The Second Chapter of The Pramanavarttika
The Second Chapter of The Pramanavarttika
The Second Chapter of The Pramanavarttika
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
Handout
for
the
Fall
2014
Term
for
the
Advanced
Buddhist
Philosophy
Course
in
English
INSTITUTE
OF
BUDDHIST
DIALECTICS
McLeod
Ganj,
Dharamsala,
India
Prepared
by
Venerable
Kelsang
Wangmo
1
DRAFT
-‐
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
2
Introduction
The
following
handout
for
the
IBD
Buddhist
philosophy
course
on
the
second
chapter
of
Dharmakirti’s
Pramanavarttika
contains
translations
of
two
texts:
1. The
second
chapter
of
Dharmakirti's
Pramanavarttika
(Tib.:
tshad
ma
rnam
‘grel,
Engl.:
Commentary
on
[Dignaga’s
Compendium
of]
Pramana)
2. The
second
chapter
of
Gyaltsab
Je's
commentary
on
the
Pramanavarttika,
called
Elucidation
of
the
Path
to
Liberation,
a
Detailed
Explanation
of
the
Verse
Lines
of
the
Pramanavarttika
(Tib.:
tshad
ma
rnam
'grel
gyi
tshig
le'ur
byes
pa
rnam
bshad
thar
lam
gsal
byed)
–
usually
referred
to
as
Elucidation
of
the
Path
to
Liberation
(Tib.:
thar
lam
gsal
byed)
Gyaltsab
Je’s
Elucidation
of
the
Path
to
Liberation
is
interspersed
with
the
Pramanavarttika,
for
the
commentary
provides
detailed
expositions
on
the
meaning
of
the
verses
of
the
root
text.
Furthermore,
since
both
texts
are
difficult
to
comprehend
on
their
own,
they
are
also
interspersed
with
additional
explanations
by
contemporary
masters
such
as
Geshe
Yeshe
Thabgyal,
Geshe
Palden
Drakpa,
Geshe
Wangchen,
Geshe
Gyatso,
Geshe
Tsering
Norbu,
and
others.
As
the
name
of
the
text
implies,
Dharmakirti's
Pramanavarttika
is
a
commentary
on
Dignaga's
Compendium
of
Pramana
(Skt:
Pramana-‐samuccaya,
Tib.:
tshad
ma
kun
btus).
The
six
chapters
of
Dignaga’s
Compendium
are
written
in
verse
and
constitute
one
of
the
most
important
works
on
Pramana.
Here
the
Sanskrit
term
Pramana
translates
as
“logic”
or
“epistemology”,
although
it
literally
means
“valid
cognizer”.
This
is
explained
in
more
detail
below.
Dignaga
Dignaga
(ca.
450-‐540
CE)
was
a
proponent
of
the
Chittamatra
school
Following
Reasoning
and
one
of
Vasubandhu’s
four
great
disciples,
each
of
whom
surpassed
their
teacher
in
a
particular
field
of
Buddhist
study.
Dignaga
was
more
learned
than
Vasubandhu
in
Pramana2.
Dignaga
was
born
into
a
Brahmin
family
in
Simhavaktra,
near
Kanchi
in
South
India.
At
a
young
age,
he
became
very
proficient
in
the
sacred
Brahmin
scriptures
and
the
worldly
sciences.
However,
he
eventually
lost
interest
in
the
spiritual
system
of
the
Brahmins,
developed
renunciation
for
the
suffering
nature
of
cyclic
existence,
and
took
ordination
from
a
Buddhist
teacher
called
Nagadatta
(Tib.:
glang
po
byin)
of
the
Vatsiputriya
system,
a
sub-‐school
of
the
Buddhist
Vaibhashika
School.
Nagadatta
named
him
Dignaga
(Tib.:
phyogs
kyi
glang
po)
and
gave
him
extensive
teachings
on
the
three
baskets
according
to
the
Vatsiputriya
system.
Followers
of
the
Vatsiputriya
system
assert
a
type
of
self
that
is
inexpressible
as
something
substantially
or
imputedly
existent,
or
as
being
the
same
or
different
from
the
five
aggregates.
Dignaga
was
instructed
by
his
teacher
to
meditate
on
the
inexpressible
self.
In
an
attempt
to
find
and
comprehend
the
inexpressible
self,
Dignaga
is
said
to
have
kindled
fires
in
the
four
directions,
stripped
off
his
clothes,
and
meditated
day
and
night.
When
he
reported
back
to
his
teacher
that
he
was
unable
to
find
such
a
self,
his
teacher
took
this
as
an
indirect
criticism
and
sent
him
to
study
elsewhere.
Dignaga
went
to
stay
at
Nalanda
Monastery
where
he
became
a
disciple
of
Vasubandhu.
He
studied
and
mastered
the
entire
body
of
sutras
and
treatises
of
the
Hinayana
and
Mahayana,
and
became
a
great
tantric
practitioner,
receiving
instructions
from
Manjushri
himself.
He
also
developed
great
skills
in
debate
and
on
numerous
occasions
defended
the
monastery
against
learned
non-‐Buddhist
scholars
who
challenged
the
2
The
other
three
disciples
were
(1)
Shtiramati
who
was
more
learned
than
Vasubandhu
in
Abhidharma,
(2)
Gunaprabha
who
was
more
learned
in
the
Vinaya,
and
(3)
Arya
Vimuktisena
who
was
more
learned
in
the
Prajnaparamita.
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
monks
in
debate.
Dignaga
became
particularly
renowned
for
having
defeated
the
great
Brahmin
scholar,
Sudurjaya,
who
–
as
a
result
of
losing
the
debate
–
converted
to
Buddhism
together
with
his
disciples.
At
the
time,
it
was
customary
for
a
scholar
who
lost
a
debate
to
adopt,
along
with
his
disciples,
the
spiritual
system
of
the
victor.
Dignaga
eventually
left
Nalanda
in
order
to
lead
a
contemplative
life
in
the
forests
of
Orissa.
There
he
resolved
to
compose
what
became
his
most
famous
work,
the
Compendium
of
Pramana,
as
a
compilation
of
his
many
previous
writings
on
Pramana,
which,
according
to
his
own
description,
were
fragmentary
works.
It
is
said
that
he
wrote
the
first
verse
of
the
Compendium,
comprising
the
homage
and
promise
to
compose
the
text,
on
a
rock
at
his
cave
hermitage:
To the one who has become a valid cognizer, to that which wishes to benefit migrators,
To the "teacher", the "sugata", the "protector", I prostrate.
In order to establish valid cognizers, I will herewith create a single compendium of my various
fragmentary writings
When
he
wrote
those
words
many
auspicious
signs
occurred,
such
as
light
blazing
forth,
the
earth
trembling,
loud
thunder
rolling
in
the
sky,
and
so
forth.
A
Brahmin
ascetic
called
Krishnamuni
observed
these
signs
and
through
his
clairvoyance
understood
that
they
were
the
results
of
Dignaga’s
writing.
Driven
by
envy,
he
went
to
Dignaga’s
cave
while
the
latter
was
away
on
alms-‐rounds
and
erased
the
words.
When
Dignaga
returned,
he
wrote
the
verse
again,
and
again
Krishnamuni
came
to
erase
it.
The
third
time
Dignaga
left
an
additional
note
that
read,
“Please
do
not
erase
this
verse
just
for
fun
because
with
this
verse
I
am
pursuing
a
great
aim.
Also,
there
is
no
point
in
erasing
it
out
of
envy
since
it
is
in
my
mind
from
where
it
cannot
be
removed.
But
if
you
disagree
with
these
words,
you
should
show
yourself,
and
we
will
debate.”
When
the
auspicious
signs
occurred
a
third
time,
Krishnamuni
went
again
to
Dignaga’s
cave.
But
upon
reading
the
note
he
refrained
from
erasing
the
verse
and
waited
for
Dignaga’s
return.
The
two
debated
and
Krishnamuni
was
defeated
three
times.
When
Dignaga
asked
him
to
adopt
the
Buddha
Dharma
as
a
result
of
his
defeat,
the
Brahmin
ascetic
grew
furious
and
emanated
magical
flames
that
burned
Dignaga’s
clothes
and
possessions.
Distraught
and
discouraged
by
the
Brahmin’s
reaction,
Dignaga
felt
that
if
he
could
not
help
the
highly
intelligent
Brahmin,
how
could
be
of
benefit
to
all
sentient
beings
by
composing
the
Compendium
of
Pramana?
He
threw
the
chalk
with
which
he
had
written
the
verse
up
in
the
air,
thinking,
“As
soon
as
the
chalk
touches
the
ground,
I
will
give
up
my
aspiration
to
attain
enlightenment
for
the
benefit
of
all
sentient
beings
and
instead
strive
to
become
self-‐liberated”.
But
the
chalk
did
not
fall
back
to
the
ground
and
when
he
looked
up,
he
saw
Manjushri
in
the
sky,
holding
the
chalk.
Manjushri
asked
Dignaga
not
to
give
up
his
mind
of
enlightenment,
and
promised
to
protect
him
until
he
attained
the
state
of
a
Buddha.
He
also
asked
him
to
compose
the
Compendium
and
prophesied
that
in
the
future
this
commentary
would
become
an
eye
for
migrating
beings.
Encouraged
by
these
words,
Dignaga
composed
the
Compendium
of
Pramana,
which,
along
with
Dharmakirti’s
Pramanavarttika,
has
remained
ever
since
the
subject
of
study,
contemplation,
and
meditation
–
at
first
widely
in
India,
and
then
for
centuries
in
Tibet,
Mongolia,
and
the
Himalayan
regions.
After
completing
the
text,
Dignaga
travelled
around
South
India
and
greatly
furthered
the
spread
of
Buddhism.
One
of
his
main
disciples
was
Ishvarasena
(Tib.:
dbang
phyung
sde)
who
composed
a
commentary
on
the
Compendium
of
Pramana
and
later
became
one
of
Dharmakirti’s
teachers.
Dharmakirti
Dharmakirti
(ca.
600-‐660
CE)
was
also
a
follower
of
the
Chittamatra
School
Following
Reasoning.
He
was
born
to
a
Brahmin
family
in
Tirumalai
in
the
kingdom
of
Chudamani
of
Tamil
Nadu.
Until
the
age
of
eighteen
he
trained
in
the
Brahminical
tradition
and
became
very
well-‐versed
in
non-‐Buddhist
philosophy.
Then,
upon
reading
a
Buddhist
text,
he
developed
faith
in
the
Buddha
Dharma
and
started
to
dress
in
the
style
of
a
Buddhist
layperson.
This
angered
the
Brahmins
and
he
was
expelled
from
his
community.
Dharmakirti
went
to
Nalanda
monastery
where
he
received
ordination
and
extensive
teachings
from
Dharmapala
(Tib.:
chos
skyong).
Then
he
requested
Ishvarasena
–
who
was
a
direct
disciple
of
Dignaga
–
to
teach
him
the
Compendium
of
Pramana.
Ishvarasena
taught
him
the
text
three
times.
After
the
first
time,
2
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
Dharmakirti's
understanding
of
the
Compendium
had
become
equal
to
that
of
Ishvarasena;
after
the
second
time,
it
had
become
equal
to
Dignaga’s;
and
after
the
third
time
Dharmakirti
was
able
to
recognize
that
some
of
Ishvarasena's
assertions
were
not
in
accordance
with
Dignaga's
views.
After
Dharmakirti
revealed
those
mistaken
assertions
to
Ishvarasena,
the
latter
was
delighted
by
his
student's
intelligence
and
granted
him
permission
to
compose
a
commentary
on
the
Compendium
of
Pramana
in
order
to
refute
those
assertions.
Dharmakirti
was
also
initiated
into
the
Buddhist
tantras,
became
a
highly
accomplished
practitioner,
and
had
a
direct
vision
of
Heruka.
In
order
to
deepen
his
understanding
of
non-‐Buddhist
philosophy,
Dharmakirti
then
went
to
work
as
the
servant
of
a
renowned
non-‐Buddhist
scholar,
pretending
not
to
be
a
Buddhist.
He
served
him
and
his
family
for
several
years,
learning
all
the
secret
points
of
that
philosophical
system.
Later
he
challenged
and
defeated
the
renowned
scholar
in
debate,
converting
him
and
his
disciples
to
Buddhism.
Thereafter,
Dharmakirti
travelled
across
India
converting
many
people
to
Buddhism.
Eventually
he
arrived
at
the
gates
of
the
residence
of
king
Utphullapuspa,
who
had
heard
of
Dharmakirti's
great
fame
and
invited
him
to
stay
in
his
kingdom.
Dharmakirti
accepted
and
while
staying
there
composed
the
Seven
Treatises
on
Pramana
(Tib.:
tshad
ma
sde
bdun)
–
one
of
which
is
the
Pramanavarttika
–
as
well
as
an
auto-‐commentary
on
the
first
chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika.
However,
most
contemporary
scholars
were
unable
to
grasp
the
meaning
of
the
treatises.
The
few
who
understood
the
meaning,
moved
by
envy,
claimed
that
they
were
incorrect
and
tied
them
with
a
string
to
the
tail
of
a
dog.
Dharmakirti's
response
was
that
the
dog
would
run
through
the
different
villages
and
cities,
and
in
that
manner
spread
the
treatises.
He
also
added
a
verse
to
the
beginning
of
the
Pramanavarttika
(after
the
verse
of
homage
and
the
promise
to
compose
the
text)
that
reads:
Most living beings are attached to the mundane and not endowed with the dexterity
of wisdom.
Not only are they not interested in excellent teachings, they are hateful owing to the
defilement of envy.
This is why the thought that this [treatise] will be beneficial to others does not
occur.3
However, since I have generated great effort familiarizing [my] mind with excellent
teachings, I am happy [to compose the treatise].
Sometime
later
Dharmakirti
taught
the
Pramanavarttika
to
two
of
his
main
disciples,
Devendrabodhi
(Tib.:
lha
dbang
blo)
and
Shakyabodhi
(Tib.:
sha’kya
blo).
Afterwards,
he
asked
Devendrabodhi
to
compose
a
commentary
on
the
text.
However,
displeased
with
the
first
draft
Dharmakirti
washed
it
away
with
water;
displeased
with
the
second
draft
he
burned
it.
He
finally
accepted
the
third
draft
but
criticized
it,
remarking
that
although
the
explicit
meaning
of
the
text
was
conveyed,
the
deeper
implicit
meaning
was
not.
Thinking
that
no
one
would
be
able
to
properly
comprehend
his
text,
Dharmakirti
added
the
following
line
to
the
end
of
the
Pramanavarttika:
Just as a river into the ocean, [the meaning of this treatise] will dissolve into my
body and disappear.
Towards
the
end
of
his
life
Dharmakirti
founded
a
school
and
a
temple
at
Kalinga,
where
he
passed
away.
Both
Dignaga
and
Dharmakirti
strongly
affected
the
course
not
only
of
Buddhist
philosophy,
but
of
Indian
philosophy
in
general.
Their
expositions
on
language,
negation,
direct
perception,
etc.
were
highly
influential
among
both
Buddhist
and
non-‐Buddhist
philosophers,
but
their
greatest
impact
derived
from
their
analysis
of
inferential
reasoning.
Dignaga
and
Dharmakirti
are
often
described
as
Buddhist
logicians,
for
they
formulated
a
system
of
logic
and
epistemology
that
was
based
on
a
new
form
of
deductive
reasoning.
Yet
this
does
not
mean
that
they
were
chiefly
interested
in
the
formal
properties
of
reasoning.
Instead,
they
regarded
logic
as
a
useful
tool
that
3
In
the
first
class
(October
1,
2014),
Geshe
Kelsang
Wangmo
explains
the
difficulties
this
line
presents
for
translation
and
suggests
other
renderings.
See,
p.
21
of
Class
Notes
-‐
download
from
ibd-‐buddhist.blogspot.com.
3
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
enables
Buddhist
practitioners
to
eliminate
their
misperceptions,
replace
them
with
correct
apprehensions
of
reality
and
eventually
attain
liberation
and
Buddhahood.
The
debate
format
that
is
still
very
popular
among
Tibetan
Buddhist
students
of
debate
is
based
largely
on
Dignaga
and
Dharmakirti’s
works.
Dharmakirti’s
Pramanavarttika,
in
particular,
provides
Tibetan
Buddhist
philosophers
with
a
standard
vocabulary
that
is
used
as
a
framework
for
analysis
of
the
various
Buddhist
scriptures.
It
also
represents
the
epistemological
foundation
of
the
curriculum
in
many
Tibetan
monastic
institutions.
Gyaltsab
Je
Gyaltsab
Darma
Rinchen
(1364–1432)
was
born
in
Tsang
province
of
central
Tibet.
He
was
ordained
as
a
monk
at
the
age
of
ten
and
given
the
name
Darma
Rinchen
(dar
ma
rin
chen).
Gyaltsab
Je
studied
at
the
Sakya
Monastery,
the
Kadam
monastery
of
Sangpu
(gsang
phu),
and
the
Kagyu
monastery
Tsetang
(rtse
thang
–
which
later
converted
to
the
Geluk
tradition).
Like
Lama
Tsongkhapa,
he
was
also
a
student
of
the
renowned
Sakya
Master
Rendawa
Zhoenu
Lodroe
(red
mda'
ba
gzhon
nu
blo
gros).
After
extensive
study
of
the
Prajnaparamita,
Pramana,
Vinaya,
and
so
forth
Gyaltsab
Je
became
an
accomplished
and
eloquent
scholar
of
the
Sakya
tradition,
famed
for
his
intellect
and
knowledge.
While
visiting
different
monasteries
in
Central
Tibet,
he
met
Lama
Tsongkhapa.
He
had
heard
of
Lama
Tsongkhapa’s
fame
and
went
to
attend
one
of
Lama
Tsongkhapa’s
teachings
at
Ratrong
Monastery.
As
Gyaltsab
Je
listened
to
Lama
Tsongkhapa,
he
was
astounded
by
the
clarity
and
profundity
of
his
teaching,
and
generated
great
faith.
From
that
time
on,
Gyaltsab
Je
was
completely
devoted
to
Lama
Tsongkhapa
and
became
one
of
his
main
disciples.
He
received
extensive
teachings
from
Lama
Tsongkhapa
and
took
copious
notes.
Being
a
prolific
writer
he
composed
numerous
commentaries
(such
as
the
Elucidation
of
the
Path
to
Liberation).
He
also
supervised
the
construction
of
Ganden
Monastery.
Before
Lama
Tsongkhapa
passed
away,
he
appointed
Gyaltsab
Je
as
the
first
‘throne
holder’
of
the
Ganden
(or
Gelug)
tradition.
4
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
The
eight
‘pivotal
points
of
logic'
are:
1. Correct
inferential
cognizers
(Tib.:
rjes
dpag
yang
dag)
2. False
inferential
cognizers
(Tib.:
rjes
dpag
ltar
snang)
3. Correct
direct
perceivers
(Tib.:
mngon
sum
yang
dag)
4. False
direct
perceivers
(Tib.:
mngon
sum
ltar
snang)
5. Correct
proof
statements
(Tib:
sgrub
ngag
yang
dag)
6. False
proof
statements
(Tib.:
sgrub
ngag
ltar
snang)
7. Correct
refutations
(Tib.:
sun
‘byin
yang
dag)
8. False
refutations
(Tib.:
sun
‘byin
ltar
snang)
Each
of
the
three
texts
teaches
the
eight
‘pivotal
points
of
logic’
by
primarily
teaching
the
four
correct
pivotal
points,
while
teaching
the
four
false
pivotal
points
in
an
ancillary
fashion.
The
last
four
texts
are
treatises
that
are
like
branches
because
they
do
not
teach
all
eight
‘pivotal
points
of
logic’
but
only
some
of
them,
and
because
they
are
just
supplements
to
the
first,
third,
or
fourth
chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika.
The
Hetubindu
(on
correct
reasons)
and
Sambandhapariksha
(on
the
relationship
between
correct
reasons
and
predicates)
are
supplements
to
the
first
chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika,
while
the
Vadanyaya
(on
the
issue
of
other
minds)
is
a
supplement
to
the
third
and
the
Samtanantarasiddhi
(on
debate
techniques
etc.)
is
a
supplement
to
the
fourth
chapter.
5
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
Examples
of
direct
perceivers
are
sense
direct
perceivers,
such
as
an
eye
consciousness
apprehending
a
table,
an
ear
consciousness
apprehending
a
song,
a
nose
consciousness
apprehending
the
smell
of
perfume,
and
so
forth.
These
sense
consciousnesses
realize
phenomena
that
are
obvious
or
manifest
(i.e.
not
hidden),
such
as
shapes,
colors,
sounds,
etc.
Other
examples
of
direct
perceiver
are
self-‐knowers
(which
are
explained
below),
clairvoyant
awarenesses,
and
yogic
direct
perceivers.
Yogic
direct
perceivers
are
mental
direct
perceivers
that
directly
realize
their
main
objects
(e.g.
impermanence,
selflessness
etc.)
in
dependence
on
prolonged
and
extensive
meditation.
Direct
perceivers
are
essential
to
Buddhist
practice.
Although
hidden
phenomena
are
realized
for
the
first
time
by
inferential
cognizers,
such
a
realization
is
not
sufficient
for
practitioners
aspiring
to
transform
their
mind
and
attain
liberation
or
Buddhahood.
Such
a
realization
is
not
sufficient
because
inferential
cognizers
are
conceptual
consciousnesses
that
do
not
realize
their
objects
directly
but
through
a
generic
image.
For
instance,
an
inferential
cognizer
realizing
selflessness
does
not
realize
selflessness
directly
but
through
the
generic
image
of
selflessness.
Hence,
a
practitioner
who
has
cultivated
an
inferential
cognizer
realizing
selflessness
continues
to
familiarize
with
the
conceptual
consciousness
realizing
selflessness
until,
after
prolonged
and
intense
meditation,
that
consciousness
transforms
into
a
yogic
direct
perceiver
realizing
selflessness,
which
is
strong
enough
to
serve
as
an
effective
antidote
to
the
misperception
of
the
self
and
to
other
afflictions.
Ordinary
direct
perceivers,
such
as
sense
direct
perceivers,
are
also
significant
in
Buddhist
practice,
for
they
enable
practitioners
to
listen
to
teachings,
read
the
scriptures,
etc.
They
also
facilitate
inferential
cognition
of
a
hidden
phenomenon.
For
instance,
a
practitioner
who
generated
the
inferential
cognizer
realizing
that
the
physical
body
is
impermanent
in
dependence
on
the
above
syllogism
(Regarding
the
subject,
the
physical
body,
it
is
impermanent,
because
it
is
the
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions)
must
have
realized,
prior
to
generating
such
an
inferential
cognizer,
that
the
physical
body
is
the
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions.
But
unlike
the
physical
body
being
impermanent,
the
physical
body
being
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions
is
not
a
hidden
phenomenon,
for
it
can
be
realized
for
the
first
time
by
an
eye
consciousness.
(5)
Correct
proof
statements
and
(7)
correct
refutations
are
considered
to
be
the
tools
that
facilitate
others’
understanding,
which
is
why
they
are
mainly
for
th
e
benefit
of
others.
After
having
attained
realizations
ourselves
by
means
of
inferential
cognizers
and
direct
perceivers,
we
need
to
assist
others
in
attaining
the
same
realizations
by
refuting
their
wrong
views
with
correct
refutations,
and
by
generating
realizations
in
their
mental
continuums
through
proof
statements.
(5)
Correct
proof
statements
are
verbal
statements
that
express
a
correct
syllogism.
An
example
of
a
proof
statement
is,
“Whatever
is
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions
is
necessarily
impermanent.
Like
the
last
moment
of
a
candle
flame,
for
instance.
Likewise,
the
physical
body
is
also
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions.”
Here
these
words
state
that
just
as
the
last
moment
of
a
candle
flame
is
impermanent
because
it
is
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions,
likewise
the
physical
body
is
impermanent
because
it
is
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions.
Therefore,
the
words
of
the
proof
statement
express
the
following
syllogism:
Regarding
the
subject,
the
physical
body,
it
is
impermanent,
because
it
is
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions.
Like
the
last
moment
of
a
candle
flame,
for
instance.
In
dependence
on
hearing
that
proof
statement,
a
person
who
has
not
yet
realized
that
the
physical
body
is
impermanent
is
able
to
cultivate
an
inferential
cognizer
realizing
that
the
physical
body
is
impermanent.
(7)
Correct
refutations
refer
to
correct
consequences.
Like
a
syllogism,
a
consequence
is
a
form
of
logical
statement
which
one
cites
to
help
another
person
first
to
recognize
and
then
to
let
go
of
a
wrong
view.
A
consequence
is
stated
in
such
a
way
as
to
reveal
the
absurdity
of
that
person’s
wrong
view;
it
turns
his
own
assertions
against
him,
so
that
he
is
unable
to
give
a
correct
response
without
contradicting
what
he
asserted.
For
instance,
to
a
person
who
holds
that
(a)
the
physical
body
is
permanent,
that
(b)
the
physical
body
is
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions,
and
that
(c)
whatever
is
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions
is
necessarily
impermanent,
the
following
consequence
is
cited:
6
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
Regarding
the
subject,
the
physical
body,
it
follows
that
it
is
not
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
condition
because
it
is
permanent.
In
this
case,
the
person
accepts
that
the
physical
body
is
permanent,
which
is
why
he
cannot
claim
that
the
reason
is
not
established
(i.e.
he
cannot
claim
that
it
is
not
correct
that
the
physical
body
is
permanent)
Since
he
accepts
the
forward
and
counter-‐pervasions
(i.e.
that
whatever
is
permanent
is
necessarily
not
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions,
and
whatever
is
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions
is
necessarily
not
permanent)
he
cannot
claim
that
there
is
no
pervasion.
Lastly
he
cannot
even
accept
that
the
physical
body
is
not
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions,
for
that
would
contradict
his
original
assertion
that
the
physical
body
is
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions.
He
is
thus
left
speechless.
The
person
comes
to
realize
that
his
views
are
contradictory,
which
enables
him
to
reassess
his
beliefs
until
he
is
convinced
of
the
fact
that
the
physical
body
is
impermanent.
After
he
has
reached
this
conviction,
one
cites
a
proof
statement
expressing
a
syllogism
that
establishes
that
the
physical
body
is
impermanent.
As
mentioned
above,
in
dependence
on
that
syllogism
the
person
is
able
to
eventually
generate
an
inferential
cognizer
realizing
that
the
physical
body
is
impermanent.
Regarding
the
four
‘false
pivotal
points
of
logic’,
(2)
false
inferential
cognizers
refer
to
conceptual
consciousnesses
that
are
not
actual
inferential
cognizers
because
they
do
not
realize
their
objects.
An
example
of
a
false
inferential
cognizer
is
a
correctly
assuming
consciousness
perceiving
that
the
physical
body
is
impermanent,
which
did
not
arise
in
dependence
on
a
syllogism.
Another
example
is
a
correctly
assuming
consciousness
perceiving
that
the
physical
body
is
impermanent,
which
arose
in
dependence
on
a
wrong
syllogism.
A
wrong
syllogism
is
a
logically
incorrect
syllogism
and
therefore
does
not
lead
to
an
inferential
cognizer
realizing
the
syllogism’s
object
that
is
to
be
established.
For
instance,
the
following
syllogism:
Regarding
the
subject,
the
physical
body,
it
is
impermanent,
because
it
exists,
is
a
wrong
syllogism
since
there
is
‘no
pervasion’.
There
is
‘no
pervasion’
because
whatever
exists
is
not
necessarily
impermanent.
Whatever
exists
is
not
necessarily
impermanent
because
there
are
phenomena
that
are
permanent.
Another
example
of
a
wrong
syllogism
is:
Regarding
the
subject,
the
physical
body,
it
is
permanent
because
it
is
unchangeable.
This
is
a
wrong
syllogism
because
the
reason
is
not
an
attribute
of
the
subject,
i.e.
the
physical
body
is
not
unchangeable.
Such
a
wrong
syllogism
may
give
rise
to
a
wrong
conceptual
consciousness
perceiving
the
physical
body
to
be
permanent,
which
is
also
a
false
inferential
cognizer.
(4)
False
direct
perceivers
refer
to
conceptual
consciousnesses
or
wrong
non-‐conceptual
awarenesses.
Since
false
direct
perceivers
are
either
conceptual
or
wrong
consciousnesses
they
are
not
actual
direct
perceivers.
Examples
include
a
conceptual
consciousness
realizing
selflessness,
an
eye
consciousness
perceiving
a
blue
snow
mountain,
and
a
memory
consciousness
remembering
a
table.
(6)
False
proof
statements
are
statements
that
express
a
wrong
syllogism.
This
means
that
wrong
proof
statements
express
a
logically
incorrect
syllogism
in
dependence
on
which
one
cannot
generate
an
inferential
cognizer
realizing
the
syllogism’s
object
that
is
to
be
established.
An
example
of
a
false
proof
statement
is:
“Whatever
is
unchangeable
is
necessarily
permanent.
Like
the
absence
of
an
elephant
on
the
table,
for
instance.
The
physical
body
is
also
unchangeable.”
This
statement
is
a
false
proof
statement
because
it
expresses
the
following
wrong
syllogism:
Regarding
the
subject,
the
physical
body,
it
is
permanent
because
it
is
unchangeable.
Like
the
absence
of
an
elephant
on
the
table,
for
instance.
(8)
Wrong
consequences
are
consequences
that
do
not
reveal
the
absurdities
of
a
person’s
wrong
view,
so
that
the
person
is
unable
to
become
aware
of
his
contradictory
assertions.
An
example
of
a
wrong
consequence
is:
Regarding
the
subject,
the
physical
body,
it
follows
that
it
is
not
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions
because
it
is
permanent.
addressed
to
a
person
who
holds
that
(a)
the
physical
body
is
permanent,
that
(b)
the
physical
body
is
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions,
but
who
does
not
hold
that
(c)
whatever
is
a
product
of
its
own
causes
and
conditions
is
necessarily
impermanent.
7
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
It
is
important
to
identify
and
understand
these
false
‘pivotal
points
of
logic’,
for
practitioners
may
confuse
them
with
their
correct
counterparts.
The
Pramanavarttika
Among
the
Seven
Treatises
of
Pramana,
the
most
popular
one
is
the
Pramanavarttika,
which
in
Tibet,
Mongolia,
and
the
Himalaya
region
in
particular,
has
been
more
widely
studied
than
Dignaga's
Compendium
of
Pramana.
The
Pramanavarttika
is
written
in
verse
and
has
four
chapters:
1. The
chapter
on
inference
for
one’s
own
benefit
(Skt.:
Svarthanumana
,
Tib.:
rang
don
rjes
dpag
gi
le’u)
2. The
chapter
on
the
establishment
of
a
valid
cognizer
(Skt.:
Pramanasiddhi,
Tib.:
tshad
ma
grub
pa’i
le’u)
3. The
chapter
on
direct
perception
(Skt.:
Pratyaksha,
Tib.:
mngon
sum
le’u)
4. The
chapter
on
inference
for
others’
benefit
(Skt.:
Prarthanumana,
Tib.:
gzhan
don
rjes
dpag
gi
le’u)
The
chapter
on
inference
for
one’s
own
benefit
Unlike
the
last
three
chapters
of
the
Pramanavarttika,
the
first
does
not
actually
elaborate
on
any
of
the
verses
or
chapters
of
Dignaga’s
Compendium
of
Pramana,
but
serves
as
an
introductory
chapter
to
the
text.
It
sets
forth
inferential
cognizers
(both
the
correct
and
false
inferential
cognizers,
among
the
eight
‘pivotal
points
of
logic’)
because,
as
Dharmakirti
explains
in
his
auto-‐commentary
on
the
first
chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika:
Thorough discernment of that which is factual and that which is not depends on inferential
cognizers.
Therefore,
study
and
contemplation
of
the
first
chapter
aids
practitioners
in
cultivating
inferential
cognizers
in
their
mental
continuum,
which
in
turn
facilitates
their
comprehension
of
the
last
three
chapters.
However,
instead
of
explaining
the
inferential
cognizers
themselves,
the
first
chapter
expounds
on
that
which
mainly
gives
rise
to
inferential
cognizers,
i.e.
correct
syllogisms,
and
presents
their
general
structure,
categories,
definitions,
and
so
forth.
The
chapter
on
the
establishment
of
a
valid
cognizer
The
second
chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
is
the
most
important
one.
It
comments
only
on
the
first
two
lines
of
Dignaga’s
Compendium
of
Pramana,
which
constitute
the
homage
to
Buddha
Shakyamuni.
Elaborating
on
the
two
lines
of
homage,
the
second
chapter
presents
liberation,
Buddhahood,
and
the
paths
that
lead
to
these
two
states.
Dharmakirti
presents
liberation,
Buddhahood,
and
the
paths
that
lead
there
by
way
of
establishing
that
the
Buddha
is
a
‘valid
cognizer’.
However,
this
does
not
mean
that
the
Buddha
is
literally
a
valid
cognizer,
because
valid
cognizers
are
consciousnesses
while
the
Buddha
is
not
a
consciousness
but
a
person.
Instead,
it
means
that
the
Buddha
is
a
‘valid
cognizer
being’.
The
Buddha
is
a
‘valid
cognizer
being’
because,
through
his
own
power
(without
depending
on
another
teacher),
he
unerringly
and
effortlessly
teaches
those
seeking
release
whatever
they
need
to
know
to
reach
their
goal.
As
part
of
establishing
that
the
Buddha
is
a
‘valid
cognizer
being’,
the
second
chapter
also
sets
forth
past
and
future
lives,
the
four
noble
truths,
and
so
forth.
Some
scholars
explain
that
the
reason
why
Dharmakirti
composed
the
second
chapter
is
that
at
the
time,
numerous
critics
expressed
their
disapproval
of
Dignaga’s
works
on
Pramana.
As
mentioned
above,
Pramana
literally
means
‘valid
cognizer’.
Valid
cognizers
are
awarenesses
that
are
newly
non-‐deceptive,
i.e.
that
newly
realize
their
main
objects.
There
are
two
types
of
valid
cognizers:
(a)
direct
valid
cognizers
(i.e.
valid
cognizers
that
are
direct
perceivers)
and
(b)
inferential
valid
cognizers
(i.e.
valid
cognizers
that
are
inferential
cognizers).
One
of
the
main
objectives
of
the
Pramana
literature
is
to
teach
practitioners
the
means
of
cultivating
correct
apprehension
of
the
essential
concepts
of
the
Buddha
Dharma.
Such
apprehension
depends
primarily
on
realizing
phenomena
that
are
currently
hidden
to
us
and
which
we
can
realize
initially
only
with
inferential
8
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
cognizers.
Inferential
cognizers
in
turn
depend
on
correct
syllogisms
and
thus
on
logical
reasoning.
Since
the
Pramana
literature
elucidates
such
logical
reasoning
and
the
way
to
utilize
it
as
a
tool
to
comprehend
impermanence,
selflessness,
and
so
forth,
commentaries
on
Pramana
are
usually
referred
to
as
commentaries
on
“logic”
or
“epistemology”,
and
the
study
of
Pramana
is
referred
to
as
the
study
of
“logic”
or
“epistemology”.
However,
many
Indian
scholars
were
unable
to
recognize
the
value
of
Dignaga’s
work.
Some
claimed
that
teachings
on
Pramana
(i.e.
logic
or
epistemology)
were
not
based
on
the
teachings
of
the
Buddha.
Others
alleged
that
the
main
purpose
of
the
Pramana
literature
was
to
defeat
an
opponent
in
debate
and
that
it
was
of
no
use
to
those
aspiring
to
attain
liberation
or
Buddhahood.
Therefore,
Dharmakirti
taught
the
second
chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
to
counteract
these
assertions
by
demonstrating
the
significance
of
the
Pramana
literature
with
respect
to
studying,
contemplating,
and
meditating
on
past
and
future
lives,
the
four
noble
truths,
liberation,
Buddhahood,
and
so
forth.
Please
note
that
even
though
in
general,
the
Pramanavarttika
is
based
on
the
point
of
view
of
the
Chittamatra
School
Following
Reasoning,
the
second
chapter
is
from
the
perspective
of
the
Sautrantika
School.
The
chapter
on
direct
perception
and
the
chapter
on
inference
for
others’
benefit
The
last
two
chapters
of
the
Pramanavarttika
comment
on
the
actual
body
of
Dignaga’s
Compendium
of
Pramana,
i.e.
the
six
chapters
of
the
text.
Among
the
eight
‘pivotal
points
of
logic’,
the
third
chapter
presents
correct
and
false
direct
perceivers,
and
the
fourth
chapter,
correct
and
false
proof
statements
as
well
as
correct
and
false
refutations.
9
The
Second
Chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika
(1.1) The
means
of
ascertaining
hidden
phenomena
(1.2) An
explanation
of
the
objects
of
ascertainment
–
liberation,
omniscience,
and
the
paths
that
lead
there
(1.3) The
means
of
ascertaining
obvious/manifest
phenomena
Among
the
three
subheadings,
the
first
is
the
main
heading
of
the
first
chapter,
the
second
is
the
main
heading
of
the
second
chapter,
and
the
third
is
the
main
heading
of
the
third
chapter.
After
citing
the
main
heading
of
the
second
chapter,
Gyaltsab
Je
gives
a
short
introduction
to
the
second
chapter
of
the
Pramanavarttika,
in
which
he
briefly
explains
the
meaning
of
the
two
lines
of
homage
of
Dignaga’s
Compendium
of
Pramana
and
the
reason
for
establishing
that
the
Buddha
is
a
‘valid
cognizer
being’.
Thereafter
he
starts
his
elucidation
of
the
verses
in
Dharmakirti’s
second
chapter.
11