Based on the book of Reyes on PRC principal by induction, where the killer is the principal by direct

participation.

CRIMINAL LAW I Two or more persons who took part in the commission of the crime
are principals by direct participation, when the following requisites
Art. 17: Principals are present:
1. That they participated in the criminal resolution
Art. 17. Principals. – the following are considered principals:
2. That they carried out their plan and personally took part
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; end
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense Co-principals
by another act without which it would not have been Where 2 accused each inflicted a serious wound which contribute
accomplished. to the death of the victim

1. That they participated in the criminal resolution

Two or more persons participating in the crime
• 2 or more persons are said to have participated in the
• When 2 or more persons are involved in killing another,
criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at
it is necessary to determine the participation of each.
the time of the commission of the crime.
• If they are all principals, all of them may be principals by
• A person may be convicted for the criminal act of
(a) Direct participation (Art. 17, par. 1)
another where, between hem, there has been
(b) Principal by induction (Art. 17, par. 2)
conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the
(c) Principal by direct participation by indispensable
commission of the crime charged.
cooperation (Art. 17, par. 3)
Conspiracy
• Exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement
Example:
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
A, by promises of price and reward, induced B to kill C, a person
it (Art. 8, par. 2)
living on an island far from the mainland. D, the owner of the only
• Conspiracy contemplated in the 1st requisite s not a felony,
motor boat in the place and knowing the criminal designs of A and
but only a manner of incurring criminal liability
B, offered to transport and actually transported B to the island.
• RULE: to be a party to a conspiracy, one must have the
Once there, B alone killed C.
intention to participate in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose
A – principal participation by directly inducing B to kill C
• Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act
B – principal who took direct part in the execution of the felony by
without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not
personally killing C
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy – there must
D – Also a principal, since he cooperated in the commission of the
be an intentional participation
offense by another act (transporting the actual killer to
• Ways to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of
the island) without which the commission of the offense
conspiracy:
would not have been accomplished.
1. Actively participating in the actual commission of the
crime
Difference between a principal under any of the 3 categories
2. Lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
enumerated in Art. 17 and a co-conspirator:
being present at the scene of the crime
3. Exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the
(a) Accused who is principal under any of the 3 categories
conspirators as to move them to executing the
enumerated in Art. 17 – criminal liability is limited to his
conspiracy.
own acts
(b) A co-conspirator who is also a principal – responsibility • Silence does not make one a conspirator
includes the acts of his fellow conspirators • Conspiracy transcends companionship
_____________________________________________________ - The 2 accused may have happened t leave together,
and one of them left a closing warning to the victim,
Par. 1: Principals by direct participation cannot instantly support a finding of conspiracy.
• Existence of conspiracy does not require necessarily an
“Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act.” agreement for an appreciable length of time prior to the
• Principal by direct participation personally takes part in execution of its purpose – conspiracy exists if at the time of
the execution of the act constituting the crime the commission of the offense, the accused had the same
• One who only orders or induces another to commit a purpose and were united in its execution
crime is not a principal by direct participation because he • Conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree,
does not personally execute the act constituting the expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith
crime but a principal by induction decide to pursue it.

E.g. A common-law wife who induced the killing of another

common-law wife of her husband by giving money to the killer is a
Proof of Conspiracy responsibility of one who is alleged to have taken a direct
(a) The direct evidence of conspiracy may consist in the part in the killing, but who has not himself inflicted an
interlocking extrajudicial confessions of several accused injury materially contributing to the death.
and the testimony of one of the accused who is
discharged and made a witness against his co-accused People v. Ortiz and Zausa
who did not make any confession. Defense contends that Ortiz should be acquitted since he did
not take part in the attack made by Modesa Zausa and there
In absence of collusion among the declarants, their was no previous agreement between them to murder Sotero
confessions may form a complete picture of the whole Bancoyo. Each of the participants is liable only for the acts
situation and may be considered collectively as committed by himself
corroborative and/or confirmatory of the evidence
independent therefrom. E.g. Two assailants each caused a mortal inflicted wound by
stabbing the victim with a knife while the other with a bolo -
(b) To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be A is convicted of murder and the other of only less serious
proofs as to the previous agreement and decision to physical injuries.
commit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors
shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same picture. Conspiracy is implied when the accused had a common purpose
and were united in its execution
Formal agreement or previous acquaintance among several
persons not necessary in conspiracy Unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime:
• It is sufficient enough that there is a meeting of the minds
understandingly so as t bring about an intelligent and a. Spontaneous agreement at the moment of the commission of
deliberate agreement t commit the offense charged. the crime is sufficient to create joint responsibility
• Sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all the
People v. Ibanez
accused manifested by their acts a common intent or
Deceased challenged the 2 accused, who accepted assaulted and
desire to attach so that the act of one accused becomes
killed the challenger, it was said that the acceptance of the
the act of all.
challenge by the 2 accused and their concert of attack clearly
• Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence
showed a community of purpose and design
• Conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting
among them to concert ways and means is proved.
b. Active cooperation by all the offenders in the perpetration of
• Conspiracy is shown where the offenders we all present
the crime will also create joint responsibility
at the scene of the crime, acted in concert in attacking
a.
the victims, assaulting and beating them up and chasing
them and stabbing, divesting them of their watches, gold c. Contributing by positive acts to the realization of a common
rings, etc. criminal intent also creates joint responsibility
-
Conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence
• Establish a finding of criminal conspiracy-proof beyond d. Presence during the commission of the crime by a band and
reasonable doubt lending moral support thereto, also create joint responsibility
• A defendant satisfactorily explained his presence with with the material executors.
the group that committed the robbery, he cannot be -
considered as a conspirator
e. Where one of the accused knew of the plan of others to kill the
• Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of
2 victims and he accepted the role assigned to him, which was
its commission is not by itself sufficient to establish
to shoot one of the victims, and he actually performed that
conspiracy.
role, he is a co-principal by direct participation in the double
• To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of
murder.
conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an
-
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy (either actively
participating in actual commission of the crime; lending Ownership of the safe house
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present; If an unoccupied house will become the venue of the crime and the
exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the co- owner has no knowledge on the crime, he is not criminally liable
conspirators)
There may be conspiracy even if there is no evident premeditation
When there is no conspiracy, each of the offenders is liable only for on the part of the accused
the act performed by him
Liability of participants where there is conspiracy
Participation in criminal resolution is essential The act of one is the act of all – there will be collective responsibility
• Accused must also participate in the criminal resolution • Liability of a conspirator for another conspirator’s acts
of the other which differ radically and substantially from which they
• In homicide, immediate participation in the criminal intended to commit.
design entertained by the slayer is essential to the
 • If robbers are only 3, or even than 3 but not more than 3 Conspiracy presupposes an agreement and a decision to commit a
are armed, Art. 29 is not applicable and the robber who felony
does not take part in the assault is not liable.
In cases of criminal negligence or crimes punishable by special law,
Where there is conspiracy to commit a felony, all of the allowing or falling to prevent an act to be performed by another,
conspirators are liable for its consequences makes one a co-principal

A conspirator is not liable for another’s crime which is not an object People v. Santos: Professional driver allowing his conductor to drive
of the conspiracy or which is not a necessary and logical the truck which then bumped into a jeepney resulting in the death
consequence thereof of one jeepney passenger, was held criminally liable as co-principal
of homicide and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
Other defendants not held liable for the killing of persons not Both the driver and the conductor were held liable as co-principals.
covered by the conspiracy
US v. Siy Cong Bieng & Co Kong: Storeowner held liable for the act
Conspiracy may cover persons previously undetermined of his employee for selling an adulterated coffee although the
storeowner did not know that the coffee was sold by his employee.
A person in conspiracy with others, who had desisted before the Both the storeowner and the employee were held liable as
crime was committed by the others, is not criminally liable principals.

When there is conspiracy, it is not necessary to ascertain the People v. Ong Chiat Lay:
specific act of each conspirator Held: One of the accused as not a principal by direct participation
because he was absent from the scene of the fire when the crime
When there is conspiracy, the fact that an element of the offense of arson was committed by the other accused.
is not present as regards one of the conspirators is immaterial
Exceptions: Two or more persons who took part in the commission of the crime
1. In the crime of parricide, the element of relationship are principals by direct participation, when the following requisites
must be present as regards all the offenders are present:
2. In the crime of murder where treachery is an element of 1. That they participated in the criminal resolution
the crime, all the offenders must at least have knowledge 2. That they carried out their plan and personally took part
of the employment of treachery at the time of the in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same
execution of the act or their cooperation therein. end
_____________________________________________________
All are liable for the crime of abduction, even if only one acted with
lewd (obscene/vulgar) designs Second requisite: Principals by direct participation
Lewd designs on the part of the offender is an element of the crime – culprits carried out their plan and personally took part in its
of abduction (Art. 342 – forcible abduction; Art. 343 – consented execution, by acts which directly tended to the same end.
abduction)
The principals by direct participation must be at the scene of the
People v. Padilla: Case of forcible abduction with rape where crime, personally take part in its execution
accused conspired with his co-accused o forcible abduct Carmen by
dragging her out of the house where she was staying, boxing her, Exception to the rule:
prying loose the hold of her aunt, threatening to kill her if anyone To be a principal by direct participation, the offender must be at
comes near, and standing guard to prevent any intrusion as his co- the scene of the commission of the crime:
accused raped Carmen, the accused’s claim that he did not directly People v. Santos
participate in the abduction nor cooperated in the commission of The conspiracy to kidnap and ill the victim and only one of the
the rape. He is a co-principal not only by direct participation but conspirators kidnapped the victim and, after turning him over to his
also by cooperation. co-conspirators for execution, left the spot where the victim was
killed. The one who kidnapped the victim was liable for murder
In multiple rape, each rapist is equally liable for the other rapes committed by others.
Each defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally Reason:
committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others By kidnapping the victim, he already performed his part and the
since each of them cooperated in the commission of the rape killing was done by his co-conspirators in pursuance of the
perpetrated by the others, by acts which it would not have been conspiracy.
accomplished.
The acts of each offender must directly tend to same end
Participation in another’s criminal resolution must either precede Acts of each and every one of the offenders are all directed to the
or be coetaneous (co-existent) with the criminal act same end – the killing of their victim. Criminal responsibility is
collective.
There could be no conspiracy to commit an offense through
negligence
One serving as guard pursuant to the conspiracy is a principal by a. By giving price, or offering reward or promise
direct participation Principal by inducement – giver of the price/reward
EXCEPTION: Principal by direct participation – one committing the crime
People v. Samano
The guards doing so in obedience to superior orders and without People v. Lao
knowledge that the deceased wo was then under investigation Wife, who induced the killing of the mistress of her husband by
would later be killed. There was no evidence that there was giving money to the killer, by induction. The killer is a principal by
conspiracy between those who pleaded guilty and he present direct participation
appellants.
HELD: Mere passive presence at the scene of another’s crime does b. By using words of command
not constitute complicity. Both the person who used the words of command and the
person who committed the crime, because the words of
Where the second requisite is lacking, there is only one conspiracy command, are equally liable. There is also a collective
There is only a conspiracy among the several defendants who criminal responsibility
participated in the criminal resolution, and if the crime they agreed
and decided to commit is not treason, rebellion or sedition, they Requisites of using words of command:
are not criminally liable. In order that a person may be convicted as a principal by
E.g. Timbol case: inducement, the following requisites must be present:
Dalmacio Timbo, who merely conspired with his co-accused to kill 1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention
the deceased but left the place before his co-accused began of procuring the commission of the crime;
shooting the deceased, was acquitted of the charge of murder.
People v. Otadora:
Accused, blinded by the grudge which she bore against
Par. 2: Principals by induction the deceased, caused her co-accused through promise of
pecuniary gain to shoot the victims with a gun which she
Provides for the second class of principals had furnished the latter, it is clear that she had the
Art. 17: intention of procuring the commission of the crime.
“Those who directly force or induce others to commit it.”
- Principals by induction 2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the
- Principals by inducement commission of the crime by the material executor.
- Spanish autores por induccion – price, promise of reward, Inducement exists if the command or advice is of nature
command, and pacto that, without its concurrence, the crime would not have
materialized.
The principal by induction becomes liable only when the principal
by direct participation committed the act induced EXCEPTION:
If the principal by direct participation had personal
People v. Ong Chiat Lay reason to commit the rime so that he would commit it
Held that one cannot be held guilty of having instigated the just the same even if no inducement was made by
commission of the crime without first being shown that the crime another, this second requisite des not exist.
was actually committed by the other.
Alcontin case:
Two ways of becoming principal by induction under Art. 17: Proposition of the woman, in view of the relations
1. By directly forcing another to commit a crime existing between her and the other accused, was the
2. By directly inducing another to commit a crime. determining cause of the commission of the crime by the
latter.
1. By directly forcing another to commit a crime
US v. Indanan:
2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime* To constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the
a. By using irresistible force inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort
b. By causing uncontrollable fear to secure the commission of the crime, together with the
*In these cases, there is no conspiracy, not even a unity of criminal presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of
purpose and intention. Only the one using force or causing fear is temptation to commit the crime.
criminally liable. The material executor is not criminally liable
because of Art. 12, par. 5 and 6. A thoughtless expression without intention to produce the result is
not an inducement to commit a crime
2. By directly inducing another to commit a crime ✓ Chance word spoken without reflection
✓ Wrong appreciation of a situation
a. By giving price, or offering reward or promise ✓ Ironical phrase
b. By using words of command ✓ Thoughtless act
- The one who spoke the word or performed the act would
not be guilty of the crime committed by the other
 There is collective criminal responsibility when words of
Example of imprudent advice, not constituting sufficient inducement were used.
inducement:
US v. Indanan: One who planned the crime committed by another is a principal by
A person who advised a married woman whose husband was very inducement
stingy and treated her badly that the only thing for her to do was to The persons who planned the crime committed by other persons
rob him, was not guilty of the crime of robbery by inducement, for are guilty as authors by inducement.
the reason that an imprudent and ill-conceived advise is not
sufficient – the person who gave the advice did not have the If the crime committed is not contemplated in the order given, the
intention to procure the commission of the crime. inducement is not material and not the determining cause thereof

The inducement may be by acts of command, advice, or through People v. Lawas

influence, or agreement for consideration Accused Lawas, as head of the home guards whose duty was to
- So effective that it alone determines the commission preserve peace and order among the inhabitants in Barrio Baris,
of the crime Lanao, ordered his men to fire at the Moros suspected of having
killed 11 Christian residents. In the course of the melee that
The words of advice of the influence must have actually moved the followed, some of the home guards fired at the women and
hands of the principal by direct participation children who were in the 2nd floor of the house.
HELD: Lawas is not guilt of murder for the killing of the women
US v. Indanan and children, because to hold him liable as principal by induction,
Person who persuaded an inexperienced boy of tender age to steal it is necessary (1) that the inducement is material and precedes
certain jewels of his grandmother was found guilty of theft by the commission of the crime; (2) that such inducement is the
inducement. determining cause thereof.

Minors under 15 are easily susceptible to the suggestions of the Principal by inducement in falsification
inducer, because usually they have no discernment or judgment of People v. Giok
their own. Employee of the office of the treasurer who performed the overt
act of writing the false facts on the residence certificate of the
Words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a accused, the accused who induced him to do so by supplying him
crime with those facts. The accused was a principal by inducement. The
• Words of command of a father to his sons, under employee was a mere innocent agent of the accused in the
conditions which determine obedience, excited performance of the act constituting the crime.
exclamations uttered by an individual to whom HELD: Employee was not criminally liable, because he had no
obedience is not due knowledge of the falsity of the facts supplied by the accused.
• Moral influence of the words of the father may
determine the course of conduct of a son in cases where Distinguish principal by inducement from the offender who made
the same words coming from a stranger would not make proposal to commit a felony
no impression.
Principal by inducement Proposal to commit a felony
People v. Bautista There is inducement to There is inducement to
Accused, who, exercising dominance and ascendancy commit a crime commit a crime
over his 3 year old son, compelled the latter to hurl a Becomes liable only when Mere proposal to commit a
stone at another boy, causing injury to the latter’s eye. the crime is committed by felony is punishable only in
the principal by direct treason or rebellion
In order that a person using words of command may be held liable participation
as principal under the par. 2 of Art. 17, the following 5 requisites Involves any crime Proposal to be punishable
must all be present: must involve only treason
1. That the one uttering the words of command must have or rebellion
the intention of procuring the commission of the crime
2. That the one who made the command must have an
ascendancy or influence over the person who acted. Effects of acquittal of principal by direct participation upon the
3. That the words used must be so direct, so efficacious, so liability of principal by inducement
powerful as to amount to physical or moral coercion. 1. Conspiracy is negatived by the acquittal of co-defendant
4. The words of command must be uttered prior to the 2. One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the
commission of the crime. commission of the crime without first being shown that the
5. The material executor of the crime has no personal crime has been actually committed by another.
reason to commit the crime.
But if the one charged as principal by direct participation is
Ascendancy or influence as to amount to moral coercion is not acquitted because he acted without criminal intent or malice,
necessary when there is conspiracy his acquittal is not ground for the acquittal of the principal by
inducement.
REASON FOR THE RULE: the crime so that J might freely consummate the prearranged rape,
In exempting circumstances, such as when the act is not voluntary as the latter did with violence and intimidation.
because of the lack of intent on the part of the accused, there is a HELD: C cooperated in the perpetration of the crime by acts without
crime committed, only that the accused is not a criminal. In which its commission would not have been accomplished.
intentional felonies, the act of a person does not make him criminal
unless his mind be criminal. US v. Lim Buanco
HELD: R was a principal by indispensable cooperation
Possessor of recently stolen property is a principal
Rules of Court, Sec. 2 (j) Liability of conspirators who took turns in raping a girl
• Possessor of a recently stolen article is considered a 4 person each took turns in having sexual intercourse with a girl by
principal, not merely as an accessory or as an accomplice, force.
unless he roves in a satisfactory manner that he is but an HELD: Each of them is responsible, not only for the act of rape
accessory or an accomplice. The other person, from who committed personally by him, but also for the rape committed by
the article came, is the one who stole it from the owner the others, because while one of them was having sexual
thereof. intercourse with the girl, the others were
holding her, so that each one of them cooperated in the
consummation of the rape committed by the others by acts without
Par. 3: Principals by indispensable cooperation
which could not have been accomplished. 4 sentences were
“Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another imposed on each accused.
act without which it would not have been accomplished.”
Collective criminal responsibility
“Cooperate” – to desire or wish in common a thing, but common There is collective responsibility when the offenders are criminally
will or purpose does not necessarily mean previous understanding, liable in the same manner and to the same extent. Penalty to be
for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances of each imposed must be the same for all
case. ✓ Principals by direct participation have collective criminal
responsibility.
Requisites: ✓ Principals by induction, except, that who directly forced
1. Participation in the criminal resolution – either anterior another to commit a crime and principal by direct
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention participation have collective responsibility
immediately before the commission of the crime charged; ✓ Principal by indispensable cooperation has collective
✓ Co-delinquency in par. 3 requires participation in criminal responsibility with the principal by direct participation
resolution and there must be conspiracy
✓ There is a cooperation by acts of negligence and he is a Individual criminal responsibility
co-principal Applies only in the absence of previous conspiracy, of which crime
committed by one member is that not of what is agreed upon
2. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing during the conspiracy, will be individually held criminally liable for
another act, without which it would have been accomplished. his acts
✓ Cooperation must be indispensable
✓ If the cooperation is not indispensable, the offender is E.g.: Deceased was the one who assaulted a group of 3 individuals
only an accomplice. with a knife, and in the course of an incomplete self-defense, 2 of
✓ The act of the principal by indispensable cooperation them caused less serious physical injuries upon the assailant,
should be different from the act of the principal by direct while the 3rd inflicted the fatal wound.
participation. HELD:
✓ Principal by direct participation: if the cooperation of one The party who inflicted the fatal wound would be the only one
of the accused consists in performing an act necessary in responsible as principal for the crime of homicide; other 2 would
the execution of the crime committed be held liable only for less serious physical injuries
✓ In the commission of homicide, one of the offenders held
the victim while the other as stabbing him, the one who
held the victim should be a principal by direct
participation
✓ Exception: SC considered the accused who held the
victim while being stabbed by the other accused as
principal by indispensable cooperation under par.3 Art.
17
US v. Javier
Where it appears that C seized the hands of a 12-yearold girl,
dragged her by force and violence to a place behind a house where
there were some trees and called to his confederate, J, the person
chiefly interested in the perpetration oof the crime, with whom C
must have had an agreement beforehand, delivered her to him
upon his arrival at the place, and then went away from the scene of