1. Hontiveros v.

Altavas
G.R. No. L-8606; March 29, 1913
Topic: Elections Laws; Suffrage
Facts: At the general election held in the Province of Capiz on June 4, 1912, Jose Altavas,
according to the proclamation of the provincial board of canvassers, received 3,542 votes, and
Ramon Hontiveros received 3,371 votes, for the office of provincial governor. Hontiveros
protested. The Court of First Instance, after trial, found that the Hontiveros received 3,317 legal
votes and Altavas 2,842. Judgment was entered directing the provincial board of canvassers to
correct its canvass accordingly. Altavas appealed insisting that the protest was not presented
within the time required by law.
First protest (June 18) – two weeks after election day
Second/amended protest (June 27) - within two weeks after the proclamation of the board of
canvassers
Issue: Whether the time within which the motion which introduces an election contest for a
provincial governorship expires two weeks after the day upon which the ballots are cast or two
weeks after the day upon which the provincial board of canvassers determines who has been
elected.
Ruling: In Navarro vs. Veloso and Manalo vs. Sevilla, the court held that the two weeks begin to
run  from the date of the proclamation of the provincial board of canvassers and not from the
day the ballots were cast. 

The treatise on the subject of "Elections" in 15 Cyc., 279 et seq., defines the word as follows:

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. In common parlance an election is the act of casting and receiving the
ballots, counting them, and making the return.

If this be the only meaning of the word, there is little room for doubt as to the meaning of the
term "after the election" as used in section 27. But it is insisted that the word is used in numerous
places throughout the Act to designate only the day and the operation of casting the ballots by
the duly qualified voters. From this source is derived the chief if not the sole reliance of the
advocates of the contrary construction. In view of the speciousness of this arguments and the
tenacity with which it is maintained, we are not disposed to set it aside upon the mere strength of
the lexicographer's definition of the word "election." We shall endeavor to show that it is also
inappropriate to the manifest intention of the Legislature.

Section 3 probably gives more color to the argument in question than any other. In it we find
(quoting from the original act) such expressions as the following:

An election to elect such delegates shall be held upon the thirtieth day of July, 1907.
 Subsequent elections for such delegates shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first
Monday in November of 1909, and of each old-numbered year thereafter.

An election for provincial governor and third member of the provincial board shall be

held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of 1907, and upon the first
Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each odd-numbered year thereafter.

An election shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November of
1907, to elect municipal presidents and vice-presidents.

At first blush it would appear that the word "election" as used in these excerpts is confined to the
day upon which those enjoying the right of suffrage are called to the polls to express their choice
of candidates; or, in other words, that it is equivalent to the expression "election day" as used in
section 10. But although the statute requires that it be concluded upon that day. Subsequent
sections of the act show this most clearly. Section 21 is the section which, as a matter of fact,
provides for the actual operation of depositing the votes. It is there provided that the duly
qualified electors shall have access to the polls "from seven o'clock in the morning until five in
the afternoon." It also provides the method by which the ballots shall be deposited. If this is the
only meaning of the word "election" as used throughout the act, what relation to an election must
be attributed to the operation described in a subsequent section (No. 25) entitled "counting the
votes; announcement of the results?" 

Section 25 provides that the provincial board shall sit as a board of canvassers to tabulate the
statements prepared by the municipalities in accordance with section 24. Yet, that this canvass is
indispensable to the election of a delegate to the Assembly or a provincial officer cannot be
denied. The counting of the votes and the announcement of the results by the municipal officers,
and the canvass by the provincial board are integral parts of the election, and the word cannot,
therefore, be confined to the day upon which the ballots were cast. We think it too clear for
argument that the Legislature in saying that an election should be held on a specified date
intended only to convey the idea that the initial operation of selecting the candidate should start
upon that day. The expression is thus used so frequently and with this certain meaning in all
election statutes as to practically amount to an idiom of language, "the meaning of which as a
whole cannot be derived from the conjoined meanings of its elements."
 2. Moya v. Del Fierro
GR No. 46863. November 18, 1939

Topic: Election Laws; General Principles; Suffrage;

Doctrine: No technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that
intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde.

Facts: In the general elections held on December 14, 1937, respondent Agripino Ga. Del Fierro and
petitioner Ireneo Moya were contending candidates for the office of the mayor of the Municipality of
Paracale, Camarines Noret. After canvass of the returns, the Board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner as
the elected mayor with a majority of 102 votes. However, respondent Del Fierro filed a motion of protest
and judgment in the CFI of Camarines Norte which sustained the election of Moya with a plurality of 91
votes. Upon appeal, the CA ruled in favor Del Fierro. Thereafter, Moya filed the instant petition wherein
he alleged the following errors: In admitting and counting in favor or respondent Del Fierro,
a. 8 ballots either inadvertently or contrary to the controlling decisions of the SC;
b. 3 ballots marked “R. del Fierro”;
c. 7 ballots marked “Rufino del Fierro”;
d. 72 ballots marked “P. del Fierro:

Issue: Whether or not Moya’s petition should be granted? No.

Held: Del Fierro is the elected Mayor. Technical rules should not defeat the intention of the voters even
though the electorate made mistakes in writing the name of their desired candidate, it is apparent that they
voted for Del Fierro.

As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the
modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be
emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of
good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a
representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government and
whenever called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally,
is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable,
liberality. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection that whatever might have been said in
cases heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the
voter, if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde . This rule of
interpretation goes to the very root of the system. Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the
suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots which are now incorporated in section 144
of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No.357)
 3. Rulloda vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 154198 | January 20, 2003.

Topic: Election law; General Principles

Doctrine: Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the
electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of
their elective officials.

Facts:

Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido (Private Respondent) were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto.
Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. Romeo Rulloda died and her wife, Petitioner Betty Rulloda wrote a letter to the COMELEC
seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband, which the latter did not
allow and ordered for votes for the surname “Rulloda” to be labeled “not counted”. During elections, the surname Rulloda won.
Despite this, Placido was still the person proclaimed as the winner. Petitioner filed a petition for certiotari seeking the
nullification of the COMELEC’s order and for her to be proclaimed as the winner. Placido argues that petitioner did not file any
certificate of candidacy; hence, there was only one candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely, respondent Placido
himself.

Issues: WoN Rulloda’s substitution as candidate for her late husband is valid

Ruling:

Yes. The court first reiterated that an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote through
the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the
embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the candidate who has
obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the
basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution because there is no
political party from which to designate the substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the purpose
of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and
unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and
spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Contrary to respondent’s claim, the absence of a specific
provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution.
Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the
substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or party affiliations reign, a
fact that must have been subsumed by law. To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested
election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the
electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of
their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.
 4. Bagumbayan v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206719; April 10, 2019

Topic: Kinds, Manners and Scope of Election

Doctrine: See Ruling

Facts: In G.R. No. 206719, Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan) and Senator Richard J.
Gordon (Senator Gordon) filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus lodged with the Court under Section
3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for the purpose of compelling the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to comply with the provisions of Section 14 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, as amended
by R.A. No. 9369 or The Automated Election System (AES).

In G.R. No. 206784, the petitioners Tanggulang Demokrasya (Tan Dem), et al. filed a Special Civil
Action for Mandamus lodged with the Court under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for the
purposes of compelling COMELEC to use digital signatures in the electronic election returns, and provide
for the basic security safeguards, which include the source code review, vote verification, and the random
audit, in compliance with R.A. No. 9369.

For G.R. No. 206719 and

G.R. No. 207755

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436, otherwise known as the Election
Modernization Act of 1997, which authorized the COMELEC to adopt an automated election system
(AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national
and local elections.7

On January 23, 2007, R.A. No. 9369 was signed into law, amending among others certain
provisions of R.A. No. 8436, pertinently Section 10 of the latter.

SEC. 12. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 14. Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of the Source Code
for Review. - The Commission shall allow the political parties and candidates or their
representatives, citizens' arm or their representatives to examine and test the equipment or device to
be used in the voting and counting on the day of the electoral exercise, before voting start. Test ballots
and test forms shall be provided by the Commission.

Immediately after the examination and testing of the equipment or device, parties and candidates or their
representatives, citizen's arms or their representatives, may submit a written comment to the election
officer who shall immediately transmit it to the Commission for appropriate action.

The election officer shall keep minutes of the testing, a copy of which shall be submitted to the
Commission together with the minute of voting.
Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the
source code of that technology available and open to any interested political parry or groups which
may conduct their own review thereof.

To facilitate the review process as mandated by the law, the COMELEC promulgated Minute Resolution
No. 10-0138 on February 10, 2010, adopting the guidelines recommended by the COMELEC Advisory
Council and the Technical Evaluation Council (TEC). This resolution set the guidelines for the conduct of
the source code review, and was done a month before the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.

For the 2013 National and Local elections, the TEC submitted to the COMELEC on February 12,
2013 the former's resolution on the certification of the validity of AES for the 2013 elections. As required
by Section 9 of R.A. No. 9369, SLI Global Solutions (SLI), certified and categorically stated that "the
AES, including its hardware and software components, are operating properly, securely, and accurately,
in accordance with the provisions of the Act," and that the same could be used by the voters, board of
election inspectors (BEI), local and national boards of canvassers, as well as the COMELEC in the
aforementioned elections.

As a result of the aforementioned issuances, several parties, Parti do Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas Bayan,
Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino, the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting and the Liberal Party, in
separate letters to the COMELEC, requested for participation in the source code review. From April 10 to
24, 2013, these parties conducted the source code review for the Consolidated Canvassing System and
Elections Management System, but not for the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) source code, as the
same had not yet been released due to negotiations between the COMELEC, Dominion Voting Systems
(Dominion), and Smartmatic TIM (Smartmatic) over an issue involving a disagreement with the latter two
institutions.

This disagreement started on September 6, 2012, when Smartmatic filed an action with the Court of
Chancery in the State of Delaware in the United States against Dominion, to which the latter filed a
counterclaim. According to COMELEC, this termination birthed two (2) consequences: first, Smartmatic
lost its access to the program systems of Dominion, which signified that any counting error committed in
the following elections could not be corrected; and second, Smartmatic failed to deliver to the
COMELEC the source code, pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 8436, a failure that meant the said source
code would not be reviewable by any party or candidate participating in the 2013 elections.

The foregoing caused a delay in the availability of the source code, and thus, it was only on May 5, 2013
when a representative from SLI arrived in the Philippines with a copy of the PCOS source code that was
subjected to the trusted build.

On May 3, 2013, ten (10) days before the start of the elections, the petitioners filed the instant Petition
for Mandamus (With Extremely Urgent Prayer to Set Petition for Oral Arguments), to compel
COMELEC to obtain the source code and to make the same available for review of the petitioners and
other similarly situated parties.

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the Writ of Mandamus to compel COMELEC to
open up the source code review for the elections immediately for the review of the petitioners and other
similarly situated parties. NO.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the Writ of Mandamus (a) to compel COMELEC to use
digital signatures in the electronic transmission of electronic election returns; (b) to provide for vote
verification in the casting of votes, and provide for randomness in the selection of precincts for the
manual audit; and (c) to postpone the elections until such time that provisions for the use of digital
signatures, review of the source code, vote verification and randomness of manual audit are set in place.
NO.

Ruling: 1. As the thrust of its Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, the petitioners firmly advance their
narrative that the COMELEC failed to comply with Section 14 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section
12 of R.A. No. 9369 The brunt of the petitioners' grievances lies in the alleged procrastination and
negligence in both obtaining the source code, as well as the delay in making the same available for review
to all concerned. This delay is attributed to the requirements for review as found in the assailed
resolutions issued by the COMELEC, which go against the mandate of R.A. No. 8436 to "promptly make
the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which
may conduct their own review thereof."

By introducing requirements deemed as difficult to obtain and fulfill before the source code would be
reviewable by an interested party, the petitioners advocate that the respondents, in effect, ensured that the
source code could not promptly be made reviewable, which would then go against the express provisions
of the pertinent statute. Thus, the petitioners pray for Mandamus that would direct the COMELEC to
allow the source code review even if there is a lack of compliance or even complete non-compliance for
the requirements for review as promulgated by the COMELEC.

To counter the petitioners' claim, the respondents put forth the defense that the strict nature of the
guidelines is necessary in order to safeguard the process, and that the COMELEC has the power to
regulate the conduct of the review through its guidelines.

The respondents also posit the view that Resolution No. 9651, being the product of official acts, enjoys
the presumption of regularity which all parties interested in reviewing the source codes must observe.

As a matter of great importance, the Court takes judicial notice  of the recent Resolution No. 10423
promulgated on September 21, 2018, or the Guidelines on the Conduct of the Local Source Code
Review of the Automated Election Systems for the 13 May 2019 National and Local Elections by
Interested Parties and Groups.

As a result of this new issuance, the dictates of procedural due process behoove the Court to dismiss the
prayer for the Writ of Mandamus as to the source code. The Court holds that there has ceased to be a
justiciable controversy.

In this case, the supervening event is found in the superseding of the assailed resolutions on the source
code review with a new resolution, which pertains to the source code review for the upcoming 2019
elections. In Resolution 10423, it is observed that the COMELEC modified the qualifications for the local
source code reviewer, to wit:

Sec. 5. Qualifications. The source code reviewer must be duly-authorized by the interested party or group
and must be knowledgeable in computer programming languages and must be able to understand
computer language preferably on the following programming languages and systems: C/C++, Java
application development, Bash, Object Oriented Programming Language, Unix-like systems, and linux
operating system.

The prescribed qualification is to ensure that the code reviewer can understand and appreciate the source
codes of the AES to be reviewed. The interested parties and groups are expected to choose their reviewers
based on this consideration.

Sec. 6. Number of Reviewers; Limitations. Each interested party or group may appoint primary and
secondary code reviewers for each system. However, depending on the availability of space at any given
time, each party or group may be limited to field only one (1) qualified reviewer at a given time.

The Court also observes that the application process contained in Resolution No. 10423 contains several
steps before an interested party may actually get around to reviewing the source code. To wit:

IV. APPLICATION FOR THE LOCAL SOURCE CODE REVIEW

SEC. 7. Procedure. The interested party or group must submit a written request addressed to the Local
Source Code Review Ad-hoc Committee signifying its intent to participate including its attachments. The
written request must be signed by the duly-authorized representative of the party or group.

SEC. 8. Written Request; Contents. The written request shall contain the following details:

i. Name of the interested party or group;

ii. Intent to participate in the conduct of the local source code review;

iii. Name of the local source code reviewer/s and the latter's credentials;

iv. Signature of the duly-authorized representative of the interested party or group.

For this purpose, interested parties and groups shall completely fill-out Annex "A" of this resolution.

SEC. 9. Annexes to the written request. The written request shall attach the resume of the local source
code reviewer specifically mentioning his or her experience in computer programming or related field.
Said resume shall be under oath.

For IT Groups, a favorable recommendation from the CAC and/or the DICT shall also be attached.

For Civil Society Organizations, a brief summary of the electoral reforms initiated or supported shall also
be attached.

In the event that the interested parties or groups cannot submit the complete requirements, a reasonable
explanation must also be attached.

SEC. 10. Approval. All requests filed within the specified period shall be subject to the approval of the
Local Source Code Review Ad-hoc Committee. The approval or denial shall be based on the following:
i. Request and its attachments;

ii. Presence of Qualifications;

iii. Date and time of the request received, if applicable; and

iv. Availability of slots/space in the source code review room.

The approval or denial of the request shall be sent to the e-mail address of the interested party or group
used in the application.

The approval of the request shall also be posted in the official website of the Commission on Elections.

As this Resolution No. 10423 now governs the conduct of the upcoming elections, and any automated
election from here on out unless it, itself, is superseded by another, the cause of action of the petitioners
has ceased to exist.

Despite its aforementioned misgivings about the conduct of the COMELEC at the time the consolidated
petition was filed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to this important development in the case's factual
milieu, the issuance of the new Resolution No. 10423. Thus, as to the source code review, with a mention
that the COMELEC should be more circumspect when it comes to its rule-making power, the Court rules
that the claims of the petitioners are moot and academic.

2. As for those subjects not related to the source code review, the Court finds that Mandamus does not lie
as regards the other claims of the petitioners, specifically to compel the COMELEC to use digital
signatures in the electronic transmission of electronic election returns, to provide for vote verification in
the casting of votes, and provide for randomness in the selection of precincts for the manual audit, and to
postpone the elections until such time that provisions for the use of digital signatures, review of the
source code, vote verification and randomness of manual audit are set in place.

As to the issue on the digital signatures, Tan Dem, et al. state that the COMELEC removed the
requirement of digital signatures, in supposed violation of the automated election laws. The petitioners
disagree that the "machine signature" of a PCOS machine may be the functional equivalent of the
aforementioned "digital signature." First, property such as a PCOS machine cannot be a valid substitute
because, as property, it cannot assume the identity of a person, only the latter able to acquire rights and to
be the object of legal relations.

Likewise, the COMELEC was alleged to have disabled the vote verification of the PCOS machines that
would have shown the actual votes as aptly scanned and read. Instead, the PCOS machines merely
displayed the statement "Congratulations. Your vote has been registered." According to Tan Dem,  et al.,
these statements only confirm that the voting process was finished, but not necessarily that the votes were
actually read and recorded, as the votes were never displayed for confirmation.

Finally, as for the allegation that there was a complete lack of randomness in the manual audit,
COMELEC states that Tan Dem, et al. misconstrue the law, and that the term "random" pertains to the
randomness of the selection of the precincts subject of the audit, not that the audit was to be done secretly
or by surprise.
It is critical to note that the Court En Banc has already recognized that the PCOS machines produce
digital signatures. In Archbishop Capalla,61 the Court clarified during the oral arguments that there is no
infirmity as regards the signature of a PCOS machine being the equivalent of a digital signature.  The
Court, in that case, categorically stated that the PCOS machines produce digitally-signed signatures, and
the Court sees no need to disturb that finding absent any compelling evidence to the contrary adduced by
the petitioners.

The law is clear that the "randomness'" being advocated by Tan Dem, et al. refers to the random choice of
the precinct per congressional district, and not the disclosure of the precincts which were in fact shown to
have been randomly selected. According to Section 29 of R.A. No. 8436:

SEC. 29. Random Manual Audit. - Where the AES is used, there shall be a random manual audit in one
precinct per congressional district randomly chosen by the Commission in each province and city. Any
difference between the automated and manual count will result in the determination of root cause and
initiate a manual count for those precincts affected by the computer or procedural error.

The Court notes that the COMELEC was able to comply with the legal requirement by developing a
system that replaced the previous manual method of random selection, and resulted in the random
selection of 234 sample clustered precincts. And, as previously mentioned, the point is moot with the
promulgation of Resolution No. 10458, which will govern the May 13, 2019 elections and the subsequent
elections.

5. Brillantes v. Yorac
G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990

Topic: Election Laws; The Commission on Elections; Composition

Doctrine: The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under the
discretion of the COMELEC and not of the President. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even
with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.

Facts: The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of Associate Commissioner Haydee
B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC.
The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, where President Elpidio
Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting member of the COMELEC and the Court revoked the
designation as contrary to Article IX-C, Section 1(2) Constitution. It is also alleged that the respondent is
not even the senior member of the COMELEC, being outranked by Associate Commissioner Alfredo E.
Abueg, Jr.
 The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
President of the Philippines violates their independence.

Issue: Whether the President has the power to designate an Acting Chairman of the COMELEC. NO.

Ruling: Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of
the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions
conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as
provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the
Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is still
a government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all,
did not call for presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the
COMELEC themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the COMELEC would most likely have
been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice
and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

6 – Funa vs. Villar

G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Guillermo N. Carague  as Chairman of the

Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution.
Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008.

Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar

(Villar) as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004
until February 2, 2011.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as
COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008
to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as
Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the
appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner
or on February 2, 2011. 

Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura) was appointed as COA

Commissioner to serve the unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner or up to February 2, 2011.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office
upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA
Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after
having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in
light of the term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1
(2), Art. IX(D)1 of the Constitution and if valid how long can he serve?

HELD:

The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.

1
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years,
and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for
five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be
reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was
appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of
seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from "dominating"
the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.

The same purpose obtains in the second sentence of Sec. 1(2). The Constitutional Convention
barred reappointment to be extended to commissioner-members first appointed under the 1987
Constitution to prevent the President from controlling the commission. Thus, the first Chairman
appointed under the 1987 Constitution who served the full term of seven years can no longer be
extended a reappointment. Neither can the Commissioners first appointed for the terms of five
years and three years be eligible for reappointment. This is the plain meaning attached to the
second sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D).

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from
commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven
years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that "the appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor." In addition,
such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan
or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service
of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position
of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance,
validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution
decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4
years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said
rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear
purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set
of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like
respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as
chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of
the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as
the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated
circumstances or conditions.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a
fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by
the Constitution.

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or

impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full
term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any
position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of
the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that
the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal
by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means
a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to
Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or
office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the
strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting

capacity.
 7. Francisco vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 230249, 2018

Topic: COMELEC Powers and Functions

Doctrine: The present Constitution clarifies that the COMELEC retains its character as an administrative
agency notwithstanding its authority to resolve election contests. As enunciated, the COMELEC's
adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial in character since the COMELEC is a
governmental body, other than a court, that is vested with jurisdiction to decide the specific class of
controversies it Is charged with resolving. In adjudicating the rights of persons before it, the COMELEC
is not just empowered but is in fact required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise
of discretion in a judicial nature.

Facts:
Francisco is a registered voter in Cainta, Rizal, while Nieto was elected as mayor of the same
municipality in 2013. Nieto filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) to signify his bid for re-election for the
2016 National and Local Elections.

On April 8, 2016, Francisco filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Nieto,
docketed as SPA 16-062(DC), alleging that on April 1-2, 2016, respondent made financial contributions
out of the government coffers for the asphalt-paving of the road entrance along Imelda Avenue of Cainta
Green Park Village. This, according to petitioner, amounted to the expending of public funds within
forty-five (45) days before the 2016 polls and to illegal contributions for road repairs, respectively
punishable under Sees. 261(v) and 104 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC). Petitioner further claimed that the said asphalt paving was one of the
accomplishments that respondent reported on his Facebook page.

In his Answer filed on April 22, 2016, Nieto countered that the questioned asphalting project was
subjected to public bidding on March 15, 2016, with a Notice of Award issued on March 21, 2016. Thus,
the asphalting project falls within the excepted public works mentioned in Sec. 261(v)(l)(b) of the OEC.

During the preliminary conference on May 5, 2016, the counsels for the parties marked their respective
pieces of evidence. Thereafter, an Order was issued giving them ten (10) days to file their respective
memoranda. The COMELEC would receive copies of the memoranda on May 16, 2016 and, thereafter,
the case was deemed submitted for resolution. In the interim, Nieto would be re-elected as municipal
mayor of Cainta, Rizal, having garnered the plurality of votes upon the conclusion of the 2016 polls.

Issue/s:
 1. Whether or not the COMELEC acted in grave abuse of discretion in ruling that a petition
for disqualification under Sec. 68 of the OEC cannot prosper without a prior judgment
finding the respondent guilty of an election offense. NO. (MAIN ISSUE)
2. Whether or not petitioner sufficiently established by substantial evidence that respondent
violated Secs. 261(v) and 104 of the OEC. NO.

Ruling:
1. No, Comelec did not commit a grave abuse of discretion.

The COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial in character since
the COMELEC is a governmental body, other than a court, that is vested with jurisdiction to
decide the specific class of controversies it Is charged with resolving. In adjudicating the rights of
persons before it, the COMELEC is not just empowered but is in fact required to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from
them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. This is simply
in congruence with the concept of due process that all administrative adjudicatory bodies are
enjoined to observe.

The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation to
the election contests before it. This has been the thrust of the decade’s worth of constitutional
revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a purely administrative body, whose scope of
decision making is limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce election laws, to a polling
commission that also exercises original and exclusive, as well as appellate, jurisdiction over
election contests.

Considering the historical evolution of the COMELEC, the Court now declares that the polling
body has full adjudicatory powers to resolve election contests outside the jurisdiction of the
electoral tribunals. To rule otherwise would be an act of regression, contrary to the intent behind
the constitutional innovations creating and further strengthening the Commission.

To reiterate, the COMELEC, as an adjunct to its adjudicatory power. may investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings. weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action.

It may be true that the sole ground for Petitions to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC is false
material representation compounded by intent to deceive on the part of the candidate and that the
intent to deceive or mislead will be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain absent an established
fact that the candidate deviated from. Contrary to Poe, the Court categorically rules herein that
the COMELEC can be the  proper  body to make the pronouncement against which the truth or
falsity of a material representation in a COC can be measured. But lest it be misunderstood, these
disquisitions will not by any means alter the outcome of Poe, for even if We dispense the
requirement of a predicate judgment therein and uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, the
Court's conclusion would still find mooring on the factual findings on Poe's Filipino blood
relation and residency.
 2. No, Petitioner have not submitted a substantial evidence in the case filed.

The quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Corollarily, the
rule is that he who alleges must prove. Thus, the burden is on Francisco to establish through
substantial evidence that Nieto unlawfully disbursed government funds during the election ban, a
burden that Francisco failed to discharge.

There is simply a dearth of evidence to support petitioner's claim that respondent violated Sec.
261(v) of the OEC. To be sure, petitioner merely submitted the following to support his
allegations:
1. Pictures of the asphalt-paving along Imelda Avenue of Cainta Green Park Village,
Barangay San Isidro, Cainta, Rizal;
2. Picture of the Facebook page of the respondent acknowledging the project as one of the
accomplishments of his administration; and
3. Picture of a tarpaulin banner expressing gratitude for the asphalt-paving.

The photographs petitioner presented depicting the construction and works done on the asphalting
project would only prove the fact of paving, which is not even contested. They do not, however,
establish that respondent expended public funds or made financial contributions during the
election prohibition.

On the other hand, respondent Nieto sufficiently parried the alleged commission of the election
offenses by proving that the asphalting project squarely falls under the exception in Sec. 261 (v)
(l)(b). The provision states:

v. Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. - Any public official or
employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before
a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:

1. Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

xxxx
b. Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or by negotiated
contract awarded, before the forty-five day period before election: Provided, That
work for the purpose of this section undertaken under the so-called "takay" or "paquiao"
system shall not be considered as work by contract; (emphasis added)

The Court is in concurrence with the observations of Commissioners Luie Tito F. Guia and Ma.
Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon that the evidence on record sufficiently proved that the expenditure
 for the road repair is exempted from the prohibition under Sec. 261 (v) of the OEC. Private
respondent Nieto was able to show with competent evidence that the bidding for and the award of
the subject project were regular and done consistent with existing laws. The charge for illegal
contribution under Sec. 104 of the OEC has even less leg to stand on. There was no contribution
to speak of since it was established that the asphalting work was a government project and not a
contribution.

There being substantial evidence to support Nieto's defense that the construction procurement for
the project was aboveboard, there is then no reason to disturb public respondent's rulings. No
abuse of discretion, let alone one that is grave, can be attributed to the COMELEC Second
Division in dismissing the Petition for Disqualification, nor to the COMELEC En Banc in
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court declares that in a Petition for
Disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a prior judgment by a
competent court that the candidate is guilty of an election offense is not required before the
said petition can be entertained or given due course by the Commission on Elections.

9. Aquino vs. COMELEC (2015)

Topic: Election Laws: COMELEC- Powers and Functions
Doctrine: The Constitutions and the laws grant COMELEC with the power (1) to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election; and (2) to promulgate rules and regulation.
The Constitution and law also grant the COMELEC with powers, necessary and incidental to achieve the
objective of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Facts:
Aquino, as President and CEO of Philheath issued a reassignment order directing the reassignment of
several PhilHealth officers and employees. In view of the reassignment order and its directive, Dean
Avila, consultant to chairman of Board of PhilHealth and former Secretary of PhilHealth BOD, filed
before COMELEC a complaint against Aquino for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 in
relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881. Adre, Alonto, and Macabato also filed before the COMELEC a
similar complaint. The complaints were subsequently consolidated. Aquino filed a petition before the
COMELEC and argued that the reassignment order is beyond the coverage of COMELEC Resolution as
he issued the order prior to the start of the election period in 2010. COMELEC declared that Aquino
violated Section 261(h) of BP 881 which considers an election offense “any public official who makes or
causes the transfer or detail whatever of any public officer or employee in the civil service xxx within the
election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.”
To the COMELEC, a transfer/reassignment order must be issued and implemented prior to the start of the
election period to be excluded from the coverage of the transfer ban. Aquino argued that the COMELEC
exceeded its authority and maintained that the addition of the term “whatever” was never meant to
include within the coverage of the prohibition any mode of personnel action other than transfer and detail.

Issue:Document6

1. Did the COMELEC validly issued the Resolution No. 8737 that defined transfer as contemplated
under Section 261(h) of BP 881, to include all personnel action including reassignments? YES
2. Did COMELEC validly found prima facie case against Aquino for violation of Resolution 8737 in
relation of Section 261(h)? NO
Held:

1. YES. The COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 is valid. Art. IX, Section 6 of the Constitution
provides that COMELEC may promulgate its own rules. Section 2 of the same article states that
the COMELEC may enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. BP 881 provides that COMELEC shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. Obviously, the Constitution and of
the law to grant the COMELEC with powers, necessary and incidental to achieve the objective of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. In exercising these powers and
fulfilling its mandate, the COMELEC, in addition, must necessarily interpret the provisions of the
law that they are to enforce and for which they will craft the guidelines. Thus, to this extent and
in this sense, the COMELEC likewise exercises the power of legal interpretation pursuant to the
legal principle that the grant of a power includes all the powers necessary for the exercise of the
power expressly given. However, the grant to COMELEC of its interpretative powers are not
without limitation. The exercise of these powers should always be read with the Constitution and
the laws from where it draws its powers.

Here, the COMELEC did not exceed the exercise of its rule-making power. The reassignment is
included in the prohibition pursuant to the phrase “transfer or detail whatever”. The COMELEC’s
interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" based on the case
of Regalado’s interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent. The interpretation that
includes any form of personnel action, such as reassignment, within the coverage of the phrase
precisely guards against any such electioneering and political harassment situations. This
interpretation also more vigorously enforces the aim not only of BP 881, but more importantly of
the Constitution to secure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Thus, to reiterate
and emphasize - the election law's prohibition on transfer or detail covers any movement of
personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency when
made or caused during the election period.

2. NO. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding that Aquino violated the
Resolution. Aquino completed the act of making or causing the reassignment of the affected
PHIC officers and employees before the start of the election period. As Aquino's acts of issuing
the order fell outside the coverage of the transfer prohibition, he cannot be held liable for
violation of Section 261(h). The issuing orders that were clearly not for reassignment, but which
were simply orders for retention of position or orders for temporary discharge of additional
duties. The COMELEC also went beyond the clear contemplation and intention of the law and of
existing jurisprudence when it included within the prohibition's coverage
the implementation aspect of the reassignment process - acts that were obviously no longer
within his active and immediate control and beyond the ambit of making or causing to which the
prohibition applies.
 10. Dumarpa vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192249, April 2, 2013

Topic: Election Laws; The Commission on Elections; Powers and Functions

Doctrine: The COMELEC’s broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall," carries with it all necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.

Facts: Petitioner Salic Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st District of Lanao del Sur
during the 10 May 2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in seven (7)
municipalities, including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao and Kapai, which are
situated in the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del Sur. The conduct of special elections in
the seven (7) Lanao del Sur municipalities was originally scheduled for 29 May 2010. The COMELEC
issued a Resolution resetting the special elections to 3 June 2010.

Subsequently, COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 8965 which provided, among others,
the constitution of a Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and Clustering of Precincts
in Section 12. Dumarpa filed the instant petition alleging that "both provisions on Re-clustering of
Precincts (Section 12) and constitution of SBEIs [Special Board of Election Inspectors] (Section 4) affect
the Muncipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely doom petitioner to certain defeat, if its
implementation is not restrained or prohibited by the Honorable Supreme Court."

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in incorporating Sections 12
and 14 in Resolution No. 8965. - No.

Ruling: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8965 in the exercise of its plenary powers in the conduct of
elections enshrined in the Constitution and statute. Thus, it brooks no argument that the COMELEC’s
broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall," carries with it all necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. As stated in
Sumulong v. COMELEC:
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically - not from the
standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts
with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.

xxxx

There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to
evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the
laws relative to the conduct of elections x x x, we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the
Commission on Elections that initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.

Plainly, it is precisely to prevent another occurrence of a failure of elections in the fifteen (15)
municipalities in the province of Lanao del Sur that the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No.
8965. The COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is in the best position to assess the
actual condition prevailing in that area and to make judgment calls based thereon.

11. Gallardo vs. Tabamo, 218 SCRA 253 (1994)

Topic: Election Laws; COMELEC; Powers and Functions

Doctrine:
The trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an election offense under Omnibus Election Code is
clearly inconsistent with the COMELEC’s Constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of elections. Under the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has broader powers.
The trial court arrogating unto itself the powers granted to the COMELEC impedes the vision of the
Constitution for a truly independent COMELEC in ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.

Facts:
Respondent filed his Petition against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or
prosecuting certain public works projects as it violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the
Omnibus Election Code because although they were initiated few days before March 27, 1992, the date
the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of
work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works project.

On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO. In the same order, he directed the
petitioners to file their Answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the
Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally
involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in
the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court.

Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case. NONE

Ruling:
In Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, the court stated: “considering that the Commission on Elections is vested by the
Constitution with exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a case involving the
enforcement of the Election Code "is at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing
statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and unmistakable
in recent decisions."

The present Constitution and extant election laws have further strengthened the foundation for the above
doctrine; there can be no doubt that the present COMELEC has broader powers than its predecessors.
While under the 1935 Constitution it had "exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections," exercised "all other functions x x x conferred upon it by law"
and had the power to deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for
the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections, and under the 1973 Constitution it had' inter
alia, the power to (a) "[E]nforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections" (b)
"[D]eputize, with the consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections," and (c) "[P]erform such other functions as my be provided
by law," it was not expressly vested with the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. That power could only originate from a special law enacted by Congress; this is the necessary
implication of the above constitutional provision authorizing the Commission to "[P]erform such other
functions as may be provided by law."

The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules
and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IXC thereof reads as follows: "SEC. 2. The
Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: (1) Enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall." (Emphasis supplied). xxx The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973
Constitutions. It is thus clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into account the
Commission's power under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in
force when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified, to: x x x "Promulgate rules and regulations
implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer, x x x."

Under the present law, however, except in case of urgent need, the appointment or hiring of new
employees or the creation or filling up of new positions in any government office, agency or
instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, is
banned during the period of forty-five (45) days before a regular election and thirty (30) days before a
special election if made without the prior authority of the Commission on Elections. A violation thereof
constitutes an election offense. Then too, no less than the present Constitution—and not just the Election
Law as was the case at the time of Zaldivar—expressly provides that the Commission may
"[R]ecommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition
of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or
decision." Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to "investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
 CASE NO. 13
G.R. No. 112093 October 4, 1994
ANTONIO V.A. TAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOCTRINE: The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and
control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement
agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections.
In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and employees of government carry out their respective
assigned tasks, the law has also provided than upon the COMELEC's recommendation, the corresponding proper
authority (the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either to
suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of
election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC.

FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Tan was an incumbent Prosecutor of Davao City. He was desgninated by the
COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of City Board Canvasser of Davao City. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed as the
winning candidate for the congressional Second District of Davao City. Private respondent Alterado, himself a
candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and
accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the
COMELEC thereover, he being under the Executive Department of the government. The COMELEC denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner contends that the COMELEC has committed
grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction in continuing to take action on the administrative case

SUMMARY: Petitioner Prosecutor was designated a Vice-Chairman of Board Canvasser of Davao. When the
Board of Canvasser of Davao City proclaimed the winner candidate, and administrative case was filed against the
Board of Canvasser. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case assailing that COMELEC has no power to try the case
since he was an employee of Executive Department. The COMELEC dismiss his motion. Hence the case was
elevated to SC. The SC ruled that the COMELEC has the power to try the case. (please read the above doctrine).

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the case knowing that the Petitioner was is an employee of
Executive Department?

RULING: Yes, the COMELEC has the power to handle this case even though the Petitioner is an employee of
Executive Department (Department of Justice).
The Supreme Court held that:
The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when
it comes to election matters. In respect particularly to sanctions against election offenses, we quote:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omission
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized or the imposition of any
other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
Additionally, Section 52, Article VII, of the Omnibus Election Code, provides:

Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. — In addition to the powers and functions conferred
upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:

a. Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including
members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMP Cadets eighteen years of age
and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.

It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with,
the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor.
The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and control
over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement
agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and employees of government carry out
their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided than upon the COMELEC's recommendation, the
corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take
appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due
process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or
rulings of the COMELEC.

Unavoidably, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first satisfy itself that there indeed has
been an infraction of the law, or of its directives issued conformably therewith, by the person administratively
charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being in the best position to assess how its deputized
officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties, that should conduct the administrative inquiry.
To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials
and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the
proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of
due process to the official or employee concerned.

Observe, nevertheless, that the COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action but that it is
the executive department to which the charged official or employee belongs which has the ultimate authority to
impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from, but is congruent with, the general
administrative authority of the department of government concerned over its own personnel.

Hence the COMELEC has the power to investigate the case of the Petitioner and has the power the power to
recommend the result of administrative case to the Secretary of Justice.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

 14. GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, supra
G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

Topic: Powers and Functions

Doctrine: There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily
authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations – or reasonable
basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do,
in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be
exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules
especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it
has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis.

Facts: Assailed in these petitions are certain regulations promulgated by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) relative to the conduct of the 2013 national and local elections dealing with political
advertisements. Specifically, the petitions question the constitutionality of the limitations placed on
aggregate airtime allowed to candidates and political parties, as well as the requirements incident thereto,
such as the need to report the same, and the sanctions imposed for violations.

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty
(120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect
during the forthcoming elections.

The heart of the controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation of the limitation on the number of
minutes that candidates may use for television and radio advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9006 (R.A. No. 9006), otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. Pertinent portions of
said provision state, thus:
Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. – All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall
have equal access to media time and space. The following guidelines may be amplified on by the
COMELEC:
xxxx
6.2 (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be
entitled to not more than one hundred twenty (120) minutes of television advertisement and one hundred
eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
b. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to not
more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement
whether by purchase or donation.

For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to the COMELEC
a copy of its broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the review and verification of the
frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements broadcast for any candidate or political party.

During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued Resolutions
implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime limitations, to mean that a
candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes “per station.” For the May 2013 elections,
however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing the
interpretation of said candidates’ and political parties’ airtime limitation for political campaigns or
advertisements from a “per station” basis, to “total aggregate” basis.

Petitioners ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN), ABC Development Corporation (ABC), GMA Network,
Incorporated ( GMA), Manila Broadcasting Company, Inc. (MBC), Newsounds Broadcasting Network,
Inc. (NBN), and Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN) are owners/operators of radio and television
networks in the Philippines, while petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) is the
national organization of broadcasting companies in the Philippines representing operators of radio and
television stations and said stations themselves. They sent their respective letters to the COMELEC
questioning the provisions of the Resolution, thus, the COMELEC held public hearings. Thereafter, on
February 1, 2013, respondent issued Resolution No. 9631 amending provisions of Resolution No. 9615.
Nevertheless, petitioners still found the provisions objectionable and oppressive, hence, the present
petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the Comelec resolution is valid.

Held: No. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous COMELEC
resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on political advertisements. This essentially consists in
computing the airtime on an aggregate basis involving all the media of broadcast communications
compared to the past where it was done on a per station basis. Thus, it becomes immediately obvious that
there was effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and political
parties would be able to campaign through the air. The question is accordingly whether this is within the
power of the COMELEC to do or not. The Court holds that it is not within the power of the COMELEC
to do so.

a. Past elections and airtime limits

The authority of the COMELEC to impose airtime limits directly flows from the Fair Election Act (R.A.
No. 9006 [2001]) – one hundred (120) minutes of television advertisement and one-hundred· eighty (180)
minutes for radio advertisement. For the 2004 elections, the respondent COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 6520 implementing the airtime limits by applying said limitation on a per station basis.
Such manner of determining airtime limits was likewise adopted for the 2007 elections, through
Resolution No. 7767. In the 2010 elections, under Resolution No. 8758, the same was again adopted. But
for the 2013 elections, the COMELEC, through Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No.
9631, chose to aggregate the total broadcast time among the different broadcast media, thus: Section 9.
Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of Election Propaganda through Mass Media. – All parties
and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space for their election propaganda
during the campaign period subject to the following requirements and/or limitations:
a. Broadcast Election Propaganda

The duration of an airtime that a candidate, or party may use for their broadcast advertisements or
election propaganda shall be, as follows:

For Candidates/Registered Political parties for a National Elective Position

Not more than an aggregate total of one hundred (120) minutes of television advertising, whether
appearing on national, regional, or local, free or cable television, and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes of radio advertising, whether airing on national, regional, or local radio, whether by
purchase or donation

For Candidates/Registered Political parties for a Local Elective Position

 Not more than an aggregate total of sixty (60) minutes of television advertising, whether
appearing on national, regional, or local, free or cable television, and ninety (90) minutes of radio
advertising, whether airing on national, regional, or local radio, whether by purchase or donation.

In cases where two or more candidates or parties whose names, initials, images, brands, logos,
insignias, color motifs, symbols, or forms of graphical representations are displayed, exhibited,
used, or mentioned together in the broadcast election propaganda or advertisements, the length of
time during which they appear or are being mentioned or promoted will be counted against the
airtime limits allotted for the said candidates or parties and the cost of the said advertisement will
likewise be considered as their expenditures, regardless of whoever paid for the advertisements or
to whom the said advertisements were donated. x
xxx

Corollarily, petitioner-intervenor, Senator Cayetano, alleges:

6.15. The change in the implementation of Section 6 of R.A. 9006 was undertaken by respondent
Comelec without consultation with the candidates for the 2013 elections, affected parties such as
media organizations, as well as the general public. Worse, said change was put into effect without
explaining the basis therefor and without showing any data in support of such change.
Respondent Comelec merely maintained that such action “is meant to level the playing field
between the moneyed candidates and those who don’t have enough resources,” without
particularizing the empirical data upon which such a sweeping statement was based. This was
evident in the public hearing held on 31 January 2013 where petitioner GMA, thru counsel,
explained that no empirical data on he excesses or abuses of broadcast media were brought to the
attention of the public by respondent Comelec, or even stated in the Comelec Resolution No.
9615.
Given the foregoing observations about what happened during the hearing, Petitioner-Intervenor went on
to allege that:
6.16. Without any empirical data upon which to base the regulatory measures in Section 9 (a),
respondent Comelec arbitrarily changed the rule from per station basis to aggregate airtime basis.
Indeed, no credence should be given to the cliched explanation of respondent Comelec (i.e.
leveling the playing field) in its published statements which in itself is a mere reiteration of the
rationale for the enactment of the political ad ban of Republic Act No. 6646, and which has
likewise been foisted when said political ad ban was lifted by R.A. 9006.
From the foregoing, it does appear that the COMELEC did not have any other basis for coming up with a
new manner of determining allowable time limits except its own idea as to what should be the maximum
number of minutes based on its exercise of discretion as to how to level the playing field. The same could
be encapsulized in the remark of the COMELEC Chairman that “if the Constitution allows us to regulate
and then it gives us the prerogative to amplify then the prerogative to amplify you should leave this to the
discretion of the Commission.”

The Court could not agree with what appears as a nonchalant exercise of discretion, as expounded anon. 
b. COMELEC is duty bound to come up with reasonable basis changing the interpretation
implementation of the airtime limits. 

There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to
enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations – or reasonable basis. It
could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do,
in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that
must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply
change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner
in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient
basis.

Based on the transcripts of the hearing conducted by the COMELEC after it had already promulgated the
Resolution, the respondent did not fully explain or justify the change in computing the airtime allowed
candidates and political parties, except to make reference to the need to “level the playing field.” If the
“per station” basis was deemed enough to comply with that objective in the past, why should it now be
suddenly inadequate? And the short answer to that from the respondent, in a manner which smacks of
overbearing exercise of discretion, is that it is within the discretion of the COMELEC. As quoted in the
transcript, “the right to amplify is with the COMELEC. Nobody can encroach in our right to amplify.
Now, if in 2010 the Commission felt that per station or per network is the rule then that is the prerogative
of the Commission then they could amplify it to expand it. If the current Commission feels that 120 is
enough for the medium like TV and 180 for radio, that is our prerogative. How can you encroach and
what is unconstitutional about it?”

There is something basically wrong with that manner of explaining changes in administrative rules. For
one, it does not really provide a good basis for change. For another, those affected by such rules must be
given a better explanation why the previous rules are no longer good enough. As the Court has said in one
case:
While stability in the law, particularly in the business field, is desirable, there is no demand that
the NTC slavishly follow precedent. However, we think it essential, for the sake of clarity and
intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action,
that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need be, why the previous
standards should no longer apply or should be overturned. Such explanation is warranted in order
to sufficiently establish a decision as having rational basis. Any inconsistent decision lacking
thorough, ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary. And any decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.

What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to that level of requirement and accountability
which elevates administrative rules to the level of respectability and acceptability. Those governed by
administrative regulations are entitled to a reasonable and rational basis for any changes in those rules by
which they are supposed to live by, especially if there is a radical departure from the previous ones.

c. The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in adopting “aggregate”
basis in the determination of allowable airtime

The law, which is the basis of the regulation subject of these petitions, pertinently provides:
6.2. (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be
entitled to not more than one hundred twenty (120) minutes of television advertisement and one hundred
eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.

(b) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to
not more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio
advertisement whether by purchase or donation; x x x

The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be based on
the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations. Senator Cayetano has called our
attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime allowed – that it should be on a “per station” basis.

This is further buttressed by the fact that the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) actually repealed the
previous provision, Section ll (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited direct political
advertisements the so-called “political ad ban.” If under the previous law, no candidate was allowed to
directly buy or procure on his own his broadcast or print campaign advertisements, and that he must get it
through the COMELEC Time or COMELEC Space, R.A. No. 9006 relieved him or her from that
restriction and allowed him or her to broadcast time or print space subject to the limitations set out in the
law. Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 9006, felt that the previous law was not an effective and efficient
way of giving voice to the people. Noting the debilitating effects of the previous law on the right of
suffrage and Philippine democracy, Congress decided to repeal such rule by enacting the Fair Election
Act.

The Court agrees. The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it
unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate
with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling
the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the COMELEC has done is
analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast
time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot
of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national
candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that
he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more
readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper
the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.

Respondent itself states that “television is arguably the most cost effective medium of dissemination.
Even a slight increase in television exposure can significantly boost a candidate’s popularity, name recall
and electability.” If that be so, then drastically curtailing the ability of a candidate to effectively reach out
to the electorate would unjustifiably curtail his freedom to speak as a means of connecting with the
people.

Finally on this matter, it is pertinent to quote what Justice Black wrote in his concurring opinion in the
landmark Pentagon Papers case: “In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the
protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed,
not the governors. The Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would
remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets
of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception
in government.”

In the ultimate analysis, when the press is silenced, or otherwise muffled in its undertaking of acting as a
sounding board, the people ultimately would be the victims. 
 15. CAGAS vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 209185 (2013)

Topic: COMELEC; Powers and Functions

Doctrines: The Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
The COMELEC has "exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections." The text and intent of
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."

The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February
2013, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 May 2013 as
mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the
province of Davao Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360.
The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of
the plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it
with the Barangay Elections.

Facts: Marc Douglas IV C. Cagas (Cagas) filed, in his capacity as taxpayer, to prohibit the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections within the whole province of
Davao del Sur, except in Davao City.
Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon.
Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the same province, House Bill
No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed
into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental.

Sections 2 and 7 of R.A. No. 10360 provide for the composition of the new provinces of Davao
Occidental and Davao del Sur:

Sec. 2. Province of Davao Occidental. – There is hereby created a new province from the present
Province of Davao del Sur to be known as the Province of Davao Occidental, consisting of the
municipalities of Sta. Maria, Malita, Don Marcelino, Jose Abad Santos and Sarangani. The territorial
jurisdiction of the Province of Davao Occidental shall be within the present metes and bounds of all the
municipalities that comprise the Province of Davao Occidental.

Sec. 7. Legislative District. – The Province of Davao Occidental shall have its own legislative
district to commence in the next national and local elections after the effectivity of this Charter.
Henceforth, the municipalities of Sta. Maria, Malita, Don Marcelino, Jose Abad Santos and
Sarangani shall comprise the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Davao Occidental while
the City of Digos and the municipalities of Malalag, Sulop, Kiblawan, Padada, Hagonoy, Sta.
Cruz, Matanao, Bansalan and Magsaysay shall comprise the Lone Legislative District of the
Province of Davao del Sur.

Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite.

Sec. 46. Plebiscite. – The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this
Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a
plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.

The amount necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite shall be borne by the COMELEC.

As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC suspended the
conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013
National and Local Elections. On 9 July 2013, the COMELEC extended the policy on suspension of the
holding of plebiscites by resolving to defer action on the holding of all plebiscites until after the 28
October 2013 Barangay Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided to
hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013
Barangay Elections to save on expenses.
On 9 October 2013, Cagas filed the present petition for prohibition. Cagas claims since there is a specific
time when the plebiscite shall be conducted under RA 10360, hence, there is no legal basis on the part of
the COMELEC to suspend it.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can validly suspend the conduct of the plebiscite. YES.

Ruling: The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the power to conduct a plebiscite
beyond the schedule prescribed by law.

Based on Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution the conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for
the creation of a province. Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution.

Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360, however, specifically provides that the plebiscite for the creation of the
province of Davao Occidental be held within 60 days from the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, or until 6
April 2013. Cagas claims that R.A. No. 10360 "did not confer express or implied power to COMELEC to
exercise discretion when the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental will be held.
On the contrary, said law provides a specific period when the COMELEC should conduct a plebiscite."
Cagas views the period "60 days from the effectivity" in R.A. No. 10360 as absolute and mandatory; thus,
COMELEC has no legal basis to hold a plebiscite on 28 October 2013.

The Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
The COMELEC has "exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections." The text and
intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental powers
for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."
Sections 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881) the Omnibus Election Code, provide the
COMELEC the power to set elections to another date.

Sec. 5. Postponement of election.- When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after
due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall
postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February
2013, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 May 2013 as
mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the
province of Davao Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360. We also take
judicial notice of the COMELEC’s burden in the accreditation and registration of candidates for the
Party-List Elections. The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the
National and Local Elections is unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and
administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not
act with grave abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of the
province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it with the Barangay Elections.
 16. Javier vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 215847 (2016)
Topic: Powers and Functions
Doctrine: The Commission’s act of fixing the election period does not amount to an encroachment on legislative
prerogative. The Commission did not prescribe or define the elements of election offenses. Congress already defined
them through the Omnibus Election Code, the Fair Elections Act, and other pertinent election laws.

Facts: In 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Maguad filed an administrative complaint for Gross
Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse of Authority against Valderrama Mayor Roquero. Subsequently,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9581 prohibiting any public official from suspending any elective
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay officer during the election period for the May 13, 2013 elections.
Gov. Javier preventively suspended Mayor Roquero for thirty (30) days. The SP of Antique issued a decision
finding Mayor Roquero guilty of Grave Misconduct and suspended her for four (4) months. Mayor Roquero filed an
Election Offense complaint against Gov. Javier for violating Section 261(x) of the Election Code.
Aldon and Roquero sought to disqualify Gov. Javier and the other incumbent officials from running in the 2013
elections on the ground that the latter committed the election offenses by suspending Mayor Roquero. They alleged
that the suspension was political harassment calculated to intimidate the Roqueros into backing out of the 2013
elections.
After the May 2013 Elections, only Gov. Javier and SP Members Tobias M. Javier, Edgar D. Denosta, Teopisto C.
Estaris, Jr., and Victor R. Condez were proclaimed winners. Hence, the Commission considered the disqualification
cases against the losing candidates moot.
In 2014, the COMELEC issued a resolution in disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the
Governor of Antique. The COMELEC held that the preventive suspension of Mayor Roquero violated the election
period ban because it was not for the purpose of applying the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The COMELEC
ruled that Gov. Javier’s act of preventively suspending Mayor Roquero during the election period ban fell within the
contemplation of Section 261(d) of the Election Code, which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68.
While Section 261(d) of the Election Code was repealed by R.A. No. 7890, it did not remove coercion "as a ground
per se for disqualification under [Section] 68." In fact, R.A. 7890 made Coercion (an election offense) a felony with
a higher penalty.

Main issue: Whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it issued Resolution No. 9581 fixing the
2013 election period from January 13, 2013 until June 12, 2013, for the purpose of determining administrative and
criminal liability for election offenses. NO.

Ruling: The COMELEC is expressly authorized to fix a different date of the election period. Petitioner
contends that the Commission’s authority to fix the pre-election period refers only to the period needed to properly
administer and conduct orderly elections. The petitioner argues that by extending the period for incurring criminal
liability beyond the 90-day period, the Commission encroached on the legislature’s prerogative to impute criminal
and administrative liability on mala prohibita acts.

The Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the dates of the election period. Article IX-C, Section 9
provides: Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety
days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
Congress, through the Election Code, explicitly recognizes this authority: Sec. 3. Election and campaign periods. –
Unless otherwise fixed in special cases by the COMELEC, which hereinafter shall be referred to as the Commission,
the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of the election and shall end thirty days thereafter.

Evidently, the 120-day period is merely the default election period. The Commission is not precluded from fixing
the length and the starting date of the election period to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
This is not merely a statutory but a constitutionally granted power of the Commission.

The Commission’s act of fixing the election period does not amount to an encroachment on legislative prerogative.
The Commission did not prescribe or define the elements of election offenses. Congress already defined them
through the Omnibus Election Code, the Fair Elections Act, and other pertinent election laws. As defined by
Congress, some election offenses and prohibited acts can only be committed during the election period. An element
of these offenses (i.e., that it be committed during the election period) is variable, as election periods are not affixed
to a specific and permanent date. Nevertheless, the definition of the offense is already complete. By fixing the date
of the election period, the Commission did not change what the offense is or how it is committed. There is thus no
intrusion into the legislative sphere.

Issue on Repeal of Section 261 (d) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 by R.A. No. 7890: R.A. No. 7890 expressly
repealed Section 261, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC Second
Division’s October 3, 2014 resolution, however, treated this repeal as merely an implied one. COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion when it disqualified Gov. Javier based on a provision of law that had already been
expressly repealed. Its stubborn insistence that R.A. No. 7890 merely impliedly repealed Section 261 (d) despite the
clear wordings of the law, amounted to an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of judgment.

The act of Gov. Javier in preventively suspending Mayor Roquero during the Election period ban falls within the
contemplation of Section 261(d) of the Election Code which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68,
Election Code. That is, Gov. Javier issued Executive Order No. 003 suspending Mayor Roquero to coerce,
intimidate, compel, or influence the latter to collaborate with or campaign for the former, or to punish the latter for
having manifested political opposition against the former. For that, he must be disqualified.

With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for disqualifying Javier no longer existed. The jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All
other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in
nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to
the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the regular courts of justice.
 17. Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer
GR No. L-31455. February 28, 1985

Topic: B. The Commission on Elections; Powers and Functions

Doctrine:
COMELEC shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law.

Facts:

COMELEC issued an invitation to Bid for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting booths.
Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop and Acme Steel submitted their proposals and Acme Steel was
chosen by the COMELEC. Filipinas Engineering filed a writ of preliminary injunction which the Court
denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court has Jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the
COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from an invitation to bid. YES

Whether or not Filipinas has a cause of action under the premises against the COMELEC and Acme, to
enjoin them from complying with their Contract. NO

Ruling:

The case is already moot and academic as Acme already complied with the contract for the voting booths
but because of the nature and importance of the legal questions raised, the Court opted to discuss and
resolve the same with finality.

The Court held that the COMELEC shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred
upon it by law.

Thus, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its
quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct
of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a “final order” reviewable by certiorari
by the Supreme Court.

The Court also held that Filipinas, the losing bidder, has no cause of action under the premises to enjoin
the COMELEC from pursuing its contract with Acme, the winning bidder.

While it may be true that the lower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the
COMELEC’s award of contracts, the same being purely administrative and civil in nature, nevertheless,
herein petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the allegations of its complaint.

While the law requires the exercise of sound discretion on the part of procurement authorities, and that
the reservation to reject any or all bids may not be used as a shield to a fraudulent award, petitioner has
miserably failed to prove or substantiate the existence of malice or fraud on the part of the public
respondents in the challenged award.
Subject to the rights of the COMELEC duly reserved in the said Invitation, award shall be made to the
lowest and responsible bidder whose offer will best serve the interest of the COMELEC; that the
COMELEC had reserved the right, among others, to accept such bid, as may in its discretion, be
considered most reasonable and advantageous; and that the invitation was merely a call for proposals.
Consequently, the COMELEC was not under legal obligation to accept any bid since “Advertisements for
bidders are simply invitation to make proposals and the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or
lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears.

In issuing the resolution awarding the contract for voting booths in Acme’s favor, the Commissioners of
the COMELEC had taken into account that Acme’s bid was the lowest; that Acme was a responsible
manufacturer; and that upon an ocular inspection of the samples submitted by the bidders, Acme’s sample
was favorable chosen subject to certain conditions cited in the resolution. In fine, the public respondents
properly exercised its sound discretion in making the award.
 18. Brilliantes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 163193 June 15, 2004

Topic: Commission on Elections; Powers and Functions.

Doctrine: The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation of election results
based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes
for the election of President and Vice-President, in accordance with Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitution.

Facts: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to
use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. On April 28, 2004, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 6712 which was captioned as General Instructions For The Electronic
Transmission And Consolidation Of Advanced Results In The May 10, 2004 Elections. It provides for the
electronic transmission of advanced result of “unofficial” count.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution no. 6712 is constitutional. NO.

Held: The assailed Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc was declared NULL AND VOID.

First. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation of election
results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the
votes for the election of President and Vice-President, in accordance with Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitution.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by the board
of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to
the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of
the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
 Second. The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the constitutional provision that "no
money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." In this
case, By its very terms, the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election results projected under
Resolution No. 6712 is "unofficial" in character, meaning "not emanating from or sanctioned or
acknowledged by the government or government body. Any disbursement of public funds to implement
this project is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003
General Appropriations Act. The use of the COMELEC of its funds appropriated for the AES for the
"unofficial" quick count project may even be considered as a felony under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Furthermore, neither can the money needed for the project be taken from the
COMELEC’s savings, if any, because it would be violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5)47 of the 1987
Constitution. The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. In this case, no
law has, thus, far been enacted authorizing the respondent COMELEC to transfer savings from another
item in its appropriation, if there are any, to fund the assailed resolution.

Third. The assailed resolution disregards existing laws which authorize solely the duly-accredited
citizens’ arm to conduct the "unofficial" counting of votes. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173,49 and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,50 the accredited
citizen’s arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in
the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No
other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns
for purposes of conducting an "unofficial" count. In addition, the second or third copy of the election
returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the aforementioned laws, are not intended
for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The aforesaid COMELEC copies are archived and unsealed only
when needed by the respondent COMELEC to verify election results in connection with resolving
election disputes that may be imminent. However, in contravention of the law, the assailed Resolution
authorizes the so-called Reception Officers (RO), to open the second or third copy intended for the
respondent COMELEC as basis for the encoding and transmission of advanced "unofficial" precinct
results. This not only violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an "unofficial" count,
but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the election returns, as well as the returns
themselves, by creating a gap in its chain of custody from the Board of Election Inspectors to the
COMELEC.

Fourth. Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the
statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and election
devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized
representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of
technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such
devices.

Fifth. The assailed resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis. That respondent
COMELEC is the sole body tasked to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and to ensure "free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections" is beyond cavil. That it possesses the power to promulgate rules and
regulations in the performance of its constitutional duties is, likewise, undisputed. However, the duties of
the COMELEC under the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 7166, and other election laws are carried out, at all
times, in its official capacity. There is no constitutional and statutory basis for the respondent COMELEC
to undertake a separate and an "unofficial" tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically.
Indeed, by conducting such "unofficial" tabulation of the results of the election, the COMELEC descends
to the level of a private organization, spending public funds for the purpose. Besides, it is absurd for the
COMELEC to conduct two kinds of electoral counts – a slow but "official" count, and an alleged quicker
but "unofficial" count, the results of each may substantially differ.
 19. ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 133486 , January 28, 2000

Topic: Election Laws: Powers and Functions

Doctrine:

 The Comelec’s concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls disorder and confusion in
the voting centers does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is
too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not.
Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers. There is
no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers.
Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election
precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.

Facts: COMELEC prohibited the conduct of exit polls by ABS-CBN on the ground of clear and present danger it
poses to the integrity of elections. However the court said that it erred in such measure because it violates freedom
of speech and freedom of press by making an overbroad resolution as it prohibits the long-tern use of such data on
research. COMELEC released a resolution which approved the issuance of a restraining order against ABS-CBN to
conduct exit survey. It acted upon reports that the network plans to conduct a TV-radio coverage of the elections and
make an exit survey of the votes cast for Pres and VP and broadcast the results immediately. The Supreme Court
issued a TRO against the resolution of COMELEC and the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by
media. ABS-CBN argued that holding exit polls and nationwide reporting of results are valid exercises of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, COMELEC committed GAD when it issued such resolution.
COMELEC on the other hand, alleged that: 1.)The conduct of exit polls might confuse the voters and unduly
influence them. 2) Exit surveys indirectly violate the sanctity of ballots as enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 2 Art.
5) because the voters will be lured to reveal their votes. 3) Exit surveys pose a clear and present danger of destroying
the credibility and integrity of the electoral process because the media is not supervised by any gov’t agency which
can easily be manipulated.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC, in the exercise of its powers can absolutely ban exit polls.
Ruling: No. The measure is overbroad and unnecessarily restricts fundamental rights of speech and of press. The
Constitution mandates that no law shall be passed abridging freedom of speech and press. These freedoms basically
consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint. (Gonzales
v. COMELEC) It represents a profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open. There are limitations however to this freedom in which the state, in the exercise
of its police power, can curtail whenever these tests are satisfied:

1. Clear and present danger rule – the evil consequence of comment or utterance must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence must be extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to
be guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be prevented.
2. Dangerous tendency rule -  If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable.  It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. Note that the
words need not be definite so as to incite the listeners to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness.
The court adheres to the clear and present danger rule which is a question on the proximity and degree of the
utterance will result to the danger or evil sought to be avoided. This is a heavy burden because the court is always on
the side of freedom of expression. To justify restriction, the promotion of substantial govt interest must be clearly
shown. And even when its purpose are legitimate and substantial, the means employed should not be broad as to
stifle personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.

In this case, the freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be
curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. The interest
being protected is the fundamental right to vote and securing its sanctity through the ballots. However the means
employed are necessarily broad because it effectively prevents other uses of exit poll data – for long term research
purposes.

COMELEC tried to justify the restraint in arguing that such conduct of exit polls present a clear and
present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of electoral process. However its arguments are purely
speculative.

1. Because in a survey, the participants are randomly selected so the results will be a representation or
reflection of the general sentiment of the community.
2. It is merely an opinion of the community or group polled. Its result is not meant to replace or be at par with
the official COMELEC count.

The Comelec’s concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls—disorder and confusion in the
voting centers—does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad,
since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. Concededly, the Omnibus
Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers. There is no showing, however, that exit polls
or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that
the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover,
the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable
information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters’ answers to the survey questions will
forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and
the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election day and other
factors on voters’ choices. The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not
leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling.
On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or
minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.

On the issue of violation of ballot secrecy, the court said that such is not at issue here. The exit poll dies not seek
to access the ballots of the interviewees. The contents of their ballots are not exposed. Even the choice of revealing
who they voted for is not mandatory but voluntary. The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote
buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots
to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified.
Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or
illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective
votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party.
This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster
of whom they have voted for.

Dissenting Opinion (Justice Kapunan)

Our Constitution mandates the Comelec to enforce and administer laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections and to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballots to ensure orderly, honest, credible and
peaceful elections. This Constitutional provision effectively displaces the general presumption of invalidity in favor
of the presumption that Comelec acted in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers.  If no presumption of
invalidity arises, I see no occasion for the application of the “clear and present danger test.” 

20. AKBAYAN YOUTH v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001
Topic: Election Laws; COMELEC; Powers and functions

Doctrine:
The stand-by power of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes
the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.

Facts:

Akbayan Youth is pushing for the conduct of a special registration of new voters ages 18 to 21,
despite the fact that the December 27, 2000 deadline set by COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189 has
already lapsed. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 denying the request to conduct a two-day
additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001. (Two Commissioners voted to deny
the request while two Commissioners voted to accommodate the students’ request. With this impasse, the
Commission construed its Resolution as having taken effect.) Petitioners sought to nullify the COMELEC
Resolution before the Court.

One of the arguments invoked by the petitioners is the so-called standby powers or residual
powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29, Republic Act No.
6646 and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436, thus:

SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts – If it should no longer be possible
to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix
other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be
deprived of their right to suffrage.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC may validly and legally conduct a two-day special registration,
through its “standby powers or residual powers” as provided in Section 28 of R.A. 8436. NO.

Held:

The provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are
susceptible of performance within the available period prior to election day. In more categorical language,
Section 28 of R.A. 8436 is, to our mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain pre-election
acts are still capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of
election and the conduct of other related pre-election activities required under the law.

In its Comment, respondent COMELEC which is the constitutional body tasked by no less than the
fundamental charter (Sec. 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution) to decide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including registration of voters painstakingly and
thoroughly emphasized the operational impossibility of conducting a special registration, which in its own
language, can no longer be accomplished within the time left to (us) the Commission.

xxx

It is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. The law obliges no
one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words,
there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligato est. Hence, a statute may
not be so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally,
coincidentally, it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application
of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, in the interpretation of statutes, the
interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness
and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered view that the stand-by power of the respondent
COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or
availed of, and not otherwise.
 21. Tanada vs. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 207199-200. October 22, 2013.

Topic: Election Laws; Powers and Functions

Doctrine: Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase “election, returns and qualifications”
refers to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. In particular, the term “election” refers to
the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the
casting and counting of the votes; “returns” refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” refers to matters that could be raised in a  quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his CoC.

Facts: Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr., (Wigberto) and respondents Angelina D. Tan (Angelina) and
Alvin John S. Tañada (Alvin John) were contenders for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province in the May 13, 2013 National Elections. 
Wigberto filed before the COMELEC, first, to cancel Alvin John’s CoC; and, second, to declare him as a
nuisance candidate.

COMELEC First Division dismissed both petitions for lack of merit. On Wigberto’s motion for
reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc, in a Resolution dated April 25, 2013, upheld the COMELEC
First Division’s ruling in SPA No. 13-057 (DC) that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate as defined
under Section 69  "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines" However, in SPA No. 13-056 (DC), it
granted the motion for reconsideration and cancelled Alvin John’s CoC for having committed false
material representations concerning his residency in accordance with Section 78 of the OEC.

On May 15, 2013, Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the COMELEC En Banc ’s
ruling on the ground of newly discovered evidence:

These motions, however, remained un-acted upon until the filing of the present petition before the Court
on May 27, 2013. Thus, in order to avoid charges of forum-shopping, said motions were withdrawn by
Wigberto.

Despite the cancellation of Alvin John’s CoC due to his material misrepresentations therein, his name was
not deleted from – and thus, remained printed on – the ballot. Petitioner filed with the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Quezon Province (PBOC) asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited
to him instead in accordance with the Court’s ruling in Dela Cruz v. COMELEC and COMELEC
Resolution No. 9599. The PBOC, however, denied Wigberto’s motion stating that the votes of Alvin
John could not be counted in favor of Wigberto because the cancellation of the former’s CoC was on the
basis of his material misrepresentations under Section 78 of the OEC and not on being a nuisance
candidate under Section 69 of the same law.

PBOC canvassed the votes of all three contenders separately, and thereafter, on May 16, 2013,
proclaimed Angelina as the winning candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province. According to Wigberto, it was for the foregoing
reason that he impleaded Angelina as a party-respondent in the instant petition for certiorari.

Wigberto had already filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Annul the Proclamation of Angelina
(Petition to Annul) under SPC No. 13-013, asserting that had the PBOC followed pertinent rulings, the
votes cast for Alvin John would have been counted in his favor which could have resulted in his
victory. While the Petition to Annul was still pending resolution, Wigberto initiated the instant certiorari
case against the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013 declaring Alvin John not a
nuisance candidate.
On July 3, 2013, Wigberto filed a Manifestation informing the Court that he had caused the filing of an
Election Protest Ad Cautelam entitled " Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr. v. Angelina ‘Helen’ D. Tan, " before the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which was docketed as Electoral Protest Case No.
13-018.

Issue: Who has jurisdiction? (HRET)

Ruling:

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" refers to
all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. In particular, the term "election" refers to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of the votes; "returns" refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity
of the election returns; and "qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his
CoC.

In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath
and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the
case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation
of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the terms "election" and
"returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.
 22. Reyes vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207624 (2013)

TOPIC: Powers and Functions

Doctrines:

 As the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself — on a level higher than statutory administrative organs, the
COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
 A petition for denial and cancellation of the COC is summary in nature, the COMELEC is given much
discretion in the evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of determining
of whether or not the COC should be cancelled.
 The petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, she has not
yet assumed office. The term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.” Thus, until such time, the Commission
on Elections retains jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Regina Ongsiako Reyes won the elections and was proclaimed as the representative of Marinduque.

However, before the elections, COMELEC already cancelled her certificate of candidacy for not being qualified
to run for the position as she was not a Filipino citizen. Petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of
her failure to comply with the requirements of RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003, namely:

(1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and

(2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one-year residency requirement
under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of
Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.

Regina argued that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has exclusive jurisdiction
to pass upon her qualifications.

ISSUES:

1. W/N COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Regina who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already
taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
2. W/N COMELEC committed GADAJE when it took cognizance of the “newly-discovered evidence” without
the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence which became the basis for its
Resolution.

RULING:

1. Comelec has jurisdiction. Regina’s proclamation is not valid since prior to the elections, the decision of
Comelec cancelling her certificate of candidacy became final. Hence, there is no basis for her proclamation
and thus she did not become a member of the House of Representatives. Futhermore, HRET’s jurisdiction
begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representative

COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred
that she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the
question.

To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she
has not yet assumed office. The term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.” Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction.

COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives. In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to
cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the “newly discovered evidence” was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Since the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC is summary in nature, the COMELEC is given much
discretion in the evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of determining of
whether or not the COC should be cancelled.

As the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself — on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The
COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.

Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of R.A. No.
9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives other than those
enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the same meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of Representatives who
have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-
year residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired
into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if she reacquired her
status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.

23. Poe vs. COMELEC,

March 8, 2016 G.R. No. 221697

Topic: Judicial powers of COMELEC

Doctrine

There is an absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate.
Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a
competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering
from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

Facts

 In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from May 24, 2005.
 Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the
 US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
 On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who
then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother
and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
 On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
 In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.
 Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that
her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.
 On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified
as candidate for Presidency.

Issue

W/N the COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate. [No]

Decision

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-President,
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such
provision for candidates for these positions.

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his
eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is
why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has
been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination
of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary
to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state
in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the
determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in
cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve
the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under
the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.

To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment
through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version
of Rule 25, which states that:

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

Was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by
law or the Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be
summarily dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate
there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is
guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both
do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the
qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before
an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by
executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
"provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on
grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or
she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can
be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity
and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.

The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this
case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule
essentially that since foundlings are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution, they
then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a
foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that
it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such
relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her
natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
 24. Sarmiento vs. COMELEC
212 SCRA 307

Topic: Election Laws; En Banc and Division Cases

Summary:
COMELEC issued 9 resolutions classified as special cases. The Supreme Court ruled that the
COMELEC en banc has no authority to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases classified as special
cases. (See doctrine)

Doctrine:
Election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided
by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear
and decide the same at the first instance.
Facts:
Respondent COMELEC issued nine resolutions regarding special cases and petitioners impugn the
challenged resolutions as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion because the Commission,
sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of its
Divisions.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc has the authority to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases
classified as special cases.  NO AUTHORITY.

Held:
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.

The 1973 Constitution prescribed another rule. Its Section 3, subdivision C of Article XII provided as
follows:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election
cases may be heard and decided by divisions, except contests involving Members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. . . .

It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include pre-
proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the
Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the
same at the first instance. In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are
classified as Special Cases and, in compliance with the above provision of the Constitution, the two (2)
Divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide these Special Cases

Rule 27 thereof governs Special Cases; specifically, Section 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from
rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions to which they are assigned and
not by the Commission en banc. Said Section reads:

Sec. 9. Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers. — (a) A party aggrieved by an oral

ruling of the board of canvassers who had stated orally his intent to appeal said ruling
shall, within five days following receipt of a copy of the written ruling of the board of
canvassers, file with the Commission a verified appeal, furnishing a copy thereof to the
board of canvassers and the adverse party.

(b) The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by the Clerk of Court
concerned.
(c) The answer/opposition shall be verified.
(d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set the case for hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may be filed within five (5)
days from its promulgation.  The Clerk of Court of the Division shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from
the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner of such fact; in turn, the latter shall certify the case
to the Commission en banc. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court of the Commission shall calendar the motion
for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the
certification.  Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without
first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be
set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral
to a Division.
 25. Ibrahim vs COMELEC
G.R. 192289. January 14, 2013.

Topic: Election Laws; COMELEC; En Banc and Division;

Doctrine: Proceedings to cancel the certificate of candidacy involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial
powers of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide. The COMELEC en banc
cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without prior action by a division, as it would
amount to a denial of due process to the candidate.

Facts: Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of candidacy to run as municipal
Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election Officer in the said
municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department) the names of candidates
who were not registered voters therein. The list included Ibrahims name.

Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December 22, 2009 disqualifying Ibrahim
for not being a registered voter of the municipality where he seeks to be elected without prejudice to his
filing of an opposition. It prompted Ibrahim to file Petition/Opposition but was denied by the COMELEC
en banc through a Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC declared that the
Resolution dated December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certification, which was issued by Buagas and
Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase, stating that Ibrahim was not a
registered voter of the municipality where he seeks to be elected.

On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained
finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims proclamation.
Thus, this petition.
In its manifestation, the OSG for the instant petition to be granted. Citing the case of citing Bautista v.
Comelec, the OSG argues that jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy pertains to
the COMELEC sitting in division and not to the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc can only
take cognizance of petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy when the required number of votes for a
division to reach a decision, ruling, order or resolution is not obtained, or when motions for
reconsideration are filed to assail the said issuances of a division.

Issue: WON the COMELEC en banc had the authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Datu Unsay (NO)

Ruling: The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Datu Unsay.

Section 3(C), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Further, the circumstances obtaining in Bautista v. Comelec cited by the OSG in its Manifestation are
similar to those attendant to the instant Petition. In Bautista, the election officer reported to the Law
Department that Bautista was ineligible to run as a candidate by reason of his being an unregistered voter.
The Law Department recommended to the COMELEC en banc to deny due course or cancel Bautista’s
certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc adopted the recommendation and consequently issued a
resolution. In the said case, this Court discussed the COMELEC en banc’s jurisdiction over petitions for
disqualification, for denial of due course, or cancellation of certificates of candidacy in the following
wise:

In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., the Court held that it is the COMELEC sitting in division and not the
COMELEC en banc which has jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court
held:
The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz.:
“Sec.  78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
 days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election.”
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department
of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his
certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC
after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself.
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy
lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained
by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or
ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions,
orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
Xxxx
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice.  It is thus clear that
cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the
COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in this case where the cancellation proceedings
originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification
of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by
acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate.

In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions, ordered
Ibrahim’s disqualification even when no complaint or petition was filed against him yet. Let it be
stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been
instituted against Ibrahim considering that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of Datu Unsay
disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation as an eligible candidate
was an act falling within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to assume
that a proper petition had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it took cognizance of a matter, which by both constitutional prescription and
jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions.
 26. Legaspi vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 216572, April 19, 2016

Topic: En Banc and Division Cases

Doctrine:. Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution bestows on the COMELEC divisions the authority to
decide election cases. Their decisions are capable of attaining finality, without need of any affirmative or
confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC en banc. And while the Constitution requires that the
motions for reconsideration be resolved by the COMELEC en banc, it likewise requires that four votes
must be reached for it to render a valid ruling and, consequently, to GRANT the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents.

Facts: (This is a resolution of the September 1, 2015 – the court reversed its ruling).
Petitioner Legaspi and private respondent Germar both ran as mayoralty candidates in
Norzagaray. Bulacan while private respondent Santos was a candidate for councilor in the May 13, 2013
elections. On May 14, 2013 Legaspi filed a Petition for Disqualification against private respondents.
There, petitioner averred that from May 11, 2013 until election day, private respondents engaged in
massive vote-buying, using their political leaders as conduits. Through military efforts, the vote-buying
was foiled and the office, which served as the venue for distribution, padlocked. The newly-minted Chief
of Police, P/Supt. Dale Soliba, and his subordinates then attempted to force open the office and retrieve
from inside four (4) boxes containing the remaining undistributed envelopes with an estimated aggregate
amount of Php800,000.00, but a group of concerned citizens were able to thwart their plan in flagrante
delicto and intercept the said evidence of vote-buying.
The COMELEC Special First Division, by a 2-1 vote disqualified private respondents from the
2013 electoral race. Thereafter, private respondents moved for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc but the latter, through its Resolution, resolved to deny private respondents' motion.
The adverted Resolution had a vote of 3-2-1-1, as follows: three (3) commissioners, namely
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, voted for
the denial of the motion, while two (2) commissioners, Christian Robert S. Lim and Luie Tito F. Guia,
dissented. Commissioner Al A. Parreno took no part in the deliberations and Commissioner Maria Grace
Cielo M. Padaca did not vote as her ad interim appointment had already expired, vacating a seat in the
electoral tribunal.
Since the Resolution was not concurred in by four (4) votes or a majority of all the members of
the COMELEC, a re-deliberation of the administrative aspect of the case was conducted pursuant to Sec.
6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The re-deliberation resulted in the issuance of the
assailed Order9 dated January 28, 2015 with a 3-2-2 vote: the previously voting commissioners
maintained their respective positions while then newly-appointed commissioner Arthur D. Lim took no
part in the deliberations and abstained from voting
Perplexed as to how he who prevailed before the COMELEC Special First Division can face
defeat before the COMELEC en banc when three (3) commissioners voted to deny private respondents'
motion for reconsideration and only two (2) commissioners voted to reverse the judgment in his favor,
Legaspi launched a Rule 64 petition assailing the January 28, 2015 COMELEC en banc Order before this
Court. Regrettably, the Court, on September 1, 2015, voted to dismiss the petition.

Issue: How to treat the rulings of the COMELEC en banc when less than four (4) votes were cast to
either grant or deny the motion for reconsideration pending before it.
Ruling:
Under Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, 15 the COMELEC Divisions are granted
adjudicatory powers to decide election cases, provided that the COMELEC en banc shall resolve motions
for reconsideration of the division rulings. Further, under Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, 16 four
(4) votes are necessary for the COMELEC en banc to decide a case. Naturally, the party moving for
reconsideration, as the party seeking affirmative relief, carries the burden of proving that the division
committed reversible error. The movant then shoulders the obligation of convincing four (4)
Commissioners to grant his or her plea.
This voting threshold, however, is easily rendered illusory by the application of
the Mendoza ruling, which virtually allows the grant of a motion for reconsideration even though
the movant fails to secure four votes in his or her favor, in blatant violation of Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of
the Constitution. In this case, in spite of securing only two (2) votes to grant their motion for
reconsideration, private respondents were nevertheless declared the victors in the January 28, 2015
COMELEC en banc Resolution.
To exacerbate the situation, the circumvention of the four-vote requirement, in turn, trivializes the
proceedings before the COMELEC divisions and presents rather paradoxical scenarios, to wit:
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to muster the required majority vote only
means that it could not have validly decided the case. Yet curiously, it managed to
reverse the ruling of a body that has properly exercised its adjudicatory powers; and
A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the ground that the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling; or that the said decision, order or
ruling is contrary to law. If the COMELEC en banc does not find that either ground
exists, there would be no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the COMELEC division.
Otherwise stated, failure to muster four votes to sustain the motion for reconsideration
should be understood as tantamount to the COMELEC en banc finding no reversible
error attributable to its division's ruling. Said decision, therefore, ought to be affirmed,
not reversed nor vacated.
These resultant paradoxes have to be avoided. Under the prevailing interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule
18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a movant, in situations such as this, need not even rely on the
strength of his or her arguments and evidence to win a case, and may, instead, choose to rest on
inhibitions and abstentions of COMELEC members to produce the same result. To demonstrate herein, it
is as though the two (2) abstention votes were counted in favor of the private respondents to reach the
majority vote of four (4). This impedes and undermines the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC
divisions by allowing their rulings to be overruled by the en banc without the latter securing the necessary
number to decide the case.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is then difficult to see how the Mendoza doctrine
"complements our Constitution." Far from it, the prevailing interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure severely suffers from constitutional infirmities and calls for the
nullification of the rule itself.
In conclusion, Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution bestows on the COMELEC divisions the
authority to decide election cases. Their decisions are capable of attaining finality, without need of any
affirmative or confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC en banc. And while the Constitution
requires that the motions for reconsideration be resolved by the COMELEC en banc, it likewise requires
that four votes must be reached for it to render a valid ruling and, consequently, to GRANT the motion
for reconsideration of private respondents. Hence, when the private respondents failed to get the four-vote
requirement on their motion for reconsideration, their motion is defeated and lost as there was NO valid
ruling to sustain the plea for reconsideration. The prior valid action - the COMELEC Special First
Division's October 3, 2013 Resolution in this case - therefore subsists and is affirmed by the denial of the
motion for reconsideration.
 27. Akbayan-Youth vs. COMELEC, supra
G.R. No. 147179. March 26, 2001
Topic: Voter Registration

Doctrine: The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration
is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process.

Summary: Petitioners seek to direct the COMELEC to conduct a two-day special registration less than
120 days before the General Elections for the benefit of new voters.

Facts: Petitioners seek to direct the COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001
General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and
Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional
Registration of New Voters Only.

In view of the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc has to discuss all aspects regarding this request with
directives to the Finance Services Department to submit certified available funds for the purpose, and for
the Deputy Executive Director for Operations for the estimated costs of additional two days of
registration. It was the consensus of the group to disapprove the request for additional registration of
voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.

On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued a resolution denying the request to conduct a two-day
additional registration of new voters.

Issue: Whether voter registration may be extended 120 days before the day of election. NO.

Ruling: The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of
suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.

The right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must
undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to
exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is
obliged by law to register under the Voters Registration Act. The act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process.

In the exercise of its inherent police power, the State may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voters’ registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.

R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing registration, is explicit, to wit:

SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The Personal filing of application of registration of
voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
 28. Kabataan v. COMELEC
A.M. No. P-13-3132, June 4, 2014

Topic: V(C)(2) – Election Laws; The Voters; Registration

Doctrine:

Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. In
order that a qualified elector may vote in any election, plebiscite or referendum, he must be
registered in the permanent list of voters for the city or municipality in which he resides.  The penalty of
deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation, neutrally applies to all voters.

Summary (Recit): In this case, the SC ruled that biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and
implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, is constitutional. This
requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized
conformant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter's
Registration Act of 1996.  Further, the COMELEC had shown that the biometrics validation requirement
under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct
of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing - if not eliminating, the perennial problem of
having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. The objective of the law was to cleanse the
national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were
truly reflective of the genuine will of the people. 

Facts:

President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367 which mandates the COMELEC to implement
a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.

RA 10367 likewise directs that "registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit
themselves for validation." "Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 Elections shall be deactivated x x x."
Nonetheless, voters may have their records reactivated after the May 2016 Elections, provided that they
comply with the procedure found in Section 28 of RA 8189, also known as "The Voter's Registration Act
of 1996."

Consequently, COMELEC issued Resolutions 9721, 9863 and 10013 related to the implementation of
RA10367.

Issue: Whether or not the biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and implemented under
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013 are constitutional. YES.

Ruling:
The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the
State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good.

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for the exercise of
suffrage:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right of
suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by law; and third, he
must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote
for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.

The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of suffrage. The State may
therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the
same do not amount to, as per the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy, property or other
substantive requirement." Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the limitation is geared towards the
elimination of irrelevant standards that are purely based on socio-economic considerations that have no
bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good.

Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. In
order that a qualified elector may vote in any election, plebiscite or referendum, he must be
registered in the permanent list of voters for the city or municipality in which he resides. 

The penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation, neutrally applies to all voters.
Thus, petitioners' argument that the law creates artificial class of voters is more imagined than real. There
is no favor accorded to an "obedient group." If anything, non-compliance by the "disobedient" only
rightfully results into prescribed consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal
protection of the laws, which only works "against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.

Petitioners' claim that biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and implemented under
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, is untenable. This requirement is not a
"qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of
which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations
of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996. 

Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and
the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.

In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367
advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest,
and credible elections by containing - if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as
well as dead and multiple registrants. According to the sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino L.
Pimentel III, the objective of the law was to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral
fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were truly reflective of the genuine will of the
people. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.
 29. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003

Topic: Constitutional Commissions; Common Provisions; Guarantee of Independence

Summary: Atty. Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC in order
to stop the agency from implementing the supposed unconstitutional provisions of RA 9189, specifically
§§ 5(b), 18.5, and 25. In deciding the case the Supreme Court resolved the provisions of the
aforementioned provisions. In resolving the case of §5(b) the Court ratiocinated that the Constitution and
the Constitutional Commissioners never envisioned to deprive OFW’s or those working in foreign
countries through contracts their right to vote, instead the Congress was empowered to pass a law
allowing them to vote. This should not be read that the residency or domiciliary requirements of the
Constitution was so strict that it deprives a Filipino Citizen of his/her right to suffrage just because he/she
was not in the country within the time required by the Constitution. It must be understood that in cases of
election laws the Court has repeatedly ruled that domiciliary and residency is interchangeable and such a
requirement merely means that it is the place where the person established a permanent residence. As for
§18.5 the Court declared it unconstitutional, saying that the Congress cannot give to another agency of
government a power which was specifically granted to it by the Constitution. Lastly on the issue of §§ 19,
17.1, and 25 of RA 9189 the court ruled that they were also unconstitutional because the COMELEC
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created.

Doctrine: A Filipino abroad whose domicile remains to be Philippines may still validly exercise their
right to suffrage.

Facts: Atty. Macalintal, in his capacity as a tax payer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the COMELEC in order to stop the agency from implementing the supposed unconstitutional
provisions of RA 9189, specifically §§ 5(b), 18.5, and 25.

Issue: Whether or not § 5(b) of RA 9189 is unconstitutional. NO.

Ruling: No, contrary to the contention of the Atty. Macalintal the law, RA 9189, by allowing a Filipino
who is a green card holder or a permanent residency status holder of a foreign country the right to be
registered as an absentee voter under the restrictive circumstance provided in it actually puts into effect
the intended purpose of the Constitution. This is because the law actually grants the Filipino the right to
vote especially since he/she actually intends to return to the Philippines. This is in line with the
interpretation of residency as synonymous to domicile under our election laws. By indicating in an
affidavit that they intend to return they shows that they see the Philippines as their domicile which
counteracts the presumption that they actually no longer wish to return. As for the status of their votes in
case they failed to comply with the conditions of the law the Court said that there is no need to invalidate
the votes since they at the time they were cast the person may validly cast his/her vote.
 30. Nicolas-Lewis et al. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 162597, August 4, 2006

TOPIC: Absentee Voters

DOCTRINE: Persons who have retained and/or re-acquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225
may vote as absentee voters under R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003). This applies to
dual citizens and non-resident citizens.

FACTS: Petitioners were dual citizens of both the United States and the Philippines, due to being
successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225. Pursuant to R.A. No.
9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (OAV), they wanted to register as “overseas absentee
voters” for the May 2004 elections.

The COMELEC denied their request, due to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. The COMELEC stated that the OAV was enacted for
Filipino resident citizens who happened to be abroad on the day of the elections, NOT for petitioners
(non-resident “duals” who decided to re-acquire their Filipino status). The “duals” were still considered
regular voters who had to meet the requirements of residency under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, and could not be treated as absentee voters.

ISSUE: Whether or not persons who have retained and/or re-acquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to
R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voters under R.A. 9189. YES.

RULING: There is no provision in R.A. 9225 which requires “duals” to establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines before they can exercise their right to vote. R.A. 9225 implicitly
acknowledges that “duals” are most likely non-residents, and grants under its Section 5(1) the same right
of suffrage as granted to an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. The aim of R.A. 9189 is to enfranchise as
much as possible all overseas Filipinos who are qualified to vote (notwithstanding the lack of residency
requirements imposed on an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions).

NOTE: Though the petition was rendered moot and academic because the May 2004 elections had been
concluded, the Court still took on the case because of the broader and transcendental issue: the propriety
of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections.