Studying Religion in Personality and Social Psychology: Vassilis Saroglou
Studying Religion in Personality and Social Psychology: Vassilis Saroglou
Studying Religion in Personality and Social Psychology: Vassilis Saroglou
Introduction: Studying
religion in personality and social psychology.
In V. Saroglou (Ed.), Religion, personality, and
social behavior (pp. 1-28). New York, NY:
Psychology Press.
1 Introduction
Studying Religion in Personality
and Social Psychology
Vassilis Saroglou
180
160
Polics (Abstracts)
140
120
Religion (Abstracts)
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80 Total arcles / 100
60
40 Religion (Titles)
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0
Religion
I defi ne religion as the co-presence of beliefs, ritualized experiences,
norms, and group that refer to what people perceive to be a transcen-
dent to humans entity. This definition is sufficiently large to include both
established and new religions; forms that are perceived as positive (e.g.,
recognized religions) or negative (e.g., detrimental cults, Satanism); and
traditions regarded as theistic religions (e.g., the three monotheisms),
non-theistic religions, or even non-religions (e.g., Buddhism, franc-
masonry). At the same time, the scope of this defi nition is not exces-
sively large. It avoids to assimilate under the term “religion” individual
and social realities such as paranormal beliefs, philosophical systems,
ultimate concerns, secular rituals, self-transcendent emotions, core val-
ues, taboo trade-offs, and moral or political ideologies. These realities
may be somewhat proximal to religion (thus, psychologically interesting
for comparatively understanding religion; e.g., Saroglou, 2012a) but do
not require the co-presence of the four components: beliefs, ritualized
experiences, norms, and community.
These four components are universally present across cultures, reli-
gions, and societies. However, there is also important cultural, religious,
and historical variation in the mean importance attributed to each of
them, as well as in the strength of the interrelations between the four
components, which leads to cultural variability of religious forms (Saro-
glou, 2011). For instance, beliefs and morality are more normative in
mainstream Protestantism; in Judaism, this is more the case with rituals
and community (Cohen, Hall, Koenig, & Meador, 2005).
This defi nition of religion emphasizing the co-existence of different
components may be helpful to personality and social psychologists,
who study basic psychological processes that operate across domains
of individual and social life. Consequently, scholars may sometimes be
prone to reducing the phenomenon under study (e.g., the historically
and currently complex relations between Flemish and Walloons in the
bilinguistic and bicultural Belgium) as simply one typical example of
their preferred theory and subfield of research (e.g., intergroup confl ict).
Likewise, they may consider religion as simply an issue of group belong-
ingness; or simply as a meaning-making system; or fi nally as just one
among other conservative ideologies. Each of the above approaches is, of
course, important to the understanding of a different aspect of religion.
However, it is also, if not more, important to identify the combination of
the various psychological mechanisms present in religion. For instance,
philosophy, art, and religion all may be helpful for meaning-making or
as a response to existential anxiety. Each of the above though may imply
Religiousness
I defi ne here religiousness as the individual differences on being inter-
ested in and/or involved with religion. This includes individual differ-
ences in attitudes, cognitions, emotions, and/or behavior that refer to
what people consider as a transcendent entity. Depending on whether
one uses continuous or categorical variables, differences in religious-
ness can be observed gradually—varying from “not at all” to “totally”
interested/involved—or can be summarized categorically—believers/
religious and non-believers/non-religious.
Forms of Irreligion
Understanding religiousness contributes to also understanding irreligion.
For instance, knowing the psychological costs and benefits of being reli-
gious may help to look for, respectively, the psychological benefits and
costs of being non-religious. Although much less empirically studied,
there is also a variety of forms of irreligion (Zuckerman, 2012). People
who are irreligious may be agnostics, atheists, militant anti-religious,
socialized as secular, “apostates” (those who exit from religion), “decon-
verts” (those who abandon faith through a process similar to conver-
sion; Streib, Hood, Keller, Csöff, & Silver, 2008), or “liminals” (those
inconsistent across time when declaring no religious preference; Lim,
MacGregor, & Putnam, 2010).
Understanding thus religion from a personality and social psychologi-
cal perspective includes, in principle, the psychological study of religion
(traditional religion), spirituality (modern forms, possibly independent
from traditional institutions), and irreligion. However, psychologists
have been more interested in understanding religion than the lack of
it. Thus, psychological research that focuses specifically on the various
forms of irreligion is rare and has only recently emerged (Hunsberger &
Altemeyer, 2006; Zuckerman, 2011).
Research Methods
In the past, research on the personality and social psychology of reli-
gion has been heavily based on correlational and cross-sectional studies.
Experimental and quasi-experimental studies were sporadic (see Batson
et al., 1993; Wulff, 1997) but have become increasingly dominant in the
past 15 years. There has also been a diversification of alternative data
sources and data collection methods than self-reported questionnaires
administered to small samples of participants. This in turn led to higher
use of complex data analytic strategies.
Today, personality and social psychological research on religion is
also based on: observer ratings, implicit and behavioral measures and
Measures of Religiousness
Almost exclusively religiousness and its forms, as well as more specific
religious constructs, have been measured through questionnaires. This
is not surprising, since the nature of religiousness resembles attitudes,
beliefs, and values. However, even if rarely, one can also fi nd in recent
research alternative measures such as implicit and projective, quasi-
behavioral measures.
Scales
There exists a large array of religious and spiritual scales. These include
measures of general religious attitudes, various forms of religious-
ness, and various aspects of spirituality. Table 1.1 lists examples of key
measures that have been widely used in research and across different
cultural/religious contexts. In addition, there exist measures of more
specific religious constructs studied regularly in psychological research
such as religious coping, God images, attachment to God, religious and
Implicit Measures
Explicit measures of religiousness may to some extent be affected by social
desirability and, in particular, impression management (Sedikides &
Gebauer, 2010). Although research also shows that the relation between
explicit religious measures and external outcomes is not totally due to
social desirability (results most often remain significant after control-
ling for social desirability; Lewis, 1999, 2000; McCullough,Emmons, &
Tsang, 2002; Regnerus & Uecker, 2007; Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette,
Verschueren, & Dernelle, 2005), it is of interest also to implement alter-
native measures of religiousness such as implicit, projective, and behav-
ioral ones.
The Implicit Association test typically uses reaction time as an indi-
cator of a given construct when comparing pairs congruent with the
construct (targets and attributes) with pairs incongruent with the con-
struct. Implicit measures of religiousness have been in use. For instance,
LaBouff., Rowatt, Johnson, Thedford, and Tsang (2010) found that
some people made the associations of religious terms with the self and
of non-religious terms with others more quickly than the associations of
non-religious terms with the self and religious terms with others; these
people were higher in several explicit measures of religiousness. More-
over, explicit and implicit measures of religiousness predicted similar
social attitudes (antigay prejudice). In another study, after exposure to
an argument against the existence of God, participants associated less
quickly religious target words with words denoting truth versus words
denoting non-truth (e.g., true, real, valid vs. fake, false, untrue); again,
this implicit measure of religious belief was related to an explicit mea-
sure of religiousness (Shariff, Cohen, & Norenzayan, 2008). Other
implicit associations apply to the concept of God. Meier, Hauser, Rob-
inson, Friesen, and Schjeldahl (2007) found that participants implicitly
used the metaphor of verticality and automatically associated God with
“up” and devil with “down;” these implicit associations were stronger
among believers.
Objectivity
Psychological research on religion focuses on issues that researchers,
students, and the public may feel personally relevant, be they religious,
agnostics, or atheists. This invites prudence in deriving hypotheses,
designing a study, interpreting results, and drawing conclusions. Fortu-
nately, the more this research involves scholars from different cultural,
religious, and convictional backgrounds, and the more fi ndings are rep-
licated through different methods, across samples from various cultural
and religious contexts, and by independent laboratories, the more the
reliability of fi ndings and conclusions increases. The present volume was
attentive to the sensitivity of these issues.
Reductionism
Scholars from other scientific disciplines are sometimes suspicious on
whether psychology can study successfully such a complex phenomenon
as religion without reducing it; or without having a personal experience
of faith and religion. Both suspicions are unjustified. First, reduction-
ism is by definition what each behavioral and social scientific discipline
is expected to do, applying its own methodology to study a particular
object. No sole discipline can fully explain a complex phenomenon. Sec-
ond, even science as a multidisciplinary global enterprise is reductionist
by principle. Psychologists, sociologists, and other scientists investigate
and arrive at principles determining, at least partly, why people fall in
love and with whom. Such knowledge is not sufficient to preclude the
perception of the falling-in-love process as important, personally signifi-
cant, and somewhat mysterious. Finally, the psychology of religion, like
for instance the psychology of sport, may benefit from the personal expe-
rience of insiders but this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition;
and it may present disadvantages too (e.g., eagerness to accept confirming
evidence and to neglect disconfi rming one). The same remarks apply, of
course, to outsiders, that is, scholars who do not practice religion or sport.
Causality
The specificity of the psychological study of religion is to understand the
psychological mechanisms that can explain why religion or religious-
ness co-occurs with, follows, or precedes other psychological charac-
teristics and behaviors. Efforts to identify the psychological variables or
processes that may statistically explain (in regressions and meditational
analyses) in full the relations between religion and other outcomes are
more than welcome. Having a successful explanatory model in which
religious variables do not have additional power constitutes an ideal and
not a limitation for a researcher. As psychologists, we need to under-
stand for what reasons religious attitudes and behavior influence human
behavior. It is thus misleading to confound statistical analyses and psy-
chological understanding and conclude, for instance, that religion has
no causal role on human behavior if its power has been fully explained
in meditational analyses; or, on the contrary, that religion has “unique”
power if its predictiveness remained significant beyond the effects of
other predictor variables. Opposing religion’s causal role with “secular”
psychological mechanisms (Galen, 2012) is psychologically rather mean-
ingless (Myers, 2012; Saroglou, 2012b).
The question of uniqueness of the processes under study is an inter-
esting issue. Indeed, it is theoretically important to understand what the
specific combination of common psychological processes is that makes
Generalizability
Scholars may sometimes perceive religion and religiousness as too per-
sonal and intimate, too individualized; or as too culturally specific (Bel-
zen & Lewis, 2010). Undoubtedly, there is a large variability in religious
expressions across religions, cultures, and historical periods. Religion
interacts with many other non-religious, country-level cultural dimen-
sions, which results in a large variety of culturally specific outcomes
(Saroglou & Cohen, 2011; see also Johnson & Cohen, Chapter 15, this
volume). However, and although systematic cross-cultural psychologi-
cal research on religion is only emerging, there is also evidence that, to
some extent, universals may exist in the psychological characteristics,
predictors, functions, and effects of religion across cultures, religions,
and societies (Saroglou, 2011; Saroglou & Cohen, 2013). Adopting thus
in the psychology of religion excessive cultural relativism or excessive
cultural universalism is empirically premature and seems unjustified.
A related issue is the question of whose religiousness has been studied
through decades of personality and social psychological research. As in
other domains of research, most studies on religion were carried out in
Western contexts with most often participants of Christian (predomi-
nantly Protestant, but also Catholic) background. Fortunately, however,
in the last 10–15 years, studies, including experimental ones, with partic-
ipants of other religious background and/or from non-Western cultural
contexts have started to accumulate. Finally, the main body of scientific
knowledge has relied on the “average” religiousness of “average” people.
This is not necessarily a problem, as it provides a reasonably good global
picture. Note, however, that the psychology of champions supplies addi-
tional information to what we know from the sport psychology of the
average citizen. Similarly, the psychology of central religious figures
(e.g., current or historical models) could add precious knowledge.
Acknowledgments
The writing of this chapter benefited from Grant ARC08/13-013 from
the Communauté Française de Belgique. I am grateful to Constantine
Sedikides for very helpful comments on an earlier version of the chapter.
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