.R. Nos.

89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS

CRUZ, J.:

At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their
alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to
the exclusion of all others.

The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had
married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981.
Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson,
who claim to be their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista,
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of
Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional
rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting
and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving
children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12.
The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel.
As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the
same evidence.

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,

virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967.   Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
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evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967.   Consequently, the three children were
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entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.

In his decision dated September 30, 1986,   Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030,
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holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own
decision dated February 28, 1989,   the respondent court disposed as follows:
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WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed
decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is
affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent
court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the
pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.

The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on
March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is
Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."

Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother.  6

The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the
adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate
daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel
was born to the couple.

On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of
adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967.   Assuming the the
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petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption
was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.

As the respondent court correctly observed:

When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the
issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about
the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners
could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although
the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission
of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the
plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the
present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be
faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were
not disqualified.

A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the
adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding
frontally addressing the issue.

The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether
erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption
arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the
necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350,
pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:

Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd
Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:

An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the
burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered
void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is
obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such
as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption,
this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the
decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or
necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect
the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the
rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since
the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might
be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the
adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another
court would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the
respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is
one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence   of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is
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lacking in the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly
suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila   denying her earlier
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statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it
was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must
be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals,   where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of
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public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings
for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely
evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral

In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive
heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the
Civil Code:

Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child.

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives.
It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his
children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is
gone from this earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented
but the one who the person represented would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno
and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel
as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are
under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals
was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of
her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of
the deceased Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.