Employee Empowerment: Towards Greater Workplace Democracy

Employee empowerment:
towards greater workplace

democracy
.
Employee empowerment
: Contents
Executive summary 4
1. Introduction 11
2. What do we mean by empowerment? 17
3. Why employee empowerment? 20
4. Forms of participation 29
5. The role of trade unions 42
6. Overseas experience 47
7. Introducing employee participation: the role of

government 53
8. The way forward 61
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10
: Introduction
It might seem like an odd time to be advocating something as

idealistic as workplace democracy – the idea that employees
should be given a greater voice in the firms that employ them. The
UK is currently struggling to recover from a deep recession and
debt burden. The Conservatives, the larger party in the coalition
government, have not traditionally been seen as supporters
of such ideas. Surely, this would be a distraction from where
the focus should be - on pro-business policies designed to help
economic growth?
In fact the time for such a proposal has never been better.
The economic crisis which began in 2007/8 is still continuing
and there is widespread acceptance that we cannot go back to
“business as usual”. That would involve
:managers of firms continuing to make short term

decisions with adverse long term consequences; and
: rapid escalation of pay levels for senior executives with
no apparent linkage to company performance.
The quest is therefore on to create a new paradigm for British
capitalism - what Will Hutton has termed “good capitalism”; or
Anatole Kaletsky “Capitalism 4.0”.
In addition there is strong evidence that employee empowerment,

particularly when combined with employee share ownership,
has a positive impact on company performance. Employee
empowerment should therefore be an integral part of the supply
side reforms being pursued by the coalition government.
In many European countries there is a different form of capitalism

from the Anglo-American model. In countries like Germany it
is recognised that shareholders are not the only party entitled
to decision making rights in businesses . Workers are seen as
11
stakeholders in the business every bit as much as shareholders

and customers and in many ways are seen as the most
committed and dependent of all. Workers are less able to move
between employers than consumers are between providers.
Shareholders can invest in and divest from businesses with
ever increasing ease and speed – a problematic issue in itself.
For larger companies with many, often passive, shareholders,
employees often have the most long term commitment to the
business.
Greater employee empowerment is also relevant to the current

debate on high pay, with concerns that pay differentials
between top executives and ordinary workers are rising.4 This
is an issue which is difficult for the government to address
directly; statutory regulation on high pay levels is seen as
undesirable and illiberal. However suggestions from bodies
such as the High Pay Commission (seemingly endorsed by
the business secretary Vince Cable) that firms should include
workforce representatives on remuneration committees shows
that the balance of argument is shifting. Once it is accepted that
workers should be included on remuneration committees (and
hence accepting that this should not solely be the decision of
shareholder representatives) then an important principle has, in
our view rightly, been conceded that other stakeholders should
have a say.
The last serious consideration given to this issue in the UK

was over thirty years ago with Sir Alan Bullock’s ‘Report of the
committee of inquiry on industrial democracy’ (1977). Since then
large quantities of academic research has continued to show the
benefits of greater employee participation, not just to workers
themselves but to the productivity of their firms and the wider
economy.
“Cumulating evidence from North-western Europe shows that

a well functioning employee representation system can play
an important role in the modernisation and performance of a
workplace”5
Furthermore the decline of trade union membership makes
4 High Pay Commission, ‘More for less: what happened to pay at the top and does it
matter’ (2011)
5 European Commission, ‘Report on Industrial Relations in Europe’ (2006) p102
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it even more important to find alternative mechanisms for

dialogue between employers and employees.
The political environment is also more favourable than it has

been for many years. The presence of Liberal Democrat ministers
in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills gives this
particular political saliency. We have already seen proposals for
the introduction of large scale employee ownership in Royal Mail
and the mutualisation of the Post Office. The Liberal Democrats,
and their predecessor the Liberal party, have a long history of
advocacy of such principles, as indicated in the preamble to the
party’s federal constitution
“We want to see democracy, participation and the co-

operative principle in industry and commerce within a
competitive environment in which the state allows the
market to operate freely where possible but intervenes
where necessary.”
The party has not however made this a major part of its recent
policy platform, last considering the issue in the early 1990s.6
This concept also ties in with the Conservative party thinking

about the ‘Big Society’ – with its stress on mutual association
and participation and empowering communities to take control
of their own affairs from external power structures. Whilst
the main focus of the ‘Big Society’ has been on geographical
communities, it can be argued that the philosophy is equally
applicable to the workplace, where many people spend as much
of their time as in their local geographical community.
At present many employees have little influence over the

environment in which they work. They find their lives run by
top-down management structures, their creativity stifled, their
avenues for complaint or positive suggestions often cut off. This
is detrimental to their wellbeing and to the long term health of
the organisations that employ them. Indeed research has shown
that “54 per cent of the actively disengaged report that work
was having a negative impact on their physical health”.7
Lack of employee voice can be a significant contributor to high

stress levels through less autonomous work, poor work-life
6 ‘Citizens at work’, Liberal Democrat Green Paper (1990)

7 D. MacLeod and N. Clarke, ‘Engaging for Success’, BIS (2009)
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balance and perceived threat of job insecurity. As one recent

study put it “the health argument for workplace democracy,
which has been generally overlooked in the past... may well
be the most compelling argument because of its ethical and
economic implications... Tax-payers also have the right to have
a say about whether they are willing to continue to subsidize
the actions of businesses that are affecting employee health and
raising health care costs”.8
The emerging strand of thought within Conservative thinking

is represented, for example, by Jesse Norman MP who set up
the Conservative co-operative movement. The stress in the
public service reform proposals of the ‘Open Public Services’
white paper on mutuals and employee co-operatives is further
evidence of this trend.
Within Labour, the Blue Labour movement, the Blairite Progress

campaign group in their Purple Book9 and the Compass
campaign group10 have all stressed the need to draw on Labour’s
co-operative traditions, and to introduce greater democracy into
the workplace.
Increased interest in the political parties in this policy area

is welcome but the focus has generally been on employee
ownership, co-operatives and mutuals. However hard this is
promoted it will be of little relevance to the majority of workers
who will never form part of co-operatives or employee owned
firms. Indeed there are reasons for arguing that from the
standpoint of diversifying risk it is a bad idea for an individual
to have a significant portion of their wealth as well as their
main source of income from the same source. Nevertheless
the arguments for employees having a greater voice in the
workplace remains.
But it is not just amongst the political parties that there has been
renewed interest in these ideas. Many organisations have
“begun to see that workers respond best – and most

creatively – not when they are tightly controlled by
8 J.R. Foley & M. Polanyi, ‘Workplace Democracy: Why Bother?’, Economic and Industrial
Democracy 27 (2006) p186
9 Robert Philpot, ‘The Purple Book: A Progressive Future For Labour’, Progress (2011)
10 Chris Ward and Zoe Williams, ‘Swimming with the Tide: Democratising the places
where we work’, Compass (2009)
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management, placed in narrowly defined jobs, and

treated like an unwelcome necessity, but instead when
they are given broader responsibilities, encouraged to
contribute and helped to take satisfaction from their
work”11
But progress has been limited. Efforts to engage more closely

with workers have, often, been seen as little more than skin-
deep charades designed solely with the intent of increasing
productivity. Workers, it seems, are sceptical of the motives
of employers who only pretend to offer them a greater say
in the running of their organisations. And so improvements
to employee participation have, for most organisations, been
slight. According to the ‘Workplace Democracy Association’,
“Research by Towers Perrin and Gallup shows that

between 71% and 86% of employees fall between
being moderately engaged to actively disengaged
from their workplace.”12
Whilst the ‘Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 “asked

managers whether they normally negotiated with, consulted, or
informed union or non-union representatives over twelve terms
and conditions of employment [Pay, hours, holidays, pensions,
staff selection, training, grievance procedure, disciplinary
procedure, staffing plans, equal opportunities, health and safety
and performance appraisal]…In two-thirds of workplaces (67
per cent) management did not engage with employees on any
of the twelve listed items.”13
Notwithstanding these trends and many notable success stories

such as the John Lewis Partnership in the UK, W.L. Gore &
Associates in the USA or Semco in Brazil, these ideas have
until very recently remained outside the mainstream political
discourse in the UK.
Despite the adoption in 2004 of an EU Directive on the

information and consultation of employees, the closest that the
UK government has recently come to promoting these ideas
11 Walton, ‘From control to commitment in the workplace’, Harvard Business Review

(1985), p76
12 ‘What is Workplace Democracy’, home page of Workplace Democracy Association
website http://workplacedemocracy.wordpress.com, accessed on 06/01/2012
Kersley et al, ‘Inside the Workplace: First Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment
13 Relations Survey’ (2006)
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is a 2009 BIS report ‘Engaging for Success’ on the related,

though much broader, topic of employee engagement. Whilst
filled with many suggestions for how businesses could better
motivate their employees, the report only touches on the issue
of actual employee ‘voice’ or representation within businesses
– potentially one of the most powerful ways in which really to
engage employees with their work.
Nor does the report discuss in any depth the alternative forms that
such representation can take, or outline any concrete proposals
for potential government action on this issue, concluding
that it is “not an issue for legislation or regulation”.14 It is our
view however, that more government action will be needed to
overcome the reluctance on the part of businesses and trade
unions to depart from the status quo.
The time is now opportune both economically and politically

to look at what can be done to enhance employee ‘voice’ and
workplace democracy. Whilst empowering employees in their
workplace may not be a new idea it is one “whose time has
come”.
This paper therefore
:
defines for the purpose of this report what we mean by
the term ‘employee empowerment’;
: looks at the arguments for employee empowerment;
: examines the different forms which employee
empowerment can take;
: considers the role of trade unions and the overseas
experience;
: looks at the role of government in introducing employee
empowerment; and
: makes recommendations as to the way forward.
The paper explicitly does not consider employee share
ownership, co-operatives, mutuals etc. This is not because these
are unimportant (indeed this is to be welcomed and sits naturally
alongside greater employee empowerment) but because they
have tended to receive more recent attention by policymakers in
a way that greater employee empowerment has not.
14 D. MacLeod and N. Clarke, ‘Engaging for Success’, BIS (2009), p117
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: 2 What do we mean by employee

empowerment?
There has been a variety of terms used often interchangeably

by authors to cover the concept of employee empowerment-
‘employee participation’, ‘industrial democracy’, ‘workplace
democracy’, ‘employee voice’, ‘participatory management’ and
many more. The phrases incorporating the term ‘democracy’
carry connotations of a specific form of empowerment. Terms
such as ‘employee voice’ or ‘employee participation’ could be
interpreted as simply giving employees a say rather than real
empowerment.
The term which we prefer is ‘employee empowerment’ but for

the purposes of this paper the terms will be assumed to be
broadly synonymous.
Attempting to pin down what conditions are required before

we can call employees empowered or a workplace ‘democratic’
is, however, far from easy. Practices can take many forms: self-
managed work groups, traditional hierarchies where managers
are elected by the workforce, worker representation on boards
or in work councils, or informal procedures where workers
nonetheless are consulted over decision-making and can have
significant influence over decisions taken. As with countries
employers can practice democracy in a variety of ways.
Nor is it simply a question of dividing employers into those who

practise workplace democracy or employee empowerment and
those who don’t; there is rather a sliding scale based on the
degree of freedom and control that employees have. The extent
to which employees participate in decision-making bodies and
procedures is an important element of this, but so too is the
extent to which that participation represents real influence over
important decisions:
1_
“Participation is a necessary but insufficient condition

for workplace democracy … Workplace democracy
exists when employees have some real control over
organizational goal-setting and strategic planning…
Participation does not meet the requirements for
workplace democracy, because it exists whenever
employees are allowed to give input into organizational
decisions, even if it means they only suggest ways to
implement decisions that have already been made.” 15
Some formal structures of employee empowerment – work

councils for instance – can be little more than tools for managers
to inform their employees of pre-made decisions and enlist their
help in implementing them. By contrast, some firms have few
formal structures at all, but nonetheless foster a highly inclusive
working environment where workers have real influence.
Carole Pateman categorises employers into three groups which
highlight these different types of participation (see box)
Pateman’s participative categories16
Full participation Partial Pseudo

participation participation
Worker Worker Participation
representatives representatives is used by
have equal power influence the management
to determine decision-making to persuade
outcomes in the process but do not employees to
decision-making have equal power accept ready-
process. to decide the made managerial
outcome. decisions.
Clearly, if we are interested in promoting workplace democracy,

we are most interested in the first two categories, as only
once participation leads to genuine influence can any effects
of democracy really begin to be seen. Marchington and
Wilkinson illustrate this path of increasing participation through
15 J.R. Foley & M. Polanyi, ‘Workplace Democracy: Why Bother?’ Economic and Industrial
Democracy 27 (2006), p174
16 Sayce and Gold, ‘Revisiting industrial democracy and pension trusteeship: the case of
Canada’, Economic and Industrial Democracy (2011); ideas originally from Pateman.
‘Participation and Democratic Theory’ (1970), p68
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their ‘Escalator of participation’, shown below. The top level,

control, represents completely autonomous worker groups. Co-
determination represents shared power, as practised by many
continental firms with powerful works councils and supervisory
boards. At present, however, the UK government has only gone
so far as to call for information, communication and consultation
of employees, and in many cases even that is not achieved.
Escalator of participation17
Control
Codetermination
Consultation
Communication
Information
Knell and Philpott draw attention to the dichotomy of a growing

incidence of information and consultation methods across
UK workplaces and to equally robust evidence that a sizeable
proportion of UK employees feel that their voice lacks influence
in workplaces and lack trust in senior management.18 This
Knell and Philpott attribute to the lack of a shared sense of
organisational purpose and culture within the workplace. when
evidence suggests that it is a shared sense of organisational
purpose among employees which is a key driver of sustainable
organisational purpose. An imposed common purpose only
creates cynicism and resistance.
When talking about employee empowerment or workplace

democracy, we mean more therefore than simply good
employee engagement as recommended in the review of
employee engagement for BIS by David MacLeod and Nita
Clarke. Whilst there is good evidence to show, as Macleod
and Clarke did, that good employee engagement is beneficial
to a firm, it typically does not extend up the ladder as far as
co-determination. The subject of this report goes beyond good
employee engagement.
17 Marchington and Wilkinson, ‘Human resource management at work’ (2005), p4

18 John Knell and John Philpott, ‘Up to the Job’, Demos (2011)
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: 3: Why employee empowerment?
The idea of introducing aspects of democracy to the workplace

is far from new. The early Belgian syndicalist César De Paepe
pointed out in the late 19th Century that workers had far more
knowledge of the workplace, where they were denied influence,
than of political affairs, where they were at least entitled to vote.
In the eyes of such early thinkers workplace democracy was not
only desirable as a natural extension of democratic principles; it
was also inevitable.
A liberal Idea – the political case

Workplace democracy and employee participation have been at
the core of liberal thinking since it was first espoused by John
Stuart Mill in ‘Principles of Political Economy’:
...the civilizing and improving influences of association,

and the efficiency and economy of production on a
large scale, may be obtained without dividing the
producers into two parties with hostile interests and
feelings......the relation of masters and work-people
will be gradually superseded by partnership, in one of
two forms: in some cases, association of the labourers
with the capitalist; in others, and perhaps finally in all,
association of labourers among themselves
Mill then argues that the advantages of this form are that the co-
operatives and associations bring material gain from workers
having better incentives, but also moral gain from:
“the healing of the standing feud between capital

and labour; the transformation of human life, from a
conflict of classes struggling for opposite interests,
to a friendly rivalry in the pursuit of a good common
to all; the elevation of the dignity of labour; a new
sense of security and independence in the labouring
_0
class; and the conversion of each human being’s daily

occupation into a school of the social sympathies and
the practical intelligence.”
Although Mill was specifically arguing for worker ownership,

some of the “moral gains” which he saw can derive more
narrowly from greater employee participation. Amartya Sen
also shares the view that there are significant moral gains to be
had from greater employee empowerment, as he lists ‘voice’ as
one of the important capabilities that together form a measure
of human wellbeing. The central tenet of his approach is that a
society’s prosperity should be evaluated in terms of its citizens’
“capabilities to function: that is, their effective opportunities to
undertake – with the resources or commodities they command
– the actions and activities they want to engage in, and to be
who they want to be”.19
In order for it to be possible to transform people’s resources

into capabilities, a number of ‘conversion factors’ are necessary
which may have to include institutional factors such as the
right of employees to participate in workplace decision-making.
Using this capability approach, a number of current academics
therefore argue in favour of a “development of a ‘capability for
voice’ in the British system of industrial relations”.19
Some recent writers such as Ward and Williams20 argue that

“the absence of democracy in any meaningful economic sphere
is in direct conflict with Rawls’ theory of justice which values
liberty, equality and democracy”. Whilst there may be debate as
to whether this is one of Rawls’ “fundamental liberties” which
should be subject to constitutional guarantee, O’Neill argues
that workplace democracy is of value in helping to develop the
democratic and participatory habit amongst citizens.21
There are therefore good arguments as to why liberals, who

believe that an essential part of individuals’ freedom is influence
and control over the decisions which affect their lives, should
see there being a strong philosophical justification for workplace
19 Aristea Koukiadaki, ‘The establishment and operation of information and consultation

of employees’ arrangements in a capability-based framework’, Economic and Industrial
Democracy 31 (2010)
Chris Ward and Zoe Williams, ‘Swimming with the tide: Democratising the places
20 where we work’, Compass (2009)
Martin O’Neill, ‘Liberal egalitarian routes towards economic democracy’ (2008)
21
_1
democracy as part of the empowerment of the individual.
In its ‘Big Society’ agenda, the Conservative party has also

been keen to promote the idea of citizens taking control of
their communities. When communities come together to run
themselves, it is thought, they fare far better (and indeed it is
more liberal to encourage them to do so) than when they are
organised externally by hierarchical and distant managers.
So far, this debate has focused largely on geographical

communities – villages and neighbourhoods. But from the
liberal perspective as Greaves and Lishman point out,
“A community is a group of individuals with something

in common: nationality, neighbourhood, religion,
work, workplace...”22
and the community and social group, in which most adult

citizens spend much of their lives, is their workplace. Greaves
and Lishman go on to argue that
“community politics is applicable to the running of

industry and other places of work. The establishment of
the claims of the communities involved in these fields
to run their own affairs is no different in principle from
the claims of members of a neighbourhood residential
community.”
So the same principles apply here too. Top-down, hierarchical

management structures are precisely what the current UK
government criticizes in the state bureaucracy today. Yet the
self same management structures can be found in businesses
and other organisations across Britain. Liberating communities
from these structures to gain more control over their own lives
is a liberal aim. This is true whether communities are village
neighbours clubbing together to save their local post office or
employees of a large corporation working together to improve
the management of their factory. It is an idea in the spirit, of
liberalism, of empowering communities but also in the spirit of
the Conservatives’ ‘Big Society’.
At its heart therefore this is an idea based on the values of

democracy. Just as there are many reasons why we think citizens
22 Greaves and Lishman, ‘The Theory and Practice of Community Politics’ (1980)
__
should have a say in how their country is governed, so there

are good arguments that employees should have a voice in the
management of firms that have authority over them and affect
so much of their lives. Whilst it is true that workers can choose
to leave workplaces which they don’t like and sell their labour
elsewhere, it is similarly true that citizens can leave countries
and emigrate to live elsewhere if they prefer to. Both types of
movement are difficult and costly to individuals. Such an ability
does not, therefore, detract from the argument that they are
entitled to some say in the governance of their workplace or
country wherever they are.
This ethical argument by analogy to the political realm is

stressed by Collins (1997). On the basis that “congruence among
the social philosophical assumptions of political, economic,
and organization theory is highly desirable”; and that “ethical
arguments are superior to economic arguments”, he concludes
that
“From an ethical perspective, the authoritarian model

[of the workplace] should have been dismissed
long ago and the current debate in organization
theory should consist of libertarian challenges to
communitarian forms of organizational structures and
policies.”
The workplace equivalent of modern representative democracy

is what Collins describes as “participatory management”.
In summary, we can distinguish three related pillars supporting

the liberal case for workplace democracy. First, the workplace
is for most working adults a key community to which they
belong; belief in the importance of freedom and empowerment
of communities more generally must make us committed to
liberating workplaces in particular. Secondly, there is an issue for
democracy in our society at large; allowing people to experience
more democratic working environments might contribute to
revitalizing our national democracy. And thirdly, as discussed
in the introduction to this paper, there is the argument that
workers have a right to some influence in the running of their
employer because of their status as key stakeholders which are
highly dependent on the long term success of their employer
– more so than either consumers or shareholders.
__
These ethical and political arguments should indicate why this

is a matter that deserves attention and perhaps government
action. But there is also a strong economic case for greater
employee participation.
Improving firm performance – the economic case

Most studies in the UK have - understandably, given the lack of
formal structures of employee participation in the UK - looked
at the performance of employee owned firms or those with
substantial employee ownership, rather than those simply with
employee participation. Nevertheless these studies have shown
that there is a strong positive relationship between employee
ownership and participation and firm performance.2324
Those few studies that have looked at employee participation

and consultation (without employee ownership per se) have
generally shown a positive effect on performance. The studies
have generally looked at overseas experience given the lack
of formal employee empowerment in the UK. Vlachos (2008)
showed in a study of Greek firms the effect of decentralised
decision-making and information sharing on performance.25
From Spain, Ordiz and Fernandez (2005) used a regression study
to find the circumstances in which high employee involvement
practices are most effective.26 From Turkey, Kaya (2006) finds
that human resource management practices account for
up to 9% of variation in firms’ performance.27 Riordan et al.
(2005) find in a study of insurance companies that employee
involvement has positive effects on financial performance,
morale and turnover.28 And Harrison and Freeman (2004) weigh
the advantages of workplace democracy against the cost in time
and resources required to sustain it and conclude there is a net
social benefit.29
23 Lampel et al, ‘Model growth: do employee-owned businesses deliver sustainable

performance’, Cass Business School, (2010)
24 “The employee ownership effect: a review of the evidence”, Matrix Evidence, 2010
25 I. Vlachos, ‘The effect of human resources practices on organizational performance:
evidence from Greece’, Int. Journal of Human Resource Management 19:1 (2008)
Ordiz and Fernandez, ‘Influence of the Sector and the Environment on Human Resource
26 Practices’ Effectiveness’, Int. Journal of Human Resource Management 16:8 (2005)
N. Kaya, ‘The impact of human resource management practices and corporate
27 entrepreneurship on firm performance: evidence from Turkish firms’, IJHRM (2006)
Riordan et al, ‘Employee involvement climate and organizational effectiveness’ (2005)
Harrison and Freeman, ‘Is Organizational Democracy Worth the Effort?’ (2004)
28
29
__
These findings hold true for a range of measures including

productivity, sales and profits. Whilst there have also been a
number of inconclusive studies, the number suggesting that
more participation leads to negative outcomes are vastly
outnumbered by those showing a positive relationship.30 At the
very least it seems that workplace democracy doesn’t hurt the
competitiveness of firms, and in many cases it would appear
to be actively beneficial. In particular, the correlation between
workplace democracy and productivity seems especially
strong:
“Profit-sharing, worker ownership, and worker

participation in decision-making are all positively
associated with productivity” (Doucouliagos, 1995)
It is not surprising that giving employees more say in the running

of their businesses leads to greater productivity. Employees
in most organisations have a greater understanding of what
happens on the ‘shopfloor’ than their managers. In many cases
they not only have a clearer awareness of the problems they
face in their daily work, but also have in mind a number of
ideas about how their work could be improved. The more that
management can connect with workers, the easier workers will
find it to pass these ideas and information upwards.
In non-democratic work environments, workers can be reluctant

to share valuable information with decision-makers. It is
argued that if workers do not trust managers to share gains in
productivity with them, they will not be as keen to share the
information that enables such gains to be made. A working
environment where workers feel they have more control over
how the profits are shared out within the firm are going to be
much more willing to take steps to try to raise productivity.
The existence of formal democratic institutions like work councils,

or workers who are empowered in other ways encourages the
sharing of information and raising of concerns, and provides a
forum in which staff can do so with the confidence that they will
neither be ignored nor punished for doing so. Making senior
managers accountable in some way to all their staff can guard
against fears of negligent governance or wilful blindness more
30 Marsden and Canibano, ‘An Economic Perspective on Employee Participation’ in ‘The

Oxford Handbook of Participation in Organisations’ (2010), p155
__
than accountability simply to shareholders.
Breaching Disconnect, helping wider engagement

A second way in which employee empowerment
can benefit firms is by improving employee’s motivation
and the degree to which they value their organisation and
identify themselves with its goals. The ‘Sunday Times Top 100
Companies to Work for’ found ‘feeling listened to’ to be the single
most important factor in influencing how much an employee
valued their organisation. Employee empowerment therefore is
important not just to enable better decision making, but because
of the effect it can have on the attitudes of employees.
The 2009 BIS report ‘Engaging for Success’ focused on this in the
context of what it called ‘employee engagement’. ‘Engagement’
can be an ambiguous term associated with a wide range of
positive indicators, but can here be broadly described as
meaning that employees feel connected with their employers
and their work, are enthused to turn up to work every day and to
do a good job. The 2009 report has already shown that employee
engagement is (unsurprisingly given this definition) associated
with improved performance in organisations. But what really
matters is what can be done to boost levels of engagement. To
quote from the BIS paper, research by Towers Perrin-ISR shows
that of
“seventy five possible drivers of engagement the

one that was rated as the most important was the
extent to which employees believed that their senior
management had a sincere interest in their well-
being. This same research goes on to ask employees
whether they think their senior management actually
exhibit this attitude and behaviour. Thirty-nine per
cent said they did not believe this would be the case,
32 per cent were neutral and only 29 per cent felt that
their senior management was sincerely interested in
their well-being.”
Knell and Philpott 31 report that evidence suggests that it is a

shared sense of organisational purpose among employees
which is a key driver of sustainable organisational purpose
31 John Knell and John Philpott, ‘Up to the Job’, Demos (2011)
__
whereas an imposed common purpose only creates cynicism

and resistance.
The best way to convince workers that managers really do have

their interests at heart is by setting up practices that gives some
power to workers themselves. Where workers have significant
influence in decision making in areas that affect them, such as
their own skill development or work design, they can directly
make sure that their own well-being is of primary concern. As
a result they can make sure that the work environment is one
which they value and which motivates them.
There is one other element of feeling valued that is also

important however. According to the ‘Workplace Democracy
Association’,
“The foundation of workplace democracy is based

on one of the first lessons that we learn as young
children – the importance of sharing. There are three
things that successful democratic workplaces share
amongst their employees: information, discretion,
and rewards.”32
The advantages of sharing information and discretion have

already been outlined. But the third element, sharing of
rewards, also deserves a mention. There are always concerns,
particularly during times of economic downturn, that workers
share disproportionately in the costs of failure compared with
their managers, via layoffs or falling real wages, whilst not
receiving their fair share of rewards when companies do well.
Employee share ownership schemes are the standard attempt
to try and overcome this problem, but simply implementing
a share ownership scheme without taking steps to improve
employee participation in decision making, information sharing
or other areas will fall flat. These factors must work together if
employees are to be convinced that they are being genuinely
valued by managers.
Perhaps one of the clearest expressions of this issue is current

concerns about pay differentials, as examined by the ‘High Pay
Commission’, an independent inquiry set up by the Compass
think tank. The inequitable distribution of the gains from growth
32 ‘What is Workplace Democracy’, home page of Workplace Democracy Association

website http://workplacedemocracy.wordpress.com, accessed on 06/01/2012
__
and success between top and bottom earners is a symptom

of the same theme of disconnect between top managers and
ordinary employees that this section has already highlighted.
Moreover, it is one of the areas that employees are most keenly
sensitive about as it drives home to them how little say they have
in the management of their own organisations. Worse still, all
the evidence shows that this pay gap is rapidly and consistently
widening.
“Analysis by the High Pay Commission shows that

between 1997 and 2007/8 income for the top 0.1% of
the population grew by 64.2% while the income of a
person in the 50th percentile only grew by 7.2% over
the same period”33
The constantly widening pay gaps are clearly an important

matter to address if employees are to feel genuinely valued by,
and able to engage with, their employers. The current levels of
high pay can also risk distorting executive incentives, including
incentives towards excessive risk taking and decisions not in the
long term interests of the organisation. But it is not a problem
that lends itself to an easy solution. The government has,
understandably, been reluctant to intervene directly to dictate
salary levels to the private sector; this would doubtless be seen
as a highly illiberal move.
Just as these widening pay gaps are symptomatic of a lack of

employee participation and workplace democracy, so too they
can be combated through precisely those mechanisms. There
have been proposals to place employee representatives onto
remuneration committees to put procedures under proper
scrutiny where otherwise hefty pay awards are often simply
waved through with little consideration by the non-executive
directors who normally decide them. But if this principle is
accepted there seems to be no good reason why this could not
be further extended to wider worker representation in other key
company decisions.
33 High Pay Commission, ‘More for less: what happened to pay at the top and does it
matter’ (2011)
__
: 4: Forms of participation
As already discussed, some participatory institutions offer

more ‘genuine’ empowerment of employees than others.
Effective employee participation can take a variety of forms,
and an appreciation of their differences is useful in helping
organisations to implement policies that are well suited to their
particular circumstances.
Apart from trade unions and employee share ownership /

cooperatives (both slight unique cases which will be considered
separately) there are numerous approaches, many of them
sharing similar features but difficult to classify, from ‘dispute
resolution panels’ to ‘joint consultative committees’ or ‘joint
industrial committees’, ‘work councils’ and ‘staff associations’.
Even in the 1970s, Sorge referred to the “bewildering variety

of industrial democracy institutions”34 then in operation – a
level of variety which has only increased in decades since. For
simplicity, we will consider only two other specific proposals: the
direct election of employee representatives to boards or other
management positions and the formal continental model of
work councils; and the general category of other, non-statutory
systems of consultative bodies which we will classify together
as ‘informal participatory procedures’, including concepts such
as ‘quality circles’. Finally, we present two case studies to show
how BT and Tesco have promoted employee participation and
workplace democracy.
Informal Participatory Procedures
Quality circles
34 A. Sorge, ‘The evolution of industrial democracy in the countries of the European

Union’ (1976), p278
__
Quality circles are one form of employee participation that has

gained significantly in popularity over recent years. The 2004
‘Workplace Employment Relations Survey’ found that “Around
one-fifth (21 per cent) of workplaces had groups of non-
managerial employees that met to solve specific problems or
discuss aspects of performance or quality. The equivalent figure
in 1998 was 16 per cent”35
They tend to be small groups of employees who meet on a regular

basis. Often they are free to set their own agenda and discuss
any aspect of the organisation’s activities that interests them,
but generally they focus on matters concerning productivity,
performance and product/service quality. This is a form of
participation designed by managers directly for the benefit of
the firm which also explains why they are widespread.
Obviously this opens them to criticism for being overly
management oriented, not really providing democratic
participation. Some employee groups deride them as tools
for providing information to managers without in any way
empowering workers. However, there is some evidence to
suggest that through their flexibility they are slowly growing in
impact and ability to act in the interests of workers, as this quote
from a recent study shows:
“Quality circles and other forms of small group

problem solving have become commonplace in the
Anglo-American world. These management driven
forms of involvement are designed to serve employer
goals of improved productivity and flexibility.
However, our data suggests they increasingly meet
the desire of workers to be involved in the things that
relate most directly to them” 36
Team working
Another form of employee participation is team working.

Dividing the workforce into semi-independent teams and
allowing them to manage many aspects of their own work can
be effective at improving productivity – it encourages workers
35 Kersley et al, ‘Inside the Workplace: First Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment
Relations Survey’ (2006)
36 Boxall et al, ‘the management of managers: A review and conceptual framework’
(2007), p215
_0
to take responsibility for their own work, to work together and

gives them the freedom to be creative in finding solutions to
problems they face.
“The Survey of Employees indicated that greater levels
of autonomy are viewed positively by employees:
those working in teams with greater autonomy were
more satisfied with the amount of influence they had
over their jobs than team-workers who were given
limited freedom or responsibility.”37
The downside is that such a model of autonomous team working

groups only lends itself to certain kinds of organisation which
don’t rely on too much co-ordination or complex production
processes. In addition the survey also showed that only 6% of
workplaces with teamworking had been given the autonomy to
appoint their own team leaders – so team working often has its
limits in empowering employees. There are also some aspects
of an employee’s interests – notably profit sharing and the future
of the organisation – that simply can’t be devolved to this level
and need higher level representation.
Joint consultative committees
The Joint Consultative Committee is roughly the UK’s

equivalent of the ‘works councils’ found on the continent. They
generally operate at company level, with a formal constitution,
including managers and worker representatives elected for a
fixed term. They have regular meetings and discuss matters
of mutual interest which are not covered by trade union
negotiations, either because they fall outside their scope or
because trade unions are not present.
They differ from their continental counterparts in that they have
no statutory protection, nor do they generally have any formal
powers of co-determination. They are ultimately negotiating
forums, not decision making bodies. Nevertheless, they are
among the most significant forms of participatory body that exist
today in the UK. However they have been in a gradual decline in
the UK for some time. In 2004, the year that the Information and
Consultation of Employees Regulations were introduced in the
UK, the Employee Relations Survey reported of JCCs:
37 Kersley et al, ‘Inside the Workplace: First Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment
Relations Survey’ (2006)
_1
“They were present in 14 per cent of workplaces with

10 or more employees in 2004. A further 25 per cent of
workplaces did not have a workplace-level committee,
but had a consultative forum that operated at a higher
level in the organisation. The equivalent figures in 1998
were 20 per cent and 27 per cent respectively.” 38
Works councils
Many continental countries operate a system with far more

formal and uniform bodies, all known in English as works
councils, though in practice there is considerable difference
between a German ‘Betreibsrät‘, French ‘comité de‘entreprise‘
and Italian ‘rappresentanza’. The key defining features of
these bodies are that they are composed exclusively of
elected employee representatives (with no management
representatives), at least some of whom tend to have full time
release from normal work to carry out their representative
duties, they operate on the individual plant or firm level (as
opposed to trade unions which can operate at the industry
level) and are engaged in consultation and negotiation with
managers over a range of issues and, in some cases where
they are strongest, a form of co-determination.
In most cases their existence is mandated by law for any
employer over a certain size and regulated in their composition
and powers, thus tending to follow fairly uniform structure and
patterns within each country. They tend to have a statutory right
to a wide range of information and a provisional veto on issues
such as hiring and firing, changes to wages and working hours.
The relationship between works councils and trade unions varies

between countries. In Germany a tripartite system operates
between works councils, unions and managers exercising co-
determination in decision making. They tend to be mutually
reinforcing with unions, as over 75 percent of council members
come from a trade union, often on a single slate. In Scandinavia,
an area with high union membership, unions have near complete
control over works councils (in Sweden they are essentially the
same organisations, where the ‘förtroendevala’ or ‘workplace
stewards’ provide the only mediation between employer and
employees).
38 Kersley et al (2006)
__
Even in countries where works councils are nominally

independent of unions they nonetheless remain at least partially
dependent on them for support and legitimacy. This can, of
course, be a weakness – where they are largely controlled by
unions they are less able to represent the interests of non-union
members; obviously a problem given the growing majority of
workers who no longer fall into this category
There is also a variation between countries in the extent to

which the councillors are seen as ‘delegates’ or ‘representatives’
of the workforce. More often the latter is true, in the model of
parliamentary democracy, with no power of recall existing until
re-election (the same is true of board-level representation – see
below). This model is sensible as it ensures that managers can
have confidence in employee representatives when negotiating
with them, without fearing that they could be replaced at short
notice by dissatisfied workers.
There are serious obstacles to the implementation of European

model works councils in the UK, not least due to the opposition
they face from vested interests;
“Britishemployersoverwhelminglyregard
mandatory councils as a challenge to their own
managerial prerogatives, and most unions have also
considered them a threat to their ‘single channel’ of
representation”39
Even among advocates of workplace democracy, there is a fear

that, with increasing decentralisation and more sophisticated
specialisation and training in many industries, employees
become increasingly detached from their works council
representatives who become ‘co-managers’ in their own right.
Another concern is that globalisation means that managers are
less able to negotiate with works councils on a national level, as
many firms will be increasingly multinational.
Direct democratic participation - elected managers

A few highly innovative firms have experimented with
extremely egalitarian management approaches. One option
is to have managers directly elected by the employees that
39 Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman ‘Works Councils: The European Model of Industrial

Democracy’ in ‘The Oxford Handbook of Participation in Organisations’ (2010), p288
__
they manage – an approach that guarantees a high degree of

engagement between the two and a management that workers
are happy with. There are, however, significant risks in such an
approach. Popular individuals may find themselves installed in
management positions for which they are unqualified (though
shortlisting by other, senior, management could reduce this), or
managers could spend too much time currying favour among
employees rather than doing less popular parts of their job.
High turnover is also a concern.
A similar approach can work well in some circumstances,

however. W. L. Gore & Associates, Inc., for instance, operates
on an entirely non-hierarchical basis described as a ‘lattice’
organisation. All employees are equal ‘associates’ operating in
self-managed teams; they choose willingly to follow ‘leaders’
who show initiative, rather than having ‘managers’ appointed
for them. In this particular case, this highly democratic approach
works remarkably well – W.L. Gore & Associates has been in the
US Fortune “100 Best Companies to Work For” for 13 consecutive
years, and its European operations feature in similar lists in the
UK, Germany, France and Italy.
Gore’s line of work, designing and manufacturing a range

of different products from a known input, fluropolymers,
is particularly well suited to this approach which favours
experimentation and creativity over co-ordination, planning and
oversight.
Employee board members
Rather than choosing managers, another way in which

employees can be involved is having employee representatives
sit alongside directors at board level. These could be directly
elected, or elected through unions or works councils. In Germany,
for instance, every firm with over 2000 employees automatically
has works council representatives on its supervisory board. Direct
election may be preferable, in cases where union membership
is low, so as not to exclude members of the workforce from the
democratic process.
There is a case for saying that employees deserve representation

at this level, given that they are one of the main stakeholders in
any enterprise and have a clear interest in ensuring that it is
__
governed well from the very top. Nor are these ideas particularly
new to the UK:
“Interest in industrial democracy…grew in the
1960s and 1970s, culminating in the UK with two
initiatives sponsored by the Labour government
(1974–9): the Bullock Report, which investigated how
a system of worker representation could operate at
company-board level (Gold, 2005), and an attempt
to introduce union-nominated trustees onto the
boards of UK pension funds (Gold, 2008). Neither
initiative won wholehearted union support, and both
collapsed in 1979 on the election of a Conservative
government.”40
Pension funds have since secured member representation, but

plans for worker representation at company board level were
never revived. Yet elsewhere in the EU such practices are the
norm. Even in the UK there are isolated examples, mainly in the
public sector, of employee representation at this level – many
schools have teachers among their governors, universities often
have staff members on their governing bodies and the boards of
NHS Foundation Trusts include staff members as well.
Board representation is not necessarily a panacea. Many key

decisions are not taken at board level, and conflicts of interest
can potentially arise when boards discuss matters of industrial
relations (though employee representatives can by convention
absent themselves from such discussions). There are also
concerns that employee board members, who may well take
considerable time off from normal work to fulfil these duties, may
end up having more in common with managers and directors
than those they are meant to represent. There is evidence
(largely from other countries) that employee board members can
be effective at supporting other forms of workplace democracy
within an organisation.
“European practice suggests that ERBs [Employee

Representatives on Boards] may play effective roles in
corporate governance, to the benefit of management,
employees and organisations as a whole, in the private
as well as public sectors. The European experience
Canada’, Economic and Industrial Democracy (2011), p481
__
also suggests that ERB works best in association with

other extensive forms of employee participation, such
as works councils and union representation” 41
However it is important to recognise that there would be

important implementation issues if this were to be adopted in the
UK. Employee Board members work well within a two tier Board
structure with a supervisory board and an executive board, as
is the case in many European countries. The UK tradition is for
there to be a single tier board containing executives and non-
executives. Whilst not impossible this does make employees
on the board somewhat more problematic. Secondly within
current UK company law, employees on the board cannot be
“representatives” of the interests of employees. Once they are
on the board they have a fiduciary duty under Section 172 of
the Companies Act 2006 to act in the way he/she considers,
in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of
the company for the benefit of its members (ie shareholders in
the case of a company limited by shares) as a whole, and in
doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to the interests
of employees.
Mutuals and co-operatives

Perhaps the most obvious types of organisation to demonstrate
workplace democracy are those that are largely or entirely
owned by their employees. Mutuals, co-operatives and other
employee-owned organisations are not the main focus of this
paper; nevertheless they are clearly concepts closely related to
workplace democracy and merit at least a brief mention, not
least because they form a key part of the governments open
public services agenda.
Firstly, it is obvious that worker owned businesses tend to be

more democratic in their management styles. The International
Co-operative Alliance lists “democratic member control” as
one of its key five principles of co-operatives worldwide.42 At
the very least, as shareholders, employees have the power to
elect their own directors. They also tend to benefit from a more
41 Markey et al, ‘Worker Directors and Worker Ownership’ in ‘The Oxford Handbook of
Participation in Organisations’ (2010), p253
42 International Cooperative Alliance, ‘Principles’ on ICA website, http://www.ica.coop/
coop/principles.html accessed on 06/01/2012
__
democratic ethos, with employees of different pay-grades often

having equal status as ‘associates’ or ‘partners’ (as in the John
Lewis Partnership). That said, the two concepts are distinct.
Evidence shows that workplace democracy and employee

ownership are complementary ideas. They work naturally
together and their positive effects are mutually reinforcing.
One study into the effects of stock-ownership programs in the
US on productivity concludes that firms “need both employee-
ownership and democratic decision making to improve
performance”.43 Similarly,
“A 1993 survey of 188 companies conducted by the

Washington State Office of Trade and Economic
Development found that employee-owned firms grew
no faster than conventional companies unless they
gave workers a voice in management…But firms that
put the three together grew about 12% faster than
their competitors.”44
Promoting more of both these things would seem to be a good

idea. The government is apparently already keen on strong action
to promote and support mutuals and co-operative enterprises,
particularly in the public sector:
“You can’t just talk, like people have in the past,

about wanting more mutuals and co-ops and hope
somebody, somewhere gradually gropes towards
making it happen. You really need to push it.” 45
Case study: BT
BT has a large and highly unionised workforce of 98,000 people
with union membership in the UK around 90 percent for non-
managers represented by CWU and 50 percent for managers
represented by Prospect. There is regular contact involving
consultation and information exchange. The company’s success
as an employer is characterised by positive and constructive
industrial relations. Its dual approach of consultation with the
43 Brent Kramer, ‘Employee ownership and participation effects on outcomes in firms

majority employee-owned through employee stock ownership plans in the US’,
Economic and Industrial Democracy 31 (2010)
‘We’re All the Boss’, Time Magazine, April 8, 2002
44 Francis Maude, ‘Mutuals Will Empower Public Sector’, Guardian Comment is Free, 12
45 August 2010
__
unions and an active direct approach to employee engagement

ensures there is a significant amount of employee involvement.
In addition, BT supports dialogue among employees, their

representatives and management in the UK, Ireland and
continental Europe. This is through the BT European Consultative
Council (BTECC) which meets four times a year and focuses on
BT Group performance and strategy, jobs and employment
plans, as well as the commercial and regulatory factors affecting
BT’s operations. BTECC also discusses other relevant issues
such as training, health and safety, environmental stewardship
and corporate responsibility. BT has separate works councils in
European countries outside the UK.
The communications infrastructure provided by BT is extensive,

with channels ranging from social media tools like office talk
to leadership round tables and ‘roadshows’. There is a drive to
increase the frequency and quality of conversations between
leaders and people. A key employee engagement tool is BT’s
CAREagile survey programme which invites 50,000 employees
every three months to give their feedback on their employee
experience and to share ideas and suggestions. CAREagile is a
key channel for input that is responded to by senior leaders and
local managers.
When feedback is given, managers discuss the ideas put

forward with their teams and together actions at the local level
are agreed. Senior leaders use the insight gleaned from the
employee survey to inform improvements to their business unit
or function. They make sure that themes in the feedback are
acknowledged in their broader communications. The results
from the CAREagile surveys are discussed with the unions.
Other mechanisms like the “My Customer Challenge Cup” and a

new ideas scheme make it easy for BT staff to air their views and
to change things for the better in their organisation.
Employee share-ownership is encouraged, and for staff

shareholders there is a special meeting before every AGM
where workers can be consulted before agenda points are
put to the rest of the shareholders. BT also runs a series of
“People Networks” for various groups of workers within the
company, including women, those with disabilities and other
minority groups. Each of these networks has both an elected
__
committee, which represents its members in all policy matters

across the company, as well as a senior manager responsible
for advocating on the committee’s behalf and ensuring that its
needs are considered.
BT uses the technology based nature of its work to connect with

employees through Facebook, Twitter and its online magazine
“Your View”. This encourages free flowing conversation
between employees and allows them to propose debates on
topics of interest. Moreover, the BT CEO regularly goes online to
speak with interested employees, to be challenged over points
of contention and to take feedback about corporate practices.
The aim of these online forums is to encourage more people
to involve themselves in discussions about the company so
that there will be greater employee participation through other
channels as well.
Finally, in the area of flexible working BT has around 9,000 home

based workers, mainly from management grades. Employees
have the opportunity to request different types of attendance
arrangements. Provided these meet the needs of the business,
they are generally approved. Currently BT operates around 30
different attendance arrangements including part-time working,
four day weeks etc, although in any line of business the number
of arrangements is likely to be less. Allowing people greater
flexibility in how they work is one of the key issues that workers
care about and can have a powerful impact. This is an important
way of engaging the workforce and gaining commitment.
A notable sign of this successful approach to employee relations

is that only a single day has been lost to strike action over the
last 20 years. This is low when compared with Royal Mail, for
example, from which both BT and its unions separated at the
start of the 1980s. BT also reports a significant benefit in the
form of cooperation to changes in working practices needed to
meet the challenges it faces as a business operating in a very
competitive market. The company has succeeded in maintaining
levels of motivation amongst its employees during times of
significant change. It attributes this to the consistently open and
honest conversations held between leaders and people.
__
Case study: Tesco

Tesco is a large employer with a moderately unionised workforce,
with 58 percent being USDAW members. Tesco enjoys a good
relationship with USDAW, but does not simply rely on the union
as a bilateral negotiating partner to represent the views of all its
employees. Instead, Tesco makes use of innovative structures
to involve both its unionised and non-unionised employees and
gives them all a voice inside the company.
The primary source of real employee participation in Tesco

comes through a series of forums. In effect, these operate like a
series of tiered works councils. Each Tesco store elects several
staff representatives to sit alongside their local USDAW shop
steward on a store forum. The forum meets three times a year
to discuss issues of concern to the local workforce and to put
these concerns to management. The local forums each elect
a representative to sit on a regional forum which performs a
similar role on a larger scale. Each regional forum in turn elects
a representative to sit on the national forum, representing all
UK workers concerns on large-scale issues and putting these
directly before Tesco’s senior management. The national forum
also forms working parties to address specific issues, working
with USDAW and management directly to affect Tesco’s policy
in these areas. Products of this in recent years include Tesco’s
attendance policy and its new pay award package for staff
(including a minimum £7 per hour wage), as well as other issues
of concern to employees such as the provision of paid leave for
organ donation.
Like many large employers, Tesco also has several voluntary in-
company ‘networks’ to represent various interest groups such as
women, the LGBT community and ethnic minorities, across all
areas of company policy. It also has various listening mechanisms
through which it can receive input from employees, including
an annual ‘Viewpoint’ survey to get an overview of employees’
concerns and quarterly ‘Pulse’ surveys, which deal in detail with
more specific issues. These surveys are anonymous and the
results are used by senior management to drive changes in the
company. These listening mechanisms, however, are quite one-
way in their approach, taking suggestions from workers without
providing feedback.
_0
The benefits for the business
Through the staff forums, Tesco receives invaluable feedback

from staff on business strategy and employee policy initiatives.
This gives Tesco the ability to change and innovate, allowing the
business to stay ahead of its competitors. The forums can act as
an early warning system if something is not working properly.
They also help to identify good practice.
The forum process gives staff a better feeling of ownership and

belonging to the business. This improves staff commitment and
yields higher productivity.
Over the last decade Tesco has become the number one retailer
in the UK with some of the best pay and conditions in the
sector.
The benefits of the partnership to the workforce
Members of staff have the opportunity to have a real say on pay,

policies and other major business decisions. They have some
of the best pay and conditions in the retail industry and have a
clear, transparent and well defined pay structure.
USDAW views the partnership agreement that it has with Tesco

(of which the staff forums are an integral part) as being of
benefit to the business, employees and the union and enabling
employees to have a say on issues extending beyond just pay
terms and conditions.
This system of employee involvement pre-dates all of the relevant

legislation, such as the 2004 Information and Consultation
of Employees Regulations, and despite its resemblance to a
system of works councils is nonetheless clearly of a unique
structure designed to suit Tesco’s circumstances. It provides
another example of good practice that would be undermined
by the imposition of any ‘one size fits all’ model of employee
empowerment.
_1
: 5 The role of trade unions
Why cannot employee’s voice simply be heard through the

trade unions? For much of the last century trade unions were
seen as the natural forum through which employees could
represent themselves, safeguard their rights and influence their
employers. Unlike in the US, where trade unions are often seen
as necessarily hostile bodies, narrowly concerned with higher
wages and often disruptive of economic efficiency, Europeans
have tended to regard trade unions as social partners for
businesses, concerned with a broader range of issues and
fulfilling a much more significant representative democratic
role. The trade union was once the pre-eminent intermediary
between employer and employee for all significant matters.
A tension still exists for trade unions, however, over quite how
closely they should be prepared to engage with employers. The
majority of initiatives towards greater employee participation
over the last three decades has tended to come from employers.
Whilst trade unions can embrace these initiatives and participate
in them itself as the representative of employees (for instance
by placing union members onto management committees or
workers’ board seats), it is often highly reluctant to do so.
There is a tension here for unions in the decision over

whether it is best to remain separate from employers and
risk marginalisation, or involve themselves in participatory
management to reap the rewards of real influence and ability to
shape the working environment but risk the subversion of trade
unions to employers’ interests and values.
“A key issue for the unions was their grounding in

a defensive mentality which prioritized traditional
forms of collective bargaining for better terms and
conditions – a perspective that has characterized both
the UK and Canada (Payne and Keep, 2005; Weststar
__
and Verma, 2008). Unions harboured concerns over

‘incorporation’, fearing that their representatives
might be ideologically or practically subverted into
becoming managerial tools (Schuller, 1985: 79).” 46
Alternative forms of workplace democracy can offer an escape

from this dilemma. Parallel systems of work councils or quality
circles, for instance, can allow workers to engage with employers
whilst allowing trade unions to remain distinctly ‘outside’ firms
to practise collective bargaining in areas such as wages, and
to represent individual workers in the case of disputes with the
company.
This issue is made all the more pressing because of falling

union membership in the UK. In 2010, trade union membership
fell by 2.7 percent to 6.5 million people, its lowest level since
the Second World War, with union representation down to just
26.6 percent of all employees.47 However even this low figure
disguises a wide disparity between union representation in the
public and private sectors. Whereas one in two public sector
workers are members of a trade union only one in seven private
sector workers are members. As unions have declined, both in
terms of their membership and the legal tools available to them,
so they are less able to represent employees in participatory
management schemes. Non unionised workers may still,
however, be very willing to engage in in-firm participation via
other means – indeed, evidence suggests that as unions have
been declining, the number of workplaces that practice non-
union forms of representation has been increasing, and at
a faster rate. This is not something that needs to be reversed
– rather we should embrace this trend and focus our efforts on
making sure that the new forms of employee representation
work effectively to secure the fundamental interests of workers.
Non-union systems of employee representation have other

advantages. They can alleviate concerns that greater workplace
democracy simply places more influence into the hands of trade
unions as institutions rather than the workforce at grassroots
level. Alternative systems can also be less prone to conflict and
Canada’, Economic and Industrial Democracy (2011), p481
47 James Achur, ‘Trade Union Membership 2010’ National Statistics, Department of
Business Innovation and Skills
__
friction between workers and managers than those that rely on

the same structure as a traditionally adversarial trade union.
According to Gregor Gall,
“Unions predisposed to an oppositional ideology are

more likely to believe members’ interests will not be
best served by participation”48
Bodies with oppositional ideologies of this kind are clearly not

likely to make good partners for employers looking to set up
systems of participatory management – instead of functioning
workplace democracy they risk creating deadlock in the system
designed to foster engagement and cooperation. Workplace
democracy can run more smoothly and better engagement
between employers and employees can take place if workers
can persuade and vote through their wishes on an internal
committee, board or works council then resort to disruptive
industrial action in the face of an implacable employer.49
There are some fears that allowing alternative, more direct, forms
of employee participation might supersede the need for trade
unions altogether, not least from trade unions themselves. In its
2007 published guide, Unite advises its members to reject any
suggested system of non-union information and consultation
that might
“…undermine union representation arrangements,

e.g. by guaranteeing non-union I & C representative
places in bargaining units where the union is
recognised” or “undermine union information and
influence by providing for company representatives to
meet with I & C Reps more frequently than they meet
with union negotiating bodies” 50
Should trade unions be entirely replaced by internal systems of

workplace democracy there is, of course, a risk that the ability of
workers to secure reasonable wage demands through collective
bargaining might be undermined,. Eventually, however, if true
employee empowerment could be achieved (as opposed to
pseudo-participation), where workers had genuine influence
48 Gall, ‘Labour Union Responses to Participation’, in ‘The Oxford Handbook of

Participation in Organisations’ (2010), p363
49 Kersey et al ‘Inside the Workplace’, BIS (2006), Figure 4, Page 17
50 Unite the Union, ‘The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004:
Guidance for Unite Amicus Section Officers and Workplace Representatives’ (2007)
__
on decision making bodies, there is no reason why wage

determination (and board remuneration) should not fall within
the purview of such bodies. Indeed, given current trends it
seems that there is not so much a case of workplace democracy
displacing collective wage bargaining, as a collapse of collective
bargaining into unilateral management decisions that workplace
democracy is desperately needed to fill.
“In 2004, 35 per cent of employees had their pay set

through collective bargaining, down from 38 per cent
in 1998. The shift was largely accounted for by a rise
in the percentage of employees whose pay was set by
management (up from 49 per cent to 57 per cent).” 51
Whilst unions need to fear less from the offers of participation

from employers , employers also need to do more to calm such
fears, not least by ensuring that the offers of participation it
makes offer a genuine prospect of workplace democracy and
are not just a superficial veneer of legitimacy. The experience
of employee participation in companies such as Tesco and BT
shows that employee participation can be complementary to
the role of the unions and in no sense threatening. Indeed if
union representation in a firm is very high it may be the case
that representation through the union may be an appropriate
mechanism for employee voice to occur. There is precedent for
this. The Takeover Panel code gives a formal recognition of the
union to act on behalf of the workforce
“An employee representative is:
(a) a representative of an independent trade union,

where that trade union has been recognised by the
offeror or the offeree company in respect of some or
all of its employees; and
(b) any other person who has been elected or

appointed by employees to represent employees for
the purposes of information and consultation.
There should be no reason why Britain cannot pursue

a system of greater employee voice (irrespective of
whether employees are union or non-union members)
whilst retaining an active role for the trade unions;
“the rise of Human Resource Management, we argue,
51 Kersey et al ‘Inside the Workplace’, BIS (2006)
__
is not the cause of union voice decline. HRM and most

forms of voice – dual channel and non-union voice
– act as complements rather than substitutes at the
workplace level”52
“An extensive transnational survey reveals that

both works councils and JCCs [Joint Consultative
Committees] are positively associated with a union
presence; there is no evidence from this sample that
either is used to any significant extent as a substitute
for unions.”53
If, the decline of trade unions in the workplace does continue it

will not be because organisations have adopted other forms of
employee empowerment. Rather such alternatives will become
all the more important in representing employees, and all the
more important that the government takes note and makes sure
than they are done well.
52 Gomez et al, ‘Voice in the Wilderness? The Shift from Union to Non-Union Voice in
Britain’ in ‘The Oxford Handbook of Participation in Organisations’ (2010), p400
53 Brewster, Wood, Croucher & Brookes ‘Are Works Councils and Joint Consultative
Committees and Threat to Trade Unions? A Comparative Analysis’, Economic and
Industrial Democracy 28 (2007), p49
__
: 6 Overseas experience
Workplace democracy and employee empowerment is much

more common in continental Europe than it is in the UK.
There has long been a legislative basis for work councils in the
Netherlands, France and Germany, and to a lesser extent in
Italy and Sweden where they are supplemented by collective
agreements.
There is therefore a wide pool of experience to learn from when

considering our own approach.
“… the general approach to social dialogue at a

European level contains many useful lessons for
Britain. It demonstrates that an IR system can be rooted
in a search for compromise. It means institutions
that are designed to generate agreement rather than
resolve conflict. This requires a cultural change on the
part of British employers…”54
Germany, more than any other country, has its own particular
system of industrial relations that stands in stark contrast to
current UK practice. In Germany there is a statutory requirement
for firms to establish consultative bodies known as works councils
(the closest equivalent being consultative committees in the UK)
when requested by workers. Many small firms don’t bother, as
there is little worker demand for them – not a great concern as
in small firms it is much easier for workers to remain in direct
contact with managers. Among larger firms, however, very few
get away without consultative bodies compared with the UK
– the procedures for German workers requesting representation
are much easier than is the case in the UK.
The crucial difference, however, is that in the UK these
54 Taylor, ‘A-Z of Trade Unionism and Industrial Relations’ (1994) p. xvi; cited in Ackers
and Payne, ‘British Trade Unions and Social Partnership’ IJHRM (1998), p536
__
consultative bodies are generally the full extent of employee

representation, whilst in Germany they sit embedded in a much
broader culture known as ‘mitbestimmung’ or ‘co-determination’
which the UK conspicuously lacks. One aspect of this is the two-
tiered board structure in Germany. In the UK limited companies
are managed by boards of directors elected by shareholders. In
Germany, executive control of all limited companies is vested in
a management board which is in turn elected by a ‘supervisory
board’. This second board has no equivalent in the UK – it
consists by law of 50% shareholder elected representatives and
50% employee representatives elected through the works
councils, for all firms employing over 2,000 workers. As well as
electing and supervising the management board which handles
the day-to-day running of the company, the supervisory boards
also must approve any major decisions including investments,
raising capital, plant closures, major redundancies and
takeovers.
In this way both of the major stakeholders in limited companies

– the owners who supply the capital and the employees who
supply the labour – can supervise and hold to account the
management and ultimately have joint control over the enterprise.
This clearly has benefits not only in terms of better representing
employee interests but can also have wider economic benefits.
As employees tend, on the whole, to have significantly longer-
term interests than shareholders, their presence on supervisory
boards tends to make the outlook of German firms more long-
term than their UK counterparts.
“Company goals, less orientated towards immediate

profit and dividend payouts, reflect Germany’s
distinctive financial context and its ownership
structure; but also a set of values distinguished by
long-term, almost vocational, commitments made by
individuals to their particular organizations.” 55
This is certainly no bad thing at a time when many businesses

in the UK seem to be focused on short-term profits at the price
of long-term stability.
As to other reported benefits of the German model of co-

determination, there is increased worker involvement and
55 V. Papadakis and T.P. Barwise, ‘Strategic Decisions’ (1998), p108
__
engagement with their employers at all levels, as well as more

harmonious industrial relations. In practical terms this could
contribute towards the high productivity of German workers
(something that has been long admired in the UK) and low
number of strikes.
Studies of German co-determination have shown that the

“presence of a supervisory board with co-determination
relates positively to productivity and wages”.56 Meanwhile the
number of working days lost through industrial action per 1,000
employees on average between 2005 and 2009 was 23.8 in the
UK, compared with only 6.2 in Germany; and this despite the
fact that in Germany no ballots are required for workers to take
strike action.57
The lessons for the UK, however, are less than straightforward.
Simply changing our legal framework to require dual rather
than single boards would be highly disruptive and would by no
means transform the UK experience into that of Germany. It is
not simply the fact that Germany has such a dual-board system
that makes them successful in this area - other countries, such as
Sweden, have a strong tradition of employee participation with
only single-tiered boards. Rather, the German system works
precisely because the Germans have a deep-rooted culture of
co-determination, much of which is not directed by law but is
the result of informal cultural norms and attitudes.
Many works councils in Germany have few more formal ‘powers’

than UK consultative committees, but managers freely choose to
consult them far more freely and take heed of their views in a way
that UK managers on the whole do not. Frequently companies
have employee representatives on their management as well as
their supervisory board – human resources or ‘labour’ directors
are often chosen in this way. The relationship between trade
unions and employers are habitually much closer than in the
UK – wage bargaining takes place at a sector-level by employers
associations and sector-wide unions that removes a degree of
the hostile stand-offs that sometimes characterise UK industrial
disputes. In short co-determination takes place at every level,
56 Franziska Boneberg, ‘The Economic Consequences of one-third Co-determination in

German Supervisory Boards’ (2010)
57 European Industrial Relations Observatory, ‘Developments in Industrial Action
2005-2009’
__
from individual plants to national-level.
It would seem impossible for the UK to move to a German-

style co-determination system in a single move, even if the
government wanted to. Certainly individual employers could
learn good lessons from abroad – the benefits of having some
employee representatives at board level might be one, though
the legal status of directors and their responsibilities may have
to be re-examined to make this more feasible. Laws, of course,
can be changed swiftly if necessary, but culture and prevailing
attitudes cannot. The UK needs to adopt an incremental approach
to this issue and one that takes into account the distinctly
‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture the exists here. At the very least however
corporate law might be changed to enable companies to adopt
a supervisory board structure if they wished to do so.
Australia, having more shared culture with us on this issue, may

provide some lessons, for what legislation can achieve under
these cultural constraints. Historically the legislative position
in Australia was UK-style voluntarism. Tribunal bargaining
for wages and working hours was the only significant area of
employee influence. In the early 1990s the Keating government
changed the law to mandate consultation on a much wider
range of issues, facilitating and requiring employee participation
in these areas unless there was mutual consent not to do so.
However, when the Keating government was replaced in 1996,
the incoming Conservative government repealed the legislation
and reverted to the system of voluntarism.
Data from the Workplace Research Centre indicates that the

number of consultative committees rose significantly after the
Keating legislation was introduced, peaking at 58 percent in
1999, before declining again to 33 percent by 2003.58 Despite the
apparently delayed response of firms, the impact of legislation
here seems clear. The evidence suggests that employees, trade
unions and managers were encouraged by government support
to come together and work constructively to build systems of
participation and, in some cases, co-determination. But once
legislative support was withdrawn, such projects gradually
collapsed. The lesson for the UK would seem to be that in a country
58 Forsyth et al, ‘Regulating for Innovation in Workplace Production and Employment

Systems: A Preliminary Discussion of Issues and Themes’ (2006)
_0
lacking a German-style culture of co-determination, legislative

support can still lead to effective employee participation. But this
cannot go too far too fast, as it takes time for people’s attitudes
and habits to catch up with legislative changes.
One final point worth noting is that the Keating government

in Australia was criticized for failing to “prescribe the means
(Structure or processes) through which such consultation was to
occur”.59 Legislation designed to push employers towards more
employee participation needs to strike a careful balance between
being too prescriptive on the one hand, which stifles innovation
and forces employers and employees into models not suited to
their circumstances, and too vague on the other, to the point of
the legislation becoming meaningless and unenforceable.
One example of how this might be achieved would be to follow

the example of the ‘Societas Europaea’ or ‘European company’
model. These SEs are bound by separate European regulation;
more flexible than domestic legislation in any EU country and
allowing an opportunity for renegotiation of provisions. SEs
have three standard models of employee participation, and it
is expected that all new SEs should follow one of them, with
an exception for (predominantly British) companies with no
prior experience of participation, which can choose to opt-out
of the provisions when forming SEs (and generally have done
so). Workers can either be represented at board level alongside
employers, or in a separate works council of employee only
representatives, or by a third option negotiated by common
consent of employees and management. Clearly the preference
is for the third, negotiated option and the first two models act
both as incentives to ‘nudge’ employers and employees into
reaching agreement on such an option and as a fall-back in case
of failure.
Despite other problems with the workings of SEs, this particular

aspect of their regulation appears to have considerable merit.
Current UK regulation could be upgraded to resemble this
model more closely. Currently there are ‘standard information
and consultation provisions’ included in UK regulations which
represents the default system that must be implemented if
59 Mitchell et al, ‘Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the
Principle of Who and What really Counts’ (1997), p203
_1
employers and employees cannot negotiate a preferred system.

For example this default procedure could be changed to include
board level representation and / or a full consultative works
council covering a broader range of issues than at present.
This way a voluntary negotiated arrangement can remain the

preferred first choice, but failing that a strong system of worker
representation would be guaranteed. This would both provide
a higher minimum standard for intransigent employers, but
would also make most employers far more willing to come
to a negotiated agreement, knowing that the default system
triggered should negotiations fail will be much stronger.
__
: 7: Introducing employee participation:

the role of government
If the case for employee participation in the workplace were purely

an economic one – that the performance of firms is improved if
there is greater employee participation, then it could be argued
that whether to introduce greater employee participation should
be entirely an issue for firms themselves. Government might
have a role as part of economic policy to facilitate and encourage
workplace democracy but nothing more. .This is broadly what is
happening with the employee engagement agenda arising from
the work of David Macleod and Nita Clarke for BIS.
However, if the case for employee participation goes beyond this,

as we argued in Chapter 3, that it is also about the fundamental
rights of workers in a developed economy to decent working
standards, then it is appropriate for government to be more
actively involved.
One argument against the government becoming involved

in requiring employee participation is that this goes against
a fundamental principle of capitalism that the owners of the
company are the shareholders who therefore ultimately control
the company. This has been the view put forward by the CBI,
most recently in its arguments against including workers on the
remuneration committees of Boards. According to this argument
it is wrong that others should be involved in setting out the
future direction of the company, issues of merger, acquisition
and disposal – these are decisions for executives to make in the
interests of shareholders alone. As Milton Friedman argued:
“In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a

corporate executive is an employee of the owners
of the business. He has direct responsibility to his
employers. That responsibility is to conduct the
__
business in accordance with their desires, which

generally will be to make as much money as possible
while conforming to the basic rules of the society” 60
It is argued that anything else is a violation of basic shareholder

property rights. In other words employees and other stakeholders
have no rights relating to management decisions whatsoever. As
a more recent defender of this view of ‘shareholder capitalism’
put it;
“The stakeholder theory, despite its meretricious,

supposedly modern language, is really rather
reactionary. It belongs to the nineteenth-century
world of large-scale industry, big unions, more or
less unchanging production techniques, and stagnant
social relationships … It is little more than a sanitized
version of socialism.”61
Many would dispute the extent to which shareholders really do

have control over the management and direction of particularly
large listed companies. Moreover whilst this is a characteristic
of “Anglo-Saxon” capitalism the position is more nuanced in
respect of continental European models, and as we have argued
there are some advantages flowing from such a model . Indeed
if one is seeking to move towards a different form of “good
capitalism” it is only right that some of these nostrums are
challenged.
Furthermore, even in the current system in the UK the position

is rather more complex than the simplistic model set out above
infers. It is already the case that in the ownership of firms,
through different classes of share, that economic interest can
be separate from control. Furthermore the Companies Act 2006
in section 172 acknowledges that Directors of a company in
exercising their responsibilities cannot solely have regard to the
interests of their members.
Duty to promote the success of the company
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he

considers, in good faith, would be most likely to
60 Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’, New York
Times Magazine, September 13, 1970
61 N. Barry: ‘The Stakeholder Fallacy: Stakeholderism Undermines the Defining Feature of
Capitalism: The Exclusive Rights of Ownership’ The Freeman 50:3 (2000)
__
promote the success of the company for the benefit of

its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard
(amongst other matters) to—
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long

term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,
(c) the need to foster the company’s business

relationships with suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the

community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a

reputation for high standards of business conduct,
and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the

company.
Indeed there are calls from many for there to be workers on

remuneration committees of Boards and the Department of
Business, Innovation and Skills has launched a consultation
on curbing excessive executive pay which has this as one of
the options. This is effectively accepting the case that there is a
role for workers to be involved in some issues concerned with
the direction of the company. In our view it would not therefore
be such a fundamental change to introduce greater employee
empowerment as some would imply
The current legislative framework

Until recently there was little legislation in the UK concerning
employee participation in any form. There was interest towards
the end of the 1970s in legislating on the issue of workplace
democracy, but the arrival of the Conservative government in
1979 led to the recommendations of the Bullock report being
dropped.
Non-union forms of employee participation were not illegal

(as they largely are in the US under NLRA legislation) but nor
were they mandated or strictly regulated (as in much of Western
Europe). Employers were essentially free to set up whatever
consultative or participatory bodies they wished, or not, so long
__
as employees agreed to take part.
In 2004 the Labour government introduced the ‘Information

and Consultation of Employees Regulations’ as part of the
Employment Relations Act 2004. These were introduced
primarily as a response to the EU Information and Consultation
Directive (2002/14/EC). They guarantee all employees the right
to request that their employer set up a procedure to consult with
them over:
“the recent and probable development of the

undertaking’s activities and economic situation”;
“the situation, structure and probable development

of employment within the undertaking and on any
anticipatory measures envisaged, in particular, where
there is a threat to employment”; and
“decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work

organisation or in contractual relations” 62
However, in order to trigger the requirement to set up a

consultative body, a series of steps need to first be taken by
employees, who must secure the support of at least ten percent of
the total workforce before they can put their request to employers,
or 40 percent in cases where existing consultation mechanisms
already exist. Moreover the emphasis of such arrangements is
primarily information provision and consultation rather than
employees having a truly participatory role in the firm.
It was initially hoped that the EU Directive would go some

way towards harmonizing minimum standards of employee
consultation across Europe. Finding a common European
standard proved almost impossible, however, given variations
between countries, and the resulting regulations set the bar
very low. Most West European countries already have far more
extensive national regulations on workplace democracy and, as
a result, have been little affected by this change. By contrast
this represented a significant change for the UK, which has
historically adopted a ‘voluntarist’ approach towards workplace
democracy.
The adoption of the 2004 Information and Consultation
62 Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004, Regulation 20
__
of Employees Regulations therefore represented the first

real attempt at statutory regulation, guaranteeing rights to
consultation. However it has not fundamentally changed the
attitude of most UK employers on this issue. The CBI did find a
ten percent increase in the number of “permanent information
and consultation bodies” in its 2006 employment survey.63 But in
general the number of firms that have adopted new information
and consultation schemes as a result of the regulations has been
low and the influence of those bodies within the organisations
disappointing. Generally employers have established the bare
minimum required to comply with the regulations, and even
then only when either forced to act or as an attempt to pre-empt
more substantial proposals.
“The limited influence of employee representatives

in a number of the observed cases can be attributed
to the narrow remit of the ICE Directive, with its
provisions being markedly inferior when compared
with those of the European Company Statute Directive,
in which board-level representation for employees is
considered essential. Moreover, the ICE Regulations
do not allow for any enforcement of negotiation
rights nor do they contain any explicit preference
for employees to have any substantial influence in
management decision-making.”64
Meanwhile, a 2005 report by CHA found that “65% of employees

say a lot of the information they receive seems irrelevant…Half
say it can be confusing and 40% say it uses too much ‘corporate
speak or business jargon’.”65
Simply throwing information at employees in this way is

not particularly helpful, nor does it contribute much to real
workplace democracy of the kind discussed in the earlier parts
of this paper. One of the reasons why many employers have not
implemented any consultative schemes at all can be explained
by the trigger mechanism required to mandate them to do so.
Given the lack of employer enthusiasm, initiatives generally
have to come from the workforce themselves. Yet here there
63 IRS Employment Review 856 (2006)

64 Sofoklis Sarvanidis, ‘The Implementation of Information and Consultation of Employees
Regulations in Great Britain’, University of Bath (2010), p254
Colette Hill Associates, ‘A Little More Conversation’ (2005), p5
65
__
seems to be considerable ignorance among employees of how

to proceed – the same 2005 CHA report found that “Only 13%
of employees are aware that the Directive gives them the right
to ask their employer for information about the future of their
organisation”.
Employers and trade unions, the main forums through which

employees receive important information about their work, have
shown little enthusiasm in passing on news of this important
new legislation. CHA found that “(88%) have not been told
about the Directive by their employers and almost all (94%)
have not been told about it by their trade union” – a shockingly
high proportion.
Combine this with the ten percent threshold of employees

needed to trigger negotiations and it is not hard to see why
take-up has been less than universal. Hall66 describes the ten
percent threshold as “a tough standard to meet”. In cases
where existing arrangements are already in place, the threshold
to trigger an attempt to change them is even higher – 40 percent
of the entire workforce must either sign a petition or turn out
and vote in a ballot in favour of a change; in many cases an
insurmountable obstacle. Moreover, such difficulty in changing
consultation systems once set up makes both employees and
unions extremely wary of entering into them in the first place,
for fear they will find themselves stuck in arrangements that
are not to their advantage. The introduction of a cut-off date
beyond which pre-existing agreement can no longer be used
as an obstacle to new negotiations might help to alleviate this
problem.
This is especially true in heavily unionised workplaces, where the

unions generally already provide a higher quality of information
and consultation functions than those minimally guaranteed in
the regulations. Unions have therefore tended to sit back and
wait for the initiative of employers or individual workers, which
often never comes.
“With regard to the individual employees, in

nonunionised workplaces there is an obvious lack of
expertise and therefore, it is not surprising that they
66 Hall, ‘A cool response to the ICE Regulations? Employer and trade union approaches to
the new legal framework for information and consultation’, IRJ (2006), p461
__
have not been proactive in triggering negotiation

procedures. Even in the workplaces, where
consultation councils are not existent, it appears that
the threshold of 10 per cent may be a considerable
barrier when individual employees wish to initiate the
negotiation process”67
Experience in the UK shows that both direct regulation and more

indirect tools can prove useful. As well as the information and
consultation regulations already discussed the UK regulation of
employee representation in pension funds is a useful experience
to draw on. The UK Pensions Act 2004 imposed a statutory
requirement that member-nominated representatives be given
a third of seats on all pension trustee boards. This demonstrates
that mandating other organisations to allow employee
representation is neither unthinkable nor unworkable.
In other areas of policy, mandatory reporting has been found to

be a useful tool in persuading employers to adopt more desirable
policies without the need for direct regulation. In environmental
policy and corporate governance and ethics, many large firms
are now required to publish annual reports outlining the current
practices they follow and detailing any proposals for future
improvement.
A study by Ioannis Ioannou and George Serafeim finds “evidence

for the positive impact of mandatory sustainability reporting
on socially responsible management practices.”68 In other
words, organisations that have to report publicly on what they
are doing tend to be much more proactive in improving their
policy towards what are seen as socially desirable standards.
Mandatory reporting on workplace democracy could therefore
be an important weapon in the government’s arsenal that
doesn’t involve any changes to direct regulation.
It is also worth noting that managers have been increasingly

willing to promote the “concept of industrial democracy
and [employee] participation…as a response to the threat
of legislation” (Cressey et al., 1981: p. 54) on the issue. By
talking about this issue and discussing possible proposals, the
67 Sofoklis Sarvanidis, ‘The Implementation of Information and Consultation of Employees

Regulations in Great Britain’, University of Bath (2010)
68 Ioannou and Serafeim, ‘The Consequences of Mandatory Corporate Sustainability
Reporting’, Working Paper, Harvard Business School (2011)
__
government can spur private sector organisations into making

voluntary changes.
It is disappointing therefore that the government is appearing

to move backwards in terms of employee involvement as a
result of its proposed changes to company reporting set out
in the Consultation Paper on narrative reporting published by
BIS in September 2011. This paper proposes that the existing
requirement on companies to report on employee involvement
through a statement of actions to introduce, maintain or develop
arrangements aimed at providing employees with information
on matters of concern to them; consulting employees or their
representatives on a regular basis; encouraging involvement
of employees in company performance, which was introduced
through the Employment Act 1982 for companies employing
more than 250 employees should be dropped. The rationale given
is that the existing requirement generates disclosures which are
of little value to investors, employees or other stakeholders,
as the rights of employees to information are protected by the
Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004
Whilst there is little point in producing information for the sake

of it, as discussed above the 2004 Information and Consultation
Regulations have had limited take up. At the very least the
requirement to report on employee involvement fits within a
framework of transparency and establishing the expectation on
companies that they should be considering what they should be
doing in respect of employee involvement. If it is considered that
this has become a “boilerplate” exercise it would seem more
appropriate to consider how this might be improved rather than
simply to get rid of the requirement.
There are also measures that the Financial Reporting Council

could take to amend the UK Corporate Governance Code to
require listed companies to establish a policy concerning
employee empowerment, in the same way as it is proposing to
do for boardroom diversity in response to the Davies report.
_0
: 8. The way forward
If the case for greater employee empowerment was purely an

economic one then it could be argued that it is up to the individual
firm as to whether it involves employees. However, as we have
argued, the beneficial impact of employee empowerment on
corporate performance and industrial relations means it should
form an integral part of the coalition government’s growth
strategy, which is seeking to undertake supply-side reforms.
In addition, because we believe that there is a more fundamental

right for employees to have a voice in the decisions which affect
them in the workplace, this is a further reason for government to
have a role to play in promoting employee empowerment. For
this reason we set out below a broad approach for government
to follow in promoting employee empowerment. The detail of
the individual measures will need further investigation to ensure
the practicality of their implementation. We are very clear that
whatever the detail of the measures required, there are strong
economic and political grounds for measures to give employees
greater voice in how their companies are run.
However we do not consider that a prescriptive top down

approach is appropriate for the following reasons:
: there is much good practice already taking place in

companies which has been developed in conjunction
with the workforce and in some cases the unions.
Imposing a different system from on high would
be a mistake. For example, Tesco has developed in
partnership with USDAW and its employees a system
of workplace, regional and national forums which work
well and are similar in many respects to Works Councils.
_1
It would be wrong and counter-productive to impose a

system of Works Councils on top of this.
: for participation to work well requires a substantial
culture change on the part of employers, employees
and trade unions. To point to the example of Germany
or other countries whilst useful also needs to take
into account the different history, context of industrial
relations as well as company law. Change cannot
happen overnight.
: the circumstances of some firms will differ so
substantially that the pattern of implementation must be
tailored to the circumstances of the firm. For example a
tiered system of workplace forums might work well in
the context of Tesco where there are clear workplace
units eg stores and depots compared to a much more
dispersed organisation such as BT.
As it will be important to secure a cultural change amongst
both employers and employees for employee participation to
be fully effective simply legislating to secure employee voice is
unlikely to be successful on its own. For this reason we advocate
that, at least initially, an approach is adopted which draws on
behavioural economics, commonly known as “nudge” theory
to secure change. The focus should initially be on firms of
more than 250 employees, where formal forms of employee
participation are more likely to be beneficial.
However, as in other areas where changes in corporate

behaviour are being sought such as representation of women
on Boards and executive pay, legislation should not be ruled out
if behavioural change by employers is insufficient.
Within the framework of behavioural economics or ‘nudge

theory’ there are several measures which government could
consider to promote employee empowerment and workplace
democracy.69
An information and awareness raising campaign
This echoes the findings of the 2009 BIS report ‘Engaging for
Success’, which called for a “nationwide awareness raising
69 Institute for Government, ‘Mindspace: influencing behaviour through public policy’

(2010)
__
campaign” and increased support. This needs to come in

two forms. First, a campaign targeted at employers, raising
awareness of workplace democracy as an issue and as an
effective way of modernising management style to increase
productivity. Managers should be encouraged to visit and talk
to counterparts at other organisations that have been successful
at implementing more employee empowerment and should
be provided with guidance from the Department of Business
Innovation and Skills on how they can proceed and which
approaches represent best practice.
Secondly, a campaign targeted at workers, making sure that

they are all aware of their rights under the 2004 regulations
and offering training and support for employees who want to
establish systems of participation in their workplaces. These two
campaigns should run in parallel and ought to increase both the
number and quality of participation schemes, and should focus
as much on informal procedures as formal ones.
Promotion of increased employee empowerment as a norm to

which employers should aspire
Establishing norms of behaviour is an important factor in

influencing actions. One way of doing this is by establishing
reporting standards and so we consider that the government
should retain the requirement on companies with over 250
employees to provide an annual public report on their practices
of employee involvement. We understand the concern set out
in the latest BIS consultation paper that this has become an
exercise of form rather than substance. However we believe
that it would be a retrograde step to remove this requirement
. Instead we believe it should be extended to give it meaning
and that it should be extended beyond reporting on employee
involvement towards employee participation and how these
processes meet the principles of employees
: Having a say in the remuneration policies of the company

(including at Board level)
Having a say in the terms and conditions of employment
: of the company
Having a say and influencing the strategic direction of
: the company
__
:Provisions for dealing with employee suggestions and

concerns,
: any provisions they have implemented under the 2004
regulations.
This would help bring about the cultural acceptance of
internationally recognised labour standards, as laid out by the
International Labour Organisation which lists the “Existence of
measures for consultation, cooperation and communication at
all levels” as one of the essential criteria constituting a ‘decent
work standard’.70
The investor community has a potentially important role to

play in promoting such good practice. The Financial Reporting
Council could help to enforce this by amending the UK Corporate
Governance Code to require listed companies to establish
a policy concerning employee participation, including the
measurable objectives for implementing the policy. Companies
could be made to disclose annually a summary of the policy and
progress made in meeting the objectives.
Incentivisation
A further way to encourage behavioural change is through

incentives. There are many examples where government has
sought to influence the behaviour of individuals through the tax
system, eg a lower tax rate for unleaded compared to leaded
petrol, alcohol and tobacco taxes etc. The recent suggestion by
the Labour leader Ed Miliband that there should be differential
corporation tax rates between “good” and “bad” companies
extended this concept directly to the corporate sphere. Such
an approach to promoting employee empowerment could be
considered, A lower rate for corporation tax rates is just one
option which could be considered alongside other incentives
such as a lower national insurance employers’ contribution or
raising the threshold at which national insurance is payable by
employers. If an incentivisation approach were to be pursued
then our initial view is that using national insurance would be
a better approach than using corporation tax as it would give a
larger incentive to more labour intensive firms.
This could be enacted through linking the discount to

70 International Labour Organisation, ‘Decent Work, standards and indicators’, working
paper 58 (2005), p5
__
requirements for employee participation similar to those used

by the ‘Societas Europaea’ or ‘European company’. SEs have
three standard models of employee participation, and it is
expected that all new SEs should follow one of them, Workers
can either be represented at board level alongside employers, or
in a separate works council of employee only representatives, or
by a third option negotiated by common consent of employees
and management. However such an approach is likely to be
expensive - a one percentage point discount on corporation tax
rate would cost the Exchequer around £1billion per annum. At a
time of fiscal austerity such a use of potential tax revenue may
be regarded as a low priority.
Legislation
For this reason we think that legislation should be considered for

firms with, say, over 250 employees, if a substantial momentum
cannot be built up towards greater employee empowerment
from the first two measures outlined above. We do not
advocate legislation setting out a specific form of participation
which should be used by all firms. Rather we would propose
a principles based approach and/or a structure based on the
employee participation arrangements of the European company
outlined above. In the former case there would need to be a
body which would approve participation arrangements. This
could be along the lines of the Industrial Participation Agency
or a strengthened Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service
(ACAS), as proposed by the Liberal Democrats in 1990.71 The
agency could also act as the promotional body for employee
empowerment to run the awareness campaign outlined above,
working with employers to help them find forms of workplace
democracy that suited their circumstances. It could also establish
the standards and norms for employee empowerment to be
used in the second measure outlined above.
Furthermore, the government could consider a change to

company law to facilitate the use of a supervisory board structure
for UK companies that wished to pursue this as an option.
In one area there may be a case for legislation more immediately

ie employees being represented on remuneration committees
71 ‘Citizens at Work’, Liberal Democrat Green Paper (1990)
__
of boards. In this instance, efforts to change behaviour without

legislation have proved ineffective to date, and hence firmer
action may be required.
In addition two further steps could taken to promote greater

employee empowerment.
First, action could be taken to strengthen the existing Information

and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004:
: Reducing the ten percent threshold for making a valid
employee request under Regulation 7 to five percent
and the upper limit from 2,500 to 1,000 employees.
: Reducing the 40 percent threshold for making changes
to existing arrangements under Regulation 8 to 20
percent, or the introduction of a cut-off date for such
arrangements.
Secondly, government itself as the UK’s largest employer
could set an example and so without any regulation of private
organisations whatsoever, transform the workplaces of over
six million employees.. At present, the public sector does not
always set the example it should. In the NHS for instance:
”The 2008 NHS staff survey revealed that only 51

per cent of staff felt they were involved or consulted
on decisions that might affect their work area, team
or department; only 27 per cent thought senior
managers involved staff in important decisions”72
There are, however, some examples from the public sector that
are very successful in this area. The 2009 BIS paper ‘Engaging
for Success’ includes case studies of several public sector
bodies which it considers to practice excellent staff engagement
policies, including the State Pension Forecasting & Pension
Tracing Service Unit at the Department for Work and Pensions,
Chorley and Aberdeenshire councils and the Blackpool, Flyde
and Wyre NHS Foundation Trust.
The coalition government already has a plan for public sector

reform. It wants to open public services up to alternative providers,
enable them to mutualise, make them more accountable and
set up a new body to enforce the public’s right to choice. This
72 D. MacLeod and N. Clarke, ‘Engaging for Success’, BIS (2009); originally from Healthcare
Commission, ‘Sixth Annual NHS Staff Survey’ (2008)
__
would be an ideal moment to tie in reforms to make them more

democratic and accountable to their employees as well.
Care needs to be taken to ensure that this does not conflict

with democratically elected bodies. However there are already
precedents with workers being represented on the governing
bodies of schools and foundation hospitals. In the case of
democratically elected bodies it may be that formal works
councils are the most appropriate form of representation.
However it is clear that the public sector should be setting an
example and that improving employee relations in the public
sector would yield considerable benefits.
__

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Employee empowerment:

towards greater workplace

2. What do we mean by empowerment? 17

3. Why employee empowerment? 20

5. The role of trade unions 42

7. Introducing employee participation: the role of

8. The way forward 61

It might seem like an odd time to be advocating something as

:managers of firms continuing to make short term

In addition there is strong evidence that employee empowerment,

In many European countries there is a different form of capitalism

stakeholders in the business every bit as much as shareholders

Greater employee empowerment is also relevant to the current

The last serious consideration given to this issue in the UK

“Cumulating evidence from North-western Europe shows that

Furthermore the decline of trade union membership makes

it even more important to find alternative mechanisms for

The political environment is also more favourable than it has

“We want to see democracy, participation and the co-

This concept also ties in with the Conservative party thinking

At present many employees have little influence over the

Lack of employee voice can be a significant contributor to high

6 ‘Citizens at work’, Liberal Democrat Green Paper (1990)

balance and perceived threat of job insecurity. As one recent

The emerging strand of thought within Conservative thinking

Within Labour, the Blue Labour movement, the Blairite Progress

Increased interest in the political parties in this policy area

“begun to see that workers respond best – and most

management, placed in narrowly defined jobs, and

But progress has been limited. Efforts to engage more closely

“Research by Towers Perrin and Gallup shows that

Whilst the ‘Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 “asked

Notwithstanding these trends and many notable success stories

Despite the adoption in 2004 of an EU Directive on the

11 Walton, ‘From control to commitment in the workplace’, Harvard Business Review

is a 2009 BIS report ‘Engaging for Success’ on the related,

The time is now opportune both economically and politically

This paper therefore

14 D. MacLeod and N. Clarke, ‘Engaging for Success’, BIS (2009), p117

: 2 What do we mean by employee

There has been a variety of terms used often interchangeably

The term which we prefer is ‘employee empowerment’ but for

Attempting to pin down what conditions are required before

Nor is it simply a question of dividing employers into those who

“Participation is a necessary but insufficient condition

Some formal structures of employee empowerment – work

Pateman’s participative categories16

Full participation Partial Pseudo

Clearly, if we are interested in promoting workplace democracy,

their ‘Escalator of participation’, shown below. The top level,

Knell and Philpott draw attention to the dichotomy of a growing

When talking about employee empowerment or workplace

17 Marchington and Wilkinson, ‘Human resource management at work’ (2005), p4

: 3: Why employee empowerment?

The idea of introducing aspects of democracy to the workplace

A liberal Idea – the political case

...the civilizing and improving influences of association,

“the healing of the standing feud between capital

class; and the conversion of each human being’s daily