G.R. No.

L-42925 January 31, 1977

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RICARDO D. GALANO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XIII, and GREGORIO SANTOS, respondents.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Hugo
Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and Trial Attorney Blesila O. Quintillan for petitioner.

Juanito M. Romano for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J:

The Court sets aside the respondent judge's orders dismissing the information for estafa
against respondent accused, since the offense charged clearly has not prescribed.

The complaint filed with the Batangas court which expressly alleged commission of the
offense within the municipality and which pended for twelve years (the accused having
jumped bail and evaded rearrest for nine years) and which was eventually dismissed by
said court for lack of territorial jurisdiction as a result of the proof adduced before it
properly interrupted and tolled the prescription period.

Respondent judge failed, in ruling otherwise, to apply the settled rule that the jurisdiction
of a court is determined in criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or
information and not by the result of proof. The case is ordered remanded for
determination with the utmost dispatch, since this case has already been pending for
fifteen years owing to respondent accused's deplorable tactics. The undisputed factual
background of the case is succinctly stated by then Acting Solicitor General, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., thus:

FACTS:

1. On October 2,1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court of

Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City) against the accused-respondent
Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito Limbo, ...

2. Gregorio Santos was arrested to answer for the above charge, and upon his arrest,
posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter arraigned and
he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its merits. However, on
September 16, 1964, the accused jumped bail. As a result, his bail bond was forfeited
and the case against him archived by the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas.

3. It was not until September 14, 1973, about nine years later, when the accused was re-
arrested, and the trial of the said case resumed.

4. On October 21, 1974, while the said case was pending trial, private respondent
Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas court
did not have territorial jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the crime was
committed in Manila.

5. Finding the motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court issued an order dated
November 5, 1974, dismissing the case against Gregorio Santos for lack of territorial
jurisdiction over the crime charged ...
6. On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled the same case
against Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. A preliminary investigation was
conducted. On July 29, 1975, the corresponding information was filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 22397, ...

7. On November 12, 1975 the accused Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss criminal
Case No. 22397 on the grounds of prescription and double jeopardy.

8. The prosecuting fiscal filed his opposition to said motion on December 2, 1975, to
which the accused filed a rejoinder on December 5, 1975.

9. On December 8, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, presided over
by the Honorable Ricardo D. Galano, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No.
22397 on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed, ... The
prosecution moved for the reconsideration of said order but this was denied by the lower
court by order of January 7, 1976. ...

10. From the said Order of dismissal, the City Fiscal of Manila offenses provides:
interposed an appeal by certiorari to this Honorable Court on January 24, 1976. On
March 3, 1976, this honorable Court issued the Resolution of March 3, 1976 requiring the
Solicitor General to file the petition for review within fifteen days from receipt thereof ...

The People avers in the petition 1 that respondent judge "dismissing criminal Case No.
22397 despite the provisions of Article l of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly indicate that
the offense charged has not prescribed" and "in not considering the prevailing jurisprudence
indicating non-prescription of the offense charged, and in holding that the case of People v.
Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, does not apply to the case at bar."

The petition is patently meritorious and must be granted.

I. The offense of estafa for which respondent accused stands charged clearly
has not prescribed.

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.— The period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or by their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information and shall commence to run again when the proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him. ...

September 16, 1962 commission of the offense

Respondent failed to account for and instead misappropriated to his own use the sum of
P8,704.00 representing the net proceeds (minus his commission) of 272 booklets of
sweepstakes tickets that had been entrusted to him be the complainant, who
promptly filed on October 2, 1962 plainly within the ten-year prescriptive period the
criminal complaint against respondent accused in the Municipal Court of Batangas,
Batangas. The prescriptive period was thereupon interrupted.

After his plea of not guilty and during the trial, respondent accused jumped bail in
September, 1964 and evaded rearrest for nine years until September, 1973 and the trial
was resumed. When the Batangas court in its Order of November 5, 1974 upon
respondent's motion dismissed the complaint "for lack of jurisdiction" since
the evidence (of both prosecution and accused) showed that all elements of the crime
were committed in Manila (and not in Batangas), 2 the proceedings therein terminated
without conviction or acquittal of respondent accused and it was only then that the
prescriptive period (which was interrupted during the pendency of the case in the Batangas
court) commenced to run again.

When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29, 1975 the
same case against respondent accused in the Manila court of first instance, (after having
conducted a preliminary investigation), it is clear that not even a year of the ten-year
prescriptive period had been consumed.

Respondent accused intent on thwarting his prosecution filed anew a motion to dismiss
the information on grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. There is manifestly no
jeopardy, because he was not acquitted by the Batangas court which on the basis of the
evidence could neither convict him because it was thereby shown to have no jurisdiction
over the offense.

But respondent judge gravely erred in sustaining the ground of prescription, ruling that
there was no interruption of the prescriptive period during the pendency of the case in the
Batangas court because "(T)he proceedings contemplated by Article 91 are proceedings
which are valid and before a competent court. If they are void from the beginning
because the court has no territorial jurisdiction of the offense charged, it is as if no
proceedings were held thereat. If this is so, then the warrant or order of arrest as well as
the bail given by the accused for his provisional liberty is of no effect. Inevitably, there
can be no jumping bail to speak of and there are no proceedings to be interrupted."

This is plain error for "Settled is the rule ... that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in
criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result
of proof." 4

It follows clearly that the Batangas court was vested with lawful jurisdiction over the
criminal complaint filed with it which expressly alleged that the offense was committed "in
the Municipality of Batangas, province of Batangas" and that the proceedings therein
were valid and before a competent court, (including the arrest warrant, the grant of bail
and forfeiture thereof upon the accused's jumping of bail), until the same court issued its
November. 1974 order dismissing the Case and declaring itself
without territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence presented to it by both
prosecution and the accused.

It follows just as clearly that the prescriptive period was interrupted and tolled during the
12-year pendency of the proceedings before the Batangas Court (for nine years of which
respondent accused had jumped bail and evaded re-arrest).

II. Respondent judge gravely erred in dismissing the information on the ground of
prescription and disregarding the controlling case of People vs. Olarte. 5

In the second People vs. Olarte case, 6 the Court clarified precisely for the guidance of
bench and bar that the true doctrine is that the filing of the compliant in the municipal court,
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary investigation (where the offense charged is
beyond its jurisdiction to try the case on the merits) should, and does interrupt the period of
prescription, as follows:

Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines
of decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes has
been interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with the
justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the prescriptive
term: (People vs. Olarte, L-131027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs.
Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590.) Another series of
decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint or information must have
been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits: People vs.
Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and
Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and after mature consideration has arrived
at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the
decision holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court
for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuation already represents the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the
offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. 7

Respondent judge in his dismissal order correctly cited the rationale for statutory
prescriptions, inter alia, that "the delay in instituting the proceedings not only causes
expenses to the State, but exposes public justice to peril, for it weakens oral evidence
due to the lapse of the natural period of duration of memory if not to anything, else. And it
is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt and that statutes enforcing
that promptitude should be maintained, they being not merely acts of grace, but checks
imposed by the State upon its subalterns, to exact vigilant activity and to secure for
criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained. 8

But respondent judge fell into grave error in not applying the controlling case of Olarte on
his misconception that there had been no valid complaint filed with a competent court in
Batangas contrary to what has already been held hereinabove that the express
allegations of the complaint that the offense was committed in Batangas vested the
Batangas court with lawful jurisdiction until its dismissal order twelve years later for lack
of jurisdiction as a result of the proof presented before it during the tiral (and in not taking
into account that the delay was not at all due to the State but to respondent accused
himself who jumped bail and escaped tile law for nine [9] years and who apparently has
made no effort all this time to make good the amount the to complainant or any part
thereof).

Since the record with transcript of the testimonial evidence in the Batangas court is
complete (and shows that the trial was continued on August 2, 1974 to September 10,
1974 while respondent accused was testifying on the witness stand but that he instead
filed his motion to dismiss of October 14, 1974 which granted by the Batangas court for
lack of territorial jurisdiction) and this case had already been pending for almost 15 years,
all the evidence already taken by the Batangas court as recorded in the minutes and
transcript shall be deemed reproduced upon remand of the case to the Manila court
which is hereby ordered to receive only the remaining evidence of the respondent
accused and such rebuttal evidence as the parties may have and thereafter resolve the
case with the utmost dispatch.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge's dismissal orders of December 8, 1975 and January

7, 1976 are hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to respondent judge or whoever
presides Branch XIII of the Manila court of first instance for continuation of the trial (with
reproduction of the evidence in the Batangas city court in Criminal Case No. 532 thereof,
entitled "People vs. Gregorio Santos") in line with the directives in the preceding
paragraph. Respondent judge or the judge presiding his court is further ordered to report
to this Court the action taken hereon within a period of ninety (90) days from
promulgation of this decision. In view of the many years that the criminal case has been
pending, this decision is declared immediately executory upon promulgation.

SO ORDERED.