OCTOBER 3

1.Director of Religious Affairs vs Estanislao. Bayot 74 Phil 579

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, COMPLAINANT, VS.

ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is  an attorney-at-law, is  charged with malpractice for
having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune  of June 13,
1943, which reads as follows:
"Marriage
"license promptly  secured thru our assistance &  the annoyance of delay or 
publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to  wishes of parties. 
Consultation on any matter free for the poor.  Everything confidential.
 
"Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room 105
Tel. 2-41-60."
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published
the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru  his attorney, he admitted
having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of 
the Court, promising  "not to repeat such  professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical  rules of the law profession." 
In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement  was  published
only  once in  the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason
thereof.
 
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
 
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation 
by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public.  Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that  "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of  gain,  either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."   It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.  Law is a profession
and not a trade.  The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by  advertising his
services or offering  them to the public. As a member of the bar, he denies 
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old
defiled the temple of Jehovah.  "The most worthy  and effective
advertisement possible, even for a  young lawyer,   *  *  * is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust.  This cannot be forced but must be the outcome oi
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
 
In In re Tagorda,  53 Phil., 37, the respondent attorney was suspended
from the practice  of  law for the period of one month for advertising his
services  and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. 
That case, however, was more serious than this because there the
solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
 
Considering his plea for leniency and his  promise not to repeat the
misconduct, the Court is of the  opinion and so decides that the respondent
should  be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

 2. 11 SCRA 755; August 31, 1964 Cui vs Cui

Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses
Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent
invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by
legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders
jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may nominate or
designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of
donation)”

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In
1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui
pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial
document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his
brother’s assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio,
demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied,
Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
HELD
Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.

Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to
sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed
gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who
if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in
that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among
those otherwise qualified.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his
license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do
with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant
to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession
of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in
some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure,
where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take
the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the
necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such
persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor
of Laws from some law school or university.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not
having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the
Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before
he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio. The term “titulo de abogado”
means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership
in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s
degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements,
does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely
serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the
examinations has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lawyer, first of all, because in all of the works of
an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice
the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of
administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for
immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated
before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral
rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first
place.Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

3.113 SCRA 39; March 25, 1982 Villegas vs. Legaspi

These two cases (L-53869 and L-51928) filed in May, 1980 and September, 1979, respective,
involved the prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Charter, which used to read:

Sec. 11. No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a
court with appellate jurisdiction, ...

FACTS:
In G.R. No. 53869, a complaint for annulment of the bank checks and damages was filed by
petitioner against private respondents before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. An answer
was filed by private respondents through their counsel, Atty. Valencio Legaspi, a member of
the Batasang Pambansa. Petitioner “challenged” the appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi.
In. G.R. No. 51928, petitioner Reyes filed Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal against N.V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Exelsior-De Maas and private
respondent Eustaquio Acero to annul the sale of Excelsior’s share in the International Pipe
Industries Corporation to Acero. Assemblyman Fernandez entered his appearance as
counsel for Excelsior, which was questioned.
ISSUES:
The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like
Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A. Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts
of First Instance.
RULING:
No. Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, reads, “No member of the
Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any Court without appellate
jurisdiction….” Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen
Legaspi and Fernandez appeared as counsel, were acting in the exercise of original
jurisdiction, they must be held barred from appearing as counsel before said Courts in the
two cases involved herein.
RA 7160 Section 90

Section 90. Practice of Profession. -

(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are
also members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or
any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only
on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom.

 
 
 

4. Alawi vs. Alauya 268 SCRA 628; February 24, 1997

FACTS:
Sophia    Alawi    was    a    sales    representative    of    EB    Villarosa    &    Partners   
Co.,    Ltd    of    Davao    City,    a    real    estate    housing    company.   
Ashari    M.    Alauya    is    the    incumbent    executive    clerk    of    court    of   
the    4th Judicial    Shari’a    District    in    Marawi    City.
Through    Alawi’s    agency,    a contract    was    executed    for    the    purchase    on   
installment    by    Alauya    of    one    of    the    housing    units    belonging    to    the   
Villaros a    &    Co. and    in    connection    therewith,    a    housing     loan     was     also  
granted     to     Alauya     by     the     National     Home     Mortgage     Finance     Corp.   
(NHMFC).   Not    long    afterwards,    Alauya    addressed    a    letter    to    the   
President    of    Villarosa    &    Co.    and     to     NHMFC     advising     of     the    
termination    of     his     contract     with     Villarosa     &     Co.,     as     his   
consent     was     vitiated     by     gross     misrepresentation,     deceit,     fraud,    
dishonesty,     and     abuse     of    confidence.     According     to     him,     he     was    
induced     by     Alawi     to     sign     a     blank     contract     on     the   
assurance    that    Alawi    would    show    the    completed    document    to    him    later   
for    correction,    but    she    never    did.    Alawi,     in     response,     filed     a     verified  
complaint     praying     that     Alauya     be     dismissed     or   
disciplined,    for    the    reason,    among    other    that    he    usurped    the    title    of   
attorney    which    only    regular    members    of    the    Philippine    Bar    may    use.   
In     response,   Alauya     first     submitted     a     preliminary     comment     in     which    
he     questioned     the   authority    of    Atty.    Marasigan,    Asst.    Div.    Clerk    of  
Court    who    signed    the    notices    of    resolution,   to    require    explanation    of   
him,    pertaining   him    as    a    mere    assistant    and    that    the    resolution   
was    a    result    of    strong    link    between    Alawi    and    Atty.    Marasigan’s    office.  
Alauya     justified     his     use     of     the     title     “attorney”     by     the     assertion    
that     it     is     lexically   synonymous     with          “counselors at law”,     a     title   to    
which     Shari’a     lawyers     have     a     rightful   
claim,    adding    that    he    prefers    the    title    of    “attorney”    because    “counselor”   
is    often    mistaken    for     “councilor”,     “konsehal”     or     the     Maranao     term    
“consial,”     connoting     a     local     legislator    beholden    to    the    mayor.    Withal,   
he    does    not    consider    himself    a    lawyer.   
 
ISSUE:
WON     respondent     Alauya     is     allowed     to     used     the     title     “attorney”    
although     only    passing    the    Shari’a    Bar.   
 
HELD:
No! Persons     who     pass     the     Shari’a     Bar     are     not     full
pledged     members     of     the     Philippines     Bar,    hence     may     only     practice    
law     before     Shari’a     courts.   While     one     has     been     admitted     to     the   
Shari’a    Bar,    and    one    who    was    been    admitted    to    the    Philippines    Bar,   
may    both    be    considered   “counselors,”    in    the    sense    that    they    give   
counsel    or    advice    in    a    professional    capacity,    only   the    latter    is    an   
“attorney.”    The    title    of    “attorney”    is    reserved    to    those    who,    having   
obtained   the    necessary    degree    in    the    study    of    law    and    successfully   
taken    the    Bar    Examinations,    have   been    admitted    to    the    IBP    and    remain 
members    thereof    in    good    standing;   and    it    is    only    them   who    are   
authorized    to    practice    law    in    this    jurisdiction.   Respondent’s    disinclination    to 
use    the    title    of    “counselor”    does    not    warrant    his    use    of    the   title   
attorney.   As    a    member    of    the    Shari’s    Bar    and    an    officer    of    the   
Court,   Alawi    is subject    to    a    standard    of   conduct    more    stringent    than    for   
most    other    government    workers.    As    a    man    of    the    law,    he   
may     not     use     language which     is     abusive,     offensive,     scandalous,    
menacing,     or     otherwise   improper.    As    a    judicial    employee,    it    is    expected 
that    he    accord    respect    for    the    persons    and   
the    rights    of    others    at    all    times,    and    that    his    every    act    and    word   
should    be    characterized    by   prudence,     restraint,     courtesy,     dignity.     His    
radical     deviation     from     these     salutary     norms   might    perhaps    be    mitigated, 
but    cannot    be    excused,    but    his    strongly    held    conviction    that    he   had   
been    grievously    wronged.    Alauya    was    reprimanded    for    use    of    excessively 
intemperate   insulting    or    virulent    language,    i.e,    language   unbecoming    a   
judicial    officer,    and    for    usurping   the    title    attorney;    and
is    warned    that    any    similar    or    other    impropriety    or    misconduct    in    the  
future    will    be    dealt    with    more    severely.  

5. Ledesma vs. Climaco G.R. No 12815; June 28,1974

Facts: Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before the sala
of Judge Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge denied the
motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases. Atty. Ledesma filed
another motion to withdraw because he was appointed as election registrar ( Municipality of
Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental), which was still denied. 

Issue: Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?

Held: No. The respondent judge’s denial was proper. It was observed that there is no real
conflict between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The appointment of a
lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers in fact, readily welcome as
an opportunity to render their services for free. In the same way, all lawyers should treat it
that way as an opportunity to prove to the community that the proper performance of his
profession is not contingent upon the payment of his fees. 

6. In re: Cunanan 94 Phil 534; 1954

FACTS

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952.
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50
per cent in any subject."(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by
this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory
Note to R. A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in
1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general
average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.

The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that request,
seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto.
Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371 which is an Act to fix the passing marks for bar
examinations from nineteen hundred and forty-six up to and including nineteen Hundred
and fifty-five, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced
by their failure in the exams.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the
motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act
No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to
be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid,
should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not.

ISSUE

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

HELD

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that
in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension,
disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the

constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the
resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so
R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter,
and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must
elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4.
It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire
law is void.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the
debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our
beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in
voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved,
and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force
and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and
shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations
of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953
obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not.
After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

7. Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions [PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company,
42 SCRA 302, 305

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS v. BINALBAGAN ISABELA

SUGAR COMPANY, GR No. L-23959, 1971-11-29
 
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
Canon 34 of Legal Ethics
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before
the Court of Industrial Relations, and many others like him who are not licensed to practice,
registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily... before the said
court.
Ruling:
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, entitled,
"PAFLU, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial
Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the... reinstatement with
backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas.  Said decision became
final.  On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning
complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.  On
22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable
amount.  Complainants Entila and Tenazas, on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation
indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's... fees for 25% of their backwages,
and, on the same day, Quintin Muning filed a "Petition for Award of Services Rendered"
equivalent to 20% of the backwages.  Muning's petition was opposed byCipriano Cid &
Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The provision in Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 875 that --
"In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be
required to be represented by legal counsel. . . . . . . ."... is no justification for a ruling that
the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is
not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees:  for the same section adds that ?
"it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross
examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
evidence ",... thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to
duly qualified members of the bar.
Issue: whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible
from the backpay of some of its members.
 
Ruling:
An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a... contract, as
in the present case.
For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court, providing --
"Sec. 24.  Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.  - An attorney shall be entitled
to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, . . . . . ."
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated[7]; that acting
as an attorney without authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or... both[8], and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of
an unlawful act or an act done in violation of law
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10%
of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning.  Said orders are
affirmed in all other... respects.  Costs against respondent Muning.

8.  Philippine Lawyer's Association vs. Agrava 105 Phil. 173 , February 16, 195
 
Facts:
respondent Director  issued a circular announcing that he  had scheduled for June 27, 1957
an examination for the  purpose of  determining  who are qualified  to practice  as patent
attorneys... said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice
before said office.
According to  the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers  and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are... qualified to take the said examination.  It
would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the 
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines
and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines
Patent Office... act of the respondent Director requiring members  of the Philippine Bar  in 
good standing to take and pass an examination given by  the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before... said office, such as representing
applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his
jurisdiction... respondent... maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve
entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training, so  much so... that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution
of patent cases may be handled not  only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and  technical training
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent Law of the United  States of America
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who
may practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly ...
authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No.  165.
Issues:
whether or not appearance before  the Patent Office and the preparation and prosecution of
patent applications. etc., constitutes or is included  in the... practice  of law.
Ruling:
Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines[1] and  any member of the  Philippine Bar in good standing
may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether... judicial or quasi-judicial or
administrative,... practice  of law  is  not  limited  to the conduct of cases or litigation m
court; it embraces the preparation  of  pleadings and other  papers incident  to actions and
special proceedings, the... management  of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges  and courts,  and in  addition,  conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with  the law incorporation
sendees,... assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial  body,  the foreclosure of a mortgage,  enforcement of a  creditor's  claim in
bankruptcy and  insolvency proceedings,  and conducting proceedings in attachment,... and
in matters of estate  and  guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,  as  do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and... conditions.
under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no  immediate relation  to  proceedings in court.
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety... of subjects,  and the
preparation and  execution of legal  instruments covering an  extensive field of business and
trust  relations and other  affairs.
no direct connection with court... proceedings, they are always subject  to become involved
in litigation.
practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and  other persons, and the  prosecution  of their applications for
patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their... rights in patent cases.
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and  application of technical
and scientific knowledge  and training,  still,  all such business  has to be conducted... and
all orders and decisions  of the Director of Patents have to be rendered in accordance with 
the Patent  Law,  as well  as  other laws,... involves the  interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established  in
accordance with the law  of evidence and... procedure.
All  these things involve the application of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure.
They call for  legal... knowledge, training and experience for which  a  member of the bar
has been prepared.
appeal  is taken to this Tribunal.  If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the
acts, orders and decisions of the  Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical
and scientific knowledge and training, then logically,... the  appeal should be taken not to a
court or judicial body, but rather to  a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which
is not the case.
Director  of Patents, exercising as he  does judicial or quasi-judicial functions,  it is 
reasonable  to hold  that a member of the  bar, because  of his legal  knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the
Patent Office, without further examination or  other qualification.
provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far,y are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law  as  regards authority  to hold examinations to determine  the
qualifications
U. S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that
they possess the necessary qualifications  and competence to render valuable service to
and advise  and assist their clients in  patent cases,... which showing may take the form of a
test or examination to be held by the Commissioner,  our Patent Law,  Section 78, is  silent
on this important  point.
Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make
regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law,... Were we to allow the Patent 
Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary
sanction, to require lawyers to  submit to  and pass  on examination prescribed by  it before 
they are allowed to practice before said
Patent  Office, then there would  be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus  of
Internal Revenue and  Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less
complicated, such as the presentation of books  of  accounts, balance... sheets,  etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as  regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties,  seizures,  confiscation, etc., 
as regards the Bureau of Customs, may  not... also  require that any lawyer  practising
before  them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first 
pass an examination to qualify.
members of the Philippine Bar authorized  by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of
the business in said office involves the... interpretation and determination  of the scope and
application  of the Patent Law and other laws... part of the functions of the Patent Director
are judicial or quasi-judicial, ... so  much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are,
under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

9.  Vidaylin Yamon-Leach Vs. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga. A.C. No. 5987. August 28, 2019

Facts:

The respondent urged the petitioner to buy a "beach-front" property of Ms. Villaflora Un in
Baybay, Leyte. Atty. Astorga did not give me a receipt but petitioner trusted him being a
distant relative and the family lawyer. When petitioner returned to the Philippines, he visited
Atty. Astorga, who told him that he has already paid Ms. Un and that he was allegedly
working for the transfer of the title of the land to my name.  Atty. Astorgathen handed a
Deed of Absolute Sale and asked petitioner to sign below the word "Conforme,". However,
there are some strange features in the document, namely: it was undated; different persons
as sellers; it did not contain a description of the boundaries of the land subject of the sale;
and the number of the respective tax certificates of the sellers were not indicated. Atty.
Astorga assured that everything was alright and that he would just make the necessary
corrections later.

Petitioner’s brother verified from Ms. Villaflora Un the transaction who informed him that she
did not receive a single centavo from Atty. Astorga. Further verification revealed that the
sellers' signatures in the subject Deed of Sale prepared by Atty. Astorga were forgeries.
Atty. Astorga admitted that he has used the money and made several promises to pay back
however, failed to do so. Hence, a case was filed but respondent filed several motions to
request for extension to file his comment.

Issue:Whether or not Atty Astorga should be administratively liable?

Ruling: Yes

Respondent's failure to comply with the Court's several directives to file his comment to the
complaint constitutes willful disobedience and gross misconduct. The Court defined gross
misconduct as "any inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the
person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the
parties or to the right determination of a cause." It is a "conduct that is generally motivated
by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose." In previous cases, this Court held that
a respondent-lawyer's failure to comply with the lawful orders of this Court constitutes gross
misconduct and insubordination or disrespect which, alone, can merit the penalty of
disbarment.

To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of
legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must
perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code.
Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by
imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.

As to the merit of complainant's allegations, it is evident from the documents presented that:
respondent was the one who sought the complainant and encouraged her to invest in and
buy what he represented as a "beach-front" property; respondent volunteered to act as
complainant's representative in the supposed purchase of the alleged property as well as
the processing of the documents necessary to transfer title to complainant; respondent not
only received but even solicited and demanded substantial amounts from the complainant in
four separate instances totaling P1,819,651.00, which he himself acknowledged to have
received; he misrepresented that the said amount would cover, aside from the purchase
price, expenses for the payment of various forms of taxes, processing fees and his
professional fee; respondent misappropriated the money he received from
complainant; respondent deceived complainant by making it appear that he bought
the "beach-front" property when, in fact, he did not; he defrauded complainant and
made false representations by showing a "Deed of Absolute Sale"25 of another
property which appeared to have been executed by the owners thereof, when in fact,
the said owners died eight (8) years prior to the date that they supposedly signed the
said Deed; and respondent even went to the extent of making it appear that these dead
people acknowledged the execution of the subject Deed of Sale before him as a notary
public.
 

Through the foregoing acts, respondent is guilty of violating the provisions of Article 19 of
the Civil Code which states that "[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."

Respondent also breached his oath as a lawyer to, among others, "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and
discretion."

Respondent is, likewise, guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which states that
"a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Any act or
omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient
to, or disregards the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the
element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. To be
dishonest means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; be unworthy;
lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness, and straightforwardness,
while conduct that is deceitful means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true
facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.In order to be deceitful, the
person must either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and conscious
ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with the
intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the
false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury. Deceitful conduct involves
moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary to justice, modesty or good morals. It is
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga GUILTY of deceit, gross
misconduct in office, violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and willful disobedience of lawful orders of the Supreme Court. He is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
remove the name of Arturo B. Astorga from the Roll of Attorneys.

10.  Mercuria D. So Vs. Ma. Lucille P. Lee. B.M. No. 3288. April 10, 2019

Facts:
Petitioner sent a letter to Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) alleging that Lee is a defendant
in Civil Case No. 740 and is not fit for admission to the Bar considering her irresponsible
attitude towards her monetary obligations. Defendant admitted that she obtained a
P200,000.00 loan from So but had already paid a total of P140,000.00 for 10 months. Lee
explained that due to the losses her business suffered, she failed to pay the subsequent
monthly payments. She pointed out that she did not intend to evade her obligation to So,
but had asked the latter to give her ample time to settle it.

In a resolution, the Court held in abeyance Lee's request to be allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys in view of the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436, and required her to
manifest the status of the aforementioned cases. Lee manifested that Civil Case No. 740
had been dismissed in view of the Compromise Agreement she had entered into with So.
She noted that a Judgment by Compromise had been issued dismissing Civil Case No.
1436 in view of the Compromise Agreement she had executed with Bolos.

The Issue

WHETHER LEE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Ruling

YES. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. It is extended only to the few who possess the high standards
of intellectual and moral qualifications and the Court is duty-bound to prevent the entry of
undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have
become a disgrace to the profession. Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides
for the minimum requirements applicants for the admission to the Bar must possess, to wit:

SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines, and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baselessness, vileness, or the

depravity of private and social duties that man owes to his fellow man or society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

Jurisprudence had deemed the following acts as crimes involving moral turpitude: abduction
with consent, bigamy, concubinage, smuggling, rape, attempted bribery, profiteering,
robbery, murder, estafa, theft, illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, issuance of
bouncing checks, intriguing against honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, perjury, forgery, direct bribery, frustrated homicide, adultery, arson,
evasion of income tax, barratry, blackmail, bribery, duelling, embezzlement, extortion,
forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, mutilation of public
records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under
the promise of marriage, falsification of public document, and estafa through falsification of
public document.

Nevertheless, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. The determination whether
there is moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances. In turn, it is for the Court to ultimately resolve whether an act constitutes
moral turpitude. In the same vein, not all civil cases pertain to acts involving moral turpitude.
As defined, acts tainted with moral turpitude are of such gravity that manifests an
individual's depravity or lack of moral fiber.

As such, the pendency of a civil case alone should not be a deterrent for successful Bar
examinees to take their Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys especially since not
all charges or cases involve acts evincing moral turpitude. The facts and circumstances of
each case should be taken into account to establish that the applicant's actions tarnished
his or her moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. If it were otherwise, one's entitlement to
be a member of the legal profession would be seriously jeopardized by the expedient filing
of civil cases, which do not necessarily reflect one's moral character.

Thus, the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436 against Lee is not enough reason to
prevent her from taking her Lawyer's Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys. The
existence of these civil cases alone does not establish that she committed acts tainted with
moral turpitude.

WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to
ALLOW Ma. Lucille P. Lee to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys
subject to the condition that she: (a) notify the Court within one (1) month from making her
first monthly payment to Joseph Bolos; and (b) inform the Court upon full satisfaction of her
monetary obligation in accordance with the terms and conditions of the January 29, 2019
Judgment by Compromise.

11. Tajan vs. Cusi 57 SCRA 154; 1974

G.R. No. L-28899. May 30, 1974.

FACTS: In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, he

was required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be
removed or suspended from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a
petition in court containing factual averments which petitioner knew were false. Petitioner, in
answer thereto, wrote a letter to respondent Judge on December 7, 1967 denying the
material averments of respondent Judge's letter and explaining the circumstances under
which he prepared the aforementioned petition. At the hearing on January 24, 1968,
petitioner questioned, among others, the propriety of the proceedings, contending that since
the case was one for disbarment, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner as well as the subject matter thereof.
ISSUE: (1) Whether Courts of First Instance has jurisdiction over disbarment or suspension
cases? (2) Whether a disbarment case is a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the
respondent a defendant?

HOLDING AND DECISION: (1) YES. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the
Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar. (Sec. 28,
29, 30 of the Revised Rules of Court) (Sec. 22, 23, 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure)

Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the
investigation themselves, subject to another and final investigation by the Supreme Court in the
event of suspension of the lawyer. On the basis of the certified copy of the order of suspension and
the statement of the facts upon which the same is based, required by Section 29 of Rule 138, the
Supreme Court "shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or
extending the suspension or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant." In
other words, under such circumstances the intervention of the Solicitor General would, therefore, be
unnecessary.

The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and
suspend members of the bar.

The following provisions of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable:

SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.

— The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises.

SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further

proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the
Court of First Instance forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was
based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court
shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or
extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the
facts warrant.

SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension.— No attorney shall be

removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon
reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may
proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

These provisions were taken from Sections 22, 23 and 25, respectively, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which read:

SEC. 22. Suspension of lawyers.— Courts of First Instance may suspend a lawyer

from the further practice of his profession for any of the causes named in the last
preceding section, and after such suspension such lawyer will not be privileged to
 practice his profession in any of the courts of the Islands until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises.

SEC. 23. Proceedings upon suspension. — Upon such suspension the judge of the
Court of First Instance ordering the suspension shall forthwith transmit to the
Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the
facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and
statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and
make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the lawyer
permanently from the roll as it shall find the facts to warrant.

SEC. 25. Hearing of charges.— No lawyer shall be removed from the roll or be

suspended from the performance of his profession until he has had full opportunity to
answer the charges against him, and to produce witnesses in his own behalf and to
be heard by himself and counsel, if he so desires, upon reasonable notice. But if
upon reasonable notice the accused fails to appear and answer the accusation, the
court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

(2) NO. It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar
are not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. Indeed
it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own motion, proper
proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an attorney, when from information
submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted
himself in a case pending before said court as to show that he is wanting in the proper
measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good character
essential to his continuance as an attorney. This is for the protection of the general public
and to promote the purity of the administration of justice.

12. Teofilo Paar vs . Fortunato V . Borromeo , et al. GR No. L-1003 Oct 27, 1947

Teofilo Paar is charged in Manila with treason before the People’s Court, and prayed
that he be assisted in his defense by Andres R. Camasura who is not a member of the
bar. The People’s Court denied the petition, hence, this action for mandamus.

Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 112 are as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 3. Duty of court to inform defendant of his right to have attorney. — If the
defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his
right to have attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid
of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring
attorney.

"SEC. 4. Who may be appointed attorney ’de oficio.’ — The attorney so employed or
assigned must be a duly authorized member of the Bar. But in provinces where duly
authorized members of the bar are not available, the court may, in its discretion, admit
or assign a person, resident in the province and of good repute for probity and ability,
to aid the defendant in his defense, although the person so admitted or assigned be not
a duly authorized member of the Bar." cralaw virtua1aw library

It is clear from these provisions that in Manila where there are many members of the
bar, defendants in the People’s Court may be assisted only by members of the bar.

Petition denied, without costs.

- 1987 Philippine Constitution Article 8 Sec 5

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers

and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and

habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules

of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive

agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or

regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty

imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may

require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the

judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the

integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a

simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform

for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive

rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective

unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

 (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service

Law.

- RA 7160 Section 90

Section 90. Practice of Profession. -

(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are
also members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or
any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only
on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom.

- Rule 138 Rules of Court

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines.

Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. —
Citizens of the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed
members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good
and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the
Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of
office:

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law

in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission
who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of
the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest
court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory
certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such
practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred,
may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.

Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other
than those referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and
successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate,
accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence
of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily

completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the
government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation
and legal ethics.

Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted
unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before
he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized
and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a
four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree
in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration:
political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.

Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with
the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen
(15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of
this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by
section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing
the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been
revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the
same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship.

Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published

by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and
Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the examination.

Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3

and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law;
Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional
Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public);
Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).

Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking
the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The
questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish,
shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without
help from anyone.

Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that
it will be difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may
allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless
typewriters shall be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the
substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names
on the examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.

Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines
shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be
disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be
distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and
Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon);
Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial
Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).

Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee

of bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed
of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated
by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who
shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall
be published in each volume of the official reports.

Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any

member of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate
with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates
this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and
the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including
permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.

Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in
all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average,
the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15
per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal
Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent;
Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.

Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than
February 15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the
committee shall file its report on the result of such examination. The examination papers
and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the
parties in interest, after the court has approved the report.

Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar
examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless
they show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth
year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule
shall certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the
subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them
in the particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed
the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the
bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.

Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a
member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be
entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him
by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.

Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all
attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he
receives his certificate.

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only
as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he
is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or

proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless
or oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless
of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of
law.

Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly

authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person
who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys
wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court,
may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.

Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. —
An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to
continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his
appearance in the appellate court.

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special
authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's
claim but the full amount in cash.

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be

entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent
of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be
bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but
may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A
written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly
retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at
any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the
court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be
entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the
change shall be given to the advance party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the
contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the
attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full
compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the
court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the
attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been
retained by the client.

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for
a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. —
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for
any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such
attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises.

Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further
proceedings in Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the
Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon
the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full
investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the
suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.

Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be

removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity
upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to
appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render
professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that
the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are
necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the
duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused
therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.

Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may
be provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as
counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with
section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than
thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in
light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos
(P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in
capital offenses.

Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official
or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the
Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the
bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the
Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same
until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering
such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof
to be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and
power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and
secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

13. JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO vs. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B.
BRAGAS, A.C. No. 11754, October 3, 2017

FACTS: In an earlier ruling, the Supreme Court suspended Atty. Era from the practice of
law for two years. However, despite the said suspension, Atty. Era still practiced law – his
name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and the Supreme Court. Atty.
Bragas, on the other hand, being an associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, helped Atty.
Era in representing the law firm’s clients. He, thereby, allowed and assisted Atty. Era to
engage in an unauthorized practice of law. 

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is

found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's lawful order and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is
likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately
from receipt of this Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense, or a commission of another offense will warrant a
more severe penalty. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of
respondents as members of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. DOCTRINE: CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. It is a lawyer's duty to
prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is
founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. Atty. Bragas ought to know that
Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice could be performed only by a member of the Bar
in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she should have not
participated to such transgression.

14 Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay 540 SCRA 424

In Re: Dacanay, B.M NO. 1678, December 17, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.On
July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.On that day, he took
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice.

Issue:

WON petitioner may still resume practice? YES

Held:

Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the bar be
a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a
resident of the Philippines. He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of
Filipino citizenship ipsojure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.The exception is when Filipino citizenship
is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225.Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure
from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: 
• the updating and payment of IBP membership dues;
• the payment of professional tax;
• the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and
• the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

15 Rufina Luy Lim Vs. Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza. A.C. No. 10261. July 16, 2019

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is a Complaint[1] for Disbarment filed by Rufina Luy Lim (Rufina) against
Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8, Rule 8.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Canon 11, Rule 11. 03,
and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Section
20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Rufina is the surviving spouse of Pastor Y. Lim (Pastor) who died on June 11, 1994. She
claimed that during his lifetime, Pastor used conjugal funds to organize several dummy
corporations[2] (Skyline International, Inc. (Skyline), Nell Mart, Inc. (Nell Mart), etc.) using
his mistresses and employees as incorporators and/or stockholders, in order to defeat her
claims to said properties.[3]
On March 17, 1995, Rufina filed a Joint Petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City for the settlement of Pastor's estate. Miguel Lim (Miguel), brother of Pastor, on
behalf of his mother Yao Hiong, filed a Petition for Intervention dated August 17, 1995
categorically stating under oath that Skyline, etc., are dummy corporations and that the
persons whose names appear as incorporators, stockholders and officers thereof were
mere dummies. The Petition also averred that the parcels of lands titled under the names of
the corporations were really owned by Pastor.[4]
The Petition for Intervention was executed before Atty. Mendoza, as notary public.[5] He
also notarized the affidavits of Teresa T. Lim, Lani G. Wenceslao, Susan Sarcia-Sabado
and Miguel, who all admitted under oath that: Pastor created dummy corporations; the
purported stockholders thereof did not pay a single centavo for shares under their names;
and, the affiants as directors, stockholders, or officers did not have any actual participation
in the operation of said companies.[6]
Later, however, Atty. Mendoza, as counsel of Skyline, argued that Skyline is the registered
owner of several real properties and that it has all the right to protect its interest against
Rufina. Rufina averred that Atty. Mendoza made such allegation despite his knowledge that
Skyline is a dummy corporation and it has been judicially declared as conjugal property of
Rufina and Pastor.
Rufina also claimed that Atty. Mendoza, acting as Vice-President of Nell Mart demanded
from the tenants of lots covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 236236 and
236237 to vacate the property, claiming that Nell Mart owned the same, even while knowing
that Nell Mart is a dummy corporation.
Rufina finally averred that Atty. Mendoza used intemperate language in his pleadings
particularly when he said that Rufina collected "BILLIONS OF PESOS" as rentals which
were "DISSIPATED ON HER GAMBLING VICES."[7]
Atty. Mendoza, in his Answer, countered that Rufina and Pastor were separated for more
than 26 years by the time Pastor died. On May 11, 1972, the couple entered into an
Agreement where they already partitioned their conjugal properties. As for the issue on
dummy corporations, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 99 already held in Special
Proceeding Case No. Q-95-23334 that "the bank deposits in the names of [Nell Mart] and
Skunac Corporation x x x which were found to be properties distinct from the estate, are x x
x not properties of the estate of xxx Pastor x x x and are, therefore, ordered excluded
therefrom x x x."[8]
While he admitted having filed the Petition for Intervention, he said that it was "pre-arranged
between Rufina Luy Lim and Miguel Y. Lim." Unfortunately, Miguel and Yao Hiong died
before they could testify, hence the statements made in the Petition for Intervention are
mere hearsay.[9]
Atty. Mendoza further pointed out that this is the second complaint filed by Rufina against
him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) involving the same issue of ownership
of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 236236 and 236237 registered in the name of Nell
Mart. He claimed that Rufina filed the disbarment complaints against him in retaliation for
her losses in other cases.[10]
IBP Report and Recommendation
On March 4, 2009, Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) issued his Report and Recommendation[11] recommending the
suspension of Atty. Mendoza from the practice of law for two years.
The Report noted that although Atty. Mendoza admitted that the 1972 Agreement may be
improper, he still argues that the same is valid between the parties. Respondent's
insistence on the validity of the Agreement only betrays his ignorance of the law which
contravenes Canons 1[12] and 5[13] of the CPR.
The Report further observed that assuming that respondent drafted the Petition for
Intervention, since he signed the same, the presumption is that the contents thereof are true
and correct, as in fact, his client attested to the truthfulness of the contents thereof. To later
assail the truthfulness of the Petition for Intervention, alleging that it was a pre-arranged
agreement between his client and the complainant, shows that respondent actually lied to
the courts.
The Report further noted that despite his knowledge about the irregularity in the issuance of
shares in Nell Mart, he still acquired shares of stocks and even claimed to be a buyer in
good faith.
As a notary, he notarized affidavits which in effect attested to repeated violations of the
Corporation Code, without any showing that he even attempted to caution his clients of the
illegality of their acts. Respondent also did not deny using offensive language in his
pleadings. Finally, the Report noted that respondent's Position Paper lacked Professional
Tax Receipt Number, IBP Receipt or Lifetime Number, Roll of Attorneys Number and his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE), in clear violation of Bar Matter Nos. 1132
and 1922.[14]
On April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution approving and adopting
the Commission's report and recommendation.
It reads:
RESOLUTION No. XX-2013-510
CBD Case No. 08-2263
Rufina Luy Lim vs.
Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and considering that Respondent violated Canons 1, 5, 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years.[15]
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Considering however that this is not
the respondent's first infraction, the penalty of disbarment, instead of mere suspension, is in
order.
It has been pronounced, time and again, that the practice of law is a privilege bestowed on
those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it.
Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and
morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform a four-fold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR.[16]
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer, not just to obey the laws of the land, but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity to the courts, as well as to his clients. All lawyers are servants of the law, and
have to observe and maintain the rule of law, as well as be exemplars worthy of emulation
by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the CPR emphatically reiterates
the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness.[17]
Canon 10 of the CPR stresses that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
While Rule 10.01 states:
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
As properly observed by the IBP-CBD, respondent drafted and signed the Petition for
Intervention which avers in essence that the subject corporations, Skyline, etc., were mere
dummies created by the late Pastor Lim.[18] He also notarized the affidavits of Teresa Lim,
Lani Wenceslao and Susan Sabado stating in essence that they were dummies in the
corporations of Pastor.[19]
Respondent in his Position Paper before the IBP-CBD claimed however that the statements
in the Petition for Intervention, as well as the Affidavits in support thereto were not his
statements. The petition was filed pursuant to "agreed arrangements" between complainant
and the late Miguel Lim and that the assignment of shares of stock by Miguel to him, was a
"pre-arranged agreement as payments for attorney's fees and for reimbursements of
whatever litigations [sic] expenses advanced by the respondent."[20]
The flip-flopping averments of respondent in his pleadings betray a lack of forthrightness
and transparency on his part. He initially averred, through the Petition for Intervention and
supporting affidavits which he signed and notarized, that the corporations were dummies of
Pastor. He now claims, however, that the statements in the Petition were mere hearsay and
that the shares of stocks he now owns in the corporations were actually payments to him for
his services and advances.
With the incompatibility of the two positions, it is clear that respondent has been less than
truthful in at least one occasion. This, we cannot countenance.
As officers of the court, lawyers are expected to act with complete candor. They may not
resort to the use of deception, not just in some, but in all their dealings. The CPR bars
lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood, or from misleading or allowing the
court to be misled by any artifice or guile in finding the truth. Needless to say, complete and
absolute honesty is expected of lawyers when they appear and plead before the courts. Any
act that obstructs or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct which
merits disciplinary action on lawyers.[21]
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to be a disciple of truth, having sworn upon his
admission to the Bar that he would do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court,
and that he would conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.[22]
Respondent should bear in mind that as an officer of the court, his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice
and arriving at a correct conclusion. Courts meanwhile are entitled to expect only complete
honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.[23]
This respondent failed to do.
Respondent also cannot feign ignorance as to the veracity of the statements in the petition
because he signed the same.[24] Lest respondent forgot, a counsel's signature on a
pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere means for identification. It is a
solemn component of legal practice that through a counsel's signature, a positive
declaration is made. In certifying through his signature that he has read the pleading, that
there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his
competence, credibility, and ethics.[25]
Respondent also erred in asserting that while the May 11, 1972 Agreement between Rufina
and Pastor was "improper for notarial act," it has "binding effect against third persons." The
Agreement in essence was a contract entered into by the parties, separating their present
and future properties, with Rufina waiving her support from Pastor and both spouses
waiving any future action between them, whether civil or criminal.[26]
The sworn obligation of every lawyer to respect the law and the legal processes is a
continuing condition for retaining membership in the profession.[27] He is also expected to
keep abreast of legal developments.[28] To claim that such agreement is binding against
third persons shows either respondent's ignorance of the law or his wanton disregard for the
laws of the land. Either of which deserves disciplinary sanction.
Respondent likewise failed to use temperate and respectful language in his pleading
against complainant. In his Comment in Special Proceeding Case No. Q-95-23334 before
RTC-QC Branch 77, respondent averred that Rufina collected "BILLIONS OF PESOS" in
rent which were "DISSIPATED ON HER GAMBLING VICES."[29]
The Code provides that a "lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language that
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper." Lawyers are instructed to be gracious and
must use such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. Our
language is rich with expressions that are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.[30]
Here, respondent, in his eagerness to advance his client's cause, imputed on Rufina
derogatory traits that are damaging to her reputation.
Finally, respondent failed to indicate in his Position Paper material information required by
the rules. These are, the Professional Tax Receipt Number, IBP Receipt or Lifetime
Number, Roll of Attorneys Number and his MCLE, in violation of Bar Matter Nos. 1132 and
1922.
These requirements are not vain formalities or mere frivolities. Rather, these requirements
ensure that only those who have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to
engage in it. To willfully disregard them is to willfully disregard mechanisms put in place to
facilitate integrity, competence and credibility in legal practice.[31]
In Sosa v. Atty.Mendoza,[32] this Court found respondent guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the
CPR, for his willful failure to pay a loan in the amount of P500,000.00. The Court ordered
his suspension from the practice of law for one year with a stern warning that a commission
of the same or similar offense will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. In said
case, the Court declared that Atty. Mendoza's "failure to honor his just debt constitutes
dishonest and deceitful conduct x x x [which is] compounded by Atty. Mendoza's act of
interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he refused to pay a
valid and just debt."[33]
The string of offenses committed by respondent betrays his propensity to ignore, disrespect
and make a mockery of the judicial institution he has vowed to honor and protect. His
violations, in not just one instance, show his recalcitrant character, undeserving of the
privilege to practice in the legal profession.
It cannot be stressed enough that membership in the Bar is a privilege laden with
conditions, granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers as instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. As
officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, lawyers are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility. They are mandated to behave at all times in a manner that is
consistent with truth and honor and are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[34]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza is DISBARRED from the practice of law for
violation of Canons 1, 5, and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for its
distribution to all courts of the land; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to be entered into Atty. Mendoza's personal records as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

16 EDUARDO L. NUÑEZ v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, AC. NO. 6131, 2005-02-28

Facts: On June 5, 1968, the late Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuñez executed a Sale with Right to
Repurchase of a lot in favor of Eugenio O. Nuñez for a consideration of P400.00. The
stipulated time of repurchase was ten (10) years from the date of execution thereof or until
June 5, 1978. The vendor’s right to repurchase subsequently expired without any
agreement of extending said period of repurchase. Eugenio O. Nuñez occupied and
possessed said Lot for more than 40 years. A year after the execution of the said pacto de
retro sale, the late Maria Ortega Vda. de Nuñez and her son Ricardo Nuñez, extrajudicially
partitioned his estate including the subject Lot. Ricardo Nuñez then appointed respondent,
Atty. Astorga, as administrator. Astorga had been disturbing the peaceful occupation and
possession of complainants of the Lot claiming that complainants have no right over the
same. Complainants then agreed to buy the subject Lot and respondent, who, without being
appointed by the court as administrator of the intestate estate of the late spouses Ricardo
Nuñez sold and conveyed to Imelda Nuñez and Elisa Nuñez-Alvarico, daughters of
Eduardo, the portions of the Lot they were occupying. After which Elisa Nuñez-Alvarico filed
a criminal complaint for Estafa against respondent. Sometime on 29 March 2001 at around
7:30 in the evening, respondent went to the house of Eduardo L. Nuñez at corner J.P.
Laurel and M.L. Quezon Sts., Baybay, Leyte and threatened to kill Eduardo Nuñez. 

Issue: Whether or not the respondent commit a conduct unbecoming an attorney. 

Held: Yes, respondent’s offensive language against complainants and their counsel
unbecoming an attorney. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga is ACQUITTED of the charge of serious
misconduct, but is held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney and is FINED two
thousand pesos. The legal profession exacts a high standard from its members. Lawyers
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law. Neither
shall they, whether in public or in private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule
8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper. Astorga’s statement constitute conduct unbecoming a
member of the legal profession

17. Saladaga vs. Astorga ( 741 SCRA 603, 2014

Facts:
Complainant Saladaga and respondent Atty. Astorga entered into a deed of sale with right
to repurchase on December 2, 1981. Atty. Astorga sold to the complainant a parcel of
coconut land located in Baybay, Leyte for 15,000.00. Under the deed, Saldaga represented
that it has “the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee simple” the subject property, and that
the property is “free from all liens and encumbrances”. The deed also provided that Atty.
Astorga, as vendor a retro,two years within which to repurchase the property, and if not
repurchased, “the parties shall renew the instrument or agreement”. 

Atty. Astorga failed to exercise his right to repurchase within the period stipulated in the
deed, and no renewal of contract was made when Saladaga made a final demand.
Saladaga remained in peaceful possession of the property until December 1989, he
received letters from Rural Bank of Albuera  (Leyte) informing him that the property is
mortgaged by Atty. Astorga to it. That the bank had foreclosed the property and Saladaga
should vacate the property. Saladaga was dispossessed of the property, so it filed a case of
estafa against the respondent.  The complainant likewise instituted an administrative case
which was then referred to the IBP for  investigation, report  and  recommendation, where it
found Atty. Astorga guilty of Bad Faith when he dealt with Saladaga misrepresenting him
that the property was covered with TCT No. T-662 when the said TCT was  already 
cancelled  earlier  and  transferred  to  her  wife’s  name  without  informing  Saldaga. It
likewise held that Atty. Astorga shall be suspended from the practice of law for two years
and ordered to return the sum of 15,000 with interest. 

Issue:
WON the investigating commissioner correctly ruled that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two years and pay the corresponding amount.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled on the affirmative because when Atty. Astorga was admitted to
the legal profession, he took an oath to obey the laws, do no falsehood and uphold the
constitution, as well as to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion. This, in which he gravely violated his oath, when it caused the
ambiguity or vagueness in the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase as he was the one
who drafted or prepared such document. Respondent could have simply denominated the
instrument as a deed of mortgage and refer himself and the complainant as “mortgagor”
and “mortgagee”, rather than “vendor a retro” and “vendee a retro”, then the controversy
could have been avoided. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face
betrayed the lack of legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath, to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. 
Indeed. respondent had the right to mortgage the property but as a lawyer, he should have
seen to it that the agreement faithfully, clearly and expressly embody or reflect the intention
of the parties. Otherwise, it will open the door to legal disputes which in the case at bar was
caused by respondent’s poor formulation of the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase”.
Which played a significant factor in the controversy.
            Likewise, the respondent dealt with the complainant with Bad Faith, Deceit and
Fraud when he made it appear that property was covered with TCT-662 when it was in fact
cancelled nine years earlier. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: 
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
          Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the
legal processes, he is moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the
other hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers. Any act or
omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is “unlawful.”  “Unlawful” conduct does not necessarily imply the element
of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. The actions of
respondent in connection with the execution of the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase”
clearly fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They also reflect
bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on respondent’s part. 
Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.
18 JERRY M. PALENCIA, Complaint vs Atty. PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Atty. GERARD M. 
LINSANGAN A.C. No. 10557
FACTS:

Complainant was an overseas Filipino worker seafarer who was seriously injured during
work when he fell into the elevator shaft of the vessel M/T "Panos G" flying a Cyprus flag.
After initial treatment in Singapore, complainant was discharged and flown to the Philippines
to continue his medical treatment and rehabilitation. While confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital,paralegals in respondents' law office, approached and convinced him to engage
the services of respondents' law office and Gurbani & Co., a law firm based in Singapore, in
order to file a suit against his employers for indemnity. Complainant agreed to pay
attorney's fees of 35% of any recovery or settlement obtained for both.

Respondents and Gurbani & Co. also filed a tort case against the owners of "Panos G"
before the High Court of Singapore. Respondents engaged the services of Papadopoulos,
Lycourgos & Co., a law firm based in Cyprus, to draft a written opinion on the issues
involving Cyprus law, as well as the services of retired Justice Emilio Gancayco for his
expert opinion regarding various issues raised by defendant's lawyer and representatives

Negotiations led to a settlement award in favor of complainant in the amount of

US$95,000.00. Gurbani & Co. remitted to respondents the amount of US$59,608.40. This
amount was deducted by respondents for payment to Justice Gancayco, their attorney’s
fees and other expenses, leaving the net amount of US$18,132.43 for
complainant.Respondents tendered the amount of US$20,756.05 (representing the
US$18,132.43) to complainant, which the latter refused.

On March 28, 2007, complainant filed the subject letter-complaint with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) and requested that an
investigation be conducted and the corresponding disciplinary action be imposed upon
respondents for committing unethical acts. After proceedings, the IBP-CBD in its Report and
Recommendation ruled that respondents violated the canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR): (1) in soliciting legal business through their agents while complainant
was in the hospital; (2) in failing to account for, and deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand; and (3) in hiring the services of a foreign law firm and
another lawyer without prior knowledge and consent of complainant of the fees and
expenses to be Incurred. The IBP-CBD recommended that all respondents be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one year.

ISSUE:

Whether respondents violated Rule 1.03, Rule 2.03, Canon 3, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and
Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
HELD:

Yes. The Court adopts the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondents
Attys. Pedro L. Linsangan and, Gerard M. Linsangan.

However respondent Atty. Glenda M. Linsangan-Binoy is absolved for lack of any evidence
as to her participation in the acts complained of.

I. In employing paralegals to encourage complainant to file a lawsuit against his employers,

respondents indirectly solicited legal business and encouraged the filing of suit. These
constitute malpractice which calls for the exercise of the court's disciplinary powers and
warrants serious sanctions.

The practice of law is a profession and not a business. They are prohibited from soliciting
cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Thus,
"ambulance chasing," or the solicitation of almost any kind of business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment, is proscribed.

II. While respondents gave prompt notice to complainant of their receipt of money collected
in the latter's favor, they were amiss in their duties to give accurate accounting of the
amounts due to complainant, and to return the money due to client upon demand. It is
improper for the lawyer to put his client's funds in his personal safe deposit vault. Funds
belonging to the client should be deposited in a separate trust account in a bank or trust
company of good repute for safekeeping. Respondents violated the trust reposed in them,
and demonstrated their lack of integrity and moral soundness. Respondents' flagrant and
malicious refusal to comply with the CPR amounts to gross misconduct.

III. The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. Thus, the
violation of the lawyer's oath and/or breach of the ethics of the legal profession embodied in
the CPR may, depending on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts, result in the suspension or disbarment of a member of the Bar.

Respondents' acts do not merely constitute a violation of Canon and its rules, but already
amounts to gross misconduct.

19 Larry C. Sevilla Vs. Atty. Marcelo C. Millo. A.C. No. 10697. March 25, 2019

Before the Court is an administrative complaint 1 filed on November 14, 2014 by

complainant Larry C. Sevilla (complainant), before the Office of the Bar
Confidant,2 against respondent Atty. Marcelo C. Millo (respondent), charging the latter
of harassment, misconduct, obstruction of justice and ignorance of the law.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that he is the publisher of Pampango Footprints. On April
2014, he issued a statement of account in the amount of Php 33, 120.00 to Sps. Manalo as
fee for the foreclosure of mortgage, which was published in 3 consecutive issues of
Pampango. Sps. Manalo refused to settle the account and threatened the complainant for
Pampango’s disqualification. Consequently, complainant filed this administrative complaint
against respondent. During the pendency of this complaint, Sps. Manalo negotiated for a
discount of fifty percent (50%), to which complainant agreed. Yet, respondent intervened
and forbade his clients to pay. For this reason, complainant called respondent, but instead
of explaining his side, respondent shouted, "I am busy I don't want to talk to you!" and
banged his cellphone.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be administratively sanctioned for the acts
complained thereof. 

HELD: YES. It is well to stress that lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and are
expected to serve the latter with competence and diligence. Consequently, lawyers are
entitled to employ every honorable means to defend the cause of their clients and secure
what is due them.20 However, professional rules set limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it
with necessary restrictions and qualifications.21 In this regard, Canon 1 of the CPR
provides that lawyers "shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and of legal processes." In furtherance thereto, Rule 1.04 of the CPR
mandates lawyers to "encourage [their] clients to avoid, end, or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement."

20 Commissioner of Internal Revenue Vs. La Flor Dela Isabela, Inc. G.R. No. 211289. 
January 14, 2019

Facts:

La Flor dela Isabela, Inc. (La Flor) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine Law. It filed monthly returns for the EWT and WTC for CY 2005. On
9/3/2008, 2/16/2009, and 12/2/2009, it executed Waivers of the Statute of Limitations. On
1/7/2010, it received four Formal Letters of Demand and Final Assessment Notices (FANs),
all dated 12/17/2009. On 1/15/2010, it filed its Letter of Protest contesting the assessment
notices.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)

On 7/20/2010, it issued the Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) involving the
alleged deficiency withholding taxes in the aggregate amount of P6,835,994.76.

CTA Third Division Decision

In its 8/3/2012 Decision, it ruled in favor of La Flor and cancelled the deficiency tax
assessments against it.

It ruled that based on the dates when La Flor filed its returns for EWT and WTC, the CIR
had until 2/15/2008 to 3/1/2009 to issue an assessment pursuant to the three-year
prescriptive period under Section 203 of the NIRC. The Waivers entered into by the CIR
and La Flor did not effectively extend the prescriptive period for the issuance of the tax
assessments.

CTA En Banc Decision

In its 9/30/2013 Decision, it affirmed the Decision of the CTA Division. It ruled that the EWT
and WTC assessments were barred by prescription. The 9/3/2008 and 12/2/2009 Waivers
were inadmissible because they were never offered in evidence. Further, the 2/16/2009
Waiver was defective because it failed to comply with RMO No. 20-90 as it did not specify
the kind and amount of tax involved.

In its Comment  dated August 15, 2014, La Flor countered that the CIR's petition for review should
13

be denied outright for procedural infirmities. It pointed out that the petition failed to comply with Bar
Matter (B.M.) No. 1922 because the date of issue of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) compliance of the counsels of the CIR was not indicated. In addition, La Flor noted that the
petition for review did not observe Section 2, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requiring the paragraphs
to be numbered. Further, it asserted that the assessment of the EWT and WTC had prescribed
because it went beyond the prescriptive period provided under Section 203 of the NIRC. La Flor also
assailed that the Waivers should not be considered because they were neither offered in evidence
nor complied with the requirements under RMO No. 20-90.

In its Reply  dated February 18, 2015, the CIR brushed aside the allegations of procedural infirmities
14

of its petition for review. It elucidated that failure to indicate the date of issue of the MCLE
compliance is no longer a ground for dismissal and that it had stated the MCLE certificate
compliance numbers of its counsels. The CIR posited that the Rules of Court does not penalize the
failure to number the paragraphs in pleadings.

Issues: won failure to include the date of issue of the MCLE compliance number of a counsel in a
pleading is a ground for dismissal

The Court's Ruling

Other than challenging the merits of the CIR's petition, La Flor believes that the former' s petition for
review on certiorari should be dismissed outright on procedural grounds. It points out that failure to
include the date of issue of the MCLE compliance number of a counsel in a pleading is a ground for
dismissal. Further, La Flor highlights that the paragraphs in the CIR's petition for review
on certiorari were not numbered.
In People v. Arrojado,  the Court had already clarified that failure to indicate the number and date of
15

issue of the counsel's MCLE compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case, to wit:

In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's
failure to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate
of Compliance, this Court issued an En Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended
B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with
"Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and
disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his
or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no
longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records.
Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.

On the other hand, even La Flor recognizes that Section 2, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court does not
provide for any punishment for failure to number the paragraphs in a pleading. In short, the
perceived procedural irregularities in the petition for review on certiorari do not justify its outright
dismissal. Procedural rules are in place to facilitate the adjudication of cases and avoid delay in the
resolution of rival claims.  In addition, courts must strive to resolve cases on their merits, rather than
16

summarily dismiss them on technicalities.  This is especially true when the alleged procedural rules
17

violated do not provide any sanction at all or when the transgression thereof does not result in a
dismissal of the action.

Nevertheless, the Court finds no reason to reverse the CTA in invalidating the assessments against
La Flor.

21 Marilu C. Turla Vs. Atty. Jose M. Caringal. A.C. No. 11641. March 12, 2019

Facts: 
A complaint was filed by Marilu C. Turla against the respondent, Atty. Jose Mangaser
Caringal (Caringal), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). Turla discovered that Atty. Caringal had not attended the required
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars for the Second (MCLE II) and
Third (MCLE III) Compliance Periods. Yet, Atty. Caringal signed the pleadings and motions
in several cases on which he indicated the following information after his signature and
other personal details: "MCLE Exemption II & III Rec. No. 000659126 Pasig 8.10.10."4 As it
turned out, the receipt Atty. Caringal pertained to was not for his MCLE exemption, but for
his payment of the MCLE non-compliance fee.

Consequently, in her Complaint, Turla charged Atty. Caringal with (1) failure to take the
MCLE seminars for the MCLE II and III compliance periods as required under Bar Matter
(BM) No. 850; and (2) violation of his lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood. She further
alleged that even if Atty. Caringal was already confronted with his deception, he continued
to flaunt such duplicity since he still filed pleadings with the courts afterwards.
Atty. Caringal, in his Answer, countered that Turla's Complaint was a form of harassment
since as the counsel for the oppositor in Special Proceedings No. Q09-64479, he had filed
motions in the said case for Turla to undergo DNA testing to prove her filiation with the
deceased over whose estate she was claiming rights.

In any case, Atty. Caringal averred that he had taken several units for the First (MCLE I)
Compliance Period, which was from April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004, but was unable to
complete the required units. The Investigating Commissioner of the CBD held that Turla's
motives are unimportant to a disbarment case since the issue is mainly to determine the
fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court. He found that there was no
question that Atty. Caringal failed to complete the MCLE requirements for the MCLE II and
III compliance periods, but noted that Atty. Caringal paid the non-compliance fee which then
served as his penalty for said infraction. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the foregoing Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification that Atty. Caringal be suspended from the practice of law for three years due to
his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and because of his misrepresentation that
he had an MCLE exemption. Atty. Caringal then filed a Petition for Review by Certiorari
before the Court who referred to the Office of the Bar Confidante. The OBC agreed with the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to impose a three-year suspension on Atty.
Caringal from the practice of law.

Issue: Whether or not Atty Caringal should be suspended from the practice of law

Ruling: 

YES.The directive to comply with the MCLE requirements is essential for the legal
profession, as enshrined in BM No. 850. The purpose is "to ensure that throughout [the IBP
members'] career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law."27

In case a lawyer fails to comply with the MCLE requirements within the compliance period,
Rule 13 of BM No. 850. It is worthy to note that Atty. Caringal could not be declared a
delinquent member as the sixty (60)-day period for compliance did not commence to run.
There was no showing that he was ever issued and that he had actually received a Non-
Compliance Notice as required by the MCLE Implementing Rules. In addition, by March 11,
2011,28 he had already complied with the MCLE requirements for MCLE II and III
compliance periods, albeit belatedly.

Nevertheless, Atty. Caringal is being held liable for knowingly and willfully misrepresenting
in the pleadings he had signed and submitted to the courts that he was exempted from
MCLE II and III.
Considering the foregoing, Atty. Caringal violated his sworn oath as a lawyer to "do no
falsehood" as well as the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
When Atty. Caringal indicated that he was MCLE-exempt in the pleadings and motions he
filed, although in fact he was not, he engaged in dishonest conduct which was also
disrespectful of the courts. He undoubtedly placed his clients at risk, given that pleadings
with such false information produce no legal effect31 and can result in the expunction of the
same. Undeniably, he did not stay true to the cause of his clients and actually violated his
duty to serve his clients with competence and diligence.

The Court had previously pronounced that "[t]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts."32
Considering Atty. Caringal's willful statement of false MCLE details in his pleadings to the
prejudice of his clients, aggravate, by his lack of diligence in fully and promptly complying
with the MCLE requirements within the compliance period, and his seemingly defiant and
unremorseful attitude, the Court deems it apt to adopt the recommendations of both the IBP
Board of Governors and the OBC, and imposes upon Atty. Caringal the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for three years.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.

22 ELIBENA A. CABILES v . ATTY. LEANDRO S. CEDO A.C. No. 10245. August 16, 2017

Facts: Complainant Elibena Cabiles filed an administrative complaint before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of Atty. Leandro Cedo for neglecting the
two cases she referred to him to handle. Cabiles, engaged the services of respondent
lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal case. Respondent lawyer was paid Php5,500.00 for
drafting therein respondents' position paper and Php2,000.00 per appearance in the NLRC
hearings. During the hearing only Danilo Ligbos, the complainant therein, showed up.
According to Cabiles, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that it was Danilo who
was absent during the said hearing. Moreover Cabiles claimed that respondent lawyer failed
to indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance in the position
paper and in the memorandum of appeal that he prepared. Cabiles presented a certification
issued on June 29, 2010 by the MCLE Office that respondent lawyer had not at all complied
with the first, second, and third compliance periods of the (MCLE) requirement. Anent the
second case, Cabiles claimed that, despite payment of his professional fees, respondent
lawyer did not exert any effort to seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before
the City Prosecutor's Office; that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City
dismissed her Complaint for unjust vexation on the ground of prescription. Respondent
lawyer did not refute Cabiles’ claim that he failed to indicate his MCLE compliance in the
position paper and in the memorandum of appeal. The IBP’s investigating commissioner
found respondent lawyer guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension for two years. Aside from
respondent lawyer's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements, the Investigating
Commissioner also found him grossly negligent in representing his clients, particularly (1) in
failing to appear in the NLRC hearing, and file the necessary responsive pleading; (2) in
failing to advise and assist his clients who had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with,
the NLRC rules of procedure, in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing to file seasonably the
unjust vexation complaint before the city prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was
overtaken by prescription. The IBP Board of Governors reduced the suspension to one
year. 

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Cedo violated Canon 5 of the CPR when he failed to indicate his
MCLE compliance in the pleadings? 

Ruling: The Court found Atty. Cedo guilty of having violated Canon 5 of the CPR and
recommended his one suspension. Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for
IBP members as an additional requirement to enable them to practice law. This is to ensure
that they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and
enhance the standards of the practice of law. Non-compliance with the MCLE requirement
subjects the lawyer to be listed as a delinquent IBP member. In Arnado v. Adaza, the Court
administratively sanctioned therein respondent lawyer for his noncompliance with four
MCLE Compliance periods, in accordance with Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, even if therein respondent attended an MCLE Program covered by the Fourth
Compliance Period, his attendance therein would only cover his deficiency for the First
Compliance Period, and he was still considered delinquent and had to make up for the other
compliance periods. In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the
pleadings filed in the said labor case the number and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate
of Compliance for the Third Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010,
considering that NLRC case had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon checking with the
MCLE Office, Cabiles discovered that the respondent lawyer had failed to comply with the
three MCLE compliance periods. For this reason, there is no doubt that respondent lawyer
violated Canon 5.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leandro S. Cedo is hereby found GUILTY of violating
Canons 5, 17, 18, and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
upon receipt of this Decision, and warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act
will be dealt with more severely.

23 Arlene O. Bautista Vs. Atty. Zenaida M. Ferrer. A.C. No. 9057. July 3, 2019

Bautista v. Ferrer Doctrine: Rule 6.02, Canon 6 and Rule 8.01 of Canon 8

Facts: Bautista owed Ferrer P200,000.00, but the latter is now claiming that the amount is already
P440,000.00. Respondent lend money to petitioner to finance a lending business which they operate
for the employees of Deped. Ferrer, who was very furious, came to her house she was renting from
the latter and uttered derogatory remarks. Ferrer then brought out a handgun from a bag being held
by her driver, forced her to leave the house she was renting, illegally searched her bag, and forcibly
took her Nokia cellular phone. When her live-in partner and the latter's sister arrived on a tricycle,
she also harassed them and took the key thereto from him. Ferrer forcibly brought her to the City
Hall of San Fernando supposedly to identify those people who she lent Ferrer's money to. Ferrer next
detained and delivered her to the custody of the Philippine National Police without any legal
grounds.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be administratively sanctioned for the acts complained
thereof.

Held: Yes, While Ferrer had every right to demand the return of her investments, the appropriate
course of action should have been to file a collection case against Bautista. But instead, she chose to
put the law into her own hands by personally questioning Bautista, bringing her to the police station,
and confiscating her personal belongings. To the Court, Ferrer's acts evinces a certain vindictiveness,
an undesirable trait in any individual, and as extensively discussed above, these actuations violated
multiple provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, Ferrer may have been in the
government service for many years, but such fact may not extinguish her administrative liability.
Indeed, the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent, and a continuing
requirement, to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. This
proceeds from the lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
Bar's integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer's public
or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanour, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

Ferrer suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

24 Catu vs. Rellosa [AC No. 5738. February 19, 2008]

FACTS Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of the units in
the said building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignored demands to
vacate the place. The parties went to the Lupon Tagapamayapa to try to settle the issue
amicably. Respondent Rellosa as Punong Barangay presided over the conciliation
proceedings. The parties failed to settle their case, and the petitioner brought the case to
court. Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This
prompted Catu to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of impropriety.
IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa violated Rule 6.032
and RA 67133 . The committee recommended Rellosa’s suspension from practice for 1
month. 

ISSUE W/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03 

HELD No.Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has left government service.
Rellosa was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 7160, which
actually allows him to practice his profession. However, being a public official, he is also
governed by Revised Civil Service Rules, which requires him first to obtain a
written permission from his department head who is the Sec. of DILG. This he failed
to do. SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyer’s oath (to uphold and obey law),
Rule 1.01 (lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), and Canon 7 (lawyer shall
uphold integrity and dignity of the profession), for a lawyer who disobeys law
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension and strongly advised him to
look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
__________
Hofilena question: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their profession?
Answer: Yes, RA 6713 says “if the constitution or law allows it” Public officers
however are subject to Civil Service Rules which state that should they engage in
private practice of their profession, they should first secure a written permission from
their department head.

25 Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes Sereno. G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018

Facts: On August 30, 2017, an impeachment complaint was lodged before the Committee
on Justice of the House of Representatives against respondent for culpable violation of the
Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. Having learned of
respondent's disqualification as a Chief Justice from the House Committee on Justice's
hearings, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent, basically questioning her
eligibility for the Chief Justice position. 

The Court observed that since the filing of the impeachment complaint, during the pendency
of the quo warranto case, and even after the conclusion of the quo warranto proceedings,
respondent continuously opted to defend herself in public through speaking engagements
before students and faculties in different universities, several public forums, interviews on
national television, and public rallies. As the Court noted in its decision in the quo warranto
case, respondent initially refused to participate in the congressional hearings for the
impeachment complaint.

When the petition for quo warranto was filed, respondent likewise continuously refused to
recognize this Court's jurisdiction. Instead of participating in the judicial process and
answering the charges against her truthfully to assist in the expeditious resolution of the
matter, respondent opted to proceed to a nationwide campaign, conducting speeches and
accepting interviews, discussing the merits of the case and making comments thereon to
vilify the members of the Congress, cast aspersions on the impartiality of the Members of
the Court,degrade the faith of the people to the Judiciary, and falsely impute ill motives
against the government that it is orchestrating the charges against her. In short, as the
Court stated in the said decision, respondent chose to litigate her case before the public
and the media instead of the Court.

Respondent's Explanations/Arguments

(1) Respondent contends that she should not be judged on the stringent standards set
forth in the CPR and the NCJC, emphasizing that her participation in the quo warranto case
is not as counsel or a judge but as a party-litigant.
(2) The imputed acts against respondent did not create any serious and imminent threat
to the administration of justice to warrant the Court's exercise of its power of contempt in
accordance with the "clear and present danger" rule. Respondent avers that she cannot be
faulted for the attention that the quo warranto case gained from the public considering that it
is a controversial case, which involves issues of transcendental importance.
(3) Assuming arguendo that the CPR and the NCJC apply, respondent argues that in
addressing the matters of impeachment and quo warranto to the public, she was in fact
discharging her duty as a Justice and a lawyer to uphold the Constitution and promote
respect for the law and legal processes pursuant to the said Codes
(4) Assuming arguendo that respondent violated some provisions of the CPR and the
NCJC in her public statements, the same does not warrant the exercise of the Court's
power to discipline in view of the attendant circumstances, to wit: (a) no less than the
Solicitor General repeatedly made personal attacks against her and publicly discussed the
merits of the case, hence, she had to respond to such accusations against her; and (b) she
was not given her right to due process despite her repeated demand.

ISSUE:

May respondent be held administratively liable for her actions and public statements as
regards the quo warranto case against her during its pendency?

RULING:
Respondent's reckless behavior of imputing ill motives and malice to the Court's process is
plainly evident in the present case. Her public statements covered by different media
organizations incontrovertibly brings the Court in a position of disrepute and disrespect, a
patent transgression of the very ethics that members of the Bar are sworn to uphold.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law
as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct
by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a
judge to the proper authorities only.

26 Joy A. Gimeno vs. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide; G.R. Number: A.C. No. 10303

FACTS: 
Joy Gimeno filed a complaint with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
accusing Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers. Atty.
Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use several notarial registers in his
separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients and
accommodate their growing number. This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries
in his notarial registers.
The Investigating Commissioner of IBP CBD noted that Atty. Zayde violated Section 1 (a)
and 1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained several active notarial
registers in different offices. Hence, he was meted with suspension for nine months, but this
was increased to one year by the IBP Board of Governors. 

ISSUE: 
Whether or not Atty. Zayde violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice
Rules when he maintained several active notarial registers in different offices.

RULING: 
Yes. The Court find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining
different notarial registers in several offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized
documents had been irregularly numbered and entered
Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep,
maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a
chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound
book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary public shall
keep only one active notarial register at any given time." On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of
simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1,
Rule VI.
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active
notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one
active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several
notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on
his behalf. 
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also
personally administer the notarial acts that the law authorizes him to execute. This
important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary
public, should perform it.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers and
duties are impressed with public interest. A notary public's office is not merely an income-
generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to receive a
notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform. 
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission.
His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a
simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended
penalty of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul
Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for
using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and
Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if
existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for
one (1) year from the practice of law.

27 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL H. SESBREÑO G.R. No. 121764 September
9, 1999.

In a Per Curiam decision, the Court En Banc on February 3, 2015 consolidated two
complaints for disbarment filed by Dr. Melvyn Garcia against Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño, who
was found guilty of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the
Cebu City Regional Trial Court, Branch 18.

On appeal, however, the High Court downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced
Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for nine years and one day of prision mayor
as minimum to 16 years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Sesbreño was
released from confinement on July 27, 2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of
his parole on July 10, 2001.
Dr. Garcia claimed that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude and Atty. Sesbreño
should thus not be allowed to continue practicing law. Sesbreño argued that the executive
clemency granted to him restored his full civil and political rights.

The Court adopted the findings and recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), and the IBP Board of Governors.

Citing the case of International Rice Research Institute vs NLRC, the Court said that
whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.

However, according to the IBP-CBD, in the case of Atty. Sesbreño’s conviction for
homicide, the circumstances leading to the death of the victim, Luciano Amparado, involved
moral turpitude. The victim was just at the wrong place at the wrong time and did not do
anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Atty. Sesbreño that eventually led to
Amparado’s death.

OCTOBER 10

Belo-Henares vs Guevarra

Facts:

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group,
Inc. On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio,
who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on
her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online
social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant.

The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that
were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical
practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause.

Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly
threatened complainant with criminal conviction, without factual basis and without proof.
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to extort
money from her, as apparent from the following reply made by respondent on a comment
on his Facebook post.

Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to
inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as
to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from his demand letter dated
August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against
respondent.

Issue
1.   Whether or not complainant violated the right of privacy of respondent, claiming that
they were "private remarks" on his "private account" that can only be viewed by his circle of
friends.
2.   Whether it is violative of the freedom of expression
3.   Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the
allegations of the verified complaint.

Ruling

First Issue

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed
with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user's profile, as well
as information uploaded by the user.

Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social
networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said user manifests the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through
the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting
complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter
has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook
available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few.
Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts,
as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends,
respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
Restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute
protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of
friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can
view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." Under the circumstances,
therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.

Second issue

No. Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. The constitutional right of freedom of expression
may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or
reputation or bring them into disrepute.

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were
ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and
BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola,"
and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to destroy
respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and
reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence
upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client
Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's
services all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed
against complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal
negligence and estafa which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."·

Third Issue:

Yes. The subject Facebook posts are in complete and utter violation of the following
provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent
disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times,
be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner
befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted
inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and
conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and
BMGI's reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who
is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal
condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant breached
the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.

Penalty: suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year

Valin vs Ruiz 

FACTS
The complainants were two of the surviving children of Pedo and Cecilia Valin.
Pedro was the original registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Andres,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, with an area of 833 square meters. Then, in December 1992,
Pedro died in Honolului, Hawaii. However, after several years, Honorio discovered
that the subject land has been transferred to Atty. Rolando Ruiz, the godson of Pedro
for a consideration of P10,000.00 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15,
1996 purportedly by Pedro with the alleged consent of his spouse, Cecilia. They
alleged that the subject deed was obviously falsified and the signatures therein of
Pedro and Cecilia were forgeries because Pedro was already dead and Cecilia was in
Hawaii at that time. They also asserted that Pedro's Community Tax Certificate
which was used to identify Pedro in the deed, was also falsified as it was issued only
on January 2, 1996 long after Pedro's death. The complainants pointed to Atty. Ruiz
as the author of the falsifications and forgeries because the latter caused the
registration of the subject land unto his name and because he was the one who
benefited from the same.
In his Answer, Atty. Ruiz claimed that Rogelio Valin one of the children of Pedro and
Cecilia, sold the subject land to him sometime in 1989 allegedly in representation of
Pedro since Rogelio was in need of money for the surgery of his son. Atty. Ruiz also
denied having knowledge regarding the execution of the subject deed in 1996. He
insisted that he neither falsified-the said deed and Pedro's CTC No. 2259388 nor
forged the signatures of Pedro and Cecilia as it was Rogelio who processed the
transfer of the title of the subject land in his name. He explained that when the
subject land was sold in 1989, Rogelio, as the vendor, undertook to process the
transfer of the title of the subject land. Respondent further clarified that in 1996, he
instructed his house helper, Judelyn Baligad (Baligad), to sign the release of the title
in his name because at that time he was busy to go to the RD to sign the release for
himself as per instruction of Rogelio's messenger.
The IBP CBD found Atty. Ruiz to be unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney. It reasoned that as the beneficiary of the falsified deed, Atty. Ruiz was
presumed to be the author thereof. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the suspension
of Atty. Ruiz from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) resolved to adopt and approve the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD for the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty Ruiz violated the lawyer’s oath and Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of
the CPR

RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court is convinced that Atty. Ruiz violated the lawyer's oath and
Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR when he participated and benefited from the falsified
deed. According to the Court, Atty. Ruiz being the author or, at the very least, has
connived with the author of the subject deed and Pedro's CTC for his personal
benefits. Atty. Ruiz incessantly closed his eyes until he became blind to the
anomalies surrounding the sale of the subject land. Whether through deliberate
intent or gross negligence, he participated in the successful registration and release
of the title that originated from an absolutely falsified deed of sale. There being
numerous occasions that respondent could have stopped and noted the red flags
apparent throughout the transaction. Disappointingly, he chose to profit from the
falsified deed, devoid of any empathy that his actions would damage innocent third
persons.
Respondent's acts are inconsistent with the sacred oath to do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any. Even though he acted in his personal capacity in the
improper sale and registration of the subject, he is not excused from liability. A
lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts
which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable
opinion of the public. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may
not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz is found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath,
Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court
hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years effective
immediately, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will
be dealt with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt
of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take
effect.
Antero Sison vs Atty. Camacho

Facts: Complainant, Atty. Antero M. Sison Jr., is the President of Marsman-Drysdale

Agribusiness Holdings, Inc., (MDAHI), the company having employed the services of
respondent, Atty. Manuel Camacho as counsel in an insurance claim action against
Paramount Life & General Insurance Corp. Initial insurance claim of MDAHI against
Paramount was Php 14, 863,777.00. Respondent met with Atty. Dimaano (secretary of
MDAHI) to propose an increase to their claim to Php 64, 412, 534.00, accounting the
interests imposed. Respondent clarified that increase in the claim would require additional
Php 1, 288, 260.00 for additional docket fees. MDAHI agreed and granted said amount.
RTC ruled in favour of MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus interest in amount approx.
Php 65,000,000.00 Respondent sent a letter to MDAHI recommending a settlement with
Paramount amounting to Php 15,000,000.00 despite the already favourable ruling of RTC.
MDAHI refused and did not indicate in its conforme letter to respondent. But respondent,
even without conformity, filed Satisfaction of Judgment before RTC stating that parties had
entered into compromise. Complainant met with respondent to clarify events. Complainant
asked respondent if the Php 1, 288, 260.00 for docket fees was paid. Respondent replied
that he simply gave it to clerk of court as payment period had lapsed. Complainant argued
that respondent violated the CPR, particularly Rule 1.01 for dishonesty entering into a
compromise agreement without authorization and Rule 16.01 for failure to render an
accounting of funds wheich were supposed to be paid as additional docket fees.
Respondent denied allegations, stressed that he had authority to enter into compromise
agreement and alleged docket fees from MDAHI formed part of his attorney’s fees; that
judgment debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI without objection as evidenced by an
acknowledgement receipt; that Court granted his Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Pay
Attorney’s Fee (Sept. 13, 2011) stating that Php 1,288,260.00 formed part of his attorney’s
fees; that MDAHI disregarded this RTC order because it filed an estafa case against him
concerning the Php 1,288,260.00 RTC ruled in respondent’s favour and opined that only
Php 300,000 was previously paid to respondent as attorney’s fees. Case was elevated to
Court. 

Issue/s: Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)

Held: Rule 1.01 “entering into a compromise without written authority of the client”and Rule
16.01, “account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.”
Decision: Court finds respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of CPR. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as member of the Bar. Respondent’s defense that Php 1,288,00.00
formed part of his attorney’s fees is grossly contradictory to the established purpose of said
amount. Well-settled is the rule that lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their
clients’ money for themselves. Worse, the RTC ruling on May 26, 2011 entitling MDAHI to
insurance claim of Php 65,000,000.00 showed that there was no more need for additional
docket fees. Despite decision, respondent did not reject said amount nor return it to his
client.

A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand, funds held to him on behalf of his client gives rise
to the presumption that he has appropriated the funds for his own use, a gross violation of
general morality, and professional ethics. Court finds respondents acts are so
reprehensible, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as member
of the Bar. Wherefore, respondent is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. For reasons above stated, he is disbarred from the
practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent is
ordered to return to MDAHI, the amount of Php 1, 288, 260.00 within ninety (90) days from
finality of this decision.

Jon de Ysasi vs NLRC

FACTS: Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The private
respondent (father) owns a hacienda in Negros Occidental while petitioner (son) is
employed in the hacienda as the farm administrator. After marriage, the petitioner moved
abode yet still continue to work in the farm. Sometime June and August 1982, De Ysasi III
had acquired various ailments and was hospitalized such that later November 1982,
underwent surgery and so he missed work. While under recovery, several instances also
that the petitioner had acquired other illness like acute gastroenteritis and thereafter,
infectious hepatitis. During the entire periods of petitioner’s illnesses the respondent took
care of his medical expenses while the petitioner continued to receive compensation. De
Ysasi III was confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was terminated, without
due process, by his father thus filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the
National Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked that his son actually abandoned
his work. 

ISSUE: W/N petitioner De Ysasi III abandoned his work. 

HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute
abandonment, there must be: a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.
With the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some
overt acts. No such intent was proven in this case. In relation to abrupt termination of
petitioner from his employment, its clearly unquestionable that his right to due process was
denied since there was no prior notice given of such dismissal and the grounds therefor,
much less a chance to be heard thereby respondent contravene 1987 Constituion Article III
Sec.1 “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws”. 
Further, the Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the lawyers for both camps
failed to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court
and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between
their clients especially considering that the parties involved are father and son. This case
may have never reached the courts had there been an earnest effort by the lawyers to have
both parties find an off court settlement but records show that no such effort was made. The
useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible
by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic
exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord
and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation pursuant to Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides
that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.” Both counsels fell short of what was expected of them, despite
their avowed duties as officers of the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who
handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor
Code mandating that a labor arbiter “shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement
of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction.” If he ever did so, or at least entertained the
thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same. In the light of the case, the court acclaimed that legal dispute has
been adjudicated base on law and jurisprudence yet saddened by the fact that it did not
merit reconciliation of familial bonds between the father and son and hope that parties may
find way to an ultimate resolution of their differences. The court held decision ordering
respondent to pay the petitioner.

In Re Sycip, 92 SCRA 1

FACTS:

      Two separate petitions were filed before this Court; 1)by the surviving partners of Atty.
Alexander Sycip, and 2)by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, praying that they
be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had
passed away.

      Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments: 1) A partnership is not

prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a
deceased partner as under Art. 1840 of the Civil Code; 2) In regulating other professions,
such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm
names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased
partner; 3) The Canons of Professional Ethics transgressed by the continued use of the
name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership. Canon 33: The
continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use; 4) No possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths
of their respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; 5) No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased
partner’s name in a professional firm name; 6) Continued use of a deceased partner’s name
in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by US Courts.

ISSUE:

      Whether or not the firms may continue to use the partnership name despite the death of
a partner.

RULING:

      No. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able
lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputations established
by deceased partners.

      Secondly, Art. 1840 of the Civil Code treats more of a commercial partnership with a
good will to protect rather than of a professional partnership.

      In the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased
former partner’s name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our
custom, identify the more creative and/or more senior partners or members of the law firm.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the
names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may,
however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms
indicating the years during which they served as such. chanrobles.

Ulep vs Legal Aid Clinic

FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that
of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence
of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the
legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs
sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements
at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised
are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the
light of the caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly
decidedby the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue: Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute
practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as defined:Black defines "practice of law" as:"The rendition of services requiring
the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with thelaw." The contention of
respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered
nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer
systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation
will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have
to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course
of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls
squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not
be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but
extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that
the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtueof the nature of the services it
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of
his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession,
advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.
The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests
on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the
profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a 138
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned
as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to
the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is
a normal by-product of effective service which is rightand proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda.

Samala vs Atty. Valencia

FACTS: Ø Complainant Clarita J. Samala filed against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia for
Disbarment on the following grounds: serving on 2 separate occasions as counsel for
contending parties knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary
evidence initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees having a
reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children. Ø Commissioner found
respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended the penalty of suspension for 6 months. Ø IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but
increased the penalty of suspension from 6 months to 1 year. 
ISSUE: W/N respondent should be suspended. 

HELD: respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of

Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. SUSPENDED for 3 years.
YES. Ø In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court entitled "Editha S.
Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment,
respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante, 1 of the tenants in the property subject
of the controversy. Presiding Judge warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of
being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK. Ø Rule 15.03, Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This stern rule
is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. One of the tests of
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Ø Canon 21 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his
client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated." Ø respondent's representation
of : Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband Valdez against Alba is a clear
case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Ø
Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon
being warned by the court, but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of
representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK. Ø
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to
refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating
conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a
member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with
his clients. Ø respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was
already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of
the latter's ownership. Ø What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to
mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already
cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.

Ø The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on
one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative
charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial
processes to commit injustice. Ø respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate
children. Ø respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all
over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight
children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife
died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. Ø In this case, the admissions made by
respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality. He even
justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay
and despite the fact that he sired 3 children by the latter, he does not consider them as his
second family Ø Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be
difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet,
for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of the community.

Lim-Santiago vs Atty. Sagucio

Facts:

 Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew
the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened
Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

 Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of
law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove
that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February
1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of
April 1996.

Issue: Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondent’s role as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor 

Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling: 

 1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (“Code”). However, the Court finds respondent liable for
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful
conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act
No. 6713 (“RA 6713”).

 Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties.” A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not
[to] represent conflicting interests.” However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The
prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest
exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or
when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

 Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x
conduct.” Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government
employee to “engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his]
official functions.”

 2. “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

 Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and
he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is
without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and
retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term
“practice of law.”

Chu vs Atty. Guico

Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle his company’s labor disputes. After a
decision was rendered adversely to Chu’s company, Atty. Guico asked Chu to prepare a
substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner handling his appeal to
insure a favourable decision. Chu delivered P300,000.00 to Atty. Guico, who then gave him
a copy of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favour of his company. Atty. Guico told
Chu to raise another P300,000 to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision;
however, Chu could only produce P280,000.00. Atty. Guico’s assistant received said
amount without issuance of a receipt. Chu followed up on the status of the case but was
told to wait. He was assured that should the NLRC Commissioner not accept the money,
Atty. Guico would return it. The NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to Chu’s company,
prompting Atty. Guico to file for a motion of reconsideration and an appeal which were
denied. Chu then terminated Atty. Guico as his legal counsel and filed a disbarment
complaint against him due to alleged gross misconduct. Atty. Guico denied Chu’s
allegations. However, the IBP found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended three years
suspension. 

ISSUE: Whether Guico violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 , Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to
guarantee a favourable decision from the NLRC.

HELD: YES. In taking the Lawyer’s Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to: x x x maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; x x x do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x delay no man for money or malice
x x x. The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s Oath, to wit:. CANON 1
— A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. The sworn
obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain
membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation, every lawyer should not
render any service or give advice to any client that would involve defiance of the very laws
that he was bound to uphold and obey, for he or she was always bound as an attorney to be
law abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession. Verily, he
or she must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession. Any lawyer found to violate this
obligation forfeits his or her privilege to continue such membership in the legal profession.
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the
large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus
violated the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually
using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon
appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit,
and were a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay
any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer as
well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the
law. Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave
misconduct is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.” There is no question that any gross
misconduct by an attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him unfit to
manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension
or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission
of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.

Santos vs Atty. Llamas

FACTS: 

A Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. It appears

that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and
IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he
has been using this for at least three years already.

On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is only engaged in a
“limited” practice of law and under RA 7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from
payment of income taxes and included in this exemption is the payment of membership
dues.

RULING:

Yes. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues
and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if
nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent
is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent
does not include exemption from payment of membership or association dues.

            In addition, by indicating “IBP Rizal 259060” in his pleadings and thereby
misprepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chpater, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.

            Lawyer was suspended for one year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later.

In Re Howard Terrell

Facts: An action for the suspension of attorney-at-law Howard Terrell from the practice of
law was filed in the CFI of Manila for allegedly assisting in the organization of “Centro Bellas
Artes” and acting as attorney for such association with full knowledge that it was created for
the purpose of evading the law then in force in said city. The CFI of Manila held that the
charges against Terrell were true and made an order suspending him from his office as a
lawyer in the Philippine Islands. Aside from the action for his suspension from the practice
of law, Terrell was also charged with estafa in a separate criminal action but was eventually
acquitted. 

Issue: W/N Terrell should be suspended from the practice of law 

Held/Ratio: Yes, he should be suspended. Malpractice or gross misconduct in his office

warrants a lawyer’s removal or suspension from the practice of law. Assisting a client in a
scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest or conniving at a violation of law are acts
which are enough to justify disbarment. However, Terrell’s acquittal on the charge of estafa
serves to lower his sanction to suspension from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands
for the term of one year from February 7, 1903.