SPECPRO-SCA | Case Digests Atty.

Senga 2019-2020 ib-3g

Special Civil Actions (SCA)

Rule 62 - Interpleader
1. Sy-Quia v. The Sheriff of Ilocos Sur
GR NO. 22807
October 10, 1924
Ostrand, J.

FACTS
- Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes Cheng-Kiaco executed a chattel mortgage in favor of petitioner
Gregorio Sy-Quia on February 3, 1915 on their mercantile establishment, and all the merchandise located therein for
P6,000. It is the intention of the parties that the mortgagors shall sell the merchandise and replenish the stock from
time to time and the new stock shall be subject to mortgage. The mortgage fell due on February 3, 1917.
- On May 5, 1924, Cheng-Laco executed another mortgage on the same establishment and its contents in favor of
Filadelfo de Leon, the same recorded on May 14, 1924.
- On May 14, 1924, petitioner requested in writing to the respondent sheriff to take possession of the subject property
and sell it at a public auction. The sheriff seized the establishment and its contents and fixed the date of the sale.
- In the meantime, de Leon presented an adverse claim over the property by virtue of his chattel mortgage, alleging
that the mortgage of Sy-Quia had seen sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of de Leon was executed.
- The sheriff, being in doubt as to the priority of the conflicting claims, suspended the action and instituted requiring
the two claimants to interplead.
- A mandamus was consequently instituted by the petitioner, alleging that the duty of the sheriff to proceed with the
sale is a ministerial one.

ISSUE: Whether the interpleader instituted by the sheriff is proper

HELD: YES
- In respect to conflicting claims to property seized by the sheriff in the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, the sheriff may
bring an action of interpleader under Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to determine the respective
rights of the claimants.
- Should the sheriff ought to sell the property and hold the proceeds, the sheriff might lay himself open to an action for
damages if he sold the goods without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage. In these circumstances, his action
in suspending the sale pending the determination of the interpleader seems justified.

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2. UCPB v. IAC and Makati Bel-Air Condominium

G.R. No. 72664-65
March 20, 1990
Feliciano, J.

FACTS
- UCPB instituted a complaint-in-interpleader against Makati Bel-Air Condominium Developers, Inc., and Altuira
Investors, Inc., the subject matter a manager’s check in the amount of P494,000 issued by UCPB payable to Makati
Bel-Air, purchased by Altuira.
- Altuira delivered the check to Bel-Air as payment on an office condominium unit on July 16, 1979.
- On July 17, 1979, UCPB received from Altuira instructions to hold payment on the manager’s check in view of
material discrepancy in the area of the unit purchased by Altuira. UCPB then requested Makati Bel-Air why it
should not issue stop payment order requested by Altuira. Makati Bel-Air explained their side of the controversy
and proposed a possible reduction of the purchase price.
- UCPB requested Makati Bel-Air to hold in abeyance for a period not exceeding 15 days the presentation of the
manager’s check, so that both parties could settle their differences. In a letter on July 20, 1979, Makati Bel-Air
advised UCPB that Makati Bel-Air did not agree to the request of the bank. Hence, the complaint-in-interpleader
filed on July 23, 1979. The court ordered the deposit of the funds into a special account subject to further orders of the
court.
- Makati Bel-Air: Answer and incorporated a counterclaim against UCPB and a cross-claim against Altuira;
- Altuira: Filed an answer; motion to dismiss cross-claim of Makati Bel-Air.
- August 29, 1979 – UCPB filed a motion to withdraw complaint and motion to dismiss counterclaim stating that
there is no longer conflict between Makati Bel-Air and Altuira since Makati Bel-Air alleged in its answer that it had
cancelled and rescinded the sale of the condominium and had relinquished its claim over the funds covered by the
manager’s check.
- Trial court: resolved UCPB’s motion to withdraw complaint and MTD counterclaim on April 28, 1983 – its previous
order of February 18, 1980 directing UCPB to release the funds to Altuira has been rendered moot and academic.
- Upon motion by UCPB, the trial court issue an order clarifying that the counter-claim of Makati Bel-Air was
dismissed when the funds covered by the manager’s check was released to Altuira without the
objection of Makati Bel-Air.
- CA: dismissed the trial court orders to the extent that dismissed the Makati Bel-Air’s counterclaim. Withdrawal of
complaint-in-interpleader does not ipso facto operate to dismiss Makati Bel-Air’s counterclaim for the reason that the
counterclaim was based on entirely different cause of action from that of interpleader.

ISSUE: Whether the counterclaim is dissolved upon withdrawal and dismissal of the complaint-in-interpleader.

HELD:
- YES. Under Sec. 4, Rule 9, a compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. On the other hand, an
interpleader is a proper remedy where a bank had issued a manager’s check is subjected to opposing claims
by persons who respectively claim a right to the funds covered by the managers check. (Mesina v. IAC, 145
SCRA 497)
- UCPB is entitled to take precautions so that, as far as possible, it does not make a mistake as to who is entitled
to payment; the necessary precautions include recourse to an interpleader suit. Makati Bel-Air’s counterclaim
arose out of or was necessarily connected with the recourse of petitioner to this remedy of interpleader,
claiming that petitioner Bank had in bad faith refused to honor its undertaking to pay represented by the manager’s
check it had issued.
- When the trial court granted petitioner’s motion for withdrawal of its complaint-in-interpleader as having become moot
and academic, the trial court held that petitioner Bank’s recourse to interpleader was proper and not a malicious
maneuver to evade its obligation to pay to the party lawfully entitled the funds represented by the manager’s check.
Having done so, it could not have logically allowed Makati Bel-Air to recover on its counterclaim.

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3. Del Carmen v. Spouses Sabordo
G.R. No. 181723
August 11, 2014
Peralta, J.

FACTS
- Sometime in 1961, Suico spouses entered into a business venture, obtaining a loan from DBP as part of their capital.
To secure the said loan, four parcels of land owned by Suico (Lots 506, 512, 513, 514, and another lot by their business
partner) were mortgaged. They failed to pay the loan, foreclosed the mortgaged, then DBP consolidated its ownership
over the same. DBP however allowed Suico spouses to repurchase the lots by way of conditional sale.
- Threatened with the cancellation of the conditional sale, Suico spouses sold their rights over the said properties to
spouses Sabordo (respondents), executing a supplemental agreement wherein Lots 512 and 513 were sold to them;
while Lots 506 and 514 were given to them as usufructuaries. Respondents were able to repurchase the foreclosed
properties.
- The San Carlos RTC ruled, in an action for declaratory relief filed by Restituto Sabordo, held that spouses Suico has
the right to recover from respondents Lots 506 and 514.
- In the meantime, Toribio Suico died, leaving his widow and several others, including petitioner as legal heirs. They later
discovered that Lots 506 and 514 were mortgaged with Republic Planters Bank (RPB) as security for a loan which has
become delinquent.
- Petitioner and co-heirs filed a complaint seeking to compel respondents and RPB to interplead and litigate
between themselves their interest in the sum of money, claiming that they are ready with the payment of P127,500
(amount fixed by the CA for Suico to redeem the subject lots) and that they cannot determine as to whom such payment
shall be made.
- RPB: MTD, no valid cause of action; they had no valid cause of action and no primary legal right which is
enforceable and binding against RPB.
- Spouses Sabordo: interpleader improper; RPB not laying any claim over the sum
- The RTC dismissed the complaint of petitioner for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether the interpleader is the proper remedy availed by the petitioner.

HELD:
- NO. The trial court correctly ruled that interpleader is not the proper remedy because RPB did not make any claim
whatsoever over the amount consigned by petitioner and her co-heirs with the court.

Re: consignation (not Specpro related but may be a collateral issue)

- The petitioners cited Arzaga v. Romabaoa in which the deposit made with the court is considered a valid payment of
the amount adjudged without tender of payment, which is erroneous in this case.
- Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot
accept or refuses to accept payment, and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. In Del Rosario v. Sandico,
the Court held that for a consignation be considered as a payment, there must be prior tender to the judgment
creditor who refuses to accept it.
- The Court in Arzaga held that the deposit, by itself alone, may not have been sufficient, but with the express terms
of the petition, there was complete offer of payment made directly to defendants-appellants.
- Here, there was no tender of payment and what petitioners prayed for is that respondents and RPB be directed to
interplead with each other to determine their alleged respective rights over the consigned amount, and
respondents be directed to substitute with other real properties as collateral for their loan with RPB.

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4. Arreza v. Diaz
G.R. No. 133113
August 30, 2001
Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:
- Bliss Development Corporation filed with the Makati RTC an action for interpleader against petitioner and
respondent regarding their conflicting claims over the subject housing unit, the claims involved in a case before
the Makati RTC.
- Trial court resolved the conflict in favour of Arreza; Bliss executed a Contract to Sell the aforementioned property and
so Diaz was constrained to deliver the property with all its improvements to petitioner.
- Thereafter, Diaz filed a complaint against Bliss seeking to hold Bliss and Arreza liable for reimbursement of
P1,706,915 representing the cost of acquisition and improvements on the subject property.
- Arreza: MTD; res adjudicata, conclusiveness of the interpleader and lack of cause of action. Denied by the court
- CA: denied petition of Arreza, holding that the interpleader action merely resolved the issue who between Arreza and
Diaz has the better right over the property in litigation; it did not resolve the rights and obligations of the parties.

ISSUE: Whether Diaz claims for reimbursement against Arreza are barred by res ajudicata.

HELD:
- YES. The court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and
adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by
the aggrieved party in the assertion of his rights.
- Sec. 5, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides that parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-
claims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules. This is to expressly
authorize additional pleadings and claims in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents.
- Pursuant to these rules, respondent should have filed his claims against petitioner in the interpleader action; respondent
Diaz should have crystallized his demand into specific claims for reimbursement by petitioner Arreza. This he failed to
do.
- Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz, being in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim is now barred.

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5. Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma Corporation
G.R. No. 193494
March 12, 2014
Leonen, J.

FACTS
- Lui Enterprises and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of land on March
9, 1995, covered by a TCT named under Eli Lui.
- On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBCOM) claiming
to be the new owner of the leased property and asking Zuellig to pay rent directly to it. Lui Enterprises, after
being informed by Zuellig of PBCOM’s claim, wrote to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect the leased
property’s rent.
- Due to the conflicting claims, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader with Makati RTC praying that it be
allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental payments and Lui and PBCOM be ordered to litigate their
claims.
- Lui Enterprises: MTD, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment is pending with Davao RTC against
PBCOM, barring the filing of the interpleader case. The property leased by Zuellig Pharma among those allegedly
dationed to PBCOM. To support its argument, Lui Enterprises cited a writ of preliminary injunction issued by Davao
RTC ordering Lui and PBCOM to maintain status quo.
- Zuellig opposed the MTD, arguing that it should have been dismissed for having filed late. Summons were served
July 4, 2003, Lui Enterprises filed the motion July 23, 2003. Zuellig Pharma moved that Lui Enterprises be declared
in default.
- Trial court: denied MTD of Lui; declared Lui in default in an order dated October 6, 2003.Lui did not move for the
reconsideration of the order. Thus, the Makati RTC heard the interpleader case without Lui Enterprises’ participation.
- It was only on October 21, 2004 did Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside the order of default on the ground of
excusable negligence; meanwhile, a manifestation and motion to dismiss was filed stating that the Davao court ordered
nullification of the deed of dation in payment, also ordering PBCOM to inform Zuellig Phama to pay rent to Lui
Enterprises. The Makati court denied the manifestation and MTD, holding that Lui lost its standing in court.
- Makati RTC: Lui is barred from any claim in respect of the rental payments since it was declared in default.
- CA: Filed MTD four days late; failed to show excusable negligence that prevented it from filing its motion to dismiss on
time.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to set aside order of default

HELD:
- NO. An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting claims over the rent due for
the property leased. This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or her from double vexation in respect of one
liability. He or she may file the interpleader case to extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or her from
adverse claimants’ dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to litigate among themselves.
- In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader to extinguish its obligation to pay rent. Its purpose in filing the
interpleader case was not defeated when the trial court declared Lui Enterprises in default.
- An adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default. Sec. 5, Rule 62 provides that a claimant
who fails to answer within the required period may, on motion, be declared in default. The consequence of the
default is that the court may render judgment barring the defaulted claimant from any claim in respect to the subject
matter.
- The Makati RTC declared Lui Enterprises in default when it failed to answer the complaint within the required period.
Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside order of default without an acceptable excuse why its counsel failed to answer
the complaint. The Makati RTC thus did not err in refusing to set aside the order of default.

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6. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Won
G.R. No. L-23851
March 26, 1976
Castro, J.

FACTS
- The petitioner corporation filed an action of interpleader in the Rizal CFI alleging that:
- Lee Won claims ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of decision rendered in a
civil case in Manila CFI entitled “Lee E. Won vs. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club” and by virtue of
membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the clerk of court of said CFI;
- while Bienvenido Tan claims to be the owner of the said certificate by virtue of membership fee
certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him pursuant to assignment made in his favour by “Swan,
Culbertson and Fritz”, the original owner and holder of certificate 201.
- Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of res judicata, failure to state a cause of action, and bar by
prescription.
- Trial court: Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment (res judicata) and failure to state cause of action well taken,
the trial court dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: Is the remedy of interpleader proper and timely in this case?

HELD:
- NO. The action of interpleader, under Sec. 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has
personal property in his possession or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either,
comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to
demand compliance, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the
other thing.
- The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect
to one’s liability.
- A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants in court. He should file an action of
interpleader within reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the
contending claimants.
- A stakeholder’s action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in
favour of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where
judgment was rendered.
- It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against the Corporation that the remedy of interpleader was
invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to be entitled to this remedy, the applicant must be able to show that
he has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants.
- Since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper
and unavailing.
- Besides, a successful litigant cannot be later impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled
to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the
judgment.

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7. Beltran v. People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation
G.R. No. L-25138
August 28, 1969
Teehankee, J.

FACTS
- Plaintiff, in their own behalf and in behalf of all residents of Project 4 in Quezon City, pray that respondents PHHC
and GSIS be compelled to litigate and interplead between themselves their alleged conflicting claims involving
said Projet 4.
- Plaintiff alleges that since they occupied their respective housing units in 1953 under lease from PHHC and paying
monthly rentals therefore, they were assured that after 5 years of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to
purchase said units.
- On February 21, 1961, PHHC announced to the tenants that the management, administration, and ownership of Project
4 will be transferred to GSIS in payment of PHHC debts to GSIS. In the same announcement, PHHC asked the tenants
to signify their conformity to buy the housing units at the selling price, agreeing to credit the tenants as down payment,
30% of what had been paid by them as rentals. Tenants accepted.
- In September 1961, the collections from tenants on rentals/instalment payments were delivered by the PHHC to GSIS.
On December 27, 1961, the agreement of turn-over of administration and ownership of PHHC properties was executed
by PHHC to GSIS.
- Subsequently however, PHHC, through its new Chairman, refused to recognize all agreements and
undertakings previously entered into with GSIS. GSIS meanwhile insisted in its legal rights to enforce the said
agreements.
- The defendant corporations filed MTD for failure to state a cause of action. Trial court dismissed the complaint; holding
that during the hearing of the said motion, it is made of record that GSIS has no objection that payments on the monthly
amortizations from the residents of Project 4 be made directly to the defendant PHHC.
- Plaintiffs appealed the decision, contending that they do not know who, as between GSIS and PHHC is the right and
lawful party to receive their monthly amortizations as would of eventually entitle them to a clear title to their dwelling
units.

ISSUE: Whether there is error in trial court’s dismissal of the complaint

HELD:
- NO. Rule 63, Section I of the Revised Rules of Court requires as an indispensable element that conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff in interpleader who claims no interest
whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.
- While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to management,
administration or ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor they do involve or
affect the plaintiffs.
- The questions of enforceability and recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turn-over agreement
between two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their action of interpleader, for it is between two corporations
and not against plaintiffs.
- Furthermore, the record shows that there were no conflicting claims by the defendant corporations as against
plaintiffs’ tenants, as both defendant corporations agreed that PHHC should continue receiving the tenants’ payments,
and would be duly recognized by the GSIS should it eventually take over Project 4.
- There is therefore, no error in the dismissal of the complaint for interpleader.

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8. RCBC v. Metro Container Corporation
G.R. No. 127913
September 13, 2001
Kapunan, J.

FACTS
- Ley Construction Corporation (Leycon) contracted a loan from RCBC in the amount of P30 Million pesos, secured by
a real estate mortgage over a property in Valenzuela City. For failure to settle its obligations, RCBC extrajudicially
foreclosed the property, with RCBC as highest bidder.
- Leycon filed a petition for nullification of extrajudicial foreclosure sale against RCBC; meanwhile, RCBC consolidated
its ownership for failure to redeem it within 12 months. By virtue thereof, it demanded rental payments from Metro
Container Corporation (Metrocan), which was leasing the property from Leycon.
- Meanwhile, Leycon filed an action for unlawful detainer against Metrocan in Valenzuela MTC
- Metrocan then filed a complaint for interpleader, before the Valenzuela RTC against Leycon and RCBC. During pre-
trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case insofar as Metrocan and Leycon were concerned in view of
an amicable settlement by which Metrocan paid rentals to Leycon.
- Thereafter, judgment was rendered on the unlawful detainer case ordering Metrocan to pay Leycon whatever rentals
due on the subject premises.
- On the interpleader case:
- Metrocan moved for the dismissal of the case having become moot and academic due to the amicable
settlement it entered with Leycon; Leycon otherwise moved for the dismissal citing same grounds.
- Trial court: motion dismissed; CA set aside the orders of the trial court.
- Petitioner RCBC argues that the plaintiff may not unilaterally cause the dismissal after the case after the answer have
been filed.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal is proper

HELD:
- YES. It is undisputed that Metrocan filed the interpleader action because it was unsure which between Leycon and
RCBC is entitled to receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. However, it is also undisputed
that the unlawful detainer case between Leycon and Metrocan is limited to the question of physical or material
possession of the premises, and outcome thereto could not affect conflicting claims of ownership between RCBC and
Leycon.
- Hence, the reason for the interpleader ceased when MeTC rendered judgment wherein the court directed Metrocan
to pay Leycon whatever rentals due on the subject premises. Thus, Metrocan has no alternative but to pay rentals
to Leycon. Metrocan, therefore, moved for the dismissal of the interpleader action not because it is not interested but
there is no more need for it to pursue the cause of action.
- It should be remembered that an action for interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability,
but against double vexation in respect of one’s liability.

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Rule 63 - Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

1. Velarde v. Social Justice Society
G.R. No. 159357
April 28, 2004
Panganiban, J.

FACTS
- A petition for declaratory relief was filed by respondent SJS against petitioners Mike Velarde, together with Jaime
Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erano Manalo, Bro. Eddie Villanueva, and Bro. Eliseo Soriano as co-
respondents.
- The petition prayed for the resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader like herein
respondents (petitioner thereto), in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or
requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the spirit of the constitutional
provisions.
- All sought the dismissal of the Petition on common grounds that it did not state a cause of action and that there is
no judicial controversy.
- Trial court:
- said that it had jurisdiction over the petition, because the petition only raises question of law;
- opined at some point that endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear
violation of the separation clause; and
- the trial court did not include a dispositive portion in the assailed decision.

ISSUE: Did the petition for declaratory relief raise a judiciable controversy; state a cause of action; and respondent have any
legal standing to file the Petition?

HELD
- NO. Sec. 1, Rule 63 deals with petitions for declaratory relief. Based thereof, an action for declaratory relief should be
filed by a person interested under a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected
by a statute, an executive order, a regulation, or an ordinance.
- Purpose: to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument AND to seek a judicial declaration of the
parties’ rights or duties thereunder.
- Essential requisites:
1) justiciable controversy;
2) controversy between persons whose interest are adverse;
3) party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
4) issue is ripe for judicial determination.

Justiciable controversy
- refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory.
- Here, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents
therein, what particular acts are in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
- SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that the religious leaders had endorsed or threatened
to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices, posing a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the
people’s faith in the electoral process. Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical; sheer speculation
does not give rise to an actionable right.
- The petition merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders
violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state; it did not ask for declaration of is rights
and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights.

Cause of action
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- In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of cause of action does not strictly apply. An action for
declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights
arising thereunder, but the breach should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.
- A perusal of the Petition discloses no explicit allegation that SJS had legal right in its favour that it sought to protect.
The Corpus Juris Secundum SJS cited in its stance provides that there must be no uncertainty that the loss will
occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded. Here, it merely conjectures that herein petitioner might actively
participate in partisan politics x x x to enable it to elect men to public office, enabling it to control the government.
- The Court finds no single allegation of fact upon which SHS could base a right of relief from the respndents.

Legal standing
- Defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged act.
- Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that the law is invalid,
but also that they have sustained or are immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer in some indefinite way.
- There was no showing in the Petition that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be
adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, and that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of
votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its thousands of members
who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters is too general; not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character,
it is too vague, highly speculative, and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.

- The trial court may, motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant, dismiss a complaint that does not allege the plaintiff’s
cause or causes of action.
- When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, a
counterclaim, or cross-claim, or to obtain a declaratory relief, may, at any time after the answer thereto has been
served, move for summary judgment in its favour. Similarly, a party against whom a claim, a counterclaim, or crossclaim
is asserted, or declaratory relief sought, may, at any time, move for a summary judgment in its favour.
- Proceedings for declaratory relief must still follow the process and the decision must adhere to constitutional
and legal requirements.

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2. Tambunting v. Spouses Sumabat
G.R. No. 144101
September 16, 2005
Corona, J.

FACTS
- The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land located in Caloocan City previously registered in the names of
respondents spouses Sumabat. They mortgaged it to petitioner Antonio Tambunting, Jr. to secure a payment of a
P7,727.95 loan.
- Because they defaulted in their obligation, Commercial House of Finance, Inc. (CHFI), as assignee of mortgage,
initiated foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property, but it did not push through. It was restrained by CFI
Caloocan City, but the injunction case was subsequently dismissed.
- Respondents then filed an action for declaratory relief seeking a declaration of the extend of their actual
indebtedness. Petitioners were declared in default; they moved for dismissal of the action on the ground that the
subject had already been breached prior to the filing of action, but was dismissed as they had already been
declared in default.
- CFI: fixed respondent’s liability at P15,743.83. Respondents consigned the amount upon compliance with the decision
of the court on January 9, 1981.
- March 27, 1995, respondents received notice of sheriff’s sale indicating that mortgage had been foreclosed by CHFI
on February 8, 1995 and an extrajudicial sale would be held on March 27, 1995.
- Respondents then instituted a petition for preliminary injunction, damages, and cancellation of annotation of
encumbrance before the Caloocan RTC.
- RTC: The 1981 CFI decision had attained finality; mortgage extinguished when respondents paid their indebtedness
by consigning the amount in court; foreclosure barred by prescription.

ISSUE: Whether the 1981 CFI decision was already final and executory

HELD
- NO. The CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case in 1979.
- An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will, contract, or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order, regulation or ordinance before breach or
violation thereof.
- It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. A court
has no jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed
before the institution of the action. Under the circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in
favour of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment.
- In the absence of jurisdiction, its decision was void and without legal effect.

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3. Malana v. Tappa
G.R. No. 181303
September 17, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS
- Petitioners filed before the RTC of Tuguegarao City a complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of title, and damages
against respondents.
- Petitioners allege that they are the owners of a parcel of land inherited from Anastacio Danao. Danao had allowed
Consuelo Pauig to build and occupy the southern portion of the property, agreeing that the latter would vacate the land
any time Anastacio and his heirs might need it. They also allege that Consuelo’s family members continued to occupy
the property even after her death, building their residences with permanent materials.
- Respondent asserted that they owned the property, presenting documents ostensibly supporting their ownership.
- As they allege that respondent’s documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the claim,
nevertheless creating cloud upon petitioner’s title, they were compelled to file the complaint.
- RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, being a real action involving a property with an assessed value
less than P20,000. MR filed, denied.
- Another motion was filed, reiterating their argument that Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to
quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of RTC
- Note: assessed value of subject property is only P410.

ISSUE: Whether RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction

HELD:
- NO. The RTC correctly made distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court.
- The first paragraph describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for
declaratory relief, as may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
- The second paragraph specifically refers to:
1) action for reformation of an instrument;
2) action to quiet title;
3) action to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase.
These are considered similar to declaratory relief because they result in the adjudication of the legal rights
of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.
- Sec. 1, Rule 63 does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC, repeatedly using the
word “may” i.e., “may x x x bring an action in an appropriate RTC.” The use of the word may denotes that the
provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility.
- In contrast, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 uses the word “shall” and explicitly requires the MTC to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property
where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.
- Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of rights arising thereunder. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending
controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is available, and supplies the need for a form
of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, and invasion of rights,
and a commission of wrongs.
- In this case, the complaint of quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused
to vacate the subject property. Since they aver that they have already been deprived of possession of their property,
the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, not declaratory relief.

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4. City of Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA
G.R. No. 184203
November 26, 2014
Leonen, J.

FACTS
- Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) was created to operate, administer, and manage the export processing
zones established in Port of Mariveles, Bataan. To maintain its non-profit character, EPZA was declared exempt from
all taxes that may be due to the Republic of the Philippines, specifically in Sec. 21, PD 66. President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1811, establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
- In 1995, PEZA was created by virtue of RA 7916 to operate, administer, manage, and develop economic zones in the
country. The law required EPZA to evolve into PEZA in accordance with the guidelines and regulations set forth in an
EO issued for the purpose.
- President Fidel Ramos then issued EO 282, directing PEZA to assume and exercise all of EPZA’s powers, functions,
and responsibilities as provided in PD 66, and all EPZA’s properties, equipment, and assets were ordered transferred
to the PEZA.
- The City of Lapu-lapu demanded, in a letter dated March 25, 1998, from PEZA P32,912,350 in real property taxes for
the period from 1992 to 1998 on PEZA’s properties located in the Economic Zone. The City made subsequent demands
until its last reminder on May 13, 2002, where the city assessed PEZA P86,843,503 as real property taxes from 1992
to 2002.
- On September 11, 2002, PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief with Pasay City RTC, praying that the trial
court declare it exempt from payment of real property taxes.
- Trial court: granted the declaratory relief; declared it exempt from payment of real property taxes.
- The City of Lapu-lapu insists that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear PEZA’s petition, as it involves real
property located in the City of Lapu-lapu, and hence should be filed in Lapu-lapu RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the declaratory relief filed by PEZA

HELD:
- NO. The trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, that is, the petition for declaratory relief.
- The court with jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief is RTC, the subject matter of litigation in an action for
declaratory relief being incapable of pecuniary estimation.
- A special civil action for declaratory relief is filed for a judicial determination of any question of construction or validity
arising from, and for a declaration of rights and duties under any of rights and duties, under any of the following subject
matters: a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation. However, a declaratory judgment may issue only if there has been no breach of the
documents in question. If the subject matter of the action has already been breached, the appropriate ordinary civil
action must be filed.
- If adequate relief is available through another form of action or proceeding, the other action must be preferred
over an action for declaratory relief.
- PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief against the City. It had already issued demand
letters and real property tax assessment against the PEZA, in violation of PEZA’s alleged tax-exempt status under its
charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, had
already been breached.
- Once an assessment has already been issued by the assessor, the proper remedy of a taxpayer depends on whether
the assessment was erroneous or illegal. (Either protest and appeal, or judicial action)

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5. CJH Development Corporation v. BIR
G.R. No. 172457
December 24, 2008
Tinga, J.

FACTS
- Proclamation No. 420 was issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos to create a SEZ in a portion of Camp John Hay in
Baguio City. Sec. 3 thereof granted the SEZ same incentives already enjoyed by the Subic SEZ, among which are
exemption from payment of taxes, and operation as special customs territory providing for tax and duty free
importations.
- In line with the proclamation, BIR and BOC issued issuances providing for rules and regulations to be implemented
within the Camp John Hay SEZ. Subsequently however, Sec. 3 of Proclamation 420 was declared unconstitutional
in John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim (GR No. 119775).
- While MR was pending in this case, the City of Baguio sent a demand letter on its real property taxes due; BOC
demanded duties and taxes due on all importations made by CJH from 1998 to 2004; BIR sent demands for corporate
income tax and VAT.
- CJH filed this declaratory relief before the Baguio RTC questioning the retroactive application by the BOC of the
decision of this court in G.R. No. 119775, claiming it was null and void violating the non-retroactive principle under
the Tariff and Customs Code.
- RTC: held that the decision in G.R. No. 119775 applies retroactively; and that the petition for declaratory relief is not
the appropriate remedy, holding that a judgment of the court cannot be the proper subject of a petition for declaratory
relief; CA 55 proscribing use of declaratory relief in cases where a taxpayer questions his tax liability is still in force.

ISSUE: Is the remedy of declaratory relief proper in this case?

HELD:
- NO. A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject matter.
- The requisites for declaratory relief to prosper are:
1) justiciable controversy;
2) must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
3) party seeking declaratory relief must have legal interest in the controversy; and
4) issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
- The proper subject matter of a declaratory relief is a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, or the construction
or validity of statute or ordinance. Ultimately, this Court is asked to determine whether the decision of the Court has a
retroactive effect. This cannot be countenance.
- A court decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of the words “other written instrument.”
The Rules of Court already provides for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or
clarified without need of resorting to the expedient prescribed.
- There are other remedies available to a party who is not agreeable to the decision whether it be a question of
law or fact. One of the requisites of declaratory relief is that the issue must be ripe for judicial determination, meaning
that litigation is inevitable or there is no adequate relief available in any other form or proceeding.

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6. Ollada v. Central Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-11357
May 31, 1962
Dizon, J

FACTS
- Felipe Ollada is a CPA, duly qualified to practice his profession. In December 1955, by reason of a requirement of the
Import-Export Department of the Bank, that CPAs submit to an accreditation under oath before they could certify
financial statements of their clients applying for import dollar allocations with its office, Ollada’s previous accreditation
is nullified.
- Pursuant to the new requirement, the department issued APPLICATION FOR ACCREDITATION OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (CB-IED Form No. 5) and ACCREDITATION CARD (Form No. 6) to accomplish under
oath.
- Ollada, for himself and allegedly on behalf of numerous other CPAs, filed a petition for declaratory relief in Manila
CFI to nullify the said accreditation requirement.
- Central Bank filed MTD for lack of cause of action. Central Bank further manifested that it was willing to delete
paragraph 13 from the Form No. 5 in the answer to query whether they agreed to follow strictly the rules and regulations
of the Philippine Institute of Accountants, and to modify paragraph 14 thereof.
- Trial court: dismissed the complaint in resolving the motion to dismiss filed by respondent, appearing that the
declaratory relief has become groundless in view of the fact that the objectionable parts has been deleted and modified.

ISSUE: Whether the case was properly dismissed

HELD:
- YES. The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute, or right has been
breached or violated.
- In the case at bar, respondent had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury, giving him a cause of
action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or proceeding. The rule is that an action for Declaratory
Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding.
- An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of contract, statute or right.

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7. DILG v. Gatuz
G.R. No. 191176
October 14, 2015
Brion, J.

FACTS
- An administrative complaint was filed before the Office of Ombudsman against respondent Gatuz, barangay captain of
Brgy. Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan, for Abuse of Authority and Dishonesty.
- The Deputy Ombudsman found the respondent guilty and imposed the penalty of three months suspension without
pay. DILG received the indorsement thereafter. Respondent moved to reconsider the decision. Ombudsman denied
the reconsideration.
- In a query by DILG, Ombudsman states that the filing of a motion for reconsideration or petition for review of the
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the Ombudsman does not stay its implementation unless a TRO or a writ of
injunction is in force. DILG then directed the Regional Director to implement the suspension in a memorandum.
- Respondent filed a petition for declaratory relief and injunction, asking the court to explain his rights pending the
resolution of his motion for reconsideration and to restrain the Department from implementing his suspension.
Respondent argued that the filing of MR or appeal stays the execution of Ombudsman’s decisions in administrative
cases pursuant to Samaniego and Lapid v. CA.
- Trial court: declaring the DILG memorandum void and prohibiting DILG from implementing the memorandum.

ISSUE: Whether declaratory relief is proper in this case

HELD:
- NO. Court decisions cannot be the subject matter of declaratory relief.
- The DILG memorandum subject of this petition was an implementation of Ombudsman’s decision, in the nature of a
writ of execution. Therefore, the declaratory relief action was essentially against a quasi-judicial action of the
Ombudsman, a subject matter beyond the RTC’s declaratory relief jurisdiction.
- Court orders cannot be subject of declaratory relief; the same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of
quasi-judicial bodies, based on the principle of res judicata. The losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of
judgment under guise of an action for declaratory relief.

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8. PDIC v. CA
G.R. No. 126911
April 30, 2003
Carpio-Morales, J.

FACTS
- Respondents Abad had 71 certificate of time deposits denominated as “Golden Time Deposits” with an aggregate value
of P1,115,889 at the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC), Iloilo branch.
- On May 22, 1987, the Monetary Board of BSP issued a resolution prohibiting MBC to do business in the Philippines,
and placing its assets under receivership. The resolution however was not served on MBC until Tuesday of the following
week, or May 26, 1987 when the designated Receiver took over.
- On May 25, 1987, the next banking day following the MB resolution, Jose Abad was at MBC to pre-terminate the 71
GTDs and redeposit the fund in 28 new GTDs in denominations of P40,000. Of the 28, it pre-terminated 8 and withdrew
its value in the total amount of P320,000. Respondents thereafter filed their claims with PDIC for the payment of
the 20 remaining GTDs.
- Out of 20, PDIC withheld payment of the 17 GTDs after the receiver submitted a report of massive conversion and
substitution of trust and deposit accounts on May 25, 1987 at MBC-Iloilo.
- Because of serious reservations in recognizing respondents’ GTDs as deposit liabilities, PDIC filed a petition for
declaratory relief with Iloilo RTC for judicial declaration and determination of the insurability of respondents’
GTDs at MBC-Iloilo.
- Trial court: declared 20 GTDs to be deposit liabilities of PDIC as statutory insurer; ordered PDIC to pay the
respondents the value of 20 GTDs less the 3 GTDs it paid.
- Petitioner posits that it erred in ordering to pay the balance of the deposit insurance to respondents, maintaining that
the declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process and that the only relief that should have been
granted by the trial court is the declaration of the parties’ rights and duties.

ISSUE: Whether declaratory relief does not entail an executory process.

HELD:
- NO. Without doubt, a petition for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process. There is nothing,
however, in its nature that prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the same action.
- After all, a special civil action is not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, except that the former deals with
a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. Rules governing ordinary civil suits may
and do apply to special civil action, if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions
of the peculiar rules on special civil actions.

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9. Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur
G.R. NO. L-28138
August 13, 1986
Yap, J.

FACTS
- On August 24, 1966, the Municipality of Malabang, Lanao del Sur enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 45-46, making
unlawful for any person to ship out of the Municipality of Malabang, cassava starch or flour without paying to the
Municipal Treasurer or authorized representatives the corresponding fee of P.30 per sack of cassava starch or flour.
- Matalin Coconut, Inc. challenged the validity of the ordinance in a petition for declaratory relief before the Lanao
del Sur CFI. The petitioner also prayed for preliminary injunction but was denied by the court, hence ordered to pay the
fee due.
- Trial court: declared the municipal ordinance null and void, ordering the Municipality to refund to the petitioner the
payments it made under the said ordinance as well as all payments made subsequently after
- Petitioners appealed the decision on the ground that the trial court erred in adjudicating the money claim of the
petitioner in an action for declaratory relief.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in adjudicating the money claim of the petitioner in an action for declaratory relief

HELD:
- NO. Under Sec. 6, Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary action and the parties
allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final termination of the case a breach
or violation of an ordinance should take place. In the present case, no breach or violation of the ordinance
occurred.
- The payment under protest of the petitioner did not affect the case, and the declaratory relief was still proper because
the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions remained to be solved, although the matter could also be
threshed out in an ordinary suit for recovery of taxes paid.
- The inclusion of allegations of payment by the petitioner was not objected, nor the introduction of evidence made by
the petitioner during the trial. Respondents were fully aware of the petitioner’s claim for refund and of what would have
happened it the ordinance be declared invalid by the court.
- Respondents’ contention, if sustained, would in effect require a separate suit for recovery of the fees paid. Multiplicity
of suits should not be allowed or encouraged and, in the context of the present case, is clearly uncalled for and
unnecessary.

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10. DBM v. Manila’s Finest Retirees Association, Inc.
G.R. No. 169466
May 9, 2007
Garcia, J.

FACTS
- In 1975, PD 765 was issued constituting the Integrated National Police to be composed of Philippine Constabulary and
the INP. It was complemented by PD 1184 to professionalize the INP and promote career development therein.
- Thereafter, RA 6975 was enacted, establishing the PNP consisting of the INP and officers and enlisted personnel of
the PC. Less than 8 yeas later, RA 8551 was enacted amending RA 6975 reengineering the retirement scheme in the
police organization. Relevantly, PNP personnel stood to collect more retirement benefits than the INP members of
equivalent rank, who had retired under the INP Law.
- Hence, all INP retirees, spearheaded by the respondent, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Manila RTC,
alleging in gist that INP retirees were equally situated as the PNP retirees and were unconscionably and arbitrarily
excepted from the higher rates and adjusted benefits accorded to PNP retirees. They pray for a declaratory judgment,
declaring with certainty that they, INP retirees, are truly absorbed and considered as PNP retirees and thus
entitled to enjoy the same and identical retirement benefits being bestowed to PNP retirees.
- Trial court: RA 6975 did not abolish the INP but merely absorbed its police functions by the PNP, and ordering
implementation the proper adjustments on INP Retiree’s agreement retroactively. CA upheld.
- Petitioners fault the trial court for ordering the immediate adjustments of the respondents’ retirement benefits when the
basic petition filed before it was one for declaratory relief.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for declaratory relief may entail an executory process

HELD:
- YES. The execution of judgments in a petition for declaratory relief is not necessarily indefensible, citing PDIC
v. CA, and Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal Council of Malabang.
- This disposition becomes all the more appropriate considering that the respondents, as petitioners in the RTC, pleaded
for the immediate adjustment of their retirement benefits which, significantly, the petitioners did not object to. Being
aware of said prayer, the petitioners then already knew the logical consequence if, as it turned out, a declaratory
judgment is rendered in the respondents’ favour. The judgment forestalled multiplicity of suits which would only entail
a long and arduous process.

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11. Republic v. Batuigas
GR No. 183110
October 7, 2013
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS
- On December 2, 2002, Azucena Saavedra Batuigas filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga
del Sur, stating that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and
that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her
naturalization.
- After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known
lucrative trade. Trial court denied MTD.
- Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucena’s evidence was then set on May 18, 2004. Neither the OSG nor
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence, Azucena’s counsel moved that the
evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted.
- RTC: granted petition
- In its Omnibus Motion, the OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court
violates Section 10 of CA 473, as the law mandates public hearing in naturalization cases. RTC denied.
- Before the CA, the OSG claimed that the State was denied its day in court because the RTC, during the May 18, 2004
initial hearing, immediately allowed the proceeding to be conducted ex-parte without even giving the State ample
opportunity to be present.
- CA ruled in favour of Azucena.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for naturalization is properly made

HELD:
- The Court is not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding authorized by the law or by the
Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual (Mo Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
Immigrations). Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor
in a naturalization proceeding.
- This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for
judicial naturalization under CA 473.
- In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a
Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to
acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473.
- Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this
Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.

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Rule 64 – Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the COMELEC and COA
1. Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. v. COA
G.R. No. 213525
January 27, 2015
Bersamin, J.

FACTS
- Antique LGU and petitioner executed a MOA concerning life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries,
treasurers, and tanod, obligating P4,393,593 for premium payment
- COA, upon submission of disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit, disallowed the payment for lack of
legal basis under RA 7160.
- Consequently, petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. COA issued decision denying the petition.
Petitioner received the copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, filed MR on January 14, 2013.
- COA denied MR, received by petitioner on July 14, 2014.
- Petitioner filed petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but was dismissed for late filing of the petition.
- In its MR, it submits that it filed the petition for certiorari within the reglementary period following the fresh period rule
enunciated in Neypes v. CA.

ISSUE: Whether the fresh period rule applies in Rule 64

HELD:
- NO. There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and petition for certiorari under Rule 64.
- Rule 42 governs an appeal from judgment or final order rendered by the RTC in its appellate jurisdiction; Rule 64 is
similar to petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and assails judgment or final order of the COMELEC and COA.
- The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. Rule 42 – 15 days; Rule 64 – 30 days. The filing
of the motion for new trial or reconsideration under Rule 64, if allowed under the procedural rules of the
Commission concerned, interrups the period; if denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining
period, which shall not be less than 5 days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
- Here, petitioner filed MR 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of COA. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 64, it only
had 5 days from receipt of denial of its MR to file the petition. It only had until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. It filed
25 days too late.
- In Pates v. COMELEC, the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period
apply was fatal to the course.

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2. Pormento v. Estrada
G.R. No. 191988
August 31, 2010
Corona, CJ

FACTS
- The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from any
reelection.
- Estrada was elected President of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998; he sought presidency
again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010.
- Petitioner opposed Estrada’s candidacy and fled petition for disqualification before the COMELEC. COMELEC denied
his petition, MR denied.

ISSUE: Whether a petition for certiorari stays the execution of the judgment, final order, or resolution of the COMELEC

HELD:
- NO. Under Rules of Court, the filing of petition for certiorari would not stay the execution of the judgment, final
order, or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed.
- Petitioner did not pray for the issuance of TRO or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to
participate as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number
of votes.
- Since the issue of the proper interpretation of the phrase “any reelection” will be premised on a person’s second election
as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case.

Rule 66 – Quo Warranto

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1. De Castro v. Carlos
G.R. No. 194994
April 16, 2013
Sereno, CJ

FACTS
- President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed petitioner as Assistant General Manager for Operations (AGMO) of the MMDA,
concurred by the members of Metro Manila Council.
- Thereafter, on July 29, 2010, Executive Secretary Ochoa issued OP Memorandum Circular No. 2, s. 2010 stating that non-
CESO occupying CES positions in all agencies shall remain in office only until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have
been accepted or their replacements appointed or designated.
- On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, issued Office Order No. 106, 5 designating Corazon
B. Cruz as OIC of the Office of the AGMO. Petitioner was then reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of
the General Manager. Upon designation of Carlos as OIC, the name of the petitioner was stricken from the payroll and was no
longer paid his salary beginning November 2010.
- Petitioner, upon clarification from CESB, had the Executive Director thereof that the position of AGMO had not yet been
classified and could not be considered as belonging to the CES, and that he is not holding a conterminous position, hence, not
covered by Memorandum Circulars Nos. 1 and 2.
- He then demanded payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll to AGM for Finance and Administration,
and raised the matter to the OP upon failure to obtain response from MMDA. President Aquino III however appointed
respondent as the new AGMO of the MMDA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to the position

HELD:
Re: propriety of direct recourse to SC
- Although Section 5 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not
exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
- A direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly
and specifically set forth in a petition.
- In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and after respondent had
already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the present Petition.
- Petitioner, citing stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this Court.

Re: Nature of position

- Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position,
otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.
- Resolution No. 799 issued by the CESB declared certain positions meeting the criteria set as embraced within the CES, to
wit:
b. Unless provided otherwise, all other managerial or executive positions in the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters are embraced within the CES provided that they meet the following criteria:
i.) The position is a career position;
ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,
iii.) The duties and responsibilities of the position require performance
of executive and managerial functions.
- An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises management over people, resource, and/or policy;
and assumes functions like planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and overseeing the activities of MMDA.
The position of AGMO, therefore, is within the coverage of CES.

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- an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level career service within the CES. In this case, petitioner
does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, his appointment to the position of AGMO was merely temporary. His
appointment therefore is “co-terminous with the appointing authority.”
- Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a quo warranto
proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a
showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.

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3. Calleja v. Panday
G.R. No. 168696
February 28, 2006
Austria-Martinez, J.

FACTS
- Respondents led a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and
Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against
herein petitioners.
- Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the ling of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of
directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the
incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which
supposedly belonged to respondents.
- The RTC Br. 58 issued order transferring the case to Naga City RTC; Naga City RTC refused to receive the case folder of the
subject case for quo warranto.
- The RTC Br. 58 then proceeded the case, where petitioners raised the affirmative defense of improper venue, lack of
jurisdiction, and wrong remedy of quo warranto. The RTC Br. 58 ruled denying the motion to dismiss, remanding the case to
RTC Naga City pursuant to Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, as a special court under RA 8799.

ISSUE:
Whether the transferring of the case to another RTC is valid

HELD:
- NO. Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp
a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without
being legally incorporated," while " [a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a
corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No.
902-A as amended)."
- RA 8799 was thereafter passed and provided that actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an oce in a corporation,
which were formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the
courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not
apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation.

Which court has jurisdiction over the matter in this case?

- Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that has
jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation, i.e., it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial
Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein respondents.
- RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases
previously cognizable by the SEC.
- Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another
branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack
of jurisdiction.

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4. PLDT v. NTC
G.R. No. 88404
October 18, 1990
Melencio-Herrera, J.

FACTS
- Petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) assails, by way of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65,
two (2) Orders of public respondent National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), namely, a) the Order of 12 December
1988 granting private respondent Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI) provisional authority to install, operate and
maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System in Metro-Manila (Phase A) in accordance with specied conditions, and b) the
Order, dated 8 May 1988, denying reconsideration.
- Act No. 2090 was enacted, also known as, "An Act Granting Felix Alberto and Company, Incorporated, a Franchise to Establish
Radio Stations for Domestic and Transoceanic Telecommunications." Felix Alberto & Co., Inc.’s corporate name is changed to
ETCI. ETCI filed an application with public respondent NTC (docketed as NTC Case No. 87-89) for the issuance of a Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to construct, install, establish, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone
System and an Alpha Numeric Paging System in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions.
- Opining that "public interest, convenience and necessity further demand a second cellular mobile telephone service provider
and finds PRIMA FACIE evidence showing applicant's legal, financial and technical capabilities to provide a cellular mobile
service using the AMPS system," NTC granted ETCI provisional authority to install, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile
telephone system in Metro Manila, Phase A (first assailed order).
- In a "Motion to Set Aside the Order" granting provisional authority, PLDT alleged essentially that the interconnection ordered
was in violation of due process and that the grant of provisional authority was jurisdictionally and procedurally infirm. NTC
denied reconsideration. (Second assailed order)
- PLDT urges the Court to annul the NTC Orders of 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 and to order ETCI to desist from,
suspend, and/or discontinue any and all acts intended for its implementation.
- Moreover, PLDT alleges that the ETCI franchise had lapsed into non-existence for failure of the franchise holder to begin and
complete construction of the radio system authorized under the franchise as explicitly required in Section 4 of its franchise,
Rep. Act No. 2090.

ISSUE: Whether NTC acted without jurisdiction in issuing provisional authority to ETCI

HELD:
- NO. There can be no question that the NTC is the regulatory agency of the national government with jurisdiction over all
telecommunications entities. It is legally clothed with authority and given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or
authority.
- Rep. Act No. 2090 grants ETCI (formerly FACI) "the right and privilege of constructing, installing, establishing and operating
in the entire Philippines radio stations for reception and transmission of messages on radio stations in the foreign and domestic
public fixed point-to-point and public base, aeronautical and land mobile stations, . . . with the corresponding relay stations for
the reception and transmission of wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony . . . . "
- The NTC, in its Order, liberally construed the technical term “telephony” as to include operation of a cellular mobile telephone
system. The construction given by an administrative agency possessed of the necessary special knowledge, expertise and
experience and deserves great weight and respect.
- Anent the allegation that the ETCI franchise had lapsed into non-existence for failure to complete requirements, such allegation
partakes of a collateral attack on a franchise which is not allowed. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise,
or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ
of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise" (Sections 1, 2 and 3,
Rule 66, Rules of Court), the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury.
- A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a
franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government.

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4. Divinagracia v. CBS, Inc.

G.R. No. 162272
April 7, 2009
Tinga, J.

FACTS
- Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and People's Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) were
incorporated in 1961 and 1965, respectively. Both are involved in the operation of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines,
they being the grantees of legislative franchises.
- By virtue of RA 7477, and RA 7582, PBS was granted a legislative franchise to construct, install, maintain radio and television
stations in the Philippines; CBS’ franchise was extended, respectively. Both laws provide a common provision which requires
grantee shall make public offering through the stock exchanges of at least thirty percent (30%) of its common stocks within a
period of three (3) years from the date of effectivity of this Act.
- Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia filed two complaints both dated 1 March 1999 with the NTC, respectively lodged against
PBS and CBS. He alleged that he was "the actual and benecial owner of Twelve percent (12%) of the shares of stock" of PBS
and CBS separately, and that despite the provisions in R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582 mandating the public offering of at
least 30% of the common stocks of PBS and CBS, both entities had failed to make such offering. For failure on part of PBS
and CBS then to comply with the mandate of their legislative franchise, he prayed for cancellation of all provisional authorities
or CPCs of PBS and CBS.
- NTC dismissed the complaints. While the NTC posited that it had full jurisdiction to revoke or cancel a Provisional Authority
or CPC for violations or infractions of the terms and conditions embodied therein, it held that the complaints actually constituted
collateral attacks on the legislative franchises of PBS and CBS since the sole issue for determination was whether the
franchisees had violated the mandate to democratize ownership in their respective legislative franchises; it ruled that the same
is properly subject of an action for quo warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor General, pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules
of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the NTC, with its retinue of regulatory powers, is powerless to cancel Provisional Authorities and Certicates
of Public Convenience it issued to legislative franchise-holders.

HELD:
- YES. The scarcity of radio frequencies made it necessary for the government to step in and allocate frequencies to competing
broadcasters. In undertaking that function, the government is impelled to adjudge which of the competing applicants are worthy
of frequency allocation. It may impose regulations to see to it that broadcasters promote the public good deemed important by
the State, and to withdraw that privilege from those who fall short of the standards set in favor of other worthy applicants.
- The question now is, whether a law or policy allowing the NTC to cancel CPCs or licenses is to be narrowly tailored to achieve
that requisite compelling State goal or interest, and whether such a law or policy is the least restrictive means for achieving that
interest.
- There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored and least restrictive remedy that is afforded by the law. Such
remedy is that adverted to by the NTC and the Court of Appeals — the resort to quo warranto proceedings under Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court.
- It is settled that "[t]he determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has
been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a
rule, belongs to the State 'upon complaint or otherwise', the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and
not a private injury." Forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the
State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government.
- The authority of the franchisee to engage in broadcast operations is derived in the legislative mandate. To cancel the
provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel the franchise or otherwise prevent its exercise. The NTC is incapacitated
to frustrate such mandate by unduly withholding or cancelling the provisional authority or the CPC for reasons other than the
orderly administration of the frequencies in the radio spectrum.
- What should happen is the converse. If the courts conclude that private respondents have violated the terms of their franchise
and thus issue the writs of quo warranto against them, then the NTC is obliged to cancel any existing licenses and CPCs since
these permits draw strength from the possession of a valid franchise.
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6. Gonzales v. Chavez
G.R. No. 97351
February 4, 1992
Romero, J.

FACTS
- According to the petitioner, the Solicitor General is the counsel for the Republic and the PCGG in thirty-three (33) cases before
this Court, one hundred nine (109) cases in the Sandiganbayan, one (1) case in the National Labor Relations Commission and
another case in the Municipal Trial Court or a total of one hundred forty-four (144) cases. In December 1990, the Solicitor
General withdrew as counsel in said cases through a pleading entitled "Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation." As a
result of such withdrawal of appearance, the PCGG hired forty (40) private lawyers, nineteen (19) of whom are trial lawyers.
- Petitioner contends that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 and Section 35 of the Administrative Code of 1987, however,
mandatorily require the Solicitor General to stand in the place of, and act for the Republic and the PCGG in court. Therefore,
the Solicitor General has "no discretion to reject by withdrawing" as counsel for said entities.
- Petitioner contends, the PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as substitutes for the Solicitor
General. Nowhere in Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14 does it appear that the PCGG is authorized to hire said lawyers. By
so hiring, the PCGG is creating a public office, and naming a public officer. And, in the absence of a law providing for the
creation of the office of PCGG counsel, said hired lawyers are usurpers or intruders whose acts may be challenged in a collateral
proceeding such as an action for prohibition.
- PCGG contends that its power under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 14 to "file and prosecute all cases investigated by it"
includes "the grant of discretion to the Commission in determining the manner of filing and prosecuting its cases including the
matter of who, in particular, will control and supervise the prosecution of said cases."

ISSUE: Whether or not the Solicitor General neglected his public duty by withdrawing as counsel for the Republic of the
Philippines and the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in cases he had led in court

HELD:
- Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to
prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or
compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other party. Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that
the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reasons, for the discretion given him is not unlimited. Its
exercise must be, not only within the parameters set by law but with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal.
- Sec. 1, EO 14, reads: “xxx the Presidential Commission on Good Government, with the assistance of the office of the Solicitor
General and other government agencies, is hereby empowered to file and prosecute all cases”. These legal provisions
ineluctably lead to no other conclusion but that under the law of its creation and the complementary Rules, the law office of the
PCGG, as it is for the rest of the Government, is the Office of the Solicitor General. Although the PCGG is "empowered to file
and prosecute all cases investigated by it" under Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, it does not thereby oust the Office of the
Solicitor General from its lawful mandate to represent the Government and its agencies in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.
- Upon receipt of a case certified by the PCGG to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the
case. He may start the prosecution of the case by ling the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all.
He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the
government on the matter at hand.
- After filing a case, he may even move for its dismissal in the event that, along the way, he realizes that prosecuting the case
would not serve the government's purposes. He may not, however, abdicate his function through an arbitrary exercise of his
discretion. We find that a withdrawal of appearance on flimsy or petty grounds is tantamount to withdrawing on no grounds at
all and to a dereliction of duty.
- The Court is firmly convinced that, considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical interpretation
of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to "represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer."

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7. Mendoza v. Allas
G.R. No. 131977
February 4, 1999
Puno, J.

FACTS
- Petitioner was appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). The position
was reclassified by the CSC as Director III; his position was then categorized as “Director III, CIIS”, and discraged the function
and duties of the said office.
- He was then temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place,
respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District
Collector, however, he continued to receive the salary and benefit ts of the position of Director III. In September 1994, he
received a letter informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as
Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos.
- Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority
rights. No reply was made. Hence, he filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the Paranaque RTC,
Branch 258.
- RTC: petitioner was illegally terminated from office without due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and
that as he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab
initio. The court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the
reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and other benefits appurtenant thereto
- While the case is pending in CA, respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to Deputy Commissioner of Customs
for Assessment and Operations; Allas then moved to dismiss the appeal for being moot and academic, which the CA granted.
- Petitioner led with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied the motion on the
ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who
was not a party to the quo warranto petition.

ISSUE: Whether the writ of execution may still be issued, considering that respondent Olores, not a party to the case, now
occupies the subject position.

HELD:
- NO. Petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or oce
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
- If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully holding the same, the court
may order:
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of all the parties
to the action as justice requires.
The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of the court and on the
relief sought.
- Although petitioner did not specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that he be paid his "full back wages and
other monetary benefits” appurtenant to the contested position "from the time they were withheld until reinstated."
- A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his
title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such,
but always against the person — to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or
exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.
- In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was led by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out
before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not
against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.

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