HIMACHAL PRADESH

NATIONAL
LAW UNIVERSITY

LAW OF CRIMES ASSIGNMENT

GROUP LIABILITY : COMMON INTENTION AND

COMMON OBJECT

Submitted to – Made by –
Dr. Ruchi Sapahia Mr. Shivam
Associate Professor of Law 1020202126
BA-LLB (Hons.)
3rd Semester

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Each project, anyway huge or little it could be and anyway significant it is, is effective
generally because of the endeavours and commitment of various people who have helped in
the manner they can, by giving data identified with it or by offering guidance that is
fundamental in the consummation of the task. I genuinely like the help of these individuals
and express gratitude toward them for their help and direction that was instrumental in
making this undertaking a triumph.

I Shivam, an understudy of Himachal Pradesh National Law University (Shimla), am thankful

to the University for the certainty offered in me and entrusting my capacity.

I additionally acknowledge and stretch out my gratitude to my task control, Dr. Ruchi
Sapahia , who tutored me while assembling the undertaking. His knowledge has been
incredibly important in the finish of this venture.

I might want to expand my final expression of appreciation to every other person engaged
with helping me with the task.

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 DECLARATION

I, Shivam , hereby declare that this project titled “Group liability : common intention and
common object” is the result of my original research work conducted under the supervision
of Dr. Ruchi Sapahia , Associate Professor of Law, Himachal Pradesh National Law
University, Shimla. In all the instances where some other work has been cited, full
acknowledgement has been given. This work has never been submitted, in whole or in part,
in any institution for any award(s).

Name of the student:

SHIVAM Date: - 30 thNovember
2021

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION TO GROUP LIABILITY.

2. COMMON INTENTION- SECTION 34 UNDER IPC, 1860.
3. ELEMENTS OF COMMON INTENTION.
4. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF COMMON INTENTION.
5. COMMON OBJECT- SECTION 149 UNDER IPC , 1860.
6. ELEMENTS OF COMMON OBJECT.
7. DIFFERENCE OF COMMON OBJECT AND COMMON
INTENTION.
8. CONCLUSION.
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY.
10. PLAGIARISM REPORT.

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 ABBREVATIONS
Number(s) No.

Introduction Intro.
Position(s) Post.
Interest(s) Int

ACT REFFERED

1. INDIAN PENAL CODE ,1860

LIST OF CASES

1. Surendra Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2000 SC 1436

2. Kripal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 706

3. Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar (2003) 1 SCC 268

4. Suresh v. State of U.P (2001) 3 SCC 673

5. State of Orissa v. Arjun Das Agarwal AIR 1999 SC 3229

6. Mahboob Shah v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 118

7. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor AIR 1925 PC 1

8. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sahrunnisa AIR 2009 SC 3182

9. Israr v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2005 SC 249.

10. Krishnan v. State (2003) 7 SCC 56

11. Gangadhar Behra v. State of Orissa (2002) 8 SCC 381

12. Nanak Chand v. State of Punjab 1955 AIR 274

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 INTRODUCTION

IPC Section 34 and Section 149 represents the rule of constructive liability which means that
an individual is responsible for the repercussions of another person’s amendment, but Section
34 and Section 149 should never be mixed around each other. In Section 34 and Section 149,
the law of common intention is in no manner synonymous and has its distinguishable
characteristics. Chapter Eight of the Indian Penal Code relates from section 141 to section
160 to’ Offenses against Public Tranquility.’ Offenses against public peace, also known as’
Group Offenses,’ lead to public peace disturbance. Section 141 defines’ Unlawful
Assembly,’ for which 5 or more persons should be present, and the object should be
prevalent to all.

Criminal intent is the greatest type of criminal liability of mind and mens rea. The intention
in criminal law occupies a symbolic position. It refers to murder and the most serious type of
crime in the criminal justice system as the largest type of mental component. In the Indian
Penal Code, the word ‘ intention’ is still not described, but IPC Section 34 deals with
common intention.

Section 34 offers a notion of joint liability that is present in both civil and criminal law. It
addresses a scenario where an offense involves a specific criminal intention or understanding
and is committed by multiple persons. Each of those who join the act with such
understanding or purpose shall be responsible in the same manner as if that intention or
understanding was accomplished by him alone. 

Common purpose, common object, under Section 34: When various people commit a
criminal act in support of the common intention of all, each of those persons shall be liable
for that act within the same manner as if it was done by him alone.

Common intent implies a scheme that has been prearranged. On the contrary, Section 149 of
The Indian Penal Code refers to an act committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in
prosecuting that assembly’s common object.

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 COMMON INTENTION

Intention means guilty mind, ‘purpose of desire to bring about a contemplated result or
foresight that certain consequences will follow from the conduct of the person.’1 When two
or more persons share this guilty desire it is common intention. And when a criminal act is
done by such persons s. 34 makes them liable for the act, irrespective of what role one person
individually played in that action. It states,

When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of
all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him
alone.2

S. 32 states that ‘acts done extend also to illegal omissions.’ ‘The word “act” denotes as well
a series of acts as a single act: the word “omission” denotes as well a series of omissions as a
single omission’.3 Vicarious liability under s. 34 is fixed on a member of group when

(i) A criminal act is done in furtherance of ‘common intention’ of members of the group.

(ii) The member has participated in some manner in the happening of the criminal action.

Common Intention

Participation of the Accused Act in Furtherance of

in the Act Common Intention

1
K.D. Gaur, Textbook on the Indian Penal Code (Universal Law Publishing, 2009) p. 49
2
SS. 35, 36 and 37 elaborate on this principle and fix liability on different persons of a group on the basis of
common intention. S. 35 states, ‘Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a
criminal knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with such
knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that
knowledge.’ S. 36 states, ‘Wherever the causing of a certain effect, or an attempt to cause that effect, by an act
or by an omission, is an offence, it is to be understood that the causing of that effect partly by an act and partly
by an omission is the same offence.’ S. 37 states, ‘ When an offence is committed by means of several acts,
whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either
singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence.
3
S. 33 IPC.

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Common intention denotes meeting of mind of the persons accused of an offence. This
requires prior concert. In Surendra Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh 4 a doctor was
neither competent to terminate pregnancy nor he had the approval of the government. His
clinic lacked the basic instruments necessary for the purpose. Victim was taken to that clinic
by a person for termination of the pregnancy of the victim and she died in the process.
Doctor and the person who took her to clinic were held liable for the death of the victim as
the crime was committed in furtherance of the common intention. In this case the two
accused knew that the clinic did not have the facility for termination of pregnancy and the
doctor did not have the competence to complete the procedure without hazard. Still they
concerted and carried on the termination of pregnancy of the victim. Hence there was
common intention of the two accused to undertake a procedure illegally and in furtherance of
their common intention they subjected the victim to the abortion process as a result of which
the victim dies. Hence there was common intention, an act was done in furtherance of the
common intention and each of the two accused participated in the criminal act. One brought
the victim to the clinic and the other applied the procedure on the victim. Although common
intention means meeting of mind which requires prior concert, it can also develop on the spot
after the offenders have gathered there. In Kripal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 5 there was a
dispute over land between the accused and the victim. One morning the three accused tried to
stop labourers from working in the field which the labourers tried to resist. When the victim
intervened two accused hit him with sharp weapons. Third accused stabbed the victim with
spear blade which struck the victim in jaw. The blow injured the brain of the victim who died
on the spot. The court held that the three accused were liable under s. 326 read with s. 34.
However, third accused alone was liable for murder. The common intention which developed
on the spot was to attack the victim with sharp weapons. Other two accused did not intend
murder of the victim. Another example which seems close is Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar 6
wherein court quoted with approval following observation of the Supreme Court in Suresh v.
State of U.P.7

There is no gainsaying that a common intention presupposes prior concert, which requires a
prearranged plan of the accused participating in an offence. Such preconcert or preplanning
may develop on the spot or during the course of commission of the offence but the crucial

4
AIR 2000 SC 1436
5
AIR 1954 SC 706
6
(2003) 1 SCC 268
7
(2001) 3 SCC 673

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test is that such plan must precede the act constituting an offence. Common intention can be
formed previously or in the course of occurrence and on the spur of the moment. The
existence of common intention is a question of fact in each case to be proved mainly as a
matter of inference from the circumstances of the case.8

In Lallan Rai vs. State of U.P. victim alongwith three other persons was returning from
Taraiya Bazar to his village on the day of Holi festival. 14 accused were sitting at the house
of Rajendra Rai variously armed with weapons. At the instigation of Rajendra Rai all
accused persons encircled the victim and his companions and killed the victim. Defence
unsuccessfully tried to plead that the accused should be tried for their individual actions. It
could not be proved that 14 accused had assembled with the purpose to kill the victim
because there was no evidence that they knew that he would be returning at that time through
that path. It was found in trial that the plan to kill developed all of sudden. That is why
application of s. 149 failed because the assembly was not unlawful. But the Supreme Court
applied s. 34 and held the accused persons liable for murder because they shared common
intention to kill the victim and this common intention had developed on the spot.9

ELEMENTS OF SECTION 34
8
Id. 386.
9
State of Orissa v. Arjun Das Agarwal AIR 1999 SC 3229

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Criminal Act Done By Several Persons

The said criminal act must have been performed by more than one person. If the criminal act
was a fresh and independent act that springs entirely from the doer’s mind, the others will not
be liable simply because they intended to be involved with the doer in another criminal act
when it was done. The acts committed in the criminal action by different confederates may
be different, but they all have to participate and engage in the criminal enterprise in one way
or another.

Common intention

 To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each person be known to
all the others and be shared by them.’10 In Mahboob Shah v. Emperor11 Allah Dad and few
others were trying to collect reeds from the bank of Indus river. They were warned by
Mahboob Shah against collecting reed from lands belonging to him. Ignoring the warning the
deceased collected reeds but was stopped by Qasim Shah, nephew of Mahboob Shah while
he was placing them on boat. Qasim Shah was hit by the victim by a bamboo pole. On
hearing Qasim Shah’s cries for help, Mahboob Shah and his son Wali Shah came armed with
their guns. Wali Shah fired at the victim who died instantly and Mahboob Shah fired at
another persons causing him some injuries. Lahore High Court sentenced Mahboob Shah
with murder of victim under s. 302 read with s. 34. But on appeal Privy Council set aside the
conviction for murder for Mahboob Shah stating that common intention required pre-
arranged plan and it has to be proved that criminal act was done in concert pursuant to
prearranged plan. Here the two accused might be having same or similar intention but not
common intention and since firing of Mahboob Shah did not kill anyone he was not held
liable for murder by the application of s. 34. The common intention is most often confused
with Section 149, which states that each member of the unlawful assembly is guilty of the
offense committed in prosecuting a common object. It must be recognized that there are
differences between the operations of both the sections. 

Participation in The Criminal Act

10
K.D. Gaur, , Textbook on Indian Penal Code(Universal Law Publishing, 2009) p. 36.
11
AIR 1945 PC 118

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An essential ingredient of liability under s. 34 is participation of the accused in the
commission of the crime. In State of Orissa v. Arjun Das Agarwal some persons entered the
hotel of the victim after 10 pm and picked up quarrel with him. One of the accused stabbed
him and others gave blows. Fifth accused, Arjun Das Aggarwal was standing outside the
hotel on the road and instigating the other accused to finish the victim soon. Supreme Court
held four accused liable under s. 302 read with s. 34 but did not hold Arjun Das Agarwal
liable for murder because he neither went inside the hotel of the deceased nor took any part
in the commission of the murder. He was only standing outside and instigating and there was
no evidence to show that more blows were given to the victim due to instigation of the
respondent. This was a case where common intention had developed on the spot. In direct
contrast to this case is the decision of the Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh v.
Emperor12 which was preplanned. In this case four men attacked the office of the post master
while he was counting money. Three of them entered the office and demanded the money.
Thereafter they opened fire at postmaster and fled with the money. Appellant who was one of
the party was standing outside the office all this time. He was visible from inside and could
see what was happening inside.

Defence of the appellant was that he was frightened and he did not participate in the crime
and was merely standing outside the office. Rejecting his appeal, Privy Council stated that
‘they also serve who stand and wait.’ In this way his participation was sufficient to make him
vicariously liable for the actions of the other participants in the group. Whether the accused
had participated or not has to be decided on the basis of facts surrounding the case. In certain
cases helpless spectators have not be held to be liable under s. 34. For example in State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Sahrunnisa13 three boys of the family were being sacrificed on the
superstitious belief of a father and daughter that they would regain life. Mother of the boys
and her son- in-law (husband of her daughter) were helpless spectators. Two boys died in this
while the third somehow escaped death. Dismissing the appeal of the State, the Supreme
Court held that a poor muslim lady would normally be too afraid of her husband and
daughter who were mistakenly convinced of supernatural occurrence and hence dared not
oppose their actions. This cannot be termed as her having common intention to commit the
crime nor can her not opposing be termed as participation in the crime.

12
AIR 1925 PC 1
13
AIR 2009 SC 3182

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Once it is established that a crime has been committed in furtherance of common intention of
all the accused, it is irrelevant what was the nature of participation of particular accused. He
would be liable for the crime as if he alone committed the crime. If two persons attack
someone with the common intention to kill him they both would be liable for murder read
with s. 34 even though death was caused by the wound given by one of them only. 14 In
Krishnan v. State15 the victim was attacked by four accused. They had earlier also threatened
her. One day when the deceased refused to comply with their demand, they attacked her and
her brother armed with sharp weapons. Four accused gave blow at different parts of the body.
One gave blow on the right side of the head of the deceased with aruval. This injury proved
to be fatal. Holding all the accused liable for murder under s. 302 read with s. 34 the
Supreme Court held that when several persons participate in a criminal act with common
intention it is irrelevant what was the individual role of a participant. All would be held liable
for the crime as if it was done by him alone.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF COMMON INTENTION

14
Israr v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2005 SC 249.
15
(2003) 7 SCC 56

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Section 34 is only a Rule of Evidence and Does Not Create a Substantive
Offence

In the case of Sachin Jana and anr. v State of Bengal, it was mentioned that the section is a
rule of evidence. The distinctive feature is the participation of the jointly liable people. The
participation in the direct offence will not matter but the people will be jointly liable as
though, the offence has been committed by that person only.

The Common Intention should be Prior or Antecedent to the Occurrence

The common intention doctrine states that there should be an antecedent to the occurrence. A
clear distinction is made between common intention and common object is that common
intention denotes action in concert and necessarily postulates the existence of a pre-arranged
plan implying a prior meeting of the minds, while common object does not necessarily
require proof of prior meeting of minds or pre-concert. Though there is a substantial
difference between the two sections namely Section 34 and Section 149, they also to some
extent overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of each case.

Common Intention may Develop during the Course of the Occurrence and
could Develop on the Spot

Common intention has to be ascertained in the investigations, however, it is not necessary

that it happens before the occurrence only. It might happen during the occurrence of the act
as well. The intention is curated at any given point in the action.

Common Intention is Different from Same or Similar Intention

Common intention mentions the fact that the people involved in the act had a common
intention, whereas similar intention includes the change in intention during the act due to the
intervention of some other external circumstances.

For example: there had been common intention of 4 people to commit the offence of
abduction. But, in the process, if one of them kills the person who was abducted without the
consent of other parties. That person will be held liable for abduction and murder and the rest
will be liable only for abduction.

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Proof of Common Intention: Rule for Evaluating Evidence

Proof of common intention is evaluated through the measurement of participation in overt as

well as covert acts. The parties prove their involvements in the carrying out of the act. The
proof of common intention is measured by witnesses and deduced circumstances.

Conduct of Parties as Evidence for Proving Common Intention

Common intention can also be proved by the statements provided by the parties involved.
The conduct of parties as evidence may be used for proving common intention. For example,
in the case of a theft, the conduct of the people involved, is proved by their participation and
conduct in the crime.

Circumstantial Evidence as Proof of Common Intention

This counts as the basic mode of proving the common intention of people involved in the
crime. The evidence that was found during the investigation of the circumstances is generally
taken as the most important and crucial evidence of proving the common intention.

COMMON OBJECT-SECTION 149 UNDER IPC,1860

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Section 149 of IPC, 1860 is defined as: Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence
committed in prosecution of common object.

S. 141 of IPC tells us that an assembly of five or more persons is called an ‘unlawful
assembly’ if the common object of the assembly is one of the five objects listed in that
provision.16 An assembly of five or more persons may be unlawful since the inception if it is
formed with unlawful object or may become unlawful later when its object became unlawful
under s. 141. 17 If any person joins or continues in an unlawful assembly knowing it to be an
unlawful assembly is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly.18

S. 149 of IPC fixes vicarious liability for members of unlawful assembly. ‘If an offence is
committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of
that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in
prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is
a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.’

This Section can easily be understood as, where an offense is committed by any member of
an unlawful assembly in the prosecution of the common purpose of that assembly, or as the
members of that assembly knew likely to be committed in the prosecution of that purpose,
any person who is a member of the same assembly at the time of the commission of that
offense shall be guilty of that offense.

ELEMENTS OF SECTION 149 

An offense committed by members of an unlawful assembly-The Supreme Court in Yunis

vs. Madhya Pradesh State held that the presence of the accused as part of an unlawful

16
First –To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State Government or
Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such
public servant; or
Second-To resist the execution of any law, or any legal process; or
Third-To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or
Fourth-By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any
property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal
right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or
Fifth-By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to d what he is not legally
bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.
17
Explanation S. 141.
18
S. 142

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assembly was sufficient for the conviction to be held. The fact that the accused was a
participant of the unlawful assembly and his presence on the spot of the event is adequate to
hold him liable even if he is not accused of any overt act. However, mere presence in an
unlawful assembly cannot make an individual responsible unless he is acting by common
object and that object is one of the objects set out in Section 141.

The specifics of an unlawful assembly are detailed in Section 141 of the Indian Penal Code.
It states that if the common object of such assembly is any of the following, an assembly of
five or more persons is an unlawful assembly.

1. In order to demonstrate criminal power. 

2. Resisting law enforcement or legal proceedings.
3. Committing criminal offense or wrongdoing. 
4. Forcing others to do what they are not legally bound to do by a criminal force
demonstration.
5. Taking possession of property by using criminal force.
6. Exempting anyone from using incorporeal law by using or demonstrating criminal
force.

(A) In prosecution of the common object– “In prosecution of the common object “does
not mean” the persuasion of the common object of the assembly. The words” in prosecution
the common object” show that the offense committed was immediately linked to the common
object of the assembly of which the accused were members. The act must be the way it was
done to achieve the common purpose attributed to the members of the unlawful assembly.
The words “in the prosecution of the common object” must be interpreted strictly as
equivalent to “in order to achieve the common object.”

(B) Members knew to be likely- the second part refers to a situation in which members of

the assembly knew that the offense was likely to be committed in prosecuting the common
object. A thing is likely to occur only when it will probably occur or may very well
occur/happen. At the time of the commission of an offense, the word’ knew’ indicates a state
of mind and not the latter. Knowledge must be proved. The word’ likely’ means some strong
proof that such knowledge was available to the unlawful assembly. The prosecution must
show that not only did the accused know that the offense was likely to be committed, but also
that it was likely to be committed in prosecuting the assembly’s common object.

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(C) Five or more persons- to apply this section, it is essential to prove that the common
object was shared by at least five people. While it may happen that some of them are
identifiable or that their identity was doubtful, the presence of five or more people must be
unquestionably proven. Even less than five people may be convicted in some cases. But if it
is doubtful that under this section there were at least five people, no conviction is possible.

Section 142 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  makes it easier to identify the factors that
make someone a part of an illegal assembly. It says that if someone joins an assembly or
continues to be a member of that unlawful assembly even after being aware of the facts that
make such assembly unlawful.

DIFFERENCE OF COMMON OBJECT AND COMMON

INTENTION

First question that arises is what is common object? In Gangadhar Behra v. State of Orissa 19
Pasayat, J. defined common object in following terms: The word “object” means the purpose
19
(2002) 8 SCC 381.,Shivjee Singh v. State of Bihar(2008) 11 SCC 631.

17 | P a g e
or design and, in order to make it “common” it must be shared by all. In other words, the
object should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that is to say, they
should all be aware of it and concur to it.20

Again he states,

An object is entertained in the human mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct
evidence can be available and, like intention, has generally to be gathered from the act
which the person commits and the result therefrom. Though no hard and fast rule can be laid
down under the circumstances from which the common object can be culled out, it may
reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms it carries and behavior at or
before or after the scene of incident.21

Distinguishing common object from common intention he states,

“Common object” is different from a “common intention” as it does not require a prior
concert and a common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if each has the same
object in view and their number is five or more and that act as an assembly to achieve that
object. 22

Referring to Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor23 , S.K. Das, J. in Chikkarange Gowda

&Ors. v. State of Mysore24 distinguished between common object and common intention in
following words

In Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor the distinction between Sections 149 and 34, Penal
Code was pointed out. It was observed that Section 149 postulated an assembly of five or
more persons having a common object, namely, one of those objects named in Section 141,
and then the doing of acts by members of the assembly in prosecution of that object or such
as the members knew were likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. It was
pointed out that there was a difference between common object and common intention;
though the object might be common, the intention of the several members might differ. The
leading feature of Section 34 is the element of participation in action, whereas membership

20
Id. pp. 396-397
21
Id. 398
22
Id. p. 397.
23
AIR 1953 PC 118
24
AIR 1956 SC 731

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of the assembly at the time of the committing of the offence is the important element in
Section 149. The two sections have a certain resemblance and may to a certain extent
overlap, but it cannot be said that both have the same meaning.25

Difference between common object and common intention can better be understood with the
help of the facts and decision in this case where both ss. 34 and 149 were mixed. A mob of
about 100 persons rushed towards a house at noon where two brothers Putte Gowda and
Nanje Gowda were found. The mob sprinkled kerosene oil on the roof and started burning
the house. When the inmates of the house came out the two brothers were brutally assaulted
and this resulted in their death. Four appellants were members of the mob. Appellant 1 had
hit Putte Gowda on Abdomen with a cutting instrument, appellant 4 hit Putte Gowda on the
knee with a chopper. Second appellant hit Nanje Gowda with a spear and third appellant hit
Nanje Gowda on the head with axe. The appellants alongwith several others were charged
under section 148, 302 and 302 with ss. 34 and 149 on the ground that the common object of
the assembly was to kill Putte Gowda. However, it was found that the common object of the
assembly was only chastisement of Putte Gowda. The question was whether four appellants
can be held liable for separate common intention of causing death of Putte Gowda? The
Supreme Court held that appellant 1 and 4 could not be held guilty of murder on the principle
of joint liability under section 34 because they were not given any notice and reasonable
opportunity to present their case on separate common intention of three persons of causing
death of Putte Gowda and Nanje Gowda as separate from common object of the unlawful
assembly which was chastisement only. Hence they had to be judged for their individual
actions which went beyond the common object of the unlawful assembly. None of the
injuries caused by the two appellants was fatal in nature. Hence they were help liable under
ss. 326 and 148 IPC only. Appellant 2 was charged with causing spear wound to Nanje
Gowda which was not found to exist in the medical evidence, hence he was also charged
only under s. 148. Appellant 3 had hit Nanje Gowda on head with axe which was found to
sufficient to cause death and hence he was held guilty under section 302 IPC.

Difference between ss. 34 and 149 was elaborated in Nanak Chand v. State of Punjab 26 also
where the prosecution had argued that s. 149 does not create any offence and merely
provides for constructive guilt similar to s. 34 of the IPC. Negating the contention of the

25
Id at 735
26
1955 AIR 274

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prosecution, the Supreme Court stated that section 34 is merely explanatory and does not
create any specific offence but same is not true about s. 149.

The principal element in section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is the common intention to
commit a crime. In furtherance of the common intention several acts may be done by several
persons resulting in the commission of that crime. In such a situation section 34 provides
that each one of them would be liable for that crime in the same manner as if all the acts
resulting in that crime had been done by him alone.' There is no question of common
intention in section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. An offence may be committed by a
member of an unlawful assembly and the other members will be liable for that offence
although there was no common intention between that person and other members of the
unlawful assembly to commit that offence provided the conditions laid down in the section
are fulfilled. Thus if the offence committed by that person is in prosecution of the common
object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to
be committed in prosecution of the common object, every member of the unlawful assembly
would be guilty of that offence, although there may have been no common intention and no
participation by the other members in the actual commission of that offence.27

The court referred to the decision of Lord Sumner in Barendra Kumar Ghosh vs. Emperor 28
where it was pointed out that element of participation in action was the leading feature of s.
34 and it was replaced in s. 149 by membership in assembly at the time of committing of the
offence.

CONCLUSION

Section 34 merely defines joint liability and does not impose any penalties for the same. This
section has to be read with multiple other sections of IPC such as Section 120A defining
criminal conspiracy, Section 120 B providing a penalty for criminal conspiracy, and Section
149 dealing with unlawful assembly. This Section 34 cannot be implemented alone and must
be implemented together with some other section in order to make an individual jointly
27
Id at 277
28
AIR 1943 PC 118

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liable for the offense. There is no need for people to always share the common intention and
commit a crime It might be possible that they are present at the scene just by mere chance
and shared no common intention which is the core ingredient of Section 34 of IPC.

Fixing vicarious liability under Section 34 or Section 149 depends on their method adopted
to furnish the crime. There are two sections managing ‘common intention’ and ‘common
object’ beneath two chapters of IPC ‘General Explanation’ and ‘Of Offences against Public
Tranquility’ respectively. 

Sometimes there arises difficulty in proving with proof that whether they shared common
intention or not and also how many individuals with the same common object were members
of the unlawful assembly. However, the Supreme Court abolished these ambiguities in
various instances after determining each case’s facts and condition.

In order to have a clear and better knowledge, India’s Law Commission also gave the
Legislature many suggestions to amend some parts of the statute. Finally, I can say that both
Section 34 and Section 149 make an individual vicariously responsible for his companions’
actions. Both sections cannot always be provided by direct proof, and it should be inferred
from the facts and conditions of the case.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1- https://blog.ipleaders.in/comparative-analysis-of-sec-34-and-149-ipc-1860-with-
judicial-interpretations/#Introduction_to_Section_34_under_IPC_1860
2- http://epgp.inflibnet.ac.in/epgpdata/uploads/epgp_content/S000020LA/P001795/
M025748/ET/15137700504etext.pdf

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 3- file:///D:/Download%20tmp/IPC-SCLLB-2.pdf
4- http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/1338/Common-Intention-And-Common-
Object-Under-The-Indian-Penal-Code-1860.html
5- https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-3415-joint-and-constructive-criminal-
liability.html

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 PLAGIARISM REPORT

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