Process Equipment Common Attributes For Inherently Safer Processdesign at Preliminary Design Stage

Process Safety and Environmental Protection 128 (2019) 14–29
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Process Safety and Environmental Protection

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/psep
Process equipment common attributes for inherently safer process

design at preliminary design stage
Muhammad Athar a , Azmi Mohd Shariff a,∗ , Azizul Buang a , Salman Nazir b ,
Heri Hermansyah c , Tan Lian See d
a
Centre of Advanced Process Safety (CAPS), Chemical Engineering Department, Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS, 32610, Bandar Seri Iskandar, Perak Darul
Ridzuan, Malaysia
b
Training and Assessment Research Group (TARG), Department of Maritime Operations, University of South-Eastern Norway, Postboks 4, 3199, Borre,
Norway
c
Industrial Bioprocess Engineering Laboratory, Department of Chemical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Universitas Indonesia, Kampus UI Depok,
Depok, 16424, Indonesia
d
Department of Chemical Process Engineering, Malaysia - Japan International Institute of Technology (MJIIT), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), Jalan
Sultan Yahya Petra, 54100, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: Hazards associated with chemical processes can lead to accidents and require therefore proper manage-
Received 30 November 2018 ment. An inherent safety strategy is a proactive approach to serve this purpose, one capable of minimizing
Received in revised form 19 May 2019 hazards whilst offering sustainable process design. Current inherent safety techniques are limited to com-
Accepted 20 May 2019
paring process routes and selecting safer one using the process parameters, whereas process equipment
Available online 23 May 2019
characteristics are rarely scrutinized. Therefore, this paper consolidates a new technique that integrates
the mutually shared attributes of process equipment, in order to offer inherently safer process design
Keywords:
at the preliminary design stage. Inherent safety assessment for process equipment (ISAPE) consists of
Indexing
Inherent safety
an indexing procedure, followed by risk assessment. The indexing procedure can highlight the criti-
Inventory cal process equipment, which can be further studied through risk assessment. When the risk is beyond
Plant layout acceptable threshold and must be minimized, inherent safety concepts are implemented, leading towards
Preliminary design engineering inherently safer process design. The complete ISAPE technique is exhibited through the case study of the
Sustainable process design acetone production process. In this case study, various ISD options have been applied to the critical
process equipment, identified through the proposed indexing; the options have then been compared to
select the best one. The method is easy to use, and as such, it is suitable to be put into practice by design
engineers at the preliminary design stage.
© 2019 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction hazards up to a tolerable level, as the complete elimination of pro-

cess hazard is practically unfeasible. Each of these strategies offers
The progression of the chemical process industry has escalated a certain contribution to the process life cycle. The inherent safety
the magnitude of unwanted loss-containment scenarios. To fore- strategy is typically applied at the preliminary design stage. It aims
stall such situations, both academia and industry professionals are to deliver a sustainable process design allowing to bring the hazard
multiplying their efforts to achieve state-of-the-art hazard-tackling to a minimum level from the start of the life cycle (Song et al., 2018).
strategies. These strategies, which serve both in creating sustain- The sustainability in the process design can be obtained by tak-
able process designs for new facilities and in managing the hazards ing into consideration the typical metrics related to sustainability,
in the existing process plants, can be classified along four dimen- for example, energy, water, wastes and pollutants (Carvalho et al.,
sions (Hendershot, 2011). These four strategies act as the pillars 2008; de Jesús Guillén-Cuevas et al., 2018; Lu et al., 2011; Sikdar,
of modern process safety, as demonstrated in Fig. 1(a). The overall 2003). The inherent safety strategy is mostly dealing with chemi-
target for all these strategies is to minimize the impact of process cals, operating conditions and inventory. Although the remaining
strategies of process safety contribute to the later stages of pro-
cess lifecycle by controlling the hazard through add-on measures,
∗ Corresponding author. these pillars are also essential for a perfect process safety system
E-mail address: [email protected] (A.M. Shariff). (PSS) in order to achieve the objective of minimum acceptable risk
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2019.05.033
0957-5820/© 2019 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
M. Athar et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 128 (2019) 14–29 15
Fig. 1. Pillars of (a) process safety (b) inherent safety.
(MAR), which is imposed by authorities. Furthermore, the inher- index (IEPI) (Frank et al., 2016) and inherent chemical process route
ent safety strategy is primarily introduced to address the safety index for safety, health and environment prospects (Warnasooriya
issues in the complete life cycle of a process plant (CCPS, 2010b; and Gunasekera, 2017). LInX compares different process routes to
Hendershot, 2010). However, it is considered preferable for ear- identify the best one using environment, health, safety, and cost
lier stages, due to its capabilities in risk management and capital sub-indices. On the other hand, IEPI has been developed to observe
investments, which ultimately leads to generating sustainable pro- the environmental sustainability performance for oil and gas com-
cess design. This approach has been established over the years, and panies. A few other examples of tools and techniques that address
strategies of inherent safety have been devised by various sources both inherent safety and sustainability metrics can be found in
available in the literature (CCPS, 2010b; Kletz and Amyotte, 2010), the literature (Ee et al., 2015; Koller et al., 2000). Recently, Song
which are presented in Fig. 1(b). Among inherent safety strategies, et al. (2018) developed an inherent safety performance index (ISPI)
intensification, also known as minimization, has been the most fre- which have engaged the fuzzy set with the indexing to solve the
quently identified strategy in industries with the aim of generating issue of exact boundaries for sub-indices. The method was meant
the sustainable process designs. On the other hand, the remaining for the evaluation of design alternatives to generate the sustain-
three strategies, i.e., moderation, simplification, and substitution, able process design. This method extends the initially proposed
receive comparatively less attention in sustainable process design- indexing methods - such as PIIS and ISI by the inclusion of weight-
ing (Hussin et al., 2015). ing factors for reaction and equipment. All of these techniques rely
Since, as mentioned earlier, the inherent safety strategy is upon the indexing concept, which has certain limitations and draw-
mostly related to earlier stages of the process life cycle. However, backs, such as subjective scaling and weighting factors (Ahmad
the available methods such as Dow FEI index cannot quantify the et al., 2014; Srinivasan and Nhan, 2008). To deal with these short-
inherent safety at the earlier design stage. Therefore, there is a need comings, other themes have been introduced, such as graphical
for a dedicated tool to quantify the inherent safety at this stage. techniques and optimization for estimation purposes. The graphi-
Prompted by the unavailability of any such method, researchers cal techniques include a simple graphical method for the inherently
have endeavored to develop the required tool. In this context, the safer route (Gupta and Edwards, 2003), a graphical technique for
very first dedicated method, named proto-type index for inherent root-cause analysis in inherent safety assessment (Ahmad et al.,
safety (PIIS) came into existence (Edwards and Lawrence, 1993; 2015) and a graphical method for consideration of inherent safety
Lawrence, 1996), followed by inherent safety index (ISI) (Heikkilä, in process design (Ortiz-Espinoza et al., 2017). The optimization
1999; Heikkilä et al., 1996). Both these methods are capable of methods are more flexible because of their capability to tackle con-
comparing various process routes to identify the safest option. flicting objectives, which can be solved through a multi-objective
A consequence-based method, called integrated inherent safety optimization (MOO) scheme. This type of methods include the
index (I2SI), has merged safety and cost dimensions in a single integration of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for safety anal-
technique. The method aims to analyze the impact of unwanted ysis in the optimization approach focusing on economics, safety
chemical releases by incorporating various process and material and environment (Fuentes-Cortés et al., 2016), an optimization
characteristics as well as the cost analysis for different process technique for analyzing design alternates (Ruiz-Femenia et al.,
routes in order to choose the best possible option (Khan and 2017) and a multidimensional optimization method to concen-
Amyotte, 2004, 2005). All these methods so far have focused on the trate on safety, environment, economics, and sustainability aspects
safety dimension alone, while the environment and safety features (Guillen-Cuevas et al., 2018). Besides these formal methods, a new
have been coupled for the process routes comparison by concen- concept has now been introduced for the identification of hazard
trating on the material and energy consumption (Andraos, 2016). A prevention strategies (HPS) in process designing via inherent safety
few other methods are also available which have considered mul- assessment and can be used at the earlier design stages. The frame-
tiple aspects for sustainable process design, including atmospheric work for this concept has been based upon the thematic analysis
hazard index (Gunasekera and Edwards, 2003), life cycle index applied to the accident database screening leading to the formula-
(LInX) (Khan et al., 2004), integrative environmental performance tion of the HPS (Ahmad et al., 2019).
16 M. Athar et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 128 (2019) 14–29
Inherent assessment methods for sustainable process design are

Nomenclature classified into two approaches: an overall approach and an indi-
vidual equipment approach. All of the above-discussed methods
Greek Symbols
rely upon the overall approach, whereas the individual equip-
f function of
ment approach has not been explored extensively (Hendershot,
␩ efficiency factor
2010). Furthermore, individual equipment has also been indi-
␳ density (kg/m3 )
cated in the “onion model” of sustainable process design as an
␥ ratio of specific heat capacities, CP /CV
important level for the recent trends of sustainable process design
(Martinez-Hernandez, 2017). A few methods have indeed incor-
Alphabetical Symbols
porated the individual process equipment such as safety weighted
AIT auto ignition temperature ringC)
hazard index (Khan et al., 2001), inherent safety index calculation
A empirical constant
(Abedi and Shahriari, 2005) and comprehensive inherent safety
Ah opening area (m2 )
index (Gangadharan et al., 2013). However, these methods are not
a time constant
capable of accommodating the individual characteristics of pro-
a1 constant for overpressure
cess equipment (Kidam et al., 2016). Recently, a few methods have
b1 constant for overpressure
been developed to produce the inherently safer process design
c1 constant for overpressure
for heat exchanger network, process piping, and the mechanical
c concentration
material selection via the incorporation of dedicated characteris-
CD discharge coefficient
tics (Athar et al., 2018, 2019b; Pasha et al., 2017). Nonetheless,
f explosion frequency (yr−1 )
the consideration of mutual characteristics shared by each individ-
k strength constant
ual process equipment for the inherently safer process designing
m total mass (kg)
has been the missing factor in the currently available methods.
MIE minimum ignition energy (mJ)
Therefore, a new method is presented in this paper, to deal with
p pressure (kPa)
the mutual attributes of each process equipment for the inher-
povr overpressure (kPa)
ently safer process design. The method is proficient in investigating
P probability
the mutually shared attributes of process equipment, such as the
T operating temperature ringC)
distance between process units, inventory and other characteris-
H energy of combustion (kJ/kg)
tics. The complete technique consists of two sections, namely 1)
z distance (m)
indexing method and 2) risk assessment and analysis, followed by
−z scaled distance (m)
incorporation of inherent safety strategies to provide a safer pro-
Subscript Symbols cess design. While the indexing section helps in identifying the
amb ambient most critical process equipment in the chemical process, the sec-
del, ign delayed ignition ond section ascertains the risk acceptability of the critical process
exp explosion equipment. For the unacceptable risk, the inherent safety princi-
exp/ g/ ign probability of delayed ignition leading to explo- ples are employed to reduce the potential and the consequences of
sion explosions. The process simulation software, ASPEN HYSYS, and the
f flammable spreadsheet tool, MS Excel are integrated into this method in order
imm, ign immediate ignition to extract and handle the process information, with the purpose of
IL initial leakage achieving inherently safer process designing.
LFL lower flammability level of mixture
mix chemical mixture
V vapor 2. Methodology
TNT trinitrotoluene
2.1. Inherently safer process design via mutual attributes of
process equipment
It is highlighted in the literature that not all equipment share

Although all the above-mentioned approaches have been aimed the same hazard in the process and that some equipment are more
at the earlier design stages, there are some common limitations, hazardous than others (Heikkilä, 1999). Each process equipment
such as manual data extraction, dealing with individual chemical contributes to a different level of hazard in the process due to the
instead of the chemical mixture and the failure to use inherent variance in the characteristics of each individual process equip-
safety guide words for safety improvement. The gaps in manual ment. However, there are certain attributes which are shared by
data extraction and chemical mixture have been covered through each process equipment, even though their magnitude can be dif-
integrated risk estimation tool (iRET) by linking HYSYS and MS ferent depending upon the type of equipment. In the ISI method, the
Excel to analyze the information (Shariff et al., 2006). The use distance between various process equipment is scrutinized, and a
of inherent safety guide words has been demonstrated in the generic scale is proposed regarding the safety of process equipment
extended techniques of iRET, which include process stream index using the subjective indexing (Heikkilä, 1999). The score value here
(PSI) (Shariff et al., 2012), toxic release consequence analysis tool is not dependent upon the adjacent process equipment, which may
(TORCAT) (Shariff and Zaini, 2010), toxic release inherent risk vary in individual processes. The distance between process equip-
assessment (TRIRA) (Shariff and Zaini, 2013) and inherent fire con- ment is an equipment attribute, which does not only depend upon
sequence estimation tool (IFCET) (Shariff and Wahab, 2013; Shariff the considered equipment itself but also the adjacent, connected
et al., 2016). The ISPI method, described above, has also considered process equipment. Furthermore, there are other characteristics of
the chemical mixture for the comparison of various process routes, process equipment mutually shared by each equipment which have
integrating the process simulation software ASPEN PLUS for this not been considered in earlier works.
purpose. These techniques are capable of using the inherent safety A chemical process becomes functional when numerous pro-
strategies in order to prepare sustainable process designs. cess equipment are connected with each other. This interaction
is dependent upon the chemicals, the process conditions and the ently safer intra-equipment index based on the factors mentioned
kind of the process equipment. The previous research on inher- above can be estimated by:
ent safety presented in section 1 has mostly focused on the first
Ia EI = A × (ID × IN × IFR ) (1)
two aspects, whereas the later prospect has been left wanting for
consideration. It is precisely this aspect that is scrutinized in this For the smaller magnitude of Ia EI, a magnifying factor, A, can be
paper to generate the inherently safer process designs for the chem- engaged to amplify the numerical value and significantly differen-
ical processes. Certain attributes of process equipment can define tiate the level for individual process equipment. This index would
the individual nature of such process equipment and are classi- be estimated for all process equipment in the process; the higher
fied in terms of physical and non-physical characteristics. Physical the value of Ia EI, the more critical is the equipment in the chemi-
features are defined in terms of working parts, while non-physical cal process and vice versa. Ia EI identifies the most critical process
features can be defined via inventory and ignition sources. All these equipment based on the mentioned factors through the sub-indices
attributes are shared by each process equipment, albeit the mag- for each aspect. In the following subsections, the calculation of
nitude can vary for each process equipment. Inventory is initially these sub-indices is explained.
defined as the capacity or the production scale of the process and
has been termed as the process attribute (Heikkilä, 1999). How- 2.2.1. The distance between process equipment
ever, the inventory is basically the equipment characteristic rather Hazard avoidance or minimization are usually the two viable
than the process characteristic, on the grounds that for a specific options to achieve acceptable risk. This is in accordance to the
production scale of the chemical process, each process equipment theme presented by Kidam et al. (2016) for inherent safety. In
has a different inventory level than the others. Since there may be order to avoid the hazard, the distance between units is of vital
other potential common attributes that have been missed, the fail- importance as it would be related to domino effects to neighbor-
ure rate can be employed for the definition of process equipment ing process equipment. Increasing the distance between different
attributes in order to bridge the gap and cover for the missing fac- process equipment would minimize the effect of consequences
tors. Furthermore, this failure rate is based upon the real behavior from unwanted events on nearby process equipment in the process,
of each process equipment in chemical processes in addition to without reducing the hazard magnitude. Furthermore, the distance
process conditions and chemical characteristics. Therefore, these is a key factor in defining the density of the process equipment in
parameters are jointly considered to avoid duplication. However, a chemical process. This is because with shorter distance between
the failure rate considered for this present study is independent the process equipment, numerous equipment are closely packed
of different operating scenarios. Usually, the failure rate of process either on one floor or on multi-floor. It leads to a compact layout
equipment operating under severe corrosive environment would in which the piping needs to be whirled in a small space, thus,
be different from the process equipment dealing with mild chemi- increasing the density of process equipment in a chemical process.
cals. For this purpose, a modifier can be included in the future works Guidelines are available in the literature for process equipment
to account for various operating scenarios in calculating the failure placements to create the best possible plant layout (CCPS, 2010a;
rate. Conclusively, the mutually shared equipment characteristics Mannan, 2013; Moran, 2016; Vazquez-Roman and Mannan, 2010).
relevant to safety can be defined as follows: It should be noted that these guidelines only provide the infor-
mation regarding the minimum distance requirements; the actual
distance required for process plant layout of any specific process is
1 The distance between process equipment not available in the open literature. Typically, the plant layout anal-
2 The nature of individual process equipment ysis is performed at later design stages of process lifecycle (Brunoro
a) type of parts, i.e., static or moving Ahumada et al., 2018). There are a number of research works avail-
b) type of ignition source able in the literature to propose the plant layout, for example, cost
c) equipment size using the inventory level and safety aspects for plant layout by genetic algorithm (Caputo
3 The equipment failure rates et al., 2015), mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) (Latifi
et al., 2017), mixed integer linear programming (MILP) (Guirardello
and Swaney, 2005; Patsiatzis et al., 2004; Rahman et al., 2014) and
All process equipment in a chemical process can be analyzed mixed integer optimization (MIO) (Xu and Papageorgiou, 2009).
through the mentioned factors. The relative ranking-based index- Although the MILP approach has been recently applied for the lay-
ing would help to highlight the critical process equipment, as well out of storage vessels at the design stage (de Lira-Flores et al., 2018),
as reduce the efforts of process engineers during the preliminary it is not clearly defined whether the design stage is preliminary,
design stage. For the purpose of identifying the critical process basic or detailed. Indeed, a general limitation shared by all these
equipment, a new indexing method is developed in this paper, methods is that detailed information regarding the process is seen
namely inherently safer intra-equipment index (Ia EI). The most as a pre-requisite, but it might not be available at the preliminary
critical process equipment can be further scrutinized through the design stage. Considering the plant layout at the preliminary design
risk assessment for its acceptability. For the unacceptable risk, the stage, on the other hand, would be vital in creating the inher-
inherent safety themes are applied to suggest how the design can ently safer process designs for chemical processing facilities. For
be changed so that it generates an inherently safer process design. the preliminary design stage, only process equipment inside bat-
The whole concept is named as an inherent safety assessment for tery limit are taken into account, since information regarding the
process equipment (ISAPE) and will be explained in the next sub- process equipment outside the battery limit is not available from
sections, while the relevant framework is provided in Fig. 2. process simulation. For this reason, the process equipment outside
the battery limit is excluded from this paper. The area where the
raw material is converted to the product is termed as ‘area inside
2.2. Inherent safety intra-equipment index (Ia EI) battery limit’, whereas the remaining area is known as ‘outside the
battery limit’ (Heikkilä, 1999).
The subjective scale indexing method adopted in the ISI method Minimum distance guidelines, available in the literature (CCPS,
has certain drawbacks, as mentionesd in Section 1. Therefore, in this 2010a; Mannan, 2013; Moran, 2016; Vazquez-Roman and Mannan,
paper, it is replaced with the relative indexing method, which has 2010), have been studied and are summarized in Table 1, which can
been described in the PSI method (Shariff et al., 2012). The inher- serve as the starting-point for studying the distance between dif-
Fig. 2. Framework for inherent safety assessment for process equipment (ISAPE).
ferent process equipment. In any chemical process, various kinds tify the distance required w.r.t the connected process equipment
of process equipment are available; these, in turn, are connected to and determine its criticality. The maximum distance required for all
other process equipment. For any process equipment in the process, process equipment is then converted into index value through rela-
each connected equipment has individual characteristics; there- tive ranking, followed by a mutual comparison to identify the most
fore, that particular process equipment needs varying distancing critical process equipment in the chemical process. The distance
requirements need to be applied for each connected process equip- sub-index can be estimated by:
ment. For any process equipment, the distance required with each
Max. distance needed for an individual equipment
connected process equipment can be established using Table 1. ID = (2)
Average of max. distance needed of all equipment
Among these distances, we have selected the maximum distance
value, defining the criticality level of the considered process equip- The higher the magnitude of ID , the higher the chances for this
ment in the process. For example, in the case of a heat exchanger, equipment to create a severe domino effect and vice versa.
the connected process equipment are two other heat exchangers:
a compressor and a high hazard reactor. In this case, the distances 2.2.2. Nature of process equipment
required for this heat exchanger are 2, 2, 9 and 8 m from the Since each unit operation is based on a unique principle, the con-
connected process equipment respectively. Among these distance tributing hazard of each process equipment is different from the
values, the maximum distance for the subject heat exchanger to others. The attributes associated with the nature of process equip-
define the critical level in the process is 9. In a similar fashion, all ment can be defined in terms of parts type involved, related ignition
the process equipment in the chemical process are studied to iden- source and inventory, which are all relevant for their contribution
towards the hazardous scenario.
Table 2
Subjective hazard scaling for equipment nature characteristics.
Exchangers
Emergency
Part Type Ignition source Potential Hazard Level
Static Parts / No Moving Parts Friction 1
–
Moving Parts Hot Surface 2
Flame available 3
Exchangers
Heat
On the basis of the parts, process equipment can be categorized
15
2
into two groups: static and rotary. The domino effect would be
more severe for equipment containing rotating parts compared to
Exchanger
Air Cooled
static process equipment. For example, should there be an explo-

sion in a compressor, the rotor of the compressor can be flung at
Heat
15
longer distances because of its high rotation speed. Conversely,
–
5
the domino effect of an explosion in a separation vessel is com-
Incinerators,
paratively weaker, as no rotating parts are involved. Since this

Oxidizers
Heaters,
parts-based categorization of process equipment is qualitative in

Fired
nature, no numerical magnitudes derived from the process sim-

15
15
15
8
ulation software are available for these scenarios. This limitation,

however, can be eluded by assigning the subjective values for these
Rundown
characteristics, as given in Table 2. In this table, the higher numeric

Tanks
value indicates the more hazardous parts type, while the lower
31
31
31
31
31
value is associated with the less hazardous ones. Each process

equipment in the chemical process is assigned with a numeric value
based on Table 2. It is then converted into the index value which is
Accumula-
Columns,
estimated through relative ranking with the following equation:

Drums
tors,
31
15
15
Part hazard level of individual equipment

5
5
3
IPS = (3)
Average part hazard level of all equipment
Moderate
The ignition source is an essential factor for explosions and other

Reactors
Hazard
fire accident scenarios. In the process industries, ignition sources

31
15
15
can be of several types. Nevertheless, it can be grouped into two

5
8
5
3
general classes, i.e., direct and indirect. The ignition sources rele-
Intermediate
vant to process equipment available in each class are:

Reactors
Hazard
1 Direct ignition source

31
15
15
5
5
8
5
5
a) Flame
High Hazard
2 Indirect ignition source

Reactors
a) Friction
b) Hot surface
15
31
15
31
8
8
8
8
8
Irrespectively of the equipment part type, there is no quanti-

High Hazard
tative grading for these ignition sources. Therefore, the subjective

Pumps
values outlined in Table 2 are proposed to quantify the hazardous

level of individual ignition sources. The higher the numeric rating,
31
15
15
2
5
5
5
5
5
5
the higher the hazardous ignition source involved in the particular

Distance between process equipment inside battery limit (in meters).
process equipment. For any chemical process, each process equip-

Compressors Immediate
ment is assigned a specific hazard value based on the associated

Hazard
Pumps
ignition source. Meanwhile, the relative ranking is used to esti-

31
15
15
2
2
3
3
3
3
5
3
mate the index value for this parameter. The number of process
equipment in each ignition class would affect the index value of
individual process equipment and it is independent of subjective
indexing.
15
15
15
15
15
31
15
15
9
9
9
9
Ignition source hazard of individual equipment

IIS = (4)
Fired Heaters, Incinerators, Oxidizers
Average ignition source hazard of all equipment

Columns, Accumulators, Drums
In the case of an accident scenario, inventory leakage is the ini-

Intermediate Hazard Reactors
tiating event. The more the contributing inventory is involved, the

Air Cooled Heat Exchanger
Moderate Hazard Reactors
Immediate Hazard Pumps
more severe the consequences of the accident would be. Although

Emergency Exchangers
High Hazard Reactors
the plant capacity is specified for any chemical process, each pro-
High Hazard Pumps
Process Equipment
cess equipment has a different level of chemicals termed as the

Heat Exchangers
Rundown Tanks
inventory of process equipment. Therefore, the hazard contribu-

Compressors
tion by individual equipment based on the inventory is different

in magnitude. The actual inventory information is available if the
Table 1
dimensions of the equipment are known. However, this is not usu-

ally the case at the preliminary design stage. Nevertheless, this
Table 3 2.3. Risk estimation

Residence time values of process equipment.
Equipment Residence time Risk assessment is a four-step procedure, where hazard identifi-
Reactor 2 min cation is the first and most critical step (Arendt and Lorenzo, 2010;
Vapor-Liquid Separator 5 min CCPS, 2000). Hazard can be identified through various methods.
Other Vapor Liquid Separation (e.g. 15 min Past accidents analysis (PAA) is one of the tools for this purpose.
Distillation Absorption etc.) In this work, the scope of risk estimation is restricted to a single
Pumps and Compressors* 10 sec
accident scenario, and PAA is used to identify the possible hazard
Heat Exchangers 13 sec (for shell)
3 sec (for Tubes) scenario from the process industry. An explosion has been identi-
*
fied as the most frequent accident event in the process industry, as
Holdup time for the casing of rotating process units is considered.
reported in numerous accidents analysis available in the literature
(Khan and Abbasi, 1999; Koteswara and Kiran, 2016; Mihailidou
limitation can be countered by a recently presented concept by et al., 2012). Although for certain process equipment, such as pip-
Warnasooriya and Gunasekera (2017), and the inventory informa- ing and storage vessels, fire is the most frequent accident scenario
tion can be estimated by: (Chang and Lin, 2006; Jang et al., 2012), for an overall process plant,
the explosion is the most frequent accident event (Athar et al.,
Inventory = Flow rate × Residence Time (5) 2019a). Additionally, for the domino effect, it is identified by Darbra
et al. (2010) that the most frequent primary scenario is an explo-
Flow rate related to each process equipment is accessible from sion which is more damaging than fire. Furthermore, among the
the process simulation software ASPEN HYSYS, which is trans- several types of explosion scenarios, vapor cloud explosion (VCE)
ferred to MS Excel through VBA coding. The residence time is also a is identified as the most frequent scenario (based on PAA). Hence,
function of equipment dimensions, which is missing at the prelim- this particular accident is used in this work, only for demonstration
inary design stage. For this reason, at the preliminary design stage, purposes. However, the ISAPE tool can be extended to include fire
heuristic values of residence time for different equipment - avail- and toxicity in future works.
able in the literature - can be used (Coker, 2014; Couper et al., 2012; The explosion risk can be estimated through:
Warnasooriya and Gunasekera, 2017), as shown in Table 3.
Once the inventory of each process equipment in the chemical VCE Risk = Consequences of VCE × Probability of VCE (9)
process is estimated through Eq. (5), it can be converted into the
index value using the concept of relative ranking as follows: 2.3.1. Consequences of VCE
VCE consequences are dependent upon the blast wave overpres-
Inventory level of individual equipment sure, which is the function of initially released amount, as well
IINV = (6)
Average inventory level of all equipment as process and environmental conditions. The released chemical
quantity depends on process conditions and type of the equipment,
The higher the value of IINV , the more critical the process equip-
as each process equipment contains specific inventory level. For a
ment, as the higher inventory translates into the higher amount
small leak, a release rate needs to be estimated, while in case of full
of chemical involved in an unwanted scenario, with more severe
rupture of process equipment complete inventory can be assumed
consequences.
as the mass released, estimated using Eq. (5). For a specified hole
All three aforementioned characteristics namely the part type,
size in the process equipment, the release rate can be estimated
ignition source, and inventory are combined to estimate the overall
as follows (CCPS, 2000; CEPPO, 1999; Cowley and Johnson, 1992;
effect of equipment nature towards inherently safer process design,
Tweeddale, 2003):
which can be estimated by:
2 +1
IN = IPS × IIS × IINV (7) −1
m = CD Ah p (10)
+1
2.2.3. Equipment failure rates The next step is the estimation of flammable mass, which is the
There could be many attributes associated with process equip- contributing factor involved in generating the overpressure. This
ment, which can contribute to an accident scenario. A few of these can be computed by:
have been identified in the previous subsections. However, there
could be other equipment attributes which may have been missed mf co 2cLFL co
= exp ln − √ ln( ) (11)
and could be of vital importance for accidents. The failure rate of m cLFL co cLFL
each process equipment can cater for all these missing factors, as
each process equipment has an individual failure rate based on the Explosion overpressure is also dependent upon the energy
associated equipment attributes as well as on the interaction of released by the explosion and the scaled distance. Trinitrotoluene
chemicals and process conditions, which depicts the actual behav- (TNT) equivalent method is used to estimate these parameters and
ior of process equipment in the process industry. An equipment is the necessary equations are provided as follows:
considered as failed if a leak has occurred. The leak rate of each ex mf HV
equipment is available in the literature for different hole sizes. The mTNT = (12)
HV,TNT
failure rate of individual process equipment is shown in Table 4. The
z
failure rate for each process equipment in the chemical process can z̄ = (13)
1
be converted into index value using the following relationship (mTNT ) ⁄3
Failure rate of individual equipment Overpressure can be estimated by the non-linear regression of
IFR = (8)
Average failure rate of all equipment experimental data (Shariff et al., 2006), which is demonstrated in
Fig. 3. The overpressure regression equation is given as follows:
High IFR means a high probability of failure for any equipment
in the specific process. The value is dimensionless and is dependent 1⁄z
upon the number of process equipment in the chemical process. povr = a1 (b1 ) zc 1 (14)
Table 4
Failure rates of process equipment (Moosemiller, 2011).
Equipment Leak frequency (yr−1 )

type
1/8 –1/2 hole 1/2 –2 hole 2 –8 hole Rupture
Pressure vessel* 2 × 10−4 1 × 10−4 1 × 10−5 1 × 10−5

Tank 5 × 10−3 1 × 10−3 1 × 10−4 2 × 10−5
Centrifugal Pump 2 × 10−2 4 × 10−4 – 1 × 10−4
Reciprocating Pump 7 × 10−2 2 × 10−3 – 1 × 10−3
Centrifugal Compressor 5 × 10−3 1 × 10−3 – 3 × 10−5
Reciprocating Compressor 5 × 10−2 3 × 10−3 – 5 × 10−4
Heat Exchanger 1 × 10−3 2 × 10−4 4 × 10−5 2 × 10−5
*
Reactors and separation columns can be considered as pressure vessels.
1
MIEmix = n yi
(18)
i=1 MIEi
The absence of immediate ignition would lead to the event of

the delayed ignition and is the function of ignition strength (Bob
et al., 2014). It can be calculated using the following equation:

Pdel,ign = 1 − 1 − S2 × e-St (19)
The ignition source and the size of the flammable cloud are
the parameters to define the ignition strength. Values for different
ignition conditions are provided in the literature (Bob et al., 2014;
Moosemiller, 2011). There are two different probable outcomes for
delayed ignition event: either explosion or the fire. For an explo-
sion to occur, a substantial amount of flammable mass is needed
to convert to a flammable cloud (Pasha et al., 2017). If an adequate
quantity of flammable mass accumulates, then the probability of
Fig. 3. Experimental data for overpressure and scaled distance (Shariff et al., 2006).
explosion scenario is higher. On the other hand, the probability of
explosion diminishes if the quantity of flammable mass is lower.
2.3.2. Frequency estimation for VCE The probability of an explosion, therefore, is dependent upon the
VCE frequency can be estimated through event tree analysis flammable mass, and can be computed using:
(ETA) methodology, for which the detailed procedure is available
in the literature (CCPS, 2014; Moosemiller, 2011), and is discussed Pexp/g/ign = 0.024 m0.435
f
(20)
below. This framework of ETA is reliable to use because the interme-
diate probabilities are dependent upon the process conditions and 2.3.3. Risk analysis
the chemicals in the process rather than on the expert judgment. After the risk estimation, the analysis must proceed along with
The frequency of VCE scenario can be estimated using: some acceptance criteria. For VCE risk, a matrix is proposed in this
paper, as shown in Fig. 4. This matrix is based on the overpressure
f = fIL × 1-Pimm,ign × Pdel,ign × Pexp/g/ign (15) consequences, placed on the horizontal axis, and the frequency of
The explosion frequency is a function of the initial release VCE scenario reported on the vertical axis. The description of the
frequency from process equipment and the probabilities of inter- consequences in terms of overpressure and the frequency for VCE
mediate events. There are three intermediate events involved, scenario is provided in Table 5. The risk is divided into three levels:
namely immediate ignition, delayed ignition, as well as delayed acceptable, tolerable and unacceptable. The tolerable risk is usually
ignition which leads to an explosion. If the ignition leads to the defined as the remaining risk after implementing all risk minimiza-
fire event before the accumulation of chemical mixture, then it is tion strategies. This matrix is used to analyze the VCE risk for the
termed as immediate ignition (Javidi et al., 2015). The probabil- critical process equipment identified in section 2.2. The identified
ity of immediate ignition, Pimm,ign , is dependent upon autoignition critical process equipment is analyzed to identify whether the risk
temperature and minimum ignition energy. The later aspect would is within the acceptability range or not. For this process equipment,
identify the static discharge potential of the chemical mixture being if the risk is beyond acceptability, the inherent safety strategies are
released (Moosemiller, 2011). The probability of immediate igni- implemented to reduce the risk to an acceptable range, as demon-
tion can be estimated by combining the potential of autoignition strated in the ISAPE framework given in Fig. 2. Conversely, if the
and static discharge (Moosemiller, 2011), using the following equa- explosion risk is unacceptable, the inherent safety strategies men-
tion: tioned in section 2.4 are employed until the risk has been reduced

1
to be within an acceptable range before the designer can proceed.
T
−9.5 AIT (p) ⁄3
Pimm.ign = 1 − 5000e + 0.0024 × (16)
2 2.3.4. Available ISD options
(MIE) ⁄3 For the unacceptable risk, modifications in the design through
The autoignition temperature and the minimum ignition energy inherent safety strategies can lead to the creation of inherently safer
for the chemical mixture can be estimated using the Le-Chatelier’s process designs. There are different ISD options available to modify
mixing rule (Crowl and Louvar, 2011), through the following equa- the design by exploiting the parameters of equipment attributes.
tions: These options are as follows:
1
AITmix = n yi
(17) 1 Increasing the distance of critical process equipment from the
i=1 AITi remaining process equipment.
Fig. 4. Risk Matrix for VCE.
Table 5
Grading for explosion risk matrix.
Consequence levels Likelihood levels

Axis Value
(CCPS, 2011; Crowl, 2010; Eckhoff, 2016; Hutchinson et al., 2012; Lobato et al., 2009; Zipf (Shariff and Zaini, 2013)
and Cashdollar, 2017)
Overpressure (kPa) Effects Occurrence Description of

Likelihood Occurrence
6 ≥ 138 Fatalities 100%, whole facility destroyed (buildings & process units) 10−0 > P > 10-1 Very high
5 ≥ 69 High fatalities, most process units destroyed 10−1 > P > 10-2 High
4 ≥ 34.5 High injuries with deaths, process units & buildings badly damaged 10-2 > P > 10-3 Moderate
3 ≥ 21 Serious injuries with rare deaths, buildings destroyed, process units slightly damaged 10−3 > P > 10-4 Low
2 ≥ 14 Injuries due to secondary effects, buildings damaged but repairable, very mild effects on 10−4 > P > 10-5 Very low
process units
1 ≥7 Light injuries due to secondary effects, windows damaged, no processing unit is affected 10−5 > P > 10-6 Unlikely
This option would reduce the domino effect in case of an aid the inherently safer process design procedure, so that process
unwanted event, i.e. hazard avoidance. Shifting of the critical pro- engineers could pick the best design option in the greater interest
cess equipment to a far distance, however, would not reduce the of the processing facility based upon the risk criteria only. Since
magnitude of the risk. the parameters employed in this paper for indexing are not engag-
2 Reduce the size of critical process equipment. ing the process conditions or the chemical properties directly;
Reducing the equipment size would minimize the inventory therefore, the ISAPE methodology is limited to minimization and
so that the impact of consequences can be reduced, i.e. hazard simplification strategies only. Inventory reduction can be consid-
minimization. This idea can be applied in two ways: ered as being classified as a form of inherent safety minimization
a) reduce the capacity of the entire process plant: strategy, whereas the increasing the separation distance can be
Not only the inventory of critical equipment is reduced, but considered as a form of simplification strategy since it reduces the
also the capacity for the entire process is affected, which might density of process equipment in a chemical process.
limit the production capacity of the process and influence the
economics directly.
b) divide the flow rate between parallel equipment: 3. Results and discussion
The inventory of the critical equipment is divided into
several small-sized parallel process equipment. For any 3.1. Indexing through Ia EI
unwanted scenario in the small-sized process equipment, the
amount of contributing chemical is considerably reduced. In The complete ISAPE methodology is demonstrated through the
this scenario, the production capacity of the process would acetone production process. Acetone can be produced using differ-
not be affected, although the capital cost would escalate. ent raw materials including cumene, isopropyl alcohol, propene,
3 The combined option of reducing equipment size and increasing carbohydrate, ethanol, and calcium acetate. For this work, isopropyl
the distance. alcohol is selected as the raw material. Acetone produced from iso-
The combined option would reduce the quantity of released propyl alcohol is free from trace aromatic compounds, particularly
material as well as eliminate the domino effect, without affecting benzene (Akram et al., 2009). In this process, an azeotropic mix-
the production capacity of the chemical process. ture of isopropyl alcohol (IPA) and water (88 wt% IPA), stream 1,
is mixed with the recycled unreacted IPA/water mixture, stream
2. This material is then pumped to heat exchanger E-401, where it
These ISD options can be studied by the design engineers for is vaporized prior to entering the reactor. Heat is provided for the
any specific process. The comparison of all these options would endothermic reaction using the circulating stream of molten salt.
Table 6
Ia EI values for acetone process.
Subfactors for nature

Tag No ID IN IFR Ia EI
IPS IIS IINV
P-401 0.8333 1.80 0.90 0.0467 0.0757 7.5000 0.4729

E-401 1.3333 0.90 1.80 0.0140 0.0227 0.2727 0.0083
R-401 1.3333 0.90 1.80 0.5604 0.9079 0.1364 0.1651
E-402 1.3333 0.90 1.80 0.0140 0.0227 0.2727 0.0083
E-403 0.8333 0.90 1.80 0.0140 0.0227 0.2727 0.0052
V-402 0.8333 0.90 1.80 1.4011 2.2697 0.1364 0.2579
T-100 0.8333 0.90 1.80 1.2568 2.0361 0.1364 0.2314
T-402 0.8333 0.90 1.80 4.2418 6.8717 0.1364 0.7809
T-403 0.8333 0.90 1.80 1.4511 0.0757 7.5000 0.4729
Fig. 5. Hysys process simulation of the acetone process (Akram et al., 2009).
The reactor effluent, stream 6, containing acetone, hydrogen, water, Table 7

Parameters for T-402 VCE risk for initial design.
and unreacted IPA, is cooled in two exchangers, E-402 and E-403,
prior to entering the phase separator V-402. The vapor leaving the m (kg) mf / m mTNT (kg)
separator, stream 10, is scrubbed with water to recover additional For Consequence 750 0.4716 276
acetone. Then the liquid, stream 14, is combined with liquid from
the separator V-402, stream 11, and is sent to the separations sec- fIL Pimm, ign Pdel, ign Pexp/g/ign
tion as stream 15. The non-condensable gases leaving the acetone For Frequency 0.00001 0.00888 0.00013 0.06694
scrubber, T-100, are sent off-site to the boiler plant where these are
burned to recover the fuel value. Stream 15 is sent for further pro-
cessing to two distillation columns, which are used to separate the magnitude, i.e., A value is considered as 1. The prioritization of these
acetone product in T-402 and the excess water from the unused IPA Ia EI values for the process equipment in the acetone process has
in T-403, as stream 19. The unused reactant is then recycled back identified the distillation column T-402 as the most critical process
to the front end of the process as a near-azeotropic mixture, after equipment. This process equipment would be more damaging than
a purification process which is not considered in this study. The the remaining process equipment in the acetone process because
process simulation diagram of this process is presented in Fig. 5. of the attributes associated and shared by the process equipment
In the first step, all process equipment in the acetone process involved. This process equipment is further studied through risk
are identified. There are nine process equipment involved in this estimation and analysis as presented in section 3.2, while insofar
process. The next step is to recognize all the connected process as the unacceptable risk is concerned, aforementioned ISD options
equipment to ascertain the respective distance requirements for would be investigated in section 3.3 to improve the safety level of
each connected process equipment using Table 1. Among the dis- the acetone process at the preliminary design stage.
tance values of all the connected process equipment, the maximum
value is picked for the process equipment which depicts the criti- 3.2. Risk estimation of critical process equipment
cality level. In the case of the heat exchanger, E-401, the connected
process equipment are P-401 and R-401, while the respective The VCE risk for the identified process equipment, T-402, is esti-
required distances are 5 m and 8 m respectively. Among these, the mated using equation (9). A full rupture scenario is assumed to
maximum value is selected to define the criticality level of E-401 fairly estimate the risk because the consequences for this scenario
in the process, i.e., 8 m. This procedure is repeated for each pro- would be more severe. The mass released would be the total inven-
cess equipment in the acetone process, followed by ID calculation tory of this equipment, calculated using equation (5). The rest of
for each process equipment using equation (2) which is provided the calculations for consequences estimation of the explosion are
in Table 6. Next, nature and failure rate sub-indices are estimated performed using equations (11) to (14). The maximum distance
through the method explained in subsections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. The of interest is assumed to be 100 m. The prerequisite data for the
values of these sub-indices along with sub-sub-indices of equip- estimation of the explosion consequences for T-402 is provided in
ment nature are displayed in Table 6. Finally, the overall index value Table 7. The explosion consequences are determined by calculat-
is estimated for each process equipment in the acetone process ing the overpressure value at every 5 m using equation (14). This
using equation (1) and presented in Table 6. In this case study, mag- explosion overpressure profile is displayed in Table 8. The explo-
nifying factor is not necessary as the index value is considerable in sion frequency for T-402 is calculated using the event tree analysis
Table 8 With regards to the reduced equipment size, as described ear-

Explosion consequence profile for T-402.
lier, there are two possible scenarios. The first option is to reduce
Actual Distance Scaled Overpressure the flow rate of the overall process through a hit-and-trial method
Distance aimed at decreasing the risk level by moderating the flow rate
(m) (kPa) (psi)
while maintaining the process conditions unchanged. By reduc-
5.00 0.77 18,200.26 2,639.73
ing the process throughput, the risk contours are narrowed due
10.00 1.54 1,254.21 181.91
15.00 2.30 401.73 58.27 to the reduced amount of the mass released. The adjacent process
20.00 3.07 201.61 29.24 equipment, however, are still in the highly hazardous consequence
25.00 3.84 124.11 18.00 zone, as demonstrated in Fig. 8. A positive aspect regarding this
30.00 4.61 85.64 12.42 ISD scenario for the acetone process is that the quality of enriched
35.00 5.38 63.52 9.21
40.00 6.14 49.50 7.18
acetone is undisturbed, whereas the amount of lean acetone is
45.00 6.91 39.97 5.80 disturbed sharply. The change in mass balance have affected the
50.00 7.68 33.16 4.81 amount of acetone due to the new thermodynamic stability. This
55.00 8.45 28.10 4.08 resulted in the maximum amount of acetone being shifted to the
60.00 9.22 24.21 3.51
enriched stream. Furthermore, no additional capital investments
65.00 9.99 21.16 3.07
70.00 10.75 18.70 2.71 are required to implement this option.
75.00 11.52 16.69 2.42 A variation of reduced equipment size is possible by employ-
80.00 12.29 15.02 2.18 ing small and identical sized parallel process equipment so that
85.00 13.06 13.61 1.97 the output of the production facility is not compromised. In this
90.00 13.83 12.42 1.80
option, the critical process equipment T-402 is replaced with two
95.00 14.59 11.39 1.65
100.00 15.36 10.50 1.52 small-sized equipment connected in parallel. The inventory of orig-
inal T-402 is equally divided among the two small parallel columns.
These small-sized process equipment are placed in the original plot
method illustrated in sub-section 2.3.2, through equation (15). The plan using the guidelines mentioned in Table 1 and the amended
mandatory intermediate probabilities for frequency are calculated plot plan with the revised risk is shown in Fig. 9. In this scenario, the
using equations (16) to (20) and are presented in Table 7. For prob- risk contours shrunk because of little inventory size, but a few of
abilities computation, the process information available in HYSYS the nearby process equipment are still inside the highly hazardous
is transferred to MS Excel through VBA coding, while chemicals consequence zone. With the option of small parallel equipment,
information is collected from the literature and nested in MS Excel the total amount and the quality of the final product is not affected,
though data entry. The estimated probability of explosion is 8.57 × neither in enriched nor in lean acetone streams; However, the cap-
10−11 yr-1 using the parameters provided in Table 7, and labeled as ital investment has increased significantly because of extra piping,
level 1, as explained in Table 5. civil structure, process equipment, and land. The data for both cases
To visualize how the explosion risk affects the acetone process, of reduced equipment size is provided in Table 9.
a tentative plot plan is prepared using the guidelines for distances The last ISD option is to place the small-sized parallel columns
between process equipment displayed in Table 1. The plot plan far away from the remaining process equipment. In this option, the
for the acetone process is provided in Fig. 6. The top two conse- two small-sized columns are placed not only far from each other,
quence levels are marked to portray the effect of the explosion, but also from the other neighboring process equipment so that the
which is estimated by the regression of the overpressure profile. It domino effect is reduced. The revised plot plan, along with the risk
is illustrated in Fig. 6 that most of the process equipment of the contours for this option are presented in Fig. 10. For this ISD option,
acetone process are in the highly hazardous consequence zone, the capital investment has increased excessively, because of addi-
while a few process equipment and equipment at outside bat- tional land, piping, civil structures, and extra process equipment.
tery limit (OSBL) are beyond the highly hazardous consequence On the other hand, the product quality of enriched acetone and
area. This plot plan with risk mapping portrays how the explosion lean acetone streams remain unchanged, exactly like in the second
would affect the complete processing facility. Although the overall option of reduced equipment size, because the process conditions
estimated risk for most of the process equipment lies in the accept- have not been altered. Finally, a qualitative comparison of all ISD
able/tolerable region, however, the consequences of overpressure options is presented in Table 9. The most prominent feature of the
are very high; therefore, an early stage study is necessary in order to risk aspect is that by incorporating any of the above-mentioned
create inherently safer process design, considering the highlighted ISD strategies, only the consequences of the explosion have been
ISD strategies in section 2.4. reduced. On the other hand, the frequency remains the same for all
the options, as highlighted in Table 9, due to the unchanged pro-
3.3. Improvement through ISD cess conditions. Process designers can compare all the ISD options
and make a decision based on the constraints implemented by var-
All highlighted options of ISD, as described in section 2.4, are ious authorities, which may vary by location, company policies or
investigated to create the inherently safer process design for an government regulations, and may also include land availability or
acetone production facility. All these options are applied to the capital investment. In this scenario, a multi-objective optimization
process, and the tentative mapping of risk is illustrated from Fig. 7 would be required for a better decision making by considering
until Fig. 10. In the first option, the identified critical process unit a number of factors such as risk, cost, material residence time,
is placed far from the rest of the process equipment, as depicted increased risks are associated with longer pipe runs, plot size avail-
in Fig. 7. Although the critical process equipment is distant from ability and land costs. This optimization can be incorporated in
the rest of the process equipment, the magnitude of the risk and the future works. Furthermore, the highlighted metrics of sus-
consequences are not reduced. Nevertheless, the domino effect is tainability in Section 1 can be coupled with this method in the
reduced to minimize the impact to nearby process equipment. This future for inherently safer sustainable process designing. Nonethe-
option would lead to an increase of the capital investment because less, the current proposed method has equipped the designer for
of additional land and piping needed to bridge the long distance of the creation of different ISD scenarios. The method also helps
T-402 from the other process equipment. The qualitative evaluation the designer to visualize the residual risk after implementation
for this ISD opportunity is available in Table 9. of ISD by considering the mutually shared attributes of individ-
Table 9
Qualitative evaluation of all ISD options for acetone process.
ISD Options
Parameter Base Case
M. Athar et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 128 (2019) 14–29
Unit Option 1 Option 2 (a) Option 2 (b) Option 3
Increase the distance Reduce the flow rate Divide the Flow into Parallel Small Equipment
between units Parallel Equipment with Increase in distance
10% Reduced 20% Reduced
Product Amount
Feed Flow Rate (Stream 1) kg/hr 2630.00 2630.00 2,367.00 2,104.00 2630.00 2630.00
Feed Flow Rate (Stream 2) kg/hr 344.30 344.30 304.87 275.44 344.30 344.30
Product Flow Rate (Stream 16) kg/hr 1974.00 1974.00 1974.00 1,975.00 1974.00 1974.00
Acetone Fraction (Stream 16) – 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Product Flow Rate (Stream 18) kg/hr 408.80 408.80 375.90 202.90 408.80 408.80
Acetone Fraction (Stream 18) – 0.89 0.89 0.63 0.08 0.89 0.89
Consequence Part for Risk

Inventory of T-402 kg 750.00 750.00 674.25 600.25 375.27 375.27
Zone 6 Distance m 28.24 28.24 27.25 26.13 22.10 22.10
Zone 5 Distance m 38.04 38.04 36.87 35.53 30.59 30.59
Other Process Equipment in – Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
consequence zone 5/6
Frequency Part for Risk

Pimm, ign – 0.00888 0.00888 0.00888 0.00888 0.00888 0.00888
Pdel, ign – 0.00013 0.00013 0.00013 0.00013 0.00013 0.00013
Pexp/g/ign – 0.06694 0.06694 0.06694 0.06694 0.06694 0.06694
Frequency yr−1 8.57 × 10−11 8.57 × 10−11 8.57 × 10−11 8.57 × 10−11 8.57 × 10−11 8.57 × 10−11
Qualitative Evaluation for Capital Expenditure

Total Area Required m2 15,048.00 18,240.00 15,048.00 15,048.00 15,048.00 21,390.00
Operating Area Required m2 2493.12 3733.80 2493.12 2493.12 2493.12 3351.60
Additional Structure Cost – N/A Yes (Only Piping) No No Yes Yes
Applicable (Piping, Civil Structure, (Piping, Civil Structure,
Fabrication of Vessel) Fabrication of Vessel)
25
Fig. 6. Tentative layout with unacceptable risk mapping.
Fig. 7. Risk mapping for acetone process after ISD option of increasing the distance between units.
Fig. 8. Risk mapping for acetone process after ISD option of reduced flow rate.
Fig. 9. Risk mapping for acetone process after ISD option of parallel small size equipment.
Fig. 10. Risk mapping for acetone process after ISD option of combined small units with long distances.
ual process equipment. The well-known indices used in process Acknowledgments

industry such as Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index and Chemical
Exposure Index require detailed information about the process, and The authors would like to express their gratitude to the Univer-
this data is not available at the preliminary design stage. A few siti Teknologi PETRONAS, Malaysia for providing research facilities
examples of the detailed prerequisite information include mate- and funding to make this research possible.
rial handling and transfer, drainage and spill control, leakage for
joints and packing and hot oil heat exchange system. However,
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Process Safety and Environmental Protection 128 (2019) 14–29

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Process Safety and Environmental Protection

Process equipment common attributes for inherently safer process

1. Introduction hazards up to a tolerable level, as the complete elimination of pro-

Fig. 1. Pillars of (a) process safety (b) inherent safety.

Inherent assessment methods for sustainable process design are

It is highlighted in the literature that not all equipment share

Static Parts / No Moving Parts Friction 1

On the basis of the parts, process equipment can be categorized

static process equipment. For example, should there be an explo-

paratively weaker, as no rotating parts are involved. Since this

parts-based categorization of process equipment is qualitative in

nature, no numerical magnitudes derived from the process sim-

ulation software are available for these scenarios. This limitation,

characteristics, as given in Table 2. In this table, the higher numeric

value is associated with the less hazardous ones. Each process

estimated through relative ranking with the following equation:

Part hazard level of individual equipment

The ignition source is an essential factor for explosions and other

ﬁre accident scenarios. In the process industries, ignition sources

can be of several types. Nevertheless, it can be grouped into two

vant to process equipment available in each class are:

1 Direct ignition source

2 Indirect ignition source

Irrespectively of the equipment part type, there is no quanti-

tative grading for these ignition sources. Therefore, the subjective

values outlined in Table 2 are proposed to quantify the hazardous

the higher the hazardous ignition source involved in the particular

process equipment. For any chemical process, each process equip-

ment is assigned a speciﬁc hazard value based on the associated

ignition source. Meanwhile, the relative ranking is used to esti-

Ignition source hazard of individual equipment

Average ignition source hazard of all equipment

In the case of an accident scenario, inventory leakage is the ini-

tiating event. The more the contributing inventory is involved, the

more severe the consequences of the accident would be. Although

cess equipment has a different level of chemicals termed as the

inventory of process equipment. Therefore, the hazard contribu-

tion by individual equipment based on the inventory is different

dimensions of the equipment are known. However, this is not usu-

Table 3 2.3. Risk estimation

Equipment Leak frequency (yr−1 )

Pressure vessel* 2 × 10−4 1 × 10−4 1 × 10−5 1 × 10−5

The absence of immediate ignition would lead to the event of

Fig. 4. Risk Matrix for VCE.

Consequence levels Likelihood levels

Overpressure (kPa) Effects Occurrence Description of

Subfactors for nature

P-401 0.8333 1.80 0.90 0.0467 0.0757 7.5000 0.4729

The reactor efﬂuent, stream 6, containing acetone, hydrogen, water, Table 7

Table 8 With regards to the reduced equipment size, as described ear-

Parameter Base Case

Consequence Part for Risk

Frequency Part for Risk

Qualitative Evaluation for Capital Expenditure

Fig. 6. Tentative layout with unacceptable risk mapping.

ual process equipment. The well-known indices used in process Acknowledgments

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