THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 188464, July 29, 2015

ALBERTO J. RAZA, Petitioner, v. DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC. AND

MAMORU ONO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals'
Decision1 dated December 22, 2008 and Resolution2 dated April 14, 2009 which upheld
the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in its Resolutions dated
May 31, 2006 and July 31, 2006 that petitioner was validly dismissed by respondents.

The facts of the case follow.

Petitioner Alberto J. Raza (Raza) was hired as a driver by respondent Daikoku

Electronics Phils., Inc. (Daikoku) on January 11, 1999. Eventually, he was assigned to
drive for the other respondent, the company president Mamoru Ono (Ono). Raza claims
that his working days and hours depended on Ono's schedule and needs, so it was not
unusual for him to be ordered to work from very early in the morning up to past
midnight of any day, including Sundays.3 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On the evening of July 21, 2003, Raza dropped Ono off at the latter's residence called
the Pacific Plaza Condominium in Makati City. But Raza, instead of parking the company
vehicle at the condominium building's parking area, drove the vehicle to his home and
parked it there overnight. The next morning, as Raza was about to fetch Ono, the latter
confronted him and asked why the vehicle was not at the condominium parking lot.
Raza replied with a lie, telling Ono that he parked the car at the condominium building
but in the wrong slot. Three (3) days later, on July 24, 2003, Raza was served a
company Notice of Violation of the Code of Conduct for Dishonesty. On July 25, 2003,
Raza submitted his written explanation wherein he admitted bringing the car to his
home without permission and lying about it to Ono.4 He apologized for these infractions
but he also indicated that he was previously told by Ono that he could use the car if he
needed to.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The company's Investigation Committee conducted a hearing wherein Raza again

admitted bringing the car home and lying about it to Ono, but Raza reiterated that
there were previous occasions when Ono authorized him to bring the vehicle
home.6 The Committee then recommended the suspension of Raza for twelve (12) days
without pay for the offenses of parking the company vehicle at home without authority
and for lying about it.7 However, disregarding such recommendation, the company's
General Affairs Manager Gerardo Gaytano sent a letter dated August 7, 2003
terminating Raza's services for dishonesty.8 Respondents explain that the harsher
punishment was imposed because at the meeting of the board of directors, Ono denied
permitting Raza to use the company car and even presented a report from the Pacific
Plaza Security Office stating that from May 1, 2003 to July 20, 2003, Raza did not park
the company car at the said building for a total of thirty-one (31) instances, all without
authority nor permission.9 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, Raza filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for damages and
attorney's fees.

On January 15, 2005, Labor Arbiter Lita V. Alibut rendered a Decision10 in favor of Raza
as complainant. In NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-9-18127-03-L, the said officer ruled as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the complainant's dismissal unlawful, respondents are hereby

directed to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights
and other benefits and (are) further ordered solidarily to pay complainant backwages
from the time of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement minus the salary
corresponding to the suspension period of twelve days plus 10% of the total award for
attorney's fees computed as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

FULL BACKWAGES:  
A. Basic pay  
From 8/14/03 to 1/14/05  
P 12,000 x 17.03 = P204,360.00
B. 13th month pay
P 204,360 ÷ 12 = 17,030.00
C. Service Incentive Leave
Pay
P 12,000 ÷ 30 x 5 days x
2,838.33
17.03 ÷ 12 =
P224,228.33
Less: P12,000 ÷ 30 x 12 days
4,800.00 
=
TOTAL: P219,428.33
Attorney's fee of P219,428.33 x
P 21,942.83
10% =
SO ORDERED.11
The Labor Arbiter found that the allegations of Raza's infractions, such as his repeated
use of the company vehicle without permission, are unsubstantiated by evidence.12 She
ruled that although the company alleges that there were thirty-one (31) prior incidents
of Raza taking the company vehicle, allegedly reported by the condominium security
guard, Raza was not confronted with the same in the notice of violation and neither was
it presented during the deliberations by the investigating committee. And even if such
report was admitted, the Labor Arbiter still sustained Raza's explanation that he was
permitted to do so by Ono and that there were times when Raza would work until 1:30
in the morning and was told to report back to work at 7:00 in the morning of the same
day, or with just a few hours of rest in between.13 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Disagreeing with the decision of the Labor Arbiter, respondents filed an appeal to the
NLRC.

In a Resolution14 dated August 31, 2005, the NLRC dismissed the appeal due to
respondents' failure to include a certificate of non-forum shopping and lack of proper
verification.

A motion for reconsideration with manifestation and compliance was filed by

respondents.15 It was duly opposed by Raza, who alleged that the same was filed out of
time.16 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The NLRC, in a Resolution17 dated May 31, 2006, reinstated the appeal of respondents
and ruled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to meet
the demands of substantial justice. In the same resolution, the NLRC set aside the
findings of the Labor Arbiter and ruled in favor of respondents.18 It held that Raza was
not illegally dismissed since the infractions he committed were a just cause for
dismissal.19 Such infractions include the taking of the company vehicle without
authority, which the NLRC described as a “recurring act,” and the uttering of falsehood
towards company president Ono, which it believed was a show of disrespect and
brought dishonor to the latter.20 However, the NLRC still found respondents liable for
Raza's monthly salary, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay during his
period of reinstatement from the time of their receipt of the Labor Arbiter's decision up
to the time of the NLRC's decision.21 The NLRC held:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents' Motion for Reconsideration is

GRANTED. Complainant's Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt is DENIED for lack of
merit.

The assailed Decision dated January 15, 2005 of the Labor Arbiter is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered declaring that complainant was validly
dismissed from his employment. Nevertheless, for failure to reinstate complainant
Alberto J. Raza pursuant to the Labor Arbiter's Decision, respondent DAIKOKU
ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC. is hereby ordered to pay him his wages from 11 March
2005 up to the promulgation of this Resolution, provisionally computed as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Basis pay: (3/11/05 – 5/11/06)

=
(P8,790.00 x 14 months)
P123,060.00
13th month pay:
(P123,060.00/12 mos.) = 10,255.55
Service Incentive Leave Pay:
(P8,790.00/30 x 5 days x 14
1,709.17
mos. / 12) =
=
TOTAL  
P135,024.72
SO ORDERED.22
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Raza filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision, but the same was denied
by the NLRC in a Resolution23 dated July 31, 2006.

Raza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the NLRC's resolutions, but the
petition was initially dismissed by the appellate court in its Order24 dated November 6,
2006 for its failure to meet procedural requirements, such as the inclusion of pleadings
and documents relevant to the petition, as well as the inclusion of the actual addresses
of the respondents.
From the said dismissal, Raza filed a motion for reconsideration while submitting the
pertinent documents that were missing in his petition.25 Thus, in an Order26 dated
September 24, 2007, the CA granted the motion and reinstated the petition, as well as
declared Raza an indigent litigant.

On December 22, 2008, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 100714, rendered its assailed
Decision,27 denying the petition filed by Raza. The dispositive portion of that decision
states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed rulings
STAND.

SO ORDERED.28
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CA rejected Raza's allegation that respondents' motion for reconsideration of the
NLRC's August 31, 2005 Resolution was filed late with the NLRC, stating that Raza
failed to substantiate such allegation with evidence.29 Then, it found that Raza's
dishonesty, consisting of parking the vehicle at his home overnight and lying about it to
Ono, is deserving of the sanction of dismissal.30 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The motion for reconsideration filed by Raza was likewise denied in the other assailed
Resolution,31 dated April 14, 2009.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners rely on the following grounds for the grant of their
petition:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED

RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED OCTOBER 21, 2005
SUBMITTED BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION WHICH WAS
OBVIOUSLY FILED OUT OF TIME AND IN TRAVESTY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW WHEN IT ALLOWED THE

IMPOSITION OF A GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE PENALTY ON THE ALLEGED
INFRACTION COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The issues for this Court's resolution are procedural and substantive: whether the
respondents' Motion for Consideration dated October 21, 2005 was submitted on time
with the NLRC, and whether petitioner Alberto J. Raza committed infractions or
violations of company rules that merit the penalty of dismissal from employment.

As for the procedural ground, petitioner Raza argues that the motion for reconsideration
filed by respondents with the NLRC after the tribunal initially dismissed their appeal was
filed out of time.32 He states that the deadline for filing the said motion was October 21,
2005, but there was allegedly a certification from the postmaster that the latter's office
was without any clear record of mailing, or even a record of mailing or dispatch.33 Raza
admits, however, that the envelopes sent to the NLRC and his counsel all indicate
through stamps and handwritten markings that the mailing date was October 21,
2005.34 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To this Court, Raza's contentions as to the allegedly late filing of respondents' motion
with the NLRC are untenable. Verily, the concerns raised are all factual which, under a
petition for review under Rule 45, should not have been elevated to this Court for
review. This Court is not a trier of facts, and this rule applies in labor cases.35 The issue
in question first came up and was already raised on the appeal with the NLRC, whose
disposition of it was already affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In such a situation, the
findings of the lower tribunals are no longer to be disturbed, and are even accorded
finality,36 unless the case falls under any of the exceptions that would necessitate this
Court's review.37 The petition does not even allege nor demonstrate that the case is
covered by any of these exceptions.

At any rate, this Court finds nothing out of the ordinary nor irregular in the mailing of
the motion of respondents as would put in doubt the timeliness of its filing. The mailing
of the motion was done on the deadline for the filing and service of such, which was
October 21, 2005, as indicated by the post office on the envelopes as well as in the
registry receipts sent to the NLRC. Thus, the motion is considered filed on that date and
the filing was on time. Petitioner does not dispute but even admits the fact that the
envelopes and registry receipts bear that date. The rule is that whenever the filing of a
motion or pleading is not done personally, the date of mailing (by registered mail), as
indicated by the post office on the envelope or the registry receipt, is considered as the
date of filing.38 The fact that the post office indicated October 21, 2005 on the envelope
and receipts as the mailing date, as examined first-hand by the NLRC based on its
records, entitles respondents to the presumption that the motion was indeed mailed on
said date. Official duties – in this case, of a post office employee – are presumed to be
regularly performed, unless there is an assertion otherwise and the one so asserting
rebuts such with affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.39 In
addition, the stamps and marks made by the postal worker are considered entries in
the regular course of duty which are considered accurate unless proven otherwise.40 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The postmaster's belated certification41 that there is no clear record of mailing or

dispatch or that dispatch or delivery was done on a later date does not contradict the
fact of mailing done on October 21, 2005. On the contrary, the evidence disputes the
postmaster's certification.

In Raza’s own Second Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt,42 the post office’s

copies of Registry Receipt Number 1421 (which corresponds to the mailing done to
Raza’s counsel (Atty. Gesmundo) of his copy of the motion) and Receipt Number 1422
(which corresponds to the mailing of the NLRC’s copy) were submitted in evidence to
the NLRC.43 The receipts were clearly marked “V. Gesmundo” and “NLRC,” respectively,
the names of the recipients.44 Then, the date November 2, 2005, which appears thereon
and which the postmaster certified as the date of “dispatch” does not negate the fact of
mailing done on October 21, 2005. That the mail was dispatched or delivered by the
postal service on a later date that it was deposited or “mailed” by the sender is only
logical. And it is only probable that there would be a delay of a few days between the
mailing and delivery. As to the alleged absence of a “clear record of mailing,” the same
only refers to the office’s own record, but the stamps and marks of October 21, 2005
on the envelopes are also a record and are reliable evidence of mailing done on that
date. Also, it has been held that between the belated certification of the postmaster and
the marking or stamping done by the post office at the time of mailing, the latter is
preferred as evidence for having been done closer to the transaction in question,
especially in this case when the postmaster's certification does not even clearly allege
nor prove any irregularity or mistake made in such marking or stamping.45 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court now proceeds to the case's substantive aspect. The respondents claim that
Raza committed infractions that deserve the punishment of dismissal, as they amount
to valid grounds for termination as defined in Article 282 (a) and (c) of the Labor
Code.46 Raza, for his part, disagrees and contends that dismissal is a very severe
punishment that is not commensurate to his purported offense.47 He also maintains that
he was previously allowed by his superior to take home the company vehicle.48 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

What is in issue, therefore, is whether petitioner Raza's numerous acts of taking the
company car home overnight and lying about one of the incidents to the company
president legally deserve the supreme penalty of dismissal from the company.

The Court denies the petition. Raza was validly dismissed within the confines of a just
cause for termination as provided for in the Labor Code.

Before the Court resolves the issue, it needs reiterating that such an exercise requires
this Court to re-examine the facts and weigh the evidence on record, which is normally
a task that is not for this Court to perform, for basic is the rule that the Court is not a
trier of facts and this rule applies with greater force in labor cases.49 Questions of fact
are for the labor tribunals to resolve.50 It is elementary that the scope of this Court's
judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is confined only to errors of law and
does not extend to questions of fact.51 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

However, the case at bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, that
exception being when the findings of the Labor Arbiter conflict with those of the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals.52 The conflicting findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the
Court of Appeals pave the way for this Court to review factual issues even if it is
exercising its function of judicial review under Rule 45.53 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that
the dismissal was illegal.54 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Upon this Court's assessment, however, it finds that this burden has been discharged
by respondents and this Court agrees with the latter that petitioner Raza's acts
amounted to serious misconduct which falls under the valid grounds for termination of
the services of an employee as provided for in the Labor Code, specifically Article 282
(a) thereof, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ART. 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for

any of the following causes:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work; x x x.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct.55 It is the transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.56 For
misconduct to justify dismissal under the law, (a) it must be serious, (b) must relate to
the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) must show that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer.57 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the case at bar, it must be noted that Raza's termination came not as a result of a
singular incident on July 21, 2003 of driving home the company car, keeping it
overnight and then lying about such act to the company president the next day. It
came because such incident launched a company investigation during which it was
found out that the July 21, 2003 incident was preceded by thirty-one (31) other
instances in the previous two and a half (2-1/2) months (or from May 1, 2003 to July
20, 2003) in which Raza similarly did not park the car in the assigned area but took it
home overnight without permission.58 Thus, the termination letter against Raza
mentioned a “recurring act of taking the subject vehicle without authority,”59 as a
ground for his separation from service. This Court finds and agrees with respondents
that the above acts constitute serious misconduct which rendered Raza’s termination
valid.

Raza admits his acts but prays for a lighter penalty because he disputes the actual
number of incidents wherein he brought home the subject car and he claims that he
enjoyed the authority to do so from the respondents.60 However, not only does he fail
to provide an actual number of his admitted acts of bringing home the car, he also fails
to substantiate his claim that he did the same with the “permission and tolerance” of
the company president. The evidence also disagrees with his contentions. First, as to
the actual number of incidents, the “in and out” logs of the condominium security
guards are clear and indisputable. The guards dutifully logged as “in” the time when the
subject car was driven into the parking lot and, again, they logged it as “out” when the
car was driven out. Based on the said record, this Court counted at least twenty-nine
(29) incidents of the car being driven into the parking lot in the early or late evenings,
only to be driven out within a few minutes, indicating that the vehicle did not stay
parked therein for the whole night. Second, if it is true that the acts of driving the
company car home was with the permission of Ono or the previous company president,
then Ono would not have asked Raza about the car's whereabouts the previous night in
the morning of July 22, 2003. Then, Raza, too, would not have had any reason to lie, as
he could have simply told Ono that he drove the car home as the latter had previously
permitted. Instead, he waited for a formal investigation for him to finally admit driving
home the car. What is also material is that Raza has no evidence of having obtained
permission other than his mere assertion.

The Court expects proof from Raza because his claims go against ordinary experience
and common practice among companies. A company's executive vehicle is usually for
the personal service of the person to whom it is assigned and is supposed to be
available solely to the latter at any given time. It is rarely made available for the
personal use and service of the chauffeur even if the executive is already home and
retired for the night and the chauffeur himself has to go to his own residence that is
away from his master's residence. By taking the vehicle out and driving it to his home,
the driver exposes such company property to the risk of damage or loss due to
collisions, theft or even untoward incidents such as a fire or civil disturbance. There is
also a risk of company liability to third persons arising from such use. In addition, such
use is not free of costs, since the extra journey entails fuel use, wear and tear, and
other allied expenses. Therefore, it can be safely held that use of a company vehicle for
a driver's personal needs is more of an exceptional privilege rather than the norm. It
cannot be presumed as bestowed on every employee, not even a chauffeur, so that one
who claims to have it has the obligation to provide proof of his authority, permission or
privilege for the use to be considered warranted.

As to the allegation that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh, it is long established that
an employer is given a wide latitude of discretion in managing its own affairs, and in
the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of its
employees.61 The broad discretion includes the implementation of company rules and
regulations and the imposition of disciplinary measures on its workers.62 But for the
management prerogative to be upheld, the exercise of disciplining employees and
imposing appropriate penalties on erring workers must be practiced in good faith for the
advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements.63 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the case at bar, the infractions of Raza were numerous enough that they already
amount to an unlawful taking of company resources and that they may be subsumed
under the charge of serious misconduct leveled against him.64 It has been held that
“although as a rule this Court leans over backwards to help workers and employees
continue with their employment or to mitigate the penalties imposed on them, acts of
dishonesty in the handling of company property are a different matter.”65 Such may be
penalized with dismissal.66 It matters little that Raza claims that his record prior to this
was clean or that he has yet to cause substantial damage to the company or to its
property in committing his acts. His transgressions are too serious and too many to
escape without heavy sanction. In the present situation wherein Raza has already been
found guilty of numerous acts of driving the company vehicle for his personal use
without prior authority, the Court cannot expect and require the employer company to
wait for one more such instance of unauthorized use or for actual damage to be caused
by such use before the company can be considered justified in penalizing the erring
employee.67 This Court has held that a series of irregularities when put together may
constitute serious misconduct, which is a just cause for termination.68 In the case at
bar, the seriousness and volume of the prior incidents, committed in such a short
period of time, are already enough as ground to terminate petitioner.

On this note, this Court disagrees with the Labor Arbiter's finding that the infractions
were too light and do not merit the supreme sanction of dismissal. The arbiter's finding
is grounded on her incorrect disregard of the security guards' report on the thirty-one
(31) alleged prior incidents, which she claimed was not included in the notice of
violation and was not presented during the hearing by the investigating committee. The
Labor Arbiter also held that even if the incidents [were] considered, such are excused
by Raza’s long and unusual working hours. Suffice it to state during the investigation,
Raza himself admitted such incidents as, during his appearance before the investigating
committee, he himself alleged and acknowledged that on several occasions, “Mr.
Mamoru Ono authorized (him) to take the vehicle home,” which has the effect of
admitting that he, indeed, has previously taken the car home.69 Then, the company's
letter of termination dated August 7, 2003 included as one of the grounds therefor
Raza's allegedly “recurring act of taking the subject vehicle without authority,”70 which
Raza had the chance to refute via a letter-motion for reconsideration71 dated August 19,
2003.

In any case, the presentation of the security guards' report for the first time with the
Labor Arbiter through the respondents' Position Paper is neither too late nor improper.
For one thing, the NLRC is not restricted by the technical rules of procedure and is
allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in hearing and deciding labor cases.
Under Section 2, Rule I of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure and reiterated verbatim
in the same provision of the 2011 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission, it is provided that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 2. Construction. – These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the
objectives of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines and other relevant
legislations, and to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive
resolution and settlement of labor disputes.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Further, under Section 10, Rule VII of both the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure and
the 2011 NLRC Rules it is also identically stated that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 10. Technical rules not binding. – The rules of procedure and evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process.

In any proceeding before the Commission, the parties may be represented by legal
counsel but it shall be the duty of the Chairman, any Presiding Commissioner or
Commissioner to exercise complete control of the proceedings at all stages.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

And far more importantly, it is precisely at the stage of the filing of the position paper
that the parties are required to submit “supporting documents and affidavits” to bolster
their causes of action or defenses, as the case may be.72 Hence, it was just proper and
the most opportune time that the said report was presented at that stage and at the
level of the Labor Arbiter.

Then, too, it is with the Labor Arbiter that Raza had the chance to refute, contradict or
deny the veracity of the report. He had every opportunity to present his own
controverting evidence to impeach the credibility of such evidence. He did none of that,
however. Instead, Raza admitted in his Reply that he indeed brought the car to his own
house “for a number of times,” albeit allegedly with prior “knowledge, permission and
tolerance” of his superior.73 Although he was unclear whether such “number of times”
corresponds with the number of incidents reflected in the security guards' report, what
is more important is his admission of the fact of bringing home the car more than a few
times. He did not deny nor disprove that he committed such acts, even when he was
given the chance to do so. In administrative proceedings, one may not claim having
been denied due process when one has been given ample opportunity to be heard, for
the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.74 It is evident
in the case at bar that Raza was not barred from being heard nor that he had an
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

Also, unlike the Labor Arbiter, the Court does not excuse Raza's acts by considering his
allegedly long working hours or the fact that he was allegedly duty-bound to report for
work very early in the morning and get dismissed late at night, including Sundays and
holidays. Even if such working conditions were true, then it only makes Raza entitled to
overtime, night differential and holiday pay, if ever such remain unpaid to him, a claim
which he does not even make in his complaint. But certainly, such does not justify his
acts of appropriating the use of company property for his own personal gain without
prior permission. The fact that he is often tired right after driving Ono to the latter's
residence every night and the fact that he is still required to report early the next day
does not entitle him to the use of the company car as his own service vehicle, as such
entails risks and expenses to the company that the latter has not consented to facing.
The Court likewise fails to see how the personal use of the car could have greatly
benefited Raza's work performance, since he himself claimed in his Position Paper that
he did not live far, as he also resided in Makati City, which is the same city as his
master Ono's residence.75 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This Court has previously upheld as legal the dismissal of employees for using the
employer's vehicle for their own private purposes without prior permission or authority.
In Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao,76 the Court held that “a rule prohibiting
employees from using company vehicles for private purposes without authority from
management is a reasonable one.” Thus, an employee who used the company vehicle
twice in pursuing his own personal interests, on company time and deviating from his
authorized route, all without permission, was held to have been validly dismissed, for,
as the Court held, to condone the employee's conduct will erode the discipline that an
employer should uniformly apply so that it can expect compliance to the same rules and
regulations by its other employees.77 In another case, Family Planning Organization of
the Philippines v. NLRC,78 the Court also affirmed the dismissal of an employee who
used the company vehicle twice without permission and for personal reasons, noting
that employees must yield obedience to the rule against unauthorized use of company
vehicles because this is proper and necessary for the conduct of the employer's
business or concern.79 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

While the Court remains invariably committed towards social justice and the protection
of the working class from exploitation and unfair treatment, it, nevertheless, recognizes
that management also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.80 The aim is always to strike a balance
between an avowed predilection for labor, on the one hand, and the maintenance of the
legal rights of capital, on the other.81 Indeed, the Court should be ever mindful of the
legal norm that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the
light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.82 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated December

22, 2008 and Resolution dated April 14, 2009 are AFFIRMED. The Labor Arbiter,
unless barred by mootness or some other legal cause, is hereby ORDERED TO
PROCEED WITH THE EXECUTION of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of the NLRC
WITH DISPATCH.83 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

No costs.

SO ORDERED. cralawla
Facts:

Raza was an employee of the Daikoku Electronics Phil. Inc. as a driver of the company’s president.

Sometime, Raza dropped off the President to his condominium, but instead of parking the car to the
parking lot of the condominium he went home and parked the car on his home overnight. On the next
morning, the president confronted daza why the car was not parked on the parking lot of the
condominium but instead of telling the truth, Raza lied that he just parked on a wrong parking slot.

Three days letter Raza received a notice of his violation on the company’s code of conduct for
dishonesty, he wrote an explanation that he indeed lied to the president of the company when he said
that he just parked the car on a wrong parking slot and admitted that he brought the car at home, he
also apologized for the infractions and told that the president himself told him that he could use the car
when he needed to. The company conducted an investigation and ordered the dismissal of Raza for 12
days, but the Company’s general manager issued a letter terminating the employment of Raza, on the
reasons that the president denied that he had given Raza a permission to use the car when he needed
and also because of the record from the condominium of 31 instances where raza did not parked the car
on the condominium’s parking lot.

Raza filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the LA, which rendered a decision in favor of Raza, stating
that the company’s allegation on Raza infractions of using the company vehicle are unsubstantiated by
evidence.

This prompted the company to file an appeal with the NLRC, which reversed the decision of the LA,
stating that Raza was not illegally dismissed since the infractions he committed were a just cause for
dismissal.

Raza then filed an appeal with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether the Raza was illegally dismissed.

Ruling:

1. The court ruled that the respondent was not illegally dismissed. The court said that they
recognize the management prerogative of an employer to regulate all aspects of
employment according to their best discretion and judgement and in general, the
management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate
penalties pursuant to company’s rules and regulations. Provided, that it was not done in
abuse of discretion or bad faith nor it is contrary to justice and fair play. In this case,
Raza’s series of irregularities or infractions when put together already constitute serious
misconduct which is a just cause for termination.