Hof 11
Hof 11
Hof 11
BELLHELICOPTER.COM
22 BESPOKE VS PRET A PORTER?
“The Australian Army has taken
delivery of three additional H-47
Chinooks from Boeing, just 85
days after placing the order”
announced the article on the army
technology website. 85 days?
ISSUE 11 I 2 017
THE TEAM
PUBLISHER
Ned Dawson
EDITOR
Mark Ogden
DEPUTY EDITOR
Alan Norris
SUB EDITOR
Leigh Neil
EUROPEAN EDITOR
Alexander Mladenov
PROOFREADER
Barbara McIntosh
GRAPHIC DESIGN
Dot Design
4 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
Kia Kaha Media Group
PO Box 37 978, Parnell,
Auckland 1001, New Zealand
T +64 21 747 757
EMAIL
[email protected]
NEWS DESK
[email protected]
www.heliopsmag.com
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 5
FROM THE EDITOR
Significant
forces
H
ow often do we see media criticism of military projects? How often
do you hear of the projects that have gone well? Military projects
are expensive, usually at the bleeding edge of technology and
subject to whims of political masters.
Australia has had several military contracts that have not gone
well and yet has others that have had little trouble. One project in particular though
provides an insight into how not to run a project.
The Australian National Audit Office (ANOA) conducted an independent
performance audit of the Australian Army’s Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)
‘Tiger’. The report provides a sobering overview of a program that went badly wrong
and has cost Australian taxpayers billions for an aircraft that is unlikely to ever meet
the performance objectives set back at the turn of the century.
The ARH was to provide an important combat capability for the Australian Army
- its intended functions included; airmobile escort missions; providing support to
covering forces, helicopter attack, and recovery missions. Following the RFT release
in December 2000, the Department of Defence signed a contract with Eurocopter
International Pacific (now Airbus Group Australia Pacific) in December 2001 for the
acquisition of 22 of its ‘Tiger’ variant helicopters at an acquisition cost of $1.1 billion
2001 price); and a Through-Life Support contract at a cost of $397 million (2001
price).
Interestingly, Government approval for the acquisition was on the basis that
it was a low-risk, off-the shelf platform. An ANAO performance audit 10 years
ago concluded that Tiger was more developmental than off-the-shelf and this
heightened the Government’s exposure to schedule, cost and capability risks, both
for the acquisition of the aircraft and its sustainment.
In April 2016, Chief of Army finally declared Final Operational Capability (FOC) for
the Tiger, which allowed the helicopter to be operationally employed. This however,
was seven years later than planned, and even then was accompanied by nine
operational caveats. The Tiger also has more than 70 capability deficiencies relating
to Army’s current and future operational requirements, 60 of which the Department
deemed critical. The 15-year (2004–2019) sustainment contract provided for
expenditure of $571 million. That sum had been expended by June 2014, and
expenditure as at mid-2016 was over $900 million. The cost per flying hour for the
Tiger fleet was over $30 thousand, 33% higher than the target of $20 thousand.
Despite huge expenditure, on average only 3.5 aircraft of the operational fleet (16
aircraft) were serviceable at 10am on any given day in 2015, against a target of 12
aircraft – only 30% of the target.
Defence spent $1.86 billion on the acquisition (capital expenditure), yet the
acquisition missed all but one of its scheduled key milestones. As at April 2016, the
project had been in progress for 14 years against an initial schedule of 6.5 years.
The Project appeared on the Government’s first ‘Projects of Concern list’ in January
2008, and was removed from the list just 3 months later after Defence classified the
Project as ‘remediated’. Yet it was a further eight years before the declaration of
FOC and for some reason, Tiger was not put back onto the Projects of Concern list
6 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
FROM THE EDITOR
during that intervening period. The report also revealed that despite the shortfalls
identified in aircraft availability, rate of effort and the threat environment in which the
Tiger can operate, Defence did not seek Government agreement to these shortfalls
prior to declaring FOC, as required by Defence Instructions.
The Tiger continues to draw resources with the 2016 Defence White Paper
allocating $500–$750 million to address the current capability shortcomings despite
there being a plan to replace the platform mid 2020s, at a cost of some $5–$6 billion.
As the report noted, the upgrade is scheduled for consideration less than 12 months
after the Tiger achieved Final Operational Capability! One has to ask, is this a case
of throwing good money after bad?
So what to make of this project? I do not pretend to be an expert in project
management but it seems that there has been a significant gap between
Government/Army expectations and the Contractor’s performance and deliverable.
It also raises questions how a country like Australia, which does not employ or
purchase significant numbers of individual items of defense equipment, can afford
to develop unique systems. True off the shelf purchases by Australia through the
Foreign Military Sales program, such as the C-17 Globemaster, SH-60R Seahawk
and Super Hornet have gone well. These projects exposed the budget and military
capability to minimal risk, provided on time introduction and stayed within budget.
Commonality with the US Forces provides an upgrade path that is rarely available
with unique systems. On the other hand, such off the shelf purchases provide
minimal country industry participation in the building of equipment and development
of systems (and provides an elevated risk to the potential of a cutoff of support
should relations with the originating country sour). It is a dilemma but the cost of
military acquisitions needs to be analyzed to provide a proper consideration of
capability, cost, development risk, and industry participation.
The Australian MRH 90 has experienced problems and that project continues
to work through its challenges. It would be easy to point the finger at the European
industry as the source of Australia’s project problems but this ignores history with
US-sourced programs (e.g. Wedgetail, Super Seasprite and F-111) and the role
Defence has had in the specification and management of these projects. I dare say,
the F-35 looms as another ‘challenge’.
Australia is not unique in facing these issues but when the numbers are few, the
problems tend to be accentuated. To me though, the ANOA report shows that it
would seem that many Government and Defense bureaucracies have real difficulties
in contract specification, development and management, a lack of honest analysis
and reporting to facilitate Governments with opportunities to make decisions about
whether to stick with a program or make at an early exit.
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 7
INDUSTRY NEWS
8 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
DELIVERING GLOBAL COVERAGE OF THE HELICOPTER INDUSTRY
WHERE
EVERYTHING
IS HAPPENING!
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 9
INDUSTRY NEWS
KAZAKHSTAN ORDERS
MI-35M
AS565 MBE PANTHER TO INDONESIA The Ministry of Defense of
The first three of 11 AS565 MBe Panthers ordered by Indonesia’s Ministry of Kazakhstan has ordered four
Defense and the Indonesian Navy have been handed over to PT Dirgantara, transport-combat Mi-35Ms with
Indonesia, and the remaining aircraft deliveries will be completed by 2018. delivery planned for 2018.
10 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
INDUSTRY NEWS
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 11
INDUSTRY NEWS
12 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
The HeliOps Frontline Helicopters &
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HELIOPS FRONTLINE 13
INDUSTRY NEWS
14 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
INDUSTRY NEWS
COMANCHE ON DISPLAY
The Boeing-Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche,
that did not make it into the Army’s
FIRST ALLIGATORS OF 2017 inventory, is now on display at the U.S. Army
Russian Helicopters has produced and tested the first batch Aviation Museum, Fort Rucker. One of only
of Ka-52s, a reconnaissance and combat helicopter, for two of the type that were built and flown has
scheduled delivery to the Russian Ministry of Defense in 2017. been in storage but can now be viewed by
Production of the type is expected to more than double in 2017 the public for a limited time.
as the company now has overseas orders to fulfill.
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 15
INDUSTRY NEWS
NEW CHINOOK
COMPOSITE BLADES
During recent flight tests
by Boeing a Chinook
has demonstrated the
Advanced Chinook Rotor
Blades which have added
an additional 1,500
pounds of lift.
16 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
INDUSTRY NEWS
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 17
INDUSTRY NEWS
frontline
TAP
FOR MORE
INFO
18 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
INDUSTRY NEWS
FINAL
EC135T2+ FOR
AUSTRALIA
Airbus Helicopters
has achieved
Factory Acceptance
of the last six of
the EC135T2+ for
the Helicopter
Aircrew Training
System for the
Australian Defense
Force, completing
on-time deliveries
of the full fleet of 15
helicopters.
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 19
TECH THOUGHTS
“Can Do”
or “Must Do”?
BY PAUL KENNARD
T
his is a difficult article to write, and from this viewpoint we are not in full possession of the facts.
However, it is my belief that we only prevent accidents by talking about them. My heartfelt
condolences to the families of all of the crews in the accidents discussed below; I mean no
disrespect, but feel that we, as aviators, need to be more candid about the pressures we’re under
(“no” is often the hardest word to use in aviation…) in order that, as a community, we can stay safe….
The Marine Corps Times headline is pretty damning – “Squadron in crisis: Total dysfunction preceded
Marines’ deadliest crash this year”1. The tragic collision between two CH-53Es off the coast of Hawaii has
left families devastated and opened the lid on some highly dangerous, and toxic, trends and leadership traits
within the USMC, at least as evinced at local unit level. Most of us as military aviators have faced a situation
on Operations where we have knowingly broken peacetime regulations and SOPs. We’ve done it because our
militaries invest a small fortune in training us to prepare us for the time when we will step outside the “comfort
blanket” of TTPs/SOPs/Regulations in order to get the job done. We are trained to exercise captaincy and
military judgement when these times arise, often out of direct radio comms, and it is our way, as helicopter
pilots, of exercising “Auftragstaktik” or “Mission Command”; i.e. get the job done to the best of your ability
and the CoC empowers the crews to bend/break the rules (only with good reason) to achieve the task. But
only in Wartime or national emergency - not routinely in peacetime training. On Ops I’ve flown way below
weather/Illumination limits, far in excess of Crew Duty Periods and carried troops and cargo outside of the
aircraft Release to Service or the rules of safe restraint; I guess most of us have. When there is an operational
imperative and the campaign and/or lives are at risk we, as trained, experienced and trusted aviators make
the call. We make it with the sincere hope that the CoC “has our back”. The USMC accident report2, heavily
quoted in the Times’ article suggests that the ongoing problems with CH-53E availability pushed the Unit
hierarchy into some stark choices; maintain declared readiness (with stretched/fatigued crews and dreadful
serviceability) or hold up a red flag and declare the unit non-operational in certain roles. Days prior to the
accident the CO had been relieved for, reading between the lines of the report, a “lack of improvement in aircraft
readiness…”. So the CO was pushing, and pushing hard. He was relieved it seems for not getting results. Now
put yourself in the minds of the accident crews and the Ops Officer on the day of the accident; the microscope
was on the unit – was saying “no” even discussed? If it was, it was ignored and crews “walked” to do a
complex sortie mentally fatigued, distracted and in some cases bouncing off the limit of currency.
20 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
TECH THOUGHTS
The background to this terrible accident reminds me of discussions I’ve had with several civilian
helicopter pilots employed in the VIP Industry. The “Principal” has invested a small fortune in buying a
helicopter and hiring crews. They expect a helicopter to be a service, a fast car if you like. The pressure
for crews to fly below their limits or beyond their duty time can be immense – especially if the crews are
relatively low-time and setting off on their career with large debts. Several I’ve spoken to have been given
ultimatums such as “I don’t care about the weather; get me there or I’ll hire a pilot that will…”. Who speaks
for them? Who has their back? The accident report for the loss of an AW139 which crashed departing in
thick fog reports a comment on the CVR from the co-pilot – “I don’t mind telling you I’m not **** very happy
about lifting out of here”3. The commander briefed a vertical departure but attempted a shallower, more
conventional, departure and seemingly suffered disorientation (possibly Somatogravic Illusion) and flew the
aircraft into the ground at a high rate of descent. The AAIB report also mentions an earlier conversation:
Co-pilot: “Yeah I know that (brief pause) what I’m saying is are you going to tell him?”
Commander: “No…(pause) **** it it’s down to them (pause) if he asks I’ll tell him (pause) I said I’ll check
the weather when I get to Norwich and give them an update (pause) that’s what I’ll do”
On one level the conversation seems to be sensible, with the Commander making a decision. However,
there seems to be a lot of uncertainty and concern between the crew – especially over the potential of
telling the owner that the weather might be unsuitable. The AAIB appears to suggest that the crew were
under pressure to complete the task by referencing a comment from an earlier report, that of AW109E
G-CRST (which crashed into a building in central London in low cloud attempting to land at Battersea),
which stated:
“…pilots will often be subject to pressures – real or perceived – to complete a task. These pressures
might lead pilots to continue with flights in circumstances where otherwise they would not…”
Aviation, it is often said, is a cruel and unforgiving mistress. A lot of the time we take risks and succeed
– on the battlefield, to quote James T. Kirk “Risk is our business”. We need to accept a tolerable risk in
preparing our crews for combat, or, indeed training civil pilots to be safe all-weather aviators. But that
distinction between peace and war, between acceptable and unacceptable risk needs to be held firm to
protect crews, commanders and managers from the awful consequences highlighted above.
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 21
STORY BY PAU L K E N N A RD
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 23
“The Australian Army has taken delivery of
three additional H-47 Chinooks from Boeing,
just 85 days after placing the order”1 announced
the article on the army technology website.
85 days?
I
t took Mercedes almost upgraded their CH-47Ds – “The
that long to deliver my Australian CH-47Fs are US-configured
new car, so how on earth models, which allowed Australia to take
can Boeing deliver 3 brand advantage of volume pricing when the
new multi-million dollar state of the art $370 million manufacturing order was
helicopters so quickly? The answer, of placed with Boeing in January 2012”3
course, is referenced further down the . Therefore, if you can access cutting
article with the comment “Boeing said edge capability at a “bulk discount”
in a statement that the early delivery and in record time by aligning with the
of the helicopters was made possible US Army why doesn’t every else do
with US Army’s approval”. In other it? Having worked in the UK Chinook
words, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) project team when we were mulling the
team in the Department of Defence same question I can suggest that, “it’s
(DoD) had negotiated with the US Army complicated”. What are the pros and
(PEO Aviation, PM Cargo)2 for three cons of buying “off the peg” rather than
imminent delivery slots to the US Army “made to measure”?
to be diverted to the Australian Army
and then backfilled. Good business MONEY TALKS
for Boeing, good politics for US/ The US Army is, by far, the largest
Australia relations and, of course, good user of rotorcraft in the West and in
headlines for all concerned. However, NATO. Many of the platforms have been
this deal was only possible because in full-rate production for decades,
the Australian Army operates identical only interrupted by Block upgrade
CH-47Fs to the US Army – a decision programmes. The amortisation of the
Research and Development investment
made back when the Australians
1. Army-technology.com “Boeing Completes Delivery of Three H-47 Chinooks to Australian Army” article
dated 7 July 16, accessed 8 Jan 17.
2. Program Executive Office Aviation, the US Army directorate responsible for US Army helicopter
programmes and Project Manager Cargo is the organisation that supports the CH-47 directly.
3. Defence Industry Daily – “Australia Ordered CH47F Chinooks Contract Fulfilled; Housing Under
Construction” – article dated Dec 22 2015, accessed 8 Jan 17.
24 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 25
26 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 27
over extended production runs has avionic baseline onto the aging CH-47D
an obvious impact on the fly away derived UK core fleet. FMS is not “free”
cost of the aircraft. By accessing however, there is an overhead cost
the “volume price” of an identically levied for the administration work that
produced aircraft, FMS customers can the US Army personnel are required
gain a considerable discount over the to do, typically this is 4% of the
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) price contract value and includes a portion
for a tailored platform. It’s always a for Government to Government work
difficult undertaking to compare the and for QA/Scrutiny by the Defence
pricing of similar aircraft packages for Security Co-operation Agency (DSCA –
different customers, but as an example, www.dcsa.mil). Even with the surcharge,
Australia’s original order for 7 CH-47Fs, FMS appears substantially cheaper.
2 flight simulators and spares was Even more stark than the Chinook
quoted by Defence Industrial Daily as example for the UK is the AH64.
costing $513.5m whereas the purchase The original contract for the highly
of 14 modified CH-47F aircraft (known modified UK Apache (different
as Chinook Mk6) by the UK Royal Air engines, DAS/ASE and radios) was
Force cost, according to media sources, placed with Westland Helicopters in
somewhere in the region of £1Bn Yeovil. The total programme cost of
(approx. $1.5Bn at the exchange rate the production run of 67 airframes
at the time) without flight simulators. was estimated at £3.1Bn, which,
This puts the UK Mk6 Chinook as crudely, equates to £47m per copy
approximately 35-40% more expensive (in late 1990s money…). The extensive
per airframe than the Australian order use of the Apache in Afghanistan
– and is only that cheap because much accelerated the fatigue on the airframe
of the R&D for the Mk6 had already and they require replacement almost
been spent during the $450m Project a full decade before expected. More
JULIUS, which introduced a new fleet financially challenged than at the time
4. UK Govt website announcement 11 Jul 16 – “MoD orders new fleet of cutting edge Apache helicopters
for Army” – accessed 9 Jan 17.
28 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
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HELIOPS FRONTLINE 31
Using the US Army as a “reference
of the previous order, the UK MoD
customer” also enables other countries
has ignored AgustaWestland and
to step through the Block upgrade
ordered 50 AH-64Es through FMS at
approach hand in hand with the US and
an estimated project cost of $2.3Bn4
benefit from technology insertion and
noting that “Buying the AH-64E ‘off
Test & Evaluation either for free or at
the shelf’ allows the MOD to take
dramatically reduced cost. Therefore,
advantage of the US Government’s
so far, it’s “win-win”. Why would foreign
larger production programme in Mesa,
governments do anything other than
Arizona, with the UK benefiting from
buy through FMS?
economies of scale”. This project
recapitalises the AH64 airframe and THE ELEPHANT(S) IN THE ROOM
provides simulators / logistics support The first issue with buying FMS is the
at a cost of approximately $46m per almost immediate loss of “Operational
copy, which even with the depressed Sovereignty” or, as it is sometimes
Sterling exchange rate, is still some 20% referred to, “Freedom of Action”. The
cheaper than the price paid in the late US Government, through the DoD,
1990s – considerably cheaper when effectively controls the supply of
allowing for inflation. spare parts, the configuration control
The fly away cost is only the start (and hence airworthiness) of the
of the savings however. The Through platform, the source codes and data
Life “Cost of Ownership” bill can be in the software and decides the future
substantially reduced by exploiting upgrade path based upon US needs.
the US Army’s logistic support, both Why are these important?
in terms of the day to day provision of
spares (potentially on operations as a. Spares. Whilst having the same
well if deployed alongside US forces) configuration as the US Army can
and in obsolescence management. greatly reduce the costs of spare
32 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
parts, and hence make the “Cost per Management and capability
Flight Hour” bill smaller, the reliance upgrades to be managed at reduced
on the timely supply of spares can cost. However, the timing and
give the US Government a degree affordability may not fit with planned
of influence over the operating and funded upgrade projects as
nation’s “Operational Sovereignty”. seen by the operating country. Given
For example, if the operating nation the choice, nations like to “veer
elects to become embroiled in a and haul” spending commitments
foreign policy initiative at odds with based on fiscal restrictions, changing
US Government policy then the priorities and the volatility of
supply can be swiftly turned off. exchange rates. By being “locked
If the aircraft had been procured in” to the US roadmap, a change of
through DCS then the operating schedule by the US can leave other
nation could attempt to stockpile operators facing difficult financial
parts or obtain them from 3rd decisions without the flexibility to
party sources, retaining the ability shift upgrades further to the right,
to operate, for a time, without US or, indeed, to the left to exploit
approval. One could argue that Iran underspend or a beneficial currency
has been successful in operating US fluctuation.
built aircraft for nearly 4 decades
without OEM support…. c. Airworthiness Assurance. US
aircraft are designed to Military
b. Upgrade Timing. The key to Specifications and Military Standards
accessing the reduced operating (better known as Mil Specs and
costs is to stay in step with US Mil Stds) and are certified as
upgrade programmes. On paper this airworthy through a variety of
is sensible, enabling Obsolescence different mechanisms, individual
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 33
PHOTO COU RTESY US N AV Y
34 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 35
to the platform and the operating obvious issue, and there are several
community5. This means that if you technologies that the US will simply
purchase through FMS you have a not share the raw data for – for
choice of paying to operate under completely understandable reasons.
US airworthiness (in which case the Trade restrictions, the infamous
configuration control of the aircraft “ITAR”6, can often place draconian
in terms of hardware, software restrictions on who can access what
and firmware must remain locked data for what reason – sometimes,
to the US standard) or taking the seemingly, for no good reason. The
platform and operating it under ITAR covers all military or “dual use”
your own airworthiness regulation. items and services covered by the
On paper this is quite simple, but “US Munitions List” and applies strict
it can be problematic. Firstly if you controls over access to data and to
have your own National Standards any attempt by the receiving country
then the US Standards may not be to re-sell items at the end of their
an exact match. In the UK the MoD service life. ITAR has undoubtedly
operates under Defence Standards hurt US exports; it is often quoted
(Def Stans) – which, in the main, that Australia rejected buying further
are comparable to Mil Specs and Blackhawks and purchased NH90 in
Mil Stds, but which also have a part due to access to software codes
significant number of differences. required to assure airworthiness.
Each of these “differences” requires Finally, FMS vs IP can be a tricky
a degree of investigation and area as the US Government is acting
assurance to permit a waiver to be as a “go between” for the purchaser
issued. However, sometimes, the and Industry – for a DCS the
data / code required to complete purchaser can negotiate directly for
this evaluation cannot be released access to codes and trials data that
for US security, trade or Intellectual they need, provided, of course, that
Property reasons. Security is an the data is releasable under ITAR!
5. Traditionally the US Army has “owned” the airworthiness of its platforms either through PEO Avn (for
“green” aircraft) or TAPO (Technology Applications Program Officer) for Special Mission assets.
6. International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
36 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
d. Industrial Offset and Technology avionics and weapons. Perhaps at
Base. It is always a great temptation the forefront of this are the Israelis
for Governments to use their who are even modifying the F35
Defence Dollar to support their with Israeli developed avionics.
own Industries. As referenced The IDF have also extensively
above, the UK government is not modified their AH64A/D fleet with
alone in having a long history of indigenous DAS/ASE and weapons,
“tinkering” with established designs including a rapid program to clear
(and paying handsomely to do so…) the Rafael Spike ATGW when the
in order to assuage Trade Unions US halted the supply of Hellfires,
re jobs and to retain certain key thereby neatly reasserting a degree
design and manufacturing skills of “Operational Sovereignty” too.
within the Industrial and Technology Outside the clear industrial offset
base. Often forgotten is that those benefit, is the tactical freedom that
home-based workers modifying and a “bespoke” capability can provide
assembling platforms are paying that is attractive. If a nation elects
their taxes and spending their wages to purchase an identical aircraft to
in the home country, ploughing back the US through FMS then it should
cash into the economy that would accept that the platform’s DAS/ASE,
otherwise disappear – albeit at a rate Comms and Night Vision systems
still substantially less than the cost will be optimised towards US Tactics
delta of buying FMS. Techniques and Procedures (TTPs),
and that the weapons clearance will
e. Capability Requirements. Often the only extend to ordnance in the US
single largest driver for selecting inventory. The receiving nation also
“Bespoke” rather than “Off the Peg”. should accept that the Software
Some nations will simply want to use in the ASE/DAS will be optimised
their own role/mission equipment, towards US TTPs, and that few (if
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 37
38 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 39
any) countries will have unfettered Outside of US platforms, one
access to the T&E evidence that criticism often levelled at the NH90
supports the Declaration of programme is that it has tried to be
Performance. The UK and US have “all things to all men” satisfying the
quite different approaches to some diverse requirements from many nations
elements of TTPs, and for this reason in many roles. Whilst notionally there
the former has traditionally fitted are only two versions of the NH90, the
their own mission equipment. The Tactical Transport Helicopter (TTH)7
emphasis is, therefore, very much and Naval Frigate Helicopter (NFH),
on trusting that the kit works at the ability for customers to ask for
delivery as you need it to and can a plethora of configuration options
be upgraded when required. I came led to lengthy delays due to the long
across another small FMS wrinkle; list of design, Test & Evaluation and
the UK had acquired an element certification overheads. For the Swedes,
of ASE for their helicopter fleet who ordered the NH90 with their
and was successfully using it on Nordic brethren, delays in the delivery
Operations. There was a Software of the aircraft, ironically, led them to
upgrade ready to deploy on UK buy Blackhawks as an interim measure
platforms but this was held back at a cost of over $700m…
until US platforms could field it first. Perhaps the most effective way of
A small, but potentially frustrating getting the FMS “sticker price” with
problem, but indicative of the the capability you want is to partner
potential pitfalls that the unwary can with US programmes. This enables
come across. you to “nudge the asteroid”8 at the
7. And even the TTH comes in two structurally different cabin sizes…
8. If an asteroid were to be found on a collision course with Earth early enough much less energy needs
to be expended to change its orbit to generate a “miss”. In programmatic terms, the closer to TRL 7 / IOC
the bigger the cost/time impact in making changes, therefore sowing the correct capability seeds in the
Concept/Low TRL phase is extremely efficient.
40 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
programmes earliest stages to deliver is, with many things, is “it depends”.
the output capability required at the As with most Defence Acquisition
favourable price point. For the UK, it projects there is a “tug of war”
appears that the upgraded AH-64E between the User’s Requirement and
has elements of UK thinking embodied, the Government’s industrial strategy.
including more powerful engines Buying off the peg can save a large
and a more Open Architecture for sum of money over the lifetime of a
avionic upgrades. For several NATO platform, and can deliver a capability
countries, there is the possibility with quickly. Balanced against this is
the nascent FVL/JMR programme to the reliance on a 3rd party nation
“nudge the asteroid”. Although much for support, dependence on their
of the air vehicle work is mature, there airworthiness assurance and little/no
remain opportunities to partner for the control over the future direction of any
development of the mission systems platform or subsystem upgrade.
and avionics. Looking ahead, this could
be particularly valuable in terms of Saville Row or the shopping mall?
ASE/DAS and DVE9 capability. Check your wallet and your needs
Which Path to Take? The answer before you shop…. v
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 41
42 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
Global climate change and the lack of rain in summer have
caused a significant increase in the risk of forest fires starting and
rapidly spreading in Spain. A small spark is sufficient to ignite a
large fire. One of the main organizations tasked with fighting fires
in Spain is the Unidad Militar de Emergencias (UME).
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 43
44 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
T his organization assists the
local authorities by being able
to call in support from the
air force with its water bomber airplanes and a
in 2008 BHELMA II was disbanded to become
Batallón de Helicópteros de Emergencias
(BHELEME) II. The unit is a part of FAMET but
the operational command is in the hands of the
dedicated fleet of helicopters from the Spanish commander of UME. In their new role, the tasks
army air force (Fuerzas Aeromóviles del Ejército performed by BHELEME II include assisting in the
de Tierra, FAMET). This fleet includes four Airbus safety and welfare of citizens in cases of serious
Helicopters (formerly Eurocopter) EC-135 and threats and calamities. In 2009 the unit reached
three AS532AL Cougars operated by the 2nd their operational readiness in forest fire fighting
Emergency Battalion (Batallón de Helicópteros and in 2011 in search and rescue.
de Emergencia II) and we were able to join a fire
fighting exercise in the area near Valencia. UME
This emergency unit was established based on
HISTORY the defence directive 1/2004 that stated the armed
The history of the battalion goes back to 1971 forces should collaborate with the civil protection
when the unit was established in the Sahara system and other state institutions to secure the
desert to support ground forces in their battles wellbeing of the citizens. The commander is the
against the Polisario front. The unit received the Minister of the Interior who can declare a state of
name UHEL II, (Helicopter Unit 2) initially operating national emergency. The headquarters of UME
the Bell UH-1 Huey. The silhouette of this chopper are in Torrejon with five battalions spread over the
is still in the squadron insignia. In 1975, the unit country. In the summer period, the main task for
transferred to “El Copero” base near Seville to UME is fighting forest fires. In support of the 2016
combine with UHEL IV, the southern helicopter campaign, a total of 3,000 military are available
group. In 1979 the unit moved to its current base consisting of ground, air and support staff. With
in Betera near the city of Valencia. The fleet then their presence in the various regions of Spain,
included a mix of Hueys, Alouette III, and Kiowa UME guarantees to intervene through the whole
helicopters and was eventually increased with the country in less than four hours, with the exception
inclusion by nine MBB Bo-105 helicopters in 1981. of the Balearic Islands and the autonomous cities
In June 1988 the FAMET decided to rename of Ceuta and Melilla, where general army units
all the units and this unit became the Batallón will provide support work until the UME units have
de Helicópteros de Maniobra II (BHELMA II). arrived to relief them.
In the nineties the mixed fleet of helicopters The current air assets available to the UME
was changed to the new Aerospatiale AS532 commander are the 43rd Group of the air
Cougars, locally designated as HT-27. After the force including up to 13 Canadair CL 215 and
establishment of the UME in 2005 it became clear CL415-T water bombers flying from detachments
that helicopter support would be necessary and at Zaragoza, Pollensa, Albacete, Santiago,
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 45
46 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 47
Salamanca, Malaga, Badajoz and the main base in of water into areas that ground forces cannot
Torrejon de Ardoz and BEHELEME II. reach. These teams can be deployed during
BHELEME II has a continuous readiness of two daytime and at night with the use of night vision
EC-135 helicopters in the command and control goggles. This year a large exercise was held by all
role and two Cougar helicopters in direct support five battalions to train the procedures in their areas
of ground units of the UME for fighting forest fires of responsibility.
with Bambi Buckets and rescuing or evacuating
civilians. The Cougars can also carry a squad COUGAR
of 10 UME fire fighters, (airmobile unit (Unidad The Eurocopter AS532AL Cougars of
Aeromóvil)), with their equipment and 1,000 litres BHELEME II are the newest delivered to the
48 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
50 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 51
Spanish army between 2011 and 2013. The local significant structural damage. The three-person
designation is HU-27 making it slightly different crew escaped unharmed, but the FAMET is
when compared to the older HT-27 (AS532UL) still investigating the potential to repair of the
model. The AS532AL is the current production helicopter.
model for military customers having a hardened The Cougar is equipped with two Turbomeca
airframe to withstand crash loads and the cabin is Makila 1A1 engines. The engines provide a
equipped with crashworthy seats. maximum continuous power of 1,240kW and are
Initially the unit received four helicopters, able to maintain their maximum take-off power
but in September 2015 they lost one airframe of 1,380kW for five minutes. The standard fuel
at Requena aerodrome when during a training capacity is 1,984 litres providing a range of over
flight the helicopter tipped over and sustained 700 kilometres, but this capacity is increased by
52 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 53
the external tanks to reach a flight time of around to the filtered light while in flight with a flip of a
4.5 hours and a range of over 1,100 kilometres, switch on the IFCO Control Box. The L-3 Wescam
enabling the helicopters to reach any part of MX-15i multi spectrum imaging system, mounted
mainland Spain without refuel. The BHELEME II under the nose of the helicopter is providing the
Cougars have been modified to always have a crew with a complete line of visual high definition
hoist installed (capacity of 272 kilograms) and are imagery that can be used in both the search and
have a Litton INS/GPS system installed enabling rescue and fire fighting missions. The last, and
the crew to exactly pinpoint their position. most visible addition is a set of mirrors enabling
A Spectrolab SX16 Nightsun IFCO searchlight the pilots to maintain visual contact on the Bambi
is mounted on the starboard side of the helicopter. Bucket that is carried on the external sling.
A variety of filters is available for the IFCO Hood The Cougars use two types of buckets. The
including the infrared filter used in conjunction with BBT 6578 has a capacity of 2,500 litres; the
night vision systems. The motorized IFCO Hood smaller BBT 4453 carries 2,000 litres and is used
allows for changing from standard white light for deployments further away from Valencia since
54 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
it can also be carried on board the helicopter. second crew has one hour longer to reach the
Both are fitted with the PowerFill system allowing airfield. In total the battalion has 30 pilots of whom
bottom-filling from sources of water as shallow as 20 are Cougar and 10 EC-135 pilots. The Cougar
45cm, making them very flexible. Even a swimming pilots are a mix of officers and NCO’s that usually
pool in someone’s backyard can be used in case have a long history in the battalion. It is quite
of emergency. For training purposes the battalion normal for a pilot to stay at BHELEME II for a long
has built a tank just outside the base that they time and even finish his career there.
use for picking up water near the training area to 2016 was a busy year for the crews with a lot
reduce flight time. The crews also train to pick up op missions flown along the Mediterranean Sea
water from other sources such as lakes and rivers. coastline where all summer long large fires were
During the forest fire season, from June 15 raging. Thankfully all were extinguished without
until September 30, the battalion always has a any major loss of life and the focus in the battalion
crew and chopper ready at one-hour notice and a is now back on the rescue mission of the winter
second crew at two hours. In the weekends, the months. v
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 55
56 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 57
Polish Naval
Helicopter Force
in crisis
Alex Mladenov examines the consequences
of the termination of the negotiations for
the Airbus Helicopters H225 purchase by the
Polish government together and as the type
enters into the final years of its service, an
analysis on the current state and operations
of the Polish Navy’s tiny Mi-14 ‘Haze’ fleet.
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 59
FAILED PROCUREMENT AND THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES
60 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
For take-offs, the minimum visibility
is set at 1,640ft (500m), but when
scrambled to perform a real-world
SAR operation there are no visibility
limits set for take-off, and the wind
speed limit is set at 39kt (72km/h).
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 61
The M-14PL/R has a
battery of searchlights,
useful for night landings ‘HAZE SOLDIERS ON
and winching operations, The Polish Naval Aviation’s aged anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and Search and
including two on Rescue (SAR) rotorcraft fleets are represented by two Mi-14 ‘Haze’ versions, slated
front fuselage, two in
for eventual retirement by about 2018. The ‘Haze-A’ is a large amphibious machine
sponsons and one on
the tailboom.
based on the Mi-8 design with a boat hull, optimized for naval operations and able
to operate from sea surface. The Polish hard-working Mi-14PL fleet has been subject
of a comprehensive service life extension program (SLEP) undertaken at the local
WZL-1 military aviation maintenance facility in Lodz in the previous decade, with the
first example, serialed ‘1002’, re-delivered to Darlowo in 2007. Provided with seven
years of service and 1,000 flight hours at the SLEP completion, this aircraft was
finally grounded in 2014 and used as a spare parts donor for the flying ‘Haze’ fleet.
As Polish naval aviators claimed, despite its age, the 13-tonne Mi-14 is still a
pretty capable aircraft for Baltic Sea operations in both the ASW and SAR roles,
thanks to its flight performance, combined with the reliable and effective mission
equipment. “No submarine can hide from our highly-upgraded ‘Hazes’”, proudly
noted one of the Mi-14 pilots at Darlowo, citing the result from Baltops-series of
multinational annual exercises held in the Baltic Sea. In Baltops, NATO practices for
two-weeks all the major warfare areas and in one of the recent exercise editions
the Darlowo-based ‘Haze-A’ crews have reported detection and tracking of two
French Navy and one German Navy submarines. He also added that the Mi-14PL/R
is currently being regarded as the most capable SAR helicopters in the Baltics Sea.
The upgraded ASW fleet originally included eight upgraded Mi-14PLs, used for
ASW and maritime reconnaissance missions (with serial numbers ‘1001’, ‘1002’,
‘1003’, ‘1005’, ‘1007’, ‘1008’, ‘1010’, ‘1011’) plus two more Mi-14PL/Rs converted for
the SAR role (‘1009’ and ‘1012’). The Polish Mi-14PLs underwent the first upgrades
of their mission suites in the second half of the 1990s. Tests have shown that the
upgraded ASW suite, employing newly added digital processors, is well capable
of detecting not only moving submarines but also sunken ships resting on the
sea floor. The first upgraded ‘Haze-A’ was commissioned in service in November
2000. In the early 2000s, the Mi-14PL’s armament was further enhanced with the
integration of the modern MU90 anti-submarine guided torpedo, manufactured by
the French-Italian consortium Eurotorp.
62 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
When they fly over the
sea, Mi-14 aircrews use the
orange Polish-made MUP-1
survival immersion suites.
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 63
ABOVE; The Mi-14 era in
the Polish Naval Aviation
is set to end in 2018
when the service life of
the type will expire.
Presently, the active Mi-14PL fleet of the Polish Naval Aviation has been reduced
to three examples out of eight upgraded between 2007 and 2014, as ‘1002’, ‘1001’
and ‘1005’ were grounded due to the expired service life, with ‘1003’ and ‘1005’
slated to follow suit until the end of 2016. One more M-14PL is expected to be retired
in 2017, another will follow in 2018 while the last machine, ‘1008’ (life-extended and
overhauled as late as in 2014), will be good for use, (at least in theory), until 2021 but
most likely it will be also retired in 2018.
64 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
The Mi-14PL crew
consists of five
members – pilot,
co-pilot, two ASW suite
operators and a flight
engineer.
66 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
Some of the Polish
Haza-As wear striking
sharkmouth artwork.
the PZL Swidnik Mi-2 helicopter. “In general, it takes too long time here to qualify
for each individual mission on the ‘Haze’. As a consequence, I spent no less than five
years as co-pilot and only then upgraded to crew commander while after five more
years I got my flight instructor rating.”
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 67
The Mi-14PL/R has an SPG-350 electric winch
in the enlarged door, equipped with a large
basket for sea rescue missions.
Capt. Hope graduated with 200 flight hours under his belt, all logged on the
3.4-tonne Mi-2. The conversion to the 13-tonne Mi-14PS was a big step for him at the
time. During his officer career he amassed some 1,100 flight-hours on the
Mi-14 while his total flight time is about 1,500 flight hours. Asked to comment the
‘Haze’ performance as a SAR platform, Capt. Hope gladly and proudly shared
that the heavyweight helicopter has a lot of power and carries a lot of fuel,
making it able to stay in the air for five a half hours while the spacious cabin can
accommodate up to 20 survivors during mass evacuations. The two Klimov TV3-
117MT turboshafts are rated at 2,200shp (1,641kW) each in one engine inoperative
(OEI) conditions, sufficient to retain horizontal flight), while the take-off rating is
1,950 shp (1,456 kW).
“Today we have only one equivalent in the world in the terms of size and payload
– the EH101 (AW101) Merlin”, he claimed. Ironically, Capt. Hope was a member
of the Polish MoD evaluation team which downselected in April 2015 the Airbus
Helicopters H225M Caracal as a Mi-14PS/PL successor in the ill-fated tender, which
has reportedly failed to materialize into a purchase contract in October 2016.
The Baltic Sea may be relatively small compared to other water basins but it
accounts for a 15% of the global transport of goods by sea. Each day, 2,500 to
3,000 vessels of various sizes pass through. Up to 120 accidents of various types
occur each year, all needing the prompt intervention of SAR assets. The Polish area
of responsibility for providing sea SAR service covers over 30,000km2. The Polish
Navy performs the mission by working closely with the nation’s Maritime Search and
Rescue Service, which is responsible for the sea SAR management and coordination
of rescue operations at sea, and provides surface and air assets to perform the
operations. As Capt. Hope noted, the SAR Group at Darlowo is tasked to cover the
entire southern part of the Baltic Sea, some 92nm (170km) from the coastline, in the
worst seas. The area of responsibility also includes up to 54nm (100km) onshore,
covering all northern regions of the country bordering with the Baltic Sea.
68 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
The Mi-14 is a 13-tone rugged rotorcraft designed by using the Mi-8
airframe modified with a boat-style bottom of the hull.
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 69
Mi-14PL ‘Haze-A’ – facts and figures
Dimensions
The Mi-14PL/R crew during a typical mission includes pilot, co-pilot, flight
engineer (who also acts as a winch operator), rescue swimmer and doctor. When
performing rescue missions in bad weather the Mi-14 would usually go to the airport
which is closest to the appropriate hospital while in good weather the helicopter is
required to land as close as possible to the hospital. SAR crews on quick reaction
alert (QRA) at Darlowo work a 24 hour-long shift pattern, but in fact their working
time is 25 hours due to the need to kit out, perform pre-flight checks, hover-test the
helicopter and other preparatory activities. Each QRA shift begins at 8 o’clock in the
morning. Time from the scramble order to take-off during day missions is within 20
minutes, extended to 30 minutes in case of night-time take-off. During the winter,
the daylight reaction time is also set at 30 minutes because of the need to warm up
some equipment onboard. The number of duty shifts is between three and seven
per month. Mi-14 aircrews use the Polish-made MUP-1 survival immersion suites
all the time when they fly over the sea. The suite is flame-resistant and provides
thermal protection in water.
70 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
carried out in sea states up to eight due to the limitations imposed onto the ship
involved in the training winching operations. The ‘Haze’ cabin is usually equipped
with a set of four stretchers, but when necessary can be configured with up to ten,
together with liferafts and other rescue and medical equipment. Capt. Hope claims
that the ‘Haze’ has the distinction to be equipped with the best anti-icing system
in the world. “In one particular mission in the winter we had ice build up so thick
on the fuselage that after landing it proved next to impossible to open the cabin
door, but the helicopter remained flyable”, he recalled. The Mi-14’s rotor blades are
provided with electrical heating, while the intakes and the windshield are heated
by bleed air taken from engine compressors. The anti-icing system is switched on
when the outside air temperature is below 100C and is required to work all the time.
In fact, pilots are advised to avoid as much a possible prolonged flying in zones
with known icing conditions. The Mi-14 is cleared for operating with no restrictions
imposed in the temperature ranging from -50 to +45 0C.
According to Capt. Hope, when hovering for winching operations, the Mi-14PL/
R’s altitude depends on the size of the boat. For instance, over fishing boats, 20 to
13ft (6 to 7m) long, the helicopter has to be low, as the pilot has to get a reference
point, usually a part of the boat, in order to maintain stable hover, usually at 50ft
(15m) altitude. No autopilot is used and the pilot and co-pilot have to fly by hand
to maintain hover and adjust the helicopter position in relation to the boat. “After
five to ten minutes in hover over small boats, I have to hand over helicopter control
to my co-pilot and take some rest as it is a very high workload and I get exhausted
very rapidly. My longest non-stop time hands-on hover during winching operations
is 15 minutes, while during training total time is 45 to 50 minutes.”
Each pilot and co-pilot in the SAR group racks up about 120 flight hours a year.
Before 2010, when the SAR ‘Haze’ fleet had serviceability issues, the annual flight
time was limited to between 50 and 60 hours.
When asked to comment about the mission capabilities of the converted
Mi-14PL/R, Capt. Hope replies that it is not so good as the original Mi-14PS, which
he flew between 2003 and 2010. “The Mi-14PL/R has a new attitude indicator,
which is not so good, and the winch installation is also inferior due to its external
mounting. The flight control system of the converted ‘Haze-A’ also features
different settings, resulting in notably inferior controllability and lacking some of the
stabilization performance available on the original Mi-14PS. In addition, the position
center of gravity has shifted due to the installation of the new mission equipment
and this has resulted in a different hovering attitude, with more nose-up, providing
somewhat reduced visibility for the pilot when involved in low-level winching
operations, especially if hovering over small boats”, he said. Furthermore, the large
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 71
72 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 73
‘pimple’ radome of the Buran-A radar adds some discomfort at the night as it tends
to reflect the light rays coming from the front search lights thus creating unwanted
glares, worsening the visibility for the pilots.
74 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
Some of the upgraded Mi-14PLs also feature two workstations in the
cabin – the first one for the navigator-operator (almost the same as
that of the original in the front part of he cabin) and another, newly-
added, to be occupied by a sensor operator, who works with the
sonar, magnetic anomaly detector and the hydro-acoustic system.
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 75
As Capt Hope claimed,
the 6.4-tonne W-3WR is
not considered as able to conditions for submarine search by using hydro acoustic sensors. As a result, the
perform the full spectrum
upgraded ‘Haze-A’ sonar got significantly improved detection performance with
of SAR missions currently
doubled range for detecting and tracking submarines. While the original Oka-
assigned to the Mi-14.
“The W-3WR is a good 2M has a range of up to 3nm (5.6km) when working in the active mode against
helicopter in general but conventional submarines, the upgraded Oka-2M/Z is said to be capable of detecting
not for this style of SAR similar targets at a maximum range of some 6.5nm (12km).
operations. Its endurance The Mi-14’s auto hover system provides stabilization in roll, pitch and yaw, and
is up to three hours
keeps the helicopter motionless in relation to the dipping sonar transducer. Once
without reserves and it
is limited to taking up to
a contact has been established and confirmed, the new digital mission computer
five survivors onboard. is used to guide the helicopter to a weapon release point in automatic or semi-
So, the W-3WR is a totally automatic mode. The APM-60 towed magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) was
different helicopter when replaced by the Polish-made Mniszka device. It retained the ‘bird’ (bomb-shaped
compared to the Mi-14
body) of the original Russian device towed on a 119ft (36m) cable but has an all-new
and cannon replace it
electronics for increased sensitivity and therefore boasting a considerably longer
in the heavy-duty/long-
range SAR work in the detection range.
Baltic Sea”. The new Krab sonobuoy system uses the original Soviet-era RGB-1 passive buoys
but added digital processing of the received signals for increased detection range in
the complex environmental conditions offered by the Baltic Sea.
The upgraded ‘Haze-A’ retained the original Initziativa-2M centimeter-wavelength
360-degree search radar. It is used for long-range maritime surveillance and offshore
navigation. The powerful radar is a rather obsolete piece of kit but is still highly useful
as it had been claimed to possess a 136nm (220km) detection range against large
surface ships, while submarine periscope or life raft can be detected at up to 9nm
(15km). The radar can also provide useful coastline picture in several display scales – a
feature highly priced for bad weather navigation in proximity to the seashore.
The ASW tactics requires the Mi-14PL to be employed in pairs or sections of four
machines. When engaged in pairs, one helicopter acts as the ‘hunter’ and the other
as the ‘killer’ but they can swap the roles at any given moment.
The first upgraded ‘Haze-A’, serialled ‘1007’ was handed over in November 2001
to the Polish Navy after the completion of a testing program intended to verify
the operability of the new mission suite. In the event, the upgrade is believed to
has been was implemented on six Mi-14PLs. The upgraded Mi-14PLs retained
the depth charge ordinance selection of the original ‘Haze-A’, including the 276lb
(125kg) PLAB-125-120 and 110lb (50kg) PLAB-50-64. For training missions, the
‘Haze’ uses the P-50 practice bomb without explosive charge, 12 of which can be
accommodated in the spacious weapons bay. Bomb drops are usually preformed
from 820ft (250m) altitude. v
76 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
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HELIOPS FRONTLINE 77
The Comando Aéreo de Combate 4 is the
main helicopter unit of the Colombian Air
Force, training new pilots while also having
combat capabilities. With a fleet of 70
helicopters, SANTIAGO RIVAS looks at the
biggest helicopter unit in Latin America.
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 79
A
t only 70 kilometers to the southwest of Colombia’s capital,
Bogota, is the town of Melgar, a small city but with a huge
military presence. Close to the town is one of the biggest
Colombian Army bases, Tolemaida, but there is also a small
but very active Colombian Air Force base, the Comando Aéreo de Combate 4
(CACOM-4), a unit specialized in helicopter operations.
The unit was born as Base de Helicópteros in 1954, when the land to build the
base in Melgar was purchased by the Air Force. The first Hiller OH-12 and OH-23
(originally purchased in 1952 by the Public Works Ministry) and five Bell OH-13Ds
received from 1954 (FAC 200 to 205), were based there. In February 1954,
before the new Melgar base was completed, the first helicopter training course
began at Palanquero Air Base, under direction of US pilot Theodor Leopold.
Helicopter operations were new and risky - on 23 September of that year the
first accident occurred at Tolemaida, killing Lt. José Arevalo.
Later in 1954 the Melgar base started operations, continuing the training of
the new pilots with observation and liaison duties in support of the Army. The
internal situation in Colombia was difficult. In November, the runway was ready,
allowing fixed wing operations. In January 1955 the second helicopter course
began and a year later, the Base-Escuela de Helicópteros was reorganized
to officially create the helicopter school. During the fifties the fleet gradually
increased with Bell 47 / OH-13 (nine Bell 47G – FAC 206 to 214-, four OH-13H –
FAC 215 to 218-, eight OH-13S – FAC 222 to 229- and three OH-13J – FAC 219 to
221) added.
The first medium helicopters were six Kaman HH-43 Huskies (FAC 251 to
256), the only ones of their type in Latin America, followed in 1963 by ten
Bell UH-1B (FAC 270 to 279). These were the first Hueys to operate in a Latin
American air force. In 1963 the base’s name was changed for Luis F. Pinto and
with the increase of internal guerrilla activities (1964 saw the birth of the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC, main guerrilla group in the country
to present day), the unit was divided, creating a separate Grupo Aero-Táctico
(GRAT) at Neiva. The unit was recombined again in 1964 with the creation of the
Comando Aéreo de Apoyo Táctico (Tactical Support Air Command).
The unit was divided into a school and a separate squadron for tactical
operations, with the Bell 47s dedicated to the School and the Hueys used for
transport, assault and attack. In 1968 the fleet was increased with the addition
of 15 Hughes 369HS (FAC 241 to 255) for advanced training and scout missions,
and the following year the first of a batch of 20 Bell UH-1H arrived (280 to 299),
to replace the Huskies, which retired in 1968. The Uh-1Hs were followed in 1972
by twenty Bell 205A (FAC220 to 239), which were armed to fulfil attack missions
and the fleet of Hughes 369s was expanded by ten more aircraft in 1977 (FAC
256 to 265).
In 1982 another twenty UH-1H were received (FAC 401 to 420) and since
1984 all helicopter serials changed for four digits, adding a “4” to at the start
of each number. Also, in 1982, to reinforce the diminishing fleet of Bell OH-13,
five Hughes TH-55s were purchased for the school, but they were transferred to
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A rescuer descends with
the stretcher from a Bell 212
during a training mission.
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One of the most recentlyUH-1Hs modified into
Huey 2s after loading water into a Bambi Bucket.
Photo 1st Lt. Grace Martínez.
the Military Aviation School in Cali in 1989, and returned in 1991. As the Hughes
369 fleet was diminishing, in 1985 15 Hughes 500D (4331 to 4345) were added,
followed by five MD 500E (4301 to 4305) in 1987. Between 1988 and 1992
the unit also operated the first Blackhawks, before they were transferred to
Rionegro, Antioquia. Also, in 1985 arrived six Bell 212, five of which were (4002
to 4006) based at Melgar.
A big step ahead was made in 1992, with the first night vision goggle
operations, the unit being pioneers in Latin America for such operations.
For training, in 1994 twelve Enstrom F-28F (FAC 4450 to 4461) were
purchased, replacing the remaining Bell OH-13 and in 1996 the unit became the
Comando Aéreo de Apoyo Táctico No. 1 (CAATA-1).
The UH-1B were retired in 1994, and in 1997 a plan was started to convert
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The unit still
has a Bell OH-13
eight examples to the Huey II level, with the idea of reaching 42 modified operational for
exhibitions.
examples, but only the initial batch was modified, while nine Bell CH-135 (UH-1N)
were received from Canada through the Plan Colombia in 1995.
With the beginning of the new millennium, in December 2001 the unit again
changed its name becoming the Comando Aéreo de Combate No.4 (CACOM-4),
name used to this day. A year later, the school was transformed into the Escuela
de Pilotos de Helicópteros de la Fuerza Pública, officially training the pilots of
the other armed forces and the Police. Since 1983 (when they started training
pilots for other forces), the unit has trained 285 pilots of the Army, 111 of the
Navy and 55 of the Police.
Another seventeen UH-1H arrived (4501 to 4517) and one UH-1V (4500)
arrived in 2001, also as part of the Plan Colombia. The last addition was made
2008, comprising twelve Huey 2, (4520 to 4531), which have the longer nose
(like the Bell 212) and a turret for optical sensors. In total, the force received 57
UH-1H, 12 Huey 2 and one UH-1V, of which about 40 survive today. The aircraft
have also been distributed among other units, such as the CACOM 1, 3 and 6.
A project began in 2011 to locally modernize ten UH-1H to Huey 2 with full
glass cockpits, new avionics and keeping the old Huey nose, starting with the
FAC 4500, which received the new serial FAC 4418 and was delivered in 2013,
followed by two more until now, which received serials 4419 and 4420.
As the Enstrom F-28 no longer satisfied their needs, in 2005 twelve Bell 206B
were delivered. In 2010 the US government delivered 30 Bell OH-58A to increase
the training capacity to include foreign students.
CACOM-4 TODAY
Currently, the command comprises the Escuela de Helicópteros de la Fuerza
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Flight line at Melgar, with Bell UH-1H, Huey 2,
Hughes 369HS, Bell 206 and OH-58A.
Pública “Coronel Carlos Alberto Gutierrez” and the Grupo de Combate 41, having
in total a fleet of about 70 helicopters and flying about 20,000 hours per year. It is
probably the unit with the most operational hours in the whole of Latin America.
The School is presently equipped with 11 Bell 206s to train only the pilots of the
air force, and to the end of 2016 had about 25 OH-58A (from the batch of initial 30
delivered) for use in training other forces’ pilots, including foreigners. The foreign
pilots are mainly from the air forces of Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and Peru.
The OH-58s still belong to the US Government and only have a two-digit serial
number for identification, without any other markings. In March 2016, the force
received 10 Bell TH-67 ‘Creeks’ delivered by the US government to start replacing
the old OH-58s, followed by a second batch of twenty in September. A last batch
of 30 is expected to be delivered between 2017 and 2018 and will be used to
replace the Bell 206B on training missions, sending those helicopters to other units
for use on liaison.
86 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
A Bell 212 performing a
recovery of a wounded
The intensity of the training at the school is such that the OH-58A reached during a training, using
more than 25,000 flight hours in just six years, while the Bell 206B reached the rescue hoist.
30,000 in their first ten years. Currently, a couple of OH-58As are still operational
and will be returned to the United States soon. The unit also has a single Bell
OH-13 (Sioux) used only for exhibitions.
As the school’s flying effort increased each year, a plan was developed to move
it to Flandes, near the town of Girardot, about 30 kilometers from Melgar. In the
end however, only a field was bought close to Flandes with three small runways
built. Inaugurated in 2014, the field is used during the day to desaturate the
operations in Melgar. By the end of 2015, the school has trained a total of 7035
pilots, including about 90% of all the Colombian helicopter pilots.
The Grupo de Combate 41 is divided into three squadrons, the Escuadrón de
Combate 411 is equipped with the last three Bell 212s and four CH-135, which in
Colombia were called “Rapaz”. These helicopters can be equipped with LAU-68A
70mm rocket launchers with seven tubes plus M-60 or GAU-17 7.62mm machine
guns, GAU-19 12.7mm machine guns or M-19 grenade launchers on the doors.
Despite performing attack missions in the past, they have been replaced by the
more powerful and better-armed Blackhawks (locally called Arpías). Now the Bells
are mainly used for Combat SAR (C-SAR) operations and in for this mission they
are usually armed with door mounted M-60 machine guns and equipped with a
rescue hoist.
The Escuadrón de Asalto Aéreo 412 has the Huey fleet, with ten Bell UH-1H
and fourteen Huey 2s. Of the Huey 2s, two were among the last three modernized
between 2013 and 2016 and are used for air assault and training missions in
conjunction with the UH-1Hs. Most of the pilots that finish the school go to this
squadron as their first operational unit.
The other 12 Huey 2s are the batch received in 2008 and received a Rafael
Toplite nose turret with optical sensors, chaff / flare dispensers on the sides of
the rear fuselage and usually are armed with a GAU-17 of 7.62mm on one side
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88 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
HELIOPS FRONTLINE 89
The first of the UH-1H taken to Huey 2 standard
since 2013, including new avionics and full glass
cockpit. It’s the former FAC 4500.
A rescuer descends with the The sole Hughes 369HS still operational with the
stretcher from a Bell 212 during FAC. Most probably will be retired now with the
a training mission. arrival of the TH-67s.
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An UH-1H approaching the base on the sunset. The
crews train on them to perform night operations.
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The Bell 212s are sometimes armed with rocket
launchers and called Rapaz, but now they
are mostly used for C-SAR, leaving the attack
operations to the Arpías (armed Black Hawks).
and a GAU-19 of 12.7mm on the other side on escort missions or with just two
M-60 machine guns for transport and C-SAR operations. As they mostly operate
at night, they are called “Búhos” (Owls) and their mission is to escort other
helicopters on assault and C-SAR missions on day and night operations.
Usually, operations against the guerrillas are made during the night, with the
helicopter crews having the advantage of night vision goggles. At Melgar the
Huey 2s are mainly used to escort the Bell 212s on C-SAR missions, making first
a reconnaissance of the area where the rescue will take place and then flying
over the rescue helicopter. This squadron also has the only fixed wing assets of
the CACOM-4, which is presently a single Cessna Grand Caravan used for liaison
and light transport. This plane replaced a IAI Arava, which also replaced older
models, like the Douglas C-47, Beech C-45 and DHC-2 Beaver.
The last squadron of the group is the Escuadrón de Ataque 413, which now
only has the last Hughes 369HS and MD 500E of the force; using the helicopters
for liaison. In the past they were also used on scout missions, with the MD500E
armed with seven tube rocket launchers and GAU-19 miniguns. The unit also
performs humanitarian relief operations on natural disasters and perform
firefighting, using Bambi Buckets.
FUTURE
As well as planning to receive 60 Bell TH-67, the plans for the CACOM-4
is to keep modernizing the UH-1Hs into Huey 2. With the introduction of the
TH-67s, the Hughes 369 and the MD 500E will finally be retired. In the meantime,
the retired Enstrom F-28 are stored at the base and being offered for sale.
With the possibility of an end to the internal war in Colombia, a reduction
of the air activity is taking place, which is also affecting the plans to renew
the fleet. Currently, there are no plans to replace the venerable Hueys nor the
Bell 212s. v
94 HELIOPS FRONTLINE
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