G.R. No.

L-46496             February 27, 1940 2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and Philippine Army.
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs. 3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents. delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial
Relations. 4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon. dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay". petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
LAUREL, J.: elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth
Act No. 213.)
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled
case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we 6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court: dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que
ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se 7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against
termine la obra; the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya 8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
obreros de la misma;
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a herein.
dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica
injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion
virtud del paro. for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed
judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we
Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers: deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly
procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be
ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the
Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or
activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a
record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion
drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be
counsel have no evidentiary value. deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further
industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules
of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of
Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of this character:
of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and
laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider  the evidence
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.)
tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm- In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence,
laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside
Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to without notice or consideration."
be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing (3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a
settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more
President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a
locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such limitation upon power.
industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations
compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v.
which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al ., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not
requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R.
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern
may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not
evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations",
No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)" and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice
R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby
appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations,
report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise
Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or
any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and
may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of
Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the
Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally
Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the
difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our
case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood
(appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the
by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed
by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner
with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather";
that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments"
 Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST. Effective
January 5, 1978, he appointed Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position with compensation at
P18,384 per annum. The appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission.
Doctor Afable, in his letter dated January 20, 1978, explained that the appointment was made after
a thorough study and screening of the qualifications of Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon and upon the
recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation Committee that gave 88 points to Doctor Anzaldo
and 61 points to Doctor Venzon (p. 78, Rollo).
Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to Jacobo C. Clave, appealed to the
Office of the President of the Philippines (pp. 139-40). The appeal was forwarded to the NIST
G.R. No. L-54597 December 15, 1982
Anzaldo to the contested position (p. 63, Rollo). The appeal-protest was later sent to the Civil
FELICIDAD ANZALDO, petitioner, Service Commission.
vs.
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo
JACOBO C. CLAVE as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and as Presidential Executive
recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 that Doctor Venzon be appointed to
Assistant; JOSE A. R. MELO, as Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission, and EULALIA L.
the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the 1978 appointment of Doctor
VENZON, respondents.
Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil Service Commission (pp. 30 and 48,
Antonio P. Amistad for petitioner. Rollo).
Artemio E. Valenton for private respondent.
The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,
Madamba, Deza & Almario Law Offices for respondent .
Presidential Decree No. 807 (which took effect on October 6, 1975) and which provides that
Demegildo Laborte & Lazano Law Offices for respondent public officials.
"before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service
AQUINO, J.:
Commission."
This is a controversy over the position of Science Research Supervisor II, whose occupant heads
After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980,
the Medical Research Department in the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of
Doctor Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. As stated earlier,
Science and Technology (NIST).
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave (who was concurrently Chairman of the Civil Service
Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul the decision of Presidential Executive Commission) in his decision of March 20, 1980 revoked Doctor Anzaldo's appointment and ruled
Assistant Jacobo C. Clave dated March 20, 1980, revoking her appointment dated January 5, that, "as recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and
1978  as Science Research Supervisor II and directing the appointment to that position of Doctor Commissioner Melo), Doctor Venzon should be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor
Eulalia L. Venzon, 48. Anzaldo's appointment to the said position should be considered "valid and effective during the
pendency" of Doctor Venzon's protest (p. 36, Rollo).
The contested position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor Quintin Kintanar,
became Director of the Biological Research Center. Doctor Kintanar recommended that Doctor In a resolution dated August 14, 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied Doctor
Venzon be appointed to that position. Doctor Anzaldo protested against that recommendation. The Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On August 25, 1980, she filed in this Court the instant special
NIST Reorganization Committee found her protest to be valid and meritorious (p. 34, Rollo). civil action of certiorari.
Because of that impasse, which the NIST Commissioner did not resolve, the position was not filled
What is manifestly anomalous and questionable about that decision of Presidential Executive
up.
Assistant Clave is that it is an implementation of Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23,
At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30, 1974, both Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon were 1979 signed by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission  and concurred in
holding similar positions in the Medical Research Department: that of Scientist Research Associate by Commissioner Jose A. Melo.
IV with an annual compensation of P12,013 per annum. Both were next-in-rank to the vacant
In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo, acting for the Civil Service Commission,
position.
recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed Science Research Supervisor II in place of Doctor
Anzaldo.
When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined to concur in Considering that Doctor Anzaldo has competently and satisfactorily discharged the duties of the
the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission", what he meant was that he was concurring contested position for more than four (4) years now and that she is qualified for that position, her
with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was concurring with himself (p. 35, Rollo). appointment should be upheld. Doctor Venzon's protest should be dismissed.
It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Clave dated March 20, 1980 is set aside, and petitioner
Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Anzaldo's promotional appointment to the contested position is declared valid. No costs.
Commission. The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-
49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that the decision of Secretary of SO ORDERED.
Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision in a mining case
as Director  of Mines was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a
mockery of administrative justice.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be
appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.
Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who
should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in
the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
appointment. HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture &
In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the Civil Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of
Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Manila, petitioners,
Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation for, as held in the Zambales vs.
Chromite  case, that would not be fair to the appellant. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA
IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and
We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the appeal in APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
favor of Doctor Venzon. The appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in accordance with law and
properly exercised his discretion in appointing Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position. NARVASA, J.:

Doctor Anzaldo finished the pharmacy course in 1950 in the College of Pharmacy, University of the The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the
Philippines. She obtained from the Centro Escolar University the degree of Master of Science in Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on
Pharmacy in 1962 and in 1965 the degree of Doctor of Pharmacy. Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision
or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial
Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical technologist and functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated
supervisor (unassembled). otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or
other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on
She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has served in that agency for about twenty-eight (28)
Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and
years now. As already stated, in January, 1978, she was appointed to the contested Position of
adjudication?
Science Research Supervisor II. Her present salary as Science Research Supervisor II, now known
as Senior Science Research Specialist, is P 30,624 per annum  after she was given a merit The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as
increase by Doctor Kintanar, effective July 1, 1981 (p. 259, Rollo). substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action.
These facts, together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court or
On the other hand, Doctor Venzon finished the medical course in the University of Santo Tomas in
otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1957. She started working in the NIST in 1960. She has been working in that agency for more than
twenty-one (21) years. Doctor Anzaldo is senior to her in point of service. 1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among
them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to 5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without
they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of 6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775 ." In
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a
teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. 
to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño)
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the
more teachers joining in the days that followed. case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b)
herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and)
non-political demands of the MPSTA.  with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." The Commission thereafter issued an
Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were
administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation
charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and
P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of
committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the
Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all
Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter.
named respondents, the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme)
Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when x x x           x x x          x x x
their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating 7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to
Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990
November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no
to boycott the entire proceedings." The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño jurisdiction over the case."
dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers,
affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of 8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.  "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No.
Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for
the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo;  and
grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590
assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the
dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual
Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590."  Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf
petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," and  inter
of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous
alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders, file
similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be
impleaded."
administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
those charges." function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
(10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
merits with or without respondents counter affidavit."  It held that the "striking teachers" "were provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the
Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Commission on Human Rights.
Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the
Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office.  Upon its
1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra). constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at
the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. Its powers and functions are the following:
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf
of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition. (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this
Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
"to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
following general issues: within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and protection;

2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike. (5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of respect for the primacy of human rights;
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the (6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to
Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to
the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely. (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations
on human rights;
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under
the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession
agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
political rights.
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not performance of its functions;
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and
that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return
rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by
testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings.  These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or
the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues
and resolved them, and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire said issues. 
into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry."  The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due
the inquiry. process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself,
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to eventually the Supreme Court.
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no
an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service
or matters."  Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its
own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: them.
settle judicially: . . . act as judge."  And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with
judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."  This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary
judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the
Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Commission. It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if Commission.
there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question,
initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members
thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775)
on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and
Romero, JJ, concur.
 
Separate Opinions
  GUTIERREZ, JR., J.,  concurring:
I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome the
Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J.,  concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and
in many other similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and
their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and the
latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who
G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992
defend the same;
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of strikes
vs.
may be laid off because of financial repercussions.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the Commission ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY
on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending so-called "human rights' but OF FINANCE, and THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.
the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES,
 FELICIANO, J.:
and JUSTICES.
On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also
to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines,
corresponding "human obligations."
an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the
 PADILLA, J.,  dissenting: board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. This additional duty was subsequently increased from five percent (5%) ad valorem to
I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of Executive Order No. 443, dated 3 January
case. 1991.
On 24 July 1991, the Department of Finance requested the Tariff Commission to initiate the
process required by the Tariff and Customs Code for the imposition of a specific levy on crude oil
and other petroleum products, covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and 27.11 of Section 104 27.10 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, subject of Annex "A" hereof,
of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended. Accordingly, the Tariff Commission, following the shall continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine (9%) percent ad valorem.
procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, scheduled a public hearing to
give interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of their Under the above quoted provision, crude oil and other oil products continue to be subject to the
respective positions. additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem under Executive Order No. 475 and to the special
duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products under
Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President, on 15 August 1991 reducing the Executive Order No. 478.
rate of additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad
valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which continued to be subject to Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the
the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem. enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the
province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the President a therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue
"Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products" dated 16 August 1991, for consideration measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of
and appropriate action. Seven (7) days later, the President issued Executive Order No. 478, dated the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
23 August 1991, which levied (in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent
(9%) ad valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special duty  of P0.95 per liter or (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix  within specified limits, and subject to
P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts  within the framework of the national development
In the present Petition for Certiorari,  Prohibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails the validity of program of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are
violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows: There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to
such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates .
Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of . . and other duties or imposts . . ."
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections
104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the President
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section 104 of the Tariff and
President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in Customs Code provides in relevant part:
the nature of revenue-generating measures.
Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of import duty
Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders No. 475 and 478 contravene Section 401 of the under Section 104 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments issued under
Tariff and Customs Code, which Section authorizes the President, according to petitioner, to Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby adopted and form part of this Code.
increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties only  when necessary to
protect local industries or products but not  for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of duty indicated in
government. the Section under this section except as otherwise specifically provided for in this Code: Provided,
that, the maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad valorem.
Thus, petitioner questions first the constitutionality and second the legality of Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478, and asks us to restrain the implementation of those Executive Orders. We will The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed  pursuant to Section Four Hundred One of
examine these questions in that order. this Code shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised
by the President upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority.
Before doing so, however, the Court notes that the recent promulgation of Executive Order No. 507
did not render the instant Petition moot and academic. Executive Order No. 517 which is dated 30 xxx xxx xxx
April 1992 provides as follows: (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 1. Lifting of the Additional Duty. — The additional duty in the nature of ad valorem imposed on Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:
all imported articles prescribed by the provisions of Executive Order No. 443, as amended, is
hereby lifted; Provided, however, that the selected articles covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09 and Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. —
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security , and subject to the E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having nothing to do whatsoever with the protection of local industries and
limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National Economic and products for the sake of national economy, general welfare and/or national security . On the
Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: (1) to increase, contrary, they work in reverse, especially as to crude oil, an essential product which we do not
reduce or remove existing protective rates of import duty  (including any necessary change in have to protect, since we produce only minimal quantities and have to import the rest of what we
classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but in no case shall the reduced need.
rate of import duty be lower than the basic rate of ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the
increased rate of import duty be higher than a maximum of one hundred (100)  per cent ad These Executive Orders are avowedly solely to enable the government to raise government
valorem; (2) to establish import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; finances, contrary to Sections 24 and 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution, as well as to Section
and (3) to impose an additional duty on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. (Emphasis in the original)
whenever necessary; Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and The Court is not persuaded. In the first place, there is nothing in the language of either Section 104
recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of
granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code, including those subsequently granted authority. The entire contention of petitioner is anchored on just two (2) words, one found in
pursuant to this section. Section 401 (a)(1): "existing protective  rates of import duty," and the second in the proviso found at
b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA pursuant to the the end of Section 401 (a): "protection  levels granted in Section 104 of this Code . . . . " We believe
provisions of this section, except in the imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per that the words "protective" and ''protection" are simply not enough to support the very broad and
cent ad valorem, the Commission shall conduct an investigation in the course of which they shall encompassing limitation which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words.
hold public hearings wherein interested parties shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to be In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which this
present, produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear the views and Court may take judicial notice — that the Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and
recommendations of any government office, agency or instrumentality concerned. The Commission Customs Code, is one of the two (2) principal traditional generators or producers of governmental
shall submit their findings and recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30) days after the revenue, the other being the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional
termination of the public hearings. in character, that generates lower but still comparable levels of revenue for the government — The
c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within the limits fixed in Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation [PAGCOR].)
subsection "a" shall include the authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the form of duty, In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much
the corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of the duty with respect to imports from the like taxes which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory
principal competing foreign country for the most recent representative period shall be used as purposes.  Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name given to taxes on the
bases. importation  and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported
d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the Commission a copy of all customs from, or exported to, a foreign country."  The levying of customs duties on imported goods may
import entries as filed in the Bureau of Customs. The Commission or its duly authorized have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries — where such local industries
representatives shall have access to, and the right to copy all liquidated customs import entries and actually exist and are producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same
other documents appended thereto as finally filed in the Commission on Audit. customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs duties like
internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most
e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of which
section. become public funds  — have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of
economic or social activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which,
f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of this section shall take effect thirty in a particular instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the
(30) days after promulgation, except in the imposition of additional duty not exceeding ten (10)  per Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here, the
cent ad valorem which shall take effect at the discretion of the President. (Emphasis supplied) imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil
Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thrust of the delegated authorizations found in Sections 104 products may be seen to have some  "protective" impact upon indigenous oil production. For the
and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, by contending that the President is authorized to act effective, price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be
under the Tariff and Customs Code only "to protect local industries and products  for the sake of the gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are raised by the imposition of such
national economy, general welfare and/or national security."  He goes on to claim that: increased tariff rates or special duty.
In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our constitutional and
customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes
general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the
President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy,
general welfare and/or national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection of local
industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of that delegated
authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the alpha and the
omega of "the national economy, general welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely
difficult to take seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies
summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all
constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a dimension of "the
national economy, general welfare and national security" as the protection of local industries. And
so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of protecting
consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and
subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community.
It seems also important to note that tariff rates are commonly established and the corresponding
customs duties levied and collected upon articles and goods which are not found at all
and not  produced in the Philippines. The Tariff and Customs Code is replete with such articles and
commodities: among the more interesting examples are ivory (Chapter 5, 5.10); castoreum  or
musk taken from the beaver (Chapter 5, 5.14); Olives (Chapter 7, Notes); truffles  or European
fungi growing under the soil on tree roots (Chapter 7, Notes); dates  (Chapter 8,
8.01); figs  (Chapter 8, 8.03); caviar  (Chapter 16, 16.01); aircraft  (Chapter 88, 88.0l); special
diagnostic instruments and apparatus for human medicine and surgery (Chapter 90, Notes); X-ray
generators; X-ray tubes;
X-ray screens, etc.  (Chapter 90, 90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties may be seen to be
imposed either for revenue purposes purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage any
importation of the items involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and
imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any competing local industries to protect.
Accordingly, we believe and so hold that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which may be
conceded to be substantially moved by the desire to generate additional public revenues, are not,
for that reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Section 401 of the Tariff
and Customs Code. Petitioner has not successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality
and legality to which those Executive Orders are entitled. 
The conclusion we have reached above renders it unnecessary to deal with petitioner's additional
contention that, should Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 be declared unconstitutional and G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
illegal, there should be a roll back of prices of petroleum products equivalent to the "resulting
excess money not be needed to adequately maintain the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)."  KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Potenciano A. Flores for petitioner.
Robert Anthony C. Sison, Cesar B. Brillantes and Jose Z. Galsim for private respondent. On June 26, 1990; then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No.
Jose F. Miravite for movants. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to
KAPUNAN, J.: charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a
period of one (1) year. The text of the memorandum order reads in full:
Public utilities are privately owned and operated businesses whose service are essential to the
general public. They are enterprises which specially cater to the needs of the public and conduce One of the policy reforms and measures that is in line with the thrusts and the priorities set out in
to their comfort and convenience. As such, public utility services are impressed with public interest the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) 1987 — 1992) is the liberalization of
and concern. The same is true with respect to the business of common carrier which holds such a regulations in the transport sector. Along this line, the Government intends to move away gradually
peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public from regulatory policies and make progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.
regulation when private properties are affected with public interest, hence, they cease to be  juris
privati  only. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, Based on several surveys and observations, bus companies are already charging passenger rates
he, in effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to the control by the public above and below the official fare declared by LTFRB on many provincial routes. It is in this context
for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.1 that some form of liberalization on public transport fares is to be tested on a pilot basis.

An abdication of the licensing and regulatory government agencies of their functions as the instant In view thereof, the LTFRB is hereby directed to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all
petition seeks to show, is indeed lamentable. Not only is it an unsound administrative policy but it is provincial bus routes in country (except those operating within Metro Manila). Transport Operators
inimical to public trust and public interest as well. shall be allowed to charge passengers within a range of fifteen percent (15%) above and fifteen
percent (15%) below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year.
The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda,
circulars and/or orders of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Guidelines and procedures for the said scheme shall be prepared by LTFRB in coordination with
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board LTFRB) 2 which, among others, (a) the DOTC Planning Service.
authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed The implementation of the said fare range scheme shall start on 6 August 1990.
transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB and without hearing and approval
thereof by said agency in violation of Sec. 16(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, For compliance. (Emphasis ours.)
otherwise known as the Public Service Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix and determine
Finding the implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible," Remedios A.S.
just and reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus operators, and (b) establish a
Fernando submitted the following memorandum to Oscar M. Orbos on July 24, 1990, to wit:
presumption of public need in favor of applicants for certificates of public convenience (CPC) and
place on the oppositor the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service, in With reference to DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 dated 26 June 1990 which the LTFRB
patent violation not only of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same received on 19 July 1990, directing the Board "to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all
Act mandating that fares should be "just and reasonable." It is, likewise, violative of the Rules of provincial bus routes in the country (except those operating within Metro Manila)" that will allow
Court which places upon each party the burden to prove his own affirmative allegations. 3 The operators "to charge passengers within a range of fifteen percent (15%) above and fifteen percent
offending provisions contained in the questioned issuances pointed out by petitioner, have resulted (15%) below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year" the undersigned is respectfully
in the introduction into our highways and thoroughfares thousands of old and smoke-belching adverting the Secretary's attention to the following for his consideration:
buses, many of which are right-hand driven, and have exposed our consumers to the burden of
spiraling costs of public transportation without hearing and due process. 1. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act prescribes the following for the fixing and determination
of rates — (a) the rates to be approved should be proposed by public service operators; (b) there
The following memoranda, circulars and/or orders are sought to be nullified by the instant should be a publication and notice to concerned or affected parties in the territory affected; (c) a
petition, viz: (a) DOTC Memorandum Order 90-395, dated June 26, 1990 relative to the public hearing should be held for the fixing of the rates; hence, implementation of the proposed fare
implementation of a fare range scheme for provincial bus services in the country; (b) DOTC range scheme on August 6 without complying with the requirements of the Public Service Act may
Department Order No. 92-587, dated March 30, 1992, defining the policy framework on the not be legally feasible.
regulation of transport services; (c) DOTC Memorandum dated October 8, 1992, laying down rules
and procedures to implement Department Order No. 92-587; (d) LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2. To allow bus operators in the country to charge fares fifteen (15%) above the present LTFRB
92-009, providing implementing guidelines on the DOTC Department Order No. 92-587; and (e) fares in the wake of the devastation, death and suffering caused by the July 16 earthquake will not
LTFRB Order dated March 24, 1994 in Case No. 94-3112. be socially warranted and will be politically unsound; most likely public criticism against the DOTC
and the LTFRB will be triggered by the untimely motu propio implementation of the proposal by the
The relevant antecedents are as follows: mere expedient of publicizing the fare range scheme without calling a public hearing, which
scheme many as early as during the Secretary's predecessor know through newspaper reports and MINDANAO P0.395
columnists' comments to be Asian Development Bank and World Bank inspired. PREMIERE CLASS (PER KM.)
LUZON P0.395
3. More than inducing a reduction in bus fares by fifteen percent (15%) the implementation of the VISAYAS/
proposal will instead trigger an upward adjustment in bus fares by fifteen percent (15%) at a time MINDANAO P0.405
when hundreds of thousands of people in Central and Northern Luzon, particularly in Central
Pangasinan, La Union, Baguio City, Nueva Ecija, and the Cagayan Valley are suffering from the AIRCON (PER KM.) P0.415.4
devastation and havoc caused by the recent earthquake.
On March 30, 1992, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications Pete
4. In lieu of the said proposal, the DOTC with its agencies involved in public transportation can Nicomedes Prado issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the
consider measures and reforms in the industry that will be socially uplifting, especially for the regulation of transport services. The full text of the said order is reproduced below in view of the
people in the areas devastated by the recent earthquake. importance of the provisions contained therein:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned respectfully suggests that the WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 125 as amended, designates the Department of Transportation
implementation of the proposed fare range scheme this year be further studied and evaluated. and Communications (DOTC) as the primary policy, planning, regulating and implementing agency
on transportation;
On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines,
Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-the-board increase of eight and WHEREAS, to achieve the objective of a viable, efficient, and dependable transportation system,
a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types of provincial buses with a minimum-maximum the transportation regulatory agencies under or attached to the DOTC have to harmonize their
fare range of fifteen (15%) percent over and below the proposed basic per kilometer fare rate, with decisions and adopt a common philosophy and direction;
the said minimum-maximum fare range applying only to ordinary, first class and premium class
buses and a fifty-centavo (P0.50) minimum per kilometer fare for aircon buses, was sought. WHEREAS, the government proposes to build on the successful liberalization measures pursued
over the last five years and bring the transport sector nearer to a balanced longer term regulatory
On December 6, 1990, private respondent PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across- framework;
the-board increase of six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses. The
decrease was due to the drop in the expected price of diesel. NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers granted by laws to the DOTC, the following policies
and principles in the economic regulation of land, air, and water transportation services are hereby
The application was opposed by the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista adopted:
alleging that the proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the application
contained no allegation on the rate of return of the proposed increase in rates. 1. Entry into and exit out of the industry. Following the Constitutional dictum against monopoly, no
franchise holder shall be permitted to maintain a monopoly on any route. A minimum of two
On December 14, 1990, public respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate franchise holders shall be permitted to operate on any route.
increase in accordance with the following schedule of fares on a straight computation method, viz:
The requirements to grant a certificate to operate, or certificate of public convenience, shall be:
AUTHORIZED FARES proof of Filipino citizenship, financial capability, public need, and sufficient insurance cover to
protect the riding public.
LUZON
MIN. OF 5 KMS. SUCCEEDING KM. In determining public need, the presumption of need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the
applicant. The burden of proving that there is no need for a proposed service shall be with the
REGULAR P1.50 P0.37 oppositor(s).
STUDENT P1.15 P0.28
In the interest of providing efficient public transport services, the use of the "prior operator" and the
VISAYAS/MINDANAO "priority of filing" rules shall be discontinued. The route measured capacity test or other similar tests
REGULAR P1.60 P0.375 of demand for vehicle/vessel fleet on any route shall be used only as a guide in weighing the merits
STUDENT P1.20 P0.285 of each franchise application and not as a limit to the services offered.
FIRST CLASS (PER KM.) Where there are limitations in facilities, such as congested road space in urban areas, or at airports
LUZON P0.385 and ports, the use of demand management measures in conformity with market principles may be
VISAYAS/ considered.
The right of an operator to leave the industry is recognized as a business decision, subject only to On February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the
the filing of appropriate notice and following a phase-out period, to inform the public and to guidelines for the implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587. The Circular provides,
minimize disruption of services. among others, the following challenged portions:
2. Rate and Fare Setting. Freight rates shall be freed gradually from government xxx xxx xxx
controls. Passenger fares shall also be deregulated, except for the lowest class of passenger
service (normally third class passenger transport) for which the government will fix indicative or IV. Policy Guidelines on the Issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience.
reference fares. Operators of particular services may fix their own fares within a range 15% above The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The
and below the indicative or reference rate. presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while burden of
Where there is lack of effective competition for services, or on specific routes, or for the transport of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor'(s).
particular commodities, maximum mandatory freight rates or passenger fares shall be set xxx xxx xxx
temporarily by the government pending actions to increase the level of competition.
V. Rate and Fare Setting
For unserved or single operator routes, the government shall contract such services in the most
advantageous terms to the public and the government, following public bids for the services. The The control in pricing shall be liberalized to introduce price competition complementary with the
advisability of bidding out the services or using other kinds of incentives on such routes shall be quality of service, subject to prior notice and public hearing. Fares shall not be provisionally
studied by the government. authorized without public hearing.

3. Special Incentives and Financing for Fleet Acquisition. As a matter of policy, the government A. On the General Structure of Rates
shall not engage in special financing and incentive programs, including direct subsidies for fleet
1. The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and
acquisition and expansion. Only when the market situation warrants government intervention shall
jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced
programs of this type be considered. Existing programs shall be phased out gradually.
by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range.
The Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the
2. Fare systems for aircon buses are liberalized to cover first class and premier services.
Maritime Industry Authority are hereby directed to submit to the Office of the Secretary, within forty-
five (45) days of this Order, the detailed rules and procedures for the Implementation of the policies xxx xxx xxx
herein set forth. In the formulation of such rules, the concerned agencies shall be guided by the
most recent studies on the subjects, such as the Provincial Road Passenger Transport Study, the (Emphasis ours).
Civil Aviation Master Plan, the Presidential Task Force on the Inter-island Shipping Industry, and Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of
the Inter-island Liner Shipping Rate Rationalization Study. the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed
For the compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis ours) fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Said increased fares were
On October 8, 1992, public respondent Secretary of the Department of Transportation and to be made effective on March 16, 1994.
Communications Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued a memorandum to the Acting Chairman of the LTFRB
suggesting swift action on the adoption of rules and procedures to implement above-quoted On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward
Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down deregulation and other liberalization policies for the adjustment of bus fares.
transport sector. Attached to the said memorandum was a revised draft of the required rules and On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of
procedures covering (i) Entry Into and Exit Out of the Industry and (ii) Rate and Fare Setting, with merit. The dispositive portion reads:
comments and suggestions from the World Bank incorporated therein. Likewise, resplendent from
the said memorandum is the statement of the DOTC Secretary that the adoption of the rules and PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Board after considering the arguments of the parties, hereby
procedures is a pre-requisite to the approval of the Economic Integration Loan from the World DISMISSES FOR LACK OF MERIT the petition filed in the above-entitled case. This petition in this
Bank.5 case was resolved with dispatch at the request of petitioner to enable it to immediately avail of the
legal remedies or options it is entitled under existing laws.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and
restraining order. to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf.8
The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining, prohibiting and In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and
preventing respondents from implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars
orders and memorandum circulars. This meant that provincial bus fares were rolled back to the and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be
levels duly authorized by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A moratorium was likewise enforced violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU
on the issuance of franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs. members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the
burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of
Petitioner KMU anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the authority given by respondent commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected
LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later nor ignored.
increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing
authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to
illegal. Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a brush aside this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in
proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity, is illegal for being violative of view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without
the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its
discretion and waived the requirement of proper party. In the recent case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al.
In its Comment, private respondent PBOAP, while not actually touching upon the issues raised by v. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al.,9 we ruled in the same lines and enumerated some of the cases
the petitioner, questions the wisdom and the manner by which the instant petition was filed. It where the same policy was adopted, viz:
asserts that the petitioner has no legal standing to sue or has no real interest in the case at bench
and in obtaining the reliefs prayed for. . . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of
its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark  Emergency
In their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, public respondents DOTC Secretary Powers Cases, [G.R. No. L-2044 (Araneta v. Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756 (Araneta
Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have the standing to v. Angeles); G.R. No. L-3054 (Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas); G.R. No. L-3055 (Guerrero v.
maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRB's authority to set a Commissioner of Customs); and G.R. No. L-3056 (Barredo v. Commission on Elections), 84 Phil.
fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in applications for certificates of 368 (1949)], this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to
public convenience. the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if
We find the instant petition impressed with merit. we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2621)." Insofar as taxpayers'
suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not
At the outset, the threshold issue of locus standi  must be struck. Petitioner KMU has the standing it should be entertained," (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 [1972]) or that it "enjoys an open
to sue. discretion to entertain the same or not." [Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976)].
The requirement of locus standi inheres from the definition of judicial power. Section 1 of Article xxx xxx xxx
VIII of the Constitution provides:
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on  locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
xxx xxx xxx Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to
initiate and prosecute actions before this court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws,
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. Among such
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
cases were those assailing the constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836 insofar as it allows retirement
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives and to
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
elective officials of both Houses of Congress (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez,
In Lamb v. Phipps,7 we ruled that judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending 15 SCRA 479 [1965]); (b) Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25
between parties who have the right to sue in the courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision July 1987, which allowed members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries
is the principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest to hold other government offices or positions (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194
is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. The rule therefore requires SCRA 317 [1991]); (c) the automatic appropriation for debt service in the General Appropriations
that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can Act (Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 [1991]; (d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of
desynchronized elections (Osmeña v. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 750 [1991]); (e) P.D. Sec. 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. — The Commission shall have
No. 1869 (the charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation) on the ground that it power, upon proper notice and hearing  in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act,
is contrary to morals, public policy, and order (Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
197 SCRA 52 [1991]); and (f) R.A. No. 6975, establishing the Philippine National Police. (Carpio v.
Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 [1992]). xxx xxx xxx

Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy regarding locus standi  include those attacking (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls, charges, classifications, or schedules thereof,
the validity or legality of (a) an order allowing the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed,
imposed by R.A. No. 3452 (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its
377 [1965]; (b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the Constitution discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any
and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice
referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976 (Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, supra); (c) the to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service
bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business,
(Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 [1990]); (d) the approval without hearing by the Board of the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such
Investments of the amended application of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the operator for the purpose of fixing the rates. (Emphasis ours).
site of its plant from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift of feedstock xxx xxx xxx
from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (Garcia v. Board of Investments, 177
SCRA 374 [1989]; Garcia v. Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288 [1990]); (e) the decisions, Under the foregoing provision, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission
orders, rulings, and resolutions of the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body
Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987.
the National Power Corporation from indirect tax and duties (Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and
[1991]); (f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the
that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow the operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles."
petitioner substantial cross-examination; (Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board, 199 SCRA 454
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to
[1991]); (g) Executive Order No. 478 which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported oil
the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does
products (Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 [1992]); (h) resolutions of the Commission
the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become
on Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of
necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-
Sanggunians (De Guia vs. Commission on Elections, 208 SCRA 420 [1992]); and (i) memorandum
making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of
orders issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of Police of Pasay City (Pasay Law and Conscience
subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB,
Union, Inc. v. Cuneta, 101 SCRA 662 [1980]).
may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature
In the 1975 case of Aquino v. Commission on Elections  (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), this Court, despite may neither have time or competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid
its unequivocal ruling that the petitioners therein had no personality to file the petition, resolved provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that
nevertheless to pass upon the issues raised because of the far-reaching implications of the power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.
petition. We did no less in De Guia v. COMELEC (Supra) where, although we declared that De
In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare
Guia "does not appear to have locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest,"
range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an
we brushed aside the procedural infirmity "considering the importance of the issue involved,
undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been
concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and
delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent."
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
Now on the merits of the case. instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. 10 A further
delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust
On the fare range scheme. reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. 11 The policy of allowing the provincial
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, reads: bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation
but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport
operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it
pleases them or whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so. In  Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine the fare to be collected shall amount to P0.56 (that is, P0.47 authorized LTFRB rate plus 20% of
Railway Co.,12 where respondent Philippine Railway Co. was granted by the Public Service P0.47 which is P0.29). In effect, commuters will be continuously subjected, not only to a double
Commission the authority to change its freight rates at will, this Court categorically declared that: fare adjustment but to a compounding fare as well. On their part, transport operators shall enjoy a
bigger chunk of the pie. Aside from fare increase applied for, they can still collect an additional
In our opinion, the Public Service Commission was not authorized by law to delegate to the amount by virtue of the authorized fare range. Mathematically, the situation translates into the
Philippine Railway Co. the power of altering its freight rates whenever it should find it necessary to following:
do so in order to meet the competition of road trucks and autobuses, or to change its freight rates
at will, or to regard its present rates as maximum rates, and to fix lower rates whenever in the Year** LTFRB authorized Fare Range Fare to be
opinion of the Philippine Railway Co. it would be to its advantage to do so. rate*** collected per
kilometer
The mere recital of the language of the application of the Philippine Railway Co. is enough to show
that it is untenable. The Legislature has delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of 1990 P0.37 15% (P0.05) P0.42
fixing the rates of public services, but it has not authorized the Public Service Commission to 1994 P0.42 + 0.05 = 0.47 20% (P0.09) P0.56
delegate that power to a common carrier or other public service . The rates of public services like 1998 P0.56 + 0.05 = 0.61 20% (P0.12) P0.73
the Philippine Railway Co. have been approved or fixed by the Public Service Commission, and 2002 P0.73 + 0.05 = 0.78 20% (P0.16) P0.94
any change in such rates must be authorized or approved by the Public Service Commission after
they have been shown to be just and reasonable. The public service may, of course, propose new Moreover, rate making or rate fixing is not an easy task. It is a delicate and sensitive government
rates, as the Philippine Railway Co. did in case No. 31827, but it cannot lawfully make said new function that requires dexterity of judgment and sound discretion with the settled goal of arriving at
rates effective without the approval of the Public Service Commission, and the Public Service a just and reasonable rate acceptable to both the public utility and the public. Several factors, in
Commission itself cannot authorize a public service to enforce new rates without the prior approval fact, have to be taken into consideration before a balance could be achieved. A rate should not be
of said rates by the commission. The commission must approve new rates when they are confiscatory as would place an operator in a situation where he will continue to operate at a loss.
submitted to it, if the evidence shows them to be just and reasonable, otherwise it must disapprove Hence, the rate should enable public utilities to generate revenues sufficient to cover operational
them. Clearly, the commission cannot determine in advance whether or not the new rates of the costs and provide reasonable return on the investments. On the other hand, a rate which is too
Philippine Railway Co. will be just and reasonable, because it does not know what those rates will high becomes discriminatory. It is contrary to public interest. A rate, therefore, must be reasonable
be. and fair and must be affordable to the end user who will utilize the services.

In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in effect asked for permission to change its freight Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing and its far-reaching effects on
rates at will. It may change them every day or every hour, whenever it deems it necessary to do so millions of commuters, government must not relinquish this important function in favor of those who
in order to meet competition or whenever in its opinion it would be to its advantage. Such a would benefit and profit from the industry. Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be done
procedure would create a most unsatisfactory state of affairs and largely defeat the purposes of the away with. The people, represented by reputable oppositors, deserve to be given full opportunity to
public service law.13 (Emphasis ours). be heard in their opposition to any fare increase.

One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. If transport The present administrative procedure, 14 to our mind, already mirrors an orderly and satisfactory
operators will be authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent to 20% over and arrangement for all parties involved. To do away with such a procedure and allow just one party, an
above the authorized fare over a period of time, this will unduly prejudice a commuter who will be interested party at that, to determine what the rate should be, will undermine the right of the other
made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner similar to those of compounded bank parties to due process. The purpose of a hearing is precisely to determine what a just and
interest rates. reasonable rate is.15 Discarding such procedural and constitutional right is certainly inimical to our
fundamental law and to public interest.
Picture this situation. On December 14, 1990, the LTFRB authorized provincial bus operators to
collect a thirty-seven (P0.37) centavo per kilometer fare for ordinary buses. At the same time, they On the presumption of public need.
were allowed to impose and collect a fare range of plus or minus 15% over the authorized rate. A certificate of public convenience (CPC) is an authorization granted by the LTFRB for the
Thus P0.37 centavo per kilometer authorized fare plus P0.05 centavos (which is 15% of P0.37 operation of land transportation services for public use as required by law. Pursuant to Section
centavos) is equivalent to P0.42 centavos, the allowed rate in 1990. Supposing the LTFRB grants 16(a) of the Public Service Act, as amended, the following requirements must be met before a CPC
another five (P0.05) centavo increase per kilometer in 1994, then, the base or reference for may be granted, to wit: (i) the applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines, or a corporation or co-
computation would have to be P0.47 centavos (which is P0.42 + P0.05 centavos). If bus operators partnership, association or joint-stock company constituted and organized under the laws of the
will exercise their authority to impose an additional 20% over and above the authorized fare, then Philippines, at least 60 per centum  of its stock or paid-up capital must belong entirely to citizens of
the Philippines; (ii) the applicant must be financially capable of undertaking the proposed service be countenanced as only this Court is mandated by law to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
and meeting the responsibilities incident to its operation; and (iii) the applicant must prove that the practice and procedure. 19
operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the
public interest in a proper and suitable manner. It is understood that there must be proper notice Deregulation, while it may be ideal in certain situations, may not be ideal at all in our country given
and hearing before the PSC can exercise its power to issue a CPC. the present circumstances. Advocacy of liberalized franchising and regulatory process is
tantamount to an abdication by the government of its inherent right to exercise police power, that
While adopting in toto the foregoing requisites for the issuance of a CPC, LTFRB Memorandum is, the right of government to regulate public utilities for protection of the public and the utilities
Circular No. 92-009, Part IV, provides for yet incongruous and contradictory policy guideline on the themselves.
issuance of a CPC. The guidelines states:
While we recognize the authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB to issue administrative orders to
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The regulate the transport sector, we find that they committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while the DOTC Department Order
burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services and LTFRB
oppositor's. (Emphasis ours). Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department
Order No. 92-587, the said administrative issuances being amendatory and violative of the Public
The above-quoted provision is entirely incompatible and inconsistent with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Service Act and the Rules of Court. Consequently, we rule that the twenty (20%)  per centum fare
Public Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a petition and a
proper notice and hearing that the operation of the public service proposed will promote public public hearing is null and void and of no force and effect. No grave abuse of discretion however
interest in a proper and suitable manner. On the contrary, the policy guideline states that the was committed in the issuance of DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 and DOTC Memorandum
presumption of public need for a public service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. In case of dated October 8, 1992, the same being merely internal communications between administrative
conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail. officers.
By its terms, public convenience or necessity generally means something fitting or suited to the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the
public need.16 As one of the basic requirements for the grant of a CPC, public convenience and challenged administrative issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587,
necessity exists when the proposed facility or service meets a reasonable want of the public and LTFRB Memorandum Circular
supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately supply. The existence or non- No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby
existence of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein (a) delegating to
established by evidence, real and/or testimonial; empirical data; statistics and such other means provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed
necessary, in a public hearing conducted for that purpose. The object and purpose of such transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the
procedure, among other things, is to look out for, and protect, the interests of both the public and applicant for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no
the existing transport operators. need for the proposed service to the oppositor.
Verily, the power of a regulatory body to issue a CPC is founded on the condition that after full- The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar
dress hearing and investigation, it shall find, as a fact, that the proposed operation is for the as it enjoined the bus fare rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned
convenience of the public.17 Basic convenience is the primary consideration for which a CPC is administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders declared invalid.
issued, and that fact alone must be consistently borne in mind. Also, existing operators in subject
routes must be given an opportunity to offer proof and oppose the application. Therefore, an No pronouncement as to costs.
applicant must, at all times, be required to prove his capacity and capability to furnish the service
which he has undertaken to SO ORDERED.
render. 18 And all this will be possible only if a public hearing were conducted for that purpose.
Otherwise stated, the establishment of public need in favor of an applicant reverses well-settled
and institutionalized judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative procedures. It allows the party who
initiates the proceedings to prove, by mere application, his affirmative allegations. Moreover, the
offending provisions of the LTFRB memorandum circular in question would in effect amend the
Rules of Court by adding another disputable presumption in the enumeration of 37 presumptions
under Rule 131, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Such usurpation of this Court's authority cannot
 Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of lasciviousness against Mayor
Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe. 5
G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995
In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994, Deputy
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner, Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to any action taken on the previous referral of the case, more
vs. specifically the directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.6
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA,
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, and HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J. Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show
LIWAG, respondents. cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful
directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. 7
MENDOZA, J.:
For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor
This case requires us to determine the extent to which the Ombudsman may call upon government were given until August 3, 1994 within which to submit their answer. 8 An answer 9 was timely filed
prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his by them and hearings were thereupon conducted.
office and the conditions under which he may do so.
It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two prosecutors with
Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One
the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the was an administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil
Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of Service Law) 10 and another one was a criminal complaint for violation of §3(e) of Republic Act No.
duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code. 11 The complaints were based on the alleged refusal
Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with
Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed under preventive suspension. This is a petition attempted rape.
for certiorari  and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with
respect to the two proceedings. In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
Mojica issued an order on August 15, 1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial
The background of this case is as follows: Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6)
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a months, 12 pursuant to Rule III, §9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of (Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to §24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by
authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. 1 The Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting Secretary
cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas where they were docketed as OMB- of Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of Region VII as Acting Provincial
VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively. Prosecutor of Cebu.

The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders 13 in the two
no prima facie  evidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After cases, directing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and
reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the controverting evidence.
recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for certiorari  and
Regional Trial Court.2 prohibition to set aside the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of
Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Justice:
Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the "filing (a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and related
of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, . . ." 3 The case was orders, referring to the Office of the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-
eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa. 0140, entitled Jessica V. Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, "for filing of the appropriate action
It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that (for Attempted Rape) with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.
only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. 4 With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor (b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and related orders directing petitioner
and Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in writing within three (3) days from
receipt why they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
refusing and failing . . . to file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against Mayor inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime
Rogelio Ilustrisimo. committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are
related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that
(c) The 1st Indorsement  dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J. Liwag, the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed
ordering the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in prosecute.
recognition of the authority of said Office.
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance.
(d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by Ombudsman §31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
Conrado Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs.
Oliveros Kintanar and Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his
under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay. office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service
to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain
(e) The 1st Indorsement  dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag directing cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to implement the letter supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
dated August 15, 1994 of Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the Order dated August 15, 1994,
placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension. It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman
Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape
(f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994, designating against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo.
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the
Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not necessarily in the order they are preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial
stated in the petition. Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been
I. given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to
be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because
The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on under §31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the
the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the
Mayor Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa claims that the Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner
have concurrent authority to investigate public officers or employees and that when the former first cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the
took cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then Ombudsman.
became the duty of the Ombudsman's office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary
investigation by filing the information in court instead of asking the Office of the Provincial II.
Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation and filing of the information were part The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an
and parcel of the preliminary investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the filing information for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the
of information in court could not be delegated by it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. complaint in the case she found that he had committed only acts of lasciviousness.
Petitioner defends her actuations in conducting a preliminary investigation as having been made
necessary by the insistence of the Ombudsman to delegate the filing of the case to her office. §15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for
contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same
In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial
against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an
office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders herself says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an
and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal. information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate
and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, It is true that, under §24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive suspension of a public
disobedience or resistance of a lawful process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making official, the evidence against him should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is
her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 of the Rules of Court is for respondents to present:
determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it is important only to note the existence of the
contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful orders. (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
III.
(b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be
found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension. The pertinent As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 18 however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the
provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state: determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary
§21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case:
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, The import of the Nera  decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which
be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the
§22. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any officer or administrative complaint. . . . 19
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension of
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar on the following grounds:
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein cases and the records
against him. pertaining thereto against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner]
clearly leads to the conclusion that the evidence on record of guilt is strong and the charges
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the involved offenses of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and dishonesty which will warrant
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] removal from the service.
the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the Moreover, considering the unabashed attitude of respondents in openly announcing various false
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of pretexts and alibis to justify their stubborn disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman as
suspension herein provided. their official position in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in print and broadcast
A. media, the probability is strong that public service more particularly in the prosecution of cases
referred by the Office of the Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's office will be
Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her disrupted and prejudiced and the records of said cases even be tampered with if respondents
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial
because, at any rate, the evidence against them is not strong as required by §24. The contention is Prosecutor's Office during the pendency of these proceedings.
without merit. Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but
only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia: 17 Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the
preventive suspension of petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative administrative complaint against them were done in the course of their official transaction with the
complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of Office of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial
dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in
step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy
the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the matters alleged in determine whether the evidence
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the purpose of placing them under
pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his innocence. (Emphasis added). preventive suspension.
Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of
against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper Preventive Suspension is DENIED.
prosecution of that case may not be hampered.20 In addition, because the charges against the two
prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if SO ORDERED.
proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
preventive suspension. Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.
B. Romero, J., is on leave.
Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and contends that it  
should only be for ninety (90) days on the basis of cases decided by this Court. Petitioner is in
error. She is referring to cases where the law is either silent or expressly limits the period of Separate Opinions
suspension to ninety (90) days. With respect to the first situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga
v. Sandiganbayan 21 that —
REGALADO, J., concurring:
To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of
Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that I concur and welcome this opportunity to make some observations on the matter of the power of
this Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioner for six (6) months without pay, and which
laws, as follows: petitioner assails in the case at bar.
1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a It would, of course, be a handy expedient to just refer petitioner to the provisions of Section 24 of
maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public officers, Republic Act No. 6770 which expressly grants that authority to respondent Ombudsman.
(as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act. Conveniently, we would merely need to remind petitioner that for this Court to limit such authority to
suspend to a lesser period would, in effect, be constitutive of judicial legislation. But I will go a little
2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or
further by essaying the rationale for such conferment of a more extended authority to the
employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4
Ombudsman on the issue of preventive suspension, vis-a-vis the provisions on preventive
of said Pres. Decree 807, and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from
suspension in other enactments, and thereby dispel lingering doubts or misgivings thereon.
issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall both be counted in It is true that the Civil Service Decree allows a maximum preventive suspension of only ninety (90)
computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a days. 1 However, a comparison of the grounds therefor2 with those provided for in the Ombudsman
presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the Act 3 will readily show that there is in the latter the added requirement that the evidence of guilt is
circumstances of the case may warrant. strong and the additional ground that "the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
case filed against him." Further, in the aforecited Section 41 of the Civil Service Decree, preventive
On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive
suspension may be imposed on the mere simple showing that the charge involves dishonesty,
suspension pursuant to §24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive
oppression or grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not
believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service:
more than six months, without pay." Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is
whereas in Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, it is required that such charges must be
thus according to law.
supported by strong evidence of guilt in order to justify preventive suspension.
C.
On the other hand, the still shorter period of sixty (60) days prescribed in the Local Government
Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved before any Code of 1991 4 as the maximum period for the preventive suspension of local elective officials is
action in the administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt case involves a justifiable and deemed sufficient not only because the respondent involved is elected by the
prejudicial question. There is simply no basis for this contention. The two cases arose out of the people, but more precisely because such preventive suspension may only be ordered "after the
same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before the other. issues are joined." That means that before the order of suspension is issued, all the preliminary
Whatever order is followed will not really matter. requirements and exchanges had been completed and the respondent had already filed his
counter-affidavits to the affidavits of the complainant and the latter's witnesses. At that stage, the
case is ready for resolution if the parties would not opt for a formal hearing.
The preparatory procedures before such stage is reached undoubtedly necessitate and consume a On the foregoing considerations, which are much a matter of judicial and legislative experience, it
lot of time. Yet, it will be noted that those preliminary steps are included in the case of the period of is puerile for petitioner to impugn the expanded authority of preventive suspension as now granted
preventive suspension ordered even before issues are joined, as in preventive suspension by the by law to the Ombudsman. In fact, in certain situations, the maximum allowable period may even
Ombudsman pursuant to the aforecited Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770. They conceivably prove too short to subserve the intended purpose of the law.
include the service of the subpoena  or order for the respondent to file his counter-affidavits, the
usual resort to motions for extension of time to comply with the same, the improvident recourse to
the Supreme Court to suspend, annul or otherwise delay the proceedings, as well as the filing and
resolution of motions to dismiss or for a bill of particulars or for the inhibition of the investigating
officer, the denial of which motions is often also brought all over again to this Court on petitions
for certiorari.
G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997
An illustration of how the proceedings can be delayed by such procedural maneuvers is afforded
LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director
by the case of Buenaseda, et al. vs. Flavier, et al.,5 the decision in which was ultimately
(RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and
promulgated by this Court on September 21, 1993. The petitioners therein questioned through
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural
repeated resourceful submissions the order of preventive suspension issued by the Ombudsman
Resources (DENR), petitioners,
on January 7, 1992 and it took more than twenty (20) months before said order could eventually be
vs.
reviewed on the merits and finally sustained by the Supreme Court.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
That is not all. Even after the formal hearing is scheduled, respondents can easily resort to the 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE
same dilatory tactics usually employed by an accused in regular court trials in criminal actions. GUZMAN, respondents.
Such stratagems can obviously result in the continued occupancy by the respondent of his office
TORRES, JR., J.:
and, in the language of the law, could "prejudice the case filed against him."
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action
The longer period of six (6) months for preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 6770 was
for replevin  prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative
evidently induced by a desire to more meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of the
forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section
Office of the Ombudsman over public officials and employees in order to serve as a deterrent
68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
against illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient conduct on their part. As the agency mandated by
the Constitution to undertake such task, it was invested with the corresponding authority to enable Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
it to perform its mission. This intention is easily deducible from the pertinent constitutional conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
provisions creating said office and from the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6770.
Significantly, it is the only body authorized to investigate even officials removable by These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.
impeachment.6 The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent
For purposes of the present case, therefore, and specifically on the issue subject of this concurring Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by
opinion, it would be advisable to recall what we said in Buenaseda, to wit: the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
The purpose of RA No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and
efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of
particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an
effectuate the purposes and objective of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit
work of the Ombudsman should be avoided. the required explanation. On June 22, 1989,1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of
DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for Department of which it was created (Cf.
Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989
Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas, Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. [2d] 213
order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July
[1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 [1934]).
12, 1989.2 Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR
pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 13 (2) when the issue
letter for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the involved is purely a legal question,14 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
Secretary."3 Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case to lack or excess of jurisdiction,15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director agency concerned,16 (5) when there is irreparable injury,17 (6) when the respondent is a department
Baggayan4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, 5 which issued a writ ordering the secretary whose acts as an alter ego  of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of
return of the truck to private respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan the latter,18 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 19 (8)
filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, 20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in
cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the land case proceedings,21 (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. 7 Their motion for reconsideration having remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.22
been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court
of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of
question.8 Hence, this present petition,9 with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for
preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,23 private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an
1993,10 the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case.
Court. The letter, reads, thus:

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court xxx xxx xxx
could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, considered as an appeal to the Secretary.24
on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case
falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review
because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an
unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus,
to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek
truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime. court's intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of
an administrative proceedings.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we
are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order. Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations
and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court,
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
cause of action.11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 25 In Felipe Ismael,
dismissal for lack of cause of action.12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary,26 which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned
not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez,27 this Court held:
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state
that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any
pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances
cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasis ours)
there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of
confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. 28 One may be representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same"
practicable than oral argument, through pleadings.29 In administrative proceedings moreover, is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be limitation is that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 30 Indeed, deprivation of due process matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the
cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for purpose projected in the statute.33 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be
reconsideration,31 as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as
opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.34 In this wise, the
which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan, observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:
In Navarro III vs. Damasco,32 we ruled that : But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to present situations
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative and realities" and in view of the "urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country," that
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative
action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is
essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most
lack of notice or hearing. revealing:

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck "WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the
because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant
used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to
Sec. 68. . . . certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
xxx xxx xxx WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest to present situations and realities;"
products  cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not
the machinery, equipments, implements and tools  illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or only "conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products
forest products are found. (Emphasis ours) by the "court" in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68 . If as private
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court
only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include "conveyances" under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no Purpose at all . Simply put, Section 68-A would
that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra.35
private respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners
law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below: themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of
Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, which was given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part, viz.:
. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the crime, a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the
we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310
case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .36 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it
eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309
We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be punished with the penalties
misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and
stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.38
commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner
thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the
the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings
of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of
pointed out: cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies
should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction
. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the
No. 277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the
products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too
cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
or fare the same is therefor liable. . .37
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.39 "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep
that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 in custody,"40 and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful
of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of
constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.41 Under the Rules of
705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that
the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus: he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. — Any defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment,
person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and
land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any the actual value of the property.42 Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a
authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code  . . . (Emphasis ours; was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required
Section 68, P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277) permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277.
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances
follows: used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of
the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. — Any
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove  timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705,
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of
310 of the Revised Penal Code  . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section 68, Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to
P.D. 705 as amended) review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes
Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said
decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution
permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch. approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however,
SO ORDERED. That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
G.R. No. L-23825      December 24, 1965 corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and
the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even
vs. create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent. since barrios  are units of municipalities?"
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner. Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new
CONCEPCION, J.: municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which is
that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and
Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the
the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has
Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil been brought to our attention.
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain
him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. orders are based, provides:

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary,
has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other
legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any
premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into
in question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name
affected by the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to
former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the
Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary
as amici curiae. of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more
subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative
officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the
recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook
officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
new districts so formed.
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an public welfare may require.
equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in
such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare
the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines. may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which
the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748, 3 which provided that,
not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare  requires, he may, by
Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, executive order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the
for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere  transfer of territory — change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." The
from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 — which was not included in Section 68 of the
existing at the time of and prior to said transfer  (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Revised Administrative Code — governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the
Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence of the fixing powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said
and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities. section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be transferred.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we
settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other
an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68
effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient
essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in
(State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the these cases — as all judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts
exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no
Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public
409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes." Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue
rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand,
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a and cancel certificates or permits for the sale  of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate 2 — and (b) for the determination of questions of fact.
fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of
of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently
law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislative question "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway
authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs.
but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the
sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any case is
and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W.
Republican system. 1033, 1035-1037).
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative
valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate powers, state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain
any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or
vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and
villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of privilege of this Court to uphold.
the village are specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or
conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative
its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress . A better
area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative
authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a functions can hardly be given.
town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to
determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in the village, The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the
and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" (In re Villages of North laws be faithfully executed.
Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public interest" and
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power
an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia
is denied  by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With
Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S.  (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the
Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which
authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed
him by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate
restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative," provided that such disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said
codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not
will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against
Federal Supreme Court held: him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.5
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of
supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio  in which the official
conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. 6 Thus, by merely brandishing the
procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control
general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of denied to him by the Constitution.
that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of
implies no more  than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the
trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code making
exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either
authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one . As a consequence, the
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the
unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive
"public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the
legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring
virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total
upon him more  power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was given authority by the
departments, bureaus or offices. Legislature (Act No. 1748) to act upon certain details with respect to said local governments, such
as fixing of boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And the Supreme Court, within the framework of
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said the Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that the execution or implementation of such details, did not entail
Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be abdication of legislative power (Government vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 34 Phil. 518;
deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently, Act No.
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7 1748's aforesaid statutory authorization was embodied in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not Code. And Chief Executives since then up to the present continued to avail of said provision, time
all the proper parties" — referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities — "have been and again invoking it to issue executive orders providing for the creation of municipalities.
impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature." From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in implementation of said executive orders.
office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed in this Court a petition
General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain the
its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local
officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their interest in the Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order. It
case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8 is argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to grant
any such power, is invalid or, at the least, already repealed, in light of the Philippine Constitution
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the and Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio Charter).
executive order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is,
however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the President Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:
has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that the same
have been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that SEC. 68. General authority of [Governor-General) President of the Philippines to fix boundaries
the expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the and make new subdivisions. — The [Governor-General] President of the Philippines may by
General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality,
would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him. comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political
division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the
the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require:
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred Provided, That the authorization of the [Philippine Legislature] Congress of the Philippines shall
to. It is so ordered. first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the [Governor-General]
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur. President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory
Zaldivar, J., took no part. under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the [Governor-General]
President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department
having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers to the
new districts so formed.
Separate Opinions
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an
BENGZON, J.P., J.,  concurring and dissenting:
equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in
A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities. Fostering their rapid such manner as may be recommended by the [Insular Auditor] Auditor General and approved by
growth has long been the aim pursued by all three branches of our Government. the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines.
From such working I believe that power to create a municipality is included: to "separate any In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken away from the Chief
political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any such Executive. Again, to fully understand the significance of this provision, one must trace its
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created." The issue, however, development and growth.
is whether the legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power.
As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his Instructions to the Second
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should be "subject to
favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create the least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government. Said
municipalities but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a supervision and control was to be confined within the "narrowest limits" or so much only as "may
municipality will result (37 Am. Jur. 628). be necessary to secure and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers." And the
national government "shall have no direct administration except of matters of purely general
The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether the concern." (See Hebron v. Reyes, L-9158, July 28, 1958.)
municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative power
and the statute is invalid (Ibid.). Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self-government,
since it says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein granted. with the end in view of later allowing them to assume complete management and control of the
Furthermore, Section 5 of the same Code states: administration of their local affairs. Such aim is the policy now embodied in Section 10 (1), Article
VII of the Constitution (Rodriguez v. Montinola, 50 O.G. 4820).
SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion —  The exercise of the permissive powers of all
executive or administrative officers and bodies is based upon discretion, and when such officer or It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President shall have no power of
body is given authority to do any act but not required to do such act, the doing of the same shall be control over local governments. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant him such power
dependent on a sound discretion to be exercised for the good of the service and benefit of the (Hebron v. Reyes, supra). And any such power formerly granted under the Jones Law thereby
public, whether so expressed in the statute giving the authority or not. became unavoidably inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution.
Under the prevailing rule in the United States — and Section 68 is of American origin — the It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to control local
provision in question would be an invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to governments. Said relationship has already been passed upon by this Court in Hebron v.
the principle of separation of powers. Reyes, supra. In said case, it was ruled that the power to control is an incident of the power to
create or abolish municipalities. Respondent's view, therefore, that creating municipalities and
It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream of history in mind. A controlling their local governments are "two worlds apart," is untenable. And since as stated, the
proper knowledge of the past is the only adequate background for the present. Section 68 was power to control local governments can no longer be conferred on or exercised by the President, it
adopted half a century ago. Political change, two world wars, the recognition of our independence follows a fortiori that the power to create them, all the more cannot be so conferred or exercised.
and rightful place in the family of nations, have since taken place. In 1917 the Philippines had for
its Organic Act the Jones Law. And under the setup ordained therein no strict separation of powers I am compelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution has
was adhered to. Consequently, Section 68 was not constitutionally objectionable at the time of its repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code as far as the latter empowers the
enactment. President to create local governments. Repeal by the Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent with
it has already been sustained in De los Santos v. MaIlare, 87 Phil. 289. And it was there held that
The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the situation. For not only was such repeal differs from a declaration of unconstitutionality of a posterior legislation, so much so
separation of powers strictly ordained, except only in specific instances therein provided, but the that only a majority vote of the Court is needed to sustain a finding of repeal.
power of the Chief Executive over local governments suffered an explicit reduction.
Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to ask whether
Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General "shall have general Republic Act 2370 likewise has provisions in conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it to
supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government in the Philippine state, at any rate, that statutory prohibition on the President from creating a barrio does not, in my
Islands." Now Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The President shall opinion, warrant the inference of statutory prohibition for creating a municipality. For although
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision municipalities consist of barrios, there is nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully municipalities out of pre-existing barrios.
executed.
It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger political units and unable
to create smaller ones. For as long ago observed in President McKinley's Instructions to the
Second Philippine Commission, greater autonomy is to be imparted to the smaller of the two
political units. The smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for the national an exercise of one's autonomy, is to change the appellation that one was given for various
government's intervention in its political affairs. Furthermore, for practical reasons, local autonomy reasons. The other is not an exercise to change the label that was given to a person; it is simply to
cannot be given from the top downwards. The national government, in such a case, could still correct the data as it was recorded in the Civil Registry.
exercise power over the supposedly autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by exercising it over the
smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the barrios. A realistic program of decentralization therefore This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 assailing the April 29, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of
calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards, so that it is not surprising for Congress to deny the Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358, which denied the Republic of the Philippines' appeal 3 from the
national government some power over barrios without denying it over municipalities. For this Regional Trial Court December 7, 2010 Order4 granting herein respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo's
reason, I disagree with the majority view that because the President could not create a barrio under (Gallo) Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth.
Republic Act 2370, a fortiori  he cannot create a municipality. To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court of
It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370, repealed Section 68 of Ilagan City, Isabela in Special Proc. No. 2155 5 for the correction of her name from "Michael" to
the Revised Administrative Code's provision giving the President authority to create local "Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 1086 of the Rules of Court.7
governments. And for this reason I agree with the ruling in the majority opinion that the executive In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"·' her mother's middle name,
orders in question are null and void. "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981,
In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic desire to be free and in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded. 8
independent under a republican form of government, and exercising a function derived from the As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official transcript of
very sovereignty that it upholds. Executive orders declared null and void. records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate. 9
The Regional Trial Court, having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form and substance, set a
hearing on August 2, 2010. It also ordered the publication of the Notice of Hearing once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Isabela.10
The Office of the Solicitor General authorized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear on
G.R. No. 207074 January 17, 2018 its behalf. 11 Trial then ensued.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner During trial, Gallo testified on her allegations. She showed that her college diploma, voter's
vs. certification, and transcript indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The doctor who
MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO, Respondent examined her also certified that she was female. 12 On cross-examination, Gallo explained that she
never undertook any gender-reassignment surgery and that she filed the petition not to evade any
DECISION civil or criminal liability, but to obtain a passport. 13
LEONEN, J.: The Regional Trial Court, in its December 7, 20 I 0 Order, granted the petition. 14 It lent credence to
Names are labels for one's identity. They facilitate social interaction, including the allocation of the documents Gallo presented and found that the corrections she sought were "harmless and
rights and determination of liabilities. It is for this reason that the State has an interest in one's innocuous."15 It concluded that there was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate of Live Birth and
name. applied Rule I 08 of the Rules of Court, 16 citing Republic v. Cagandahan. 17 Thus:

The name through which one is known is generally, however, not chosen by the individual who WHEREFORE, above premises considered, an order is hereby issued directing the Civil Registrar
bears it. Rather, it is chosen by one's parents. In this sense, the choice of one's name is not a General, NSO through the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ilagan, Isabela to correct the entries in the
product of the exercise of autonomy of the individual to whom it refers. Birth Certificate of the petitioner as well as in the National Statistics Office Authenticated copy
particularly her first name "MICHAEL" to "MICHELLE", gender from "MALE" to "FEMALE'', middle
In view of the State's interest in names as markers of one's identity, the law requires that these name of petitioner to be entered as "SORIANO", middle names of petitioner's parents to be
labels be registered. Understandably, in some cases, the names so registered or other aspects of properly supplied as "ANGANGAN" for the mother and "BALINGAO" for the father, as well as date
one's identity that pertain to one's name are not reflected with accuracy in the Certificate of Live of marriage of petitioner's parents to be recorded as "MAY 23, 1981 ", after payment of legal fees if
Birth  filed with the civil registrar. there be any.
Changes to one's name, therefore, can be the result of either one of two (2) motives. The first, as SO ORDERED.18
The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule 103 of Petitioner holds that since the applicable rule is Rule 103, Gallo was not able to comply with the
the Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name. 19 It argued that Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Section 2 of this Rule. 36 It also argues that
jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order the use of a different name is not a reasonable ground to change name under Rule 103. 37
did not state her official name, "Michael Gallo." 20 Furthermore, the published Order was also
defective for not stating the cause of the change of name.21 Finally, petitioner insists that Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction38 as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly now governs the change of first
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision, denied the Office of the Solicitor name, superseding the civil registrar's jurisdiction over the matter.39
General's appeal.22 It found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the
corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and innocuous. 23 It further clarified that Rule 108 is To support its claim, it cited Silverio v. Republic, 40 which held that "[t]he intent and effect of the law
limited to the implementation of Article 412 of the Civil Code 24 and that the proceedings which stem is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 ... and 108 ... of the Rules of
from it can "either be summary, if the correction sought is clerical, or adversary . . . if [it] affects . . . Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
civil status, citizenship or nationality ... which are deemed substantial corrections."25 denied."41

The Court of Appeals discussed that Rule 103, on the other hand, "governs the proceeding for Respondent Gallo, in her Comment, 42 counters that the issue of whether or not the petitioned
changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register."26 corrections are innocuous or clerical is a factual issue, which is improper in a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45.43 In any case, she argues that the corrections are clerical; hence, the
Jurisprudence has recognized the following grounds as sufficient to warrant a change of name, to applicable rule is Rule 108 and not Rule 103, with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding
wit: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) properly satisfied. 44 Lastly, she contends that petitioner has waived its right to invoke the doctrines
when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; ( c) when the change of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction when it failed to file a motion
will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these issues before this Court. 45
Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without Petitioner filed its Reply.46 The case was then submitted for resolution after the parties filed their
prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing respective Memoranda.47
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would The issues for this Court's resolution are:
prejudice public interest.27
First, whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that the
The Court of Appeals also stated that Republic Act No. 10172, "the present law on the matter, change sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of error;
classifies a change in the first name or nickname, or sex of a person as clerical error that may be
corrected without a judicial order."28 It applied this ruling on the inclusion of Gallo's middle name, Second, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change under Rule
her parents' middle names, and the latter's date of marriage, as they do not involve substantial 103 of the Rules of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors; and
corrections.29
Finally, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and
As the petition merely involved the correction of clerical errors, the Court of Appeals held that a observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.1âwphi1
summary proceeding would have sufficed. With this determination, the Regional Trial Court's more
This Court finds for the respondent. 1âwphi1 Hers was a Petition to correct the entry in the Civil
rigid and stringent adversarial proceeding was more than enough to satisfy the procedural
Registry.
requirements under Rule 108. 30
I
However, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, believes otherwise. For it, Gallo
wants to change the name that she was given. Thus, it filed the present Petition via Rule 45 under In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a mere correction of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Petition raises procedural errors made by the Regional Trial error, petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45 Petition, which should only
Court and the Court of Appeals in finding for Gallo.31 raise questions of law.
Citing Republic v. Mercadera,32 petitioner argues that "only clerical, spelling, typographical and Time and again, it has been held that this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, its functions do not
other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised" in petitions for correction under Rule include weighing and analyzing evidence adduced from the lower courts all over again.
108.33 Thus, the correction must only be for a patently misspelled name. 34 As "Michael" could not
have been the result of misspelling "Michelle," petitioner contends that the case should fall under In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co.48:
Rule 103 for it contemplates a substantial change. 35 The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right,
but of sound judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of
that has already been considered in the lower courts. nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.53
Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes distinguished a question of law from a question By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or
of fact: obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after
reference to and evaluation of existing documents presented.
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the
fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was
determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by ever used.
the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues
raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of This Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the Court of
fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the Appeals, that this case involves the correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact, this
conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed Court is bound by the lower courts' findings.
requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding II.A
circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual. 49 (Emphasis supplied)
In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the
In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence as entry of Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while Republic Act No.
determining whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change 9048 applies to all other corrections sought.
requires looking into the party's records, supporting documents, testimonies, and other evidence.
Under Article 407 of the Civil Code, the books in the Civil Register include "acts, events and judicial
On changes of first name, Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic Act No. 9048, is decrees concerning the civil status of persons,"54 which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
helpful in identifying the nature of the determination sought. there.55
Republic Act No. 1017250 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake, "which Entries in the register include births, marriages, deaths, legal separations, annulments of marriage,
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding." Thus: judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning, legitimations, adoptions,
Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: acknowledgments of natural children, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation, voluntary emancipation of a minor, and changes of
.... name.56
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical As stated, the governing law on changes of first name is currently Republic Act No. 10172, which
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and amended Republic Act No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on changes or
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and corrections of name were Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code.
month in the date of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record Article 376 states the need for judicial authority before any person can change his or her
or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, or name. 57 On the other hand, Article 412 provides that judicial authority is also necessary before any
status of the petitioner. 51 entry in the civil register may be changed or corrected. 58

Likewise, Republic Act No. 904852 states: Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court under Rule 103 for substantial
changes in the given name or surname provided they fall under any of the valid reasons
Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: recognized by law, or Rule 108 for corrections of clerical errors.
.... This requirement for judicial authorization was justified to prevent fraud and allow other parties,
who may be affected by the change of name, to oppose the matter, as decisions in these
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical proceedings bind the whole world.59
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an
pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect
special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions for change of controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings
name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called in the depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or
community in which he lives and is best known." When granted, a person's identity and interactions citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action
are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be
addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial permission for a change of name affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree. allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted .... " "Where such a change is
ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law
complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution." 68 (Emphasis in
all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of the original)
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction
to hear and decide it." Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the
Regional Trial Court. The trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family relations newspaper of general circulation in the province.69 After the hearing, the trial court may grant or
or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. dismiss the petition and serve a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar. 70
However, "there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by
parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby Mercadera clarified the applications of Article 376 and Rule 103, and of Article 412 and Rule 108,
acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously thus:
impressed on the public mind." Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with
mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced ... mindful of the consequent results in the grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper
event of its grant ... "60 (Citations omitted) and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by
Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his or her name altogether must the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must
file a petition under Rule 103 with the Regional Trial Court, which will then issue an order setting a be adversarial proceedings.
hearing date and directing the order's publication in a newspaper of general circulation.61 In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
After finding that there is proper and reasonable cause to change his or her name, the Regional civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes
Trial Court may grant the petition and order its entry in the civi1 register.62 "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it
to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for
On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuous clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
mistakes in his or her documents with the civil register. 63 It also governs the correction of
substantial errors in the entry of the information enumerated in Section 2 of this Rule 64 and those This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of
affecting the civil status, citizenship, and nationality of a person.65 The proceedings under this rule clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained
may either be summary, if the correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like
substantial errors. 66 citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an
adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths
As explained in Republic v. Mercadera:67 about the facts recorded therein."71 (Citations omitted)
Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above[-]stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as However, Republic Act No. 904872 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively
even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts removing clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them
established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary under the jurisdiction of the civil registrar. 73
proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to
In Silverio v. Republic:74 Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.81
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name
through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) . . .
been filed and later denied.
....
In 2012, Republic Act No. 9048 was amended by Republic Act No. 10172.82
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
In addition to the change of the first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a person may
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
now be changed without judicial proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172 clarifies that these changes
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
may now be administratively corrected where it is patently clear that there is a clerical or
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
typographical mistake in the entry. It may be changed by filing a subscribed and sworn affidavit
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
corrected or changed is kept.83
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. 75 (Citations Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
omitted) for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the
date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical
In Republic v. Cagandahan: 76
error or mistake in the entry,  which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: rules and regulations. 84 (Emphasis supplied)
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. However, Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on
August 15, 2012-more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 May 13, 2010.85 Hence, Republic Act No. 9048 governs.
in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters
can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In II.B
effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction
As to the issue of which between Rules 103 and 108 applies, it is necessary to determine the
of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
nature of the correction sought by Gallo.
civil register.77 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Petitioner maintains that Rule 103 applies as the changes were substantive while respondent
In Republic v. Sali:78
contends that it is Rule 108 which governs as the changes pertain only to corrections of clerical
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name errors.
has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly
Upon scrutiny of the records in this case, this Court rules that Gallo's
known by that first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition.  It is only when such petition is denied Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.
that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with
the proper court. 79 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) A clerical or typographical error pertains to a

Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical [M]istake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
or typographical mistakes in the civil register or changes in first names or nicknames. 80 entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous ... which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
 another person. 95
records[.] 86
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Republic, argued against Sali's
However, corrections which involve a change in nationality, age, or status are not considered
claim, alleging that the petition was for a change of name under Rule 103 and not for the correction
clerical or typographical. 87
of a simple clerical error. It averred that there must be a valid ground for the name change, and the
Jurisprudence is replete with cases determining what constitutes a clerical or typographical error in applicant's names and aliases must be stated in the title of the petition and the order setting it for
names with the civil register. hearing. It also contended that assuming Rule 108 was the proper remedy, Sali failed to exhaust
her remedies when she did not file an affidavit under Republic Act No. 9048.96
In Republic v. Mercadera, 88 Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) sought to correct her name from
"Marilyn" to "Merlyn." 89 She alleged that "she had been known as MERLYN ever since" and she In Sali, this Court held that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition was not for a change of
prayed that the trial court correct her recorded given name "Marilyn" "to conform to the one she name, but a petition for correction of errors in the recording of Sali's name and birth date. Sali had
grew up to."90 The Office of the Solicitor General argued that this change was substantial which been using the name "Lorena" since birth, and she merely sought to have her records conform to
must comply with the procedure under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.91 However, this Court ruled the name she had been using as her true name. She had no intention of changing her name
that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition merely sought to correct a misspelled given name: altogether. Thus, her prayer for the correction of her misspelled name is not contemplated by Rule
103.97
In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what
appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn'' is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly In the case at bar, petitioner, raising the same arguments as that in Sali, claims that the change
misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix-up that sought by Gallo is substantial, covered by Rule 103 because the two (2) names are allegedly
blemished Mercadera's Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the entirely different from each other. It argues that "Michael" could not have been the result of a
same. misspelling of "Michelle."98
The [Court of Appeals] did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the On the other hand, Gallo argues that the corrections are clerical which fall under Rule 108, with the
correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly complied. 99
remember. 92
Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by
Mercadera also cited similar cases in which this Court determined what constitutes harmless errors which she is commonly known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo
that need not go through the proceedings under Rule 103: is not filing the petition to change her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling
of her name.
Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercadera's case which recognize
the same a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic it was held that "to change 'Sincio' to 'Sencio' which Correcting and changing have been differentiated, thus:
merely involves the substitution of the first vowel 'i' in the first name into the vowel 'e' amounts
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change
merely to the righting of a clerical error." In LabayoRowe v. Republic, it was held that the change of
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
petitioner's name from "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo" was a mere
as a substitute. 100
innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto,  the correction involved the substitution of the Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling
letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." of her given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael," especially since the first four
In the latter case, this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was (4) letters of these two (2) names are exactly the same. The differences only pertain to an
plainly clerical, such that, "changing the name of the child from 'Midael C. Mazon' to 'Michael C. additional letter "a" in "Michael," and "le" at the end of "Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also
Mazon' cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced be vocalized similarly, considering the possibility of different accents or intonations of different
with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).93 (Citations omitted) people. In any case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a different appellation. The lower courts
have determined that she has been known as "Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely
Likewise, in Republic v. Sali,94 Lorena Omapas Sali (Sali) sought to correct her Certificate of Live
seeking to correct her records to conform to her true given name.
Birth, alleging that her first name was erroneously entered as "Dorothy" instead of "Lorena," and
her date of birth as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968." She alleged that she had been However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.
using the name "Lorena" and the birth date "April 24, 1968" ever since. She also averred that she
had always been known as "Lorena" in her community. She claimed that the petition was just to As stated, Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. 101 The current law,
correct the error and not to evade any criminal or civil liability, or to affect any succession of Republic Act No. 10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012.102
 Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048:
The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048. 103
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the correction of
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
clerical or typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also dispensed with the need for
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register, or
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
changes of first name or nickname. Thus:
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. 107
Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil register. None of it
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
involves any change in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex.
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. 104 Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" 108 fall within the coverage of
clerical mistakes not deemed substantial. If it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no
Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the Regional
proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used, the correction may be
Trial Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the
made.
Regional Trial Court take cognizance of her case. In Republic v. Sali, 105
Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them administratively before
Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but for
filing a petition under Rule 108.
correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were
committed in the recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this
allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be was a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic
set right under Rule 108. The evidence presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been Act No. 9048. 109
using the name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to change her
name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first name, and to This was affirmed in Republic v. Cagandahan: 110
set aright the same to conform to the name she grew up with. Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect . . . clerical or typographical error.

.... It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. 111 (Citation omitted)
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name
has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as
by that first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has to biological sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve a typographical or
the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a clerical error. 112
petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be
proper court . . . considered a substantive matter.
.... In Cagandahan, 113 this Court ruled that a party who seeks a change of name and biological sex in
In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the his or her Certificate of Live Birth after a gender reassignment surgery has to file a petition under
RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been Rule 108.114 In that case, it was held that the change did not involve a mere correction of an error in
administrative, i.e., filing of the petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust recording but a petition for a change of records because the sex change was initiated by the
administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name. 106 petitioner. 115

Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her parents as IV
Angangan for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents' marriage as May Considering that Gallo did not first file an administrative case in the civil register before proceeding
23, 1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in Republic Act No. 9048. to the courts, petitioner contends that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies and
observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9048.116 True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of
On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioner has waived its right to invoke these doctrines the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the
because it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these facts and circumstances of the present case - which shall forthwith be set forth - We are of the
issues before this Court. 117 opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the
This Court rules in favor of Gallo. purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation . . .

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all ....
administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
officer concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her reasons. Thus we speak of estoppels in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these by laches.
remedies refer to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in
court. 118 Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the court's jurisdiction.119 Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno: 120 the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is
effect of noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it. 121 (Citation omitted)
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
Meanwhile, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
has jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its same jurisdiction ... In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the
proper jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its sound discretion requiring question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties
special knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.122 was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
In Republic v. Lacap: 123 judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice cannot be tolerated- obviously for reasons of public policy.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative court ... And in Littleton vs. Burgess, ... the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief,
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 124 (Citation omitted) to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. 127 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to take
cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue of non-compliance was raised
it cannot be waived. only as an afterthought at the final stage of appeal, the party invoking it may be estopped from
doing so.
However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that
failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
an opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not
of laches.125 inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the
part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy:126 illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; ( d) where the amount involved is relatively small so Performance and Damages filed by Carlito Lacap (respondent) against the Republic of the
as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; ( e) where the question involved is purely legal and Philippines (petitioner).
will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts The factual background of the case is as follows:
violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid" dated January
rendered moot; G) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong 27, 1992. Respondent, doing business under the name and style Carwin Construction and
public interest is involved; and, (1) in quo warranto proceedings . . 128 (Emphasis supplied, citations Construction Supply (Carwin Construction), was pre-qualified together with two other contractors.
omitted) Since respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded the contract for the concreting
Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2) doctrines was only of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.3 On November 4, 1992, a Contract Agreement was executed by respondent
raised in this Court. Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions before the Regional Trial Court, it is and petitioner.4 On September 25, 1992, District Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to
estopped from invoking these doctrines as grounds for dismissal. Proceed with the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.5 Accordingly, respondent undertook the works,
made advances for the purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs.6
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The April 29, 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358 is AFFIRMED. The Petition for Correction of Entry in On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga
the Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo is GRANTED. This Court directs that the conducted a final inspection of the project and found it 100% completed in accordance with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo be corrected as follows: approved plans and specifications. Accordingly, the Office of the District Engineer issued
Certificates of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance.7
1) Correct her first name from "Michael" to "Michelle";
Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.8 The DPWH prepared
2) Correct her biological sex from "Male" to "Female"; the Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner.9 However, the DPWH withheld payment from
respondent after the District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final
3) Enter her middle name as "Soriano"; release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time
4) Enter the middle name of her mother as "Angangan"; of the execution of the contract. The District Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal
Department on whether the contracts of Carwin Construction for various Mount Pinatubo
5) Enter the middle name of her father as "Balingao"; and rehabilitation projects were valid and effective although its contractor’s license had already expired
when the projects were contracted.10
6) Enter the date of her parents' marriage as "May 23, 1981."
In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal
SO ORDERED.
Department opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the
Contractor’s License Law, does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has
expired is void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the
G.R. No. 158253             March 2, 2007 contract is enforceable and payment may be paid, without prejudice to any appropriate
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND administrative liability action that may be imposed on the contractor and the government officials or
HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, Petitioner, employees concerned.11
vs. In a Letter dated July 4, 1994, the District Engineer requested clarification from the DPWH Legal
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the name and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND Department on whether Carwin Construction should be paid for works accomplished despite an
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, Respondent. expired contractor’s license at the time the contracts were executed.12
DECISION In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: recommended that payment should be made to Carwin Construction, reiterating his earlier legal
opinion.13 Despite such recommendation for payment, no payment was made to respondent.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 dated April 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages
which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, San against petitioner before the RTC.14
Fernando, Pampanga (RTC) in Civil Case No. 10538, granting the complaint for Specific
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a (a) RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to (b) IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH HAS THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO
the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.15 RESOLVE RESPONDENT’S MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.25

Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,16 the RTC issued an Petitioner contends that respondent’s recourse to judicial action was premature since the proper
Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. 17 The OSG filed a Motion for remedy was to appeal the District Auditor’s disapproval of payment to the COA, pursuant to
Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.19 Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), otherwise known as the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines; that the COA has primary jurisdiction to resolve respondent’s
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of money claim against the government under Section 2(1),26 Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and
administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State.20 Section 2627 of P.D. No. 1445; that non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of cause of action.
Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows: Respondent, on the other hand, in his Memorandum28 limited his discussion to Civil Code
provisions relating to human relations. He submits that equity demands that he be paid for the work
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of performed; otherwise, the mandate of the Civil Code provisions relating to human relations would
the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter, thru its District Engineer at Sindalan, San be rendered nugatory if the State itself is allowed to ignore and circumvent the standard of
Fernando, Pampanga, to pay the following: behavior it sets for its inhabitants.
a) ₱457,000.00 – representing the contract for the concreting project of Sitio 5 road, Bahay Pare, The present petition is bereft of merit.
Candaba, Pampanga plus interest at 12% from demand until fully paid; and
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of
b) The costs of suit. all the means afforded him by administrative processes. 29 The issues which administrative
SO ORDERED.21 agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a
court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after
The RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the due deliberation.30
completed project and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold otherwise would be to overrun the long
standing and consistent pronouncement against enriching oneself at the expense of another.22 Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. 23 On April 28, 2003, the CA rendered its within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
Decision sustaining the Decision of the RTC. It held that since the case involves the application of administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
the principle of estoppel against the government which is a purely legal question, then the principle discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply; that by its actions the government is determine technical and intricate matters of fact.31
estopped from questioning the validity and binding effect of the Contract Agreement with the
respondent; that denial of payment to respondent on purely technical grounds after successful Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
completion of the project is not countenanced either by justice or equity. primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not
inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the
The CA rendered herein the assailed Decision dated April 28, 2003, the dispositive portion of which part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
reads: illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the
as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and
interest shall be six percent (6%) per annum computed from June 21, 1995.
will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;32 (f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
SO ORDERED.24 (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
Hence, the present petition on the following ground: rendered moot;33 (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.34 Exceptions (c) and (e) are
ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT: applicable to the present case.
Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
payment to a contractor with an expired contractor’s license is proper, respondent remained unpaid legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to
for the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable delay and have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. 41 Verba legis non est
official inaction to the great prejudice of respondent. recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.42
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of its The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void
contract is entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It does not contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine
and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.35 Said question at best could be resolved prescribed under the law.
only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with
them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode
nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. 36 The issue does not require technical debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury) states:
knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law. Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor of the COA disapproved respondent’s claim or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
against the Government, and, under Section 4837 of P.D. No. 1445, the administrative remedy shall return the same to him.
available to respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim by the District Auditor to the COA This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which
itself, the Court holds that, in view of exceptions (c) and (e) narrated above, the complaint for were formulated as "basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
specific performance and damages was not prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC beings and for the stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain norms that spring
to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As the Court aptly stated in from the fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct [that] should run as golden
Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu (Branch VIII):38 threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and
The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their breath and wait until the Commission on Audit and dominance of justice."43 The rules thereon apply equally well to the Government. 44 Since
the Ministry of Public Highways had acted on the claims for compensation for the lands respondent had rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then the
appropriated by the government. The road had been completed; the Pope had come and gone; but former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no
the plaintiffs had yet to be paid for the properties taken from them. Given this official indifference, cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of
which apparently would continue indefinitely, the private respondents had to act to assert and respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.
protect their interests.39 WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court
On the question of whether a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed of Appeals dated April 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
projects, Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides: costs.

SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts SO ORDERED.
to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or vs.
license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. (Emphasis VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
supplied) CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without ESCOLIN, J.:
interpretation.40 This rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively which we quote:
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
administrative orders. office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, wrongful acts of the defendant.
733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829- Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
1840, 1842-1847. right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241- The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted
312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149- public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights
1178,1180-1278. are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is
one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty,
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65. the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630- being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986- special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857. general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without
107, 120, 122, 123. keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason
for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439. to error'
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
represent the people in cases of this character. taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
case. Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ... whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of
laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows: Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ... of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with   
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact Separate Opinions
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be   FERNANDO, C.J.,  concurring (with qualification):
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
binding force and effect.
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be I shall explain why.
justified.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban  9 sustained the right of a made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
declared unconstitutional by this Court. be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of binding force or effectivity.
these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy,
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
shall take effect immediately.
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
shall have no binding force and effect.
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
SO ORDERED. "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
Relova, J., concurs. unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is
Aquino, J., took no part. the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose
of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack
of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of
still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance
of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect
There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional otherwise provided, " i.e.  a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
application. That is as far as it goes. perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To
am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and
Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before  the completion of 15 days following its publication
A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
different rule.  
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.,  concurring:
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would
be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a
a pronouncement. date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15)
days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
separate opinion. retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.  
  PLANA, J.,  concurring (with qualification):
TEEHANKEE, J.,  concurring: The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette  required by any statute as a
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are prerequisite for their effectivity, if  said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided  " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity,  laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also
enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in
the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are
equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such
as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that
has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
 
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J.,  concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
 
DE LA FUENTE, J.,  concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature
or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.