Law 10
Law 10
Law 10
A. Waiver
B. Condonation
C. Compensation
D. Force majeure
92. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong.
A. Fraud
B. Bad faith
C. Damage
D. Injury
93. Is any event which cannot be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, is inevitable?
A. Accident
B. Injury
C. Fortuitous event
D. Calamity
94. I. Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable.
II. In fortuitous event, the mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same.
A. Only I is true
B. Only II is true
C. Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore,
not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it
must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not
impossible to foresee the same (Roberto C. Sicam and Agencia de R.C. Sicam, Inc. vs. Lulu V. Jorge and
Cesar Jorge, G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007).
A fortuitous event may either be an act of God, or natural occurrences such as floods or typhoons, or an
act of man such as riots, strikes or wars. However, when the loss is found to be partly the result of a
person’s participation-whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act—the participation-
whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act—the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to a fortuitous event (Asset Privatization Trust vs. T.J. Enterprises,
G.R. No. 167195, May 8, 2009).
A. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must have been dependent of human will
B. The event that constituted the caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable,
impossible to avoid.
C. The occurrence must have been such as to render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their
obligation in a normal manner.
D. The obligor must have been free from any participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to
the creditor.
1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must have been independent of human
will;
2. The event that constituted the caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable,
impossible to avoid;
3. The occurrence must have been such as to render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their
obligation in a normal manner, and;
4. The obligor must have been free from any participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to
the creditor (Asset Privatization Trust vs. T.J. Enterprises, G.R. No. 167195, May 8, 2009).
96. I. In order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed
no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
II. An act of God can be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the
possible adverse consequences of such a loss.
A. Only I is true
B. Only II is true
A. The cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor.
C. The event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner.
D. The debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
B. To exempt the obligor from liability for a breach of an obligation by reason of a fortuitous event, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of
the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation a normal manner; and (d) the
debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor (Mondragon
Leisure and Resorts Corporation vs. CA, et.al. G.R. No. 154188, June 15, 2005).
98. I. In an obligation to deliver a generic thing, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind
does not extinguish the obligation.
II. An obligation to pay money is generic; therefore, it is not excused by fortuitous loss of any specific
property for the debtor.
A. Only I is true
B. Only II is true
C. Both are true
C. Under Article 1263 of the Civil Code, “in an obligation to deliver a generic thing, the loss or
destruction of anything of the same kind does not extinguish the obligation.” If the obligation is generic
in the sense that the object thereof is designated merely by its class or genus without any particular
designation or physical segregation from all others of the same class, the loss or destruction of anything
of the same kind even without the debtor’s fault and before he has incurred in delay will not have the
effect of extinguishing the obligation. This rule is based on the principle that the genus of a thing can
never perish. Genus nunquan perit. An obligation to pay money is generic: therefore, it is not excused by
fortuitous loss of any specific property of the debtor (Gaisano Cagayan, Inc. vs. Insurance Company of
North America, G.R. No. 147839, June 8, 2006).
Where the obligation consists in the payment of money, the failure of the debtor to make payment even
by reason of a fortuitous event shall not relieve him of his liability. The rationale for this is that the rule
than an obligor should be held exempt from liability when the loss occurs thru a fortuitous event only
holds true when the obligation consists in the delivery of a determinate thing and there is no stipulation
holding him liable even in case of fortuitous event. It does not apply when the obligation is pecuniary in
nature (Gaisano Cagayan, Inc. vs. Insurance Company of North America, G.R. No. 147839, June 8, 2006).
II. The burden of proving that the loss was due to fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it.
A. Only I is true
B. Only II is true
B. On the merits. It is not a defense for a repair shop of motor vehicles to escape liability simply because
the damage or loss of a thing lawfully placed in its possession was due to carnapping. Carnapping per se
cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken
from another’s rightful possession, as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically give rise to a
fortuitous event. To be considered as such, carnapping entails more than the mere forceful taking of
another’s property. It must be proved and established that the event was an act of God or was done
solely by third parties and that neither the claimant nor the person alleged to be negligent has any
participation. In accordance with the Rules of evidence, the burden of proving that the loss was due to a
fortuitous event rest on him who invokes it (Jimmy Co vs. CA and Broadway Motor Sales, Corporation,
G.R. No. 124922, June 22, 1998).
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event (Roberto C. Sicam and Agencia de R.C.
Sicam, Inc. vs. Lulu V. Jorge and Cesar Jorge, G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007).
100. I. A possessor in bad faith shall not be liable for deterioration or loss in every case, even if caused
by a fortuitous event.
II. If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more persons who do not
have the same interest he shall not be responsible for any fortuitous event until he has effected the
delivery.
A. Only I is true
B. Only II is true
D. A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for deterioration or loss in every case, even if caused by a
fortuitous event (Art. 552, NCC).
If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more persons who do not have
the same interest, he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event until he has effected the delivery (Art.
1165, NCC).