Case Digest No. 1.

Corona Vs. United Harbor Pilots Assn. of the Philippines (283 SCRA 31)
Facts:
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974 (P.D No. 505 Dec. 23, 1975) and pursuant to ts
power of control and regulation the PPA promulgated PPA- AO-03-85 (March 21 1985) which
embodies the “Rules and Regulations of Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of the Pilot
and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. In issuing A.O No. 04-92 (PPA-AO-NO-04-92) by
General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan, the AO subsequently limits the terms of appointment of
harbour pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancelation. This was implemented
provided that all existing regular appointment which have been previously issued by the BOC or
the PPA shall remain valid up to December 31 1992 and therefore all appointments to harbor
pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall only be for one term of one (1) year from date of
effectively subject to yearly renewal or cancelation as mention in the latter, by the Authority
after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance. On August 12 1992, respondents United
Harbour Pilot Association and the Manila Pilots Association questioned PPA-AO-No.04-92
before the DOTC through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, but were informed by then by DOTC Sec.
Jesus B Garcia that “ the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s Administrative
issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors”. On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an
order directing PPA to hold abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO-No.04-92. The PPA
countered that said administravtive order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control
and supervision over harbour pilots under Section 6a, Article IV of P.D. No. 875. On March 17,
1993, the OP, through then Ass. Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona,
dismissed the appeal and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. He concluded PPA-AO-
No.04-92, which the PPA was merely implementing Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 857 mandating it “to
control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district”. Respondents
filed a petition for certiorari, petition and injuction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court.

Issue: Whether or not PPA-AO-04-93 is constitutional on if Philippine Ports Authority violate

the respondent’s right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law.
Held:
The court believed that the PPA-AO-No.04-92 disregarded the respondent’s rights against
deprivation of property without due process of law. It was also stated in the case that the
Supreme Court said that under the guidance of the provision, two conditions must be met,
namely, there must be deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance
of due process. As general rule, the twin requirements for precudural due process, which is
notice and hearing is essential only when Administriaitve body exercises its quasi-judicial
function. Where in the performance of executive or legislative functions, such as issuing of rules
and regulations, the essential requisites of notice and hearing need not to be complied with. The
respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO-No.04-92 is a “surplusage” and therefore,
and unnecessary enactiment and therefore must be struck down.
Whereas, there was no dispute that Pilotage as a profession has taken part in nature as a property
right, therefore PA-AO-No.04-92 unduly restricts the rights of the Harbor Pilots to enjoy their
profession before the compulsory retirement which they have all the rights to enjoy after
qualifying the requirements issued to achieve such profession.

Digest No. 2 –
GSIS v. Montes Claro
Facts:
Sangunian Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros,a 72-year old widower who married Milagros
Orbiso who was 43 years old then on July 10 1983. Nicolas filed with GSIS an application for
retirement benefits under the Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977.
Nicolas designated his wife as his sole beneficiary on his retirement application and the GSIS
approved Nicolas’ application for retirement which took effect on February 18, 1984, granting a
lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity after. When Nicolas
and Milagros wedded, he was less than one year of his date of retirement on February 17, 1984.
Nicolas died on April 22, 1992. Milagros filed a claim for survivorship pension under PD
1146but was denided of the claim because the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship
pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
On October 2 1992, Milagros filed with the trail court special civil action for declaratory relief
questioning the validity of Sec. 18 of PD1146 for disqualifying her from receiving the said
pension.
On November 9, 1994, the court rendered the judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pensions, citing that under the Articles 115 and 117 of the Family Code, the
pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contruibuted through
monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions, where such retirement benefits are
considered as conjugal property.
The trail court repealed PD 1146 for being inconsistent with the Family Code of the Philippines.
On January 10, 2003, Milagros informed the Court the she has accepted the GSIS’s decision
from disqualifying her from receiving the survivorship pensions, still the GSIS asserts the Court
must decide on the case on the merits and must be resolved despite Milagros’ decision, the issue
not only involves Milagros’ claim but also for other surviving spouses with the same issues.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the provisions of Sec 16 PD 1146 is constitutional
2. Whether Sec. 18 of 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension
3. Whether Articles 254 and 265 of the Family Code repealed Sec 18 PD 1146
Held:
The issue of the provision of Sec 16 PD 1146 was unconstitutional. It prohibits the depended
spouses from receiving the survivorship pension and is not in line with the articles 115 and 117
of the Family Code and is discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.
The provision is unduly oppressive in denying the dependent spouse claim for survivorship
pensions based on Sec. 18 of PD 1146. Also it is contrary to Sec 1, Article II of the Constitution,
which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied of the equal protection of the laws. Where the issue
directly contradicts Section 1 Article III, where the benefits due to the surviving spouse is
confiscated without giving the latter an opportunity to the heard.
Under the PD 1146, The primary beneficiaries are (1) the dependent spouses until such spouse
remarries, (2) the dependent children. The said provision has the following purposes:
(a) To preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System;
(b) To guarantee the government employee all the benefits due him; and
(c) To expand, increase and improve the social security and insurance benefits made
available to hum and his dependents such as: - increasing pension benefits; - expanding
disability benefits; - introducing survivorship benefits ; - introducing sickness income
benefits ; - extending compulsory membership to all government employees irrespective
of statues
The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving qualified beneficiaries of the deceased
member or pensioner to cushion the benefeciaries againsta the adverse economic effects resulting
from the death of the wage earning or pensioner.
The purpose of the PD 1146 is to ensure a comprehensive and integrated social security and
insurance benefits to government employees and their dependents in the events of sickness,
disability, death and retirement of the government employees. Where a statute based on
reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of
the law, the requirement for a valid and reasonable classification are:
(1) It must rest on substantial dinstictions;
(2) It must germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It must not be limited it existing conditions only;
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and
regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguishes one class from another.
PD 1146 does not satisfy these requirements, rather it discriminates against the dependent spouse
who contracts the marriage with three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under
the provision, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more that three years before
the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension, the object
of the prohibition is vague. The classification is discriminatory and arbitrary, this is the reason
why the Congress deleted the provision of the R.A No.8291 a.k.a “Government Service
Insurance Act of 1997”. Thus the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted
within three years before the retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to
avail the survivorship benefits.
The petition is denied for want of merit and declared VOID for being Violative of the
constitutional guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law of Sec. 18 of the PD
1148. The GSIS cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for survivorship benefits
based on this invalid provision.

Case Digest No. 3

Chaves V. Romulo GR. No 157036
Facts:
On January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Aroyo delivered a speech before the members of
the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crimes
incidents and directed the respondent, then former PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend the issuance of
Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). Thus requiring the responded
Ebdane to release a Memorandum on Guidelines in the Implementation of Ban on the Carrying
of firearms outside of Residence dated Januray 31, 2003.
The petitioner Francisco I. Chaves, a licensed gun owner whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation on the guidelines and the petition is
anchored on the following grounds: (1) The President has no power or authority much less by a
mere speech to alter modify or ament the law on firearms; (2) There is no presidential issuance
on the gun ban; (3) The PNP Chief has no power or authority to issue the issued guidelines
because: (a) there is no law, statute or executive order which grants the PNPN Chief the
authority to promulgate the PNP Guidelines; (b) the implementing rules and regulations of
PD1866 cannot be the subject of another set of implementing guidelines; (c) the President’s
speech cannot be a basis for the promulgation of implementing guidelines on the gun ban. (4)
The PNP guidelines violate the due process clause of the constitution; (5) Arguendo issued the
guidelines using police power, the same as an invalid exercise thereof. (6) the PNP guidelines are
unjust, oppressive and confiscatory since it revoked all existing permits to carry without
refunding the payment; (7) The PNP Guidelines Violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution (8) The Guidelines were unjust, oppressive and unfair because they were
implemented long before they were published; (9) The PNP guidelines are effectively an Ex Post
Facto law since they apply retroactively and punish all those who were already granted permits
to carry outside of residence long before their promulgation.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed guidelines
2. Whether the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional right
3. Whether the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed guidelines is a
violation of his right to property
4. Whether the issuance of the assailed guidelines is a valid exercise of police power
5. Whether the assailed guidelines constitute an ex post facto law

Held:
Regarding the first issues, clearly both P.D 1866 and R.A No. 6975 authorizes the PNP Chief to
issue the assailed guidelines. Contrary to petitioners contention, R.A 8249 does not divest the
PNP Chief of its authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation
of the P.D No. 1866. For one, R.A No. 8294 did not repeal entirely PD No. 1866. It merely
provides reduction for penalties for illegal possession of firearms, thus the provision of the P.D
no 1866 to the PNP Chief the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms remain
effective. Consequently the petitioner’s disputes against President Arroyos’ declaration of a
nationwide gun ban, arguing the she has no authority to alter, modify or amend the law on
firearms through a mere speech. The court was not persuaded. The power to make laws, the
legislative power is vested in the congress. The president emphasized the the speech was just an
expression of her policy and directive to her subordinate. Second, the apex of the entire
executive officialdom is the President, Section 17, Article VII of the constitution specifies his
power as chiefe executive; The president shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation ot her subordinate, she may act directly or merely
direct the performance of a duty. Thus, when President Arroyo directed responded Ebdane to
suspend the issuance of the PTCFOR, she was just directed a subordinate to perform an assigned
duty. Such act as it well within the prerogative of her office.
The petitioner cannot find solace to the above-qouted Constitutional provision. In evaluating due
process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property
interest exist. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorising a person to enjoy a certain
privilege is neither a property nor a right. The PTCFOR does not constitute a property right
protected under our Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked
any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions, and such as my thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his
liceses subject to such conditions as the legislature sees it fit impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such as
license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the dependant of any property,
immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. A mere
license by the State is always revocable.
Case Digest No. 4
Mirasol v. DPWH

Facts:
On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the court e petition of the declaratory judgement
with application for temporary restraining order and injuction. It seeks the declaration of
nullification of administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic
Act 2000
Pursuant to its mandate under R.A 2000 DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 DO No. 215 declaring
Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.
Petitioners filed and amended petition on February 8, 2001 where they sought the declaration of
nullity of the afforsaid administrative issuance. On June 28,2001, the trial court thruthen
Presiding Judge Teofilo Guadiz, issued an order granting petitioners application for preliminary
injunction, on july 18 2001, a writ of preliminary injunction was used by the trial court and
conditioned upon petitioners filing of cash bond in the amount of P100,000 which was complied
with by the petitioners.
Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed decision dismissing the
petition but declaring invalied DO 123. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of
their petition, but was denied by the trail court in its Order dated June 16, 2003.
Issue :
1. Wheter the RTC’s decision is already barred by Res Judicata;
2. 2. Whether DO 74 and DO215 and TRB regulations contravene RA 2000; and
3. Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional
Held :

1. No. The petitioner are mistaken they rely on the RTC’s Order granting their prayers for a
writ of preliminary injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from the order, the
petitioners assumed that the order became a final judgement on the issues.
 The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of the case that would
trigger res judicata. A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of
the issues, it being a provisional remedy.
2. Yes. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules and regulation issued
under them unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in Sec. 4 R.A 2000 to regulate toll
ways. They contended that DPWH’s is only allowed to redesign the physical structure of
toll ways and not to determine “who or what qualifies as toll ways user”.

The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to
declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law it is the DOTC
which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws rules and regulations in the field of
transportation and to regulate related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate power of
functions which its does not possess in the first place.
3. No. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then DPWC has issued AO 1 in
February 1968 as authorized under Sec 3 of R.A 2000, prior to splitting the department
and the eventual devolution of its powers to the DOTC. Because administrative issuances
had the force and effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the presumption of validity and
constitutionality. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality rested on the party assailing
it, more so when police power was at issue and passed the test of reasonableness. The AO
was no oppressive, as it did not imposed unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners
of their right to use the facilities. It mere set rules to ensure public safety and uninhibited
flow of traffic within those limited-access facilities. The right to travel did no mean the
right to choose any vehicle in traversing as toll way. Petitioners were free to access the
toll way as much as the rest of the public. However, the mode in which they wished to
travel, pertaining to their manner of using the toll way, was a subject that could validly be
limited by regulation. There was no absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this privilege
was heavily regulated.

Case Digest No. 5.

Espinocilla V. Bagong Tanyag Homeowners
Facts:
Case Digest No. 6.
Beltran V. Secretary of Health

Facts:
The promotion of public health is fundamental onligation of the State. The health of the
people is primordial governmental concern. The National blood Serves Act was enacted in
the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and
safety was inwacted into law on April 2, 1994. The act seeks to provide adequate supply of
safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and regulating blood banks in the country.
It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently
published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994 and eventually took effect on August
23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, AO No. 9 Series of 1995, constitution the implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of
Health (DOH) . Section 7 of R.A 7719 provides : Sec.7 Phase-out of Commercial Blood
Banks- All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after
the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary’
Sec 23 of A.O No. 9 provides: Sec. 23 Process of Phasing Out- the Department shall effect
the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for
a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of RA 7719.
Years to prior passage the National Blood Service Act of 1994, petitioners have already been
operating commercial blood banks under RA no. 1517, entitiled “an Act regulating the
Colleciton, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of
Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.” The law, which was enacted June 16,
1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and
blood processing laboratories. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses
granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for the iassuance of
a writ of premilinary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 7 of R.A 7719 and its implanting rules is valid on the ground that it
violates the equal protection clauase.
 Held:
Petition was granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are constitutional and
valid. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the law is a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favouring others is prohibited by classification
on a reasonable basis and not made by arbitrarily or capriciously is permited.
The classification, however, to be reasonable must be: (1) substantial disticntions which
makes a real difference; (2) germane to the purpose of the law; (3) limited to existing
conditions only; and, (4) must apply equally to each member of the class.

Case Digest No. 7

Ynot. V Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits
of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality
issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld
the ruling of RTC.

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos
from one province to another but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot
was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of
EO 626-A. Ynot averred that EO 626-A was unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard
or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly
confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against
Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so
as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

Issue:

Wheter or not the Law is Valid.

Held:

The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area
to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be
given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in
the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Case Digest No. 8

National Development Bank V. Philippine Veterans Bank

Facts:

The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No. 1717, which ordered the
rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National
Development Company.
The law outlined the procedure for filling claims against the Agrix Companies and created a
claims committee to process these claims.
Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is section 4(1) thereof providing that “all
mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations
are hereby extinguished.”
Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine
Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land situated in
Los Baños, Laguna.
During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the expressed purpose of
salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by
President Marcos.
Pursuant thereto, the private respondent filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee for the
payment of its loan credit. In the meantime, the New Agrix, Inc. and the National Development
Company, petitioners herein, invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for the cancellation of the mortgage lien in favor of the private
respondent. For its part, the private respondent took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage, prompting the petitioners to file a second case with the same court to stop the
foreclosure. The two cases were consolidated
After the submission by the parties of their respective pleadings, the trial court rendered the
impugned decision. Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero annulled not only the challenged provision,
viz., Sec. 4 (1), but the entire Pres. Decree No. 1717 on the grounds that:
(1) the presidential exercise of legislative power was a violation of the principle of separation of
powers;
(2) The law impaired the obligation of contracts; and
(3) the decree violated the equal protection clause. The motion for reconsideration of this
decision having been denied, the present petition was filed.
The Court granted the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order and instructed the
respondents to cease and desist from conducting a public auction sale of the lands in question.
The petitioners contend that the private respondent is now estopped from contesting the validity
of the decree.
The Court, after noting that the petitioners had already filed their claims with the AGRIX Claims
Committee created by the decree, had simply dismissed the petition on the ground of estoppel.
The petitioners stress that in the case at bar the private respondent also invoked the provisions of
Pres. Decree No. 1717 by filing a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee. Failing to get
results, it sought to foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by AGRIX in its favor, which had
been extinguished by the decree. It was only when the petitioners challenged the foreclosure on
the basis of Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, that the private respondent attacked the validity of the
provision. At that stage, however, consistent with Mendoza, the private respondent was already
estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the decree.
ISSUE:
WON Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for payment without
prejudice to PD 1717.
HELD:
YES. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the
protection of Bill of rights so do interests on loans, as well as penalties and charges, which are
also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one
person and given to another without just compensation and any known public purpose. This is
plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the constitution.
The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between Agrix and the
private respondent without justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the
impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public
welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the
interest of greater number.
Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in
conformity with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The
extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the
legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is
compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in
violation of the equal protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor
controlled by the government, should have been created only by general and not special law.
And in so far as the decree also interferes with purely private agreements without any
demonstrated connection with the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the
obligation of the contract
 Digested Case No. 9

Gallego V. Sandigangbayan

Facts:
An information was filed in the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Mariflor
Punzalan-Castillo against Ramon Deseo, Bernardo Gallego, Herminio Erorita and Felix
Agoncillo, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
Petitioners Bernardo Gallego and Felix Agoncillo filed a motion to quash the information against
them on the following grounds:
1.  the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; or, in the alternative,... 2.  the information
charges more than one offense.
petitioners claim that the information charges the accused with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: 
"(a) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through manifest partiality; (b) the giving of
'unwarranted' benefits through evident bad faith; and (c) the giving of
'unwarranted' benefits through gross inexcusable negligence" while in the discharge of their
official and/or administrative functions; that the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them is violated because they are left to guess... which of the
three, if not all, offenses they are being prosecuted.
The motion to quash was opposed by the prosecution alleging that the term "unwarranted"' in
Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal and is presumed to
have been used in its primary and general acceptation; that the objection by petitioners on... the
clarity of the term "unwarranted" does not suffice for the courts to declare said section
unconstitutional; that said Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 is valid unless otherwise held by
final judgment of a competent court.
With respect to petitioners' allegation that the information charges more than one offense, the
prosecution avers that what is charged in the information "is the giving of unwarranted benefits
to the owners of Test Booklets Nos. 839 and 144, while manifest partiality, evident... bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence are only the means of commission."
Respondent Sandiganbayan sustained the prosecution and denied the motion to quash.
Issues:
that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is null and void because it is...
unconstitutionally vague
Section 3(e) violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what
it seeks to penalize.
Ruling:
We hold that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness.
The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the... offense penalized in Section 3(e) of the statute may
be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same information does not mean that the
indictment charges three distinct offenses.
The information definitely states the names of the parties, the time, place, manner of commission
and designation of the offense.  The argument that failure in the information to state the reasons
why the benefits bestowed are unwarranted renders it defective is without... merit.  Informations
need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the tria... l.
ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, instant petition is hereby dismissed.

Case Digest No. 10

Estrada V. Sandigangbayan

FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against
petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but
was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than
one offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law
which states that:
Section 1. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly
or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties- Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof,
in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as
provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any
and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties
and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence-  For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct  to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.