CHAPTER 9

Veiled Reality

In their beds at night, children ask for details about a fairy tale. How big
was the pumpkin? What color were Puss-in-Boots' boots? In the same
way, our reason questions our positive understanding. Now then, all this
physics! Does it really disclose nothing but rules and recipes?
Admittedly, precise details are not lacking! They could fill hundreds of
books. The real difficulties-slurred over, it must be said, by learned
books as well as by popular ones-begin when we consider the problem of
making a selection. They begin when we try to put aside all that is merely
a description of models and see whether anything remains. This is all the
more so because, in this field, the search for thoroughness may paradoxi-
cally appear to some to be somewhat simplistic. Indulging in the search
entails laying oneself open to the criticism of those-physicists or
philosophers-who set up as a principle that" of course, in the final analy-
sis, everything is a model," and who will insist that what is subtle and
beautiful is to establish a hierarchy of models ranging from grand general
theories like quantum theory, which apparently covers all exact empirical
sciences, to the multitude of particular little models, with very limited
value, like that of the celestial sphere or the ecliptic, or those which
abound in particle theory.
The concept of a model will be further studied below, but since it is a
concept familiar to most, at least in its outline, it is legitimate to refer to it
here.
To view scientific research as a hierarchy-or as an aggregate-of mod-
els is, to be sure, a healthy and fruitful attitude of mind for a scientist.
Nay, for him who takes part in the development of science, this may even
be the most appropriate conception he may have of his professional ac-
tivities. One could even go so far as to concede that in some way such an
attitude of mind is essential to the thinking of any even slightly educated
person! Thus, for example, according to the classical principles of general
relativity-whose consequences have been so well verified-the Newto-
nian gravitational force, strictly speaking, does not exist. It is nothing but
a guise, reflecting, for our senses, the reality which is the curvature of the
universe (as opposed to other forces, which seem to defy a geometrical

B. d’Espagnat, In Search of Reality

© Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 1983
9.1 Beyond the Customhouse 83

interpretation). Gravitational force can therefore be taken into account

only as an element of a model. But whenever matters having to do with
daily life or with down-to-earth engineering are considered nobody would
even dream of denying the intrinsic reality of gravity; and descriptions of
machines or of works of art would be completely incomprehensible if we
had to give up that model and could speak only in terms of the curvature
of space. Moreover, rigor would be gained only if that notion of space
curvature were not at risk of being itself abased to the rank of a mere
element of a model, especially if the latter were meant to give only
positivistic recipes. And this would be precisely the case if the views of
the upholders of a quantization (still to be achieved!) of general relativity
were confirmed.
It must be acknowledged that, with regard to scientific knowledge, a
reasonable attitude consists not of demanding the almost impossible, but
rather in being satisfied with overlapping, or hierarchical, models based
on realistic images. Under this condition, science can supply infinitely
precise information about the universe, its birth, its evolution, its compo-
sition, the galaxies, stars, macroscopic bodies in general, life, atoms, par-
ticles, etc. Hence, if-knowing general relativity and sharing the opinion
that it should be quantized-I am nevertheless prepared to hold that the
pencil which just fell from my hand responds to a genuine attractive force
due to the earth, then I can reasonably believe-through a similar slippery
move-that (in a sense I find sufficient) all the above-mentioned informa-
tion is also true. Thousands of books, popular and purely scientific, are
then at my disposal to inform me on the details.

9.1 Beyond the Customhouse

Again the attitude described above is unquestionably the "reasonable"

one. However, it is not the one that will be considered here. For who does
not see-having studied the content of the preceding chapters-that, after
all, it leaves a void of comprehension that, properly speaking, is unac-
ceptable? Who does not see that the questions such an attitude leaves
unanswered are precisely the essential ones: those that are not "van-
ities"? Thus, I must try to venture beyond the border marked out by
Heisenberg, for example,! and must attempt to interrogate physics on the
question of knowing which descriptions of "nature in itself" remain ad-
missible. Certainly the difficulties encountered by Einstein show that this
attempt is daring. Nonetheless, it should be made. How could I ~yer form
for myself a trustworthy idea of this vast world if I constantly refrain from
venturing beyond the safe borders of my own country?

1 Cf. page 23.

84 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

At the beginning of such an attempt, it is necessary to have a broad

overall view of current physics. Among the experts concerned, it is gener-
ally admitted that the physics in question is basically a theory of quantum
fields. In fact, those objects which appear to be particles are interpreted
by the theory as manifestations of such "quantum fields." An electron in
a certain state of motion is thus nothing more than the manifestation of a
particular "excitation" relative to the universal "electronic field," and so
on. (The creation and annihilation of particles are thus reduced by the
theory to simple modifications of the state with respect to universal
fields.)
But quantum fields are not beings. In this, they differ from the classical
fields, which could always be interpreted as such. Their status is nearer to
that of observable physical quantities. To the extent that such a gross
image can be tolerated, they resemble less the Eiffel Tower than the
height, or the size, or the shape of the Eiffel Tower. Or even, if a some-
what more refined and learned comparison is desired, they resemble less
an electron of elementary quantum mechanics than they resemble the
observable properties "position" or "velocity" of an electron (hence, the
formalism of the theory associates them with mathematical entities, called
"operators," of the same kind as those entities associated with the ob-
servable properties, such as position or momentum, of the particles in
elementary quantum mechanics; but this comment is addressed exclu-
sively to the reader whose college encounters with quantum mechanics
are still fairly recent).
To common sense, the preceding statements may come as a surprise
at first. All knowable entities are thus mere properties, but properties of
what? By its very definition, a property is an attribute of an entity, even if
this entity is rather hidden. This is the obvious truth which, for example,
Einstein and, even more clearly, some of his successors, like Wheeler,
seem to have seized upon when, the former in constructing general relativ-
ity and the latter in refining it, expressed (after Descartes!) the idea that
"all is geometry." Pushed to its limit, within this conception particles are
admittedly given the status of mere properties, as in quantum mechanics.
But they are properties of something. This something is nothing other than
space or space-time, which, being locally structured (variable curvature),
have indeed enough "flexibility" to possess infinitely many "properties"
or particular local configurations. In this sense, even pushed to the ex-
treme, classical general relativity remains faithful to the postulate of phys-
ical realism.
But, however, after a great deal of research, scientists today are almost
unanimously convinced that the following statement is true: classical gen-
eral relativity cannot constitute the ultimate foundation of physics. The
world of elementary particles has proven to be too rich and too subtle to fit
such a mould. Quantum field theory is essential. The question formulated
above is therefore essential as well: Fields are properties of what?
9.1 Beyond the Customhouse 85

Quantum field theory opens up the possibility of an answer to this

question. In fact it introduces mathematical entities2 analogous to the
wave functions of elementary quantum mechanics, and which, like these
functions, play the role of describing the state of an underlying reality.
The particular value of some given field at a given point, or, again, the
number (positive or zero) of particles of a given type finding themselves in
some state of motion, are quantities which therefore appear in the theory
as simple properties of this underlying reality, which I will from now on
call "the reality," for short.
Therefore, it appears that, in quantum field theory, reality lies at a
deeper level than could be imagined by common sense or even by elemen-
tary quantum mechanics. A particle is not in itself "a reality"; it is simply
a more or less transient property of reality, a level of excitation (to speak
as physicists do) not, properly speaking, of a field (my language has
necessarily been somewhat schematic), but of reality, excited in a fashion
corresponding to the field in question. Apart from this, the fundamental
mode of description of quantum field theory is in no way qualitatively
different from that of elementary quantum mechanics. On the one hand,
the two theories are founded on the same general mathematical formalism
and, on the other hand, the purpose of both is the study of observable
properties of an underlying reality, which in the first case is simply more
general and more "remote" than in the second. But an assertion that has
already been stated in previous chapters finds its justification here: The
fundamental principles of quantum theory are the real clues to the de-
scriptions of the reality provided by contemporary physics. Now-once
again!-these principles, as has been amply emphasized above, forbid us
in general to speak of properties of reality as if reality possessed them.
Whence the practical success of the positivistic interpretation! Whence,
on the contrary, the failure of all tentative interpretations founded on
physical realism! Unavoidably-as I could well expect!-I again meet the
fundamental problem so often encountered in these pages and so highly
specific to quantum theory: How can strong objectivity be restored? How
can we attain a conception of the notion of an independent reality (which,
on the other hand, it is conceptually impossible to do without)? In compari-
son to elementary quantum mechanics-which conserved the idea that,
lacking properties, a particle could at least have an existence of its own-
what quantum field theory (and, therefore, all of contemporary physics)
achieves is a mere postponement of the point of application of the

2 These are called "state vectors." Note that the notion of state vector in quantum field
theory, here and in the following paragraph, refers to an elaborate and delicate-even very
subtle, if one may say so-aspect of theoretical physics; an aspect which at first sight it
would seem best to disregard entirely. Such a simplification does not hinder-perhaps
even aids, on the contrary!-the understanding of the general lines of reasoning on the
present subject, those which the study of the simpler notion of a "wave function" already
reveal (pp. 86-92 below).
86 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

fundamental problem. It has not modified it. Hence, in order to study the
possible solutions to the latter-all of them hazardous, as we have said-it
is legitimate to place the grand but difficult vision of quantum field theory
in parentheses, and we are permitted to imagine that particles are them-
selves basic realities. To be sure, proceeding this way requires that we
momentarily suspend taking the phenomena of annihilation or creation of
particles into account in any elegant way; but it may be a good idea to
divide the problems in order to better visualize them. The following con-
siderations are not dependent on this procedure; but the procedure does
make representation easier. It entails returning to elementary quantum
mechanics, so that I shall henceforth be allowed to make use of the
quantum-mechanical notion (which was introduced above) of the "wave
function," instead ofthe corresponding notions-more subtle but equiva-
lent for the present purpose-of quantum field theory.
The outstanding role of the wave function (the "orbital," in the lan-
guage of contemporary chemistry) is well known. Therefore, if we seek a
realistic interpretation offundamental physics, the first idea that comes to
mind is obviously to consider the wave function-or its analogue in quan-
tum field theory-as being reality. Of course, this implies that an exact
knowledge of this wave function constitutes in itself a complete knowl-
edge of the corresponding reality. But, at the time of an observation or
measurement, this wave function will generally change (or "collapse")
abruptly. One apprehends that there is a grave difficulty here. Some
physicists have solved it by refusing to consider (in a basic sense) any-
thing but the wave function of the whole world, including the observer and
his "consciousness." The difficulty encountered here is that, at least in
some cases, it follows from the mathematical structure of the theory that
the observer must necessarily find himself split between different macro-
scopic states. In extreme cases, he must be alive and dead at the same
time! Should we say that in such cases the whole universe has split into
two "branches," one in which the observer is alive and another in which
he is dead? Some physicists have gone so far as to assume this.3 In
support of their thesis, they have shown that if this were the case, another
consequence of the mathematical structure of the theory is that we could
not perceive the split. This is analogous to the fact that we cannot "feel"
the earth move, a consequence of the principles of mechanics. This re-
mark ruins the simplistic objection which "common sense" could have
made against Copernicus in his time.
To be sure, the above idea is startling! Perhaps even more startling is
the fact that, as soon as I agree not to laugh at it, I have difficulty finding a
simple and obvious argument to show that it is false! However, it seems
that even its upholders have difficulties in specifying the precise nature of

a Cf, for example, The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. edited by B.
de Witt and N. Graham, Princeton Series in Physics, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
NJ, 1973.
9.1 Beyond the Customhouse 87

the phenomena of duplication (or multiplication) of the branches of the

universe and il;J. accounting for the apparently quite strict correlation of
these phenomena with measurements. Do universes devoid of conscious
beings multiply, and if so, according to what rules? The supporters of the
theory have so far been unable to answer questions of this kind in a
completely unambiguous way. Besides, I am, right now, a conscious liv-
ing being, and it therefore seems that the branch of the universe in which I
am alive distinguishes itself, at least in this respect, from those in which I
am dead. But this distinction is not specified by the wave function of the
universe. Additional parameters are therefore necessary for a complete
specification of reality. Consequently, this theory. seems to be a special
case of the theories with supplementary parameters, on which we shall
say more below (and the question of knowing whether or not this theory
conforms to the principles of physical realism must be reduced to the
question of knowing whether the latter do).
A different theory 4 consists of taking seriously the abrupt changes of the
wave function that must take place together with the measurement pro-
cesses in any theory that does not incorporate the observer's conscious-
ness within the wave function of the system. Such a theory is avowedly
dualistic; according to this, there exist two kinds of realities, one de-
scribed completely by the wave function and the other composed of the
consciousness of the observers. Matter and mind. From a view of the
world which, by its revolutionary character, startled even the noncon-
formists among us, we thus pass on to a conception which, on the con-
trary, surprises us with its apparent traditionalism; and this, strangely
enough, on the basis of the same science and by only a "small" change in
interpretation, a change, moreover, which is practically devoid of verifi-
able consequences. The "technical" possibility of a modification which is
at the same time so momentous and so simple is disconcerting at first. It
does, however, show quite vividly the purely subjective and "epidermic"
character of such labels as "new" and "obsolete," with which we are
often content to judge the essence of ideas. Contrary to the Copenhagen
interpretation, the one we have just described has the advantage of being
explicitly realistic. It therefore deserves an examination of its qualities
and defects, even if only a brief one.
In view of such an undertaking, it is simplest at the outset to return to
Einstein's position, discussed in Chapter 7. Concerning the thesis, also
underlying the interpretation presently under consideration, that the wave
function provides a complete description of the matter constituting physi-
cal objects, Einstein, it will be recalled, formulated this objection: if such
a thesis were true, then the center of gravity of a macroscopic body could
not continue to occupy a well-defined position, and not even a
quasidefinite one. Pondering this remark, we might first wonder whether

4 Cf., for example, E. P. Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections, University of Indiana

Press, Bloomington, IN, 1967.
88 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

the interpretation under study does not suffer from the same defect as that
for which idealistic philosophies are blamed with good reasons, the defect
that rests on the impossibility of accounting for any permanence in the
localization or the properties of objects that are perceived solely in an
intermittent manner. Hume says, I leave a room where a fire is burning in
the fireplace. I reenter moments later and ascertain anew the existence of
a fire in the fireplace. Is not the simplest explanation to assume that, even
without a direct perception on my part, the fire continued to exist in my
absence? In the same way, I observe the existence of a macroscopic
object in a certain place and at rest. Then I leave it by itself. Necessarily,
according to the theory, its wave function changes and spreads out. If
such a function were to constitute a complete description of the object,
the probability of not finding the object at its initial place would be appre-
ciable. But, systematically, I find it there every time I return. Is not the
simplest explanation again to assume, like Einstein, that, independent of
the wave function, the center of gravity of the object has always had a
well-defined position?
Formulated in this way, the objection could be discarded by simple
"technical" arguments. As with any measurement, the first position mea-
surement is necessarily imperfect. And even if the corresponding uncer-
tainty is very small, the ensuing spreading of the wave function ofthe center
of gravity of a macroscopic body proves to be extremely slow. An appre-
ciable variation requires a duration to be reckoned in astronomical units. s
The relative stability of intermittent perceptions thus receives an explana-
tion which seems satisfying enough. The realist who wishes to adopt this
interpretation may nevertheless remain worried by Einstein's objection
applied to the very first measurement. For the reasons given in Chapter 7,
it seems rather unlikely that before this measurement the wave functions
of all the centers of gravity had quasilocal supports. Did the first mea-
surement of Jupiter thus fix Jupiter's position? Here it seems that the
requirements of realism cannot be satisfied with simple human conscious-
nesses, and that a Demiurge is necessary; an observing Demiurge whose
very perception of the stars fixes them in their courses!
With regard to Einstein's second objection (see Chapter 7), it leads to a
non separability which today it is no longer possible to regard as not real. In
the interpretation under study, nonseparability follows from the fact that
the wave function is nonlocal and therefore a measurement performed at
one location influences instantaneously, and sometimes quite appreciably,
what occurs at other locations arbitrarily far away. In other words,
the observing consciousness is thereby endowed with strange powers
of bridging distances. In this regard, however, a warning is quite
necessary. As we have seen in Chapter 4, nonseparability never allows

5 Except, perhaps, for objects having a velocity so poorly defined that the objection does
not apply.
9.1 Beyond the Customhouse 89

instantaneous transmission of signals or decisions over distances. We

must not rely on it for an elementary explanation of parapsychological
phenomena. Moreover, in this interpretation, it is not so much conscious-
ness which is nonlocal as the wave function, that is to say, the physical
part of total reality.
The interpretation whose outlines have just been described is a realistic
interpretation. But it does not satisfy the postulate of physical realism, for
the consciousness it brings into play is not described by physics. Whether
or not it must be believed is a question everyone will answer according to
his own taste, having taken note of two things. First, the interpretation is
flexible, for the domain of consciousness can be extended either "up-
wards" (the Demiurge already described) or "downwards" ("so all is
sensitive," as Pythagoras allegedly stated). Second, this interpretation
is not the only one possible.
A final acceptable realistic interpretation can be found in the concept
that introduces "hidden" or "supplementary" variables. 6 This theory
consists of assuming that the wave function is not the entire reality but
only one of its aspects. The state of any physical object is then charac-
terized not only by a wave function, but also by other parameters or
variables. These have often been called "hidden variables," since the
measurement of the most usual physical quantities, such as the binding
energy of an atom, cannot reveal their value in any sense in which such
information could be useful. This, at any rate, was the first and simplest
idea physicists formed concerning these variables. For example, as we
have seen, it was the conception held by Einstein (at least at a certain time
in his life).
As we have also seen (Chapter 4), through the fable of the twin
brothers, the discovery of nonseparability has shown that this simple
concept is false. Any hidden-variable interpretation in which, under any
circumstances, the results of future measurements that we intend to per-
form on a localized object depend only on the state of this object and on
that of the instrument used (regardless of the nature of the object) is an
erroneous interpretation. In fact, applied to certain pairs of particles, it
necessarily implies (whatever the details of the theory) the Bell in-
equalities which, as we have seen, are violated by experience.
Hence, the only hidden-variable interpretation that is still acceptable is
a nonlocal interpretation. In such an interpretation, as in a local hidden-
variable theory, the results of future measurements performed on a
localized object depend not only on the wave function of the object, but
also on supplementary parameters. What is new is that these parameters
are not all exclusively attached to the object in question. They include
quantities attached to other objects, which may have interacted in the past

6 Compare, for example, L. de Broglie, 1. Phys. 5 (1927), 225; D. Bohm, Phys. Rev. 85
(1952), 166.
90 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

with the object considered but which may now be far away. In other
words, in certain cases, the behavior of the now-distant objects influences
the behavior of the object under study, and does so immediately.
The interpretation we have just outlined also satisfies the postulate of
realism. Is this a "physical realism"? A positive answer could be given
only if one and only one of the interpretations surveyed above were sup-
ported by a theory that would itself be unique and sufficiently anchored in
the rest of theoretical physics in order to impose itself convincingly. But
this is by no means the case. In fact, interpretations of this nature are
interesting only because their existence proves the possibility of non-
paradoxical solutions to the problem of realism. On the other hand, it is
impossible to cast them in a concrete form except by means of ingenious
models, none of which are convincing.
The restriction we have just stated is essential. However, it does not
deprive all of these models of interest. For example, the model of Louis
de Broglie and David Bohm (to which we have already alluded above)
remains quite interesting. In fact this model succeeds in accurately repro-
ducing the verifiable predictions of quantum theory without having to
introduce an essential distinction-an apparent "dualism" of essences-
between physical objects on the one hand and instruments or observers on
the other. This feature distinguishes it not only from a few other hidden-
variables models (such as the model of a "branching universe" discussed
above) but also, it seems, from all other interpretations of quantum
theory. For this reason it is interesting to summarize its most essential
aspects in a qualitative way.
In this model, the particles are definitely real. They are pointlike and
each one occupies, at any time, a well-defined position (and has a definite
velocity). The supplementary variables are these positions. In addition to
the forces of the usual theory, other unusual forces act on the partiCles.
These can be calculated with the help of the wave function and a general
formula, and they have the following effects. If, at an initial time, a batch
of particles is statistically distributed according to the probability distribu-
tion provided by the wave function evaluated at this time, the batch
remains, at any time, statistically distributed according to the probability
distribution provided by the wave function evaluated at this new time.
Thanks to this property, the observable predictions of quantum theory are
correctly reproduced by the model. It is important to note that in this
model, on the one hand, the wave function is a real entity which plays the
role of a system of fields of forces and, on the other hand, the supple-
mentary variables which are just as real playa dual role. In one role, they
specify the localization of the particles, and during a measurement it is
they that an observer definitely "sees" directly (for this reason, some
have suggested that they should not be called "hidden"). In the other
role, because of nonseparability, those attached to an object are capable
of immediately influencing not only the supplementary variables (posi-
9.1 Beyond the Customhouse 91
tions) of nearby objects, but even those of objects lying arbitrarily far
away.
Compared to the other realistic models described above, which all re-
quired that the concept of consciousness, or perhaps even that of a De-
miurge, be taken into consideration, this one appears to be very
"mechanistic" (since it seems to reduce reality to a great system of parti-
cles and forces). It even gives the illusion of "multitudinism" (see Chap-
ter 6). Is its existence a valid argument in favor of a vision of the universe
that would be not only realistic but even mechanistic, and indeed mul-
titudinistic? It is not, for the following reasons. In the first place, and this
must be stressed, this is merely a model. In the eyes of a theorist of
quantum field theory, its description of reality by means of a fixed number
of particles is naive. Such a theorist must question that the true supple-
mentary variables, if they exist, have the ontological status of positions of
particles. And if they do not, many mechanistic aspects of the model
disappear. As to its multitudinistic aspects, they are only superficial, due
in part to the picture we have just denounced as too simplistic, and also to
the fact that within such a frame we have a natural tendency to forget non-
separability, or at least to minimize it. In fact, whenever two objects have
interacted, the hidden variables of the one could influence the behavior of
the other whether they are close or distant. And the simplest manner, the
one least dependent on the model, to express this fact is again, without
doubt, to say (as suggested even in the usual theory by the nonlocality of
the wave function of a pair) that after their interaction, the two objects
actually constitute only one object, even if they appear to be distant. We
are thus led back to a type of consideration which emphasizes the notion
of globality (by the argument that in the long run all objects interact) and
which leads us to believe that space is definitely nothing but a mode of our
sensibility.
Finally, this model leaves unanalyzed the following question: through
what process are the supplementary variables directly connected with
perception and determine it causally while, at the same time-still accord-
ing to the model-these variables are completely dependent on fields of
forces, classical and quantum, which they in turn do not influence at all?
In Young's double-slit experiment (compare page 18) modified by placing
particle counters before the two slits, both counters are under the influ-
ence of comparable quantum fields associated with the particle passing
through the device. The quantum fields associated with the particles
which compose these two counters, themselves undergo comparable evo-
lutions (which are inseparably connected). Yet, since the particle passes
through one slit only, we as observers will discern only one counter being
triggered. To say that only one is "really" triggered would mean that we
arbitrarily bestow on the supplementary variables an "ontological
status" which in a mysterious way would be superior to that of the fields,
whereas their complete dependence on the latter would suggest the oppo-
site. Ultimately, only the explicit introduction of a postulate according to
92 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

which "we perceive supplementary variables and not fields" would allow
us to justify such a difference in status. But the notion of consciousness,
which in this model we thought we had expelled through the front door,
thus enters again, not at all timidly, through the back door! It could
certainly be warded off once more by modifications of the model. But the
modified models are rather arbitrary and tend to lead to predictions that
differ from those of usual quantum mechanics, with respect to some phe-
nomena. But, up until now, these new predictions have not been con-
firmed experimentally. 7

9.2 Veiled Reality

In view of so much diversity and so much uncertainty, several attitudes

are conceivable.
The first one could be called "the attitude of Wittgenstein." This phi-
losopher's saying is well known: "Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we
must keep silent!" The obvious wisdom of this aphorism won the consen-
sus of almost all physicists of our time. Acknowledging the general
inaptness of man-and of themselves in particular-to assert anything
certain about reality, they satisfied themselves with a mere description of
measurement results. In other words, they were content to merely be able
to state mathematical abstract rules aimed at correctly predicting the re-
sults of observation. The theoretical physics they constructed along these
lines is powerful and general, but its expression-even if it brings into play
words which allude to a realistic imagery-must always be translated into
the language of preparations of states and of measurements of observable
quantities in order to be understood correctly.
Plausible as it is, Wittgenstein's statement-or, more precisely, the
radical positivism which generalizes it-is, however, less unobjectionable
than one would think. On a practical level, positivism favors the ad-
vancement of science, but merely horizontally. If an idea is truly new, one
has in general only a very faint insight into the means through which it
could be verified by experiment. Based on positivistic arguments, the
criticism of the theory of atoms by Berthelot in the course of the
nineteenth century is a celebrated example (there are others) of the practi-
cal dangers of positivism. On the theoretical level, we now know that in
physics operationalistic methodology was fruitful only in proportion to the
accepted extensions of its principles. Taken in its absolute purity, the
famous principle of verifiability has, in effect, progressively been recog-
nized as almost completely unproductive even by philosophers who ini-

7 This mainly concerns the models of Wiener and Siegel and Bohm and Bub and the
experiments ofPapaliolios. See, for example, F. J. Belinfante, A Survey of Hidden Variables
Theories. Pergamon, Oxford, 1973, where more complete references are given.
9.2 Veiled Reality 93

tially viewed it as some kind of panacea. Finally-but this judgement is to

some extent a subjective one-radical positivism, while it makes answers
to practical questions possible, discards, in principle, all the questions that
could rightly be regarded as essential, by simply asserting that they are
meaningless. Even worse, Wittgenstein's statement subtly suggests an-
other one, one that is quite definitely mischievous, namely: "What we
cannot describe does not exist." It is not certain that no positivist and no
disciple of Wittgenstein ever succumbed to the temptation of passing from
the first statement to the second.
The second attitude is that of pure and simple rejection. Science is
identified with a collection of recipes of purely practical interest and, in
order to learn about being, the instruction is to turn towards other sources
and completely discard all the information provided by science. Criticism
of that attitude has already been outlined in the preceding chapter. It can
be summarized as follows: it does not seem certain that the other sources
have ever been able to provide any sure knowledge; it is quite clear, on
the other hand, that they misled several reputable thinkers into rather
gross uncritical mythologies. Undoubtedly, this is due to the fact that,
except in the domain of daily action, the human mind often makes great
errors. And it is also connected with the fact that for persons unfamiliar
with the exact sciences, it is somewhat difficult to become conscious of
that frailty of human reason (a defect that, to be sure, is not irrevocable
but which is, however, a very serious one).
Finally, there is a third attitude that could be adopted. It essentially
consists of aiming at an impartial conception. Realizing that empirical-
deductive certitude is impossible in this domain, those who choose such
an attitude search for some reasonable equilibrium. In other words, they
return-for lack of something betterl-to the old beautiful concept of
reason as this concept was understood during the seventeenth century;
that is, to a reason that does not really "prove," in the modern sense of
the word, but whose scope is greater than that of modern reasoning. They
look for the "reasonable choice."
To guide such a research, a sound principle is to renounce precision and
details. The situation being what it is, the choice of a very precise view of
the world would be completely arbitrary. It is preferable to inquire
whether in spite of their differences-and even their oppositions-the
realistic concepts described above have anything in common.
To obtain a first answer to this question, it is sufficient to remember the
nature of the descriptions of the world that, a priori, could legitimately be
hoped to emerge from physics. In deciding to build up this science, man
could reasonably think that it would provide him with a representation of
all phenomena, in both the short and the long range, and that it would do
so with the help of a system of concepts that, at the same time, would be
operationally defined (or serve to connect operationally defined concepts)
and would be capable of being understood consistently as corresponding
to elements of independent reality. He could also hope that this represen-
94 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

tation would be unique. In short, he could expect to witness the gradual

development of a description of independent reality that would conform to
the postulate of physical realism as stated in Chapter 6, a postulate which
implies, as we know, that independent reality must be describable without
ambiguity with the help of physics.
The falseness of such a hope (if false it is) can certainly not be proven,
since we cannot know the physics of the future. However, it is important
to recognize that the present development of this science gives strong
indications that this hope is illusory. The fundamental concepts that are
operationally defined by contemporary theoretical physics cannot in gen-
eral be considered, in a strictly consistent way, to correspond to elements
of independent reality. Those introduced by the models we have consid-
ered, out of a concern for' 'realism," have not been defined operationally.
Nor do they unambiguously constitute definable links between opera-
tionally defined concepts, since there seems to exist several such inequiva-
lent models among which it is impossible to choose on the basis of purely
rational criteria.
However, a common element in all three of these models is thereby
revealed. It is that, partly because of intrinsic deficiencies and partly
because of the existence of the other two, none of these three models can
be said to satisfy the principle of physical realism. If I want to retain my
realistic requirements, I am thereby compelled to embrace a nonphysical
realism, which might also be called a theory of veiled reality. This choice
still remains quite open, yet it is significant. I understand nonphysical
realism or the theory of veiled reality to mean any realism that does not
satisfy the hope described in detail above and which the postulate of
physical realism summarizes.
Since it is necessary to make a choice, I think I am reducing the arbitrar-
iness of my choice to a minimum, by making the choice of the theory of
veiled reality and by inscribing into it the vision of the world that I am
seeking.
Having made the reasonable choice of nonphysical realism, can I now
construct an ontology according to my whims? If I am a scientist,
certainly not. To be sure, I am not guided along a strict course. There
remain several possibilities. But all my knowledge is not suddenly
rendered useless, for it continues to allow me to dismiss some ideas by
making them indefensible. Thus-to continue an application of the pre-
ceding method-it seems convenient to introduce a distinction between
"near realism" and "far realism." Let me define "near realism" to be
any vision of the world in which all the elements of reality are supposedly
adequately described by notions which to us seem near and familiar. Let
me define "far realism" to be any conception not satisfying this condition.
The view of the world of the man-in-the-street is that of near realism.
The same holds for Democritus (what is e~sier to grasp than a "little
body"?) and of most molecular biologists if they are judged from their
writings. This also holds for the vision of the world of the majority of the
9.2 Veiled Reality 95

archaic religions. And even, it might be said, for that of Plato whose
"essences" coincided in general-as has already been noted-with the
most familiar concepts. On the other hand, the visions of the world of
Buddha, of the Tao, of the gnostics, and of general realitivity are some
examples (more or less) of far realism.
Having introduced such a distinction, we have quite obviously rendered
near realism very unlikely by our knowledge of present-day physics. Just
to consider the realistic models, all those described above bring into play,
in an essential way, the concept of the wave function, the idea of non-
separability, etc., in short, notions that do not naturally emerge from our
infantile or ancestral experience and that-on a first view-do not even
seem related to it. Hence, again, it is not very risky to choose far realism
rather than near realism.
As an aside, let us say that discarding near realism is certainly not
surprising nor hardly original. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to ponder
this step for a moment, for the fact that it seems rather seriously moti-
vated is of more than academic interest. In fact, it could even be of some
"practical" use. Indeed, although it is true that a certain amount of cul-
ture spreads-thanks to secondary education, to mass media, etc.-it can
easily be observed that such a culture is superficial. As a consequence, it
fails to compensate the positive character it bestows-quite rightfully by
the way!-to the process of challenging every accepted view by a parallel
requirement for rigor. In other words, although it favors the public dis-
semination of brillant new ideas, it also favors all sorts of superficial
intellectual fashions and even very gross superstitions. For a long time-
and even up to the present day-the very existence of science was in part
a counterbalance to this effect. Though quite ignorant of all the details of
research, the general public nevertheless kept in the back of its mind the
idea that, working quite apart from the above-described futility, teams of
scientists were setting into play precise and difficult methods in order to
develop not only the technical power of man-his knowledge of the good
recipes-but also his knowledge of the world as it really is, discarding all
superstitions. If the rumor were now to spread that, according to the
opinions of those very scientists, science ultimately misses reality or
should not bother with it, then, undoubtedly, the portion of truth that such
an assertion contains would at once be simplified and distorted by thou-
sands of commentators little used to restraint and nuances and very
happy, perhaps, to be able to thereby justify some superstition or some
momentary fashion. In order to thwart the song of these sirens, one must
remember that, with regard to the question of reality, science indeed is not
mute, since it excludes near realism, as noted above. In view of the fact
that all superstitions, all the magic of all times (including ours), are-by
definition, it could be said-theses of near realism, a reminder of the very
simple circumstance just mentioned should suffice to refute them.
The exclusion of near realism and that of physical realism obviously
leaves open innumerable possibilities, and henceforth the choice is uncer-
96 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

tain. For example, should a dualistic vision of the world or a monistic one
be adopted? Physics alone is not sufficient to enlighten us with regard to
this question. Indeed, of the three great realistic conceptions (or models)
described above, two are openly dualistic, whereas the third move closely
approaches the ideal of monistic thinking, at least because of the fact that
the concept of consciousness is not required for founding its bases. On the
other hand, our direct perception of the supplementary variables remains
unanalyzed in this model, as we have seen. But, more generally, and quite
independent of any physical knowledge, it is quite clear that conscious-
ness exists. It also seems clear that it cannot be reduced to the notions
physics makes use of as a technique since, to take a well-known example,
it is impossible for me to make a person insensible to pain understand-
whether by means of an experiment or by means of a theoretical
demonstration-what I really mean by the word' 'pain. " But certainly this
does not imply that the sensation or the feeling of being conscious of
something is not associated with some mechanisms in the brain. Indeed, it
definitely is. In the old multitudinistic view of the world, founded on
Democritus' atomism, by assumption, the particles of the brain consti-
tute true reality, and, because of this, the idea that consciousness-in
spite of its irreducibility to usual physical notions-is nothing but an ema-
nation of these particles was a natural idea to uphold. In a vision of the
world that partakes of far realism, the situation is very different. In this
view, it becomes increasingly clear that reality escapes all easy descrip-
tions and even those of physics. Although, to be sure, in such a view
consciousness is still nothing but a property of that reality, exactly the
same holds for the particles of the brain. And if it remains clear that there
is between these two types of properties a phenomenological hierarchy, it
is much less clear that it should remain necessary to conceive of a corre-
sponding ontological hierarchy, or, in other words, of a relative primacy.
Such a necessity looks even more questionable when it is observed that in
the more monistic models described above, space appears to be less a
feature of (intrinsic) reality than a mode of our sensibility; for such a
circumstance weakens the strength of the arguments in favor of the on-
tological hierarchy that are founded on the fact that consciousnesses exist
only in very small regions of space.
For these reasons it seems that we would narrow our vision of the world
extremely arbitrarily if we continued to claim that consciousnesses are but
emanations of particles or fields. Less restrictive and, hence, more attrac-
tive is the view that places all of these notions on more or less equal
footing.
We could attempt to go even further. Apparently, a major lesson 01"
fundamental contemporary physics is again that the spatial separation of
the objects is in part a mode of our sensibility. It is thus quite legitimate to
perceive in the whole set of consciousnesses, on the one hand, and in the
whole set of objects, on the other hand, two complementary aspects of
independent reality. This means that neither one of them exists in itself,
9.2 Veiled Reality 97

but that each one comes into existence through the other, somewhat in the
same way in which the images of two mirrors facing one another give rise
to one another. Atoms contribute to the creation of our eyes, but also our
eyes contribute to the creation of atoms; that is, they allow the particles to
emerge from the potential into the actual. Our existence contributes to
causing particles to emerge from a reality, which is an indivisible whole,
into a (phenomenal) reality extended in space-time.
Thus, different views remain possible. But in spite of their diversity-
which cannot be denied!-a thesis can be upheld which, to be sure, is
somewhat schematic, but which seems to more or less fit them all. Such a
"greatest common denominator" is the notion that independent real-
ity-or "intrinsic" or "strong" reality-is situated beyond the frames of
space and time and cannot be described by our current concepts.
Again, in this view, empirical reality, that of particles and fields, is, like
consciousness, merely a reflection of independent reality. And these two
reflections are complementary in the sense specified above. One could say
that both are realities, but merely "weak" realities, not totally describable
in terms of strong objectivity.
A thesis like this reconciles our need for a true explanation of the
regularities of phenomena (the point on which radical positivism is faulty,
since it settles on a mere statement of these regularities) with our scientific
knowledge. The difficulty is to make this thesis expressive and evocative.
For this purpose, establishing a link with some philosophical or cultural
tradition is necessary. That of the realists of the seventeenth century is
apparently the most appropriate. The philosopher M. Merleau-Ponty dis-
tinguished between great and small rationalisms; small rationalism is that
of nineteenth century science; great rationalism is that of seventeenth
century philosophy. Both open ontological perspectives so that it is per-
missible to adopt this language and call the corresponding realisms great
and small. We will then denote "small realism" to be near realism and
physical realism, both refuted above. There remains "great realism,"
which was the basis of the thought of thinkers such as Descartes, Male-
branche, and Spinoza. But, of course, concerning such a subject, only
some very brief suggestions can be ventured here.
First, a word of caution must be expressed. An unconditional return to
the ideas of the thinkers of the seventeenth century is certainly out of the
question. In fact, since that time, not only science, but epistemology, too,
has undergone such considerable advances that-whether it is deplored or
not!-most of the statements of these philosophers must be regarded as
null and void. To give just one example, it has already been noted that in
the domain of the philosophy of mathematics, these thinkers appear to us
today to have been victims of somewhat naive illusions. On the other
hand, their use of reason, conceived by them as reconciling restraint and
extension-a reason surpassing simple understanding and syllogistic
narrow-mindedness-permitted them to give life to their great intuitions
about Being. And it lead them-sometimes in spite of themselves-to
98 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

associate these with the reality of desire. For any vision of the world, such
an aura is necessary and, as we see, studying these intuitions may be
useful for capturing it.
Within such a program the question of which thinker to choose for
inspiration is not of crucial importance. However, it seems that the
general aspects of Spinoza's view of the world is the least remote from the
general thesis described here. Some of Spinoza's conclusions are very
different from ours, since he rejected experience, considered sensory data
to be extremely deceiving, and maintained that reality is completely and
unambiguously intelligible. Moreover, the pseudomathematical camoufl-
age of his Ethics makes us quite uncomfortable today because of its ap-
parently intentional illusion of rigor. But within the perspective chosen
here, such differences are inconsequential. What is really important is the
parallelism-imperfect but quite definite, nevertheless-between the con-
ception, introduced above, of a "far" reality and the substance of Spino-
za's ideas.
Certainly the parallelism is quite imperfect. In Spinoza's view, the two
"attributes" of Substance, namely thought and extension, separately
exist, both having a kind of intrinsic existence of their own. In this regard,
Spinoza's idea partly foreshadows that of Einstein. It is realistic with
regard to the existence of space-time. But the facts that may be grouped
under the heading "nonseparability" seem to me to impose, with regard
to this point, a revision of their common doctrine. This is why the thesis
described above considers thought and extension to be nonexistent in
themselves but mutually generating within Being (or Substance). How-
ever, once such a difference has been duly noted, the important elements
of similarity are no less evident. Spinoza's Substance is what exists in
itself. In other words, it is that which is neither a quality of something nor
a phantasm of anyone. In modern physics, this Substance of Spinoza
could be neither an assembly of particles nor an ensemble of observables.
But it undoubtedly resembles the universal reality mentioned above and
to which some symbols of quantum field theory could not improperly be
considered to refer (I am thinking, for example, of the symbol I 0 >, the
vector describing the "void" for a theoretician, this void which, as
specialists know, is full of things all situated midway between the virtual
and the actual).
In this respect, a remark should be made with regard to the
inadequacy-in modern physics-of the concepts derived from our ex-
perience (or from our action) for the description of anything that could be
thought of as being independent reality. The remark is that such an inade-
quacy is also a distinctive trait of, for example, Spinoza's idea, for, in the
latter, Substance is infinite, whereas in our experiences we deal exclu-
sively with the finite. Sometimes Spinoza gives Substance (intrinsic real-
ity) the name Natura naturans. That name opposes the expression Natura
naturata which, in our present language, means the phenomena, in short.
Such a contrast quite clearly expresses the difference that must in fact be
9.2 Veiled Reality 99

established, as we have seen at length above, between the intrinsic reality,

or Being, and the empirical reality that we describe by means of our usual
concepts and in which we project so much of our own selves. Here we
thus observe that Spinoza's language (and as much could be said of that of
other philosophers of his time as well) is better adapted to the truth than
the language of modern authors, in which the use of the single word nature
blurs that distinction (the same objection could be made to the use of the
word matter, which often serves to designate without distinction either
Being in its totality or some of its parts (or, again, the empirical reality of
phenomena).
More remarkable still is, without doubt, Spinoza's use of the word God
as a synonym for the word Substance. To be sure, the use of that word, if
it were carried over here, would meet with an objection similar to that
which was formulated concerning the use of the words "nature" and
"matter"; it could easily lead to an erroneous attribution to "independent
reality" of qualities that could only be elements of "empirical models,"
qualities such as will, omnipotence, and so on, all of which, when attrib-
uted to Being itself, always bring about insoluble problems. But, in other
respects on the same point, Spinoza should be credited with a certain
wisdom worthy of imitation. Attributing the name "God" to independent
reality strongly marks the difference between that reality and the purely
phenomenal reality, and this is quite in agreement, as we saw, with the
teaching of contemporary physics. Such a denomination also has the ad-
vantage of leaving open the possibilities of some attributions. Again, to be
sure, these (such as divine love) can only be interpreted to be elements of
a model. But it is permissible to be somewhat pragmatic here, in the
original sense of William James. To the extent to which such a model is
fruitful (that is to say, according to James, to the extent to which it
contributes to the welfare of men, both with regard to emotional life and a
certain feeling of security in knowledge), we may perhaps conjecture that
the model is significant. A great advantage of physical models is, as all
physicists know, that as long as we remain conscious of dealing with a
model (and not with an alleged description of the reality itself), we need
not worry about the possible contradictions that would unavoidably fol-
low from the extrapolation of the model to phenomena different from
those for which the model was intended. It is not absurd to extend this
notion and its advantages to metaphysics, and, thus, to speak of divine
love in spite of earthquakes and their effects. He who reflects on this will
perhaps discern here a starting point for a new theodicy. Could it compete
with that of Leibniz? Yes, at least in that it would probably be better adapted
to the mentality of our times.
In spite of its dangers, Spinoza's use of the word God to denote Being
has another advantage which should at least be mentioned. In view of the
immemorial traditions of almost all civilizations (with the possible excep-
tion of the Chinese), the use ofthat name is the most direct procedure for
comprehensibly expressing the idea that Being is not blind mechanics; or
100 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

at least it leaves room for the hypothesis that it is not. Admittedly, as soon
as we introduce a spiritual element into our assertions about Being, we
run a risk which in a way is symmetrical to the one we come across when
we base such assertions exclusively on the notions of particles or fields:
that of attributing incorrectly to Being properties or "qualities" which (as
the analysis of the principles of quantum theory has shown with regard to
the properties of a "physical" type) can merely be referred to our experi-
ence. The danger of mixing up models and reality or, in other words, of
aiming at a description of Being in terms of near realism is then great. The
failure of physics to achieve such a description lends little plausibility to
any attempt in this direction. In our ways of thinking we are, however,
conditioned in such a manner that it is almost as misleading not to intro-
duce spiritual notions into our assertions about Being as it is to introduce
them, for if they are not introduced, our consciousness-which hardly
tolerates the absence of images-spontaneously fills the void thus created.
And it fills it either with the image of a mechanism or (if it is wise and
therefore cautious) at least with a more or less conscious reference to the
postulate of physical realism, implicitly considered to be necessary. But
even in this case-that in which our consciousness believes it is
cautious-it is still, in reality, very adventurous since-we must always
return to this!-the postulate in question is highly objectionable due the
fact that today physical realism can no longer be considered a workable
basis for physical theory. Apart from human experience, we know noth-
ing with certainty. In view of this, should we hastily jump to spiritualism?
Definitely not, since, as Aristotle noted, that which is first in knowledge
need not be first with regard to Being. But at least we must guard against
jumping-even more arbitrarily!-to the opposite conclusion. In this re-
spect, the use of the word God as a name for reality has the advantage that
it leaves some outlets open, though again some mistrust is appropriate
with regard to all the models of the divine which were abusively con-
sidered absolute.
Finally, a last argument in favor of using the word God for intrinsic
reality is as follows. Every kind of understanding need not necessarily be
intellectual. Our intelligence is not transcendent. It has been formed by
evolution in the same way as our muscles or our skeleton and in the same
way as some of our elementary concepts, that is to say, some of our old
terms. Moreover, it is not absurd to believe that we may have developed
other forms of comprehension as well. But then, whether intellectual or
not, any form of understanding should be inextricably linked with the old
terms expressing it (as Bohr's analysis of quantum theory has explicitly
shown with regard to our intellectual understanding of "matter"). Hence,
if there exists a nonintellectual understanding, it too is presumably linked
to the old terms. And, in particular-to some degree at least-with this
old word, "God", slowly coined over hundreds thousands of years from
the infancy of the human species (a fact the anthropologist Leakey has
especially stressed).
9.3 Empirical Reality 101

But, of course, it is also quite permissible not to like that word. In

support of such reticence, the history of Western and Islamic civili-
zation-to mention just these-indeed provides a great number of
powerful arguments. Here we should recall Blaise Pascal's Golden Rule:
"I never dispute about a name as long as I have not been told what
meaning it has been given." Here the corresponding meaning has been
specified as well as possible in the preceding pages. "God" means
Being, and above all the unity of Being common to the indications of
physics and to the most essential of Spinoza's intuitions.
Again, it turns out that this old philosopher may be helpful to the
modern searcher. Having arrived at the essential notion of the unity of
"eternal" Being (eternal here means beyond time), such a searcher could
indeed have reached the disturbing impression that he had come to noth-
ing but a dry and abstract view or, in other words, to a concept which is
purely theoretical and somewhat too general to enlighten the existence of
anyone. But, when reading Spinoza (or other realists of his century), it
appears that such a feeling of discouragement is not motivated at all, ex-
cept perhaps by the fallacious activist criteria that the imperatives of the
scientific-industrial revolution and the cult of subjectivity have imposed
upon contemporary mentality. In fact, under the apparent impassibility of
an attitude like Spinoza's, good analysts have for a long time known of the
flow of an intense impetus of an emotional kind. The existence and nature
of this impetus can easily be understood. Although it is true that-as
noted above-any conception of "love felt" by the eternal Beingfor man-
kind can be understood, in a philosophy such as that of Spinoza, only as
an element of a fruitful model, nevertheless, the reverence and love
human beings legitimately feel, and must feel, for the eternal Being are
quasinecessary requisites in such a philosophy. It is rather charming but
no less suggestive that in one of the first works of the philosopher of
Amsterdam, the Short Treatise (first dialogue), it is the allegorical charac-
ter Love who, in search of an object able to give him complete content-
ment, asks Reason and Understanding to let him know such an object. And
it is even more suggestive that the result of the dialogue is the statement
that finally, to Love, the Unity of the Being appears to be the only
certain guarantee that his satisfaction is not illusory. 8 Here Spinoza
allows us to catch a glimpse that might help us connect his views-and
the ones presented here, too-to those that under different guises and
through enigmatic images constitute the main intuition of all cultures and
of all times.

9.3 Empirical Reality

The foregoing paragraph contains what I consider to be essential. It de-

scribes the central point from which I think the more detailed views

8 V. Delbos, Ie Spinozisme, Vrin, Paris, 1968.

102 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

which can be formed on such and such particular problems can be seen in
the proper perspective. But I will not claim that these other views are
unimportant. Quite the contrary, the' 'far" and almost unknowable nature
of Being amply justifies, it seems to me, the interest we take in this interme-
diate realm. Does not this realm, empirical reality, contain practically all
we can apprehend-even entities which in our eyes are as fundamental as
space-time, the universe and its history, the irreversibility of time, life?
A great question that has been continually asked for more than a cen-
tury with regard to such apparently fundamental realities is whether their
study belongs in the realm of philosophy or that of science. Hegel, Husserl,
Bergson, Sartre: there is no end to the number of philosophers who be-
lieved that this kind of investigation belongs more or less exclusively to
their domain. Their basic argument is well founded. Above we have un-
derlined at length the eminently positivistic nature of the foundations of
contemporary physics (which is itself an anchoring point for other empiri-
cal sciences). However, this argument misses its mark to the extent
that-with regard to empirical reality-any kind of knowledge-indeed!-
is but a "recipe." Because of the universality of science, all the phe-
nomena constituting empirical reality fall without exception under
this universal law. The philosopher who rejects science because of its
positivistic aspect must then, for self-consistency, not only confine
himself to pure metaphysics, but also restrain himself from ever found-
ing his intuitions in this domain on any phenomenon belonging to his
experience.
Phenomena-as we have just stressed-are all within the realm of sci-
ence. Is life an exception? Some philosophers have maintained this,
among them even some who, like Bergson, never embraced an attitude of
systematic refusal toward science, as many of their colleagues did.
Bergson based his conception primarily on the undeniable fact that life is
inseparable from duration, or, in other words, from irreversible time. But,
he claims, physical time is nothing but reversible time, or, in other words,
space. Hence, that which is properly temporal in time, the flow of dura-
tion, escapes physical time. Moreover, this philosopher notes that human
intelligence-and, in particular, scientific intelligence-is above all a
knowledge of solids: this is a result of the evolution of our species, whose
struggle for life was specifically based on armaments and on tools made of
solids, in contrast to the animals. Consequently, science moves with ease
only in domains in which the mental operation consisting of splitting real-
ity into little separated objects is a fruitful undertaking. It is thus incapable
of capturing life, to the extent that the essential thing in the latter is the
fluid, the continuous, the moving.
In some respects, the analyses of Bergson, and of other philosophers
having similar views, remain up to date. In fact, they express ideas which
are intuitive and quite widespread in an implicit way. Most ecologists are
latent Bergsonians. With regard to ideas, it must however be stated that,
although partly justified at the time at which they were stated, Bergson's
9.3 Empirical Reality 103

doubts concerning the capacity of science to undestand life are much less
well grounded today. This is so, in part, because physics has now better
assimilated the essence-and the specific features which are irreducible to
elementary kinetmatics-of irreversible phenomena, and so on, and be-
cause it is, for that reason, able to quantitatively predict, under specified
conditions, the evolution of spatially homogeneous substances toward the
nonhomogeneous, or, in other words, the emergence of order out of fluc-
tuations. The emerging structures, which have been called dissipative
structures, can develop to ever greater complexity and they can endure
only because of continuous exchanges with the environment. It seems
legitimate to recognize in them at least some of the traits of life; others
(those studied mainly by molecular biology) can more or less be identified
with highly complex processes belonging to the realm of the mechanics of
solids.
Thus, finally, it seems to me that what has been called the "intermedi-
ate" realm above belongs mainly-perhaps even exclusively-to the
exact sciences. This is a vast domain in which problems belonging to
many conceptual levels are entangled. Some refer to applications; others
are very fundamental. Even if some shifts in the relative importance at-
tributed to them must continuously be made, it must not be feared that, in
the near future, researchers in the field of pure science wi11lack legitimate
motivations. And it would be a misunderstanding if the preference given
above to nonphysical realism over physical realism were understood to
entail denying the interest of positive scientific research as far as pure
knowledge is concerned. 9

• Concerning this choice, we need to answer some technical objections that the notion of
"veiled reality" or "nonphysical realism" could easily give rise to in the minds of some
epistemologists. It is in fact quite certain that according to most of the qualified representa-
tives of contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy-which at present appears to extend
whatever has endured from the positivistic message-such a notion must a priori give rise to
serious reservations. With the help of valid arguments, does not this philosophy condemn
metaphysical realism? And is it not true that metaphysical realism is very close to the
nonphysical realism introduced here?
With regard to this subject, this book is not the proper place to enter into very specialized
developments, no more, indeed, than with regard to particle physics. Let me merely observe
that such reservations are mainly based on an ambiguity of the expression "metaphysicai
realism." A priori this expression could indeed be used to denote a conception of reality that
would be very close to the conception of "veiled reality." That is to say, it could be used to
denote a conception in which the notion of an independent reality is considered to be "far"
and even as almost unknowable. (In fact, although the postulate of the existence of that
reality is useful to account for the existence of the regularities of phenomena, that postulate
does not allow us to infer anything certain about what the study of the latter could teach us
about the reality in question.) But this is not the meaning Anglo-Saxon philosophy attributes'
to the expression "metaphysical realism" when it aims at refuting the conception denoted by
these words. On the contrary, it understands it to denote a theory in which man sup-
posedly possesses, or may acquire, an unquestionable detailed knowledge of a reality sup-
posedly fully independent of him. It is true that such a conception is, at any rate, subject to
strong criticism. Thus, for example, one could develop arguments aimed at showing the
impossibility of a proof that a particular description of a particular element of reality is more
exact than another. Attempts at generalizing a famous theorem of mathematicallogic-due
104 Chapter 9 Veiled Reality

to Godel-have sometimes been proposed for this purpose. These attempts easily lead one
to infer that the definition of truth as an "adequation of intellect to things" cannot be upheld.
But, dealing with partial and specified truths, such a conclusion, far from refuting the
conception of veiled reality, is on the contrary quite in line with it. And, more generally, it
appears that the "metaphysical realism" which one strives to refute in this way is of a very
different kind than any theory one could try to identify with nonphysical realism as consid-
ered here.
Another objection could admittedly be formulated by these philosophers, referring now to
the alleged arbitrariness that exists in postulating an independent reality that would remain,
to a great extent, unknowable in any sure way. Contrary to the preceding one, this objection
cannot be refuted by any analysis. What is called "arbitrary" and what is not seems to
depend, to an appreciable extent, on individual dispositions. Those persons who believe that
only questions beginning with the word "how" are significant and who consider meaningless
all those that begin with "why" have good reasons, from their point of view, to take this
objection seriously. Those who ask why there are regularities in the phenomena perceived
by our subjective consciousnesses (and who regard this question as meaningful despite the
fact that it begins with "why") require a concept of an independent reality. Since physics
practically forbids them-as we have seen-to consider such a reality to be a "near" reality,
and even to be one that would be "describable by physics," is it not true that a realism that
is "far" and "nonphysical," far from being "arbitrary," is for these persons the only
possible solution?