Finman General Assurance Corp Vs CA

G.R. No.
100970 September 2, 1992
FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA, respondents.
NOCON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary
mandatory injunction to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 11,
1991, affirming the decision dated March 20, 1990 of the Insurance Commission in ordering
1 2
petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation to pay private respondent Julia Surposa the
proceeds of the personal accident Insurance policy with interest.
It appears on record that on October 22, 1986, deceased, Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner
Finman General Assurance Corporation under Finman General Teachers Protection Plan Master
Policy No. 2005 and Individual Policy No. 08924 with his parents, spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa,
and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries. 3
While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie Surposa, died on October
18, 1988 as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the three (3) unidentified men without
provocation and warning on the part of the former as he and his cousin, Winston Surposa, were
waiting for a ride on their way home along Rizal-Locsin Streets, Bacolod City after attending the
celebration of the "Maskarra Annual Festival."
Thereafter, private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said insurance policy filed a written
notice of claim with the petitioner insurance company which denied said claim contending that
murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy.
On February 24, 1989, private respondent filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission which
subsequently rendered a decision, the pertinent portion of which reads:
In the light of the foregoing. we find respondent liable to pay complainant the sum of
P15,000.00 representing the proceeds of the policy with interest. As no evidence was
submitted to prove the claim for mortuary aid in the sum of P1,000.00, the same
cannot be entertained.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent to pay complainant

the sum of P15,000.00 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint
until fully satisfied. With costs.
4
On July 11, 1991, the appellate court affirmed said decision.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition alleging grove abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate
court in applying the principle of "expresso unius exclusio alterius" in a personal accident insurance
policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance
policy considering that the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate
and intentional act of the assailant in killing the former as indicated by the location of the lone stab
wound on the insured. Therefore, said death was committed with deliberate intent which, by the very
nature of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified.
We do not agree.
The terms "accident" and "accidental" as used in insurance contracts have not
acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary
and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which
happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is
unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place
without one's foresight or expectation — an event that proceeds from an unknown
cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected.
. . . The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury does not result from accident
or accidental means within the terms of an accident-policy if it is the natural result of
the insured's voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death
or injury. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some
additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which
produces or brings about the result of injury or death. In other words, where the
death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or if
something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the
resulting death is within the protection of the policies insuring against death or injury
from accident. 5
As correctly pointed out by the respondent appellate court in its decision:
In the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that Carlie Surposa died in the course of
an assault or murder as a result of his voluntary act considering the very nature of
these crimes. In the first place, the insured and his companion were on their way
home from attending a festival. They were confronted by unidentified persons. The
record is barren of any circumstance showing how the stab wound was inflicted. Nor
can it be pretended that the malefactor aimed at the insured precisely because the
killer wanted to take his life. In any event, while the act may not exempt the unknown
perpetrator from criminal liability, the fact remains that the happening was a pure
accident on the part of the victim. The insured died from an event that took place
without his foresight or expectation, an event that proceeded from an unusual effect
of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. Neither can it be said that where was
a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his life to danger
considering that he was just going home after attending a festival. 6
Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy involved herein specifically enumerated only ten
(10) circumstances wherein no liability attaches to petitioner insurance company for any injury,
disability or loss suffered by the insured as a result of any of the stimulated causes. The principle of
" expresso unius exclusio alterius" — the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing
— is therefore applicable in the instant case since murder and assault, not having been expressly
included in the enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy
cannot be considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company from liability for,
any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner insurance
company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited risks leads
inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity.
Moreover,
it is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance
contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary. 7
WHEREFORE, finding no irreversible error in the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, the
petition for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

Finman General Assurance Corp Vs CA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Finman General Assurance Corp Vs CA

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Finman General Assurance Corp Vs CA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No.

100970 September 2, 1992

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent to pay complainant

On July 11, 1991, the appellate court affirmed said decision.

As correctly pointed out by the respondent appellate court in its decision:

Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:

You might also like