Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence
Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence
Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence
nor a skeptic, Collins may go beyond Kant's own views. He concludes: "Our represen-
tations embrace our thought of the universe as a system of spatiotemporal, causally
interconnected, material objects whose existence does not depend on our thought" (p.
242). As Collins himself points out, this comes very close to saying either that things-in-
themselves are also spatiotemporal or that it makes no difference what things-in-themselves
are. While the latter seems the more Kantian, neither statement is without problems as
a reflection of Kant's intent. Whether or not Collins steps beyond the limits of Kant's
thought, the essay is both intriguing and well done. Collins fights through straining
oppositions in Kant's thought to try to find a view consistent with the spirit of Kant's
projects. As with any essay there are points of contention: issues for which Collins might
be taken to task. One might like to see, for example, more emphasis on the specific role
of the schematism relative to the rejection of idealism. But such criticism seems better
taken as grounds for further discussion; the essay certainly satisfies its own objectives.
As a unified work, Thought and Nature sets limited goals and achieves them. There
is only one loose end that causes me any concern. In his introduction, Collins rightly
points to the superficiality of contemporary attempts to resolve the Cartesian and rationalist
problems concerning thought and nature. Indeed, perhaps the most significant reason for
this book itself is that contemporary philosophy cannot address rationalist philosophy
until it overcomes its own superficial understanding of it. Bearing this in mind, Collins
surely has his own project at stake in this series of essays: how to deal with the thought!
nature dichotomy from a contemporary perspective. While I find him agreeing in part
with Leibniz and more thoroughly with Kantianism, I am left wanting a more positive
statement from Collins himself. But I am no doubt asking too much; what counts is what
is before us. And, as it stands, the book is interesting after two readings and deserves more.
Douglas R. Anderson
Wittenberg University
Two themes form the basis for this volume. First, the author argues that the relation
between an outer transient nature and an inner eternal nature provides a thread which
enables the interpreter to trace a coherent point of view and provide an immanent criticism
of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous texts. Second, he argues that there is a dialectic of self
and other running throughout the pseudonymous works which challenges the view that
Kierkegaard's image of the human being is that of a single solitary one. He develops
these themes by applying a structural analysis to these works.
Beginning with The Concept of Irony which is taken as evidence of Kierkegaard's
early talent for writing in a dialectical manner (whether in earnest or as a parody), Dunning
92 IDEALISTIC STUDIES
introduces the kind of Hegelian dialectical analysis that he will apply to all the major
pseudonymous tests. In Hegel's dialectic of mediation, the third stage is more than a
paradoxical unity of two contradictory poles. Mediation is understood as a union in which
opposites are taken up into a third stage as aspects or moments of a new reality where
they lose their negative character and are fulfilled in their true nature as positively related
to each other. In applying this kind of analysis to Kierkegaard's work, Dunning does not
claim that it is necessary to read the pseudonymous works in this way or even that
Kierkegaard consciously writes in dialectical patterns. But he does argue that in spite of
Kierkegaard's protestations against Hegel's dialectic of mediation, a version of this can
be discerned throughout the pseudonymous texts and that reading Kierkegaard in this
manner shows that he provides an understanding of inner and outer self and self in relation
to others and God, that is more systematic than some have thought. Dunning traces these
dialectical themes in each of the major pseudonymous texts and relates them to one another
in the theory of stages, arguing that there is a systematic development from the aesthetic
to the ethical which culminates in the religious.
It is in Concluding Unscientific Postscript that the dialectic of inner and outer, self
and other, is understood to culminate in a systematic Aujhebung. In religiousness B, the
incommensurability of inner and outer is made commensurable in the revelatory paradox
of the incarnation; and self, other, and divine are fulfilled and reconciled in the paradox
of inward and divine otherness. As such, religiousness B is understood to be the culmination
of the religious stage and the dialectical fulfillment of the aesthetic and ethical stages.
This approach to reading Kierkegaard may detract in some ways from the enigmatic
character of some of his writing. But it does bring into relief many of the relational
aspects of Kierkegaard's understanding of human existence and helps counter some of
the more narrow interpretations of Kierkegaard's image of persons. Dunning's aim is to
provide a structural reading of Kierkegaard, not a critical analysis of his image of human
being. But we are left with the question whether even this more relational understanding
of Kierkegaard's concept of the self is an adequate one.
Morgenstern's book succeeds admirably in bridging the gap between idealism and contem-
porary philosophy of science.