Reducing Climate Change Ep 280408
Reducing Climate Change Ep 280408
Reducing Climate Change Ep 280408
As stated in the Stern report, “the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the
economic costs of not acting” against climate change. The EU has taken the world lead in
developing policies to fight against climate change. Such policies must not only be effec-
tive in achieving their targets but also cost-effective in this task. The design of internal EU
and international climate change policies and the extent to which other countries will join
the EU in implementing climate policies determine the magnitude and the distribution of
the costs of fighting climate change.
Early, effective and cost-efficient policies are crucial to achieving the objective of keep-
ing future temperature changes below two degrees celsius. This implies the concentration
of efforts in two areas:
n Reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions should be the main focus of climate
change policies. A functioning carbon market should be the central element of such poli-
cies. Any other complementary instrument such as the use of renewables or the setting of
standards should be designed in order to contribute efficiently to the main goal.
The European Commission recently proposed a new regulatory package to reduce car-
bon emissions by 20 percent, increase the share of renewables to 20 percent of the energy
consumed and achieve a 10 percent share of biofuels in total transport fuel consumption.
A priority item on the EU agenda is to come up with the design of a post-Kyoto agree-
ment that manages to attract as many countries as possible and is, in particular, sensitive
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to developing countries’ demands. The feasibility and success of EU climate policies rely
heavily on the conclusion of such an agreement.
The short-term economic impact of climate policies and the incentives to free-ride
might prevent governments from adopting first-best policies. This reduces the incentives
of other governments to implement stricter climate policies in order to minimise the com-
petitive disadvantage to their industry. There are several economic dimensions affected
by climate change policies.
Climate change policies affect economic growth. The Stern review estimates that the
impact of stabilising atmospheric emissions at 500-550 ppm would represent about 1 per-
cent of GDP by 2050. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth
Assessment Report estimates that the undiscounted cost of stabilising CO2 emissions
at 450 ppm (which is roughly equivalent to the EU target of keeping the temperature
rise below two degrees) would be around 0.6 percent of GDP in 2030. Such figures are
based on the assumption that countries adopt the appropriate measures that allow them
to reduce carbon emissions at the lowest cost and that they do not have incentives to free-
ride. But the cost could be twice as much if policy inefficiencies and market imperfections
are taken into account. The cost of climate change policies does not only depend on the
objectives of such policies but also on the policies themselves.
Climate change polices also affect the terms of trade. Carbon pricing schemes (such as
the EU ETS) have an impact on competitiveness. The asymmetric implementation of car-
bon-pricing schemes places at a disadvantage firms (especially in carbon-intensive indus-
tries such as cement, steel or aluminium) located in countries which price carbon, and
might give them an incentive to relocate to countries with laxer environmental regulation.
But this is not the only concern. Even where action is taken on a more uniform collective
basis, concern remains that different countries will be affected differently by carbon-pric-
ing policies, owing to differences in competitive advantage and product specialisation.
Climate change policies can have an inflationary effect. Electricity producers need
emissions permits to generate electricity. Whether these are given to them for free or are
auctioned, the companies will incorporate them as a cost and are likely to pass them on
. Stern, N., (2006). Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
. IPCC, (2007). “Climate Change 2007 - Mitigation of Climate Change Working Group III contribution to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the IPCC”.
. Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, E. Massetti and M. Tavoni, (2007). “Optimal Energy Investment and R&D Strategies to Stabilise
Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Concentrations”, CEPR Discussion Paper 6549.
. See Delgado, J., (2007). “Why Europe is not carbon competitive”. Bruegel Policy Brief. www.bruegel.org. Issue
2007/05.
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Climate change policies have an impact on public accounts. Climate policies can be a
source of public revenue via taxes but also a source of expenditure via support to climate
change research, investment in R&D or tax breaks. Governments’ fiscal imbalances can be
affected by climate policies if climate related revenues are not sufficient to finance climate
spending. A carbon market may not be sufficient to meet the climate targets and addi-
tional measures requiring public funds might be needed.
With the aim of reducing the economic impact of climate change policies, the EU must
combine an effective and cost-efficient internal policy agenda focused on the reduction of
GHG emissions with the completion of a broad, global post-Kyoto agreement.
As far as EU climate policies are concerned, our recommendations are the following:
n The coverage of carbon pricing schemes (ie carbon markets and carbon taxes)
should be as wide as possible. This not only increases the effectiveness of carbon pricing
schemes (by covering a larger share of emissions) but also gives more flexibility in cutting
. European Commission, (2008). “Impact Assessment on the Package of Implementation Measures for the EU’s
Objectives on Climate Change and Renewable Energy for 2020”. Commission Staff Working Document SEC(2008) 85/3.
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emissions across sectors at the lowest cost, and reduces the competitive distortions across
countries and sectors.
n The degree of uncertainty surrounding the process both on the climate side and
on the technology side entails flexible policy design that does not rely on a single set of
assumptions and is adaptable to a changing environment.
n Price intervention should be avoided since prices provide the appropriate signal
for investment and consumer behaviour. High prices of carbon intensive energy sources
such as oil and coal create incentives to use renewables. Windfall profits derived from
the pass-through of carbon prices on to electricity prices can be “recovered” via auction-
ing of emission permits. The impact on prices can be relaxed through complementary
policies such as further energy liberalisation, trade and agricultural policy (in the case of
biofuels).
. See McKinsey, (2007). “A Cost Curve for Greenhouse Cost Reduction”, The McKinsey Quarterly, for a cost-based rank-
ing of alternatives to reduce carbon emissions.
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n A global market for carbon replicating the European ETS but on a larger scale
would not only reduce the total costs of reducing GHG emissions, but would also help
to level the playing field between countries, thus addressing concerns about the potential
differential impact on competitiveness of climate change policies. Other accompanying
measures and financial transfers which constitute relatively cheap ways of cutting emis-
sions, such as preventing deforestation, might also be desirable.
n The use of the project-based market mechanisms established under the Kyoto
Protocol – the Clean Development Mechanism and the Joint Implementation Projects –
should be promoted in order to facilitate the involvement of developing countries and to
reduce the cost of cutting emissions. However, the conditions under which such projects
qualify should be clearly established in order to make sure they are effective in reducing
GHG emissions.
n The asymmetric application of climate policies can place firms located in coun-
tries with stricter regulation at a competitive disadvantage. A comprehensive global agree-
ment would remove such asymmetries. However, in the absence of such an agreement, the
requirement for imports to participate in the carbon market is preferable to exclude most
affected sectors from the carbon market (which would reduce the effectiveness of the car-
bon market) or to generous grandfathering of emission allowances in such sectors (which
would not provide incentives to such sectors to reduce their emissions).
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