An Overview of Blockchain Technology: Architecture, Consensus, and Future Trends
An Overview of Blockchain Technology: Architecture, Consensus, and Future Trends
net/publication/318131748
CITATIONS
READS
2,031
284,969
5 authors, including:
Hong-Ning Dai
Lingnan University
198 PUBLICATIONS 6,943 CITATIONS
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
All content following this page was uploaded by Hong-Ning Dai on 06 October 2017.
5
TABLE I: Comparisons among public blockchain, consortium blockchain and private blockchain
Property Public blockchain Consortium blockchain Private blockchain
Consensus determination All miners Selected set of nodes One organization
5
TABLE II: Typical Consensus Algorithms Comparison
Property PoW PoS PBFT DPOS Ripple Tendermint
Node identity management open open permissioned open open permissioned
Tolerated power < 25% < 51% < 33.3% < 51% < 20% < 33.3%
of adversary computing stake faulty replicas validators faulty nodes in byzantine voting
power UNL power
Example Bitcoin [2] Peercoin [21] Hyperledger Bitshares [22] Ripple [23] Tendermint [24]
Fabric [18]
5
users need not to worry about the dishonest delegates as they • Example. Bitcoin is based on PoW while Peercoin is
could be voted out easily. DPOS is the backbone of Bitshares a new peer-to-peer PoS cryptocurrency. Further, Hyper-
[22]. ledger Fabric utilizes PBFT to reach consensus.
Ripple [23] is a consensus algorithm that utilizes Bitshares, a smart contract platform, adopts DPOS as
collectively-trusted subnetworks within the larger network. In their con- sensus algorithm. Ripple implements the
the network, nodes are divided into two types: server for Ripple protocol while Tendermint devises the
participating consensus process and client for only Tendermint protocol.
transferring funds. Each server has an Unique Node List
PBFT and Tendermint are permissioned protocols. Node
(UNL). UNL is important to the server. When determining
identities are expected to be known to the whole network,
whether to put a transaction into the ledger, the server would
so they might be used in commercial mode rather than public.
query the nodes in UNL and if the received agreements have
PoW and PoS are suitable for public blockchain. Consortium
reached 80%, the transaction would be packed into the ledger.
or private blockchain might has preference for PBFT, Tender-
For a node, the ledger will remain correct as long as the
mint, DPOS and Ripple.
percentage of faulty nodes in UNL is less than 20%.
Tendermint [24] is a byzantine consensus algorithm. A C. Advances on consensus algorithms
new block is determined in a round. A proposer would be
A good consensus algorithm means efficiency, safty and
selected to broadcast an unconfirmed block in this round. It
convenience. Recently, a number of endeavors have been
could be divided into three steps: 1) Prevote step. Validators
made to improve consensus algorithms in blockchain. New
choose whether to broadcast a prevote for the proposed block.
con- sensus algorithms are devised aiming to solve some
2) Precommit step. If the node has received more than 2/3 of
specific problems of blockchain. The main idea of PeerCensus
prevotes on the proposed block, it broadcasts a precommit for
[33] is to decouple block creation and transaction
that block. If the node has received over 2/3 of precommits,
confirmation so that the consensus speed can be significantly
it enters the commit step. 3) Commit step. The node validates
increased. Besides, Kraft [34] proposed a new consensus
the block and broadcasts a commit for that block. if the
method to ensure that a block is generated in a relatively
node has received 2/3 of the commits, it accepts the block.
stable speed. It is known that high blocks generation rate
Contrast to PBFT, nodes have to lock their coins to become
compromise Bitcoin’s security. So the Greedy Heaviest-
validators. Once a validator is found to be dishonest, it would
Observed Sub-Tree (GHOST) chain selection rule [35] is
be punished.
proposed to solve this problem. Instead of the longest branch
B. Consensus algorithms comparison scheme, GHOST weights the branches and miners could
Different consensus algorithms have different advantages choose the better one to follow. Chepurnoy et al. [36]
and disadvantages. Table II gives a comparison between d- presented a new consensus algorithm for peer-to- peer
ifferent consensus algorithms and we use the properties given blockchain systems where anyone who provides non-
by [32]. interactive proofs of retrievability for the past state snapshots
is agreed to generate the block. In such a protocol, miners
• Node identity management. PBFT needs to know the
only have to store old block headers instead of full blocks.
identity of each miner in order to select a primary in
every round while Tendermint needs to know the IV. CHALLENGES & RECENT ADVANCES
validators in order to select a proposer in each round. For
Despite the great potential of blockchain, it faces numerous
PoW, PoS, DPOS and Ripple, nodes could join the
challenges, which limit the wide usage of blockchain. We
network freely.
enumerate some major challenges and recent advances as
• Energy saving. In PoW, miners hash the block header
follows.
continuously to reach the target value. As a result, the
amount of electricity required to process has reach an A. Scalability
immense scale. As for PoS and DPOS, miners still have With the amount of transactions increasing day by day,
to hash the block header to search the target value but the blockchain becomes bulky. Each node has to store all
the work has been largely reduced as the search space transactions to validate them on the blockchain because they
is designed to be limited. As for PBFT, Ripple and have to check if the source of the current transaction is
Tendermint, there is no mining in consensus process. So unspent or not. Besides, due to the original restriction of block
it saves energy greatly. size and the time interval used to generate a new block, the
• Tolerated power of adversary. Generally 51% of hash
Bitcoin blockchain can only process nearly 7 transactions per
power is regarded as the threshold for one to gain control second, which cannot fulfill the requirement of processing
of the network. But selfish mining strategy [10] in PoW millions of transactions in real-time fashion. Meanwhile, as
systems could help miners to gain more revenue by only the capacity of blocks is very small, many small transactions
25% of the hashing power. PBFT and Tendermint is might be delayed since miners prefer those transactions with
designed to handle up to 1/3 faulty nodes. Ripple is high transaction fee.
proved to maintain correctness if the faulty nodes in an There are a number of efforts proposed to address the
UNL is less than 20%. scalability problem of blockchain, which could be categorized
into two types:
5
• Storage optimization of blockchain. Since it is harder for becomes harder to reveal relationship between Alice and
node to operate full copy of ledger, Bruce proposed a Bob. However, the intermediary could be dishonest and
novel cryptocurrency scheme, in which the old reveal Alice and Bob’s private information on purpose.
transaction records are removed (or forgotten) by the It is also possible that Carol transfers Alice’s funds to
network [37]. A database named account tree is used to her own address instead of Bob’s address. Mixcoin [43]
hold the balance of all non-empty addresses. Besides provides a simple method to avoid dishonest behaviours.
lightweight client could also help fix this problem. A The intermediary encrypts users’ requirements including
novel schem named VerSum [38] was proposed to funds amount and transfer date with its private key. Then
provide another way allowing lightweight clients to exist. if the intermediary did not transfer the money, anybody
VerSum allows lightweight clients to outsource could verify that the intermediary cheated. However,
expensive computations over large inputs. It ensures the theft is detected but still not prevented. Coinjoin [44]
computation result is correct through comparing results depends on a central mixing server to shuffle output
from multiple servers. addresses to prevent theft. And inspired by Coinjoin,
• Redesigning blockchain. In [39], Bitcoin-NG (Next Gen- CoinShuffle [45] uses decryption mixnets for address
eration) was proposed. The main idea of Bitcoin-NG is shuffling.
to decouple conventional block into two parts: key block • Anonymous. In Zerocoin [46], zero-knowledge proof
for leader election and microblock to store transactions. is used. Miners do not have to validate a transaction
The protocol divides time into epoches. In each epoch, with digital signature but to validate coins belong to
miners have to hash to generate a key block. Once the a list of valid coins. Payment’s origin are unlinked
key block is generated, the node becomes the leader who from transactions to prevent transaction graph analyses.
is responsible for generating microblocks. Bitcoin-NG But it still reveals payments’ destination and amounts.
also extended the heaviest (longest) chain strategy in Zerocash [47] was proposed to address this problem.
which microblocks carry no weight. In this way, In Zerocash, zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive
blockchain is redesigned and the tradeoff between block Arguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) is leveraged.
size and network security has been addressed. Transaction amounts and the values of coins held by
B. Privacy Leakage users are hidden.
Blockchain can preserve a certain amount of privacy C. Selfish Mining
through the public key and private key. Users transact with
Blockchain is susceptible to attacks of colluding selfish
their private key and public key without any real identity
miners. In particular, Eyal and Sirer [10] showed that the
exposure. However, it is shown in [40], [5] that blockchain
network is vulnerable even if only a small portion of the
cannot guarantee the transactional privacy since the values of
hashing power is used to cheat. In selfish mining strategy,
all transactions and balances for each public key are publicly
selfish miners keep their mined blocks without broadcasting
visible. Besides, the recent study [41] has shown that a user’s
and the private branch would be revealed to the public only
Bitcoin transactions can be linked to reveal user’s
if some requirements are satisfied. As the private branch is
information. Moreover, Biryukov et al. [11] presented an
longer than the current public chain, it would be admitted
method to link user pseudonyms to IP addresses even when
by all miners. Before the private blockchain publishment,
users are behind Network Address Translation (NAT) or
honest miners are wasting their resources on an useless branch
firewalls. In [11], each client can be uniquely identified by a
while selfish miners are mining their private chain without
set of nodes it connects to. However, this set can be
competitors. So selfish miners tend to get more revenue.
learned and used to find the origin of a transaction.
Based on selfish mining, many other attacks have been
Multiple methods have been proposed to improve anonymity
proposed to show that blockchain is not so secure. In stubborn
of blockchain, which could be roughly categorized into two
mining [48], miners could amplify its gain by non-trivially
types:
composing mining attacks with network-level eclipse attacks.
• Mixing [42]. In blockchain, users addresses are
The trail-stubbornness is one of the stubborn strategy that
pseudony- mous. But it is still possible to link addresses miners still mine the blocks even if the private chain is left
to user real identity as many users make transactions behind. Yet in some cases, it can result in 13% gains in
with the same address frequently. Mixing service is a comparison with a non-trail-stubborn counterpart. [49] shows
kind of service which provides anonymity by transferring that there are selfish mining strategies that earn more money
funds from multiple input addresses to multiple output and are profitable for smaller miners compared to simple
addresses. For example, user Alice with address A wants selfish mining. But the gains are relatively small.
to send some funds to Bob with address B. If Alice Furthermore, it shows that attackers with less than 25% of the
directly makes a transaction with input address A and computational resources can still gain from selfish mining. To
output address B, relationship between Alice and Bob help fix the selfish mining problem, Heilman [50] presented
might be revealed. So Alice could send funds to a trusted an novel approach for honest miners to choose which branch
intermediary Carol. Then Carol transfer funds to Bob to follow. With random beacons and timestamps, honest
with multiple inputs c1, c2, c3, etc., and multiple output miners would select more fresh blocks. However, [50] is
d1, d2, B, d3, etc. Bob’s address B is also contained in vulnerable to
the output addresses. So it
5
forgeable timestamps. ZeroBlock [51] builds on the simple be extracted. Users can predict their potential partners’ trading
scheme: Each block must be generated and accepted by the behaviours with the analysis.
network within a maximum time interval. Within ZeroBlock,
selfish miners cannot achieve more than its expected reward. D. Blockchain applications
Currently most blockchains are used in the financial
V. POSSIBLE FUTURE DIRECTIONS
domain, more and more applications for different fields are
Blockchain has shown its potential in industry and appearing. Traditional industries could take blockchain into
academi- considera- tion and apply blockchain into their fields to
a. We discuss possible future directions with respect to four enhance their systems. For example, user reputations could be
areas: blockchain testing, stop the tendency to centralization, stored on blockchain. At the same time, the up-and-
big data analytics and blockchain application. coming industry could make use of blockchain to improve
performance. For example, Arcade City [51], a ridesharing
A. Blockchain testing
startup offers an open marketplace where riders connect
Recently different kinds of blockchains appear and over directly with drivers by leveraging blockchain technology.
700 cryptocurrencies are listed in [52] up to now. However, A smart contract is a computerized transaction protocol that
some developers might falsify their blockchain performance executes the terms of a contract [54]. It has been proposed
to attract investors driven by the huge profit. Besides that, for long time and now this concept can be implemented with
when users want to combine blockchain into business, they blockchain. In blockchain, smart contract is a code fragment
have to know which blockchain fits their requirements. So that could be executed by miners automatically. Smart
blockchain testing mechanism needs to be in place to test contract has transformative potential in various fields like
different blockchains. financial services and IoT.
Blockchain testing could be separated into two phases:
standardization phase and testing phase. In standardization VI. CONCLUSION
phase, all criteria have to be made and agreed. When a Blockchain has shown its potential for transforming tradi-
blockchain is born, it could be tested with the agreed criteria tional industry with its key characteristics: decentralization,
to valid if the blockchain works fine as developers claim. As persistency, anonymity and auditability. In this paper, we
for testing phase, blockchain testing needs to be performed present a comprehensive overview on blockchain. We first
with different criteria. For example, an user who is in charge give an overview of blockchain technologies including
of online retail business cares about the throughput of the blockchain architecture and key characteristics of blockchain.
blockchain, so the examination needs to test the average time We then dis- cuss the typical consensus algorithms used in
from a user send a transaction to the transaction is packed into blockchain. We analyzed and compared these protocols in
the blockchain, capacity for a blockchain block and etc. different respects. Furthermore, we listed some challenges and
problems that would hinder blockchain development and
B. Stop the tendency to centralization summarized some existing approaches for solving these
Blockchain is designed as a decentralized system. problems. Some possible future directions are also proposed.
However, there is a trend that miners are centralized in the Nowadays blockchain- based applications are springing up
mining pool. Up to now, the top 5 mining pools together owns and we plan to conduct in-depth investigations on blockchain-
larger than 51% of the total hash power in the Bitcoin network based applications in the future.
[53]. Apart from that, selfish mining strategy [10] showed that ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
pools with over 25% of total computing power could get more
revenue than fair share. Rational miners would be attracted The work described in this paper was supported by the
into the selfish pool and finally the pool could easily exceed National Key Research and Development Program (2016YF-
51% of the total power. As the blockchain is not intended to B1000101), the National Natural Science Foundation of
serve a few organizations, some methods should be proposed China under (61472338), the Fundamental Research Funds
to solve this problem. for the Central Universities and Macao Science and
Technology De- velopment Fund under Grant No.
C. Big data analytics 096/2013/A3. The authors would like to thank Gordon K.-T.
Blockchain could be well combined with big data. Here Hon for his constructive comments.
we roughly categorized the combination into two types: data REFERENCES
management and data analytics. As for data management, [1] “State of blockchain q1 2016: Blockchain funding overtakes
blockchain could be used to store important data as it is bitcoin,” 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.coindesk.com/ state-of-
distributed and secure. Blockchain could also ensure the data blockchain-q1-2016/
is original. For example, if blockchain is used to store patients [2] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008.
[Online]. Available: https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
health information, the information could not be tampered and [3] G. W. Peters, E. Panayi, and A. Chapelle, “Trends in crypto-currencies
it is hard to stole those private information. When it comes to and blockchain technologies: A monetary theory and regulation
data analytics, transactions on blockchain could be used for perspective,” 2015. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.
2646618
big data analytics. For example, user trading patterns might
5
[4] G. Foroglou and A.-L. Tsilidou, “Further applications of the
[31] “Antshares digital assets for everyone,” 2016. [Online]. Available:
blockchain,” 2015.
https://www.antshares.org
[5] A. Kosba, A. Miller, E. Shi, Z. Wen, and C. Papamanthou, “Hawk:
[32] M. Vukolic´, “The quest for scalable blockchain fabric: Proof-of-
The blockchain model of cryptography and privacy-preserving smart
work vs. bft replication,” in International Workshop on Open Problems
contracts,” in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
in Network Security, Zurich, Switzerland, 2015, pp. 112–125.
(SP), San Jose, CA, USA, 2016, pp. 839–858. [33] C. Decker, J. Seidel, and R. Wattenhofer, “Bitcoin meets strong con-
[6] B. W. Akins, J. L. Chapman, and J. M. Gordon, “A whole new world: sistency,” in Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Dis-
Income tax considerations of the bitcoin economy,” 2013. [Online]. tributed Computing and Networking (ICDCN). Singapore, Singapore:
Available: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2394738 ACM, 2016, p. 13.
[7] Y. Zhang and J. Wen, “An iot electric business model based on the [34] D. Kraft, “Difficulty control for blockchain-based consensus systems,”
protocol of bitcoin,” in Proceedings of 18th International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 397–413,
Intelligence in Next Generation Networks (ICIN), Paris, France, 2015, 2016.
pp. 184–191. [35] Y. Sompolinsky and A. Zohar, “Accelerating bitcoin’s transaction pro-
[8] M. Sharples and J. Domingue, “The blockchain and kudos: A distributed cessing. fast money grows on trees, not chains.” IACR Cryptology ePrint
system for educational record, reputation and reward,” in Proceedings of Archive, vol. 2013, no. 881, 2013.
11th European Conference on Technology Enhanced Learning (EC-TEL [36] A. Chepurnoy, M. Larangeira, and A. Ojiganov, “A prunable blockchain
2015), Lyon, France, 2015, pp. 490–496. consensus protocol based on non-interactive proofs of past states retriev-
[9] C. Noyes, “Bitav: Fast anti-malware by distributed blockchain ability,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1603.07926, 2016.
consensus and feedforward scanning,” arXiv preprint [37] J. Bruce, “The mini-blockchain scheme,” July 2014. [Online]. Available:
arXiv:1601.01405, 2016. http://cryptonite.info/files/mbc-scheme-rev3.pdf
[10] I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer, “Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is [38] J. van den Hooff, M. F. Kaashoek, and N. Zeldovich, “Versum:
vulnerable,” in Proceedings of International Conference on Financial Verifiable computations over large public logs,” in Proceedings of the
Cryptography and Data Security, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2014, pp. 436– 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
454. Security, New York, NY, USA, 2014, pp. 1304–1316.
[11] A. Biryukov, D. Khovratovich, and I. Pustogarov, “Deanonymisation [39] I. Eyal, A. E. Gencer, E. G. Sirer, and R. Van Renesse, “Bitcoin-
of clients in bitcoin p2p network,” in Proceedings of the 2014 ACM ng: A scalable blockchain protocol,” in Proceedings of 13th USENIX
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, New Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI
York, NY, USA, 2014, pp. 15–29. 16), Santa Clara, CA, USA, 2016, pp. 45–59.
[12] F. Tschorsch and B. Scheuermann, “Bitcoin and beyond: A technical [40] S. Meiklejohn, M. Pomarole, G. Jordan, K. Levchenko, D. McCoy, G.
survey on decentralized digital currencies,” IEEE Communications Sur- M. Voelker, and S. Savage, “A fistful of bitcoins: Characterizing
veys Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 2084–2123, 2016. payments among men with no names,” in Proceedings of the 2013
[13] NRI, “Survey on blockchain technologies and related services,” Tech. Conference on Internet Measurement Conference (IMC’13), New York,
Rep., 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/ NY, USA, 2013.
2016/pdf/0531 01f.pdf [41] J. Barcelo, “User privacy in the public bitcoin blockchain,” 2014.
[14] D. Lee Kuo Chuen, Ed., Handbook of Digital Currency, 1st ed. [42] M. Mo¨ser, “Anonymity of bitcoin transactions: An analysis of
Elsevier, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc: mixing services,” in Proceedings of Mu¨nster Bitcoin Conference,
eee:monogr:9780128021170 Mu¨nster, Germany, 2013, pp. 17–18.
[15] V. Buterin, “A next-generation smart contract and decentralized appli- [43] J. Bonneau, A. Narayanan, A. Miller, J. Clark, J. A. Kroll, and E. W.
cation platform,” white paper, 2014. Felten, “Mixcoin: Anonymity for bitcoin with accountable mixes,” in
[16] D. Johnson, A. Menezes, and S. Vanstone, “The elliptic curve digital Proceedings of International Conference on Financial Cryptography
signature algorithm (ecdsa),” International Journal of Information Se- and Data Security, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2014, pp. 486–504.
curity, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 36–63, 2001. [44] G. Maxwell, “Coinjoin: Bitcoin privacy for the real world,” in Post on
[17] V. Buterin, “On public and private blockchains,” Bitcoin Forum, 2013.
2015. [Online]. Available: https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/ on- [45] T. Ruffing, P. Moreno-Sanchez, and A. Kate, “Coinshuffle: Practical
public-and-private-blockchains/ decentralized coin mixing for bitcoin,” in Proceedings of European
[18] “Hyperledger project,” 2015. [Online]. Available: https://www. Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Cham, 2014, pp. 345–
hyperledger.org/ 364.
[19] “Consortium chain development.” [Online]. Available: https://github. [46] I. Miers, C. Garman, M. Green, and A. D. Rubin, “Zerocoin:
com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Consortium-Chain-Development Anonymous distributed e-cash from bitcoin,” in Proceedings of IEEE
[20] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease, “The byzantine generals prob- Symposium Security and Privacy (SP), Berkeley, CA, USA, 2013, pp.
lem,” ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 397–411.
(TOPLAS), vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 382–401, 1982. [47] E. B. Sasson, A. Chiesa, C. Garman, M. Green, I. Miers, E. Tromer, and
[21] S. King and S. Nadal, “Ppcoin: Peer-to-peer crypto-currency with proof- M. Virza, “Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments from bitcoin,”
of-stake,” Self-Published Paper, August, vol. 19, 2012. in Proceedings of 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP),
[22] “Bitshares - your share in the decentralized exchange.” [Online]. San Jose, CA, USA, 2014, pp. 459–474.
Available: https://bitshares.org/ [48] K. Nayak, S. Kumar, A. Miller, and E. Shi, “Stubborn mining:
Generaliz- ing selfish mining and combining with an eclipse attack,” in
[23] D. Schwartz, N. Youngs, and A. Britto, “The ripple protocol consensus
Proceedings of 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and
algorithm,” Ripple Labs Inc White Paper, vol. 5, 2014.
Privacy (EuroS&P), Saarbrucken, Germany, 2016, pp. 305–320.
[24] J. Kwon, “Tendermint: Consensus without mining,” URL
[49] A. Sapirshtein, Y. Sompolinsky, and A. Zohar, “Optimal selfish mining
http://tendermint. com/docs/tendermint v04. pdf, 2014.
{ strategies in bitcoin,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.06183, 2015.
[25] S. King, “Primecoin: Cryptocurrency with prime number proof-of- [50] S. Billah, “One weird trick to stop selfish miners: Fresh bitcoins, a
work,” July 7th, 2013. solution for the honest miner,” 2015.
[26] P. Vasin, “Blackcoins proof-of-stake protocol v2,” 2014. [Online]. [51] S. Solat and M. Potop-Butucaru, “ZeroBlock: Timestamp-Free
Avail- able: https://blackcoin.co/blackcoin-pos-protocol-v2- Prevention of Block-Withholding Attack in Bitcoin,” Sorbonne
whitepaper.pdf Universites, UPMC University of Paris 6, Technical Report, May 2016.
[27] G. Wood, “Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction [Online]. Available: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01310088
ledger,” Ethereum Project Yellow Paper, 2014. [52] “Crypto-currency market capitalizations,” 2017. [Online]. Available:
[28] V. Zamfir, “Introducing casper the friendly ghost,” Ethereum https://coinmarketcap.com
Blog URL: https://blog. ethereum. org/2015/08/01/introducing-casper- [53] “The biggest mining pools.” [Online]. Available: https:
friendly-ghost, 2015. //bitcoinworldwide.com/mining/pools/
[29] C. Miguel and L. Barbara, “Practical byzantine fault tolerance,” in [54] N. Szabo, “The idea of smart contracts,” 1997.
Proceedings of the Third Symposium on Operating Systems Design and
Implementation, vol. 99, New Orleans, USA, 1999, pp. 173–186.
[30] D. Mazieres, “The stellar consensus protocol: A federated model for
internet-level consensus,” Stellar Development Foundation, 2015.
564
View publication stats