Licenciado para - MARIANA SANTIAGO FERRAZ CHRISTIANO DE CARVALHO - 09904160708 - Protegido por Eduzz.

com

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

ScienceDirect

The subjective experience of emotion: a fearful view

Joseph E LeDoux1 and Stefan G Hofmann2

We argue that subjective emotional experience, the feeling, is discussions, the noun ‘emotion,’ or its adjectival form
the essence of an emotion, and that objective manifestations in ‘emotional,’ are variably used to refer to subjective
behavior and in body or brain physiology are, at best, indirect experiences, behavioral movements, physiological re-
indicators of these inner experiences. As a result, the most sponses, and/or cognitions that contribute to any of the
direct way to assess conscious emotional feelings is through above. Given this multiplicity of referents, it is not
verbal self-report. This creates a methodological barrier to surprising that there is debate and confusion about the
studies of conscious feelings in animals. While the behavioral nature of emotions [1–11].
and physiological responses are not ‘emotions,’ they
contribute to emotions indirectly, and sometimes profoundly. In this article, we argue that restriction of the use of the
Whether non-verbal animals have emotional experiences is a term ‘emotion’ to subjective experiences, and use of other
difficult, maybe impossible, question to answer in the positive terminology to describe objective responses that are often
or negative. But because behavioral and physiological correlated with emotional experiences would eliminate
responses are important contributors to emotions, and the much of the conceptual confusion. In making this case,
circuits underlying these are highly conserved, studies of we discuss several different conceptual approaches to
animals have an important role in understanding how emotions subjective emotional experiences and the brain circuits
are expressed and regulated in the brain. Conflation of circuits proposed to underlie such experiences in these
that directly give rise to conscious emotional feelings with approaches. Because the emotion fear has been studied
circuits that indirectly influences these conscious feelings has more than other emotions, especially in relation to brain
hampered progress in efforts to understand emotions, and also circuits, and has been the center of much of the contro-
to understand and to develop treatments for emotional versy about the nature of subjectively experienced emo-
disorders. Recognition of differences in these circuits will allow tion, we focus on it in our discussion. Because the argu-
research in animals to have a lasting impact on understanding ment made in this article applies to both fear and anxiety,
of human emotions as research goes forward. we will not distinguish these two terms (for a discussion of
the difference see [6]).
Addresses
1
4 Washington Place, Center for Neural Science, New York University, Measuring subjective experiences
United States Before considering different approaches to subjective
2
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Boston University, experiences, it is important to discuss how these
United States
unobservable private events are studied. Scientific
Corresponding author: LeDoux, Joseph E ([email protected]) assessments of inner experiences require some form
of self-reporting [12,13]. People can typically give either
a verbal or a nonverbal report of information to which
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:67–72 they have introspective access, but cannot provide a
This review comes from a themed issue on Emotion-cognition verbal report of information that is only processed non-
interactions consciously [6,14,15]. Fractures between conscious and
Edited by Mara Mather and Michael Fanselow nonconscious processes by differences between verbal
and non-verbal responses have thus played a key role in
studies of introspective awareness in humans. While
other methods of reporting that do not require verbal
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.09.011 report have been proposed [16–18], these also depend on
2352-1546/ã 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. introspection [15].

Verbal self-report remains the gold standard in studies

of consciousness. It is most suitable for assessing
the content of immediate experiences rather than
remembered experiences [14,19] and is less useful for
The English word ‘emotion’ is based on the Latin assessing the motivations underlying actions since these
emovere, which means “to move away from.” When first are often not consciously available and verbalizable
applied to psychological events in the 17th century, it [20,21]. Since non-verbal reporting is the only option
pointed to an excited state of mind that causes movement in non-verbal (non-human) organisms, determining
(behavior). This is still the most common meaning of whether other animals have conscious, subjective
emotion in everyday vernacular speech. But in scientific experiences is difficult [6].

www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:1–6

Licenciado para - MARIANA SANTIAGO FERRAZ CHRISTIANO DE CARVALHO - 09904160708 - Protegido por Eduzz.com

2 Emotion-cognition interactions

Contemporary views of subjective emotional view, fear does not cause the responses but instead results
experiences in relation to brain circuits as a consequence of the responses. Modern versions of
Four contemporary approaches to subjective emotional this theory by Antonio Damasio [31,32] and A.D. Craig
experiences in the brain, and the historical roots of each, [33,34] have proposed that fearful and other emotional
are described below. Included are approaches in the feelings are the result of activity in body sensing circuits
traditions of Charles Darwin, William James, behavior- in the neocortex (somato-sensory and/or insula areas) that
ism, and cognitive psychology. represent body states, such as those triggered when
threats activate amygdala circuits. Initially, Damasio
1. The Neuro-Darwinian Approach: Subjective Fear is an emphasized cortical body sensing circuits but more
Innate State of Mind Inherited from Animal Ancestors. In his recently has emphasized brainstem circuits [32]. As in
treatise on human and animal emotion, Darwin defined Panksepp’s theory, cognitive elaboration by higher-
emotions as innate “states of mind” that humans have cortical circuits allows introspection and self-reporting
inherited from animal ancestors, and that, when aroused, about these states in Damasio’s theory. While these
cause the expression of so-called emotional behaviors circuits clearly represent body states, convincing evi-
[22]. This is consistent with the original 17th century dence that these representations are the main causes of
use of the term emotion mentioned above. It is still the emotional experiences is lacking [6]. We propose below
commonsense view of emotion that most people have, that body feedback makes important contributions to
and also underlie Ekman’s widely cited basic emotions emotional experiences, but as modulators rather than
theory [23]. A contemporary neuroscience proponent of as direct causes.
the traditional Darwinian view is Jaak Panksepp, who
views emotions as subjective feelings that emerge from a 3. The Neuro-Behaviorist Approach: Subjective Fear is a Folk
subcortical neural circuit that is highly conserved across Psychological Construct that Should be Replaced by a Scien-
mammals, including humans [24,25]. The circuit is cen- tific Explanation. In the early 20th century, behaviorists
tered on the amygdala and related subcortical areas [24]. eliminated mental states from the causal chain between
In Panksepp’s formulation, the amygdala circuit, when external stimuli and behavioral responses. However, they
activated by a threat to well being, both gives rise to retained mental state terms when describing the empiri-
fearful feelings (subjective feelings of fear) and controls cal relation between stimuli and responses. For example,
innate behaviors and supporting physiological responses ‘fear’ was used to characterize the relation between
that help the organism defend against harm. Cognitive threats and defensive behaviors [35]. With the rise of
elaboration of subcortical fear by higher-cortical prefron- physiological approaches to behavior in the middle of the
tal circuits makes possible introspection and verbal 20th century, fear became a hypothetical physiological
reports of fear in humans. But the core of fear is the state (central state), that connects threats with defensive
inherited mental state arising from the subcortical circuit. behaviors [36]. The intended purpose of this approach
was to satisfy the behaviorist constraint against using
Problematic for this view is evidence suggesting that the subjective explanations of behavior. Ultimately, the
experience of fear is not embodied in the amygdala. amygdala emerged as the locus of the central fear state
Specifically, studies in humans show that the amygdala [37,38]. The central state model has been popular in
can respond to threats without the person knowing the behavioral neuroscience [39–42]. Many who call upon
threat is present and without feeling fear, and other the central state view today are ambivalent about the
studies show that fear can be experienced when the extent to which fear means subjective fear or a non-
amygdala is damaged [26,27]; for review see [6,7]. Also, subjective state. But adherents of a strong version of
medications can change behavioral responses to threats the position argue that subjective, conscious fear is an
without changing subjective feelings of fear [28,29]. inaccurate scientific construct that can be replaced with a
Thus, while the amygdala controls behavioral responses more rigorous scientific notion of fear as a non-subjective
to threats it does not seem to be directly responsible for state of the amygdala-centered circuits [42]. The well-
the subjective experience of fear. One could argue that known lack of correlation between verbal reports and
perhaps other subcortical areas are responsible. But the amygdala activity in humans [43–45] is, in this view, due
emphasis in the literature has been on the amygdala. to the lack of access to amygdala activity by cognitive-
Moreover, the other hypothetical subcortical circuits based introspection, and hence verbal report. In short,
would need to be identified before the role can be verbal report of subjective experience is viewed as a less
evaluated. desirable way of assessing fear than simply measuring
amygdala-controlled responses.
2. The Neuro-Jamesian Approach: Subjective Fear is a
Consequence of Feedback from Body Responses. William The mechanistic reason a threat elicits defense responses
James famously argued that fear and other emotional is because it activates cells and synapses in circuits that
experiences result by way of feedback from the act of control those responses. The fear construct is superfluous
responding [30]. Thus, contrary to the commonsense in this context [6,7,28,46]. It adds conceptual baggage

Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:1–6 www.sciencedirect.com

Licenciado para - MARIANA SANTIAGO FERRAZ CHRISTIANO DE CARVALHO - 09904160708 - Protegido por Eduzz.com

Conscious emotion LeDoux and Hofmann 3

that reifies fear and imbues the circuit with the exact imply that if through psychotherapy or pharmaceutical
phenomenological properties that are trying to be avoided treatment you successfully reduce amygdala activity, as
[47]. The way to avoid these problems is by using non- measured by amygdala-mediated behavioral and/or phys-
subjective terminology to name the non-subjective cen- iological responses, pathological fear should be amelio-
tral states. Such states, for example, can be referred in rated. But different reasons underlie this conclusion in
terms of neural activity in a defensive survival circuit each approach. In the neuro-Darwinian approach, treat-
(rather than in a fear circuit) [4]. This solves part of the ments that weaken defensive behavior should treat fear
problem but leaves open the question of how conscious problems by altering amygdala activity underlying both
fear comes about. The neuro-cognitive approach behavior and feelings. In the neuro-Jamesian approach,
addresses this issue. treatments that weaken defensive behavior by altering
amygdala activity should treat fear problems because the
4. The Neuro-Cognitive Approach: Subjective Fear Emerges behaviors, being weaker, should give rise to less body
from Higher-Order Processing. Cognitive approaches to feedback and thus weaker subjective feelings. In the
emotion arose in the 1960s in an effort to address certain neuro-behaviorist approach, altering amygdala activity
criticisms of the Jamesian approach, and to overcome the through behavioral (CBT) or pharmaceutical treatments
behaviorist’s restrictions on inner explanations. Stanley should treat pathological fear because the problems are
Schachter proposed that emotional experiences result due to the non-subjective amygdala state. Once this
when we interpret physiological arousal in the brain changes, subjective fear might also change because it is
and/or body in light of cognitive assessments of social an indirect cognitive readout of amygdala activity. How-
situations, allowing the categorization and labeling of the ever, whether self-reported feelings change is less impor-
experience [48,49]. While there have been a number of tant than whether defensive behavior changes since the
cognitive approaches to emotion [50–53], recent theoriz- latter is a direct readout of amygdala activity. A major
ing has emphasized that emotional experiences are cog- challenge for these approaches is accounting for the
nitive constructions based on conceptualizations of situa- failure of studies using defensive behaviors in animals
tions [11,54–56] or higher-order states that emerge as a as means of drug-discovery to generate novel agents with
result of the cognitive integration in working memory of clinical efficacy in treating fear and anxiety [6,28,29,62].
diverse sources of information from within the brain and
body [6,7,37,57,58]. Both of these positions reject the idea
that emotional experiences arise from subcortical circuits Conscious feelings in clinical assessment
(views of the Neuro-Darwinian and Neuro-Jamesian A major reason why people seek the help of mental health
approaches) and also reject the idea that the subjective specialists is because they feel bad and want to feel
experience is a non-scientific construct (Neuro-Behavior- better. A treatment that reduces behavior (freezing,
ist approach). behavioral timidity, avoidance) and physiology (hyper-
arousal) but does not diminish subjectively reported
The higher-order approach builds on recent develop- fearful feelings is not likely to be viewed as a satisfactory
ments in the science and philosophy of consciousness outcome by the afflicted person.
(e.g. [7,59–61]), arguing that a general network of cogni-
tions underlies both cognitive and emotional states of In the contemporary cognitive therapy literature, self-
consciousness. In higher-order emotion theory, what dis- reports, and the subjective experiences that these reports
tinguishes cognitive and emotional states of conscious- reflect, have not been given much credence. This reflects
ness, and different kinds of emotional states, is the kind of the influence of behaviorism in the development of both
inputs processed. The subcortical fear circuit of the other traditional behavioral therapy [63] and cognitive behav-
models becomes a defensive survival circuit that detects ioral therapy (CBT) [64], as well as findings suggesting
and responds to threats. The consequences of defensive that behavioral physiological responses related to fear or
survival circuit activation (brain arousal, body feedback, anxiety in humans are poorly correlated [43–45]. A recent
etc.) contribute indirectly to the experience of fear but do argument has been made for more attention to verbal
not determine it. Fear is the cognitive assessment that reports of subjective experiences, but mainly to validate
you are in harms way, a view that allows fear to arise from non-subjective measures [65]. This reflects the domi-
activity in any survival circuits (fear of being harmed by nance of the amygdala fear center view described above
starvation, dehydration, hypothermia, reproductive isola- in clinical concepts. If behavioral, physiological and sub-
tion, and so forth), or by existential concerns (such as fear jective responses are all products of the same circuit, one
of the eventuality of death or the meaninglessness of your response is as good as another as a way to judge clinical
life), in addition to predatory-related dangers that trigger outcome. This logic is also apparent in the NIHM RDoC
the defensive survival circuit. initiative, which treats subjective reports as just another
measure of fear. Kozak and Cuthbert [66], for example,
5: Summary of the Four Approaches. The neuro-Darwinian, note that “ . . . the RDoC approach accords self-report
neuro-Jamesian, and neuro-behaviorist approaches all data no special precedence among different measurement

www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:1–6

Licenciado para - MARIANA SANTIAGO FERRAZ CHRISTIANO DE CARVALHO - 09904160708 - Protegido por Eduzz.com

4 Emotion-cognition interactions

classes, any of which might contribute to a nomological subjective reports, and utilize verbal strategies to elicit
net (p. 292).” and modify them. However, we suggest that this be done
after other approaches, such as CBT or pharamceutical
An important advantage of the neuro-cognitive approach treatments, to first dampen the amygdala central state,
to fear is that it accounts for the two troubling observa- which indirectly affects subjective experience. We also
tions mentioned above that are not easily handled by recommend that future research re-examine the relation-
fear-center views: subjective fear does not require the ship between subjective report, behaviors, and physio-
amygdala, and medications that target the amygdala do logical responses of fear and anxiety in order to explain
not necessarily relieve subjective fear. It would seem the reasons for the dissociation between these measures.
that the neuro-cognitive approach should mesh well with
modern CBT. However, despite the centrality of intro-
spection and cognitive processes in human mental life, Conflict of interest statement
as noted above, subjective report never reached a central Nothing declared.
status in CBT.

Self-report has always been seen as an easy but unreliable Funding

way to measure anxiety and fear. For example, Zoellner Funded in part by the James S. McDonnell Foundation
and Foa [67] agree with Kozak and Cuthbert that 21st Century Science Initiative in Understanding Human
self-reports do not have any special status, noting that Cognition – Special Initiative.
“self-report is one piece of the net in terms of studying a
phenomenon.” But they nevertheless go on to say that
self-reports “should be considered potential valid mea- References
sures of key constructs, some of which cannot be mea-
1. Candland DK, Fell JP, Keen E, Leshner AI, Tarpy RM: Emotion.
sured in any other way, and sometimes the best measure Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc.; 1977.
of the construct of interest (p. 334).” 2. Ekman P, Davidson R: The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental
Questions. New York: Oxford University Press; 1994.
Today, CBT therapists routinely use subjective patient 3. Scarantino A: Functional specialization does not require a one-
report as part of treatment. However, its value continues to-one mapping between brain regions and emotions. Behav
to be debated. Some argue that self-reported fear is an Brain Sci 2012, 35:161-162.

inadequate measure of the patient’s emotional state 4. LeDoux J: Rethinking the emotional brain. Neuron 2012, 73:
653-676.
because reduction in reported fear during exposure ses-
sions does not predict long-term treatment effects [68,69]. 5. LeDoux JE: Coming to terms with fear. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
2014, 111:2871-2878.
While this finding is consistent with the neuro-behaviorist
(non-subjective) amygdala fear state model described 6. LeDoux JE: Anxious: Using the Brain to Understand and Treat Fear
and Anxiety. New York: Viking; 2015.
above, the evidence presented is not especially strong,
7. LeDoux JE, Brown R: A higher-order theory of emotional
and other findings directly contradict the conclusion. consciousness. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2017, 114:
Specifically, more recent clinical trials examining the E2016-E2025.
augmentation effect of D-cycloserine (DCS), a partial 8. Kragel PA, LaBar KS: Decoding the nature of emotion in the
agonist at the glycine recognition site of the NMDA brain. Trends Cogn Sci 2016.
receptor complex, show the DCS enhances exposure 9. Kuppens P, Tuerlinckx F, Yik M, Koval P, Coosemans J, Zeng KJ,
therapy primarily in those people who report a clear Russell JA: The relation between valence and arousal in
subjective experience varies with personality and culture.
reduction of reported fear during the exposures [70,71]. J Pers 2016.
This suggests that the reduction in reported fear ratings 10. Touroutoglou A, Lindquist KA, Dickerson BC, Barrett LF: Intrinsic
during an exposure session is, in fact, a crucial factor that connectivity in the human brain does not reveal networks for
determines the success of treatment [72]. Also intriguing ‘basic’ emotions. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci 2015, 10:1257-1265.
is the recent finding that Pavlovian conditioned threat 11. Barrett LF: How Emotions are Made. New York: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt; 2017.
responses can be extinguished without the arousal of
conscious fear [73]. 12. Weiskrantz L: Consciousness Lost and Found: A
Neuropsychological Exploration. New York: Oxford University
Press; 1997.
We argue that subjective reports of fear and anxiety are
13. Overgaard M, Sandberg K: Kinds of access: different methods
not unreliable proxy measures of fear and anxiety, as for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access. In
suggested by the neuro-behaviorist model. Rather, they The Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition. Edited by Fleming
SM, Frith CD. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg; 2014:67-86.
are the best direct, and, at least so far, the only measures
easily accessible for clinicians to assess the efficacy of 14. Ericcson KA, Simon H: Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1993.
treatment. If this is correct, therapists need to carefully
15. Seth AK: Post-decision wagering measures metacognitive
listen to the clients’ report about their emotional states, content, not sensory consciousness. Conscious Cogn 2008,
further develop reliable assessment instruments of 17:981-983.

Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:1–6 www.sciencedirect.com

Licenciado para - MARIANA SANTIAGO FERRAZ CHRISTIANO DE CARVALHO - 09904160708 - Protegido por Eduzz.com

Conscious emotion LeDoux and Hofmann 5

16. Persaud N, McLeod P, Cowey A: Post-decision wagering 41. Anderson DJ, Adolphs R: A framework for studying emotions
objectively measures awareness. Nat Neurosci 2007, 10: across species. Cell 2014, 157:187-200.
257-261.
42. Perusini JN, Fanselow MS: Neurobehavioral perspectives on
17. Lau HC, Passingham RE: Relative blindsight in normal the distinction between fear and anxiety. Learn Mem 2015,
observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness. 22:417-425.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2006, 103:18763-18768.
43. Lang PJ: Fear reduction and fear behavior: problems in treating
18. Maniscalco B, Lau H: The signal processing architecture a construct. In Research in Psychotherapy, vol 3. Edited by Schlien
underlying subjective reports of sensory awareness. Neurosci JM . American Psychological Association; 1968:90-103.
Conscious 2016:2016.
44. Hodgson R, Rachman S: II. Desynchrony in measures of fear.
19. Wilson TD: The proper protocol: validity and completeness of Behav Res Ther 1974, 12:319-326.
verbal reports. Psychol Sci 1994, 5:249-252.
45. Rachman S, Hodgson R: I. Synchrony and desynchrony in fear
20. Nisbett RE, Wilson TD: Telling more than we can know: verbal and avoidance. Behav Res Ther 1974, 12:311-318.
reports on mental processes. Psychol Rev 1977, 84:231-259. 46. LeDoux JE: Semantics, surplus meaning, and the science of
21. Hassin RR, Uleman JS, Bargh JA (Eds): The New Unconscious. fear. Trends Cogn Sci 2017.
New York: Oxford University Press; 2005. 47. Marx MH: Intervening variable or hypothetical construct?
Psychol Rev 1951, 58:235-247.
22. Darwin C: The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.
London: Fontana Press; 1872. 48. Schachter S: Cognition and centralist-peripheralist
controversies in motivation and emotion. In Handbook of
23. Ekman P: Are there basic emotions? Psychol Rev 1992, 99: Psychobiology. Edited by Gazzaniga MS, Blakemore CB.
550-553. Academic Press; 1975:529-564.
24. Panksepp J: Affective Neuroscience. New York: Oxford U. Press; 49. Schachter S, Singer JE: Cognitive, social, and physiological
1998. determinants of emotional state. Psychol Rev 1962, 69:379-399.
25. Panksepp J: The cross-mammalian neurophenomenology of 50. Mandler G: Mind and Body: The Psychology of Emotion and
primal emotional affects: from animal feelings to human Stress. New York: Norton; 1984.
therapeutics. J Comp Neurol 2016, 524:1624-1635.
51. Frijda NH, Scherer KR: Emotion definition (psychological
26. Feinstein JS, Buzza C, Hurlemann R, Follmer RL, Dahdaleh NS, perspectives). In Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective
Coryell WH, Welsh MJ, Tranel D, Wemmie JA: Fear and panic in Sciences. Edited by Sander D, Scherer KR. Oxford University
humans with bilateral amygdala damage. Nat Neurosci 2013, Press; 2009:142-143.
16:270-272.
52. Ortony A, Clore GL: Emotions, moods, and conscious
27. Anderson AK, Phelps EA: Is the human amygdala critical for the awareness. Cogn Emot 1989, 3:125-137.
subjective experience of emotion? Evidence of intact
dispositional affect in patients with amygdala lesions. J Cogn 53. Lewis MD: Self-organising cognitive appraisals. Cogn Emot
Neurosci 2002, 14:709-720. 1996, 10:1-26.

28. LeDoux JE, Pine DS: Using neuroscience to help understand 54. Russell JA: Core affect and the psychological construction of
fear and anxiety: a two-system framework. Am J Psychiatry emotion. Psychol Rev 2003, 110:145-172.
2016, 173:1083-1093.
55. Barrett LF: Solving the emotion paradox: categorization and the
29. Griebel G, Holmes A: 50 years of hurdles and hope in anxiolytic experience of emotion. Pers Soc Psychol Rev 2006, 10:20-46.
drug discovery. Nat Rev Drug Discov 2013, 12:667-687. 56. Barrett LF, Russell JA (Eds): The Psychological Construction of
30. James W: What is an emotion? Mind 1884, 9:188-205. Emotion. New York: Guilford Press; 2015.
57. LeDoux JE: Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are.
31. Damasio A: Descarte’s Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
New York: Viking; 2002.
Brain. New York: Gosset/Putnam; 1994.
58. LeDoux JE: Emotional colouration of consciousness: how
32. Damasio A, Carvalho GB: The nature of feelings: evolutionary feelings come about. In Frontiers of Consciousness: Chichele
and neurobiological origins. Nat Rev Neurosci 2013, 14:143-152. Lectures. Edited by Weiskrantz L, Davies M. Oxford University
33. Craig AD: How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and Press; 2008:69-130.
human awareness. Nat Rev Neurosci 2009, 10:59-70. 59. Dehaene S: Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering how the
Brain Codes Our Thoughts. New York: Penguin Books; 2014.
34. Strigo IA, Craig AD: Interoception, homeostatic emotions and
sympathovagal balance. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 60. Rosenthal DM: Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Oxford
2016:371. University Press; 2005.
35. Brown JS, Farber IE: Emotions conceptualized as intervening 61. Lau H, Rosenthal D: Empirical support for higher-order theories
variables — with suggestions toward a theory of frustration. of conscious awareness. Trends Cogn Sci 2011, 15:365-373.
Psychol Bull 1951, 48:465-495.
62. Miller G: Is pharma running out of brainy ideas? Science 2010,
36. Rescorla RA, Solomon RL: Two process learning theory: 329:502-504.
relationships between Pavlovian conditioning and
instrumental learning. Psychol Rev 1967, 74:151-182. 63. Levis DJ: The negative impact of the cognitive movement on
the continued growth of the behavior therapy movement: a
37. LeDoux JE: The Emotional Brain. New York: Simon and Schuster; historical perspective. Genet Soc Gen Psychol Monogr 1999,
1996. 125:157-171.
38. Davis M: The role of the amygdala in conditioned fear. In The 64. Hofmann SG, Asmundson GJ, Beck AT: The science of cognitive
Amygdala: Neurobiological Aspects of Emotion, Memory, and therapy. Behav Ther 2013, 44:199-212.
Mental Dysfunction. Edited by Aggleton JP. Wiley-Liss, Inc;
1992:255-306. 65. Hamm AO, Richter J, Pane-Farre C, Westphal D, Wittchen HU,
Vossbeck-Elsebusch AN, Gerlach AL, Gloster AT, Strohle A,
39. Rosen JB, Schulkin J: From normal fear to pathological anxiety. Lang T et al.: Panic disorder with agoraphobia from a
Psychol Rev 1998, 105:325-350. behavioral neuroscience perspective: applying the research
principles formulated by the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)
40. Adolphs R: The biology of fear. Curr Biol 2013, 23:R79-R93. initiative. Psychophysiology 2016, 53:312-322.

www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:1–6

Licenciado para - MARIANA SANTIAGO FERRAZ CHRISTIANO DE CARVALHO - 09904160708 - Protegido por Eduzz.com

6 Emotion-cognition interactions

66. Kozak MJ, Cuthbert BN: The NIMH Research Domain Criteria depends on the success of exposure sessions. J Psychiatr Res
Initiative: background, issues, and pragmatics. 2013, 47:1455-1461.
Psychophysiology 2016, 53:286-297.
71. Smits JA, Rosenfield D, Otto MW, Powers MB, Hofmann SG,
67. Zoellner LA, Foa EB: Applying Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Telch MJ, Pollack MH, Tart CD: D-cycloserine enhancement of
to the study of fear and anxiety: a critical comment. fear extinction is specific to successful exposure sessions:
Psychophysiology 2016, 53:332-335. evidence from the treatment of height phobia. Biol Psychiatry
2013, 73:1054-1058.
68. Craske MG, Kircanski K, Zelikowsky M, Mystkowski J,
Chowdhury N, Baker A: Optimizing inhibitory learning during 72. Hofmann SG: D-cycloserine for treating anxiety disorders:
exposure therapy. Behav Res Ther 2008, 46:5-27. making good exposures better and bad exposures worse.
Depress Anxiety 2014, 31:175-177.
69. Craske MG, Treanor M, Conway CC, Zbozinek T, Vervliet B:
Maximizing exposure therapy: an inhibitory learning 73. Koizumi A, Amano K, Cortese A, Shibata K, Yoshida W,
approach. Behav Res Ther 2014, 58:10-23. Seymour B, Kawato M, Lau H: Fear reduction without
70. Smits JA, Rosenfield D, Otto MW, Marques L, Davis ML, fear through reinforcement of neural activity that
Meuret AE, Simon NM, Pollack MH, Hofmann SG: D-cycloserine bypasses conscious exposure. Nat Human Behav 2016,
enhancement of exposure therapy for social anxiety disorder 1:0006.

Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2018, 19:1–6 www.sciencedirect.com