UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

LAND LAW I (LLAW 2013)

2021-22

Tutorials
Alice Lee
Associate Professor, Department of Law, University of Hong Kong
E-mail: [email protected]

TUTORIAL SCHEDULE

(Mon) 20/9 – (Fri) 24/9 T1: Formalities

(Mon) 27/9 – (Fri) 1/10 T2: Co-ownership
(Mon) 4/10 – (Fri) 8/10 T3: Equitable Doctrines
11/10 – 15/10 (Reading Week) Writing Exercise (submit by 15/10 noon)
(Tue) 19/10 – (Mon) 25/10 T4: Equitable Doctrines
(Tue) 26/10 – (Mon) 1/11 T5: Feedback Tutorial (on Writing Exercise)
(Tue) 2/11 – (Mon) 8/11 T6: Equitable Doctrines, Adverse Possession
(Tue) 9/11 – (Mon) 15/11 T7: Adverse Possession, Priority
(Tue) 16/11 – (Mon) 22/11 T8: Priority, Revision
(Tue) 24/11 – (Mon) 30/11 T9: Priority, Revision

OBJECTIVES

We have weekly tutorials for you to study and apply important principles/
cases/statutes. You will also learn the essential skills for the study and practice of
law:

- Client’s problem: issues from the client’s perspective e.g. client wants to stay
- Application: apply the law to facts e.g. client has executed a deed under s4(1) CPO
- Solution: solve the client’s problem e.g. client can stay in the flat as a legal owner
- Expression: clear, concise, coherent, and logical

“CASE” is our preferred approach. It summarizes our achievement criteria:

Excellent Good Satisfactory Pass

Client’s problems

Application (applying the law to facts)

Solution (solving the client’s problems)

Expression (clear, concise, coherent, and

logical)

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In tutorial and in exam, you have to advise a client on a given factual scenario which
is based on a real case. Our starting point should be identifying “the client’s
problems” so that you could take an authentic approach to problem-solving. When
studying other areas of law, you may be instructed to identify ALL possible legal
issues, whether they are feasible or not. In real life, practitioners are expected to
advise clients on what WORK, not on what DON’T WORK. Like prudent
practitioners, we should focus on what is applicable as a matter of law and, more
importantly, what is helpful to the client, i.e. taking into account the factual scenario,
what is in the client’s interest or what the client wants most.

For every legal problem you encounter, work out a framework, i.e. a step-by-step
answer plan, which may also help you tackle questions in the exam. This framework
– helps you see the flow of your arguments (be clear, concise, coherent and logical)
– works as a checklist so that you will not miss any point
– saves you when you run out of time as it shows your knowledge and approach to
the question (you are strongly advised to put down a concise framework when
you run out of time in the exam, so that we can give you the marks you deserve)

In the exam, you have to show your ability to deliver your arguments within a
limited time frame, so it is advisable to be concise and precise.

In tutorials, however, we may cover more than what the question entails just for the
sake of brainstorming. Your peers or tutor may ask additional questions and you will
have to work out what is relevant and what is not. The best way to do so is to
prepare a framework for every question you attempt.

PREPARATION FOR TUTORIALS

Before each tutorial,

1. go through the question
2. revisit the relevant lecture
3. read the relevant outline(s) and required readings
4. adopt the “CASE” approach when you prepare your written framework, i.e.
identify the client’s problems, apply the law to the facts, solve the client’s problems,
and express your arguments in a coherent and logical manner.

As stated in the Course Outline, lectures (and lecture outlines) always prevail.
Watch/read them first, then the cases and statutes cited therein, and then the
textbook.

In additional to tutorials for discussion, we have a Writing Exercise for you to

practise the “CASE” approach and a Feedback Tutorial for you to receive feedback
on your written framework.

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Tutorial 1 (Mon) 20/9 – (Fri) 24/9

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of the tutorial, you will be able to:

(a) explain the formality requirements for the sale and purchase of land
(b) explain the formality requirements for a contract for the sale and purchase of land
(c) explain the formality requirements for a lease
(d) discuss and apply the relevant cases and statutory provisions

PREPARATION

1. Revisit L1 and L2
2. Read L1 and L2 lecture outline and Steadman v Steadman (extracted below)
3. Read the relevant parts of Chapter 2 of the textbook
4. Prepare a written framework (i.e. a step-by-step answer plan)

QUESTION

[1] Jackie Chan has come to you for advice in respect of a property which is his family
home.1 For the sake of discussion, let’s assume that the property is in Hong Kong.

[2] In August 2019, Jackie agreed to buy the property, which was worth
HK$38,100,000. As part of the purchase money (HK$23,360,000) came from the
endorsement fees he earned as a celebrity, Jackie only paid the balance
(HK$14,740,000) out of his own pocket. For fear that the low purchase price
(HK$14,740,000) might adversely affect the marketability of the entire building, the
developer orally proposed, and Jackie orally agreed, that the transaction should not be
completed by execution of deed (so that the exact amount paid by Jackie to the
developer would not be exposed). The oral proposal was not mentioned in their
written agreement, which set out the names of the parties, the property and the agreed
price, and was signed by Jackie only.

[3] Jackie and his family have since been living in the property and paying all the
utilities (water, gas, and electricity). In mid-2021, the developer was unable to repay its
debts to a creditor, who is now trying to sell the property (still owned by the
developer).

1. Advise Jackie on whether he has any interest in the property, and if so, whether
his interest binds all subsequent parties.

2. Replace [2] with the following: Jackie and the developer orally entered into a
seven-year lease in August 2019 (i.e. no deed or written agreement). Jackie has
been paying a market rent.

3. Replace [2] with the following: Jackie and the developer orally entered into a
three-year lease in August 2019 (i.e. no deed or written agreement). Jackie has
been paying a market rent. Indicate what additional information you may need.

1
The original news report (in Chinese): https://hk.on.cc/hk/bkn/cnt/entertainment/20200906/bkn-
20200906033035091-0906_00862_001.html (the facts are modified for tutorial discussion)

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 Steadman v. Steadman [1976] AC 536
House of Lords
Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest,Viscount Dilhorne,
Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Salmon
1974 April 1, 2, 3, 4; June 19

Vendor and Purchaser--Specific performance--Part performance of oral contract--Compromise

agreement between husband and wife--Terms including transfer by wife of interest in
matrimonial home to husband--Variation of maintenance order--Husband's fulfilment of
undertaking to pay certain maintenance arrears and preparing deed of transfer--Whether
sufficient part performance--Whether specifically referable to part of agreement requiring to
be evidenced in writing--Law of Property Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20), s. 40

The parties, whose marriage had been dissolved, were negotiating a settlement of the wife's
claim under section 17 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 for a declaration that the
matrimonial home was jointly owned and an order for its sale when the husband, who was
£194 in arrears of maintenance, applied to the magistrates' court to vary the maintenance
order. The parties met outside the magistrates' court on March 2, 1972, and agreed that the
wife would surrender her interest in the house for £1,500; that the maintenance order for the
wife should be discharged; that the child's maintenance order should continue and that the
arrears of maintenance should be remitted save for £100 to be paid by March 31. The justices
were told of the agreement, they discharged the maintenance order and remitted the arrears
save for £100. The husband paid the £100 and his solicitors prepared the deed of transfer and
sent it to the wife. The wife refused to sign the transfer and, on the hearing of her application
under section 17 of the Act of 1882, the husband contended that the wife had compromised
the suit by the agreement of March 2. The registrar held that incurring the costs of preparing
the transfer was an act of part performance of an oral agreement concerning land and therefore
the agreement was enforceable under section 40 of the Law of Property Act 1925. The wife
appealed and the county court judge held that the agreement was unenforceable as there had
been no act of part performance. The husband appealed to the Court of Appeal and, by a
majority, the court allowed the appeal holding that the payment of £100 arrears of
maintenance, although not referable to the term of the agreement relating to land, was an act
of part performance of the contract for the purposes of section 40 (2) of the Act of 1925.

On appeal by the wife: -

Held, dismissing the appeal (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest dissenting), (1) that the alleged acts
of part performance had to be considered in their surrounding circumstances and, if they
pointed on a balance of probabilities to some contract *537 (per Lord Salmon, for the
disposition of an interest in land) between the parties and either showed the nature of or were
consistent with the oral agreement alleged, then there was sufficient part performance of the
agreement for the purpose of section 40 (2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (post, pp. 541H -
542A, 553G - 554A, 562D-E, 563A-D, 564B-C, 566H - 567B, 570D); that the terms of the
agreement of March 2 were not severable and in the surrounding circumstances, the payment
by the husband of £100 and the preparation of and sending the deed of transfer to the wife
were sufficient acts of part performance of the oral agreement and, accordingly, it was
enforceable notwithstanding section 40 (1) of the Act (post, pp. 540B-D, 553G - 554B, 563A-
C, 572B, 573B-D).
Maddison v. Alderson (1883) 8 App.Cas. 467, H.L.(E.) and Kingswood Estate Co. Ltd. v.
Anderson [1963] 2 Q.B. 169, C.A. considered.
(2) That (per Lord Reid, Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Salmon) the act of part performance did
not have to be referable to that part of the agreement for the disposition of an interest in land
(post, pp. 542B-C, 554C-D, 571G - 572B).
Per Lord Reid, Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Salmon. There is no general rule that the
payment of money can not constitute an act of part performance of a parol contract within the

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meaning of section 40 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (post, pp. 541B, 565B, 570F).
Per Viscount Dilhorne. If the husband had paid the £1,500 there is well-established authority
for saying that that could not be part performance. It is difficult to discern on what principle
that conclusion has been reached (post, p. 555B).

Decision of the Court of Appeal [1974] Q.B. 161; [1973] 3 W.L.R. 695; [1973] 3 All E.R. 977
affirmed.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeal.

The appellant, Sylvia Emily Lila Steadman, brought proceedings in the Bromley County Court against
her former husband, the respondent, Norman Leslie Steadman, for, inter alia, a declaration that the
house 9 Brookmead Close, Orpington, was jointly owned by the parties and for an order that it should
be sold and the net proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. On January 23, 1973, Mr.
Registrar Miller found that there had been an act of part performance by the husband of an oral
agreement made by the parties on March 2, 1972, by which the wife had agreed to transfer her interest
in the house to the husband for £1,500. He therefore held that the wife had compromised the
proceedings.

The wife appealed. On May 24, 1973, Judge Fife found that there had been no act of part performance
on the part of the husband and, therefore, under section 40 (1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, the
agreement was unenforceable.

The husband appealed to the Court of Appeal and, on July 30, 1973, the court (Roskill L.J. and Scarman
L.J.; Edmund Davies L.J. dissenting) held that there had been an act of part performance on the part of
the husband and, notwithstanding that the act was not referable to the term of the agreement for the
disposition of the interest in land, it was sufficient part performance for the purposes of section 40 (2) of
the Act. The wife appealed.

The facts are stated in the opinions of Lord Reid and Viscount Dilhorne.
*539 Michael Morland Q.C . and Mark Lennox-Boyd for the appellant wife.
Conrad Dehn Q.C . and Jonathan Playford for the respondent husband.
Their Lordships took time for consideration. June 19.

LORD REID.

1. My Lords, the marriage of the appellant, the wife, and the respondent, the husband, was dissolved in
1970. They were then joint owners of a house which had been bought in 1963 for £3,600. Prior to the
divorce the husband had been ordered to pay maintenance of £2 per week to the wife and £2.50 per
week for their child. The husband remained in occupation of the house.

2. In 1970 the wife applied under section 17 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, for, inter alia,
an order for the sale of the house and division of the proceeds, but no further steps were taken until
1972. At that time the husband was in arrears in paying the wife's maintenance in a sum of £194. There
were long negotiations between the parties' solicitors, and ultimately on March 2, 1972, the matter came
before the magistrates' court. The husband's solicitor met the wife before the hearing. Unfortunately her
solicitor was not present, but there is no suggestion that the husband's solicitor took advantage of his
absence.

3. The parties then reached an oral agreement with regard to both the maintenance and the house. The
court were to be asked to authorise discharge of the maintenance order against the husband and
continuation of the order with regard to the child, to order the husband to pay £100 of the arrears of her
maintenance and to order remission of the balance. In addition the court were to be informed of the
agreement with regard to the house that the husband should pay £1,500 to the wife and the wife would
transfer to the husband her interest in the house. The magistrates made orders in accordance with the
agreement and the husband paid £100 to the wife.
The husband then borrowed £1,500 from a building society and paid that sum to his solicitor and the
solicitor prepared a deed of transfer of the wife's interest in the house and sent it for her signature. But
the wife refused to sign, thinking that £1,500 was less than she ought to have. She renewed her

5
application under section 17 to have the house sold. The husband pleaded the parties' agreement as a
binding compromise but the wife pleaded that the agreement was unenforceable.

4. She relied on section 40 of the Law of Property Act 1925, which provides:
"(1) No action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest
in land, unless the agreement upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof,
is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged or by some other person thereunto by him lawfully
authorised.
(2) This section... does not affect the law relating to part performance..."

5. The husband relied on subsection (2) and the registrar held that there had been part performance so
that subsection (1) did not apply. His decision was reversed by the county court judge but an appeal to
the Court of *540 Appeal was allowed by a majority (Roskill and Scarman L.JJ., Edmund Davies L.J.
dissenting).

6. The first point taken by the husband was that section 40 does not apply to an agreement
compromising a litigation or to an agreement dealing with other matters besides the transfer of land. We
did not find it necessary to hear argument on this matter and I therefore express no opinion about it.

7. The sole question for your Lordships' decision is whether the admitted facts amount to part
performance within the meaning of section 40 (2). In my view it is clear that the oral agreement of
March 2, 1972, is indivisible and not severable. The whole must stand or fall. Indeed the contrary was
not seriously argued. And it is clear that the payment of £100 to the wife as ordered by the magistrates'
court was, taking the words in their ordinary sense, in part performance of the agreement. The husband
also relies on the following other acts by him or his solicitor as being further part performance; (1) the
intimation of the agreement to the magistrates and his abandonment of his attempts to have all arrears of
maintenance remitted, and (2) sending to the wife the transfer which she refused to sign and incurring
the cost of its preparation. I am very doubtful about the first of these but I am inclined to think that the
second could be regarded as part performance. It is the universal custom that a deed of transfer of an
interest in land is prepared by the solicitor of the transferee so the wife or her solicitor as her agent must
have known that the husband would incur the cost of preparation of the deed in carrying out the
agreement.

8. But the wife's case is that we must not take "part performance" in its ordinary meaning because the
phrase has acquired a highly technical meaning over the centuries.

9. This matter has a very long history. Section 40 replaced a part of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds
1677 (29 Car. 2, c. 3), and very soon after the passing of that Act authorities on this matter began to
accumulate. It is now very difficult to find from them any clear guidance of general application. But it
is not difficult to see at least one principle behind them. If one party to an agreement stands by and lets
the other party incur expense or prejudice his position on the faith of the agreement being valid he will
not then be allowed to turn round and assert that the agreement is unenforceable. Using fraud in its
older and less precise sense, that would be fraudulent on his part and it has become proverbial that
courts of equity will not permit the statute to be made an instrument of fraud.

10. It must be remembered that this legislation did not and does not make oral contracts relating to land
void: it only makes them unenforceable. And the statutory provision must be pleaded; otherwise the
court does not apply it. So it is in keeping with equitable principles that in proper circumstances a
person will not be allowed "fraudulently" to take advantage of a defence of this kind. There is nothing
about part performance in the Statute of Frauds. It is an invention of the Court of Chancery and in
deciding any case not clearly covered by authority I think that the equitable nature of the remedy must
be kept in mind.

11. A large number of the authorities are cases where a purchaser under an oral agreement has been
permitted to take possession of or to do things on the land which he has agreed to buy. But sometimes
rules appropriate to that situation have been sought to be applied to other cases of part *541
performance where they are not appropriate. Indeed the courts have sometimes seemed disinclined to

6
apply the principle at all to such other cases.

12. Normally the consideration for the purchase of land is a sum of money and there are statements that
a sum of money can never be treated as part performance. Such statements would be reasonable if the
person pleading the statute tendered repayment of any part of the price which he had received and was
able thus to make restitutio in integrum. That would remove any "fraud" or any equity on which the
purchaser could properly rely. But to make a general rule that payment of money can never be part
performance would seem to me to defeat the whole purpose of the doctrine and I do not think that we
are compelled by authority to do that.

13. The argument for the wife, for which there is a good deal of authority, is that no act can be relied on
as an act of part performance unless it relates to the land to be acquired and can only be explained by
the existence of a contract relating to the land. But let me suppose a case of an oral contract where the
consideration for the transfer of the land was not money but the transfer of some personal property or
the performance of some obligation. The personal property is then transferred or the obligation is
performed to the knowledge of the owner of the land in circumstances where there can be no restitutio
in integrum. On what rational principle could it be said that the doctrine of part performance is not to
apply? And we were not referred to any case of that kind where the court had refused to apply it. The
transfer of the personal property or the performance of the obligation would indicate the existence of a
contract but it would not indicate that that contract related to that or any other land.

14. I think that there has been some confusion between this supposed rule and another perfectly good
rule. You must not first look at the oral contract and then see whether the alleged acts of part
performance are consistent with it. You must first look at the alleged acts of part performance to see
whether they prove that there must have been a contract and it is only if they do so prove that you can
bring in the oral contract.

15. A thing is proved in civil litigation by showing that it is more probably true than not; and I see no
reason why there should be any different standard of proof here. If there were, what would the standard
be? The only other recognised standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, but why should that apply
here?

16. I am aware that it has often been said that the acts relied on must necessarily or unequivocally
indicate the existence of a contract. It may well be that we should consider whether any prudent
reasonable man would have done those acts if there had not been a contract but many people are neither
prudent nor reasonable and they might often spend money or prejudice their position not in reliance on
a contract but in the optimistic expectation that a contract would follow. So if there were a rule that acts
relied on as part performance must of their own nature unequivocally show that there was a contract, it
would be only in the rarest case that all other possible explanations could be excluded.

17. In my view, unless the law is to be divorced from reason and principle, the rule must be that you
take the whole circumstances, leaving aside evidence about the oral contract, to see whether it is proved
that the acts *542 relied on were done in reliance on a contract: that will be proved if it is shown to be
more probable than not.

18. Authorities which seem to require more than that appear to be based on an idea, never clearly
defined, to the effect that the law of part performance is a rule of evidence rather than an application of
an equitable principle. I do not know on what ground any court could say that, although you cannot
produce the evidence required by the Statute of Frauds, some other kind of evidence will do instead.
But I can see that if part performance is simply regarded as evidence, then it would be reasonable to
hold not only that the acts of part performance must relate to the land but that they must indicate the
nature of the oral contract with regard to the land. But that appears to me to be a fundamental departure
from the true doctrine of part performance, and it is not supported by recent authorities such as
Kingswood Estate Co. Ltd. v. Anderson [1963] 2 Q.B. 169. …

So in my judgment I am in no way precluded from acting on the views which I expressed earlier and I
would therefore dismiss this appeal.

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8
Tutorial 2 (Mon) 27/9 – (Fri) 1/10

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of the tutorial, you will be able to:

(a) explain the distinction between joint tenancy and tenancy in common
(b) explain the meaning and effect of severance
(c) discuss and apply the authorities on severance
(d) articulate the nature and effect of a charging order, citing relevant statutes and cases

PREPARATION

1. Revisit L3
2. Read L3 lecture outline
3. Click & read Ho Wai Kwan & Anor v Chan Hon Kuen & Anor [2015] 1 HKLRD 901;
Golden Connection Finance Ltd v Chan Tat Man Simon & Anor [2019] 4 HKLRD 155
4. Read the relevant parts of Chapter 5 of the textbook
5. Prepare a written framework (i.e. a step-by-step answer plan)

QUESTION 1

Vivian has come to you for advice in respect of a property that she is trying to sell to a
potential purchaser Peter. The property was originally co-owned by Vivian and her
husband Hung. The couple bought the property as joint tenants twenty years ago. In
2016, SC Bank obtained a charging order absolute in respect of the property against
Hung. Hung passed away in 2018, and the charging order was discharged in 2019
when Vivian repaid the debt Hung owed to SC Bank. Yet, Peter is still unsure whether
the charging order had any effect on Vivian and Hung’s co-ownership that might
affect Vivian’s ability to give a good title to the property.
How could Vivian persuade Peter?

QUESTION 2
Daisy has come to you for advice in respect of a three-storey village house (“the
property”) that she acquired with her father F and brother B as tenants in common.
The property has been their family home since it was bought many years ago. Last
year, GC Finance, as B’s judgment creditor, obtained a charging order absolute in court
proceedings by which B’s one-third interest in the property was charged with the
payment of HK$2,500,000. As B still fails to repay the debt, GC Finance is applying to
court for an order for sale of the one-third undivided share held by B in the property.
How could Daisy oppose GC Finance’s applica tion for sale?

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Tutorial 3 (Mon) 4/10 – (Fri) 8/10

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of the tutorial, you will be able to:

(a) evaluate and apply important cases on the acquisition of interests in land in equity
(b) advise on the latest development and future trends in applying equitable
doctrines
(c) explain the role of presumptions in ascertaining beneficial ownership

PREPARATION

1. Revisit L4
2. Read L4 lecture outline and the cases/statutes cited therein
3. Read the relevant parts of Chapter 4 of the textbook
4. Prepare a written framework (i.e. a step-by-step answer plan)

QUESTION (PAST EXAM)

You have received the following meeting notes from your supervisor:

TN (aged 48) is the youngest in his family. He has two elder sisters (aged 59 and 58
respectively) and one elder brother (aged 55). They all used to live with their
parents in a flat in a Kowloon Walled City Building (“the building”). The three
eldest children moved out one after the other upon getting married. When the
building was resumed by the government in 1988, only TN and his parents were
still living there, and a compensation of HK$300,000 was paid to the father. TN
recalled that the compensation money was used in the subsequent purchase of a
property on Ma Tau Wai Road (“the property”), and that it was his father’s idea that
the property was purchased in TN’s sole name. His father had said to him (in
Chinese): “The other children have all moved out. You are the only one left. This is
the least I could do for you.”

TN and his father attended at the solicitors’ office for the completion of the purchase
in TN’s name at a price of HK$500,000. The father said he would be able to make up
the balance of the purchase price.

TN has been living there with his parents, taking care of them. TN did not earn
much as a technician. He gave his father HK$2,000 every month when he started to
work. This had increased to HK$4,000 since he was promoted to senior technician.

In August 2021, the father was so ill that he was sent to the hospital and had to stay
there. Since then the mother has been pushing TN to sell the property and to share
the proceeds of sale with his siblings. She said she would go and live with TN’s
elder brother, who needed the money to fund the startup of a business. She said she
was entitled to share and use the proceeds any way she liked because she was the
one paying for the balance of the purchase price. TN could not believe what he
heard. He did not even know if his mother was telling the truth or had any evidence
of her alleged payment.

10
TN came for advice because his mother threatened to bring the case to court if TN
did not accede to her request.

Advise TN in relation to different factual scenarios.

(i) How would you advise TN if the mother could not prove her alleged
payment of the balance of the purchase price?

(ii) Would your advice be different if the mother was able to prove that she was
the one paying for the balance of the purchase price?

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Writing Exercise Reading Week – Submit by Friday 15/10 noon

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of the Writing Exercise, you will have:

(a) revised the land law topics we have covered so far
(b) identified the legal issues and client’s problems in a real-life scenario
(c) applied the relevant principles, cases and statutes to the facts to solve client’s problems
(d) expressed your opinions in a logical written advice

ACTIVITIES

Reading Week Writing Exercise (homework) – Upload your answer by 15/10 noon
19/10 – 25/10 [Tutor to review students’ answers]
26/10 – 1/11 Tutorial 5 (Feedback Tutorial) – In-class discussion and feedback

PREPARATION

1. Revisit L2, L3, L4 and L5

2. Read L2, L3, L4 and L5 lecture outlines and the cases/statutes cited therein
3. Read the relevant parts of the textbook
4. Prepare a written framework (i.e. a step-by-step answer plan)

QUESTION

You act for Alex. The dispute is in relation to a property situated in an old building in Yuen
Long (“the Property”). By an assignment dated 10 June 1975, the Property was acquired by
his parents Peter Lee (“Father”) and Annie Leung (“Mother”) as joint tenants.

Alex has four younger brothers and sisters: Ben, Charlotte, Dora and Ernest. The parents
were not well off when Alex was born. Alex only received elementary education while his
siblings were fortunate enough to receive secondary or even tertiary education.

After the Property was purchased in 1975, it was converted into the “Main Shop”, “Middle-
sized Shop” and “Small Shop” (see the floor plan below). The parents ran their business as a
boutique at the Main Shop in the name of Beauti Beauti, while the Middle-sized Shop and
Small Shop were rented out to tenants, who operated a grocery store and a fast food shop
respectively.

In 1977, Alex married his wife Wendy and they soon had two children. In 1981, Wendy was
pregnant with their third child. At about the same time, Father got seriously ill. Wendy left
her employment as an enrolled nurse at Queen Mary Hospital and began to work at Beauti
Beauti together with Alex (on a part-time basis) and Mother. Father eventually passed away
in 1982.

Mother was so upset that she decided to emigrate from Hong Kong to the UK to reunite
with her sons and daughters who were working there. Before she left, Mother executed a
deed of gift to add Alex as a joint tenant of the Property. She also entrusted Alex with the

12
business of Beauti Beauti. Since then Alex and Wendy had been managing Beauti Beauti and
paying off the parent’s debts incurred in the course of business. Alex did not pay any rent
for the Main Shop while operating Beauti Beauti. The Middle-sized and Small Shops were
still rented out and Mother had been receiving the rental income from both shops.

Alex and his family had been trying to move to the UK since Mother left, but his
applications for immigration visa had been turned down until 1997, when Wendy filed an
application on behalf of the family under the investment category. Wendy’s application was
approved and the family (Alex, Wendy and their children) left Hong Kong and landed in
the UK on 27 June 1997. Since Alex’s emigration, Beauti Beauti has been closed down and
the Property has been rented out to three different tenants. The rental income for the Main,
Middle-sized and Small Shops had been shared 50-50 between Alex and Mother thereafter,
until Mother passed away recently.

Dora, the executrix of Mother’s estate, is now disputing Alex’s entitlement to the Property.
She suspected that Mother made the deed of gift only to increase Alex’s chances of
emigration, given that Alex did not own any real estate in Hong Kong. Dora alleged that

(1) the deed of gift was not properly sealed;

(2) Mother served a Notice of Severance dated 1 August 1997 on Alex;
(3) Mother made her last will on 1 August 1997 to bequeath her interest in the Property to
her four children in equal shares, with the exception of Alex.

These allegations are yet to be substantiated by evidence.

As Alex’s lawyer, you have to advise on his best-case and worst-case scenarios. In your
advice, point out the relevant statutory provisions and explain their requirements, apply
relevant principles and cases to the facts, and indicate what additional information you
may need.

Floor Plan of the Property:

Middle-sized Shop
Main Shop 349 sq ft
502 sq ft

Small Shop
163 sq ft

13
Tutorial 4 (Tue) 19/10 – (Mon) 25/10

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of the tutorial, you will be able to:

(a) revise and compare all equitable doctrines
(b) apply equitable doctrines in different scenarios
(c) compare their requirements, effect, pros and cons, in order to explain which
doctrine is the best in each scenario

PREPARATION
1. Prepare a concise table to compare Part Performance, Resulting Trust, CICT and
Proprietary Estoppel (point form would do, preferably within one page). You may
be asked to hand in your comparison table before or after class.
2. With reference to the comparison table, identify the relevant doctrines and cases in
answering the following question, apply the law to the facts to solve the client’s
problems, and point out any difficulties the client may encounter.

QUESTION

Your client is Q. You have received the following meeting notes from your
supervisor:

In 1984 Q’s parents bought a flat (“the First Property”) and paid the purchase price
HK$280,000 in cash, i.e. without a mortgage. The assignment deed stated that the
property was assigned to the parents “as joint tenants” without mentioning the
beneficial ownership. The entire family, i.e. father, mother, Q and her three sisters L,
M, N, and their grandmother, moved into the property immediately upon completion
of the purchase. Q’s brother P was then studying in Canada and did not come back
and live with them until 1987 when he graduated. M and N moved out in 1992 and
1993 respectively when they got married, and their grandmother also moved out in
1993 to live with another relative.

In 1993, L, P, Q and their father bought another property (“the Second Property”) as
joint tenants (again without mentioning the beneficial ownership) and financed their
purchase with a mortgage taken in the father’s name. All four joint tenants were
supposed to share the mortgage repayments. The family moved in but the parents
found the neighbours too annoying. A week later, the parents and Q moved back to
the First Property. L and P, who stayed in the Second Property, each began to pay a
larger sum towards the mortgage.

Q had been giving a portion of her income to her mother every month since she
started to work in 1980. She said it was her contribution to household expenses and it
was up to her mother to decide how to use it. Her mother once told her that the First
Property was purchased with a loan from the grandmother. Q believed that some of
her money might be used in repaying the grandmother, but she could not provide
any receipt or give any details such as the exact time and amount of the loan, the
repayment interval, whether or how interest was charged, etc.

14
Q’s mother passed away in 1995 and Q had been looking after her father since. When
the father passed away earlier this year, Q received a phone call from P, who
demanded Q to vacate the First Property immediately. Q did an online search at the
Land Registry and discovered that the father had assigned the First Property to
himself and P as joint tenants by a deed which was executed on 13 August 2005 and
registered on 15 September 2005. The deed did not mention the beneficial ownership,
and no money was paid by P to the father. P has just issued a writ to claim possession
of the First Property from Q.

Advise Q on the following:

(i) her possible grounds of claiming an interest in the First Property, the
difficulties therein and what additional information you may need; and

(ii) if Q is successful in claiming an interest in the First Property, whether such

interest is enforceable against P.

Whether Q has any beneficial interest to the property

1.legal interest. Father and mother are beneficial joint tenant. Father and P in 2005
become the beneficial joint tenant. After father dies then P become the sole legal
owner. If P has to show that he has some beneficial owner, he has to show that
equity show not follows to law to rebut the law. -Resulting trust, CICT,
proprietry estoppel.

First hurdle
Has to be passed when Q is not a legal owner. Express case common intention or
inferred common intention. In the present case, no express or assurance so to
succeed Q has to rely on inferred common intention. For proprietry estoppel
unless the parents know that Q has mistaken belief and allow Q to continue his
detriment in reliance of the belief.

There is no evidence showing the loan of grandmother or the money from Q is

used to repay the load of grandmother. It is the difficulty for Q.

For constructive trust, stack and dowden is applied in other domestic context need
not be husband and wife

Common intention in the first hurdle can be inferred but not imputed.
Factors provided by stack and dowden: the financial to household expenses can be
used to show detrimental

For propietry estoppel:

Not express agreement so Q believes that his loan to repay is a mistaken belief
For unlateral belief we look at Crabb case. There cannot be estoppel if we cannot
prove that the parents are aware of the mistaken belief or encourage detrimental
reliance, if we cannot prove this then there is no propirtey estoppel.

Hard to prove detriemtnal reliance cuz his 1980, the property was purchased in
1984. There may be possible that P would be paying money to his mother with or
without common .

15
On the other hand this is a domestic context, his detriment can be presumed. But
there is no evidence that the parents are aware of the mistaken belief or encourage
detrimental reliance,, there is no unconscionability.

The detriement has to be substantial, the household contribution by Q may be

regarded as the contribution to the family to support their living which may not be
related to the property. HK many son and daught may pay monthly living
expenses to parents.

Remedy if Q would prove resulting trust or CICT

Q would have beneficial interest in the property.
If QW has some beneficial interest, P would not be able to evict her so we don’t
have to talk the second hurdle.

The court may take into account all

Eg the parties financial position, their relationship or whether they have
alternative accommodation.

PE, it depends what relief the court many grant

2. whether the interest of Q would be enforable against P

Whether there are competing interest, we discuss validity (show that we have a
valid interest), second discuss

If Q can prove that he has beneficial interest would be vest before the P beneficial
interest when he got the property form his father.

Whether Q interest is enforceable

We look at the first interest in time. Q interest will be the first interest but not in
writing then we apply common law rule.

We look at equities priority rules. P is not a purchaser for value becuz he didn’t
pay
P didn’t quantify as staring

Q would have priority over P interest and P cannot evict Q

16
Tutorial 5 (Tue) 26/10 – (Mon) 1/11
(Feedback tutorial)

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of the tutorial, you will have:

(a) revised the land law topics we have covered so far
(b) identified the legal issues and client’s problems in a real-life scenario
(c) applied the relevant principles, cases and statutes to the facts to solve client’s
problems
(d) expressed your opinions in a logical written advice
(e) received feedback on your written answer

PREPARATION

1. Revisit L2, L3, L4 and L5

2. Read L2, L3, L4 and L5 lecture outlines and the cases/statutes cited therein
3. Read the relevant parts of the textbook
4. Prepare a written framework (i.e. a step-by-step answer plan)

ACTIVITY

In-class discussion and feedback on Writing Exercise.

17
Tutorial 6 (Tue) 2/11 – (Mon) 8/11

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of the tutorial, you will be able to:

(a) apply equitable doctrines to ascertain beneficial ownership
(b) apply the law of co-ownership to solve client’s problems
(c) apply the law of adverse possession to solve client’s problems

PREPARATION

1. Revisit L3 to L7
2. Read L3 to L7 lecture outlines and the cases/statutes cited therein
3. Read the relevant parts of the textbook
4. Prepare a written framework (i.e. a step-by-step answer plan)

QUESTION (2019-20 EXAM)

We act for the plaintiff, M, who is the mother of the defendant D.

M was born in Mainland China and came to Hong Kong with her mother Madam Xi
in the 1950s. M met F in a factory in Tsuen Wan and got married in 1962. M gave
birth to a son D and three daughters. Madam Xi provided funds for F to set up his
own business, but the business did not go well and F was always in debt. M had to
work in a toy factory and managed to earn a decent salary to support the family. M
said she had given all her income to Madam Xi, who was helping her look after the
children, and who was saving up for M what was not spent.

In 1970, a flat in BC Building (“the flat”) was purchased for the whole family and
Madam Xi to live in. The Sale and Purchase Agreement was signed by Madam Xi, as
she was the one inspecting the flat. It was undisputed that the amount $20,000 (40%
of the purchase price) Madam Xi paid upon signing the Agreement actually came
from what Madam Xi saved up for M. Eventually, the transaction was completed by
F who signed the Assignment Deed as sole purchaser, as he insisted, and F was the
one mortgaging the flat to SC Bank for a loan of HK$30,000, the balance of the
purchase price. M’s case was that she shared the mortgage instalments with F, even
though her contribution fluctuated from month to month. D, on the other hand,
argued that it was F alone who paid off the mortgage loan.

D is pleading F’s case as F, before he died in an accident in December 2019, made a

will leaving all of his property to D. F’s will is not registered. M is now claiming
beneficial interest in the flat.

(a) Advise M on the best-case and worst-case scenarios. M would also like to know
whether F’s will would trump any possible interest she has. (30 marks)

1. whether mother has any beneficial interest of the property.

2. the quantum
3. whether father’s will has any effect on the beneficial interest of the mother

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 1. legal interest
Father is the sole legal owner. equity follows the law, father being the sole
legal owner is presume to be the sole benficial owner.
2. mother has contributed some money xxxx. Look at all the direct
contribution in modern approach. under resulting trust, mother will have
more than 40% of the property due to her direct payment.
3. father will hold the legal title for resulting trsut for himself. mother will
have it in the proportion for 40% and the remain is father.
4. CICT, first hurdle, mother shd have some beneficial interest. the money
paid by mother inferred common intention that mother should have some
beneficial interest
5. the same act can be used to prove detrimental reliance
6. second hurle, mother mortgage repayment, and the quantity will be the
same (40%)

Best case scenario, mother would have her share more than 40% of the beneficial
interest

Worst case scenario, mother cannot prove her contribution but the down payment .
under resulting trust  40%

CICT, after beneficially mother has 40%

after the death of father, the defendant will have 60% by virtue of the will and
mother will have 40%

Q3) if mother has more than 40% interest even if the father’s will say D has 100%.
The father didn’t have the 100% so he cannot give what he didn’t have to D. so
father’s will will NOT triumph any interest of mother.

After 1970, M and F had bought two other properties as legal joint tenants. It is D’s
case that M, upon discovering that F had a mistress in Shenzhen, decided to serve a
Notice of Severance on F in respect of both jointly-owned properties, so that she
could leave her share by will to her children equally. D called one of his sisters S to
give evidence that in November 2019, M handed S a Notice of Severance asking S to
give it to F when S visited F in Shenzhen. Unfortunately, F was killed in an accident
when he came back to Hong Kong in December 2019 before S had the chance to visit
him in Shenzhen. The Notice of Severance is still in S’s drawer.

(b) Advise M as to her rights in the properties. (5 marks)

1. quantm of interest of mtoehr in respect of two property. whether the notice

of severance. S7 of CPO in relation the severance of joint tenancy in law
s8. ss2, how to severe a joint tenancy in equity
2. on a drawer, so no serve to father so no severance, and mother will be the
sole beneficial owner of the property by the virtue of survivorship.

19
 3. s.62 ss.3 of CPO, any notice required to be served shall be sufficiently
served if it is left at the last-known place of abode or business in Hong
Kong of the mortgagee
By keeping the notice of severance in the daughter’s drawer is not
sufficiently served. As we do not know whether it is the abode place of
father in HK. do not know father has any asset to the daughter’s personal
property

M also bought a wooden hut in the New Territories (“the hut”) for hanging out with
her friends from Mainland China. She has not checked out the place for a long time
since her friends stopped coming. After F passed away, M felt so sad that she went to
the hut by herself, and discovered that someone named Y was living there. Y said he
had been paying rent to Z, owner of the adjacent property, since 2009.

(c) Advise M as to whether, and against whom, she can recover the hut. (15 marks)

Now is May 2020,

the fact that since 2009 is irrelevant if it started before May 2018 say April 2018. By
May 2020, it will be in 12 years. but alternatively, is June 2018 then will not be 12
years. mother interest will be extinguished by adverse possession.

if the tenancy commences before May 2008, then the mother cannot commence an
action. if after May 2008 then can

Z rented out mother’s hut to Y, typical case of adverse possession through tenancy/
licensee.

20
Tutorial 7 (Tue) 9/11 – (Mon) 15/11

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of the tutorial, you will be able to:

(a) explain and discuss the requirements for the acquisition of a possessory title
(b) explain and apply the statutory provisions relevant to the accrual of right of action
in relation to present interests in land
(c) evaluate and apply priority rules to solve real-life problems concerning title to land

PREPARATION

1. Revisit L7, L8 and L9

2. Read L7, L8 and L9 lecture outlines and the cases/statutes cited therein
3. Read the relevant parts of the textbook
4. Prepare a written framework (i.e. a step-by-step answer plan)

QUESTION (PAST EXAM)

You have received the following meeting notes from your supervisor:

We act for the plaintiff, P, who applies for a declaration that she has extinguished the
paper title to four adjoining Lots (Lots 240, 241, 242, 243, collectively “the Lots”) in
DD107, Yuen Long, New Territories. The defendant is Mr Wong, who acquired the
Lots by an Assignment Deed registered with the Land Registry in April 1997.

P filed two affirmations with exhibits in support of the present application.

Her evidence is as follows:

P has learnt from her late husband, H, that in around 1949, her father-in-law (i.e. H’s
father) Mr Wan entered into an oral tenancy agreement with a Mr Hui in relation to
the Lots. Mr Hui would visit the Lots to collect rent every month from Mr Wan. P did
not know what the monthly rent was as she was not yet married to H at the time. Mr
Wan then built a residential home for himself and his family on the Lots (the
“Ancestral Home”). Mr Wan also raised livestock and built a small warehouse on the
Lots (the “Warehouse”). Between 1949 and 1975, the Ancestral Home and the
Warehouse were occupied and used by Mr Wan’s family.

From 1975 onwards, Mr Hui had stopped collecting rent from Mr Wan and had not
been seen afterwards. Mr Wan’s family members had initially tried to locate Mr Hui
but in vain. Accordingly, from then on, they had continued to occupy the Lots
exclusively without paying any rent. They would have been willing to pay rent had
they been asked to do so, but no one approached them.

P married H in 1978 and began living in the Ancestral Home and the Lots. By that
time, Mr Wan had already occupied five other adjoining lots of lands and had fenced
off the entire area (collectively “the 9 Lots”) with a barbed wire fence around 10 feet
high. The fenced-off area was initially used as a vast farming area for Mr Wan’s
family. In 1972 they turned the farm into a wood factory under the name of Sun
Lorry. P gave birth to a daughter in 1981. When Mr Wan passed away in 1982, H
took over the family business of Sun Lorry. From 1994 onwards, the business was

21
changed to selling forage for livestock under the new name of Tai Ping. P was the
one who applied for the business registration of Tai Ping at that time. H was not
doing much as his health began to deteriorate. Since H passed away in 2009, P has
been running the business by herself which is still ongoing today. She continues to
live in the Lots with her daughter.

P has exhibited various utility bills to her affirmations, but those bills show the
address as “Box 2, Fung Kat Heung, Yuen Long”. There is no evidence to suggest
that Box 2 exclusively receives mail for the Lots. What is clear is that P uses Box 2 to
receive mail for the entire fenced-off area (i.e. the 9 Lots). There are also demand
notes for rates and government rent which date back to October 2009, showing the
correct address of the Lots, “No 49, Mo Fan Heung, Yuen Long”, as well as aerial
photographs showing the structures erected by Mr Wan over the years.

It was recently discovered that a charging order nisi was registered against the Lots
on 14 October 2021.

Advise P on the following:

(i) whether and how she could succeed in her application; and

(ii) whether the charging order should be a concern.

22
Tutorial 8 (Revision) (Tue) 16/11 – (Mon) 22/11

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of the tutorial, you will be able to:

(a) evaluate and apply important equitable doctrines
(b) compare and explain the differences between various equitable doctrines
(c) evaluate and apply the common law (i.e. non-statutory) priority rules

PREPARATION

1. Revisit L4, L5, L6 and L9

2. Read L4, L5, L6 and L9 lecture outlines and the cases cited therein
3. Read the relevant parts of the textbook
4. Prepare a written framework (i.e. a step-by-step answer plan)

QUESTION (2020-21 EXAM)

We act for F and M, the father and mother of S, an unfilial son. They also have a
younger son Y. The whole family (F, M, S and Y) moved into Flat 1A, Celestial Court
(“the family home”) in 2000 when F and M bought it as legal joint tenants.

S moved out in 2008 when he met W, and S bought a flat nearby (“the suit property”)
in joint names with W. The deed was silent on the nature of S and W’s co-ownership
and did not mention the beneficial ownership. S paid the purchase price $2,000,000 as
follows: a $1,400,000 bank loan secured by a mortgage by deed over the suit property;
a $520,000 loan from a friend; $80,000 from F and M “as a gift”, as the parents put it. S
and W had cohabited there since 2008. They eventually got married in 2011 and
continued to reside there afterwards. S was the one repaying the mortgage.

In October 2013, F and M sold the family home, and thereafter F, M and Y moved into
the suit property, to live with S and W there. F and M said they had no choice but to
sell the family home because S was having trouble paying his mortgage. F and M said
they had an oral agreement with S in August 2013 whereby F and M agreed to sell the
family home and help S pay his mortgage instalments on condition that F and M
would have “a share of the property”. It was also agreed that F, M and Y could reside
at the suit property and that F and M’s consent must be obtained before any
purported disposition of the suit property. F and M said W should be in the living
room when they discussed all this with S.

Y subsequently got married and moved out in 2015. F and M, who continued to
reside at the suit property, had been paying the mortgage instalments until 2020,
when they learnt that S and W had already transferred the suit property to a
purchaser P by a deed dated 30 November 2019.

P is now trying to evict F and M from the suit property. S has left W and moved to
Shenzhen. When F and M called W, she denied the existence of the oral agreement
and denied that she was in the living room when the alleged discussion took place.

Advise F and M.

23
F and M wants to seek beneficial interest
1. Whether F and M has any beneficial interest in the property
The deed is silent-_> rely on resumption

Presume tenant of common (s and W)

Equitiable tenant in common (legally and beneficially for S and W)

So F and M need equitiable doctrine

CICT or proprietary estoppel

Stated that have the oral agreement so cant say resulting trust.
(In exam Either not talk about the resulting trust at all or say resulting trsut is not
applicable here)

Domestic context so unlikely to have contract (intention to be legally bound)

CICT, F and M names are not on the deed so they are not legal owners. Then its similar
to a sole name case (first and second hurdle). In case where first hurdle is invloed, need
to talk about the HK case Mo ying , the court confirmed that the second hurdle will be
equally applicable for the first hurdle

Either the existence of express agreement or an inferred intention. If the court accept the
FM evidence will have express agreeemne (oral agreement). But court not allow

Infer intention
1. They showed their house as as result of the discussion,
2. they pay for the mortgage repayment

so has common intention.

FM need to prove detrimental reliance

Grand and Edward  pay purchase price can help to establish reliance.

So first hurdle is passed.

Second hurdle,
We have an oral agreement but didn’t specifiy so no express common intention

Court takes a holistic approach to consider all factors.

Most relevant factor here: Payment of mortgage repayment

FM would be able to establish, the quantum will be decided by court

The target is for FM shows they have some beneficial interest so would be kicked out
( amount not so important)

80k cant discuss cuz is gift

24
Propietray estoppel

Test-> assurance reliance and detriment

2. cuz there are competing interest between F,M and P. who has priority

first talk about validity

The purchaser’s interest whether it is valid

The interest of P was assigned by S and W by deed so P shd have the legal interest

FM equitable interest vs the purchaser’s legal interest

Since FM interest was first in time, they will be earlier than P
So FM has the first competing interest, sicne its equitable use s2(1)
Sicne its not in writing, its not registrable
So it’s a case unregistrable vs registrable
We apply the common law rule
Since euqitalr interest we apply equitable test

Whether the purchaser was a equity starting

Whether P is bono fide or he has any notice as to the existence of FM title/interest

So whether P has constructive notice?

(wong chim ying) he shd have done what a reasonable person do otherwise he will
have constructive notice

So P is likely to be affixed with constructive notice

So P cannot rely on equity starling interest

So P interst will be bound by FM interest.

Tutorial 9 (Revision) (Tue) 23/11 – (Mon) 29/11

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of the tutorial, you will be able to:

(a) identify the issues and define the client’s problems in a real-life scenario
(b) explain and apply the relevant statutory provisions/cases in problem-solving
(c) advise the client as to the pros and cons of different approaches/outcomes
(d) present your arguments in a logical and concise manner

PREPARATION

25
1. Revisit the relevant lectures
2. Read the relevant lecture outlines and the cases/statutes cited therein
3. Read the relevant parts of the textbook
4. Prepare a written framework (i.e. a step-by-step answer plan)

QUESTION (2020-21 EXAM)

You have joined a law firm and your supervisor has asked you to give your opinion
and advice on the following case:

We act for T, who owns a plot of land in the New Territories. T has been living and
farming there since he inherited the property from his parents. He has come for
advice in relation to two adjacent strips of land, Lot X and Lot Y, that he has rented
from his uncle U (who owns many properties nearby) since 2008.

Lot Y

Lot X

T’s land

26
The initial lease for Lot X was for 5 years, from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2012,
at a market rent. It has been renewed two times, from 1 January 2013 to 31 December
2017, and from 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2022, respectively. Each time a written
tenancy agreement was prepared by U’s son, setting out the address of Lot X, the
agreed rental amount, the duration and commencement date of the lease, with U’s
and T’s names and signatures. It was U’s son who took care of the documentation
and any necessary follow-up action. T had no idea whether the tenancy agreements
were registered or not. T has been farming on Lot X since 2008. Last month, someone
who claimed to be the new owner of Lot X (who showed a copy of the deed for the
sale and purchase of Lot X) came and demanded T to vacate Lot X.

Lot Y is a narrower strip of land with a storage shed on it. The initial lease for Lot Y
was for 3 years, from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2010, again at a market rent. It
has been renewed four times, and the current lease is from 1 January 2020 to 31
December 2022. Again, every time it was U’s son who prepared the written tenancy
agreement for U and T to sign. T has been using the shed for storage since 2008. As T
has instructed our firm to advise on Lot X, our firm has also checked the title to Lot
Y. It was discovered that Lot Y was actually part of T’s land rather than U’s land. T
was shocked as he and U had assumed all along that Lot Y belonged to U.

Advise T.

27