AO 106 (Rev.

04/ 10) Application for a Search Warrant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Alaska

In the Matter of the Search of )

(Briefly describe the property to be searched )
or identify the p erson by name and address) )
Case No. 3:17-mj-OO l~6"--b~~
In RE Application for a Warrant Under Rule 41 of the )

Federa l Rules of Criminal Procedure to Disrupt the )

Kelihos Botnet )

APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under
penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property (identify th e person or describe the
property to be searched and give its locatio11):

See Attachment A, incorporated here by reference .

located in the District of

- - - - -Alaska
- - - - - - - , there is now concealed (identify the
p erson or describe the property to be sei::ed):

See Attachment 8 , incorporated here by referen ce.

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (c) is (check one or more) :

ref evidence of a crime;

0 contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;

0 property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;

0 a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

Code Section Offense Description

18 USC§§ 1030, 1343, and Fraud and related activity in connection with computers, wire fraud , and illega l
2511. wiretapping.

The application is based on these facts:

See attached Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant.

ii Continued on the attached sheet.

~ Delayed notice of _ 7_ days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days:
- -- - -
) is requested
under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth o.q tM attad1~d sheet.

Signature Redacted ______

App1zca11t ·s signature

Elliot Peterson, Special Agent, FBI

Printed na~ie-and tizle

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

ISi DEBORAH M. SMITH
HIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SIGNATURE REDACTED
~ ··:
Date:
Judge's signature

City and state: Anchorage, Alaska Hon . Deborah M. Smith , United States Magistr;ite Judge
Printed name ond titie
•I,,,
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

IN RE APPLICATION FOR A
WARRANTUNDERRULE41OFTHE
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
Case No. 3:17-mj-00135-DMS
PROCEDURE TO DISRUPT THE
KELIHOS BOTNET

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AN
APPLICATION UNDER RULE 41 FOR A SEARCH
WARRANT

I, Elliott Peterson, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as

follows:

INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND

1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in

Anchorage, Alaska. I currently investigate criminal and national security computer

intrusions in the Anchorage Field Office as a member of the Counter Intelligence /

Cyber Squad. I have investigated cyber and computer intrusion matters for over

five years and I specialize in the investigation of complex botnets, including Peer to

Peer botnets, as well as botnets facilitating account takeover fraud and distributed

denial of service attacks (DDOS).

2. I make this affidavit in support of an application for a warrant under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 to authorize an online operation to disrupt

the Kelihos botnet currently under the control of Peter Yuryevich LEVASHOV, a

criminal hacker. The operation, which is particularly described in Attachm~ 1

and Attachment B, involves the distribution of updated peer lists, job m e s ~

and/or IP filter lists, further described in Attachment B, to the TARGET APR _ 5 2017

COMPUTERS currently infected with the Kelihos botnet malware in violation of

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1030, 1343, and 2511, as described in

Attachment A. This operation will also obtain the Internet Protocol addresses and

associated routing information of those infected computers, and those addresses are

evidence of crimes committed by LEVASHOV. A PRTT order has been requested for

the purpose of attaining those IP addresses and associated routing

information. This operation will not capture content from the TARGET

COMPUTERS or modify them in any other capacity except limiting the TARGET

COMPUTERS' ability to interact with the Kelihos botnet. This limitation is

achieved through the distribution of peer lists and job messages, described below.

3. Unless otherwise noted, the following information was obtained by

your affiant, other special agents and officers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI), third-party witness interviews, and/or from other law enforcement officers

who conducted additional investigation into the subject matter of this criminal

enterprise, all of whom I believe to be truthful and reliable.

TECHNICAL DEFINITIONS

4. As used herein, the following terms have the following meanings:

a. "Malware" is malicious software, usually loaded onto a computer

without the knowledge of the computer's owner or user. For example,
computer viruses are malware.

b. A "botnet" is a network of computers that cybercriminals have infected

with malware that gives a cyber criminal access to each computer and
allows a cyber criminal to control each computer remotely.

c. An Internet Protocol (IP) address is the globally unique address of a

computer or other device connected to a network, and is used to route
Internet communications to and from the computer or other devic\ I
3:17-rnj-00135-DMS ~

2 APR - 5 2017
 d. "Peer to peer" refers to a means of networking computers such that
they communicate directly with each other, rather than through a
centralized management point.

PROBABLE CAUSE

5. There is probable cause to believe that the TARGET COMPUTERS

identified in Attachment A are infected by malicious software that causes them to

collectively receive and obey commands from a common command and control

infrastructure controlled by LEVASHEV, forming a botnet that has been named

"Kelihos."

6. I have determined that Kelihos is a Peer to P eer botnet, whose

principal functions are to (1) distribute high volumes of spam email to further

criminal schemes; (2) install malicious payloads, such as ransomware; and (3)

harvest user credentials from infected computers. Each of these schemes are

conducted for the financial benefit of LEVASHOV and other cybercriminals.

7. Based upon the investigation described below, I believe that Kelihos is

operated and controlled by an individual identified as Peter Yuryevich LEVASHOV,

a.k.a. "Petr LEVASHOV," "Peter Severa," "Petr Severa," and "Sergey Astakhov." I
-··---­
---­
11111
II
-·-·-­ -
------­,­
3 : 17-mj-00135-DMS
APR - 5 2017
3

----
----- .. - --
__..______•__ _•
...-
... .
_.._
--
-· ·-·­
• 1 I have

also determined that the botnet is used for the financial benefit of LEVASHOV and

other cybercriminals.

8. I have also determined that in addition to distributing spam email, the

Kelihos botnet functions to harvest user credentials, and distribute malicious

payloads, including ransomware, as well as facilitating other schemes meant to

enrich LEVASHOV. These activities will be described more fully in subsequent

paragraphs.

1 I am also aware that an indictment was filed in 2007 in the Eastern District of
Michigan for conspiracy to commit electronic mail fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1037(a)(2)-(a)(3), 1037(b)(2)(C), 1341, and 1343 and several
substantive counts of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1037(a)(2), 1037(b)(2)(C), and Section 2. That
indictment remains pending. I am also aware that a criminal complaint filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, which in 2009 charged LEVASHOV in his true
name with two substantive counts of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), 1030(a)(5)(B)(i),
1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and 1030(a)(5)(B)(V), as well as one count of conspiracy to commit these
offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. These charges resulted from LEVASHOV's
operating the Storm Botnet from January 2007 until September 22, 2008. That botnet, like
that which is the subj ect of this prosecution, sent spam to facilitate pump and dump
schemes and the purchase of grey market pharmaceuticals. Because the government was
unable to apprehend and detain LEVASHOV, it dismissed the complaint in 2014. ~

3: 17-mj-00135-DMS
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4

 9. Based on my investigation to date, I have observed that the number of

computers infected with Kelihos at any one time can vary. At times, over 100,000

computers have been simultaneously infected worldwide with Kelihos. Presently,

the number sits between 25,000 and 100,000, approximately 5-10% of which are

computers located in the United States. Based on my review of computers which are

infected with the Kelihos malware and conversations with other FBI agents and

computer security researchers who have investigated the code used to create the

Kelihos botnet, I know that it can be difficult for computer users to detect Kelihos

infections. Kelihos is designed to persist on a victim's computer despite any overt

actions by the victim to remove it. For example, the first time that Kelihos runs, it

sets its property setting to "invisible" so that it cannot be seen or manipulated by

the victim. Based on my investigation and the investigation of others, I have found

evidence of computers infected with Kelihos throughout the United States,

including the District of Alaska, District of Connecticut, Western District of

Washington, Central District of California and the Southern District of New York.

A. OPERATION OF THE KELIHOS BOTNET

10. As described above, Kelihos utilizes Peer to Peer (P2P) connectivity.

Instead of utilizing a traditional Command and Control (C2) server to control all of

the bots, control is distributed across the entire infection base. The P2P design

prevents law enforcement from merely taking over the C2 server and gaining

immediate control of the entire botnet.

3:l 7-mj-00135-DMS APR - 5 2017

5

 11. Kelihos infects computers and divides them into two groups: "router

nodes" and "worker nodes." Router nodes are so named based upon their ability to

rout e communications directly to both backend servers as well as other infected

peers. Router nodes are Kelihos infections that have publicly accessible IP

addresses. Router nodes are important to Kelihos as they permit direct

communication to the infected computer. Router nodes comprise approximately

10% of the Kelihos botnet.

12. In contrast, worker nodes comprise 90% of the Kelihos botnet, and

utilize private IP addresses. Most internet enabled devices utilize private IP

addresses, a s they are separated from the Internet by one or more networking

devices. For example, in many U .S. households, a Wi-Fi router is connected directly

to a cable or DSL modem. This Wi-Fi router would then be assigned the

household's public IP address. Each device then connected to the Wi-Fi router

would be assigned a private IP address. Worker nodes are harder to maintain for

the botnet operator, as they are not directly accessible like a router node with a

public IP address would be.

13 . To counteract the difficulty of contacting worker nodes with private IP

addresses, Kelihos commands its worker nodes to check in regularly with the router

nodes. That "check in" takes the form of exchanging peer lists and job messages.

Peer lists maintain the IP addresses of other Kelihos infections, that is, an infected

computer's peers . This information informs each peer who else it can communicate

with. Then, when a set amount of time has passed, the worker node will contact

3:17-mj-00135-DMS ~

6 APR - 5 201 7

another router node to exchange data, including each other's peer lists. In response,

the worker node then compares its own peer list with the received peer list, and

updates its own peer list with new IP addresses until it reaches a maximum

number of 3,000.

1. Overview Of Kelihos's Spam Distribution

14. Based upon my training and experience, I know that spam email

messages distributed by botnets such as Kelihos are intended to facilitate various

activities, including the sale of grey market pharmaceuticals; the manipulation of

thinly-traded securities; the solicitation of fraudulent affiliate and "work from

home" schemes; and the distribution of malicious payloads, such as ransomware.

Spam emails directing the recipients to participate in all of these schemes have

been directed to Alaskan recipients.

15. For example, Kelihos generates massive volumes of spam emails

directing recipients to web sites advertising the sale of branded pharmaceuticals.

Based upon my training and experience, I know that many of these branded

pharmaceuticals normally require prescriptions. Additionally, I know that the

pharmaceuticals are offered at or below market rates, indicating that they are likely

counterfeit.

16. Kelihos also distributes high volumes of emails intended to manipulate

the value of thinly-traded securities, including so-called "penny stocks." In these

messages, the recipient is led to believe that a specific stock will soon trade at a

much higher value. For example, one email I reviewed stated that it was a ~

3:17-rnj-00135-DMS
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7

"Advanced Trading Alert Notice," with a "hot pick that will gain 100%... " The email

urges recipients to "[a]quire [a specific thinly-traded security] on March 1 and

receive 100% profit." . Another email stated "Don't you crave to purchase a deal at

$0.07 and cash at $.21?! 200% gains simple. Get the stock: [... ]. See,[. ..] current

ask is 0.21, it's 200% than the todays bid. On Monday they will announce big news

and it sure spike to .21. Start buying [... ] quick." Because these emails target

stocks which generally experience very low trade volume, they are vulnerable to

price manipulation associated with small increases in trade volume.

17. Spam distributed by Kelihos is also a primary vector for affiliate

recruitment scams commonly called "work from home." In these messages, the

unwitting recipient is directed to an email address or website from which they can

receive more information about performing escrow or "private buyer" services. I

have previously investigated these types of schemes and know them to principally

be vehicles to further money laundering. For example, in an escrow scheme,

individuals are instructed to receive and transfer funds in short time periods, often

1-3 days . The incoming funds are usually proceeds of other criminal schemes which

are then laundered through the unwitting recipient's bank account. Due to the

short time period from which money is received and then resent, the victim often is

left responsible for the full amount laundered through their accounts after the

financial institution detects the fraud and ceases further payment. These email

schemes are also evidence of larger wire fraud schemes, as they make fraudulent

claims of profit and opportunity or sell fraudulent goods and drugs.

3: 17-mj-00135-DMS
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8

 18. As described in greater detail below, I know that Kelihos distributes

spam in at least two distinct ways. FBI personnel have observed Kelihos distribute

spam from infected computers directly. Kelihos can command infected computers to

function, in essence, as mail servers and distribute spam to recipient email

addresses passed to the computer from the botnet. In these cases, Kelihos uses

email addressf)S and randomly generated first and last name combinations not

obviously associated with the true account from which the spam was sent. Known

as "spoofing," the result is that the spam will be made to appear to come from

[username]@gmail.com when in reality it was sent by an infected computer with no

association to the referenced email account. Kelihos accomplishes this by manually

editing the header information. The spoofing makes the spam much more difficult

to detect and block, while also concealing the true origins of the email messages.

Kelihos can also send spam directly from mail servers, such as those owned by

Earthlink or 1&1 Mail & Media, by gaining unauthorized access to them through

the use of authentic email addresses and passwords harvested by Kelihos. In those

instances, the spam is, in essence, sent from the victim's email address through the

mail server, but without the victim's knowledge or authorization.

2. Kelihos Distributes Malicious Payloads

19. In addition to sending spam emails with URL hyperlinks that cause

the downloading of malware, the Kelihos botnet can also command infected

computers to download and execute malware directly. By commanding Kelihos

victims to download and execute malware, Kelihos can retain near total contr~

3:17-mj-00135-DMS
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9

the victim's computer system by infecting them with payloads that can include

banking trojans (malware designed to steal financial credentials), and ransomware

(malware that encrypts the contents of a computer and then seeks a ransom

payment in exchange for decryption). Based on ongoing FBI investigations and

experience, I am aware that LEVASHOV will receive payment from other

cybercriminals in exchange for distributing malicious payloads to infected

computers within his botnet. This allows LEVASHOV to monetize his botnet

beyond the distribution of spam.

3. Kelihos Harvests Credentials

20. In addition to distributing spam email and malicious payloads,

Kelihos malware also harvests user credentials from victim computers through a

number of methods. First, Kelihos searches text-based files stored on victim

computers for email addresses. Second, Kelihos searches locations on victim

computers for files known to contain usernames and passwords, including files

associated with Internet browsers Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer. Any

email addresses and passwords located in these searches are harvested by Kelihos

and subsequently transmitted back to LEVASHOV.

21. To capture additional user credentials, Kelihos installs a software

program called WinPCAP on infected machines. WinPCAP is a powerful packet

capture utility that intercepts, in real time, electronic communications traversing

the victim computer's network card. Usernames and passwords found within this

network traffic are transmitted back to LEVASHOV.

3: 17-mj-00135-DMS APR - 5 2017

10

 B. KELIHOS RESEARCH, TESTING AND EVIDENCE OF CRIMES

22. Many techniques were utilized to analyze and study the Kelihos

m alware. One of the first steps was to gather appropriate samples of the malware.

One feature of the Kelihos botnet circa 2015 is that the Kelihos malware could be

downloaded directly from backend servers . A specific type ofbackend servers were

described by Kelihos administrators as "Golden Parachute Domains." I believe that

the naming convention relates to the role these servers play as redundant

mechanisms of command and control. When a computer infected with Kelihos can

no longer communicate with any other peer infections, it is programmed to reach

out to domains (websites) that are hardcoded into its configuration. These domains,

the "Golden Parachutes," provide a peer list to the infected computer so that it can

r egain communication with other infected peers. For the purposes of this affidavit,

there are at least three such domains presently relevant to the functioning of the

Kelihos botnet, gorodkoff(.)com, goloduha(.)info and combach(.)com.2 In addition to

providing peer lists, research has shown that these Golden Parachute Domains

were at times configured to distribute Kelihos malware.

23 . Kelihos, like many malware families , uses an affiliate/client system.

At any given time there appears to be ten to twenty separate Kelihos "affiliates."

These affiliates are paid by LEVASHOV to infect computers with his Kelihos

2
While the actual web addresses do not include"(.)," I h ave added them here to
avoid accidental hyper linking to these sites.

3: l 7-mj-00135-DMS
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11
malware. The affiliates are paid according to the number of victims they infect and

where those victims are located. I am aware of the affiliate model, because I

previously downloaded LEVASHOV's pricing structure from a website known as

"Smoney" that LEVASHOV maintained. A webpage labeled "loads0l_rules.html"

listed instructions for affiliates, as well as the payment rate per 1000 infections. .

24. Based on my investigation to date, I have determined that Kelihos, like

many botnet families, prioritizes the infection of U .S. victims. This can be seen in

the higher rates paid for U .S. victims. Based on my training and experience, I

believe U .S . infections are prized by LEVASHOV because many of his schemes are

directed against an English speaking audience, and U.S. IP addresses tend to be

trusted by many firewalls and spam detection systems.

25. In September 2015 , I downloaded Kelihos malware directly from

gorodkoff(.)com. I downloaded the malware by querying the server according to the

following format: gorodkoff(. )com/affiliateID.exe. I was able to determine the

affiliate IDs because the Smoney website maintained a full listing of active

affiliates. For example, one such affiliate was boxi002 . By issuing a query for

gorodkoff(.)com/boxi002 .exe, I downloa ded a Windows executable named

boxi002.exe. Subsequent analysis of this executable determined that it was in fact

the Kelihos malware. This analysis was based upon comparing characteristics of

the downloaded malware to known characteristics of the Kelihos malware. In this

case, the downloaded boxi002.exe file interacted with the Windows Registry in a

m anner identical to Kelihos . That is, key r egistry values were modified so thA
3: 17-rnj-00135-DMS
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12

executable would be loaded each time the system started up. This occurs without

the consent of the legitimate user and is a persistence mechanism designed to

ensure that Kelihos remains on the victim's computer despite any overt actions by

the victim to remove the malware.

26. My conclusions were similar to those of agents with the FBI's New

Haven, Connecticut Field Office who have also examined the Kelihos malware. The

New Haven Field Office conducted additional testing and activated a sample of the

Kelihos malware and observed the infected computer attempting to send high

volumes of spam emails. Many of those emails supported a "pump and dump"

scheme for a penny stock related to a known company (KCl).

27 . Through coordination with international law enforcement partners, I

have monitored live traffic related to backend servers maintained by LEVASHOV in

furtherance of the Kelihos scheme. In doing so, I observed commands issued from

those servers to Kelihos infected computers . Many of those commands, or job

messages, included commands to distribute emails relating to KCl. The emails

suggested to the recipients that the stock would significantly increase in value, in

the short term.

28 . The investigation by FBI's New Haven Division also revealed the

extent to which Kelihos harvests credentials from infected computers. Kelihos

searches specific locations on computers for files known to contain usernames and

passwords, including locations which store such data for several common internet

browsers, including Chrome, Firefox and Internet Explorer. New Haven Division

3:17-mj-00135-DMS

13

stored a fictitious email address and password in Internet Explorer on an infected

FBI computer. Shortly after Kelihos was installed, this username and password

was observed within Kelihos's process memory, indicating that it had been

identified and harvested.

29. Kelihos also searches for usernames and passwords for Windows

programs that use File Transfer Protocol ("FTP"). As its name suggests, FTP is a

standard network protocol used for the transfer of computer files between

computers. For example, pictures located on a computer could be backed up to a

server in another location using FTP functionality. New Haven Division stored a

FTP username and password combination on an infected FBI computer, and the

username and password were observed in Kelihos process memory.

30. Finally, the New Haven Division observed that Kelihos installed on an

FBI computer a software program called WinPCAP, which is able to intercept and

examine electronic communications traversing the computer's network card in a

Windows computer. They observed Kelihos commanding WinPCAP to intercept the

contents of all incoming and outgoing network traffic on an infected computer.

More specifically, Kelihos used this WinPCAP functionality to search for email

usernames and passwords in the self-infections' network traffic.

C. EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING LEVASHOV'S CONTROL OF

KELIHOS

31. In cooperation with private sector partners, I previously identified two

servers associated with the Kelihos botnet. Both were located outside the United

3:17-mj-00135-DMS
~

APR - 5 2017
14
States. In cooperation with international law enforcement partners, I received real­

time data from those servers which revealed multiple associations between the

Kelihos malware, servers connected to Kelihos, and LEVASHOV.

32. One of the servers, bearing the IP address 94.242.250.88, functioned as

a portion of the Kelihos backend. Additionally, it was utilized by LEVASHOV as a

proxy, meaning that some portion of his Internet activities are directed through the

server. As a result of this configuration, I have been able to observe backend

panels, or websites, that provide status updates on the Kelihos botnet. Panels such

as this are very commonly encountered in the investigation ofbotnets, as they

facilitate the operator's administration and troubleshooting of the botnet.

33. In this case, the Kelihos panel is constructed as a website and includes

information such as the status of its servers and the status of the Golden Parachute

Domains. Gorodkoff(.)com, goloduha(.)info, combach(.)com and others, are

specifically referenced, with color codes used to indicate their readiness status.

Another portion of the webpage shows various backend servers, the spam messages

they are being used to distribute, and data such as the speed at which the messages

are being distributed. For example, as shown below, the email "lists" being utilized

are "pharma_b+pharma+trade." This is the same list, described below in the

3:l 7-mj-00135-DMS

15

Jurisdiction section of this affidavit, which contained thousands of entries for

Alaskan email addresses.

Ip: 193.28.179.38 Ip: 176.103.48.27

Sat, 20 Feb 16 18:25:29 +0400 Sat, 20 Feb 16 18:47:54 +0400
List: List:
../lists/pharma_b+pharma+trade pharma_b+ pharma+trade
Body: Perfect method to ha .. . Body: Giveto your babe nig ...
ldrugmarket.ru/ ng.hxilgusk.ru/
Subject: Do you wan ... his Subject: Evoke your ...
night? _admiratio11
Counter: 712910562 Counter: 608715981
(142487 4532) (1424874532)
Speed: 79677 m/h Speed: 10323 m/h

34. Other portions of the Kelihos panel include antivirus and blacklisting

reports. This indicates that the operator actively monitor whether or not their

various servers have been identified by antivirus or other blacklisting services.

This is important for the operator, as blacklisting could reduce the reliability of

their botnet. For example, the panel indicated that both of the servers referenced

above appear to be tracked by at least one antivirus vendor.

35. Additionally, the server appeared to contain copies of many of the

spam email messages distributed by Kelihos. Subject lines of emails that appear to

have been sent to email accounts (including many hosted by Alaskan ISP General

Communication, Inc (GCI.net)) include, "Very good way to reveal your intimate life,"

"No amorous failure risk," "Attack your woman harder," and "Are you ready to

please your female partner tonight?" These emails contained links to websites that

appear to facilitate the purchase of gray market pharmaceuticals.

3:17-mj-00135-DMS

16
 36. Also appearing to have been sent to GCI.net email accounts were

emails with the subject lines, "This Company looks ready for a major run this

week! ", "Big Gainers Since My Alert!", "It is about to wake up and ROAR!" and "Its

trading levels could change in no time (MUST READ)." The content of all of these

emails were similar as they are intended to persuade the recipient to purchase a

specific U.S. listed stock. For example, one email's content listed:
- - -

This Stock is our New WILD Sub-Penny Pick! Get Ready for Multi-Bagger
Gains!
Top 10 Reasons Why We Love This Pick!
Company Name: KCl
Traded as: KCl
Long Term Target: $1.70
Trade Date: February, 29th
Closed at: 0.30

37. These spam emails facilitate "pump and dump" stock schemes, as

previously described in this affidavit. I have examined historical prices for several

stocks for which Kelihos has conducted spam email campaigns and noted that such

campaigns usually result in a temporary increase of the stock price of anywhere

from 30 to 80 percent.

38. In addition to the explicit Kelihos activity on the server, I observed

that this server was utilized thousands of times to log into the mail.ru website tied

to the email account [email protected]. Based on my training and experience, this

indicates that the user of the Kelihos server was also utilizing the email

[email protected]. The website 3038.org/listn.html associates this email address

with Pete LEVASHOV, a websmith and programmer located in Russia, with a date

3: l 7-mj-00135-DMS

17 APR - 5 2017
of birth of 8/13/1980. The website 3038.org appears to be the website for a high

school in St Petersburg, Russia, that focuses on mathematics and physics.

39. The email address [email protected] is also associated with an Apple

iCloud account in the name of Petr LEVASHOV. According to Apple's records,

LEVASHOV is a resident of the Russian Federation. A second email address is also

associated with this iCloud account, [email protected]. Apple subscriber

information indicates that this account was registered with Apple using the IP

address 83.243.67.25. Moreover, Apple's records list the Apple Digital Signaling

Identifier (DSID) 1972828024 with [email protected]'s account. An Apple DSID is a

unique ID assigned to a user when registering with Apple's iCloud service.

40. 83.243 .67 .25 is the same IP address utilized to register the Google

account, [email protected]. The accounts [email protected]

and Apple DSID 1972828024 share extensive overlap of IP addresses utilized to

access these accounts, including 91.122 .62 .16. Additionally, access logs from Apple

and Google indicate that these accounts share temporal overlap with IP addresses

as well, meaning that the same IP addresses are utilized during similar time

periods. Based upon my training and experience, common IP addresses,

particularly during the same time period, suggest that the same individual is

accessing both accounts.

41. The IP address 91.122 .62.16 was also used by LEVASHOV to negotiate

the purchase of a digital certificate from the company GeoTrust. An email was sent

from [email protected] to [email protected] on November 23 , 2016 .

Thi~

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~?R _ r, 2G\7
18

referenced an order for a "Rapid Wildcard" certificate. These records were

subsequently attained by agents within FBI's New Haven Division, and indicate

that a customer named Peter LEVASHOV, of Saint Petersburg, Russia, initiated an

order for the certificates utilizing the IP address 91.122.62.16. Moreover, the

certificate order was then completed, minutes later, utilizing the IP address

94.242.250.88. 94.242.250.88 is the same IP address utilized thousands of times to

log into the aforementioned [email protected] email account. This evidence of other

use of the same IP by LEVASHOV is further evidence that LEVASHOV is utilizing

both the Kelihos server and Google and Apple accounts which point to him.

42. Furthermore, Foursquare, a social media application that provides

recommendations on restaurants and shopping establishments to users, possessed

records for an account in the name Petr LEVASHOV, registered with email address

[email protected]. This account also displayed the same pattern of temporal overlap

within the IP access logs, when compared to the previously mentioned Apple and

Google accounts. Again, this indicates the account is likely used by LEVASHOV.

43 . One IP address appearing within LEVASHOV's Foursquare account is

85 .17.31.90. This IP address also appears within LEVASHOV's Apple DSID iCloud

account 1972828024, and the Google account [email protected]. Google records from

2016 indicate that [email protected] had been accessed by only two other IPs, one of

which is the Kelihos server IP address 94.242.250.88.

.M­
44 . The server corresponding to IP address 94.242 .250.88 also contained

many references to LEVASHOV. For example, an email sent on February 26, 2016

3: 17-mj-00135-DMS

19
APR - 5 2017
from [email protected] to [email protected] with the subject line, ''Your

app(iOS) status is In Review" is addressed to "Petr LEVASHOV" and contains a

status update on an iOS application. There are many such emails sent from this

Apple email account to [email protected].

45. Furthermore, analysis on data provided by Google revealed that on or

about June 4, 2013 , the following search terms, "kelihos" and "kelihos.f' were

attributed to the account [email protected]. Further analysis of the data

provided by Google showed that the cellphone number associated to this Google

account is LEVASHOV's mobile number ending in 0594 as indicated in Apple

records. Based upon my training and experience I know that it is common for

individuals operating botnets to conduct searches for their malware.

46. It is also common for criminals engaged in cybercrime to utilize

nicknames, especially on the criminal forums on which they exchange data on

criminal techniques and offer products and services for sale. The use of nicknames

allows them to protect their true identity, while still allowing for the benefits of

name and product recognition. While there are a large number of Internet forums

devoted to the exchange of criminal services and techniques, many criminals will

use the same nickname on different forums. This is likely due to perceptions of

anonymity, as well as the reliance upon reputations tied to nicknames. In these

communities, actors are known principally by either their given nickname, or an

email, jabber, or ICQ handle. Jabber and ICQ are "chat" applications. These

reputations become important both in the exchange of data, and access to

3:17-mj-00135-DMS

20 APR - 5 2017
marketplaces in which products and services are sold. LEVASHOV utilized

multiple nicknames, but the most common was "Severa" or "Peter Severa."

47. Upon examination of many criminal forum accounts in the name

"Severa," I have noted that in the majority, the ICQ number 104967 has been

utilized since at least 2010. ICQ is a popular Internet instant message service in

which users are identified by unique numerical values, known as ICQ numbers.
~

Based upon my training and experience, I know that online monikers,~such~as ICQ -

numbers, are rarely changed or transferred by online criminals. Therefore, I

conclude that the combination of an identical ICQ number and nickname are

indicative of the same individual accessing and utilizing these accounts.

48. Severa has used this ICQ number to advertise his botnets. For

instance, in May 2015 , the FBI received the following information pertaining to a

vendor on the Russian criminal site Korovka.cc. The vendor was advertising

"webmailer email spam" capability and the information he provided read as follows :

Username: "Severa"
Registration: 12/2/2011
Jabber contact: [email protected]
ICQ: 104967
Service: Email spam
Details: The service was offered since 1999 and delivered
spam to a recipients inbox. Every spam launched used several
thousand clean IP addresses and accounts. Unique algorithms
and technologies were constantly improved. Seller has US and
Europe email databases for spam, and fresh databases received
daily. Prices per million spam delivered were $200 USD legal
advertisement, adult, mortgage, leads, pills, replies, etc... $300
USD job spam (drops, mules, employment), and $500 USD
scam/phishing attacks.

3:17-mj-00135-DMS
APR - 5 2017
21

 49. This information conveyed that Severa's spamming was superior to

that of his competition and would be less likely to be detected ("clean IP addresses

and accounts" and "unique algorithms") and that he had been doing this for a long

time ("since 1999").

50. The nickname Severa, and communication accounts such as

[email protected], appeared frequently on the servers wiretapped by international

law enforcement partners. [email protected] is an XMPP account. XMPP is a

type of instant messaging service widely utilized on the internet. Because XMPP

servers can be individually hosted and managed, rather than hosted and managed

by a company such as Google, they are often trusted by criminal actors.

51. Similarly, on or about January 14, 2017, Severa posted the following

advertisement3 an online forum called "Club2CRD":

Hello.

I am offering my spamming service via electronic mail to

everybody who is interested. I have been serving you since the distant
year 1999, and during these years there has not been a single day that
I keep still, by constantly improving quality of spamming. Now at your
service there is the only one in the world unique technology of spamming
via electronic mail, which provides maximum possible probability of
delivering your message to the final recipient.

Today I conduct all spamming via webmail. Each spamming is

being done from dozens of thousands of clean IP addresses and accounts.
To generate a message there are used unique algorithms and
technologies which I have been constantly developing and improving.

3
The advertisement, which was written in Russian, was later translated into English
by a FBI linguist. The references in the advertisement to "[PH]" are those of the linguist and
reflect that a word has been translated phonetically. ~

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APR - 5 2017
22
 Every spamming is being automatically monitored for quality, with
regular automatic spamming and running test messages.

I conduct spamming on my databases of USA [PH], Europe, or

other countries you are interested in. I am constantly collecting and
testing new addresses from different sources. Databases are updated
daily and I have enough of collected volume, in order to provide
individual databases of addresses for each new spamming.

The prices for one spamming (for a million of delivered messages)

are:
$200.00 - legal advertising, <!dttlt, mortg~ge [PH], !eac!s, pi!ls
[PH], replication [PH], and etc.

$300.00 - drops, also known as employment spam

$500.00 - scam, phishing

I am interested in large clients, and I actively incentive that with

large discounts. The larger is the order volume, the bigger is a discount.
Discounts start just at two million, and they may exceed 50%. Verify
prices for any amount more than one million.

For contact use Jabber (XMPP): [email protected]

An alternative communication channel is ICQ 104967.

I always welcome new and old clients, as well as feedback!

Good luck and keep it up.

Petr Severa

52. LEVASHOV continues to use the nickname Severa in operation of the

Kelihos botnet. On or about March 20, 2017, an individual known to law

enforcement contacted LEVASHOV, who is currently believed to be traveling

outside of Russia, via~ chat application to express interest in purchasing one or

more spam deliveries. Upon an initial inquiry looking for the "services of Peter

Severa" and a request to confirm pricing and services offered, LEVASHOV

responded on March 21, 2017: "Hi, I am Peter Severa. I were away. what do you

want to send? job offe[r]s, dating, phishing, malware? or what?"

3:17-mj-00135-DMS
APR - 5 2017
23
 53. In subsequent exchanges between Severa and the individual on March

20 , 2017 , Severa stated that he accepts bitcoins. "Job offers"-which I know based

on my training and experience refers to money mule solicitations4-were priced at

"300 usd per 1 million emails, 450 per 2 mil[lion] ." However, Severa also indicated

price differentials for different kinds of spam deliveries: "phishing, scam etc 500 usd

per 1 mil . . . 750 per 2." Severa also confirmed that the individual could purchase

spam to be sent only to a specific country (including the United States). Severa

stated: "i need just payment and letter to start," and instructed that, "[A]fter

payment put it to archive with password and upload to sendspace.com." According

to sendspace.com's website, "Sendspace is the best way to send large files, too big

for email attachments, to friends, family and businesses, anywhere in the world."

Severa also indicated that he has "10-15 orders daily."

54. On or about March 21, 2017, the individual paid Severa in bitcoin to

purchase a spam campaign to be directed at the United States. The spam email

submitted to Severa included a link to a website advertising "work from home" job

opportunities. Severa responded that the "Mailing takes 3-4 hours, but response can

come during 2-4 days , people don't r ead emails instantly." He again reiterated that

he has "10-15 orders daily."

4
A "mule" or "money mule" is an individual who is used to transport or launder stolen
money in furtherance of criminal activity and its related organizations. These individuals
can be either wittingly or unwittingly participating in the fra ud.

3: l 7-mj-00135-DMS
APR - 5 2017
24
 55. The individual then asked Severa, "I had client recontact me about

ransomware. you can do?" Within approximately twenty minutes, Severa responded

via chat:

I do mailings for installs, it costs 500 usd per 1 million emails,

750 usd per 2 mil, lk per 3 mil. I can't send attached file inbox on
volume, nobody can now, so send letter just with link to file or landing.
I need just payment and letter to start.

you need fresh _text which never s_ent before, _and yo_l!_should _
randomize it by synonyms, by my template. You can use synonym.com
service to find variants. You can do html message, but images only by
links, not attachments.

Template:
{Spam IBlackmailing IPhishing Mailing} is {good Ivery good Ithe
best}! Always {send I use Iorder Iask for}{it Ithis}{. I! I!!!}

Samples(don't write these, it's generating automatically):

1) Blackmailing is good! Always order it!
2) Phishing Mailing is the best! Always use it!!!
3) Spam is the best! Always send this.

56. Based on my training and experience and the exchange between

Severa and this individual, I believe that Severa's reference to "mailings for

installs" refers to the distribution of malware, including ransomware.

57 . The individual then asked Severa if he "send[s] out stocks or

pharma? does pricing change." Severa immediately responded:

SEVERA: legal offers?

stocks what do you mean?
pharma is 200 u sd per 1 million emails

Individual: penny stocks ..buy/sell

3:l 7-mj-00135-DMS

25 APR - 5 2017
 SEVERA: it's PD
pump and dump
i have 25 mil traders list
my price usually is 5% of trade
with 5-l0k deposit

Individual: fair

SEVERA: 5% by yahoo numbers

Individual: ok. good to know in advance

SEVERA: (PrevClose+LastPrice) I 2 * Volume * 5%

i can move it good, just find the stock
and we need deposit
i'll subtract each day numbers, when it 0 i
stop

Individual: i've know some people in the market who

suggest stocks from time to time

SEVERA: ask them

we need the stock, if they can release news on
it - it's cool too
people buy on news
5-l0k usd deposit, I accept btc or wire. or wmz

58. Based on my training and experience, I believe that "btc" is a common

abbreviation for bitcoin and "wmz" is a common abbreviation for WebMoney.

WebMoney is a very popular alternative online payment system. WebMoney allows

its users to store funds in different "purses," where each purse can be maintained as

a separate currency, such as U.S. dollars, or Russian Federation rubles. I have

examined WebMoney account records tied to LEVASHOV. Those records revealed

the use of IP address 91.122.62 .16, the same IP utilized to access LEVASHOV's

iCloud account in his real name. This same IP address was also found to have

3: l 7-mj-00135-DMS

26 APR - 5 2017
accessed a WebMoney identifier (i.e. account) ending in 4986. Of note, registered

under this account is the WebMoney purse ending in 1018, which is the purse

supplied by LEVASHOV, under his Severa alias, when requesting payment for his

spamming services with the individual referenced above.

59. Additionally, I identified two instances when 91.122.62.16 accessed the

WebMoney account ending in 4986, expressed by WebMoney in terms of dates/times

-·-­
when access would "begin" and "end." In the first instance, I observed that

LEVASHOV received an iTunes update from Apple, via 91.122.62.16, approximately

11 hours prior to when the WebMoney account was accessed from that same IP

address. In the second instance, the same IP address accessed the WebMoney

account between May 17 and 18, 2016, and I observed one iTunes update a little

over an hour prior to that period and another update approximately 14 hours after

that access period ended. Based on my training and experience, the overlapping use

of the IP address for an iTunes account in LEVASHOV's name and a criminally

used WebMoney account by the alias Peter Severa indicates that Peter Severa is

LEVASHOV.

JURISDICTION

60. This Court has jurisdiction to issue the requested warrant under Rule

41(b)(6)(B) because the above facts establish there is probable cause to believe that

the items to be searched are protected computers that have been damaged without

authorization and are located in five or more judicial districts and that there is

probable cause to believe that activities related to the crime being investigated

3:17-mj-00135-DMS
APR - 5 2017
27
occurred within this judicial district. 5

61. It is possible to determine the IP addresses of computers infected by

Kelihos by passively participating in the Kelihos botnet. Because it is a Peer to

Peer botnet, infected computers exchange data on other known Kelihos infections.

In this way the botnet remains connected internally.

62. Examination of peer lists exchanged between peers in the botnet has

revealed IP addresses that geolocate to- Alaska, Co-nnecticut,-the Weste-r n District of­

Washington, Central District of California and the Southern District of New York,

and numerous other judicial districts. Geolocation is a term that denotes the

examination of where an IP address is likely to be located. For example, IP

addresses assigned to an ISP based in Alaska likely belong to subscribers also based

in Alaska. After identifying one such victim located in Alaska, in April 2016, I

received consent to examine her computer for evidence of a Kelihos infection. I

found that her computer's configuration settings had been changed, and that an

executable file was set to open any time her computer started up. Examination of

this executable file revealed that it was Kelihos.

63. The presence of Kelihos exposed this victim to significant potential for

harm, in the form of stolen credentials, personal information, and victimization of

other malicious payloads such as ransomware. Moreover, the victim's computer was

5
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 was amended on December 1, 2016. Rule 41(b)(6)(B) is a new
venue provision which went into effect on that date.

3:l 7-mj-00135-DMS
APR - 5 2017
28
also subject to be used for the distribution of high volumes of spam to others

without her knowledge. While an Alaskan-based Kelihos infected computer would

send spam emails to victims worldwide, my investigation revealed that these emails

were frequently directed to other Alaskan recipients.

64. Furthermore, Kelihos continues to target Alaskans with a high volume

of malicious spam. I have studied a list of email addresses used by the Kelihos

botnet, one of which was titled "pha~a~b+pha:rma+trade," and-contained almost

100 email addresses whose domains include kl2 .ak.us , meaning that these

addresses are utilized by employees of school districts within Alaska. The same list

has nearly 5,000 entries of emails utilizing the GCI.net domain. This domain,

administered by General Communication Inc. (GCI), is one of the most popular

Internet service providers within Alaska. I have also examined a March 28, 2017

Kelihos job message that directed the distribution of a spam message to 10,000

email accounts, three of which utilized email addresses with the domain

uas.alaska.edu, which corresponds to the University of Alaska Southeast. Another

included email account utilized the ci.juneau.ak.us domain, which corresponds to

the city of Juneau. The subject line of the spam email was, "Do you want to impress

your female partner tonight?" and the email included a link to a website which

purported to be the "Canadian Health and Care Mall." The website offered for sale

a large number of prescription medications, including drugs such as Viagra and

Cialis, pain relief medications such as Celebrex and Toradol, antibiotics such as

Amoxicillin and Zithromax, and Antidepressants such as Prozac and Wellbutrin.

3:l 7-mj-00135-DMS
APR - 5 20 17

29

The website itself contained fraudulent endorsements from the Federal Drug

Administration, American Pharmacists Association and Verisign

TIME AND MANNER OF EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH

65. To effectively combat the P2P structure of the Kelihos botnet, the FBI

with assistance of private partners will participate in the exchange of peer lists and

job messages with other infected computers. 6 The FBI's communications, however,

will not contain any co~~a~d~, no; will th-ey contain IP aclciresses of any of the

infected computers. Instead, the FBI replies will contain the IP and routing

information for the FBI's 11 sinkhole 11 server. As this new routing information

permeates the botnet, the Kelihos infected computers will cease any current

malicious activity and learn to only communicate with the sinkhole. The effect of

these actions will be to free individual infections from exchanging information with

the Kelihos botnet and with LEVASHOV. This will stop Kelihos's most immediate

harm, the harvesting of personal data and credentials, and the transmittal of that

data to servers under LEVASHOV's control. Another portion of the Kelihosjob

messages is a list, known as the IP filter list. This list functions as a type of

blacklist, preventing communication with those IPs contained within the filter list.

If necessary, the FBI also seeks authorization to send a filter list to TARGET

COMPUTERS to block Kelihos infected computers from continuing to communicate

6
The law is unsettled as to whether the operation authorized by the proposed
warrant constitutes a search or seizure. However, in an abundance of caution, the United
States is seeking a warrant.

3:17-mj-00135 -DMS
APR - 5 2017
30
with router nodes.

66. The sinkhole server will be a dead end destination that does not

capture content from the infected computers. The sinkhole server, however, will

record the unique IP address and associated routing information of the infected

machine so that the FBI can alert the proper Internet Service Providers of the

existence of infected machines on their network and to monitor the effectiveness of

·- - ~ 4-- - - ­

the disruption effort. By notifying Internet Service Providers, the unwitting victims

can be alerted as to their status of victims and be assisted in the removal of Kelihos

from their computers.

67. Additionally, because the Kelihos malware directs infected machines to

request peer lists from the Golden Parachute Domains when they are unable to

reach any peers, the disruption effort will not be effective unless the domains are

also redirected to the sinkhole. In order to prevent LEVASHOV from using the

Golden Parachute Domains to recapture peers, it is essential that these domains be

kept out of LEVASHOV's hands. The Temporary Restraining Order sought as part

of this action denies LEVASHOV these domains through an order to the Domain

Registries responsible for the U .S.-based top level domains requiring them to

redirect connection attempts to the sinkhole server.

68. Rule 41(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that

the warrant command the law enforcement officer (a) "to execute the warrant

within a specified time no longer than 14 days" and (b) to "execute the warrant

during the daytime unless the judge for good cause expressly authorizes execution~

3:17-mj-00135-DMS APR ~ 5 2017

31
at another time ...." The government seeks permission to transmit the updated

peer list at any time of day or night for 30 days after the date the warrant is

authorized. There is good cause to allow such a method of execution as the time of

deployment causes no additional intrusiveness or inconvenience to anyone. More

specifically, the government has no control of the timing or when the infected

computers will access the peer list. In addition, the government seeks to transmit

the peer list and job messages for 30 days, because based on my training and - ­

experience I am aware that it may take many weeks to reach the thousands of

computers infected by Kelihos. While the technical disruption should see

immediate results, computers that are powered off or not connected to the Internet

will not be redirected until they connect to the Internet, which could be weeks after

the initiation of the disruption. Because any privacy invasion that may occur

during this 30 day time period is minimal, and the benefits of continuing to disrupt

the Kelihos botnet are significant, the government believes that the extended time

period for execution of this warrant is appropriate in this case.

AUTHORIZATION REQUEST; DELAYED NOTICE

69. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C . § 3103a(b) and Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 41(£)(3), I request that this Court authorize the officers executing the

warrant to delay notice until seven days after the technical measures authorized by

the warrant have commenced.

70. There is reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate

notification of the warrant may have an adverse result, as defined in 18 U.S.C. §

3:17-mj-00135-DMS

32
APR - 5 201 7
2705 . Providing immediate notice to the owners or users of the TARGET

COMPUTERS would likely trigger media coverage of the Department's efforts to

disrupt the Kelihos botnet, which could tip off LEVASHOV or any as-yet

unidentified co-conspirators that that the United States is _attempting to seize

control of the botnet. Such a notification would seriously jeopardize the ongoing

investigation, as such a disclosure would give that person an opportunity to destroy

evidence, change patterns of behavior, notify confederates, and flee from

prosecution. See 18 U .S.C. § 3103a(b)(l). In particular, I am aware that Kelihos is

a complicated malware variant, and LEVASHOV or others operating at his

direction could easily change the malware. Nearly the entire Kelihos botnet can be

updated within 24 hours. The Kelihos botnet has been updated in this manner

previously in response to the activities of private industry researchers conducting

sinkholes or publishing research papers detailing Kelihos vulnerabilities .

SEARCH AUTHORIZATION REQUESTS

71. Accordingly, for each of the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully

requested that this Court issue a search warrant authorizing the following:

a. a deployment of updated peer lists and job messages to the

TARGET COMPUTERS, without prior announcement, within 30 days
from the date this Court issues the requested warrant;

b. that the government may receive and review, at any time of day
or night, within 30 days from the date the Court authorizes the use of
the specified interactive techniques, such IP and routing information
that is subsequently transmitted to a computer controlled by the FBI
or its private partners working under the direction and control of law
enforcement;

3: 17-mj-00135-DMS

33 APR - 5 201 7
 c. that provision of a copy of the search warrant and receipt may,
in addition to any other methods allowed by law, be effectuated by
electronic delivery of true and accurate electronic copies (e.g., Adobe
PDF file) to any owners of affected computers by means of internet
publication;

d. that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3), to satisfy the notification

requirement of Rule 41(£)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the government may delay providing a copy of the search
warrant and the receipt for any property taken until seven days after
the technical measures authorized by the warrant have commenced.

Respectfully SlJ.bmitted,
Signature Redacted

ELLIOTT PETERSON
-
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subscribed and sworn to before me

onAnril
'
-> .
2017:
/S/ DEBORAH M. SMITH ,
CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1~
=t ~ SIGNATURE REDACTED ~
- - - ­- - - ­
HOO. U~HU.l:{Atl 1v1. ;:;1v1ITH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3: 17-mj-00135-DMS APR - 5 20\7

34