CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY.

PUNO

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

A writ is a form of written command issued by the court for a person, party, or body to act or abstain in acting in
some way.

Writ of habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body
of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit
to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.

Privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is the right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the
deprivation of physical liberty.

Who may suspend the privilege?

- The President
When may the privilege be suspended?
- Article III, Section 15: In cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it."
- Hence, for the validity of the suspension, two requisites must concur:
1. the existence of actual invasion or rebellion;
2. public safety requires the suspension.
-
The new Constitution has removed "insurrection" and "imminent danger" of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion as grounds for the suspension.

Does the suspension of the privilege also suspend the right to bail?
- No. Art. Ill, Sect. 13. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended.

What are the limitations on the power to suspend the privilege?

- Article VII, Section 18.
- In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person
or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

1. Go vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009.

Facts:
Ramos filed a deportation proceedings against Go, alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien, because in the
birth certificate of Go it appears that only the citizenship of him was handwritten while the other entries were typewritten.
The Board of Commissioners directs the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Go.

Go on the other hand, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition but it was denied. Go, likewise commenced a petition
for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.

Hence, Go raised their case to the higher court.

Issue:
Whether or not it is proper to dismissed Go’s petition for habeas corpus

Ruling:
Yes, objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be
issued

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of
habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. Likewise, the
cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have
no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by
this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings,
the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.

Habeas corpus proceeding is to determine whether the detention of a particular person is valid or not. If valid, the person
should still be detained. Otherwise, the person should be released.

ISSUE: If there is already a criminal case

Once a person is charged in court, habeas corpus is cannot be used. The remedy of the person is to file a motion to quash
the information.

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

Speedy trial in section 14 covers only the trial phase of criminal cases.
- It can only be raised by the accused.
-
Speedy disposition of cases in section 16 covers all phases of any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
proceedings.
- It can be raised by an accused and also private complainant in criminal case. Also in civil cases,
administrative cases.
- Basically, any party in the case. Whether a complainant, petitioner, defendant, accused, respondent.

The effect differs depending on who raised the right:

 If the accused or the defendant raised, the case can be dismissed.
 If complainant or petitioner, the presentation of evidence of the other side can be waived or declare
in default.

If there is a violation, the remedy is the same with speedy trial.

 If accused or defendant, the remedy is mandamus

1. Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr., G.R. No. L-45647, August 21, 1987.
FACTS:
On 19 November 1976, petitioners, spouses Manuel and Lelita Caballero, claiming to be the absolute
owners of several contiguous parcels of land planted with coconut trees, situated in Salubsub, San Isidro,
Gingoog City, filed a petition for injunction with restraining order and damages against the herein private
respondents Fernando Esconde, Cesar Navarro, Gregorio Bakerel, and Francisco Rodriguez, together with
William Abatayo, Elmer Almonte, Teodorico Amoncio, and Pedro Amper, with the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental, for having allegedly entered the aforementioned parcels of land and illegally harvested
the fruits of the coconut trees planted therein without petitioners' knowledge and consent, to the prejudice
of said petitioners, for which they claimed damages in the sum of P7,000.00.

RESPONDENTS on the other hand, admitted that the petitioners are the lawful owners of the parcels of land
described in the petition. They claimed, however, that the respondents Fernando Esconde, Cesar Navarro,
and Gregorio Bakerel are the tenants on the land, while the rest, except Francisco (Frank) Rodriguez who
is allegedly an investigator designated by the Land Reform Farmers' Association to organize the tenants
into an association to put up a solid front in a program to help the New Society and to secure the success
of the land reform program, are the harvesters of the coconut lands.

They also contended that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, which is purely agrarian in nature and
cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. As counterclaim, said respondents alleged that they suffered
moral damages for mental anguish, mental torture, wounded feelings, moral shock, serious anxiety and
other inconveniences as a result of the filing of the case, for which they asked to be paid the sum of
P17,000.00.

After hearing, or on 13 December 1976, the respondent judge found that the issuance of a temporary
restraining order would be proper in the interest of justice and, consequently, ordered the respondents to
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cease and desist from gathering fruits from the coconut trees in the land until the petition for injunction shall
have been heard and resolved.

ISSUE:
WON the right to speedy trial has been violated

RULING:
NO, because the guarantee of the right to "a speedy disposition of cases," which the Constitution
expressly provides, recognizes the truism that justice delayed can mean justice denied. Likewise, the broad
sweep that the guarantee comprehends, when it provides that the right is available before all judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative bodies, confirms that the application of the immunity from arbitrary and oppressive
delays is not limited to an accused in a criminal proceeding but extends to all parties and in all cases. Hence,
under the constitutional provision, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on the part of all who
are officially tasked with the proper administration of justice.

In the case at bar, it is true that the referral of cases to the Department of Agrarian Reform opens the
door to more bureaucratic red tape and, perhaps, more opportunities for corrupt practices. The defects in
the bureaucratic system do not, however, constitute valid arguments against the merits of legislative policy
intended to protect the legitimate tenant-tiller. Besides, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of PD
1038. This is a matter left for Congress tore-examine in the exercise of its legislative authority.

However, "speedy disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
trial" accorded an accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It
is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.

In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain
factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the
delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay.

The same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially
charged with the administration of justice has violated the "speedy disposition of cases" guarantee.

To strike down a law on the ground that it violates the guarantee of "speedy disposition of cases" requires
more than a citation of what may be a misfeasance or malfeasance of a public officer whose duty and
responsibility it is to apply and administer the law. The challenge must be based on a clear showing that it
is the law, or its operation, and not merely its administration, which invades and impairs constitutionally
protected personal or property rights.

The concept of "speedy disposition of cases," like "speedy trial," is a relative term and must necessarily
be a flexible concept. In the determination of whether or not the right has been violated, the factors that
may be considered and balanced are:
1. length of delay
2. reason for the delay
3. assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and
4. prejudice caused by the delay.

2. Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120681, October 1, 1999.

Facts:
Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) against Mayor Binay of Makati for
‘Illegal Use of Public Fund' (RPC A220) and ‘Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act' (RA 3019) on
September 1994. The information filed constituted crimes which were committed by the petitioner in his
incumbency in the year 1987. The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years
constituted a violation of his constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance
pending the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to
quash and further the latter's motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to
suspend the accused ‘pendente lite' (benefits) which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered
even before he could file his reply to the petitioner's opposition. The SC then directed the SB permit petitioner to
file said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order after the submission of the reply.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect in May 1995 so much so that the petitioner filed
before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no jurisdiction over said
cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension order in June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied
the petitioner's motion. Hence, this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB
over the criminal cases.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner's right to speedy disposition has been violated.

Ruling:
No. The Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject cases.

The prosecution is not bound by the findings of the COA; it must rely on its own independent judgment in the
determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct its own review of the COA findings.
Judging from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for
their resolution.

Whether or not there is a probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject cases is a question best left to the
discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the
exercise thereof. Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexations, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure
to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the
constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

In this case, there is a discussion of What constitutes the speedy disposition of cases.
Even the complexity of the case which charged Binay was taken into account. It is really a case to case basis.

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application
of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also
be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

3. Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 199

Facts:

The accused Imelda R. Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr. with a violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the
following elements of the offense charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: 1] that the accused
acted as a public officer; 2] that subject Contract or transaction entered into by the latter is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government

Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Associate Justices Balajadia and Atienza could not agree on whether
to convict or acquit the petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending against her. Justice Atienza was in favor
of exonerating petitioner Justices. Garchitorena and Balajadia wanted to convict her in. As there was no
unanimity of votes in Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Adm. Order constituting a Special Division of five (5)
justices, and naming thereto, Justices Augusto M. Amores and Cipriano A. del Rosario. Justice Amores sent a
written request to Presiding Justice Garchitorena asking that he be given fifteen (15) days to submit his
Manifestation on the same day, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and del Rosario, after
attending a hearing of the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives, lunched together in a Quezon
City restaurant where they discussed petitioner’s cases in the absence of Justices Atienza and Amores and in
the presence of a non-member of the Special Division. Thereat, Presiding Justice Garchitorena, and Justices
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Balajadia and del Rosario agreed with the position of Justice Atienza to acquit petitioner and to convict her in
the other cases; and when the Justices returned to the official workplace of Sandiganbayan Such procedural
flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its “decision” that the decision of the
First Division of the respondent Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is void for violating her right to
substantive and procedural due process of law

More than six (6) years passed but the petitioner's prosecution is far from over. To remand the case to
the Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional right to its speedy disposition.

Issue:

WON the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases was violated

Ruling:

YES. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution assures “all persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.” This right expands the right
of an accused “to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial x x x” in criminal cases guaranteed by Section 14(2)
of Article III of the Constitution. It has a broadening effect because Section 16 covers the periods before, during
and after trial whereas Section 14(2) covers only the trial period.1 Heretofore, we have held that an accused
should be acquitted when his right to speedy trial has been violated. The rationale for both Section 14(2) and
Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution is the same: “justice delayed is justice denied.” Violation of either
section should therefore result in the acquittal of the accused.

The effect of the finding of violation of the speedy disposition of case on the part of the accused is
acquittal.

In sec. 21, it protects an individual on double jeopardy. The nature of the dismissal of criminal case – with
prejudice or without prejudice
 If prejudice, the case cannot be re-filed with court.
- Those are decisions of the court that involve discussion of certain merits of the case.
 If without prejudice, the case may be re-filed with court.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The right against self-incrimination

- It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity:
- Of policy, because, if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the
strongest temptation to commit perjury; and
- Of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confession by duress.
- Any type of confession or admission should always be done freely or willingly.

When is a question incriminating?

Chief Justice Marshall explained that usually a crime or a criminal act may contain two or more elements
and that a question would have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to elicit only one of said elements.
The right thus, includes a right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of
evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a witness.

1. U.S. vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 1272, January 11, 1904.

FACTS:
The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano are convicted of the crime of illegal
detention under Article 481 and of 483 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or
detain another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the penalty of Prison Mayor.

Article 483, par. 2 of the Penal Code provides that one who illegally detains another and fails to give
information concerning his whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished
with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment.
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It all started when the defendants, with other unknown persons, armed with revolvers and daggers, went to the
house of Felix Punsalan in Bulacan, and by force and violence kidnapped Punsalan. Up to the date of this
information, Punsalan’s whereabouts are still unknown. There is no proof that he was set free by the defendants.
The defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment but pleaded not guilty.

Again, the punishment for the crime mentioned in Article 483 of the Penal Code is the penalty of Cadena
Temporal in its maximum degree to Cadena Perpetua, or in other words one convicted of simply depriving a
person of his liberty may be imprisoned for a term of from 6-12 years and one convicted of depriving a person of
his liberty and who shall not state his whereabouts or prove that he had set said person at liberty may be punished
by imprisonment for a term of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to life, as in this case.

So, if the defendant fails to testify regarding the whereabouts of the person deprived of liberty, or to prove that
he was set at liberty, his punishment may be increased to life imprisonment. This provision has the effect of
forcing the defendant to become a witness on his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The burden
is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen his penalty. In other words, he is compelled to
incriminate himself, for the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set
the victim free is already a confession that he did in fact unlawfully detain the victim.

ISSUE:

WON the defendants' rights against self-incrimination were violated.

RULING:
YES. The right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity -
of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation
to commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress.
It is also against the Section 17 of the Bill of Rights provides that "No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."

The Government cannot charge a man with one of the necessary elements of an offense and trust to his making
out the rest by availing himself of his right to leave the entire burden of prosecuting on the prosecution from
beginning to end. If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against him as a confession of
crime, or an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of an offense, such disclosure would be an
accusation against himself. In the present case, if the defendant disclosed the whereabouts of the person taken,
or shows that he was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used to obtain a conviction under article 481 of the
Penal Code.

It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; and the accused cannot be called upon either by express words or acts to assist in the
production of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a right to rely on the
presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with which he is
charged.

In this case, the defendants are found guilty of the crime under the Penal Code, with the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity. The judgment of the Court of First Instance is however reversed regarding the penalty
- each of the defendants is condemned to 18 years or reclusion temporal, with legal accessory penalties, and
payment of the costs of both instances.

In this case, the law itself that requires a person to testify for a particular matter. The law requires for the accused
to inform the court if he really set the victim at liberty or where he set the liberty of the victim, otherwise, the
penalty is higher.

The court said that it is a prime example of subjecting a person to lie in court.

Right against self-incrimination applies only testimonial evidence – any verbal, testimony given by a witness.
- When it comes to physical or object evidence is not covered by this guarantee.

2. Isabela Sugar Co. vs. Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-5924, October 28, 1953.

DOCTRINE:

Q. When is a question incriminating?

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

A. Chief Justice Marshall explained that usually a crime or a criminal act may contain two or more elements and
that a question would have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to elicit only one of said elements. The right
thus, includes a right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove
the commission of a crime by a witness. Isabela Sugar Co. v. Macadaeg, 98 Phil. 995 (1953)

FACTS:

Respondents herein filed a complaint against petitioner.

In the course of the taking of the deposition, two questions were propounded to the petitioner, thus:
1. Q. — Referring to this property in Pennsylvania, is it not fact that you bought that property on December 7, 1943
from Alicia Ortiz de Arcega for the price of P65, 278.50 in Japanese notes and you sold it on October 11, 1944, to
Severo Capiral for P200,000 Japanese money? In other words, you erred and made a profit?
2. Q. — Did you pay any war profit tax for the sale of those three properties mentioned by you?

Upon the propounding of the questions, counsel for petitioner objected on the ground the second question is incriminating.
Judge Macadaeg, ruled that the question is not incriminatory, and that even if it were so, it was too late for the
witness to invoke the constitutional privilege.
Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second question propounded is incriminating.

RULING:
Yes, Chief Justice Marshall explained that usually a crime or a criminal act may contain two or more elements and that a
question would have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to elicit only one of said elements. The right thus, includes
a right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a
crime by a witness.

In the case at bar, when the disputed question (No. 1) was propounded to the petitioner Montilla, he had already declared
that he had sold the property for P2000,000, so that if he would answer that the purchased it for P65,278.50, he would be
directly admitting having made a profit, which is one of the elements of the offense defined in the War Profit Tax Law
(Republic Act No. 55)

Therefore, the second question propounded is incriminating.

When is a question incriminating?

Chief Justice Marshall explained that usually a crime or a criminal act may contain two or more elements and that a question
would have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to elicit only one of said elements. The right thus, includes a right to
refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a
witness.

An incriminating question can be:

1. If eliciting an answer concerning the admission of a crime; or
2. If tends to establish any of the elements of a particular crime or offense.

Which proceeding is the right Invocable?

- Any type of judicial or administrative proceeding or any official government inquiry.
- Inquiries in aid of legislation in congress

When to raise the right?

 If the person is not the accused, once the incriminating question is asked, the right against self-incrimination can be
raised.
 If the person is the accused, the right can be raised before being called by the prosecution.
- If called by the prosecution as prosecution witness, any question will always be incriminating.

If it’s the accused who takes his defense (witness for himself during defense evidence) and the accused
admitted the crime, it is not covered by the right against self-incrimination.
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3. U.S. vs. Tan Teng, G.R. No.7081, September 7, 1912.

Facts:

Petitioner herein was found guilty by the trial court for the crime of Abusos Deshonestos (dishonest abuse)
against Oliva, a seven (7) year old girl. He was positively identified by Oliva as the person who committed the
abuse. The defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined.
The policeman who examined the defendant swore that his body bore every sign of the fact that he was suffering
from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the
body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis
made of the same. It was clinically found out that the defendant is suffering from gonorrhea. Oliva testified that
the accused rested his private parts on her. Oliva was also found to be suffering from gonorrhea.

The Petitioner primarily contend that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of
the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as
proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea.

Issue: WON the admission of substance taken from his body as evidence is violative of his right not to be a
witness against himself.

Ruling:

No. The admission of substance taken from his body as evidence does not violate his right not to be a witness
against himself.

The court held that the prohibition against compelling a man in a criminal cause to be a witness against himself
is a prohibition against physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion
of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The prohibition contained in the Philippine Bill (sec. 5) that a
person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.

In this case, the petitioner is not compelled to answer questions or make any admission. The substance was
taken from the body of the defendant without his objection. The examination of the substance was made by
competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. Thus,
said finding is admissible as evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the substance coming out from the body of the accused can be used as evidence?

- It is an exception. The right against self-incrimination only covers testimony – oral, statement. Otherwise, not
included.

It was held early in Philippine jurisprudence that what is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence,
when it may be material. Thus, substance emitting from the body of the defendant was received as evidence in
a prosecution for acts of lasciviousness.

4. Villaflor vs. Summers, G.R. No. 16444, September 8, 1920.

Facts:

Emeteria Villaflor, the petitioner, and her paramour, Florentino Souingco, were charged with the crime of
adultery. The trial court, upon motion of the assistant fiscal, ordered her to submit to physical examination to
determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of
her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found
in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she could permit the medical
examination required by the court.

Issue:
Whether or not the examination was a violation of the petitioner’s right against self-incrimination.

Ruling:
No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guarantee, that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
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testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible.

Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to elements and ponder on
what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purge the
community of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men.

Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to protect the
guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice
in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will
tend to establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make the defendant admit
her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood.

But, no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the accused except
in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.

Thus, the examination was not a violation of the petitioner’s right against self-incrimination.

1920 case.
Physical Examination is not covered by the right of self-incrimination.

And since, according to the Court, the kernel of the privilege" was the prohibition of "testimonial compulsion," the
Court was willing to compel a woman accused of adultery to submit to the indignity of being tested for pregnancy.

5. People of the Philippines vs. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000.

Facts: GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. During the
arraignment on, GALLARDE, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.4 Trial of the case
immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pre-trial conference.

On cross-examination by the prosecutor and to questions propounded by the court, GALLARDE

admitted that he saw Editha on the night of 6 May 1997 in her parent’s house, particularly in the kitchen. He
was there because he joined a group drinking Colt 45 beer, as he was called by Rudio Fernandez. He drank
and had dinner in the kitchen. After dinner he returned to the drinking place and eventually went home
because he was then a little drunk. He knows Kgd. Mario Fernandez, but after he left the Talan residence
he did not see Kgd. Fernandez anymore. Kgd. Fernandez saw him inside his toilet on the night of May 6;
thereafter Fernandez took him to the barangay captain and later he was turned over to the PNP at Camp
Narciso Ramos. The police informed him that he was a suspect in the rape and killing of Editha Talan, and
he told them that he did not commit the crime. At the Talan residence he was wearing short pants and
rubber slippers. Fernandez asked him at the police headquarters to pull down his shorts and he complied.
He was then wearing briefs with a hemline that was a little loose. He was informed that a cadaver was
recovered near his house. When he was asked questions while in police custody, he was not represented
by any lawyer.

On 12 February 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting GALLARDE of the crime of
murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of thelack of proof of carnal knowledge.

Issue: WON taking pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel is a violation of
his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Ruling: No. The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a
purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not
thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of
the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit
to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his
mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints;and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable
the foregoing things to be done.

Taking pictures of the accused is not a violation of the right of self-incrimination. Taking pictures is a
mechanical act.

The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical
act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self- incrimination. The constitutional right of an
accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his
guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against
self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a
testimonial act.

6. Beltran vs. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1923.

DOCTRINE:

Q. May a person be compelled to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence in a prosecution
against him?

A. No. The Court said in Beltran v. Samson, 50 Phil. 570 (1929): . . . writing is something more than moving the
body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention ... We say that, for the purpose of constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between
one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting,
for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. And we say that the present case is
more serious . . . because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence
which does not exist.

FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear
before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of
said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified.
petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the
Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.

ISSUE:
Can the Petitioner be compelled to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence in a prosecution against him?

RULING:

No, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing
means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition
of the respondent fiscal clearly states.

the court said that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is
compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both
cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain
specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a
personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading
the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d’ etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

Therefore, the Petitioner cannot be compelled to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence in a
prosecution against him.

Handwriting, as compare to physical examination as in the case of summers, is not a mechanical act. The court
said that the right against self-incrimination can also cover this type of evidence which is not really a testimonial
but because it is mechanical act.

To force or compel Mr. Beltran to write so that it can be compared to document is covered by constitutional
privilege.

May a person be compelled to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence in a

prosecution against him? A.No. The Court said in Beltran v. Samson, 50 Phil. 570 (1929): . . .

writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of the intelligence and attention ... We say that, for
the purpose of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce
a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.

And we say that the present case is more serious . . . because here the witness is compelled to write and
create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist

7. Mapa Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices. However he was granted an
immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided that he will testify as
witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States Vs Ferdinand Marcos, during the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda
Marcos were being tried for charges of corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when
they flew to New York to testify against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the
American prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was
not able to testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect. However,
the record shows that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of the RICO
cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Does the fact that the prosecution in the RICO cases did not actually present petitioners as witnesses abrogate the
immunity granted to them?

RULING:

No. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from being
prosecuted provided they meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case where he is being tried, and
the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify implying that Mapa
was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given by him (MAPA) to testify against
the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on the RICO can not nullify the immunity
given to him by the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both of the law and the parties’
implementing agreements. Though the petitioners were not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can
be said that it’s not their own fault.

Therefore, the fact that the prosecution in the RICO cases did not actually present petitioners as witnesses; it will
not abrogate the immunity granted to them.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

Note:

TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:

1. Transactional Immunity - is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can no longer be
prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.

2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived
from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.

The state entered into agreement with Mapa to testify and his testimony would be used to go after
Marcoses in cases for which he will be prosecuted in the US. Unfortunately, for whatever reasons of not
of the doing of Mr. Mapa, his testimony was not used in the US cases. So, the state said that all
incriminating statements of him, since he did not testify, will be used against him.

Hence, the court said that those statements cannot be used against him.

What is incriminating questions?

What type of proceedings a right against self-incriminating can be used?
When to use it?
What type of evidence this covered?

Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.

(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

Involuntary Servitude:
- It is every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to another no matter under what form such
servitude may be disguised.

- What are some exceptions to the rule against involuntary servitude?

1. Involuntary servitude may be imposed as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted. Art. Ill, Sec. 18(2).
2. In the interest of national defense all citizens may be compelled by law to render personal military
or civil service. Art. II, Sec. 4.
3. A return to work order. "So imperative is the order in fact that it is not even considered violative
of the right agains involuntary servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa
Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills [80 Phil. 521]. The worker can of course give up his work ... if he
does not want to obey the order...; but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain his work
even if his inclination is to strike." Sarmiento v. Tuico, 162SCRA 676,685 (1988).
- Whenever there is a strike.

When there is a law or legal order that will require or compel a person to perform a particular act is not
contemplated by a provision against involuntary servitude.

Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any

prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

What is cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

When is a penalty "cruel, degrading or inhuman?"

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious
to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make
it cruel and unusual."

Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under this ban, the punishment must be
"flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community," People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 (1953)

or when they involve torture or lingering death. People v. Puda, 133 SCRA 1 (October 31,1984).

The following may be used as guides for determining whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual:"
1. A punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.
2. It must not be applied arbitrarily.
3. It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society.
4. It must not be excessive, or must serve a penal purpose more effectively than a less severe
punishment would.

1. R.A. No. 9346

Thirteenth Congress
Second Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand and five.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 9346 June 24, 2006

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand
One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is
hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the
Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least one a week for three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being considered or recommend for commutation or
pardon; Provided, however, That nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant executive clemency
under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitutions.

SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in two national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

2. People of the Philippines vs. Estoista, G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953.

When is a penalty "cruel, degrading or inhuman?

The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." It must be
"flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community,"

In this case, Five years' confinement for possessing firearms can not be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous,
or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience.

3. People of the Philippines vs. Puda, G.R. No. L-33841, October 31, 1984.

Facts: Defendant Flaviano Puda climbed over the fence of the house of Luis Ching Kiat Biak Parañaque,
Rizal, then once over the fence he clambered to the awning (media agua) of the back part of the ground floor of the
house and from there, he went up to the second story, removed the wooden moldings which held in place the glass
plates of the transom located over one of the windows and then removed the glass plates thereby causing an opening
to be made; that thereafter he removed his rubber shoes and went thru the opening and gained entrance into the bedroom
of Ching Tian Un, son of the owner of the house, who was then sleeping alone in said bedroom at the time; that after
having gained entry into the bedroom, defendant stabbed twice the sleeping Ching Tian With a dagger causing the
death of the latter.

The trial court also found the following aggravating circumstances to be present, namely—treachery which
qualified the killing to murder; evident premeditation which was off-set by the appellant’s plea of guilty; unlawful
entry and dwelling.

The trial court found the accused guilty of murder with two aggravating circumstances and sentenced him to
the supreme penalty of death. Unfortunately because of negligence of some court personnel, the records of the case
were not forwarded by the court a quo to this Court for automatic review.

Eleven years after his conviction, the accused wrote a letter to this Court inquiring about the status of his case.
We inquired through a letter addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, about the
veracity of the allegations of the letter of the accused and received a reply informing us that due to the inadvertence of
the then clerk in charge of criminal cases of Branch II, the records of this case were placed in the archives sometime
in 1960 instead of being forwarded to us. Hence, it was only then that the entire records were elevated to this Court.

Issue: WON death penalty is violative of the constitutional right against the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment..

Ruling: In the case of People v. Camano we ruled that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive. Citing
the case of Harden v. Director of Prisons,

“The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, , the United States Supreme
Court said that ‘punishments are cruel when they involve torturer a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life.’ ”

The Court, however, agrees with the accused’s contention that the penalty should not be imposed on him since
he has been detained and continues to be in the death row for about 24 years now since as stated earlier, it took eleven
years after his trial and conviction before the records of this case were discovered and transmitted to this Court for
automatic review. For lack of the needed votes, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous something more than the mere extinguishment of life.’
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

4. People of the Philippines vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, November 29, 2000.

FACTS:
In 1994, an information was filed against the accused-appelants SPO Mercado and Acebron
for kidnapping with murder of the 17-year old minor, Richard Buama. Both pleaded not guilty when arraigned but
the trial court found both of them guilty and sentenced them to death.

The accused-appelants filed a Supplemental Brief which they raised the question with regard to the
constitutionality of Republic Act No 7659 providing for the death penalty for 13 heinous crimes. They argue that
RA No. 7659 violates the 1987 Constitution that R.A. No. 7659 violates the constitutional ban against infliction
of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty of death violates the prohibition against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

RULING:
No, death penalty does not violate the prohibition against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
In the oftcited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that ‘punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. It implies there is something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.

Is death by legal injection cruel and unusual punishment?

No. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. Punishment is so if it involves torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life.

5. People of the Philippines vs. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997.

Is the power of Congress to re-impose the death penalty subsumed under its plenary legislative power?

No, because "it is subject to a clear showing of 'compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."' People v.
Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7,1997, 267 SCRA 682, 714.

Q. What does the constitutional exercise of the Congress' limited power to re-impose the death penalty entail?

A. It entails the following: "

1. that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
2. that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with
the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of
circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the
definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and
3. that Congress, in enacting this death penally bill be singularly motivated by 'compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.'" People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997, 267 SCRA 682,
715.

What are "heinous crimes?"

A. R.A. No. 7659 ("Death Penalty Law;" December 31, 1993) provides that crimes are heinous "for being
grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." The Court finds this definition
or descriptions "to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime." People v.
Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997, 267 SCRA 682, 715.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

A cruel, degrading is something so inhuman, barbarous, something more

Death penalty per se is not considered as cruel, degrading or unusual punishment. The state and
congress in its wisdom can impose death penalty for those of serious offenses.

It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.

Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

No person may be imprisoned for debt in virtue of an order in a civil proceeding, either as a substitute for
satisfaction of a debt or as a means of compelling satisfaction; but a person may be imprisoned as a penalty for
a crime arising from a contractual debt and imposed in a proper criminal proceeding.

What is a "poll tax?"

A poll tax can be understood as the cedula tax or residence tax. The Constitution does not prohibit the cedula
tax but it prohibits imprisonment for non-payment of the cedula or residence tax.

A poll tax may also be understood as a tax the payment of which is made a requirement for the exercise of the
right of suffrage. The imposition of a poll tax in this sense is prohibited by Article V, Section 1, which disallows
"literacy, property, or other substantive requirement for the exercise of suffrage

1. Lozano vs. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986

Facts:

In this case petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 or the Bouncing Check Law which
punishes a person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing that at the time of issue he has no sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the said check.

Petitioner argued that the BP 22 is unconstitutional for it conflicts with the constitutional provision of Bill of Rights which
states that “No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax”. Petitioners insist that, since the offense
under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank,
the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not
the act of issuing it.

Issue:

Whether or not BP 22 is not a valid exercise of the police power and transgressed the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt?

Ruling:

No, BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and it transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.

BP 22 was enacted in order to punish the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonoured upon
its presentation for payment and it is not the non-payment of an obligation. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the
legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be
abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest.

To sum it up, BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ATTY. PUNO

Q. B.P. 22, the anti-bouncing check law, is challenged on the ground that it violates the prohibition of
imprisonment for nonpayment of contract.

The gravamen of the offense is not the non-payment of a debt but the putting into circulation of a worthless
check.

ISSUE: Constitutionality of BP 22

Argument: BP 22 penalizes the failure of the person to satisfy his debt.

The SC disagreed. BP 22 penalizes the issuance of worthless check, not the failure to pay the debt or obligation.
Because it should be avoided. (General welfare discussion)

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.