New Marxist Approaches to the Relative Autonomy of Religion

Author(s): Otto Maduro

Source: Sociological Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Winter, 1977), pp. 359-367
Published by: Oxford University Press
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 Analysis,1977, 38, 4:359-367
Sociological

New MarxistApproachesto the Relative

AutonomyofReligion*
Otto Maduro
ofLos Andes(Mirida: Venezuela)
University

Traditionally,marxisttheoryhas beenunderstood as a reductionism in whichreligionis conceived as a

totally
dependent and mechanically
variable,externally determined bytheeconomic system ofeachsociety.
In thepast six years,some WestEuropean scholarshave triedto overcomethisreductionism while
preservingall ofthemarxiancontributions tothesociology ofreligions.In thisarticle,thereis a summary
ofideasdeveloped bythreeFrenchinvestigators. For all ofthese,themainpathtoovercome reductionism
without abandoningthemarxianstandpoint is through theconcept oftherelativeautonomy ofreligion:an
approachin whichreligioussystems have tobe studiedin themselves and to besituatedwithina specific
macro-social contextin a historical
perspective, thustrying to establishthecomplexmutualinfluences
between socialstructure
and religioussystems.

In The German Ideology Marx and Engels laid the foundationsof a specificsociological
paradigm and developed the thesisof the totalexternaldeterminationof religionby the
social-economicstructure(i.e, religion considered as a totallydependent variable). In a
certain sense, this approach gave birthto the sociologyof religionas such. At the same
time,though,it gave the impulse to an economic reductionismof religion.However, af-
ter Marx's death, Engels began to perceivethe onesidedness of thatapproach and triedto
surmountitby postulatingthe relativeautonomyof religion(i.e., religionconsidered as a
partiallyindependent sociological variable). Apart from a few exceptions, this view of
Engels has been used in the marxisttraditionas a helpful,ready-madeformalproposition
to fill up the unavoidable gaps of research which have arisen because of the bias of
economic determinism.In fact,though,classic marxistdeterminismincreasinglyproves
itselfpoliticallyand methodologicallyuntenable: while allowing us to discern an impor-
tantaspect of religionwhichis not visiblefromany other standpoint,it preventsus from
seeing another equally importantaspect of religiousphenomena.
All this has provoked the need for a more comprehensive standpoint,leading some
European scholars to take Engels' later contributionmore seriously.They insiston the
paramount importanceof developing a theoryof the relativeautonomyof religion,and
of doing thisin close connectionwithscientificresearchand politicalpractice.At the same
time,some of these scholarsclaim explicitlyto remain withina marxistapproach, insofar
as a significantaspect of religious phenomena can only be perceived fromthat point of
view. Incidentally,these recent effortshave enabled marxism to develop toward a
valuable confrontationwithdifferentideas fromthe sociologyof religion.Among these
contemporaryWest European essays, I have selected what I consider to be the major
attemptsto overcome the shortcomingsof classical marxistsociology of religion while
maintainingits own specific and irreplaceable contributionsto the scientificstudy of
religion.
This paper is limited,however, to brief,separate accounts of the precise points as
developed by each of the threechosen investigators: the anthropologistMaurice Godelier,

*Theoriginalversionofthispaperwaspresented
as a didacticseminarat the1976meetings
ofthe
ofReligion,New York Hilton.
for theSociology
Association

359

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360 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

the historian Hughes Portelli and the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, all three presently
workingin Paris. I shall, therefore,have to leave out the various explanations,compari-
sons, synthesesor critiquesthat I should have liked to include. Nevertheless,I shall not
make these limitationsan excuse for any defectsin thisaccount.

Godelier's
Marx: Religionas a PossibleSubstructure
According to Maurice Godelier, the classical marxian concepts of substructureand
superstructureshould be understood not as concreteconcepts to classifydifferentsocial
institutions,but rather as abstractconcepts to discern diverse social functions.In this
sense, substructure(viz., the structureof social relationsof production) means the system
of social relations determining (a) the access to the means of production, (b) the
distributionof labor force,and (c) the distributionof final products. Correspondingly,
superstructure(though Godelier has never defined it) would mean the systemof social
relationsfulfillingfunctionsother than the latter.
In capitalistsociety,substructuralfunctionstend to be performedby a systemof social
relations-the economic system-more or less clearly separated from any other social
relations. At the same time, in this society,superstructuralfunctionstend to be per-
formed by a set of social institutionsquite distinctfrom the economic ones, as, for
example, the political,educational and religioussystems.This veryfactallowed Marx to
see somethingwhichcould not be discernedbeforecapitalism:the ultimatelydetermining
characterof the social relationsof production.But, on the otherhand, capitaliststructure
usually hindersus fromgraspinga no less significantfact:the possibilityof substructural
functionsbeing fulfilledby social institutionsother than what would automaticallybe
designated as "economic."
Therefore, the firstmethodologicalstep one should take while tryingto discern,in a
particulargiven society,whatthe systemsfunctioningas the substructureare, is to get rid
of the automatictendencyto classifycertaininstitutionson one side and some otherson
the other side. Nothing permitsus to statebeforehand,i.e., prior to empiricalresearch,
either the kind of institutionsconstitutingthe substructureof a given society,or how
superstructuralfunctionsare performedtherein.What Marx discovered,therefore,was
onlya hierarchyof functionswhichseems to apply to any knownsociety:(a) substructural
functions,or those whichare essentialin the reproductionof society,and (b) superstruc-
tural functions,or those which are not basic to its reproduction. From this discovery
nothingcan be inferredabout a specificsociety,no predictioncan be made concerning
either the functionsof an existing institutionor, conversely,the institutionactually
performinga particularfunction.The notionof "ultimatedetermination"involvedin the
marxian handling of the concepts of substructureand superstructure,Godelier points
out, impliesonly a hypothesisconcerningthe hierarchyof functionsthatbringabout the
reproductionand transformationof society.This hypothesis,moreover,serves only as a
heuristicbasis forempiricalresearch; itcan be verifiedand itsactual contentsobtained,in
any precisecase, solelyas the outcome of thatsame research.Otherwisestated,to saythat
the substructureultimatelydetermines the superstructuremeans factually nothing;
methodologically,however,it suggestsa path, among manypossible others,for scientific
investigation.
Likewise, Godelier discusses the marxian notion of "dominancy." For him, capitalist
societyis the firstsocietyin historywhere an economic system,besides existingseparately
as such, is simultaneouslydeterminantand dominant. That is, it embodies, on the one
hand, the essentialrelationsfor the reproductionof capitalistsocietyas such (thus being
"determinant"and thereforeestablishingthe limitsof the development and functioning
of all other social relations) and, on the other hand, it, the economic systemwithin
capitalism, constitutesthe apparent structuringchannel of most social practices and

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 NEW MARXIST APPROACHES 361

beliefs(thus being "dominant"). This factat once leads to the conclusion,probablyvalid

only withincapitalism,that,firstly, the economic systemis the dominant one (hence, that
no othersocial system-kinshipor religion,forinstance-is dominant)and, secondly,that
determinationand dominancy are one and the same thing.This conclusion preventsus
from explaining why, for instance, kinship plays a dominant role in certain societies,
channelingall itsconflicts,structuringall itsmyths,furnishing,in a word,the "language"
of all its expressionsand communications,verbal as well as non-verbal.
For Godelier, if a particularsystemis dominant in a given societyit is just because it
functionsfromwithinas substructure,as the social relationsof production,regardlessof
itsinstitutionalformand of any other functionsit performs.But again, the nature of the
dominant system in a given society is something that can be established only after
empirical research on that society. In other words, one has to find out, through
observationof each specificcase, whichsystemfunctionsfromwithinas substructureand
then verifywhetheror not thissystemexertsitsdominancyupon the practicesand beliefs
of the membersof that particularsociety.Once more, theorydoes not do away withthe
need for researchor anticipateitsresults.
Godelier explicitlyrefers his position to the scientificstudy of religion. Religion, he
says, is not only a systemof beliefs but a systemof practicesas well. Through religion,
groups provide an explanation of theirenvironmentno less than performan action upon
it in order to transformit. This systemof practices and beliefs can in certain cases
functionfromwithinas the social relationsof production,thatis, as substructure.In such
a case, the religioussystemperformsthe threeabove mentionedsubstructuralfunctions,
and it mightthen fulfilla number of superstructuralfunctions,too. This seems to be the
case, Godelier asserts,among Mesopotamic, Inca, Eskimo and Mbuti societies.
The functionsof religion vary from one societyto another. According to Godelier,
when religionseems to operate as the substructuralsystem,hence ultimatelydetermining
all other social relations in their development and functions,it apparently exerts its
dominancy on that society, thus structuringall social practices and beliefs. Therein
probably lies the reason why, in many non-capitalisticsocieties, religion unavoidably
constitutesthe fieldwhere all formsof class consciousnessand all class strugglesdevelop.
That could explain, too, the politicaland economic role of many heresies and religious
struggles.It could thus be said that where religionis the dominant system,the transfor-
mation of societyimplies a transformationof religion,and thus, in such a society,any
social revolutionrequires a denial and a transferenceof the holy.
In itself,religionis neithersubstructuralnor superstructural.It may sometimesfulfill
substructuralfunctionseven to the point of becoming the dominant systemwithin a
specific society. Religion is not thereforenecessarilyan obstacle to revolution; on the
contrary,it is often the only way to bring about a political as well as an ideological
revolution.Rather than producing an abstract,universal,non-historictheoryof religion,
marxistsought to be constructingthe theoryof the transformations of the positionand
functionsof differentreligionsin differentsocieties,a task in which theoryshould base
itselfupon practice.

Portelli'sGramsci:ReligiousMovements
as Struggles
for Social Hegemony
The precise purpose of Hughes Portelliin the two workssummed up here is to present
a systematicexposition of the contributionof Antonio Gramsci, founder of the Italian
Communist Party,to marxism (and particularlyto marxistsociology of religion), as it
had remained scatteredabout in Gramsci'sposthumous writingsuntila shorttimeago.
Gramsci's main question is a politicalone: what was the nature of the transitionfrom
feudal to capitalistsocietyand how could the transitionfrom the latterto socialism be
achieved. In posing thisproblem,he findsthatthe consolidationof a particularsocietyis

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362 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

achieved through the formationof a "historicalbloc," that is, an organic bond between
the existingclasses and the ideological-politicalsuperstructure.Any social class, in order
to rule, needs not only to coerce but also to persuade. A fundamentalclass (i.e., a social
class whose existenceis basic to the reproductionof a given society)achieves its interests
only when it succeeds in establishingits hegemony-the general consent to its rule. To
attain hegemony, a fundamental class must produce its own "organic intellectuals"
(intellectualsin deep solidaritywiththatclass and strivingto gain the general assent to its
rule by producingand diffusingan ideologybased, at least partially,upon the ideological
background of the subordinate classes and capable of performing that hegemonic
function). In tryingto create its organic intellectuals,a fundamental class may either
produce them fromitselfor attemptthe conversion of "traditional"intellectuals(those
linkedto a rulingclass in decline). The substructuralcontradictionbetweena risingand a
declining class may often find its ideological aspect in the conflictbetween organic and
traditionalintellectuals.
The problem for Gramsci is how a new historicalbloc (based upon the workers'and
peasants' alliance) is possible, how its hegemony can be achieved, how its new kind of
organic intellectualscan be created, how these tasks are actually hindered by the old
ruling bloc (based upon the alliance of industrialistsand landowners),and how, finally,
these hindrances could be surmounted. At the core of this problem is what has been
called the peasant question: how can the proletarianvanguard win over the peasants for
the socialistrevolution?Now, the traditionalpeasant outlook is, in Italyat least,a religious
one, as is thatof its traditionalintellectuals.Thus, the creation of a corps of new organic
intellectuals,bringing together proletarians and peasants in the struggle for a new
hegemony,immediatelybringsus back to the problem of religion.
In his specificapproach to the religiousquestion, Gramsci maintainsthat a particular
religioncan be, in many ways,a necessarymeans for the developmentof a subordinate
class during a certainperiod. But when a religionchanges into the ideological support of
a rulingclass in decline, hence not expressinganymorethe needs of the masses under its
control,itcan become a barrierto popular initiative.In fact,thisseems to be the case with
the Italian peasantry. Since the peasantry has always been a subordinate class with a
preponderantlyreligiousviewpoint,the hegemonyof the feudal aristocracyover it had to
be founded upon religion,and the Church turned into the organic intellectualof that
historicalbloc. With the rise of capitalism,however,the feudal bloc entered into a crisis
undermining its hegemony. From then on, the Church changed gradually into a
traditionalintellectual,tryingto preserve itselfthrough its ancient influence over the
peasantryand strivingto maintainthisinfluencein order to reproduce itself.
When a social organization(the Church) agrees withthe attainmentof the hegemonic
needs of a rulingclass, it comes to be whatGramscicalls an "ideological State apparatus"
(ISA from now on). Any church can become, or, eventually,cease to be an ISA. What
makes an ISA of a church is itscapacityto consolidate the hegemonyof a rulingclass by
controlling and (re)producing an ideology suiting the interests of that same class.
Nevertheless,if thishegemonic functionis whatcould define a churchas an ISA, the fact
of being an ISA does not hinder a church from performingother functionsthan the
ideological, including coercive ones. Actually,the multifunctionalquality of the feudal
clergy seems to explain its preeminence, economic, political and juridical as well as
ideological. The process which allowed this clergyto constitutethe "central" ISA of the
feudal bloc was based on (a) its economic-politicalinterminglingwiththe feudal aristoc-
racy,and (b) the ideological monopolyit exerted in thissociety.
The dominant characterof the Church in feudal societyappears thus as the resultof
structuralas well as historicaland conjuncturalfactors.As an ISA, its relativeautonomy
was greater during the "hegemonic period" and less under "hegemonic crisis."Withthe

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 NEW MARXISTAPPROACHES 363

riseof capitalism,thefeudalblocentereda hegemoniccrisiswhichthreatened thevery

existenceof the Church. Anti-clerical ideologiesand movementsarose then,as an
expressionof the politicsof the bourgeoisie,whose firstideologicalenemywas the
Church,as organicintellectual of thefeudalbloc.Becauseof thedeficiencies of itsown
however,the bourgeoisiehad to call upon the servicesof thiscaste of
intellectuals,
traditionalintellectuals
as a meansto confirm itshegemony overthesubordinate classes
underecclesiastic control.In exchange,theChurchkeptpartof itsancientadvantages.
Despitethistacitsocialtransaction betweentheChurchand thebourgeoisie, structural
reasons,amongothers,turnedtheChurchintoa "peripheralISA." Catholicism shifted
froma totalitarian viewof theworldto a partialconceptionof it amid a compartmen-
talizedsociety;the Church,fromthe dominantpositionof a monopolistISA, was
convertedinto a subordinateISA, not so much producingas merelyreproducing
bourgeoisideology.
The persistence of the Churchin capitalistsocietyis thusa complexphenomenon.
Amongitscausesone shouldcounttheChurch'sinternalorganization, whosereproduc-
tionis partially
autonomousfromitssocialfunctions. As a matteroffact,theChurchhas
produced,fora verylong time,a set of organizational and ideologicalmechanisms to
reproduceitselfdespitesocialchange.To maintainthe tiesof each individualto the
Church,it reassertsthem constantly fromchildhoodon. To preventgeographical
ruptures,itreinforcescentralization.To hampersocialsplits, itcompelsdoctrinal unityas
wellas a closeconnectionbetweenitsintellectuals and themassesunderitsinfluence.
Besides these traditionalself-reproductive mechanisms, the hegemoniccrisisof the
feudalblocled theChurchto createnewdevicesforsubsisting within capitalism. One of
these is "democracy"in the recruitment of clergymen, whichcan be regardedas a
selectionofpotentialorganicintellectuals of thesubordinate classesin orderto integrate
themintothe Church'spersonnel.Anotheris the creationof "conjunctural organiza-
tions"in orderto channeland retrieve movements whoseexistenceescapesand menaces
Churchcontrol.
The consequencesof thispersistence amid a socialdeclineenduredby the Church
withincapitalism,however,are quite significant. In the firstplace, the Church is
constrained to opt fora fragile,artificial
unityforwhosemaintenance itoftenlacksthe
means. Accordingly, it is forcedto double its internal,hierarchicaldiscipline,thus
hindering thelaity'sinitiative.
Finally,
becauseofthisartificial and frailunity, theChurch
is forcedto toleratethepermanent presenceofinternalconflicts.
As a centergatheringa numberof partialcenterstendingeitherto reproduceor to
transform thewhole,or to stillmorespecificand limitedaims,the Churchfrequently
undergoesinternal clashes.Moreover, thevariety ofsocialclassesitcontains, all undergo-
ing strongexternalinfluences, leads to the manifestation of conflicting class interests
withintheChurch,whichprovokeor reinforce internalantagonisms.
In sucha situation,internalecclesiasticalinnovations arisingfromoutsidethecenter
tendto assumehereticaltraits,whichgraduallydevelopuntilcentralreactionto them
comes.This reactionof the hierarchic centerusuallyinvolvesexcludingtherefractory
innovators and recovering thehesitant,butitis oftenfollowedbysomeincorporation of
the innovationsthemselves, so as to preservethe unityof the Churchby gaining
possessionof factorsthreatening thatunity.Nonetheless, dissentand innovation haveto
be tolerated,particularlywhentheChurchgoesthrougha critical phase.In suchepochs,
successfulheresiesmay develop as an ideologicalexpressionof the break between
subordinateclasses and the rulingones, particularly in societieswhere the latter's
hegemonyis of a religiouskindand, furthermore, whenthishegemonyfindsitselfin
crisis.The outcomeof a successful heresymaybe thatofa merereformor,beyondthis,
the creationof a new linkbetweenintellectuals and the masses,thusfavoringa social
revolution.

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364 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

In conclusion,Gramsciunderlinesthe need fora comprehensive,dynamicapproach to

the religiousquestion. When studyinga particularreligionwithina specificsociety,close
attentionshould be paid to the distinctionbetween (a) organicideologies, actions and
movements(correspondingto the main tendenciesin the social structure),(b) those of a
conjunctural nature (correspondingto new social phenomena) and (c) those of an organiza-
tional origin (corresponding to the inner needs of a religious organization as such).
Likewise,the specifichistoricalcharacter(hegemonic, critical,etc) of the period studied
has to be stressed because of its consequences for the social significanceof the same
ideologies, actions and movements.Finally,the place of religionin the historicalbloc, its
social ties with each class, as well as the background and internal configurationof the
religionstudied,constituteimportantitemswhichshould not be disregardedwhen trying
to determinethe functions,actual and potential,of a particularreligionwithina struggle
forhegemony.

Bourdieu'sWeber:TheReligiousField as a FormoftheDivisonofLabor
Pierre Bourdieu affirmsthe need to maintain the marxian standpoint insofar as it
permits a grasp of religion under a sociological aspect that no other theoryrenders
visible.However, he takes Max Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
as a point of departure
in order to go furtherand escape from the simplisticalternativebetween reductionism
and the theory of the absolute autonomy of religion. Bourdieu holds that Weber's
concept of "religious labor" provides an escape from this dilemma, although Weber
himselfdid not develop thispossibility.
The source of the relativeautonomy Engels accords to religion,withoutextractingits
consequences either,lies for Bourdieu in the historicgenesis of a corps of functionaries
specialized in religious labor, that is, in the task of responding by a certain type of
practices and discourses to a particular categoryof needs characterizingcertain social
groups. Thus, the "religious field" has as its specific functionin the social division of
labor that of satisfyinga distinctsort of interests(the religious interests)which leads
laymento expect certainactions fromthe religiousfunctionaries.
The developmentof the relativeautonomyof religionfindsitsoriginin the dissociation
of intellectual and manual labor, which, in its turn, is tied to urbanization and the
correlativelygrowing opposition between the cities and the countryside.Where and
insofaras urbanizationfavorsthe constitutionof a corps of specialistsin the management
of religious commodities,it contributes,too, to (a) the creation of a major religious
division (between laity and clergy), and (b) the systematizationand moralization of
religion,thus creatingone of the main turningpointsin the historyof religions.
In fact,if religion performsany social functionat all, it is because there is a public
searching forjustificationsfor their existence as occupants of definitesocial positions.
Hence, religiousinterests,in that theyconcern sociology,are directlydeterminedby the
social position of their respective holders. The agreement between the content of a
religiousmessage and the worldlyinterestsof itsaddressees is a sinequa non of the success
of such a message. Accordingly,religious demands tend to organize themselvesaround
two major poles correspondingto the two main sortsof social situation: (a) demands of
legitimation(suited to the rulingclasses), and (b) demands of compensation(suited to the
dominated). Hence, the message most capable of meeting the religious demands of a
social group, and of exertinga symbolicinfluenceupon it, would be the one givingthe
bestjustificationof theirstatusquo.
The constitutionof a fieldforthe managementof religiousinterestsis correlativeto the
objectiveexpropriationof the means of religiousproductionfromthose who withoutthe
corps of specialistsare thus establishedas laymen.Withregard to the developmentof the
religiousfield,the differentsocietiescan be classifiedbetweentwoextremesrangingfrom
religiousself-production,on the one side, to the entiremonopolyof religiousproduction,

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 NEW MARXIST APPROACHES 365

on the other. Depending on the location of a particularsocietywithinthese extremes,it

will feature remarkable differencesin the degree of division of religious labor, and
correlativelyalso in the kind of practicesand discoursesproduced by the specialistsof the
religiousfield.Bourdieu, while pointingthisout, insiststhatthe rejectionof ethnocentric
evolutionism should not conceal the fact that certain forms of religious action and
discourse can appear solelyunder a certaindegree of the social divisionof labor. In fact,
the level of the latterrenderspossible (or impossible)a particulardegree of thedivisionof
religiouslabor, thus making possible (or impossible) certain structuresof religious prac-
tices and beliefs. In short,the variationsin the formand level of differentiation of the
productiveactivityand, specifically,of the sociallyorganized symbolicproduction,yield
concomitantvariationsof the functionsand structureof a religiousmessage.
The mutations of the religious field, including the form and content of religious
practicesand discourses,cannot be understood as a direct resultof the socio-economic
transformations.The latterjust render possible a number of alterations within the
religiousfieldwhichbecome real if,and onlyif,concomitantvariationsin the structureof
relationsof (symbolic)productionwithinthe religiousfieldactuallydo take place.
The divisionof religious labor creates withinthe religious field a differentiationthat
transformsit into a structureof dissimilarinterests.This makes the interactionsestab-
lished withinthe same fieldowe theirformto the diverse interests(or functions)met by
religious actions (interestsand functionswhichconcern, on the one hand, the different
social categories of laymen and, on the other, the diverse religious categoriesof clergy-
men). Thus, the principle of the dynamics of the religious field and, thence, of the
alterationsof religiousideology,lies in the transactionsinstitutedon the basis of (a) the
differentialinterestsof specialistsand laymen,and (b) the competitiverelationsopposing
the diverse specialistswithinthe same field.
The competitiverelationsexistingwithinthe religiousfieldcan be seen as a strugglefor
"religiouspower." This is the capacityto modifypermanentlythe practicesand beliefsof
laymen by inculcatingin them a definitereligioushabitus(i.e, a lasting,generalized and
transposable disposition to act and think according to a specificreligious outlook). In
other words, religious power is the ownership of the religious means of production,
reproduction and distributionof the pertinentcommodities. Religious power results
from a transactionbetween clergymen and laymen. In this transaction,the relative
interestsof each categoryof functionariesand of each social group of laymen should be
satisfied,although perhaps only partiallyand differentially.
Religious legitimacyat a given moment is nothing else but the actual state of the
"religious power relations," that is, the outcome of the previous struggles for the
monopolyof the legitimateexerciseof religiouspower. As a consequence, thestructureof
the objective relationsbetween the differentcategories of specialistsat a given moment
determines(a) the set of possible formsof their interaction,and (b) the set of possible
images theymightproduce of those interactions.
Among the differentiationsconnected with the division of religious labor, the most
importantaccording to Bourdieu is the one opposing "priests"(specialistscharged with
the reproduction of the religious field and officiallyendowed with the legitimacy
renderingpossible the exercise of theirfunction)and "prophets"(specialistsdeveloping a
particularreligiousproductionwithoutan officiallegitimizationof theiraction). Whereas
the authorityof the prophet should be constantlyreassertedand depends on the relation
between his offer of religious commodities and the religious demands of the public
connected withhim, the authorityof the priest,conversely,is an authorityof function,
exempting him from the need to continuallyjustify it and shelteringhim from the
consequences of an eventual failure of his religious action. The concrete outcome of a
strugglebetween a corps of priests(a church) and a prophet does not rely only on the
strictlyreligiousforceof the propheticaction but, more so, on the objectiveforceof the

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366 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

respectivegroups mobilized by the two competitiveagencies in the extra-religious (social)

relations.To put it another way,the success of a prophetin his struggleforthe monopoly
of the legitimateexercise of religious power remains incomprehensibleas long as one
restswithinthe strictlimitsof the religiousfield.
Religious systems by their own symbolic structure are predisposed, according to
Bourdieu, to performthe social functionsof inclusion/exclusion, association/dissociation
and integration/distinction. These functions become political when symbolic systems
operate amid antagonisticclasses. As forthe Church (understood as a corps of specialized
functionariesendowed with officialreligious legitimacy),it makes its own specificcon-
tributionto the maintenanceof the social order preciselyby imposinga hierarchicallogic
in agreement with the structureof the religious field and of society. Moreover, the
homologybetweenthe positionof the Church in the religiousfieldand thatof the ruling
classes in the social structureconstrains the formerto consolidate the political order
through the preservationof the religious order, that is, the impositionof a religious
habitusconsonant withthe social structure,and thus able to "sanctify"the establishment,
along with the preventionof any prophetic or heretic attemptto subvertthe symbolic
order.
The prophetic discourse, whose emergence is more likely in critical social epochs,
tends, contraryto the Church, to fulfillrevolutionarysocial functions.If the prophet is
capable of actingas an organizingand mobilizingforce,it is preciselybecause preexistent
signs (message) and meanings (aspirationsof a public) meet in his own life and words.
Everythingindicates,meanwhile,thatan ecclesiasticschismmayturnintoa popular heresy
onlywhen thecompetitionbetweenprophecyand priestcraft articulatesitselfas a conflict
regarding the means of salvation. Even so, political and religious revolution do not
necessarilyrun together.The politicalrevolutiondoes not produce by itselfthe symbolic
revolutionit requires to succeed, nor does a symbolicrevolutionby itselfproduce the
politicalone. The prophet,thatperson capable of generatinga symbolicrevolutionamid
a politicalone, is probablythe only person who can bringboth revolutionstogether.

A CriticalSynthesis
Four ideas sum up the common perspectivein which these three marxistapproaches
meet and, simultaneously,break away fromthe classicalmarxian view of religion:
1. Religion is not a mere passive effectof the social relations of production; it is an
activeelementof social dynamics,both conditioningand conditionedby social processes.
2. Religionis not alwaysa subordinateelementwithinsocial processes; it mayoftenplay
an importantpart in the birthand consolidationof a particularsocial structure.
3. Religionis not necessarilya functional,reproductiveor conservativefactorin society;
it often is one of the main (and sometimesthe only) available channel to bring about a
social revolution.
4. The scientificstudyof religionis not an easy task; it requires a many-sidedempirical
approach whose results cannot be either substitutedor anticipated by theoreticalcon-
structs.
Godelier's main contributionto such a perspectiveis, probably,only a "negative"one:
that of doing away with the traditionalmarxistconception of religion as an exclusively
"superstructural"element, on the one hand, and of "substructure"as an exclusively
economic system,on the other hand. His analysis,though introducinga very interesting
definitionof substructure,lacks a clear and distinctexplanation of notions such as
superstructure,economic system
or ultimatedetermination.These notions,howeverprincipalin
Godelier's studies, remain rather obscure, not less than his distinctionbetween "deter-
minant"and "dominant."
Portelli'srepriseof Gramsci displays a richer and more positive contributionto the
subject. As Godelier, Gramsci rejectsthe mechanical reductionof the superstructureto a

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 NEW MARXIST APPROACHES 367

mere phenomenon of the substructure.However, Gramscigoes furtherin the analysisof

the superstructureand its relative autonomy, thus proposing the dynamic concepts of
historicalbloc,hegemony, organicand traditional ideologicalStateapparatus,and the
intellectuals,
like. In his detailed studieson Italian Catholicism,the concept of "dominancy"concerning
religion appears clearer and more useful than in Godelier: not an abstractresultof the
feudal substructure,but the contingentoutcome of structuraland historicalas well as
conjuncturalfactors.Moreover,Gramscifurnishesa prolificset of hypothesisconcerning
the complex relationshipsbetween class strugglesand religious institutions,hypotheses
that underline the active part of religious leaders, organizationsand doctrinesin many
social processes. Gramsci's works provide, too, a sound theoryof the social conditions
whichinfluenceboth the persistenceand the major alterationsof religionunder contem-
porarycapitalism;particularlyinterestingin thissense is his studyof the self-reproductive
mechanismsdeveloped withinthe Roman Catholic Church during the last century.
Actually,the gramscianapproach to religionseems to me so flexibleand fruitfulthatI
should declare myselfwithout other remarks than a call for assaying, enlarging and
enhancingitwithinthe "scientificcity,"a taskforwhichBourdieu's perspectiveappears as
the most reliable point of departure.
In stressingthe part of "religiousfunctionaries"(and theirconflicts)in the outcome of
social-religiousprocesses,a taskalready suggestedby Gramsci'stheoryof the intellectuals,
Bourdieu seems to overcome one of the major shortcomingsof classic marxism: the
refusalto consider the active part of some individualsand small groups in the course of
social changes. Following Weber, Bourdieu takes the concept of "religiouslabor" as the
basis for a theoryof the alterationsof the "religious field" as well as of the influenceof
religion upon the reproduction of society.Enhancing the pertinenceof the concept of
"divison of labor" in sociological analysis, he discloses a profitable approach to the
complex and dialecticalrelationshipsbetween social divisionof labor and the "divisionof
religious labor." In this approach, Bourdieu stressesthe utmostpart of "prophets,"not
only in the transformationsof the religious field,but in those of the social structureas
well.
I would like to close this brief synthesisby affirmingthat, thanks to Portelli and
Bourdieu, but also to Godelier, marxist sociology of religion has ceased to be the
reductionisttheorywe sociologistsof religionwere used to,and now becomes a usefultool
to interrogaterealitywhileorientingresearch. Withtheircontribution,Engels' concept of
"the relativeautonomyof religion"acquires a sound content,capable of posing religionas
a unique, specificand activeconstituentof society,whose particularanalysis,althoughby
no means sufficient,is nevertheless a must in order to understand the traits and
functioningof any religionwithina definitesociety.Let us onlyhope thattheseEuropean
ideas finda fertilesoil among American sociologists.

REFERENCES
Bourdieu, Pierre. 197 la. "Genese et structuredu champ religieux." Revue Francaisede Sociologie
12:295-334.
197 lb. "Une interpretationde la theoriede la religionselon Max Weber."Archives Europeennes de
Sociologie12:3-21.
Godelier, Maurice. 1970. "Preface." Pp. 13-142 in C.E.R.M. (eds), Sur lessocietes Paris:
precapitalistes.
Editions Sociales.
1972. "Marxisme,anthropologieet religion."Pp. 209-265 inEpistemologie etmarxisme.Paris: 10/18.
1973. Horizons, trajetsmarxistesen anthropologie.Paris: Maspero.
1974. "Vers une theoriemarxistedes faitreligieux."Lumiereet Vie 117-118: 85-94.
Portelli, Hughes. 1973. Gramsci e il blocco storico. Bari: Laterza.
1974. Gramsciet la question religieuse. Paris: Anthropos.

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