Letter Reversing Position - Terrence Richardson - Final

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
Office of the Attorney General
Jason S. Miyares
Attorney General 202 North 9th Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
804-786-2071
FAX 804-786-1991
Virginia Relay Services
800-828-1120
February 4, 2022
The Honorable John Vollino

Clerk of Court
Court of Appeals of Virginia
100 North Ninth Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Re: Terence Jerome Richardson v. Commonwealth

(s/k/a Terrence Jerome Richardson)
CAV Record No. 0361-21-2
Dear Mr. Vollino:
This case involves a petition for a writ of actual innocence filed by Terence
Jerome Richardson. The former Conviction Integrity Unit of the administration of
Attorney General Mark R. Herring [hereinafter “CIU”] investigated this matter,
resulting in the Commonwealth’s filing of a brief on Monday, November 1, 2021,
joining in the instant petition for writ of actual innocence.
Following the change in administration on January 15, 2022, the Attorney

General has reconsidered the Commonwealth’s position in this case. The purpose of
this letter is to notify the Court that the Commonwealth no longer adheres to certain
arguments contained in its previously filed brief(s). The Commonwealth specifically
withdraws its previous representation under Va. Code § 19.2-327.10:1 that it joined
in the instant petition for writ of actual innocence. See Bush v. Commonwealth, 68
Va. App. 797, 804, 813 S.E.2d 582, 585 (2018) (noting that despite the
Commonwealth’s concession that an actual innocence petitioner had met his burden
of proof, “fidelity to the uniform application of law preclude[d] [the Court] from
accepting concessions of law made on appeal.”).
The Commonwealth additionally withdraws from its position that Petitioner’s

federal acquittals for the crimes of Murder of a Law-Enforcement Officer during Drug
Trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 848 (e)(1)(B)) and Using a Firearm to Commit Murder during
Drug Trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j)) [hereinafter “federal acquittals”] are
material evidence that is properly before this Court for consideration. Notably,
Petitioner’s initial five-page Petition does not request that this Court consider the
federal acquittals as supporting evidence. Although the Commonwealth’s Answer
urged this Court to consider the federal acquittals as an item of newly discovered
evidence, Commonwealth’s Answer at 1, the Commonwealth’s position is now that
the federal acquittals were not “evidence” relating to Petitioner’s guilt, delinquency,
or innocence pursuant to Code § 19.2-327.11(C). Additionally, neither the
Commonwealth nor the Petitioner moved this Court to amend the initial petition to
include the federal acquittals as a basis for granting the requested relief. For these
reasons, the federal acquittals are not properly before this Court as evidence in
support of Petitioner’s arguments.
Even if the federal acquittals were a proper part of an amended petition in this
case, Petitioner’s acquittal of murder by the federal jury has no relevance to his state
guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter. The federal jury was only instructed on the
federal law of second-degree murder during a drug trafficking conspiracy; it was not
presented with a lesser-included jury instruction for the Virginia common-law crime
of involuntary manslaughter. Commonwealth Ans. Ex. D at 1218–25. Petitioner’s
acquittal of the federal crime of intentionally and maliciously killing Officer Gibson
during a drug trafficking conspiracy therefore has no probative effect on his previous
admission in Sussex County Circuit Court that he committed a different Virginia
common-law crime with distinct elements and a less-culpable mental state.
The Commonwealth finally submits that Petitioner has failed to prove that the
federal acquittals are material, as required by Code § 19.2-327.11(A)(vi)(a). Contra
Turner v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 227, 250–51 (2011) (“Additionally, “[e]vidence that
relates to a matter that is properly at issue in the case is said to be material.”)
(quoting Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 11–1, at 431 (6th ed.
2003)). The federal acquittals rest on inadmissible evidence of other conduct that was
not properly at issue in the proceedings against the Petitioner in Sussex County
Circuit Court, namely, a federal conspiracy by the Petitioner to traffic 50 or more
grams of crack cocaine.
The remainder of Petitioner’s argument, while it presents certain evidence as

“newly discovered,” is an attempt to use the writ of actual innocence as an “omnibus
substitute for the carefully crafted procedures of the habeas corpus writ.” Contra
Bush, 68 Va. App. 797, 803 n.1. The Commonwealth agrees that no conviction should
stand when it is proven to have been based on ineffective assistance of counsel or
Brady violations. However, these issues can only properly come before this Court on
direct appeal or through the writ of habeas corpus. The primary focus of the instant
petition is to raise legal claims that are not cognizable in Virginia actual innocence
proceedings, as demonstrated by (1) Petitioner’s approximately 36 references to the
alleged withholding of “New Exculpatory Evidence;” (2) Petitioner’s citations to
unrelated and nonbinding West Virginia, North Carolina, and federal precedent
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady; and, (3) Petitioner’s conflation
of the writ of actual innocence with a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See Tyler v.
Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 445, 456 (2021) (citing In re Neal, 44 Va. App. 89, 90
(2004) (refusing to consider an actual innocence petitioner’s legal argument that there
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction).
The Commonwealth additionally withdraws its concessions regarding

Petitioner’s allegedly newly-discovered evidence, namely, the “Gay Statement” and
the “Newby Photo Array.”1 Petitioner alleges that these items constitute after-
discovered evidence relating to the testimony of Shannequia Gay. The
Commonwealth’s position is now that the Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden
of proof to show, “categorically and with specificity,” that the allegedly newly-
discovered evidence satisfies the requirements of § 19.2-327.11. The Commonwealth
specifically contends that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof with
respect to the “diligence” consideration under § 19.2-327.11(vi) and the “materiality”
and “totality of the evidence” considerations under § 19.2-327.11(vii). Because
Petitioner cannot carry his burden of proof with respect to the “Gay Statement” and
the “Newby Photo Array”, the Commonwealth additionally withdraws from and
abandons its request for an evidentiary hearing regarding these items of evidence.
Commonwealth Ans. at 56, 60.
Review of the Petitioner’s initial filings indicates that they contain nothing
other than bare assertions that the “Gay Statement” and the “Newby Photo Array”
satisfy the “diligence” standard under § 19.2-327.11(vi). The Commonwealth’s
Answer further sheds light on the insufficiency of Petitioner’s efforts to contact and
interview Shannequia Gay prior to his involuntary manslaughter conviction
becoming final. Commonwealth Ans. at 55. The only representation before this Court
regarding the “diligence” with which Petitioner endeavored to learn about any
information regarding Shannequia Gay prior to his conviction becoming final are that
Petitioner’s investigator “attempted to locate and meet with her but was
unsuccessful.” Id. Petitioner’s trial counsel and his trial investigator knew or had
1
The Commonwealth maintains its view, stated at page 66 of its Answer, that Petitioner could not
establish that the other allegedly newly discovered piece of evidence, a 911 tip, was material within
the meaning of Code § 19.2-327.11(vii). The Commonwealth furthermore avers that Petitioner has
failed to allege any facts showing how the “911 Tip,” which was allegedly created four days after the
killing of Officer Gibson, “could not, by the exercise of diligence, have been discovered or obtained
before the expiration of 21 days following entry of the final order of conviction . . . by the circuit court.”
Code § 19.2-327.11(vi).
reason to know that Shannequia Gay was a material witness with potential
identification testimony to offer, yet on the record before this Court, they apparently
made only one attempt to speak with her before the Petitioner pled guilty. The
minimal pretrial effort by Petitioner to discover additional evidence regarding
Shannequia Gay falls short of the “devoted and painstaking application to accomplish
[the] undertaking” required under this Court’s precedent. See Tyler, 73 Va. App. at
464.2
The Commonwealth further notes that it possesses 15 transcripts of interviews

conducted by the CIU in this case that do not appear to have been provided to the
Court or opposing counsel. See Code § 19.2-327.11(C) (permitting the Attorney
General to proffer “any evidence pertaining to the guilt or delinquency or innocence
of the petitioner that is not included in the record of the case”). One of these previously
undisclosed transcripts, dated May 14, 2021, contains statements from a material
witness, Shawn Lydell Wooden, which echo Wooden’s trial testimony and inculpate
the Petitioner. Wooden testified as an eyewitness at the state preliminary hearing in
the instant case, as well as in the federal trial that resulted in Petitioner’s drug
trafficking conviction. In the previously undisclosed May 2021 statement, generated
by a former CIU investigator, Wooden maintained that Petitioner “was using and
selling drugs,” that there was “nothing he had to offer or say that could help
[Petitioner],” and that “[t]he only things he could say on the stand would be harmful
to [Petitioner and co-Petitioner Ferrone Claiborne] . . .” The CIU investigator also
noted the following:
Sometime in 2018, while incarcerated at Green Rock Correctional

Center in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, Jarrett Adams [Petitioner’s
attorney] got in touch with Wooden over the phone through his counselor
at the prison. Wooden recalls that Mr. Adams admonished him for his
testimony and called him a liar. Wooden reportedly told Mr. Adams not
to contact him again.
This material information should have been part of the evidence submitted to
this Court, see Code § 19.2-327.11(C), and the Commonwealth now attaches the
interview transcript as an exhibit to this letter along with a motion for leave to file a
supplemental brief and supplemental exhibits.
Finally, the Commonwealth no longer contends that no rational trier of fact

would have found proof of Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
2 The record before this Court regarding the diligence employed by Petitioner is substantially similar
to that in Tyler. In Tyler, this Court found that the “diligence” requirement under the actual innocence
statutes was not satisfied when Tyler’s trial counsel made a bare assertion at trial that he had tried
and failed to locate a particular witness who would later recant; Tyler’s counsel did not further specify
what efforts had been made to attempt to locate the witness before Tyler’s conviction became final.
Tyler, 73 Va. App. at 464, (2021).
Commonwealth Ans. at 70. Petitioner’s guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter and
the lengthy factual proffer that accompanied it—though only part of this Court’s
analysis under the actual innocence statutes—is a “‘self-supplied conviction’ that acts
as a ‘waiver of all defenses other than those jurisdictional.’” In re Watford, 295 Va.
114, 126–27 (2018) (quoting Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196 (1969)) (granting petition
for writ of actual innocence when, among other factors, the record was “devoid of any
mention of the facts supporting [petitioner’s] guilty plea”).
The Commonwealth’s position is now that evidence of Petitioner’s self-supplied

conviction for involuntary manslaughter, as well as the detailed facts proffered in
support of his guilty plea, distinguish this case from Watford and render Petitioner
unable to satisfy this Court that no rational trier of fact would have found proof of
Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
A motion for leave to file a supplemental response regarding the positions

articulated in this letter, as well as for leave to file any necessary exhibits in support
thereof, will follow. I would appreciate it if you would circulate this letter to the
Judges of the Court.
Yours sincerely,
Brandon T. Wrobleski
Special Assistant to the Attorney General
for Investigations
Virginia State Bar No. 89697
cc: Jarrett Adams, Esq., Counsel for Terrence Richardson

Michael HuYoung, Esq., Counsel for Terrence Richardson

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COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

Office of the Attorney General

The Honorable John Vollino

Re: Terence Jerome Richardson v. Commonwealth

Dear Mr. Vollino:

Following the change in administration on January 15, 2022, the Attorney

The Commonwealth additionally withdraws from its position that Petitioner’s

The remainder of Petitioner’s argument, while it presents certain evidence as

The Commonwealth additionally withdraws its concessions regarding

The Commonwealth further notes that it possesses 15 transcripts of interviews

Sometime in 2018, while incarcerated at Green Rock Correctional

Finally, the Commonwealth no longer contends that no rational trier of fact

The Commonwealth’s position is now that evidence of Petitioner’s self-supplied

A motion for leave to file a supplemental response regarding the positions

cc: Jarrett Adams, Esq., Counsel for Terrence Richardson

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