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System Protection Schemes (SPS) and Islanding - SRN

System Protection Schemes (SPS), also known as Remedial Action Schemes or System Integrity Protection Schemes, are designed to detect abnormal system conditions and take predetermined corrective actions to preserve system integrity. SPS schemes are increasingly used to operate power systems closer to their limits and improve power transfer capability. Well-designed SPS schemes must balance dependability, security, selectivity, and robustness. International surveys have found that most SPS schemes to date have been effective, though failures can occur due to hardware, software, or human errors.

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98 views29 pages

System Protection Schemes (SPS) and Islanding - SRN

System Protection Schemes (SPS), also known as Remedial Action Schemes or System Integrity Protection Schemes, are designed to detect abnormal system conditions and take predetermined corrective actions to preserve system integrity. SPS schemes are increasingly used to operate power systems closer to their limits and improve power transfer capability. Well-designed SPS schemes must balance dependability, security, selectivity, and robustness. International surveys have found that most SPS schemes to date have been effective, though failures can occur due to hardware, software, or human errors.

Uploaded by

Pradeepkumar G
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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System 

Protection Schemes (SPS) 
and Islanding

PSTI, Bengaluru
7th August 2013
Definition of System Protection Schemes (SPS)
A System Protection Scheme (SPS) or Remedial Action
Scheme (RAS) is designed to detect abnormal system
conditions and take predetermined, corrective action
(other than the isolation of faulted elements) to preserve
system integrity and provide acceptable system
performance…………….CIGRE TB 187, June 2001

• Earlier known as ‘Special Protection Schemes’


– What is ‘special’ today may be ‘common’ tomorrow.
– Other than ‘equipment’ protection
• Now formally known as ‘System Integrity Protection
Schemes (SIPS).
What is not SPS?
• Normal control actions using power electronics
– Static Var Compensators or SVCs, HVDC controls, PSS
• Auto‐reclosing of transmission lines
– Considered as part of line protection
• Equipment over‐load protection
• Restoration of equipment
Response‐based or Event‐based SPS
• Response‐based: Measured variables cross the trigger
value after a ‘contingency’
• Event‐based: Operate based on recognition of a
combination of events
– Faster than response‐based but have to be designed for all
possible events
Source: CIGRE TB 187
Why System Protection Schemes?
• Improve power system operation
• Operate power systems closer to their limits
• Increase power transfer limits while maintaining the 
same level of system security
• Temporary installations
• Increase power system security particularly towards 
extreme contingencies leading to system collapse.
SPS to counteract power system instability
SPS design criteria
• Dependability:     Operate when required to do so

• Security:  Not operate when not required

• Selectivity:  Ability to effect the least amount of  
action when performing the action

• Robustness:  Ability to work over the full range of 
steady state and dynamic conditions

Higher the rule complexity, lower the reliability of performance
SPS design criteria
• SPS Control Actions
– Arming
– Activation (detection) control
– Determination of control action
– Sending trip/activation command
• Automatic arming or disarming is preferable 
• Co‐ordination with other SPS or control actions desirable
– Capacitor or reactor switching vs UFLS
– UFLS vs under‐frequency generator tripping
– UFLS vs transmission constraints
– Load‐shedding vs islanding
SPS Design and Reliability Evaluation
• SPS event can be classified as
– Desirable operation
– Undesirable operation………………….lesser evil 
• Can either be intended or unintended
– Failure to operate……………………….serious
• Hardware failure
• Faulty design logic
• Software error 
• Human error
• Chapter 6 of CIGRE TB 187 covers SPS design aspects 
and reliability in detail
Institutional co‐ordination

• SPS involves
– Large number of measurements from various points
– A processing/control centre
– Diverse elements affected by control actions
• So SPS is a multi‐utility level problem
Institutional co‐ordination

Source: CIGRE TB 187
Future SPS
Future SPS
Indian experience of SPS

• A decade of experience
• Nearly thirty (30) schemes in service at inter‐state level
• Mostly generation 1 schemes (local measurement, local 
control)
• A few generation 2 schemes (local measurement, 
remote actions)
• Generation 3 schemes (Wide Area Measurements and 
Wide Area Control) not yet envisaged
Islanding Schemes

• Islanding is also a category of SPS
• Frequency based islanding is very common
• Islanding based on wide area logic such as angle is 
yet to be envisaged
• ‘Die or survive but together’ has been the norm
– Some re‐think after 30th and 31st Jul 2012 
– Nuclear power stations and metro city islanding 
has been the norm so far.
References on SPS

• ‘Industry Experience with Special Protection Schemes’,


IEEE‐CIGRE Committee Report, IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, Vol 11, No 3, August 1996
• CIGRE Technical Brochure 187: System Protection
Schemes in Power networks, June 2001
• CIGRE Technical Brochure 200: Isolation and restoration
policies against system collapse, April 2002
• ‘Global Industry Experiences with System Integrity
Protection Schemes (SIPS)’, IEEE Power System Relaying
Committee (PSRC) Working Group C4, October 2009.
IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996

• 49 utilities, 17 countries, 111 schemes
IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996
IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996
IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996

• Operations between 1986‐1992 analyzed
• n1= number of successful operations= 1093
• n2= number of failures = 36
• n3 = unsuccessful operations = 20
• n4 = unnecessary operations = 306
Effectiveness index = n1/(n1+n2+n3)
Dependability index = n1/(n1+n2)
IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996
IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996
IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996
IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996
IEEE Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC)
IEEE Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC)

SIPS purpose
Thank you

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