FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 15574. September 17, 1919.]

SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), petitioner, vs. JOAQUIN

NATIVIDAD, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu,
respondent.

Ross & Lawrence for petitioner.

Attorney-General Paredes for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PHILIPPINE BILL OF RIGHTS; CONSTRUCTION.

— The guaranties extended by the Congress of the United States to the
Philippine Islands have been used in the same sense as like provisions found
in the United States Constitution.
2.ID.; ID.; FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION; DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS; ALIENS. — The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of
the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights are universal in their
application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any differences of race, color, or nationality.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The word "person" found in the Fourteenth
Amendment and in the first sentence of the first paragraph of the Philippine
Bill of Rights includes aliens.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Private corporations are "persons" within the
scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Statutes which have attempted arbitrarily to
forbid aliens to engage in any kind of business to earn their living have been
held unconstitutional, while other statutes denying certain rights to aliens
have been held constitutional
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER. — Neither the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, broad and comprehensive as
it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of
the State, sometimes termed its police power,' to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people,
and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of
society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must
often be had in certain districts." (Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U. S., 27;
New Orleans Gas Co. vs. Louisiana Light Co. [1885], 115 U. S., 650.)
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — None of the provisions of the Philippine
Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the
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 Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police
power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
8.ID., ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The public domain or the common property
or resources of the people of the State may be so regulated or distributed as
to limit the use to its citizens.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The limitation of employment in the
construction of public works by, or for, a state or a municipality to citizens of
the United States or of a State is permitted.
10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Our local experience and our peculiar
local conditions, often of controlling effect, have caused the executive
branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands, always later with the
sanction of the judicial branch, to take a firm stand with reference to the
presence of undesirable foreigners. The Government has thus assumed to
act for the all sufficient and primitive reasons of the benefit and protection of
its own citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity of its dominion.
11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Common carriers which, in the Philippines
as in the United States and other countries, are affected with a public
interest, can only be permitted to use the public waters, deemed a part of
the national domain and open to public use, as a privilege, and under such
conditions as to the Legislature may seem wise.
12.ID.; CONSTRUCTION; PUBLIC POLICY. — The judiciary, alive to the
dictates of the national welfare, can properly incline the 'scales of their
decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the
public policy.
13.ID.; ID., PRESUMPTION. — All the presumption is in favor of the
constitutionality of the law, and without good and strong reasons a court
should not attempt to nullify the action of the Legislature.
14.ID.; ID.; ID. — That is the true construction which will best carry
legislative intention into effect.
15.ID.; COMMERCE; UNITED STATES COASTWISE TRADE. — The power
to regulate commerce, expressly delegated to the Congress by the
Constitution, includes the power to nationalize ships built and owned in the
United States by registries and enrollments and the recording of the
muniments of title of American vessels.
16.ID.; ID.; ID. — Under the Acts of Congress of December 31, 1792,
and February 18, 1793 (1 Stat. at L., 287, 305) in case of alienation to a
foreigner, all the privileges .of an American bottom were ipso facto forfeited.
No vessel in which a foreigner was directly or indirectly interested could
lawfully be registered as a vessel of the United States.
17.ID.; ID.; ID. — The Act of Congress of May 28, 1895 (29 Stat. at L.,
188) extended the privileges of registry from vessels wholly owned by a
citizen or citizens of the United States to corporations created under the laws
of any of the states thereof. This law made it possible for a domestic
corporation to obtain the registry or enrollment of its vessels even though
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 some stock of the corporation was owned by aliens.
18.ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE COASTWISE TRADE; ACT No. 2761, VALIDITY. —
The history of the different laws which have concerned the Philippine
coastwise trade is set out in the opinion. The last Act on the subject, No.
2761, has returned to the restrictive idea of the original Customs
Administrative Act which in turn was merely a reflection of the statutory
language of the first American Congress.
19.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of
the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping act.
The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-
building.
20.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The Philippine Legislature made up entirely of
Filipinos, representing the mandate of the Filipino people and the guardian of
their rights, acting under practically autonomous powers, and imbued with a
strong sense of Philippinism, has desired for these Islands safety from
foreign interlopers, the use of the common property exclusively by its
citizens and the citizens of the United States, and protection for the common
good of the people.
21.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, limiting
certificates of the Philippine registry to vessels of domestic ownership vested
in some one or more of the following classes of persons: (a) citizens or
native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; ( b) citizens of the United States
residing in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed
wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or both, is
authorized by the Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, with its specific
delegation of authority to the Government of the Philippine Islands to
regulate the transportation of merchandise and passengers between ports or
places therein, and by the grant by the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
of general legislative power to the Philippine Legislature.
22.ID.; ID, ID.; ID. — While the plaintiff, a corporation having alien
stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due process of law
and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, yet
Act No. 2761, in denying to corporations such as the plaintiff the right to
register vessels in the Philippine coastwise trade, does not belong to that
vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but
falls within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police
power.
23.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Act No. 2761 does not violate the provisions of
paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
providing "that no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws."
24.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Act No. 2761 is held to be valid and
constitutional.

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 DECISION

MALCOLM, J : p

A writ of mandamus is prayed for by Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.), against
Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine
Islands, to compel him to issue a certificate of Philippine registry to the
petitioner for its motor vessel Bato. The Attorney-General, acting as counsel
for respondent, demurs to the petition on the general ground that it does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. While the facts are thus
admitted, and while, moreover, the pertinent provisions of law are clear and
understandable, and interpretative American jurisprudence is found in
abundance, yet the issue submitted is not lightly to be resolved. The
question, flatly presented, is, whether Act No. 2761 of the Philippine
Legislature is valid — or, more directly stated, whether the Government of
the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of
vessels in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders.
FACTS.
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British
subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in
the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross. The Bato was
brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's
merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu,
the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of
Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his
reason that all the stock- holders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens
either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is
the result.

LAW.
The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, repealing the Shipping Act of
April 30, 1906, but reenacting a portion of section 3 of this Law, and still in
force, provides in its section 1:
"That until Congress shall have authorized the registry as vessels
of the United States of vessels owned in the Philippine Islands, the
Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized to adopt,
from time to time, and enforce regulations governing the
transportation of merchandise and passengers between ports or places
in the Philippine Archipelago." (35 Stat. at L., 70; Section 3912, U. S.
Comp. Stat. [1916]; 7 Pub. Laws, 364.)
The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones
Law, still in force, provides in sections 3, (first paragraph, first sentence), 6,
7, 8, 10, and 31, as follows:
"Sec. 3.That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
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 law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." . . .
"SEC. 6.That the laws now in force in the Philippines shall
continue in force and effect, except as altered, amended, or modified
herein, until altered, amended, or repealed by the legislative authority
herein provided or by Act of Congress of the United States.
"SEC. 7.That the legislative authority herein provided shall have
power, when not inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to
amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in
force by this Act as it may from time to time see fit.
"This power shall specifically extend with the limitation herein
provided as to the tariff to all laws relating to revenue and taxation in
effect in the Philippines.
"SEC. 8.That general legislative power, except as otherwise
herein provided, is hereby granted to the Philippine Legislature,
authorized by this Act."
"SEC. 10.That while this Act provides that the Philippine
government shall have the authority to enact a tariff law the trade
relations between the islands and the United States shall continue to
be governed exclusively by laws of the Congress of the United States:
Provided, That tariff acts or acts amendatory to the tariff of the
Philippine Islands shall not become law until they shall receive the
approval of the President of the United States, nor shall any act of the
Philippine Legislature affecting immigration or the currency or coinage
laws of the Philippines become a law until it has been approved by the
President of the United States: Provided further, That the President
shall approve or disapprove any act mentioned in the foregoing proviso
within six months from and after its enactment and submission for his
approval, and if not disapproved within such time it shall become a law
the same as if it had been specifically approved."
"SEC. 31.That all laws or parts of laws applicable to the
Philippines not in conflict with any of the provisions of this Act are
hereby continued in force and effect." (39 Stat at L., 546.)
On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761.
The first section of this law amended section 1172 of the Administrative
Code to read as follows:
"SEC. 1172.Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration
of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross,
a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of
domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the
certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.
" 'Domestic ownership,' as used in this section, means ownership
vested in some one or more of the following classes of persons: (a)
Citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of
the United States residing in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation
or company composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of
the United States or of both, created under the laws of the United
States, or of any State thereof, or of the Philippine Islands, provides
some duly authorized officer thereof, or the managing agent or master
of the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands.
"Any vessel of more than fifteen gross tons which on February
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 eighth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, had a certificate of Philippine
register under existing law, shall likewise be deemed a vessel of
domestic ownership so long as there shall not be any change in the
ownership thereof nor any transfer of stock of the companies or
corporations owning such vessel to persons not included under the last
preceding paragraph."
Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 2761 amended sections 1176 and 1202 of
the Administrative Code to read as follows:
"SEC. 1176.Investigation into character of vessel. — No
application for a certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until
the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel
that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and
that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined in section
eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.
"The collector of customs may at any time inspect a vessel or
examine its owner, master, crew, or passengers in order to ascertain
whether the vessel is engaged in legitimate trade and is entitled to
have or retain the certificate of Philippine register."
"SEC. 1202.Limiting number of foreign officers and engineers on
board vessels. — No Philippine vessel operating in the coastwise trade
or on the high seas shall be permitted to have on board more than one
master or one mate and one engineer who are not citizens of the
United States or of the Philippine Islands, even if they hold licenses
under section one thousand one hundred and ninety-nine hereof. No
other person who is not a citizen of the United States or of the
Philippine Islands shall be an officer or a member of the crew of such
vessel. Any such vessel which fails to comply with the terms of this
section shall be required to pay an additional tonnage tax of fifty
centavos per net ton per month during the continuance of said failure."
ISSUES.
Predicated on these facts and provisions of law, the issues as above
stated recur, namely, whether Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is
valid in whole or in part — whether the Government of the Philippine Islands,
through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in its coast- wise
trade to corporations having alien stockholders.
OPINION.
1.Considered from a positive standpoint, there can exist no measure of
doubt as to the power of the Philippine Legislature to enact Act No. 2761.
The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, with its specific delegation of
authority to the Government of the Philippine Islands to regulate the
transportation of merchandise and passengers between ports or places
therein, the liberal construction given to the provisions of the Philippine Bill,
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, by the courts, and the grant by the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, of general legislative power to the Philippine
Legislature, are certainly superabundant authority for such a law. While the
Act of the local legislature may in a way be inconsistent with the Act of
Congress regulating the coasting trade of the Continental United States, yet
the general rule that only such laws of the United States have force in the
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 Philippines as are expressly extended thereto, and the abnegation of power
by Congress in favor of the Philippine Islands would leave no starting point
for convincing argument. As a matter of fact, counsel for petitioner does not
assail legislative action from this direction. (See U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15
Phil., 7; Sinnot vs. Davenport [1859] 22 How., 227.)
2.It is from the negative, prohibitory standpoint that counsel argues
against the constitutionality of Act No. 2761. The first paragraph of the
Philippine Bill of Rights of the Philippine Bill, repeated again in the first
paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights as set forth in the Jones Law,
provides "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws." Counsel says that Act
No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws
because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and
because classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or
more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the
corporation of its property without due process of law because by the
passage of the law the company was automatically deprived of every
beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a
boat it could not use.
The guaranties extended by the Congress of the United States to the
Philippine Islands have been used in the same sense as like provisions found
in the United States Constitution. While the "due process of law and equal
protection of the laws" clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights is couched in
slightly different words than the corresponding clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the first should be interpreted
and given the same force and effect as the latter. (Kepner vs. U. S. [1904],
195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S., 470, U. S. vs. Bull [1910],
15 Phil., 7.) The meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
announced in classic decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Even at
the expense of restating what is so well known, these basic principles must
again be set down in order to serve as the basis of this decision.
The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first
paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes aliens.
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U.
S., 33.) Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the
guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. (Santa Clara County vs.
Southern Pac. R. R. Co. [1886], 118 U. S., 394; Pembina Mining Co. vs.
Pennsylvania [1888], 125 U. S., 181; Covington &; L. Turnpike Road Co. vs.
Sandford [1896], 164 U. S., 578.) Classification with the end in view of
providing diversity of treatment may be made among corporations, but must
be based upon some reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary
selection. (Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S.,
150.) Examples of laws held unconstitutional because of unlawful
discrimination against aliens could be cited. Generally, these decisions relate
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 to statutes which had attempted arbitrarily to forbid aliens to engage in
ordinary kinds of business to earn their living. (State vs. Montgomery [1900],
94 Maine, 192, peddling — but see Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195
Mass., 262; Templar vs. Board of Examiners of Barbers [1902], 131 Mich.,
254, barbers; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S 356, discrimination
against Chinese ; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33; In re Parrott [1880],
1 Fed., 481; Fraser vs McConway & Torley Co. [1897], 82 Fed., 257, Juniata
Limestone Co. vs. Fagley [1898], 187 Penn., 193, all relating to the
employment of aliens by private corporations.)
A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would,
of course, cause the inevitable deduction that Act No. 2761 is
unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a corporation, some of whose
members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the laws. Like all
beneficent propositions, deeper research discloses provisos. Examples of a
denial of rights to aliens notwithstanding the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment could be cited. (Tragesser vs. Gray [1890], 73 Md., 250,
licenses to sell spirituous liquors denied to persons not citizens of the United
States; Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 19.~ Mass., 262, excluding aliens
from the right to peddle; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914],
232 U. S., 138, prohibiting the killing of any wild bird or animal by any
unnaturalized foreign-born resident; Ex parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442,
discriminating in favor of citizens with reference to the taking for private use
of the common property in fish and oysters found in the public waters of the
State; Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U. S., 175, and Crane vs. New York
[1915], 239 U. S., 195, limiting employment on public works by, or for, the
State or a municipality to citizens of the United States.)
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far
reaching in influence is, that neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other
amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of the State,
sometimes termed its 'police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to
legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources
and add to its wealth and prosperity- From the very necessities of society,
legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often
be had in certain districts." (Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U. S., 27; New
Orleans Gas Co. vs. Louisiana Light Co. [1885], 115 U. S., 650.) This is the
same police power which the United States Supreme Court says "extends to
so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them
the greatest welfare of its people." (Bacon vs. Walker [1907], 204 U-. S.,
311.) For quite similar reasons, none of the provisions of the Philippine
Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the
Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police
power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. (U. S.
vs. Toribio [1910], 15 Phil., 85; Churchill and Tait vs. Raferty [1915], 32 Phil.,
580; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.l Another
notable exception permits of the regulation or distribution of the public
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 domain or the common property or resources of the people of the State, so
that the use may be limited to its citizens. (Ex Parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla.,
442; McCready vs. Virginia [1876], 94 U. S., 391; Patsone vs. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S., 138.) Still another exception permits of
the limitation of employment in the construction of public works by, or for,
the State or a municipality to citizens of the United States or of the State.
(Atkin vs. Kansas [1903], 191 U. S., 207; Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U.' S.,
175; Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195.) Even as to classification, it
is admitted that a State may classify with reference to the evil to be
prevented; the question is a practical one, dependent upon experience.
(Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S., 138.)
To justify that portion of Act No. 2761 which permits corporations or
companies to obtain a certificate of Philippine registry only on condition that
they be composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United
States or both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must be done
under some one of the exceptions here mentioned. This must be done,
moreover, having particularly in mind what is so often of controlling effect in
this jurisdiction — our local experience and our peculiar local conditions.
To recall a few facts in geography, within the confines of Philippine
jurisdictional limits are found more than three thousand islands. Literally,
and absolutely, steamship lines are, for an Insular territory thus situated, the
arteries of commerce. If one be severed, the life-blood of the nation is lost. If
on the other hand these arteries are protected, then the security of the
country and the promotion of the general welfare is sustained. Time and
again, with such conditions confronting it, has the executive branch of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, always later with the sanction of the
judicial branch, taken a firm stand with reference to the presence of
undesirable foreigners. The Government has thus assumed to act for the all-
sufficient and primitive reason of the benefit and protection of its own
citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity of its dominion. ( In re
Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Forbes vs. Chuoco, Tiaco and Crossfield [1910],
16 Phil., 534; 228 U. S., ;549; In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41. )
Boats owned by foreigners, particularly by such solid and reputable firms as
the instant claimant, might indeed traverse the waters of the Philippines for
ages without doing any particular harm. Again, some evil-minded foreigner
might very easily take advantage of such lavish hospitality to chart
Philippine waters, to obtain valuable information for unfriendly foreign
powers, to stir up insurrection, or to prejudice Filipino or American
commerce. Moreover, under the Spanish portion of Philippine law, the waters
within the domestic jurisdiction are deemed part of the national domain,
open to public use. (Book II, Tit. IV, Ch. I, Civil Code; Spanish Law of Waters
of August 3, 1866. arts. 1. 2. 3.) Common carriers which in the Philippines as
in the United States and other countries are, as Lord Hale said, "affected
with a public interest," can only be permitted to use these public waters as a
privilege and under such conditions as to the representatives of the people
may seem wise. (See De Villata vs. Stanley [1915], 32 Phil., 541.)
In Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ([1913], 232 U. S., 138),
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 a case hereinbefore mentioned, Justice Holmes delivering the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court said:
"This statute makes it unlawful for any unnaturalized foreign-
born resident to kill any wild bird or animal except in defense of person
or property, and 'to that end' makes it unlawful for such foreign-born
person to own or be possessed of a shotgun or rifle; with a penalty of
$25 and a forfeiture of the gun or guns. The plaintiff in error was found
guilty and was sentenced to pay the above mentioned fine. The
judgment was affirmed on successive appeals. (231 Pa., 46; 79 Atl.,
928.) He brings the case to this court on the ground that the statute is
contrary to the 14th Amendment and also is in contravention of the
treaty between the United States and Italy, to which latter country the
plaintiff in error belongs.
"Under the 14th Amendment the objection is twofold;
unjustifiably depriving the alien of property, and discrimination against
such aliens as a class. But the former really depends upon the latter,
since it hardly can be disputed that if the lawful object, the protection
of wild life (Geer vs. Connecticut, 161 U. S., 519; 40 L. ed., 793; 16 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 600), warrants the discrimination, the means adopted for
making it effective also might be adopted. . . .
"The discrimination undoubtedly presents a more difficult
question. But we start with the general consideration that a state may
classify with reference to the evil to be prevented, and that if the class
discriminated against is or reasonably might be considered to define
those from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be
picked out. A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question
is a practical one, dependent upon experience. . . .
"The question therefore narrows itself to whether this court can
say that the legislature of Pennsylvania was not warranted in assuming
as its premise for the law that resident unnaturalized aliens were the
peculiar source of the evil that it desired to prevent. (Barrett vs.
Indiana, 229 U. S., 26, 29; 57 L. ed., 1050, 1052; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
692.)
"Obviously the question, so stated, is one of local experience, on
which this court ought to be very slow to declare that the state
legislature was wrong in its facti. (Adams vs. Milwaukee, 228 U. S.,
572, 583; 57 L. ed., 971, 977; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 610.) If we might trust
popular speech in some states it was right; but it is enough that this
court has no such knowledge of local conditions as to be able to say
that it was manifestly wrong. . . .
"Judgment affirmed."
We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co Ltd., a
corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded
by the-due process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine
Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the
right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong
to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned,
but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the
police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.
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 This opinion might well be brought to a close at this point. It occurs to
us, however, that the legislative history of the United States and the
Philippine Islands, and, probably, the legislative history of other countries, if
we were to take the time to search it out, might disclose similar attempts at
restriction on the right to enter the coastwise trade, and might thus furnish
valuable aid by which to ascertain and, if possible, effectuate legislative
intention.
3.The power to regulate commerce, expressly delegated to the
Congress by the Constitution, includes the power to nationalize ships built
and owned in the United States by registries and enrollments, and the
recording of the muniments of title of American vessels. The Congress "may
encourage or it may entirely prohibit such commerce, and it may regulate in
any way it may see fit between these two extremes." (U. S. vs. Craig [1886],
28 Fed., 795; Gibbons vs. Ogden [1824], 9 Wheat., 1; The Passenger Cases
[1849], 7 How., 283.)
Acting within the purview of such power, the first Congress of the
United States had not been long convened before it enacted on September
1, 1789, "An Act for Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the
Coasting Trade, and for other purposes." Section 1 of this law provided that
for any ship or vessel to obtain the benefits of American registry, it must
belong wholly to a citizen or citizens of the United States "and no other." (1
Stat. at L., 55.) That Act was shortly after repealed, but the same idea was
carried into the Acts of Congress of December 31, 1792 and February 18,
179.3. (1 Stat. at L., 287, 305.) Section 4 of the Act of 1792 provided that in
order to obtain the registry of any vessel, an oath shall be taken and
subscribed by the owner, or by one of the owners thereof, before the officer
authorized to make such registry, declaring, "that there is no subject or
citizen of any foreign prince or state, directly or indirectly, by way of trust,
confidence, or otherwise, interested in such vessel, or in the profits or issues
thereof." Section 32 of the Act of 1793 even went so far as to say "that if
any licensed ship or vessel shall be transferred to any person who is not at
the time of such transfer a citizen of and resident within the United States, . .
. every such vessel with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, and the cargo
found on board her, shall be forfeited." In case of alienation to a foreigner,
Chief Justice Marshall said that all the privileges of an American bottom were
ipso facto forfeited. (U. S. vs. Willings and Francis [1807], 4 Cranch, 48.)
Even as late as 1873, the Attorney-General of the United States was of the
opinion that under the provisions of the Act of December 31, 1792 no vessel
in which a foreigner is directly or indirectly interested can lawfully be
registered as a vessel of the United States. (14 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U. S.], 340.)
These laws continued in force without contest, although possibly the
Act of March 3, 1825, may have affected them until amended by the Act of
May 28, 1896 (29 Stat. at L., 188) which extended the privileges of registry
from vessels wholly owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States to
corporations created under the laws of any of the states thereof. The law, as
amended, made possible the deduction that a vessel belonging to a
domestic corporation was entitled to registry or enrollment even though
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 some stock of the company be owned by aliens. The right of ownership of
stock in a corporation was thereafter distinct from the right to hold the
property by the corporation. (Humphreys vs. McKissock [1890], 140 U. S.,
304; Queen vs. Arnaud [1846], 9 Q. B., 806; 29 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U. S.], 188.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, the new government found
a substantive law in operation in the Islands with a civil law history which it
wisely continued in force. Article fifteen of the Spanish Code of Commerce
permitted any foreigner to engage in Philippine trade if he had legal capacity
to do so under the laws of his nation. When the Philippine Commission came
to enact the Customs Administrative Act (No. 355) in 1902, it returned to the
old American policy of limiting the protection and flag of the United States to
vessels owned by citizens of the United States or by native inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands. (Sec. 117.) Two years later, the same body reverted to the
existing Congressional law by permitting certificates to be issued to a citizen
of the United States or to a corporation or company created under the laws
of the United States or of any state thereof or of the Philippine Islands. (Act
No. 1235, sec. 3. ) The two administrative codes repeated the same
provision with the necessary amplification of inclusion of citizens or native
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Adm. Code of 1916, sec. 1345; Adm.
Code of 1917, sec. 1172). And now Act No. 2761 has returned to the
restrictive idea of the original Customs Administrative Act which in turn was
merely a reflection of the statutory language of the first American Congress.
Provisions such as those in Act No. 2761, which deny to foreigners the
right to a certificate of Philippine registry, are thus found not to be as radical
as a first reading would make them appear.
Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine
Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate
purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building. This,
without doubt, has, likewise, been the intention of the United States
Congress in passing navigation or tariff laws on different occasions. The
object of such a law, the United States Supreme Court once said, was to
encourage American trade, navigation, and ship-building by giving American
ship-owners exclusive privileges. ( Old Dominion Steamship Co. vs. Virginia
[1905], 198 U. S., 299; Kent's Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 139.)
In the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in Gibbons vs. Ogden
([1824], 9 Wheat., 1) is found the following:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining
acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of
spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that
character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which
is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing
with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation
reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a
countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated,
in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to
give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that
effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it
is to confer on her American privileges. a contra distinguished from
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 foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners, in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial
marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise that
this whole system is projected."
The United States Congress in assuming its grave responsibility of
legislating wisely for a new country did so imbued with a spirit of
Americanism. Domestic navigation and trade, it decreed, could only be
carried on by citizens of the United States. If the representatives of the
American people acted in this patriotic manner to advance the national
policy, and if their action was accepted without protest in the courts, who
can say that they did not enact such beneficial laws under the all-pervading
police power, with the prime motive of safeguarding the country and of
promoting its prosperity? Quite similarly, the Philippine Legislature made up
entirely of Filipinos, representing the mandate of the Filipino people and the
guardian of their rights, acting under practically autonomous powers, and
imbued with a strong sense of Philippinism, has desired for these Islands
safety from foreign interlopers, the use of the common property exclusively
by its citizens and the citizens of the United States, and protection for the
common good of the people. Who can say, therefore, especially can a court,
that with all the facts and circumstances affecting the Filipino people before
it, the Philippine Legislature has erred in the enactment of Act No. 2761?
Surely, the members of the judiciary are not expected to live apart
from active life, in monastic seclusion amidst dusty tomes and ancient
records, but, as keen spectators of passing events and alive to the dictates
of the general — the national — welfare, can incline the scales of their
decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the
public policy. All the presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of the law
and without good and strong reasons, courts should not attempt to nullify
the action of the Legislature. "In construing a statute enacted by the
Philippine Commission (Legislature), we deem it our duty not to give it a
construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the
language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in
conflict with the higher law." (In re Guariña [1913], 24 Phil., 36; U. S. vs. Ten
Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1.) That is the true construction which will best carry
legislative intention into effect.
With full consciousness of the importance of the question, we
nevertheless are clearly of the opinion that the limitation of domestic
ownership for purposes of obtaining a certificate of Philippine registry in the
coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippine Islands, and to citizens of the
United States, does not violate the provisions of paragraph 1 of section 3 of
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916. No treaty right is relied upon. Act
No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is held valid and constitutional.
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Moir, JJ.,
concur.

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