American Aid To The Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions

American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good
Intentions
By Yuval Levin
Aid in U.S. policy

American aid to the Middle East is a tragedy of good intentions on a grand scale. The
stated purposes of aid – the service of American interests, the support of allies, and the
establishment of peace – are sound, reasonable, and just. The idea of using America’s
vast economic power to mold the international arena has been an important element of
American foreign policy since the 1920s. And yet, in the Middle East aid has proven to
be counterproductive and even dangerous for the United States and for its closest ally in
the region: Israel. The story of how aid came to so distort the politics of the region in
contradiction to its intended goals tells us much about international politics in our time,
and indeed at any time.
Normally, critiques of foreign aid focus on the economic costs of aid to the American
taxpayer. The fact is, though, that all foreign assistance makes up only one half of one
percent of the federal budget, and if aid achieved its stated goals, it would be a bargain.
These goals, however, have not been and could not be achieved by aid. Moreover, the
argument presented here is by no means an argument against American support of Israel.
Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, and has historically been a bridgehead of
American influence in the region. Israel deserves to survive and deserves the support of
the United States. American foreign aid, however, does not “support Israel.” Rather it is
as harmful to the Jewish state’s interests as it is to America’s.
Far from strengthening America’s allies and fostering compliance among America’s
clients, U.S. aid has harmed the economies of Israel and other allies, while failing to
restrain Egyptian and Palestinian misbehavior. Nevertheless, U.S. policy makers are
wedded to aid because they hope that the economic “carrot” will lead the Middle East
away from clashes between interests and powers, and toward a comprehensive peace.
U.S. policy seems to be based on a sense that the old ways of doing things in
international affairs are no longer relevant, that history as we have known it is nearing a
sort of end, and that we now stand at the threshold of a whole new world. Americans (and
Israelis) who think this way ignore the actual behavior of the Arab states in part because
the vast sums of American money involved give recipients an incentive to play along and
donors a means to justify their commitment. Thus it may be said that Americans pay for
the blindfolds that cover their eyes.
Why Foreign Aid?
The practice of subsidizing allies to assure their allegiance and to upgrade their militaries
extends to antiquity. Such funding became especially important to the foreign policies of
Britain and Prussia in the 18th and 19th centuries, and was an essential component of the
American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions Page 2
balance of power system in European politics. In the United States this practice began in
the aftermath of the First World War, when the U.S. loaned substantial sums to Germany
to cover German reparations to America’s former allies. These loans in effect became
grants when the Germans (and later the Allies) proved unable to repay them. Similar
loans of funds and equipment preceded America’s entry into the Second World War as
well.
But the massive economic aid programs to which we have become accustomed in the past
half century were very much a product of Cold War calculations. With Europe reeling
from World War II, the United States provided Western European nations with over $13
billion in aid in an effort largely intended to save Europe from communism. Thus, a new
foreign policy tool was institutionalized. Despite its clearly defined political ends,
American policymakers have been loath to think of aid in cold-blooded, instrumental
terms. Americans have never been comfortable with the notion that aid is a bribe to
foreign nations to support American interests. Hence the U.S. has always proffered
rationales for aid that minimize the political calculations behind it.
Nevertheless, the formal goals of American foreign aid policy have always been
expressly political. Understandably, the Congress would approve aid only on the ground
of American self-interest. “The use of the economic power of the United States to
achieve broad political ends is no new policy,” Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson
told an audience in April of 1947, “We have always used our economic power for
political ends in the national interest. It is only common sense to do so.”1 Writing in the
New York Times on May 9, 1947, the well-connected James Reston made it clear that
“the administration has not changed its objective: the holding back of Soviet
expansionism. It has merely come to believe that reconstruction aid may well be the best
barrier against such expansion.”2 The Marshall Plan and the new foreign assistance
policy of the United States, then, were quite clearly to be aimed at advancing American
political objectives.
As the threat of communism reached beyond Europe, so did American aid – but always
with the same objective. On May 8, 1950, Acheson (by then Secretary of State)
announced a policy of economic and military aid to French Indochina (later Vietnam) by
saying:
The United States Government, convinced that neither national independence nor
democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism,
considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and
military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order
to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their
peaceful and democratic development.3
1
The Marshall Plan: A Collection of Primary Documents (Independence, MO: The Harry S. Truman
Presidential Library, 1978), microfilm, 3.
2
James Reston, “Administration Shifts Its Emphasis,” New York Times, 5 May 1947.
3
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and
Vietnam. 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967.
Throughout the 1950s, as it became clear that the Cold War would involve competition
for client states, economic aid became arguably the major tool of American foreign
policy. Aid was focused particularly in Asia, with the bulk directed to South Korea,
Taiwan and South Vietnam.4 In the early 1960s, the justification of foreign aid widened
to include a moral and ethical obligation to help developing countries in general. This
focus on “development” would come to overtake nearly all other considerations in the
public discourse over foreign aid. Nevertheless, the underlying political motivation of the
policy remained.
In 1961 Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, which set up the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and that same year President Kennedy
created the Peace Corps, an organization of volunteers who perform social and
humanitarian services overseas. It is important to note that this shift in focus was at the
time almost entirely rhetorical. Kennedy and his advisors understood that foreign aid was
to be driven by political purposes. As the president told the Congress in 1963, “these
[aid] programs are clearly in our national self-interest, and have proven to be a vital tool
in our efforts to hold back communism in Europe and now also in Asia and elsewhere.”5
Aid to the Middle East was no different.
The Origins of Aid to the Middle East
The Middle East was not an important focus of American aid policy until the early 1970s.
Before that time, Middle Eastern nations including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and
others received aid generally in the tens of millions of dollars per year as part of the
American food and poverty assistance effort.6 The enormous growth of aid in the 1970s
was directly linked to the increasing importance of the region in the Cold War.
In the 1970s, the Nixon administration crafted a new approach to Middle Eastern politics
by which the United States attempted to simultaneously support its client and ally, Israel,
while carefully drawing the most powerful Arab state – Egypt – out of the Soviet camp.
American dollars were perhaps the essential tool in this effort, and beginning in the mid-
1970s right through the present day, Israel and then Egypt have been the largest
recipients of American foreign assistance.7
The United States gives many different types of bilateral foreign aid, but from the outset
economic aid to Israel and Egypt has been granted as part of the Economic Support Fund
4
Vernon Ruttan, United States Development Assistance Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1996), 256.
5
John F. Kennedy, Collected Presidential Papers, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963),
317.
6
Ruttan, United States Development Assistance Policy, 279. According to the General Accounting Office,
U.S. aid totaled approximately $1.4 billion in the years 1950-1970 (combined), while in 1999 alone aid was
over $3 billion.
7
According to USAID, Israel became the largest recipient of American aid in 1976 (after aid to South
Vietnam – which had held the top spot – was ended with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam), and
Egypt became the second largest recipient in 1979.
(ESF) operated through the U.S. Agency for International Development.8 In fact, Israel
and Egypt alone account for over two thirds of all ESF funds granted annually.9 ESF,
although it is classified as a development fund, exists to aid nations that the U.S.
considers important to its strategic interests. The purpose of ESF assistance has been
quite clearly articulated by the State Department: “to support U.S. economic, political
and security interests and to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives.”10 These purposes
provide the U.S. with criteria against which to measure the results.
Aid and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Accords
Starting after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the United States made clear that it was willing
to entice the Egyptians by offering them vast sums of money, essentially on par with the
economic (though at first not military) aid received by Israel. Following the Camp David
Peace Accords of 1979, Egypt began receiving military aid as well, and this aid became
linked with Israel’s in principle and legislation. The Camp David aid package was truly
gargantuan: nearly $5 billion to the two sides. This was a long-term commitment of
American resources to fund a new sort of politics – to purchase a new world.
But what exactly was the U.S. purchasing? Ostensibly, the funds were to help both
countries deal with the costs of implementing the deal, and to support them as American
allies. However, two decades later it is clear that aid at best has been an incentive for the
Egyptians to keep up the appearance of playing their new role (though even this has not
always been done). And U.S. aid to Israel has undermined both Israel’s economic policy
and its strategic self-sufficiency.
Aid to Egypt
U.S. aid to Egypt demonstrates the inadequacy of one of the central assumptions of
American aid policy: that aid allows a meaningful measure of control over the behavior
of potentially unfriendly regimes. In fact, as we shall see, aid and the politics surrounding
it seem to make the U.S. less capable of dealing with such states, not more so. This is
both because the amounts of money involved inevitably create interest groups that make
their living off the continuation of the aid, and because if the aid were to be stopped the
entire structure of American expectations would collapse – along with the reputations of
the policymakers. And so, the U.S. is stuck financing regimes that squarely oppose its
strategic interests, all the while maintaining that supporting them is an essential American
strategic concern.
8
ESF has only existed under that title since 1978, but programs which fell under the “Economic Support
for Defense” and “Security Supporting Assistance” programs before that time are now generally referred to
as ESF aid as well, since the authorizing language of these different programs was essentially identical.
Government documents tend to group all three under the title of ESF aid, and I will do the same in the
pages to come.
9
Ruttan, United States Development Assistance Policy, 27l.
10
United States Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation for Fiscal Year 1987,
Vol. 99 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987), 21.
American aid to Egypt began in 1951, with an agreement between the Truman
Administration and the Royal Government that preceded the Officers’ Coup that brought
Gamal Abdul Nasser to power and created modern Egypt. The agreement committed the
U.S. to only very modest levels of support, consisting mainly of credits to buy U.S.
equipment and the training of Egyptian personnel in the United States.
When Nasser’s revolutionary regime took over, however, the U.S. decided to court it
with aid. In May of 1953, the two governments agreed on a new project called the
Egyptian-American Rural Improvement Service (EARIS) intended to assist rural
Egyptian communities. In fiscal 1954 the Eisenhower Administration, determined to keep
Nasser from becoming a Soviet client, increased this program enormously, and made $10
million available to Egypt in a lump sum. Soon thereafter, however, the U.S. realized that
Nasser was turning toward the Soviet camp. Egypt’s refusal to join the Middle East
Defense Organization (established by the Baghdad Pact of 1955) and Nasser’s general
resistance to Western influence caused a cooling of relations and a drop-off in aid funds,
culminating with the American refusal to fund the Aswan High Dam project in 1956.
Following the Suez War of that year, the U.S. completely halted its participation in the
EARIS program, and for a short time ended nearly all aid to Egypt. In 1959 and 1960,
however, the Eisenhower administration made another effort to buy Nasser’s sympathies.
The EARIS program was renewed and a March 1960 agreement earmarked $32.5 million
dollars in development aid for Egypt.
Still, through the 1960s, the two nations seemed to be moving in opposite directions.
Nasser relied on the Soviets to an ever-greater extent, and the U.S. government,
particularly under President Lyndon Johnson, became increasingly dissatisfied with
Egypt’s role in conflicts in the Congo and Cyprus, and with Egyptian criticism of
America’s involvement in Vietnam. Only the fear that an economic collapse would turn
Egypt toward communism kept any aid flowing at all. Nevertheless, in 1967, Nasser
publicly rejected U.S. economic aid and provoked the Six Day War. Aid was not restored
until 1974, after Nasser’s death and the next (Yom Kippur) war.
Following that war, when Egyptian President Sadat signaled his interest in improving
relations with the United States by expelling Soviet advisers, the Nixon and Ford
Administrations responded by pledging aid to Egypt roughly equivalent to the economic
(though not military) aid provided to Israel (in that year $700 million).11 This parity
established the principle that aid to Egypt is linked to aid to Israel. The Egyptian-Israeli
peace agreement of 1979 more or less formalized this parity.
The “Special International Security Assistance Act” of 1979 began the current age of
American aid to Egypt, authorizing $4.8 billion to support the Camp David peace accord.
Egypt’s package consisted of $300 million in economic aid and $1.5 billion in military
aid. It has since received, on average, just over $2.6 billion in total American aid annually
– roughly a thousand-fold increase in aid in 25 years.12
11
Ruttan, United States Development Assistance Policy, 496.
12
Ibid.
Officially, however, the U.S. government’s generosity is not blind. American aid to
Egypt, unlike aid to Israel, is required by legislation to be aimed at specific projects.
According to USAID, approximately 25 percent of the economic assistance program is to
be earmarked for public sector reforms, and another 25 percent funds the commodity
import program, which essentially facilitates Egyptian imports of American goods. The
remaining half of the program is project assistance allocated, at least officially, for
specific infrastructure and development projects.13 Of course the Egyptians do not always
adhere to these allocation requirements (and money is fungible, which means U.S. dollars
funding these projects free the government to spend its funds on other things).
Nonetheless, there is a far greater measure of restriction on Egypt’s use of American
money than on Israel’s. The purpose of these restrictions is supposed to ensure that the
money goes to accomplish things that the U.S. wants accomplished.
Military aid has been a component of American assistance to Egypt since 1978. Military
assistance began as a series of relatively small grants ($200,000 in 1978)14 but under the
Reagan Administration grew to nearly $1 billion in combined loans and grants (at first 70
percent loans and 30 percent grants).15 Since fiscal year 1985, all military aid to Egypt
has taken the form of grants (the same has been the case for all military aid to Israel since
the same year) and the amounts have generally hovered around $1.2 billion, mostly used
to purchase American military equipment. These funds have allowed the Egyptians to
modernize and increase the effectiveness of their fighting force.
The Purpose of Aid to Egypt
What is in it for America? What important role does the U.S. expect Egypt to play in the
peace process and the new Middle East? While the United States, for strategic as well as
domestic political reasons, has sought to strengthen Israel, it has sought mostly to restrain
Egypt, to keep the Egyptians out of the way of American policies and to prevent the rise
of extreme elements. In the immediate wake of the Camp David Accords, Harold
Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter administration, told members of the
House Appropriations Committee:
Certainly, bringing about a more positive pro-American policy in Cairo is a

major goal of the funding we are requesting, it is in the interest of the United
States to be supportive of Egypt, and in return to get its support in Arab
politics.16
13
United States Agency for International Development, American Assistance to Egypt: A Briefing Book
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), 3.
14
15
Many of these loans, however, can now be considered grants since the United States forgave nearly $7
billion in Egyptian debt as a reward for Egypt’s participation in the Gulf War.
16
House Committee on Appropriations Middle East Emergency Package Funding, May 8, 1979, 96th
Cong., 2nd sess., 1979, 779-781.
The Results of Aid to Egypt
From the start, the U.S. has gotten it wrong. Financial incentives have proved insufficient
to compel the Egyptian government to run against the grain of Egypt’s anti-Western
domestic identity and geopolitical outlook. It is true that Egypt has not made war since
Israel gave up the entire Sinai Peninsula following the Camp David Accords. But neither
has Egypt been a friendly or pro-American force in Arab politics and in the Middle East.
For one thing, Egypt’s peace with Israel has been not only cold, but downright hostile.
For instance, the Egyptian government allows and at times encourages virulent anti-
American, anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic propaganda in the nation’s government controlled
press. The government daily paper Al-Akbar stated in an April, 2000 editorial that “Jews
should not be trusted because they are a nation of vagabonds filled with hatred toward the
entire world.”17 One writer in Egypt’s most highly regarded newspaper, the government-
affiliated Al-Aharam, asked rhetorically: “What benefit will they [the Jews] derive from
the dominion they have achieved in this world, once they leave it? How will they benefit
from their riches when they reach absolute poverty [in Hell]? Who will rescue them?
There is no America there, and if America were there, it would not be able to help them;
rather, it would share their fate, which it also deserves.”18 The government-affiliated Al-
Gumhuriya daily published an article which argued:
Zionist propaganda continues, even today, to raise the issue of the Nazi
crematoriums for Jews, although the historical evidence, revealed by renowned
German, British, and French historians, proved that claims that such
crematoriums existed in the Nazi detention camps are jokes…. They were
invented and used by the Zionist movement…to terrify the European countries
during WWII so that the Jews would flee from Europe to Palestine, because the
Zionist movement realized that the Jews ignored its call to immigrate to
Palestine.19
The most popular Egyptian film of the past few years described the story of a man who
has discovered an Israeli plot to poison Egypt’s drinking water, and who sets out to turn
the plot against the Israelis themselves. The film ends with a scene depicting Hassidic
Jews in full garb keeling over as they drink their poisoned water. The bounds of good
taste prevent me from reviewing many other examples of the rhetoric of the government
controlled (and often state-sponsored) Egyptian media.
Along with this sort of incitement and propaganda, the Egyptians have also taken direct
action to prevent the peace with Israel from reaching the depth envisioned by its framers.
Indeed, Egypt has often been at the head of Arab diplomatic attacks against the Israelis –
and at one point in 1995 it even proposed a resolution to the Arab League to reinstate the
17
Al-Akhbar (Cairo), 12 April 2000.
18
Mustafa Mahmoud, “Some Words for Our Cousins,” Al Aharam (Cairo), 1 April 2000.
19
Al-Gumhuria (Cairo), 4 March 2000.
economic embargo against Israel.20 Asked about this “cold peace” by Barry Satloff of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Egyptian President Mubarak said: “Believe
me, it will stay cold and it will stay cold for a very long time to come.”21
More seriously, Egypt has also engaged in diplomatic maneuvers quite directly opposed
to American interests in the region. It has for instance opposed American efforts,
including ones with Jordanian support, to unseat Saddam Hussein in Iraq.22 Egypt has
also opposed nearly all UN resolutions aimed at eliminating Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction.23 Egypt even supported a failed effort by the UAE to lift the UN sanctions on
Iraq. As recently as August of 2000, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa said that
“the issue of Iraq has to be revisited...maintaining these sanctions is unacceptable to the
Arab world.”24 It is, of course, impossible to say whether these American efforts would
have met with more success were it not for Egyptian interference, but the interference
certainly demonstrates Egypt’s willingness to stand firmly in the way of American
policy.
The Egyptians have also sabotaged the Arab-Israeli peace process. Egypt did not take
kindly to Israel’s peace treaty with Jordan, certainly the most beneficial and least
troublesome element of the peace process. In a speech to the Second Middle East
Economic Summit in 1995, Egyptian Foreign Minister Moussa interrupted and insulted
Jordan’s King Hussein saying: “Your majesty…our interaction with Israel must be
undertaken with the greatest reason, confidence and wisdom, not by showing off or
rushing in” – implying that the king was a reckless show off.25 Again and again, the
Egyptians took steps behind the scenes to make Hussein’s efforts to normalize relations
with Israel more difficult.
The Egyptians also registered strong opposition to the Turkish-Israeli Military Accord of
1996, and in its wake implicitly threatened that they might form an alliance with Syria in
response – thus suggesting, in the words of one analyst, that “rather than champion or at
least support a pro-Western alliance, Cairo would apparently prefer closer ties with a
nation that is on the State Department’s list of supporters of terrorism.”26
Another useful measure of Egypt’s behavior as a client state and recipient of American
aid is its willingness to back the United States in international forums. Here, too, we find
that Egypt often stands in opposition to American wishes and interests. At the United
20
House Committee on International Relations, A Hearing Regarding American Policy Toward Egypt,
April 10, 1997, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, 6.
21
Ibid., 12.
22
For an extensive discussion of this episode in the mid 1990s, see Paul Remington “Egypt’s (Very
Unhelpful) Foreign Policy,” IASPS Research Papers in Strategy 3, The Institute for Advanced Strategic &
Political Studies (May 1997), 4-6.
23
Harvey Morris, “Clinton Seeks to Ease Egyptian Tension,” Financial Times, 29 August 2000.
24
Dina Ezzat, “A War of Words,” Al Ahram (Cairo), 9 August 2000.
25
Syrian Arab Republic Radio Network, October 29, 1995, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS), October 30, 1995.
26
Remington, “Egypt’s (Very Unhelpful) Foreign Policy,” 10.
Nations in the past several years, Egypt has cast its ballot against the United States 61
percent of the time.27
The Egyptians have also openly opposed and violated the American embargo against
Libya, and have opened the way for military, economic and political relations with the
Kadhafi regime. In 1997, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky stated on
the Senate floor that these improving relations reflected “Egypt’s shift from a partner in
peace to an advocate for a terrorist state armed with chemical weapons - a capability
which represents a direct threat to U.S. interests.”28 McConnell even proposed cutting
American aid in response, but the Clinton Administration blocked his attempt to do so.
Even more alarming than this is Egypt’s relationship with North Korea in the
development of missile technology, in direct violation of U.S. laws governing foreign aid.
A CIA report to Congress in 1999 stated that: “During the first half of 1998, Egypt
continued to obtain ballistic-missile components and associated equipment from North
Korea. This activity is part of a long-running program of ballistic missile cooperation
between these two countries.”29 An Air Force National Intelligence Center report from
October of 1999 states plainly that Cairo “is secretly cooperating with Pyongyang in
building Scud missiles.”30 These reports do not state the obvious: Egypt’s cooperation
consists mostly of money it pays to North Korea – money that Egypt can spend only
because the U.S. itself provides the Egyptians with funds.
North Korea is designated a “terrorist state” under section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961.31 That same law states plainly: “The President shall withhold
assistance under this act to the government of any country that provides assistance to the
government of any other country for which the secretary of state has made determination
under section 620A.”32 A later law also prohibits “the sale or license of export of defense
articles or defense services to any country determined by the president, in a fiscal year, to
be not cooperating with U.S. Anti-Terrorism efforts.”33
In other words, U.S. law clearly requires the United States to withhold all economic and
military aid from Egypt, and even to stop exporting military equipment to Egypt. Hence
aid to Egypt is not only ineffective, but literally illegal. And yet it continues, because of
27
Brian Johnson, Does Foreign Aid Serve U.S. Interests? Not at the United Nations (Washington: The
Heritage Foundation, 1996), 4. In fact, an analysis of votes at the United Nations demonstrates that 68
percent of recipients of American aid voted against the U.S. in the United Nations most of the time over the
past decade.
28
“Senator Proposes Cutting U.S. Aid to Egypt,” Agence France Presse, 19 June 1997.
29
“Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January through 30 June 1999,”
[http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_feb_2000.html#egypt], November 2000. The Director of
Central Intelligence in accordance with Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization submitted
this to Congress.
30
William Gertz, “Korea Continues to Develop Missiles; Sells Technology to Rogue Nations,” Washington
Times, 28 October 1999.
31
Foreign Relations and Intercourse, U.S. Code, vol. 22, sec. 2371 (1961).
32
Ibid. The law also clearly defines “assistance” to include economic and technical cooperation.
33
Foreign Relations and Intercourse, U.S. Code, vol. 22, sec 2781 (1996).
the insupportable (but unexamined) premise that the U.S. is helping itself by helping
Egypt.
In sum, U.S. aid to Egypt is remarkably powerless against Egyptian misbehavior in part
because it involves only carrots, and no stick. As Barry Satloff of the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy has put it: “While important and fundamental areas of U.S.-
Egyptian cooperation remain intact, I fear that they reflect only an episodic convergence
of interests, not a pattern of partnership”34 Aid is not changing that.
Alas, aid has brought about the sort of convergence of interests between U.S. and
Egyptian officials that is injurious to the United States. The enormous amounts of money
involved inevitably created interests inside the U.S. bureaucracy as well as in the body
politic, whose prestige and pocketbooks profit from continued aid. Hence their support
for Egypt has less to do with any affection for Egypt or for U.S. foreign policy than with
a tacit bargain: American officials help Egyptian officials to get rich, and Egyptian
officials help their American counterparts to validate their reputations.
U.S. strategy in the region has come to rely on an intricately constructed and well-
financed chimera: permanent comprehensive regional peace. This goal requires the
suspension of all the normal rules of international politics and diplomacy. Money is the
means by which the United States entices the Arab states to play along. Without aid to
Egypt, the Egyptians might stray from the U.S. line far more clamorously than they have,
and the entire structure of the policy would collapse. Hence American policymakers have
committed the nation to continued support of a country they know acts in direct defiance
of American interests while using American taxpayers’ money to induce Egyptian
officials to help them convince those taxpayers that they are themselves doing a good job.
Egypt is the most prominent and extreme example of this problem, but the problem
applies to all of America’s Arab partners in the peace process. In order to support the
inherently incredible script of the peace process, the U.S. has had to create a fictional
political reality, and the only way to do this is to continue funneling money to the actors.
The promise of aid brings the participants to the table, and the power of aid keeps them
from openly defying the script, but just beneath the surface, as we have just seen with
Egypt, the realities of politics have not disappeared, and the nations involved act in ways
which harm U.S. interests and certainly contradict the vision of comprehensive peace.
34
House, Policy Toward Egypt, 11. The Committee’s Chairman, Rep. Benjamin Gilman of New York,
made the following statement to the members at the conclusion of the hearing: “Egypt has repeatedly called
for easing sanctions against Libya and has refused to support even mild antiterrorism resolutions against
Sudan. Egypt has opposed U.S. initiatives to compel Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions and advocated
the reintegration of Iraq into the Arab fold. Egypt has also derailed regional arms reduction talks by
insisting on discussing Israel’s purported nuclear arsenal, a move that has prevented progress on the more
urgent issue of conventional arms in the region. Moreover, as for the peace process, we hear repeatedly
from various sources that until 24 hours before the Hebron accord was signed, Egypt had not been helpful
during the negotiations. One might add to this list reports that Egypt’s human rights record has steadily
worsened in recent years. Many of our colleagues are also concerned that Egypt has abdicated its leadership
role for peace and is gradually adopting a more hostile posture toward Israel.”
American policy and American interests thus come increasingly into conflict with one
another, and aid is a principal cause of this growing contradiction.
Finally, aid is positively harmful because it keeps this contradiction hidden from
American eyes and makes the United States a victim of its own generosity.
Aid to Israel
The causes and effects of aid to Israel are not entirely dissimilar. There, too, as in the case
of Egypt, the powerful distorting influence of aid money has fostered policies that are
ultimately disadvantageous to the U.S. There, too, aid has built powerful constituencies
for its continuation, regardless of results. But in Israel, the close relationship between the
economics of aid and the strategic consequences of aid are clearer and more immediate
and dangerous. Much of the confusion and the risk inherent in the current American
policy in the Middle East has to do with American aid to Israel.
By any measure, Israel is the largest recipient of American aid. Since 1948, it has
received at least $90 billion in direct aid. This is more than twice the amount of combined
U.S. aid to all of Latin America in the same period, and over 2.5 times what all of Africa
(excluding Egypt) has received. In fiscal year 2001, even before any special aid to cover
prospective peace accords, Israel has been allocated $2.86 billion, far more than any other
recipient, and more than most regions of the world.35
History
For the first 25 years of Israel’s life, U.S. aid levels were relatively low. Between 1948
and 1973, the U.S. provided Israel with an average of $122 million a year, or a total of
$3.1 billion for the entire period. In fact, more than $1 billion of that amount consisted of
loans for military equipment before and during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.36 Prior to
1971, Israel received a total of $277 million in military aid, and approximately $700
million in economic aid.37 All military aid took the form of loans as credit sales, and most
of the economic aid was also given as American loans, and not grants.
All of that changed following the Yom Kippur War. President Nixon’s rationale in
sharply increasing aid appears to have been strategic, and not – as some observers have
claimed – based on domestic political pressures from powerful Jewish groups. As former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has written:
When confronted with the realities of power in the Middle East – after much
anguish and circuitous maneuvers – he recognized that he must pursue, in the
35
These figures are from the President’s Budget Proposal for FY 2001, since a final budget has not yet
been approved by the Congress at the time of this writing. The president’s proposal is available from the
Office of Management and Budget and the Government Printing Office.
36
Mark Clyde, Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1997-2000).
37
national interest, the same strategy which others supported for reasons of ethnic
politics: to reduce Soviet influence, weaken Arab radicals, encourage Arab
moderates and assure Israel’s security. 38
The original intention of this aid, in other words, was to advance American interests by
strengthening an ally. Since 1973, Israel has received an annual package of
approximately $3 billion in military and economic aid, and four special aid packages.
The first of these special packages was a $3 billion loan and grant package to fund
Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai following the Israel-Egypt peace treaty of 1979. $2.2
billion of that amount consisted of market rate loans, and the rest was a grant. The second
special package was approved in 1985, and consisted of $1.5 billion to combat a severe
economic crisis in Israel. The third, approved in 1996, consisted of $100 million to help
Israel fight terrorism. The fourth, which also included aid to the Palestinian Authority,
was a $1.8 billion package following the Wye River Accords of 1998.
In addition, the United States approved $10 billion in loan guarantees for Israel in 1992,
and a variety of other smaller packages, such as refugee resettlement ($80 million
annually from 1992-1998 and then reduced to $70 million in fiscal year 1999 and $60
million in fiscal year 2000), and cooperative development programs ($186 million since
1981). In addition, Israel receives funds directly through the U.S. defense budget for joint
military projects, like the Arrow missile (for which Israel has received more than $628
million in grants since 1986). Israel also receives offsets on Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
purchases, by which U.S. contractors agree to offset some of the cost of military
equipment that Israel buys from them by purchasing components or materials from Israel.
Israel’s annual economic aid package was originally a part of the U.S. Commodity
Import Program, which provides funds to foreign governments for the purchase of
American products. Since 1979, however, this aid has been provided as a direct cash
transfer in a single lump sum each year. Starting in 1985, all of Israel’s annual aid (an
average of just under $3 billion annually) has been provided as a grant, rather than a
loan. Moreover, Israel receives the full amount at the outset of each fiscal year, so that it
may benefit from interest, which accrues on the amount throughout the year. Israel is also
nearly unique among U.S. aid recipients in that it is not required to provide an accounting
of how its economic aid funds are used. In return for these unusually good terms (Israel is
the only U.S. aid recipient given aid in a lump sum in this way) Israel promised that the
amount of its non-defense imports from the U.S. would exceed the level of economic
assistance granted to it in any given year, thus in principle guaranteeing that U.S.
suppliers would not be disadvantaged by the terms of Israel’s aid package.39
In 1998, Israel offered to voluntarily reduce its annual economic aid package in return for
an increase in military aid. According to an agreement reached with the Clinton
Administration and the Congress, the $1.2 billion economic aid package will be reduced
by $120 million each year, and in principle would be phased out over ten years. Half of
38
Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), 564.
39
Clyde, Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance, 3.
the annual savings in economic assistance each year ($60 million) is to be added to
Israel's military aid package, which is to grow to some $2.4 billion annually. In 1999,
Israel received $1.08 billion in economic aid and $1.86 billion in military aid. In FY
2000, economic aid was reduced to $949.1 million and military aid increased to $1.92
billion. The FY 2001 aid package, as approved by the House Appropriations Committee
in 2000 provides $1.98 billion in military assistance and $840 million in economic
assistance.40
While this would seem to suggest that total aid to Israel is declining slightly, in fact the
Israelis fully expect any progress in peace negotiations to result in far more aid. The total
would leap upwards by some $30 billion if the U.S. carries through with plans to finance
a future comprehensive accord between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and any
future deals with Syria or Lebanon would certainly bring further sizeable (and renewable)
grants from the U.S. Treasury.
Why Aid To Israel?
Why does the United States provide so much aid to Israel? Surely, Israel’s utility for
American interests is an important part of the answer, as is a certain natural affinity
among Americans for a beleaguered Western democracy in a dangerous neighborhood.
As discussed earlier, America’s new vision for the Middle East also necessitates sizeable
economic support. There is no doubt that pressure and lobbying from Jewish political
organizations in the U.S. and the power of the Jewish vote also has a great deal to do with
the policy. But all the answers have one theme in common: the U.S. gives aid to Israel
because it believes that by doing so it will help Israel and U.S. interests as well. This
provides the U.S. with clear-cut criteria by which to assess the policy: Does aid in fact
help and strengthen the Jewish state? Does it further U.S. interests?
The Results of Aid to Israel
The answer – counterintuitive as it may first appear – is decidedly no. Even at the most
basic level, that of economic performance and growth, aid does not strengthen Israel.
Rather, it weakens Israel by exacerbating the most serious source of its weakness: the
persistence of a system of institutions and elites that refuse to allow the nation to
liberalize and that depend for their existence on the survival of the socialist economy.
Moreover, at the level of strategic thinking and defense planning, aid also weakens Israel
by distorting its understanding of strategic realities.
Economics
Analysis of the economic consequences of aid must conclude that aid slows growth,
stifles economic activity, encourages inefficiency, and keeps alive Israel’s socialist
system. It is profoundly counterproductive for the Jewish state.
40
“House Committee Passes Israel Aid Bill Despite Controversy,” [http://www.menewsline.com], 28 June
2000.
That Israel lives under a socialist system should be beyond question. The Jewish state
suffers from all the usual maladies of a government-dominated economy. The
government owns 92 percent of the nation’s land, nearly all of its natural resources, and a
substantial number of major corporations (including Israel’s only electricity and water
suppliers, nearly all of its military industries, the nation’s major airline, a number of
insurance companies and hospitals). The state also has a controlling stake in the nation’s
only domestic (non-cellular) telephone service provider, the nation’s only oil refining
firm, and many other key industrial and economic players.
To maintain its control over the allocation of capital and resources and its dominant role
in the economy, the government – again following the usual statist pattern – has
established an intricate system of transfer payments and benefits to individuals. Public
spending in Israel accounts for over 57 percent of the nation’s GDP41 (compared with 33
percent in the United States at all levels of government combined). Of course, what the
government gives it must first take away, and so tax revenues constitute nearly 54 percent
of GDP.42 The top marginal income tax rate is over 60 percent, and all purchases are
subject to a value added tax. Such massive government spending, taxation, and
ownership of capital and resources is highly detrimental to growth and prosperity.
Government officials and their cronies utterly dominate the nation’s economic life.
Government activities and the rules that support them, the non-corrupt ones as well as the
corrupt, hamper the development of Israel’s private sphere, and provide a serious
disincentive to entry for potential investors and entrepreneurs.43
Over the past 25 years, American aid and other lesser forms of “free money” have made
this bad situation worse and have created an attitude of dependence which permeates the
thinking of Israeli policy makers. Israel has come to conceive of itself as a charity case,
and to live off the kindness of strangers, without in truth needing to do so. Figures made
available by Israel’s own Central Bureau of Statistics reveal that the era of aid has been a
dark age for the Israeli economy. Between 1950 and 1973, the pre-aid age for Israel, per
capita GDP grew at an average annual rate of 5.59 percent -- a healthy rate indeed for a
new nation developing in difficult circumstances. But between 1974 (when sizeable U.S.
aid began) and 1999, Israel’s per capita GDP grew at an average annual rate of only 1.51
percent.
41
“Statistical Abstract of Israel 2000,” 20.13, [http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton51/st20_08a.pdf]. Table 20.8a
notes that in order to properly compare expenditure with revenue, the figure used here for expenditure
excludes repayments (or rollover) of existing debts (approximately NIS 42 billion in 1998), and thus
includes only net new borrowing (approximately NIS 17 billion) as a form of spending. Government
spending thus amounts to NIS 166 billion, or some 57.12 percent of GDP
42
Ibid., 20.12. Table 20.7 notes that for proper accounting and comparison, this figure also includes that
portion of capital receipts which may be considered genuine revenue (NIS 11 billion in 1998) along with
straightforward tax revenue (NIS 145.6 billion). Revenue thus amounts to NIS 156.6 billion, or some 53.8
percent of GDP.
43
For more on this picture of the Israeli economy the reader is invited to examine 15 years worth of
rigorous analysis and commentary by the Division for Economic Policy Research of the Institute for
Advanced Strategic & Political Studies, and the writings of Alvin Rabushka and the Institute’s Koret
Fellows.
The causes of this sharp decline in growth have much to do with the habits of dependency
that have developed around the unearned infusions of funds that flow into Israel by the
billions of dollars each year. Under their influence, the Israeli economy ceased even to
strive for self-sufficiency, and the nation ceased to depend on its own productivity to
support its standard of living. The costs – in real terms and in lost potential income –
have been enormous.
Figure after figure and statistic after statistic demonstrate that Israel is not economically
self-sufficient, and that the Israeli government seems untroubled by this fact. In 1998 the
government spent some $2.3 billion more than it took in through taxes.44 In the same
year, even more remarkably, the nation imported nearly $6 billion more in goods and
services than it exported.45 This massive trade deficit amounted to over 8 percent of
Israel’s GDP.
Such gross imbalances have persisted in Israel for decades, but the Israeli government’s
response has not been to reduce spending or rein in consumption. Quite the contrary,
government spending has increased by at least 5 percent annually through the past
decade, despite staggering disparities between revenues and outlays.46 Private
consumption growth has meanwhile steadily outpaced GDP growth.47 Israel is clearly
living well beyond its means.
How has this situation continued over so many years? Why has Israel not taken action to
end these gaping disparities? The answer is that Israel does not pay for these gaping
disparities out of its own pocket. Outsiders cover the costs, or at least a very substantial
portion of them. Israeli citizens receive what they perceive as the benefits of the services
and transfer payments provided by an omnipresent welfare state, while at the same time
importing far more than they export, purchasing far more than they make, and not paying
for it all.
The costs are covered by a combination of government borrowing and unilateral transfers
from abroad. Domestic borrowing consists mainly of domestic currency bonds issued by
the government; while foreign borrowing includes the sale of Israel Bonds, the exercise
of U.S. loan guarantees, bond sales in Europe, and a variety of other loans. Net new
borrowing in 1998 amounted to approximately $4.1 billion,48 though the figure had been
substantially higher earlier in the 1990s, as Israel made use of $10 billion in American
loan guarantees granted in 1992. It should also be noted that a fairly substantial portion of
44
“Statistical Abstract of Israel 2000,” 20.11, [http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton51/st20_07a.pdf]. See Table
20.7a for revenue figures, and Table 20.8a, 20.13 (for spending figures)
[http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton51/st20_08a.pdf]. See the two previous notes above for explanations of the
calculations used to derive this deficit figure.
45
Ibid., 8.5. See Table 8.1, [http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton51/st08_01.pdf].
46
“Israeli State Budget, Fiscal Year 2000,” [http://www.mof.gov.il/budget2000/part25.htm]. This text is in
Hebrew.
47
Israel in Figures (Jerusalem: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2000), 14.
48
“Statistical Abstract of Israel 2000,” 20.12, [http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton51/st20_07b.pdf.]. See Table
20.7b.
the money raised through the sale of bonds abroad is never redeemed by the generous
owners, and thus becomes a grant.
More importantly, and most amazingly, unilateral transfers – essentially free money –
added up to well over $6 billion in 1998. Along with U.S. aid in all its many forms, this
figure includes personal restitutions from Germany and other remittances to individuals
as well as assorted minor institutional remittances, but the great bulk of it, 64 percent of
the whole, is direct aid from the government of the United States to the government of
Israel.49 In sum, the Israeli government is able to spend approximately $10 billion more
each year than it takes in through taxes, and the great bulk of that amount is in the form
of aid funds that never have to be repaid.
This flow of free money creates a set of perverse incentives that distort Israeli
government policy in countless ways. Confronted by the difficulties that sometimes beset
nations – a negative balance of payments, a government deficit, – the Israeli government
looks for a solution not to better policy or stronger growth but to outside aid. This
prevents the source of the problems from being addressed, and ensures even greater
reliance on aid in the future. The quick and easy fix of aid has become a sort of narcotic
for the Israeli political system, and Israel’s elites have convinced themselves that the
nation cannot live without it. Under this mindset, aid becomes the overarching goal of
policymakers. The purpose of the nation’s economic policies is no longer growth but
rather aid; the purpose of its foreign policy is no longer strength but rather aid; the
purpose of its defense policy is no longer security but rather aid; and in the end the
motivations driving policymakers are not calculations of national interest but the desire
for continued and expanded aid.
Israel’s governing elites have been particularly prone to this distorted frame of mind
because a cessation of aid would necessarily undermine – indeed it would dismantle – the
socialist system, which nourishes the bureaucrats and politicians who now run the
country. Aid, therefore, is not only a way to avoid paying the bills, it is a way (in truth
the only way) to keep Israel’s socialist system alive, and with it the power and positions
of Israel’s elites.
Aid from abroad has both harmed the Israeli economy and put up barriers to repairing the
damage. Israel is not only unproductive; it does not strive for productivity. It not only
lacks economic freedom, it has no desire for such freedom. It desires only aid, and it
constructs its policies accordingly.
Of course, such a course is bound to end in painful failure. While aid may cover this
year’s deficit and next year’s trade imbalance it is no long-term substitute for sound
economic policy. And yet, each year as Israel’s troubles grow, the clamor for aid grows
only more desperate, and the likelihood of genuine reform dims further. As we shall see
49
“Statistical Abstract of Israel 2000,” 7.6, [http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton50/st07-02ab_e.shtml]. Table
7.2 notes the breakdown as follows: personal restitutions from Germany $788 million; other personal
remittances $1 billion; Institutional remittances $367 million; intergovernmental remittances $3.95 billion.
more clearly in the coming pages, Israel’s desperate desire for aid has much to do with its
commitment to foreign policies that weaken it even further.
In the end, the United States is not strengthening its ally with aid, but rather it is
contributing to its growing weakness and blindness. The weakening of Israel is certainly
bad for America’s strategic interests, both directly and (by the effect of a weakened Israel
on the calculations of other American allies like Turkey) indirectly. Yet the United States
pays for Israel’s internal and external weakening, as if it were doing good for itself and
for its Israeli allies. Tragedy is not too strong a word.
Military Aid
Israel’s defense needs are of course often cited in response to calls for an end to
American aid. The bulk of U.S. assistance to Israel is labeled as defense aid, and is
targeted toward Israel’s military and defense procurements. Proponents of continued aid
often argue that Israel could not maintain its strategic advantage if such aid were halted.
These claims, however, do not stand up to scrutiny. The first and foremost point to grasp
about military aid is that, because money is fungible, military aid is in fact a form of
economic aid, and must therefore be considered in light of the conclusions reached in our
discussion above. One dollar of aid, regardless of where it is spent, allows the
government to allocate a dollar of its budget to another purpose. It is true that military aid
comes with a number of strings – it must be spent on defense needs, and approximately
75 percent of it must be spent in the United States – but these needs are ones on which
the Israeli government would spend money in any case. Most likely, it would spend
much of that money in the United States. By providing money for these purposes, the
U.S. allows the Israeli government to have more funds for other uses.
With a current annual budget of $43 billion, how badly does Israel really need the
roughly $2 billion in military aid?50 The government could easily make up for the loss of
these $2 billion by reducing the tax burden on the Israeli taxpayer (thus encouraging
growth and increasing government revenue) and focusing on its truly essential tasks like
defense.
In fact, many Israelis have come to oppose American military aid, and to believe that
Israel does not require cash transfers to maintain its strategic edge. “If we absolutely
needed aid for our defense,” says Uzi Landau, a Likud member of the Knesset, “it would
be worth the associated headaches, but we do not.”51 Israel should, according to Landau,
“wean itself of U.S. aid. It will be a painful process, I’m sure, but ultimately our economy
and our national security will benefit.”52
Former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens has expressed similar sentiments. For these
Israelis, the main argument against defense aid has to do with the constraints it places on
50
“Israel,” in World Factbook (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000).
51
Barbara Opall-Rome, “Military Aid Hot Issue,” Defense News, 10 July 2000, 19.
52
Ibid.
Israel’s own weapons industries, but their opposition goes to demonstrate that Israel does
not absolutely require the aid for its security, and that even Israelis who have served at
the highest levels of the defense establishment believe it can do without it. The money,
Arens says, “is certainly not as crucial today as it was in the past to Israel’s well being
since the $1.9 billion is only 2 percent of GDP…it is not something that is going to make
or break Israel.”53
Strategic cooperation between the two nations (including joint military development
projects and access to weapons and intelligence data) is in the interest of both the U.S.
and Israel. But direct grant aid does not serve the interests of either.
The Strategic Consequences of Aid
American aid also contributes to arguably the Jewish state’s most dangerous problem: the
Israeli elites’ profound confusion about Israel’s strategic problems as well as the growing
conflict between their personal interests with the interests of the state as a whole.
Substantial numbers of Israeli elites in fact accept the vision of the new Middle East that
drives American policy. Like their American counterparts, Israeli officials, too, state
passionately that a whole new era is upon us, and that the realities of the past have lost all
relevance. “The international political setting is no longer conducive to war,”54 writes
former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, and in the future “national goals will no
longer be based on control or territory.”55 He continues, echoing the views of many elites
in Israel, Europe and the United States, that “national political organizations can no
longer fulfill the purpose for which they were established…the modern era offers no fool-
proof means of national defense other than a wide-ranging regional arrangement.”56 But
although these views are very much in line with U.S. policy, they are very much out of
line with the understanding of regional politics that Israel requires to survive. And yet,
just as aid has driven these elites to accept and champion the peace process, it has also
allowed them to argue that any dangers to which their policies expose Israel are more
than made up for by American support.
U.S. aid, then, creates the strategic equivalent of what investors call “moral hazard” – that
is, an inducement to irresponsibility caused by the belief that someone else will bear
eventual losses. In foreign policy as in economic policy, then, aid masks the effects of the
Israeli elites’ defects. The cycle of error is circular and self-intensifying. Israel’s elites do
not wish harm on their people or their nation, but the combination of economic and
political interests with a crude idealism in international politics has made them heedless
of the consequences of their actions. The violence which began in September 2000 is the
starkest example and most direct result of this cycle of errors.
53
Arieh O’Sullivan, “Waiting for Israel to Blink,” Jerusalem Post, 11 July 2000.
54
Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1993), 80.
55
Ibid., 156.
56
Ibid., 83.
Aid and the Peace Process

The peace process of the past decade has exacerbated the contradictions inherent in
American aid policy. It has put more Arab states in Egypt’s position (profiting from
American largesse while working against U.S. interests), and has deepened Israel’s
acceptance of and dependence on this line of policy. It has placed American
policymakers in the position of paying to maintain a fiction that masks a disastrous
policy.
Following the American decision to pay most of the costs related to the implementation
of the Camp David Accords and to place the signatories on a program of sustained
massive aid, it became clear that American dollars would be a major prize for any Arab
state willing to even recognize Israel’s existence. The Palestinian Authority and Syria
have both sought (and the Palestinians have indeed begun to obtain) the same sort of
American assistance that the Egyptians have received. Upon receiving it, they have
appeared equally unlikely to act in accordance with American interests. That is because
the interests of the parties involved, particularly of the Palestinians and Syrians, are not
always what they appear and are nearly never those of the United States. Hence
American money cannot buy genuine change.
The Palestinian Authority
The Palestinian case very much resembles that of Egypt. The peace process has
committed the U.S. to supporting a regime that has proven to be undemocratic,
inhumane, and anti-American in nearly all respects.
The United States has mustered great resources to reviving the Palestinian Liberation
Organization and to building it up into the Palestinian Authority. Each year since 1993,
the U.S. Congress has allocated several hundred million dollars to the Palestinian
Authority, mostly under the auspices of the USAID.57 The benefits for the United States
are, presumably, an end to the conflict in the Middle East and enhanced stability in the
region. If there really were a process leading to real peace, these American dollars might
be well spent. But the notion that the corrupt thugs who run the Palestinian Authority are
interested in peace and participation in America’s “globalized” world is a fiction difficult
to maintain.
Following the pattern of Egypt, the Palestinian press, including the official mouthpieces
of the Palestinian Authority, regularly revile and malign the United States as much as
Israel. “The actions taken by the United States in the name of international legitimacy in
recent years,” wrote the PA paper Al-Hayat Al-Jadida in 1998, “are the worst sort of
contemporary barbarism, worse than what we have seen in this century from the Nazis,
the Fascists, the Jews, the Cambodians, the Serbs, and the Rwandans.”58 Such statements,
57
The allocation request for FY 2001 currently stands at $100 million, though of course any new agreement
with Israel is likely to bring the PA far greater sums, if the patterns of the past are any indication.
58
Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (Gaza), 2 December 1998.
and school textbooks in the same vein, are standard fare. Official PA statements about
Israelis and Jews go further, much further.
Moreover, the Palestinian Authority openly opposes American policy in the Middle East,
including most prominently the American stance on Iraq (Arafat and the PLO, it must be
remembered, supported Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, and official Palestinian
spokesmen have continued to speak out in support of the Iraqi leader ever since). Despite
the fact that Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and the PA’s support for it caused tens of
thousands of Palestinians to be expelled from good jobs in the Gulf and into poverty, the
Palestinian leadership regularly and successfully uses support for Iraq to rile up its
people, as when Palestinian Ministry of Justice official Sheikh Mahmoud Salameh called
on Palestinians to take up arms in the cause of Iraq. “Islam obliges us to wage jihad,” he
told PA television, “the Arab nation is a Muslim nation and Iraq is a Muslim nation that
is under attack.”59 Guess by whom!
The PA is anti-American to its core. There is not a shred of evidence for the notion that
this regime will turn pro-Western in the foreseeable future. Conceivably the death of the
entire current leadership might do the job. But paying and empowering that very
leadership certainly cannot. There is no doubt that the PA leadership’s policies, from the
Gulf War to the Rosh Hashanah 2000 War, plus its own corruption – all abetted de facto
by U.S. aid – have impoverished Palestinians. Unfortunately, there is even less doubt that
the PA leadership has succeeded in turning popular anger at misery toward the U.S. and
Israel.
Any future final status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians would certainly
transfer many more American dollars to the Palestinian regime. In late July of 2000,
sources in the Congress told the Washington Post that they believe a new Israeli-
Palestinian deal “could cost U.S. taxpayers as much as $15 billion--and possibly much
more--over the next few years.”60 Moreover, Palestinian officials have floated a figure of
$40 billion for the cost of relocating refugees – an expense the U.S. has said it will cover
with the help of EU and Persian Gulf allies.61 “Whatever it takes will be astronomical,”
Rep. Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat from California, recently told the Washington Post, “but
it will be worth it to have peace.”62
If money could buy genuine peace, it might indeed be worth it, but that is not what
American money has so far bought, and no one has suggested how America might get its
money’s worth in the future.
59
Palestinian Authority Television, 18 December 1998, (in Arabic) (Washington: Middle East Media
Research Institute, 1998).
60
John Lancaster, “Congress Alerted To Price Of Peace,” Washington Post, 16 July 2000.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
Syria
American money has also had much to do with Syria’s calculations in the peace process.
Most sources suggest the Syrians would receive tens of billions of dollars if a Syrian-
Israeli deal followed the pattern of earlier peace agreements.63
The track record of the Assad regime under the current president’s father suggests that
these funds would be used for ends that squarely contradict American interests. Syria’s
decision to open discussions on a deal with Israel led some in the U.S. and Israel to argue
that the late Haffez el Assad had made a “strategic choice for peace,” and that this meant
he had rejected his earlier anti-American policy goals, but an examination of Assad’s
strategic considerations suggests otherwise. Indeed, a peace strategy is very much in line
with those long held anti-American objectives.
Peace with Israel would put America’s stamp of approval on Syria’s occupation of
Lebanon, and would allow the Syrians to eradicate any remnants of Lebanese
independence without fear of negative reactions in the West. Israel has already signaled
its willingness to accept such a Syrian move if a peace deal were achieved, and the U.S.
has suggested it would support it as well.64
Such a deal would also free the new Syrian leader to renew Syria’s longstanding
confrontation with Turkey – a vital American ally. Once the American and Israeli
governments have committed themselves to the preservation of Bashar Assad’s regime
by signing an accord with him, they would be hesitant to risk the hard-bought pretense of
peace on an intervention on behalf of the Turks, should Syria take action against them.
Assad would be bound to gain some leeway in his treatment of Turkey, and some
leverage against it. The Turks depend on American diplomatic and military support.
What would Turkey do without it? And what would the U.S. be doing to itself by
exchanging the allegiance of the friendly Turkish regime for the deceptive half smiles of
Syria’s dictators?
The Syrian regime also houses and aids international terrorists of all stripes, and serves as
a hub of the regional trade in illegal narcotics. An American sponsored Israeli-Syrian deal
would make it far more difficult, rather than easier, for the United States to speak up or
take action against these activities.
63
John Broder, “Israel and Syria Resuming Search for Major Accord,” New York Times, 4 January 2000.
On January 4th, 2000, the New York Times reported that Clinton Administration officials were prepared to
ask Congress for “between $10 billion and $100 billion over the next several years” to fund an Israeli-
Syrian accord. The upper end of that figure is certainly an effort to overestimate in order to soften the blow
when the true request comes, but it suggests that the eventual amount may be in the tens of billions of
dollars. The deal that was expected in early 2000 never came, but any future deal would likely carry a
similar price tag.
64
Lally Weymouth, “Q & A: ‘We Have To Act, Not Just Talk,’” Washington Post, 31 October 1999, B1.
“Syria has had a say in Lebanon for a long time,” Israeli Prime Minister Barak told the Washington Post
late last year, “and will have a say in Lebanon in the future – even once an agreement is achieved.”
Along with all this, as stated above, a deal with Israel would bring enormous amounts of
American dollars into the Syrian treasury. Thus, as with Egypt and the Palestinians, a
peace deal would simultaneously allow the Syrians to finance direct opposition to
American interests. Again, the U.S. would be placing its policy in opposition to its
interests, and paying the bill to boot.
Aid as a consequence of deals stemming from the peace process would exacerbate the
problems which aid policy has caused for Israel. In early 2000, Israeli Prime Minister
Barak made it clear to the United States that he expected any deal with the Syrians to
bring over 17 billion American dollars to his country. One report paraphrased Barak’s
message to the Administration as stating, “without knowing what Israel might get in new
U.S. commitments, he cannot sign away control over the Golan Heights and convince
Israelis that they will remain secure.”65 Again, aid has the effect of convincing Israelis
that otherwise unthinkably dangerous strategic moves are safe and profitable because the
U.S. backs them. Yet the scenario envisaged by the architects of American aid, in which
the Arab states obligingly play their role on the stage of the comprehensive peace drama
is belied by the fact that the Arab states continue to act on their long-held objectives
behind the scenes – objectives that have nothing in common with what American
policymakers assume are their interests. Dangerous deals become particularly attractive
to Israeli elites because, though it is unclear what good or harm they may bring to Israel,
they will surely bring American money to help sustain these very elites and their statist
system.
In the end, this is not only bad for Israel but for the United States as well.
Conclusion: Aid and American Interests

America’s aid policy as currently structured is not and cannot be good for American
interests. But is there not danger in changing it?
That danger is generally seen to involve the relative disarmament of Israel (to which most
Americans are rightly opposed), the danger to regional stability, a loss of American
leverage, and a decline in the allegiance of the states involved.
As this paper has tried to show, these objections are largely unfounded, and the problems
which might be caused by the ending of aid, are of a smaller magnitude than those caused
by its continuation. Aid does not help Israel or strengthen it. Aid does not ensure stability,
it does not provide real leverage, and it does not by any means guarantee the allegiance of
recipient nations.
The ending of the current situation, in which any Arab country that deigns to
acknowledge Israel’s mere existence in Aesopian language while training its people to
65
Barbara Slavin, “Israel Wants $17B Military Package as Part of Peace Deal,” USA Today, 24 March
2000, A13.
kill Jews, automatically receives American taxpayer dollars, would in fact enhance
America’s ability to use aid selectively, as it should properly be used in international
affairs.
The question then arises: what would happen if the United States ceased to support the
regimes in question? The question itself demonstrates the degree to which the current
policy has done real damage to America’s geostrategic position. If the U.S. has reached a
point at which it appears to have no choice but to fund unfriendly regimes that stand
opposed to American interests, then we are truly in great trouble. But of course, this is
not the situation. It is simply not true that the traditional balance of power approach to
global politics is no longer relevant, and that nations now respond only to financial
incentives and the logic of idealist cooperation. The problem is fundamentally an
intellectual one. The problem is that some U.S. policymakers assume that America can
buy its way out of the balance-of-power approach to international politics and into a new
Middle East, and that official Israel, too, shares this notion.
As presently articulated, a number of rationales build upon each other to support the
current aid policy. First, aid is essential for Israel’s survival and strength. Second, aid to
the Arab states cannot be separated from aid to Israel – the link between them is an
important component of America’s role as an arbiter in the peace process. Without aid on
par with Israel’s, the Arab states would not come to the table. Third, by coming to the
table, the Arab states become more pro-American, and accept the American and Israeli
conception of the new Middle East. This, in turn, enhances American power and leverage
and is good for the United States.
In reverse order, we find that aid to the Arab states in fact does not make them inherently
pro-American, but rather it often allows them to act more freely in opposition to
American interests. Next, while it is true that aid to these states cannot easily be cut off
without also cutting off aid to Israel, we now see that aid to Israel does more harm than
good for Israel, and therefore should be cut off.
In other words, both of the major assumptions that underlie the current policy are in fact
false. By recognizing this, the United States could greatly enhance its influence, leverage
and prestige. Aid could serve the interests of the U.S., and perhaps those of the peoples in
recipient countries, only if it is conceived of in realistic terms. A stick at least as large its
carrot would allow the United States to act in support of its interests and to see more
clearly the strategic realities that now shape the politics of the Middle East.
Foreign aid will only work to America’s advantage if the nation is willing to use it as a
political tool whose function is defined by a realistic conception of international affairs. If
it is not, then aid becomes not only a waste of money, but also an outright detriment to
American interests and objectives. Currently, it is precisely that.

American Aid To The Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions

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American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good

Aid in U.S. policy

Why Foreign Aid?

The Origins of Aid to the Middle East

Aid and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Accords

The Purpose of Aid to Egypt

Certainly, bringing about a more positive pro-American policy in Cairo is a

The Results of Aid to Egypt

Why Aid To Israel?

The Results of Aid to Israel

The Strategic Consequences of Aid

Aid and the Peace Process

The Palestinian Authority

Conclusion: Aid and American Interests

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