regarding ownership of prop­erties allegedly
belonging to deceased.—The jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs
of the defeased regarding the owner­ship of properties alleged to belong to
his estate is vested in

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368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals

probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an adminis­tration

proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribu­tion of the residue
among the heirs and legatees, and by liqui­dation is meant the determination
of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses
(Flores v. Flores, 48 Phil. 982).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probate court vested with ju­risdiction to
determine if properties belong to conjugal partner­ship.—The question of
whether certain properties involved in a testate proceeding belong to the
conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively, is a matter within the
jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the con-­
jugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to
be distributed among his heirs.
Ownership; Waiver by party who raises an objection.—Where a party,
by presenting a project of partition including therein disputed lands, puts in
issue the question of ownership of the lands, they can not thereafter, just
because of an oppo­sition thereto, withdraw the issue from the jurisdiction of
the court. There is a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the
ones who set the court in motion (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232),
and they can not be permitted to com­plain if the court, after due hearing,
adjudges the question against them (Mañalac v. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661).
Estoppel; Silence with knowledge of the facts required.—To constitute
estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his
rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence
without knowledge works no estoppel (21 C.J. 1152-1153).

PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.
  Romerico F. Flores for respondents.

BARRERA,  J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101
had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in
question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the
properties mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of

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Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals

the Court of Appeals as follows:

“Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first
died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his
estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will
was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in
favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all
surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed
Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition
of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio
Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs,
namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and
Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
“On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate
proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate
of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives
aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the
executor’s project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of
their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter
alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
“The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10,
1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which
evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of
memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the
executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties
disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him
exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes
had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral
heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question
the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could
question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the
testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
“The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that
the deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal
character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in
Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and void
the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife
and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.
“On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia
presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void

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Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals

without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether
it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the
first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits
donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered under the
second category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required
by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no
attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of
partition and directed the executor to file another, ‘dividing the property
mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and
the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the
instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the
deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were
conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.’ On September 27, 1960, the
executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the
contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of
Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of
Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court’s declaration of the nullity
of the donation ‘without stating facts or provision of law on which it was
based.’ The motion for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3,
1960.”

 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being
affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review by
certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred
in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and special
jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in
applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a
general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon
on testate or intestate proceedings,1 except where one of the parties
prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally
upon the

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1  Bauermann v. Casas, 10 Phil. 386; Devese V. Arbes, 13 Phil. 274; Franco v.

O’Brien, 13 Phil. 359; Guzman v. Anog, 37 Phil. 71; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 644;
Ongsingco v. Tan & Borja, G.R. No. L-7635, July 25, 1955; Raquial v. Anihan, G.R.
No. L-4377, January 23, 1953; Mallari v. Mallari, G.R. No. L-4656, February 23,
1953.

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Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals

question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate

action.2 However, we have also held that when the parties interested
are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the
probate court a question as to title to property, and when so
submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon
(Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Mañalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil.
661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting
property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of
by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests
of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil.
229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial
court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power
of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate
proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein
involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and
Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a
question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants that the
trial court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the
lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and void
and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and
submitted to its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a
creature of law and parties to an action can not vest, extend or
broaden it. If appellants’ contention is correct, then there can be no
exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the
case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: “Determination of title to
property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The
responding Soriano’s objection (that the probate court lacked
jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the
estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from
jurisdiction. It affects

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2 Garcia v. Garcia. 67 Phil. 353; Guingguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144.

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372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals

only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an

independent ordinary action) which may be waived”. Strictly
speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not
over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies
between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of
properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be
vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an
administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and
distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation
means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all
the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, distribution is made of the
decedent’s liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed
him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in
which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever
community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a
necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs
relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs
who take part in the distribution of the decedent’s estate are before
the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and
incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so
long as no interests of third parties are affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the
question of ownership of certain of the properties involved —
whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the
probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is
to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented
because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon
petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily.
There are no third par-

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3 Flores v. Flores, 48 Phil. 982.

4 Garcia vs. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353, 355.

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ties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the
deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow
is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this
right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes.
Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an
heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the
requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the
petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs
claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of
the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed
properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it
is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of
partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator’s
asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the
deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted
another. As the Court of Appeals said, “In doing so all of them must
be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same
proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as
they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have
the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the
properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the
respondents”. In other words, by presenting their project of partition
including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were
donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in
issue the question of ownership of the properties — which is well
within the competence of the probate court — and just because of an
opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their
appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly,
there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are
the ones who set the court in motion.5 They can not be permitted to
complain if the court,

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5 Cunanan v. Amparo, supra.

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374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals

after due hearing, adjudges question against them.6

Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped
to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because
the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the
inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her
deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those
inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants
require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of
the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the
act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works
no estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she
did because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of her
husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and
ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the
required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in
accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
 

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., did not take part.
  

Decision affirmed.

Notes.—Recovery of rentals allegedly due the estate does not

come within the jurisdiction of a probate court and should be by
separate suit commenced by the administrator, not by mere motion
by the administrator in the probate proceedings, because of the
absence of express statutory authorization to coerce the lessee debtor
into defending himself in the probate court (Bezore, et al. v. Camon,
L-21034, April 30, 1966). Even matters affecting property under
judicial administration may not be taken cognizance of by the court
in the course of intestate pro­ceedings, if the interests of third persons
are prejudiced

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6 Mañalac vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661.

7 21 C.J. 1152-1153.

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(Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 282).

As to other cases defining the scope of the jurisdiction of a
probate court, see Olave v. Canlas, et al., L-12709, Feb. 23, 1962, 4
SCRA 463, and the annotation thereunder.
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